NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

Deterring Non-state Actors:

A Multi-dimensional Strategy

SO3882- Deterrence, Coercion, and Crisis Management

Professor Leo Blanken

September 21,2009

by
MAJ Ian S. Davis
 Deterring Non-state Actors 2

Deterring Non-state Actors: A Multi-dimensional Strategy

The 2009 National Intelligence StrategyADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} noted that the

international security landscape is rapidly changing, complex environment comprised of nation-

states (states), non-state actors (NSAs), and transnational forces (TNFs). The first mission

objective in the strategy is to combat violent extremism. To do that, U.S. national security policy

must be a comprehensive plan to address any security threat, regardless of its sponsor. In order

to be effective, the policy must be part of a multi-dimensional strategy. Before the rise of

terrorism by violent extremist, states used a variety of strategies that drove negotiation aimed at

promoting parsimony and deterring war. Although deterring violent extremists appears to be a

complex problem, traditional state to state deterrence theories are still applicable and can be

adapted deter NSAs and TNFs. For the purpose of this essay TNFs will be included a NSA.

NSAs that espouse violent extremism can be deterred by denying their capacity to conduct

operations. To deny their capacity to conduct operations, states must influence a NSA’s freedom

of movement, support and legitimacy. The factors are part of a cyclical in interdependent

relationship. Although they are presented in a sequential manner, the effects of one hinges on

the effects of the others. To support the argument, this essay will use the following structure.

First, we will explore deterrence theory and how it applies to deterring NSAs. Next, we will

show how to influence freedom of movement, support, and legitimacy to deny NSA operational

capability. Finally, we will review concepts for denying operational capacity that were presented

in the essay and recommended policy to deter NSAs that espouse violent extremism.

Deterrence Theory

ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}

2009 Intelligence Strategy available at www.dni.gov

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Cold War deterrence theories, such as Brody’s (1959)ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} writing’s

on the fear of nuclear annihilation and Kahn’s (1965)ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} escalation ladder

of scaled response, were pivotal for shaping concepts for deterrence and coercion. The same

concepts of rationality and expected utility that are used for state-state relations can be used for

state-NSA relations. Jervis (1989),ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} found that although Rational

Deterrence Theory (RDT) shows actors will attempt to maximize their expected utility, but RDT

did not show how actors will behave. He further found that rational actors will seek conflict if it

would yield benefits or prevent a loss in the actor’s current status quo. Fearon’s Rationalist

Explanations for WarADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} used RDT to show how leaders decide to go to

war by weighing the ex ante (pre-war) and ex post (after war) costs and how they apply in a

bargaining model. If a threat is not credible, then it will not affect the target’s decision cycle.

For a threat to be credible, it must be back by capacity and will to execute the threat should the

target decide to not comply with the threat. Based on the credibility of the threat, actors

calculate their expected utility of compliance or dissention and act accordingly. Rationality and

expected utility are relative to the actor’s point of view, culture, and norms. The loss of lives,

territories, and relative power in the international community generally drives the rationally of

states. Although terrorist acts, especially suicidal terrorist acts perpetrated by NSAs, may appear

to be irrational, they are actually the outcome of a rational thought process of the NSA based on

ideology, values, norms, and to achieve particular goals. PapeADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} showed

ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}

Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," World Politics 11, no. 2 (Jan., 1959),
173-191, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009527.
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965),
308.
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," World Politics 41, no. 2
(Jan., 1989), 183-207, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407 (accessed AUgust 4, 2009).
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no.
3 (Summer, 1995), 379-414, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903 (accessed August 4, 2009).
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, The use of Force : Military Power and
International Politics, 7th ed. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

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that terrorist acts followed a strategy based on their timing, goals, and target selection. Although

states and NSAs have different views on the means to achieve their goals, they both weigh the

costs verses the benefit of their actions and commit their acts based on their expected utility.

Studies by Davis and JenkinsADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} and Trager and

ZagorchevaADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}( that concludes that traditional deterrence theories based

on state-state competition can be adapted and applied to deterrence of NSAs. The remainder of

the essay is based on the findings of the two aforementioned studies. While it is inconceivable

that Osama bin Laden will ever make peace with the U.S. and stop sponsoring terrorist acts, the

international community can increase the costs of him doing business. By influencing the

environment, states can deny the NSA’s freedom of movement, support, and legitimacy.

Freedom of Movement (FOM)t

The first goal is to influence the environment to deny NSA’s freedom of movement. FOM is

shaped by the influencing the legitimacy and support mechanisms that are necessary for NSAs to

operate. This is done internationally, nationally, and at the local level. Internationally, this can

be done by global information dominance, universal jurisdiction and cooperation, and rewards

and reprimands. The same way that NSAs leverage technology to reach a global audience, so

can states leverage technology to illuminate networks and institute a global system to monitor

indicators and warnings. Information dominance through a global network of information

exchange denied freedom of movement and is necessary to find, fix, and finish threats.

Geospatial and temporal tracking tools based on developments in network analysis are can be

used to find threats. Technology to collect and disseminated biometric data, analyze and monitor
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in
Counterterrorism : A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 86,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/.
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,"
International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?
url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=999302541&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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operational patterns, and to Tag, Track, and Locate (TTL) targets enable states to fix threats.

The refined targeting data based on a multiple sources as part of global network of information

collection and dissemination provides states more options to finish the that would otherwise slip

through the cracks of the international system. Universal jurisdiction and cooperation between

states will is a form of extended deterrence that prevent NSAs from slipping the cracks in the

international system and lends credibility to directly and indirectly..The NSA’s resulting freedom

of movement is denied by extending the applicability of appropriate authorities through

cooperation and denying the NSA the ability to hide in plain sight. Rewards and reprimands are

effective tools for rewarding those elements who deny NSAs freedom of movement and for

punishing those who support their freedom of movement. These changes in expected utility will

drive international politics and the state-state competition. Nationally (FOM) is denied by

effective coordination and synchronization, civil liberties, and prosperity. Information

dominance is also critical at the national level to deny NSAs freedom of movement. The 9/11

Commission Report found that the failure of effective coordination and synchronization of

intelligence between U.S entities charged with internal and external security was the major factor

that contributed to the failure of the U.S. to prevent the 9/11 attacks. The elimination of

bureaucracy and greater coordination within all levels of a state’s society are essential to

identify, monitor, and eliminate threats. Increased civil liberties empower the people, promote

legitimacy of the state, and help mitigate the factors that allow the NSA to gain popular support.

If the state provides a legitimate mechanism that educates and enables the people to achieve their

goals, then the people will be less likely to permit the acquiescence of the NSA. Prosperity, be it

economical or spiritual, is the manifestation of the benefits of supporting the state or the NSA. A

state fosters prosperity allowing society to create social norms and standards that frame right and

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wrong by consistently punishing bad behavior and rewarding good behavior. States, NSAs, and

citizens that operate within the boundaries established by the system are reward and allowed to

prosper that leads to an increased the expected utility for cooperation. Those that operate outside

of the established boundaries are punished and lead to a decreased expected utility for

cooperation. Actions at the national level will deny freedom of movement by indentifying and

preventing threats, removing the likelihood of the populace’s acquiescence to NSAs that espouse

extremism, and influencing the environment by diminishing the expected utility of supporting

targeted NSAs. Locally, the denial of NSA FOM is similar to counter-insurgency strategy and

relies on information, population control measures, and controlling operational assets.

Information balances FOM for the state and the NSA. The actions for denying the NSA FOM at

the local level can be viewed as the success or failure at the international and national level. The

outcome of the efforts affects the population’s susceptibility to both the state’s and the NSA’s

information campaign. The populace’s willingness to provide or protect information is driven by

their rationality based on the expected utility of cooperation with the state or the NSA. If the

benefits for cooperating with the state outweigh the cost of coopering with the NSA, the people

will give information to the state and deny FOM to the NSA. Oppositely, if the state is not

considered legitimate, or can not increase the peoples’ expected utility for cooperation with the

state, the people will passively or actively give information, safe haven, and FOM to the NSA

and deny the same to the state. Local population control measures influence the environment

and deny FOM through a system of accountability and monitoring. ID cards, checkpoints,

curfews, and entitlements are all effective methods of controlling the populace and rewarding

compliance. The directly denies FOM and operational capability by establishing a series of

control gates and indirectly denies FOM by rewarding those that participate through

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entitlements. Cooperation with the measures increases benefits, while cooperation with the NSA

decreases benefits. This denies safe haven and FOM within and through the local community.

Controlling the NSA’s operational assets at the local level by security forces and governmental

agencies is critical to deny FOM and is achieved through identification, monitoring, and

interdiction. Hardening targets and increasing operational difficulty increases requirements and

time necessary to plan and conduct operations. Interdiction of mission essential assets to execute

operations disrupts the operational cycle denies FOM and influences the NSA’s operational

cycle.

Support

Influencing a NSA’s support structure is the next method to deny operational capability.

NSAs generally have three mechanisms for support: organic, outside, and popular. According to

CroninADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} ,the majority of al Qaeda’s operations rely on a minimal

amount of startup money from the organization then it is supplemented by operatives in the field.

Means of organic financial and logistic support are illicit activities, commercial activities, and

operational recovery. Money generated by the drug trade is a major source of funding for

Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Legitimate businesses established by al-Qaeda earn profits

that are subsequently diverted to fund terrorist operations. Tighter regulations and cooperation

between states will help to identify and freeze the assets that support violent extremists.

Improved physical security controls and material management will limit pilferage of equipment.

Denying the NSA the capacity to generate resources organically will drive up the cost of doing

business and force the organization to look for outside support. As the organization looks for

outside support, the organization becomes vulnerable to observation. Outside support to NSAs

comes from state sponsors, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private donors. These
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}
Art and Waltz, The use of Force : Military Power and International Politics, 552

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sources of outside support are susceptible to influence by punishment for their associations with

NSAs that are determined to be a threat by the state or the international community.

Enforcement of laws for those who support terrorist organizations, such as criminal punishment,

seizing of assets, and sanctions, will make threats credible and dissuade active support. Popular

support comes in the form of membership, information, and acquiescence derived from

propaganda. CroninADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009/pas stated in /s552;}} found that NSAs can evolve from a

terrorist group to a social movement. In the case of al-Qaeda, members look to join the group

rather than being recruited. Most of the groups in the network have loose connections that are

linked through ideology instead of command or logistical support structures. Use of the internet

and other media outlets to send propaganda is an affective tool to increase popular support.

Since these messages do not go through any vetting process, such as religious leaders or subject

matter experts, they are effective at stirring emotions in the uneducated or disenfranchised.

Since the targets of the propaganda do not have any incentive to continue with the status quo,

they begin to support the NSA either actively or passively. By influencing the conditions that

make people susceptible to the propaganda and wanting to support the NSAs,

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the glue that holds an organization together. NSAs are not just a single

actor, but are elements of a system. All of the elements of the system are working together to

achieve a common goal. While deterrence of a NSA’s radical leadership may not be feasible, it

is easier to influence the sub-elements of the system. The NSA’s legitimacy is critical to hold

the group together. If the members do not have confidence in the leadership or the cause, the

organization will crumble. By influencing the rationality and expected utility of actors in the

system, reducing legitimacy will cause an organization to implode. Cronin’s explanations for the
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009/pas stated in /s552;}}
Ibid.

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decline and ending of terrorist groups in the modern era showed the importance of legitimacy to

the survival of an organization. They were: capture or killing of the leader, failure to transition

to the next generation, achievement of the group’s aims, transition to a legitimate process,

undermining a popular support, repression, and transition from terrorism. Davis and

JenkinsADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}} viewed NSAs as a system. By decomposing the system, they

created an escalation ladder similar to Kahn’s that facilitates targeting of the sub-elements of the

system that are susceptible to influence to set conditions for implosion stated by Cronin. The

organization’s leadership, ideology, and perception are all vulnerable to influence and can

diminish its legitimacy. Inept leadership that is viewed as criminalistic instead of heroic will

diminish popular support and cause infighting within the organization. Organizational ideology

that is not attainable or is inconsistent with the desires of the membership will decrease the

appeal to its members. Discrediting of the organizations activities by respected peers will

decrease popular perception and cause isolation and containment of the group. By influencing

the environment to reduce the NSA’s legitimacy, the states can deny the NSA’s capacity to

conduct operations by diminishing the sub-elements expected utility for remaining affiliated with

the NSA, thus reducing the NSA’s assets.

Conclusion

State-state deterrence theories are still suitable to deter NSAs with adaptation by

influencing the NSA’s operational environment to deny their operational capability to conduct

operations. To be effective, the strategy requires global cooperation and unity of effort. The

strategy is cyclic in nature, interdependent, multi-tiered, and relies on influencing the

environment through efforts at the international, national, and local levels. By influencing the

NSA’s legitimacy, support, and freedom of movement, operational capability will be denied, the
ADDIN RW.CITE{{74 Art,Robert J. 2009}}

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costs of conducting operations will increase, and the expected utility of executing an operation

will have a deterrent effect against NSAs. Although costs and benefits may be weighted

differently, both states and NSAs use a rational method to weigh costs and benefits operations.

While terrorist acts, sponsored by dogmatic zealots that espouse violent extremism, are unlikely

to stop, they can be decreased by influencing the environment and denying a NSA’s operational

capability. The way ahead is for states to enact and enforce policies and regulations that: foster

international cooperation and information sharing; promote moderate views and denounce

violence; remove oppression and ignorance; and promote rights and prosperity. This may seem

like a lofty goal, but any movement forward is a step in the right direction

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Works CitedXArt, Robert J. and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The use of Force : Military Power and
International Politics. 7th ed. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

Brodie, Bernard. "The Anatomy of Deterrence." World Politics 11, no. 2 (Jan., 1959): 173-191.

Davis, Paul K. and Brian Michael Jenkins. Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism : A
Component in the War on Al Qaeda. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002.

Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization 49, no. 3
(Summer, 1995): 379-414, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903 (accessed August 4, 2009).

Jervis, Robert. "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence." World Politics 41, no. 2 (Jan.,
1989): 183-207, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407 (accessed August 4, 2009).

Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. Hudson Institute Series on National
Security and International Order, no. 1. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Trager, Robert F. and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. "Deterring Terrorism: It can be done."

International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005): 87.

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