Intelligence Leadership and Governance: Building Effective Intelligence Communities in The 21St Century

Studies in Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE LEADERSHIP
AND GOVERNANCE
BUILDING EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Patrick F. Walsh
‘This carefully-researched book is an important contribution to the scholarship on
intelligence. Its focus is leadership, and it provides a theoretical framework for
understanding the challenges intelligence leaders will face, broadening the defini-
tion of leadership to include ethics, self-awareness and, critically, transformation.
Intelligence agencies have not been badly led—I say as someone having led one—
but I hope Walsh’s book will contribute to a more open debate about how future
leaders should be prepared when information multiplies by the second, technology
offers dramatic possibilities, both good and bad, and private intelligence providers
are both competitors and potential collaborators.’
Gregory F. Treverton, former Chair, U.S.
National Intelligence Council, now Professor
of the Practice of International Relations
and Spatial Sciences, University of Southern
California, USA
‘Australian scholar Patrick F. Walsh is one of the most thoughtful contributors

to our understanding of how the Intelligence Communities within the Five Eyes
nations operate, and how they might improve their performance. In this volume,
his third book on intelligence, Professor Walsh impressively lays out important
principles of intelligence leadership and governance, then skillfully applies them
to the challenge of overcoming the fragmentation that afflicts these organizations.
He addresses many other vital leadership problems, too, including the difficulties
that accompany the wise integration of Artificial Intelligence and ethical consid-
erations into leadership practices within these unique organizations. The intelli-
gence organizations of the Five Eyes face many institutional obstacles as they
confront—separately and together—the many threats that face the world, from
terrorism and pandemics to the national security implications of climate change
and failing states. Good leadership will be vital and Patrick Walsh lights the way.’
Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor
Emeritus, School of Public and International
Affairs, University of Georgia, USA
Intelligence Leadership and Governance
This book explores the challenges leaders in intelligence communities face in an

increasingly complex security environment and how to develop future leaders to
deal with these issues.
As the security and policy making environment becomes increasingly com-
plicated for decision-makers, the focus on intelligence agencies ‘to deliver’ more
value will increase. This book is the first extensive exploration of contempo-
rary leadership in the context of intelligence agencies, principally in the ‘Five
Eyes’ nations (i.e. Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New
Zealand). It provides a grounded theoretical approach to building practitioner and
researcher understanding of what individual and organisational factors result in
better leadership. Using interviews from former senior intelligence leaders and
a survey of 208 current and former intelligence leaders, the work explores the
key challenges that leaders will likely face in the twenty-first century and how to
address these. It also explores what principles are most likely to be important in
developing future leaders of intelligence agencies in the future.
This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic
studies, leadership studies, security studies, and international relations.
Patrick F. Walsh is an Associate Professor in Intelligence and Security Studies,

Charles Sturt University, Australia, and is a former intelligence analyst.
Studies in Intelligence
General Editors: Richard J. Aldrich and Christopher Andrew
Interrogation in War and Conflict

A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis
Edited by Christopher Andrew and Simona Tobia
An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis
A 50-Year Retrospective
Edited by David Gioe, Len Scott and Christopher Andrew
Ethics and the Future of Spying
Technology, National Security and Intelligence Collection
Edited by Jai Galliott and Warren Reed
Intelligence Governance and Democratisation
A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform
Peter Gill
The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War
The Limits of Making Common Cause
Sarah Miller Harris
Understanding Intelligence Failure
Warning, Response and Deterrence
James J. Wirtz
Intelligence Elites and Public Accountability
Relationships of Influence with Civil Society
Vian Bakir
Intelligence Oversight in the Twenty-First Century
Accountability in a Changing World
Edited by Ian Leigh and Njord Wegge
Intelligence Leadership and Governance
Building Effective Intelligence Communities in the 21st Century
Patrick F. Walsh
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

Studies-in-Intelligence/book-series/SE0788
Intelligence Leadership
and Governance
Building Effective Intelligence Communities
in the 21st Century
Patrick F. Walsh
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Patrick F. Walsh
The right of Patrick F. Walsh to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-1-138-29085-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-26593-3 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
For all the past, present and future leaders of our intelligence
communities
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Intelligence and leadership 10
3 Tasking and coordination 43
4 Collection 76
5 Analysis 97
6 Information and communication technologies (ICT) 113
7 Human resources 132
8 The future IC leader and governance challenges 151
9 Leadership development 177
10 Conclusion 191
Index 197
1 Introduction
Modernization of our intelligence community cannot be slow or timid.

Reforms must be undertaken with a sense of urgency. It must be broad,
deep and authentic. America’s intelligence professionals are capable and
dedicated. They often do their jobs in dangerous and difficult circumstances.
They need strong leadership, a renewed focus on mission, and clear lines
of authority and accountability to excel. Structural, organizational, and juris-
dictional reforms must be made and will be made. But the goal ultimately is
to create an environment and a culture where truth to power is spoken from
the bottom to the top.
(Additional Views of Senator Barbara A.
Mikulski, cited in Senate Select Report on the US
Intelligence Community’s Pre War Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq, 2004: 509)
The co-ordination that Australia’s intelligence agencies require in the twenty-

first century is different to that which shaped the establishment of the Office
of National Assessments in 1977 and defined its legislative mandate. What
is required into the future is an enterprise-based management of the NIC that
provides leadership and a focus on integration across the full spectrum of
Intelligence activities.
(L’Estrange and Merchant, cited in the Australian
Independent Intelligence Review, 2017: 56)
We suggest that the government consider establishing a National Intelligence

and Security Adviser (‘NISA’) to oversee and co-ordinate the GCSB, NZSIS
and NAB. This would facilitate efficiencies in budgetary and operational
matters, and a more effective overview of how the wider NZIC’s budget is
spent. The NISA could be the principal adviser to the government on matters
of intelligence and security. He or she could provide leadership and take a
whole-of-government view regarding these matters. The NISA could also
oversee and direct the implementation of a more flexible budget to ensure the
activities of the GCSB, NZSIS, NAB and the wider NZIC are aligned with
2 Introduction
the government’s national security priorities. The government may also wish
to consider whether a version of these priorities could be made public.
(Cullen and Reddy, cited in Report of the First
Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in
New Zealand, 2016: 62)
Objectives and overview

The above quotes are a small sample of an ever growing number of political, judi-
cial, and independent inquiries into actual and perceived ‘capability short-comings’
or ‘intelligence failures’ across the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities (ICs).
There are many more quotes that could be cited here, but the three above high-
light the types of leadership and related organisational deficiencies that have arisen
across our intelligence communities since 9/11. While we continue to learn a lot
about leadership challenges and failures from public inquiries such as those listed
above, there remain however, few academic and publicly available official sources
about what leadership means in the intelligence context. After all, if successive
inquiries are calling for ‘better’ or ‘new leadership,’ it seems critical for scholars
and practitioners to reflect more explicitly on what ‘IC leadership’ is and does.
Additionally, and somewhat more concerning, there is even less reflection on
how to address IC leadership shortcomings—the latter of which may potentially
lead to intelligence failure. In contrast, there is now a rapidly increasing volume
of studies, particularly since 9/11, that have investigated all facets of the analyti-
cal role (e.g. tradecraft, education, critical thinking, cognitive bias) and how these
impact on effective intelligence processes and outputs that decision-makers value
(Walsh 2011; Marrin 2012; George and Bruce 2014; Lahneman and Arcos 2014;
Ratcliffe 2009; Walsh 2017a).
Given it is IC leaders of our national security and law enforcement agencies
that are meant to set the structures and functions in which intelligence products
and processes are delivered, it is surprising that with some limited exceptions
(Zegart 2007; Walsh 2017b; Gentry 2008: 133–146; 2015: 637–661; 2016: 154–
177; Quarmby and Young 2010; Buckley 2013) the subject of contemporary intel-
ligence leadership remains under-investigated. This is not to suggest that there is
not a deep quarry of historical knowledge about intelligence leadership that can be
mined. Indeed, Chapter 2 makes the case that understanding contemporary intel-
ligence leadership requires a deep engagement with IC leadership in the twentieth
as much as the twenty-first century. Contemporary organisational structures and
cultures of ICs have been undeniably shaped by earlier leaders. But this book is
not a historical survey of the role played by various leaders on the evolution of
intelligence communities in liberal democracies. While current leadership and
organisational developments across intelligence agencies have been shaped by
post-war, Cold War, and pre-9/11 leaders, what is missing from the literature is
a comprehensive understanding of how the cadre of contemporary (since 9/11)
leaders have shaped our ICs. What kind of leaders do we now have in our intelli-
gence agencies? Will we need different types of IC leaders in the future than those
Introduction 3
that ran them during the Cold War or the immediate post-9/11 period and why?
What attributes, strategies, and capabilities will IC leaders need to assemble in
order to steer intelligence enterprises in directions that allow them to adapt longer
term to the ever changing security environment?
All of these questions are important, immense, and no doubt for some largely
unanswerable. In part they may seem imponderable because we are not talking
about ‘leadership’ in the private sector—or even leadership in other public agen-
cies such as health or education. After all, intelligence agencies and communities
operate largely secretly for obvious operational reasons. Nonetheless, since 9/11
we have seen a greater openness by our intelligence enterprises in liberal democ-
racies to discuss aspects of capability in institutions that once not long ago were
impenetrable to any scrutiny. There are many reasons for why a study of contem-
porary IC leadership is possible now. For one, the various episodes of intelligence
failures (9/11, WMD in Iraq)—and efforts by governments to reform aspects of
our ICs—has let the light in for intelligence scholars to produce better knowledge
about various activities prosecuted by these communities.
The ability to garner more informed insights on the state of ICs has also
been assisted by intelligence leaders that have left government employment and
entered the academy—particularly in the US. Other episodes such as WikiLeaks
and Snowden have also impacted significantly on how our ICs interact with the
public and the scholarly community. Indeed, even in times of questions about the
legitimacy of ICs and a growing mistrust about their activities, some contempo-
rary IC leaders have chosen not to completely raise the draw bridge. Instead, some
have sought as part of their leadership role to engage more publicly about what
their agencies do in an attempt to respond—if not always assuage public concerns
about IC activities. In summary, from a macro strategic level it is now possible
to know more about contemporary IC leadership than would have been possible
pre-9/11.
To that end this book seeks answers to four research questions:
1. What is leadership in the contemporary IC context?

2. Is ‘intelligence governance’ a useful theoretical construct to understand IC
leadership; and what are the key governance challenges IC leaders will need
to navigate through?
3. How can IC leaders address intelligence governance challenges to improve
organisational effectiveness and adaptation?
4. What individual attributes, skills, and capabilities are critical for the next
generation of IC leaders to develop, and what principles could underpin lead-
ership development programs?
The four research questions underscore several aspects of ‘leadership’ in the

intelligence context that are not sufficiently understood and the time for scholars
and intelligence leaders themselves to address the knowledge gaps are overdue.
As discussed in subsequent chapters, we have seen historically and particularly
since 9/11 how several leadership-related issues have impacted on ICs—some
4 Introduction
for the better and others for the worse. Such impacts, whether positive or nega-
tive, can significantly influence the adaptability and sustainability of ICs. This can
in turn influence both the quality of decision-making support governments can
expect—as well as the agility in how these communities grapple with changes
in an increasingly complex security environment. Indeed, at the time of writing
the existential health security threat posed by COVID-19 is the latest example of
how IC leaders will need to demonstrate agility to a changing security environ-
ment (Walsh 2020: 586–602). The challenges are likely to include understanding
deception by countries seeking to avoid international scrutiny, the dispatch of
non-declared human intelligence (HUMINT) missions and the risks that poses,
and how ICs can work better with public health agencies (Walsh 2020; 2018). So
the stakes are high if researchers and ICs do not make sustained efforts to under-
stand intelligence leadership in all its dimensions.
This study is a clarion call for scholars, policy makers, and both the current and
future generation of IC leaders to make greater progress in understanding how to
improve leadership in our ICs. As we shall see shortly, leadership in the IC con-
text can be understood during or after a crisis. But a central argument of this study
is that learning what makes good leadership solely during intelligence failures is
not a sustainable way to build the future generation of IC leaders. As business
strategist Michael McQueen suggests, ‘if you wait until a crisis unfolds, you will
be operating from a position of survival, not strategy’ (2018: 85). The book offers
an innovative approach to studying contemporary IC leadership by addressing the
research questions both from the perspective of individual leadership attributes
and the organisational variables and how the two impact on each other.
Methodological approach
In particular, the book includes four key methodological aspects, which are unique
hitherto to any other studies that have examined aspects of IC leadership (Zegart
2007; Walsh 2017; Gentry 2008: 247–270, 2015: 637–661, 2016: 154–177). First,
the study is cross-comparative both in intelligence contexts (national security and
law enforcement) and countries (‘Five Eyes’ and other selected liberal democratic
countries). The book’s exploration of both national security and law enforcement
sources across these countries provides a wider understanding of IC leadership;
and whether similar or different leadership challenges exist in different contexts
and countries.
The second unique aspect to the book’s methodological framework is that
it explores both the individual and organisational aspect of intelligence lead-
ership using a theoretical model—the effective intelligence framework that I
developed in 2011 (Walsh 2011: 91–151, 2015: 123–142, 2017b: 441–459). The
framework provides researchers and ICs with a tool to ‘diagnose’ how effec-
tive structural and functional aspects of an intelligence agency or entire com-
munity are performing. A key argument in my previous work on the model is
that ‘intelligence governance’ is a critical component in the design and imple-
mentation of intelligence structures and functions within and across intelligence
Introduction 5
agencies (Walsh 2011: Ibid, 2015: 123–142, 2017b: 441–459). The framework
will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Leadership). In
Chapter 10 (Conclusion), we will reflect back on the study’s methodological
approach and whether ‘intelligence governance’ is a useful construct in which to
understand IC leadership.
A third point of distinction about the book’s approach is that it seeks to take a
multi-disciplinary perspective when addressing the research questions. The intel-
ligence studies field has grown significantly since 9/11 yet various topics, ques-
tions, and issues still remain under-theorised (Walsh 2011: 283–299; Gill, Marrin
and Phythian 2008). As noted earlier, there is only a small body of research that
may be considered work on ‘intelligence leadership;’ so bringing in theoretical
perspectives from leadership/management, organisational reform/culture, psy-
chology, sociology amongst others will help inform the development of theorising
and practice related to IC leadership.
A final (fourth) different aspect to the book’s methodological approach is that
it adopts a grounded theoretical perspective to addressing the research questions.
In other words, a range of qualitative primary and secondary data sources were
collected and analysed in order to make some analytical generalisations about
IC leadership—from individual attribute and organisational perspectives. Primary
data sources included five semi-structured interviews of former IC leaders and a
survey of 208 former and current IC leaders.
The survey consisted of 24 questions that asked current and former IC leaders
a series of questions about aspects of leadership. Questions included, for exam-
ple, what leadership attributes they thought were important and why. Others
related to what the role of leadership was in various critical IC functions (e.g.
collection and analysis), whether they thought intelligence governance was a
useful way to think about leadership, and what they saw as the biggest chal-
lenges for IC leaders to deal with in the next five years. A total of 210 people
responded to the survey with 208 providing complete answers. The survey com-
pletion rate was 49 per cent, which was encouraging given most of the ques-
tions required IC leaders to provide a text response. In terms of demographics,
74.23 per cent and 24.23 per cent were male and female respectively; with 58.67
per cent in the 40–59 years age range. Respondents came from almost all the
agencies across the ‘Five Eyes’ with the highest number of responses coming
from the US Department of Defense and the Australian Federal Police (both
n = 18). There was also a large number of respondents (n = 119) who were either
from state law enforcement or selected the ‘other’ option rather than ticking
one of the agency names listed in the survey. In some cases, it seems respond-
ents ticked ‘other’ because they performed related IC leadership roles, such as
consultancies or worked in areas that provided technical advice to the IC, but
were not currently members of the IC. Another cohort of respondents selected
‘other’ but under this category listed having worked in agencies that are clearly
part of the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs such as the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
(ASIS) in Australia, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), both in the US, and the
6 Introduction
Assessment Secretariat (Canada). The range of IC leadership seniority varied
widely (n = 196). For example, 2.55 per cent identified as either heads of ICs
or agencies, 22.45 per cent retired IC leaders, 10.71 per cent intelligence man-
agers—down to others that indicated they were team leaders (11.73 per cent)
or ‘other’ (14.80 per cent) (e.g. policy makers, consultants, training, and pri-
vate sector). Finally, in terms of years of experience as an IC leader, 24.16 per
cent (n = 36) had at least five years but only up to ten years’ experience—while
51.68 per cent (n = 77) had ten or more years IC leadership experience. The
survey responses informed all aspects of the study, but particularly provided
insights into the analysis of intelligence governance challenges (Chapter 8 The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) and leadership development
(Chapter 9 Leadership Development). Secondary data sources included schol-
arly literature, policy documents, and officially released inquiries.
The audience
This book is primarily for current and future IC leaders—regardless of seniority
level within our ICs. If you are already an experienced senior leader, it is hoped
that the book provides you with an opportunity to reflect more deeply on the dif-
ficult operating environment you are working in, and how you can identify areas
for individual and organisational improvement. In particular, though, the book is
targeted at the future senior IC leaders, who right now may be in middle manage-
ment positions. Given the absence of formal leadership programs in many ICs, I
seek to provide some scaffolding that can help future leaders better identify the
personal attributes and governance challenges they will face should they seek an
executive career. I would like the book to also be useful to other areas of our ICs
such as human resources, training, and corporate affairs, who may be given the
task to develop IC leadership programs in the future. The other audience for the
book, I hope, will be scholars who do research in intelligence capability reform
issues as well as others outside of the intelligence studies discipline who are inter-
ested in leadership theorising and organisational change. Finally, I seek to engage
students contemplating higher degrees and encourage them to take up their own
research projects on IC leadership.
The book’s points of difference

There are several points of difference in this book—some such as the methodo-
logical approach (e.g. survey of former and current IC leaders on contemporary
leadership issues) have already been mentioned. But in general, I would say, and
to the best of my knowledge this is the first larger study publicly available that
seeks to understand contemporary leadership in the IC context. As we shall see
in the next chapter, there are now many excellent historical studies that traverse
important aspects of IC leadership, but this is the first study that I am aware of to
comprehensively address both the personal and organisational aspects of contem-
porary IC leadership.
Introduction 7
Book scope and limitations
The small number of interviews and survey responses collected for this study
obviously do not constitute either a generalisable sample or complete picture of
contemporary leadership in the IC context. I am only too aware of the limitations
of doing research into IC capability issues. This is now my third book, which has
examined intelligence reform issues—each has involved collecting primary data
from IC personnel. As a former intelligence analyst myself, I am acutely aware
of the challenges and sensitivities of doing research in this present space. The
conclusions made on a range of topics can only be seen as tentative given it is not
possible to have completely untethered access or visibility on all leadership-related
issues, processes, and initiatives underway across all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. There are
also always implications in selecting one research strategy and methodological
approach over another. In the following chapters, I will come back to some of the
specific limitations of the findings as appropriate and their implications—particu-
larly in Chapters 8, 9, and the conclusion (Chapter 10). Finally, before addressing
the overall structure, it’s worth reminding readers that ‘leadership’ even in tradi-
tional leadership theorising remains empirically and experientially a hotly con-
tested term. It can be hard to quantify the impact and influence of leaders on those
who are led in any environment—including in ICs. The survey results help build
further theorising about leadership in the IC context. They are sometimes helpful
and at times contradictory—much like other theoretical perspectives on leadership.
Nonetheless, I have included a range of comments from IC leaders—even some
that I may not entirely agree with them all—because along with the secondary data
sources they provide a richer tapestry in which to build better knowledge in this
area. Finally, in terms of scope, I wish to stress although the book explores ways IC
leadership may be improved in the future, I do not want to give the impression that
ICs have been mostly or are poorly run. Indeed, over the years I have met many
inspiring and competent IC leaders whose leadership has impacted significantly
and positively on their organisations. Rather, the central point of the book is how
do we prepare our future IC leadership cadre so they and their organisations can
better navigate the evolving and uncertain security environment.
Book structure
In order to fully address the four research questions, the book is structured into ten
chapters. This chapter introduces the study, including the research questions and
overall methodological approach. Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Leadership), exam-
ines IC leadership in the national security and law enforcement context. It pro-
vides the important multi-disciplinary foundation required to understand aspects
of IC leadership in the remaining chapters. It explores how history, leadership, and
organisational theory; leadership psychology; and my own theoretical construct of
‘intelligence governance’ provide the necessary backdrop in which to understand
contemporary IC leadership. Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination) examines both
the external (political) and internal (IC level) dimensions of IC leadership. Using
8 Introduction
several themes (e.g. organisational structure, information sharing, and politicisa-
tion), it explores the tensions between both dimensions and how this impacts on
the ability of leaders to effectively task, coordinate, and integrate intelligence.
Chapter 4 (Collection) explores the significance of three major themes (tech-
nological; collection and governance; and collection, ethics, and efficacy). The
themes are used to assess what intelligence governance challenges will arise for IC
leaders related to intelligence collection. Chapter 5 (Analysis) examines a range of
analytical techniques—both common and emerging in ICs and the advantages and
disadvantages of these in producing more reliable analytical judgements. The dis-
cussion again highlights a number of governance challenges arising from the use
of various analytical techniques, including how IC leaders can sustain innovation
in this vital area of the intelligence enterprise. Chapter 6 (ICT) investigates how
artificial intelligence (AI) is being used in various IC applications and explores
the extent that IC leaders can reconcile the technological, counter-intelligence,
and ethical challenges in its use.
Chapter 7 (Human Resources) explores a series of intelligence governance chal-
lenges related to improving workforce planning outcomes. In particular, recruitment,
training, education, retention, and attrition challenges are discussed and the critical
role IC leaders must play in improving human capability outcomes in the future.
Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) is the first of two
chapters (Chapter 9 Leadership Development being the other) that brings together
the analysis of key governance challenges—and how IC leaders can begin to better
conceptualise solutions to them. After summarising the challenges and potential
solutions, Chapter 8 pivots away from the organisational and back to the individual.
It asks, given the challenges and opportunities to manage them, what kind of lead-
ership attributes may help in overcoming them. This chapter connects much of the
theorising on leadership in earlier parts of the book to several perspectives gathered
from the IC leadership survey. Chapter 9 (Leadership Development) draws on the
insights of the previous chapter and additional survey results to identify six broad
thematic and inter-related areas: individual behavioural attributes, technical train-
ing, strategic and business planning, mentoring, evaluation, and lastly training and
education strategies. The chapter argues that these thematic areas should be thought
of as five principles that can provide the basis for an IC leadership development
framework. The framework is offered as a starting point to discuss how ICs could
advance leadership development programs. Chapter 10 (Conclusion) provides a
summary of the major themes raised in all sections of the book. It will also evaluate
the extent to which the four research questions have been addressed and what the
next steps might be in expanding a research agenda on IC leadership.
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Introduction 9
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2 Intelligence and leadership
Introduction
This chapter has four key objectives. First, it provides a thematic and histori-
cal (pre-9/11) introduction to the intelligence community (IC) leadership (from
individual and organisational perspectives). This is critical to understanding how
pre-9/11 leadership has influenced contemporary IC leadership. The first section
cannot provide an exhaustive detailed historical analysis of all intelligence leaders
nor their actions in each ‘Five Eyes’ country. This would be an impossible task
and is beyond the scope of the book. However, it provides a high-level histori-
cal and thematic analysis of leadership in the national security and law enforce-
ment intelligence contexts. Many of these themes will be explored in deeper detail
in subsequent chapters as they are relevant to understanding specific aspects of
contemporary leadership issues. But the main point made in the first section is
that one cannot understand IC leadership today without exploring the broader
historical forces that shaped the development of modern intelligence in the early
twentieth century.
The second objective (and another unique aspect to the book) is to introduce
a cross-disciplinary perspective to contemporary leadership in the intelligence
context. The section provides an overview of a range of disciplines (e.g. leader-
ship theory, organisational theory, leadership, and psychology), which provide
relevant knowledge and a deeper understanding of leadership in the intelligence
context. It argues that understanding leadership—regardless of its context (intel-
ligence/non-intelligence settings) has always been a cross-disciplinary endeavour.
The broad-brush stroke discussion of disciplinary perspectives in this chapter and
the historical survey of IC leadership will be built on in subsequent chapters. The
third objective is to explain the effective intelligence framework, which informs
the theoretical foundation and structure for this study. Lastly, the chapter con-
cludes with a working definition of IC leadership.
Historical intelligence leadership dimensions

How can history help us understand what leadership attributes influence IC design
and reform, and what organisational factors promote effective contemporary
Intelligence and leadership 11
leadership in our ICs? Since the mid-1970s onwards, a growing number of his-
torians and intelligence studies researchers have examined how crises/events,
personalities, and organisational change influenced the development of leader-
ship in our intelligence agencies/communities since the early nineteenth century.
The two world wars clearly played critical roles in the development of intelli-
gence in each ‘Five Eyes’ country. Intelligence played an increasingly crucial
role on the battlefields of both World War I and II, so it is not surprising that
many historians have examined how the military and political leadership of ally
countries used and developed intelligence capabilities to fight wars. It is equally
of no surprise in the literature to see a focus on World War I and II and how intel-
ligence was used across the military and civilian divide—including assessments
about different ‘styles’ of political leadership and how leaders used intelligence
to inform national strategies to prosecute the battles of both wars. An analysis of
how the political leadership used intelligence is critical to understanding how this
impacted on the development of the ICs that served them.
On the role of the political leadership in World War II, Michael Handel argued
that while there may be no ‘ideal leader,’ the kind of political leader receiving and
using the intelligence mattered. Handel provided a loose taxonomy to describe
political leaders:
dogmatic, too open-minded, and distant or too close a relationship to their intel-
ligence services. Personality, experience and the ability for both military and
civilian leaders to ‘scent out the truth were also all influential attributes’ (Handel
1988: 5). Handel and others have argued that ‘unquestionably, Churchill could
put intelligence to better use than Hitler.’ He quips that ‘while Hitler was still
a runner in the trenches of Flanders, Churchill had already gained extensive
experience in intelligence work as the First Lord of the Admiralty’. (1988: 6)
Both President Franklin Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Churchill were fasci-
nated and fond of intelligence, particularly HUMINT and covert action. Churchill
was also an avid reader of both Bletchley Park decrypted intercepts and Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports (Gentry 2018: 5–6; Goodman 2008; Aldrich
and Cormac 2016).1 In contrast, US President Woodrow Wilson had a moral aver-
sion and ignorance of intelligence, as did UK Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.
Other more contemporary scholars have similarly argued the case (that leader-
ship performance, attitude, personality/psychology, and experience mattered to
the ability of intelligence capabilities to reform and adapt), albeit looking more
broadly at how intelligence was used in the post-World War II period. For exam-
ple, Gentry makes the case for how effective political leadership mattered in
counter-insurgency operations and leadership preferences and understanding; and
interest for certain intelligence sources over others influenced the development of
the US IC (Gentry 2010: 50–75; 2018: 1–17).
From general histories of intelligence we also get assessments of the attrib-

utes of political leaders during the Cold War. For example, in the US context,
as Gentry argues: President Eisenhower’s extensive experience at the highest
levels of staff work also gave him a great appreciation of the positive contri-
bution of intelligence to any decision-making compared to President Nixon,
who attributed his narrow defeat in 1960 at least in part to the CIA, which he
held responsible for the fact that the ‘missile gap’ became a campaign issue
and was blamed on the Republicans.
(Ibid: 6)
Warner also reminds us that one should not forget the impact of adversarial lead-
ers such as Josef Stalin and Mao Zedong on the development of ‘Five Eyes’ intel-
ligence communities and those of other western powers (Warner 2014: 216). In
summary, historical studies demonstrate that the leader’s personality/psychology,
experience, and trust with intelligence over time obviously matters (Steinhart and
Avramov 2013). Of course, how political leaders use or abuse intelligence contin-
ues to be studied avidly by historians and intelligence studies scholars as the mis-
use of intelligence can result in an overly politicised exploitation of intelligence.
In most recent history, the notion of the politicisation of intelligence has been
found around the political decision-making that led to the US-led coalition inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. Though perhaps even more recently concerns remain about
how politicisation of the US IC (either from neglect or hostility) by the Trump
administration is impacting on that community’s ability to provide fully effec-
tive decision-making support to the executive. Such actual or potential examples
of the politicisation of intelligence are critical to understanding the evolution of
intelligence leadership from the twentieth century to the present. This concept
will be examined in deeper detail in Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination).
In addition to understanding how military and political leaders experience/use
intelligence and the impact this had on the development of modern intelligence,
various historical sources are also instructive in showing how changes in sci-
ence and technology were enablers of an increasingly sophisticated intelligence
capability. In particular, communications technology that allowed the establish-
ment of code breaking (in Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States) after
World War I only became more integral and sophisticated in World War II and
beyond (Kahn 2001: 83). As Warner suggests, ‘World War I linked science to
intelligence.’ ‘World War II ensured that science would forever be an element
of all aspects of the intelligence field’ (Warner 2014: 103). ‘Mathematicians and
engineers were critical to breaking the axis powers codes and also making sure
those of the western allies were impregnable’ (Ibid).
This reliance on science and technology clearly increased during the Cold War
and by ‘the early 1970s the US had become the undisputed world intelligence
leader—something it had never been before.’ Though, as Warner suggests, ‘tech-
nology had made American intelligence better but not always smarter’ (Warner
2014: 165).
While intelligence historians have now provided a clearer picture of how the
two world wars helped develop our understanding of the fault lines that eventu-
ally led to the creation of the ‘Five Eyes’ communities today, other research has
explored several other historical case studies from the war years to the present.
These have generated knowledge about the role and impact of IC leaders in coun-
ter-insurgency, covert action (Scott and Hughes 2006: 653–674), intelligence fail-
ure, intelligence and decision-making, efficacy, ethics, and accountability (Wark
1993; Best 2014; Kahn 2001; Warner 2014; Gentry 2016: 154–177). All of these
studies provide important knowledge about leadership and how intelligence was
used in a variety of different crises between the end of World War II, the Cold
War, 9/11, and beyond.
Another key lesson from intelligence historical studies is that ideology—
political, economic, and social—have always driven changes in the ‘Five Eyes’
ICs. Warner refers to how ideologically driven zealotry and violence in the late
nineteenth century in various European countries influenced the development of
internal policing and security capabilities. This could be seen, for example, in
the formation of London’s Metropolitan Police and its formation of a Special
Irish Branch in 1888 to combat a Fenian bombing campaign (Warner 2014: 26).
Additionally, the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the peace dividend that fol-
lowed was to have significant impacts (many negative) on the capabilities of
major intelligence agencies across the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance.
While there are a vast number of lessons to be learnt from the early nineteenth
century and the various major milestones of intelligence history (World Wars,
Cold War, Post-Cold War, 9/11, post-9/11) that are important for understanding
leadership in the intelligence context, space does not allow a full extrapolation
of them all. Instead, in the remaining space I will focus on six broad themes that
arose from surveying key historical sources. With each theme, I will explain its
relevance to understanding IC leadership. As noted above, this is not the end of
the discussion on how history has shaped the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communi-
ties and its leaders. As leadership topics are introduced in subsequent chapters,
a reflection on historical trends where relevant is included. Additionally, the six
themes identified here should not be construed as the only major themes arising
from historical sources. There are likely many others, but these ones seem to be
commonly found in multiple sources.
The first common theme arising out of multiple historical literature sources
is intelligence failure. Several historians and intelligence studies scholars have
provided cases of intelligence failure and their impact on intelligence capability
(Betts 1978; Zegart 2007; Dover and Goodman 2011; Hatlebrekke and Smith
2010). Such works do increase our understanding of how intelligence as an
enterprise, process, and product can fail. However, I argue that the phrase is
becoming too much of a ‘catch all’ or shortcut for any event or issue that results
in either a minor or catastrophic breakdown such as the failure of warning of the
Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor or 9/11. There is a lack of clarity too around the
term ‘intelligence failure’ and it seems in some instances it is used to describe
‘something going wrong in the intelligence machinery’ which might in fact be
more accurately called a policy failure. Is 9/11 and the faulty assessments (pro-
vided to governments in the US, UK, and Australia) leading up the coalition
invasion of Iraq (2003) more policy than intelligence failures or a bit of both?
On a smaller scale, but nonetheless impactful for the country concerned, did
New Zealand’s SIGINT agency Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB) (created in 1955) fail, as Hager suggests, to ‘predict’ the military coup
in Fiji in 1987 or the French sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior ship in Auckland
harbour in 1985 (Hager 1996)? Or in both cases were there policy mis-steps
taken?
A lack of precision and agreement amongst scholars about intelligence fail-
ure can promote sloppy analysis of the real causes why intelligence did not pro-
vide warning, reduce uncertainty, or allow sufficient decision-maker support.
Nonetheless, examining historical cases of ‘intelligence failure’ does provide
some clarity about the role leadership plays (both political and at IC levels) when
things have gone wrong and we will be coming back to examples of intelligence
failure in subsequent chapters.
A second theme arising out of historical sources are efforts towards the inte-
gration of people, policy, processes, functions within intelligence agencies and
broader communities. Discussions have included how specific functions might be
integrated, such as strategic intelligence and forecasting (Schmidt 2015: 489–511;
Michael 2015: 489–511), or how to fuse collection and/or analytical functions
across ICs (Walsh 2011a, 2015). Integration was also an important theme arising
out of the 9/11 Report and the use of the word has become a bit of a mantra for IC
leaders since (2004: 402). The integration theme is linked to another—organisa-
tional design—discussed later.
The third theme is liaison. Any analysis of historical sources will reveal how
critical strong liaison was in building cooperation and capability within and across
intelligence agencies in each ‘Five Eyes’ country. Several historical accounts
underscore the important role liaison played between the intelligence and politi-
cal leadership across the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs in building trust and common capabili-
ties. For example, a profound legacy of World War II was the creation of the vast
global SIGINT alliance known as UKUSA—a treaty signed between Britain, US,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—in 1948, which has deepened significantly
since (Aldrich 2010: 89–104; Herman 1996; Andrew 2018: 670–671).
While the UKUSA treaty was a significant stake in the ground in building trust
and sharing of intelligence between partner countries, it also had the effect of
pushing greater domestic capability building amongst treaty countries—particu-
larly in Australia and New Zealand. For example, in the 1950s both the US Truman
and UK Atlee governments were concerned about KGB penetration in Australian
politics, bureaucracy, and society. There were leaks of highly sensitive material
from the Department of External Affairs in Canberra to the KGB. London sent
senior MI5 staff to Australia to pressure the Chifley Government to deal with the
security crisis and create their own MI5, later known as the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Some senior MI5 staff stayed on afterwards
in the new ASIO. Similarly, from the NZ Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS)
perspective, historical surveys show how the UK was particularly influential in
persuading New Zealand to establish the SIS. Sir Percy Sillitoe (Head of MI5)
was sent to New Zealand to establish a sister agency there. He was successful
in his venture and many original NZSIS staff were British imports from MI5
(Greener-Barcham 2002: 510).
However, any discussion of the role of strong liaison and growing partnership
between ‘Five Eyes’ countries over several decades also needs to balance the
periods of success against other historical episodes marked by strain and in a few
instances even fraying of bonds. History shows there were occasions where there
were real tensions in the alliance, particularly at times when national interests
were not aligned. For example, although the Anglo-American partnership became
extremely close in the Cold War in monitoring the Soviet Union, it was not close
in all places where British and American interests diverged, such as during the
1956 Suez crisis (Warner 2014: 165 and 124). In later decades, as well, there were
other examples where the intelligence alliance diverged or was even disrupted
temporarily due to differing national interests. For example, New Zealand later
became partially blocked from its intelligence sharing arrangements with the US
as a result of the NZ Labour Government’s (Prime Minister David Lange) nuclear
policy that precluded US nuclear powered and/or armed naval ship visits to New
Zealand (Hager 1996).
However, despite episodic national interest differences, effective liaison and
building partnerships, not just at the most senior political or head of agency level
of course, but at working levels between officials, helped paper over more nar-
row political national interests. Lower working-level contacts helped promote and
sustain relations across ‘Five Eyes’ countries based on ‘shared ideals and long-
standing transnational connections’ (Jeffrey-Jones 2012: 707–721).
A fourth discernible theme is knowledge management and information shar-
ing. The historical literature covering the development of intelligence agencies
within each ‘Five Eyes’ ICs periodically refer to both the problems and successes
in producing good knowledge management and information sharing practices.
How do vast and diverse agencies within the US IC for example bring together
knowledge that can benefit the entire community, where historically there remains
within all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs a need to compartmentalise knowledge practice and its
management (Desouza 2009: 1219–1267; Lahneman 2004)? A culture of secrecy
is critical to the effective and secure operations in all ICs, yet increasingly after
9/11 the mantra of ‘need to know’ and policies such as the intelligence sharing
environment (ISE) have also driven intelligence reform efforts by political and
intelligence leaders in each ‘Five Eyes’ country (Walsh 2011a).
Linked to issues of information sharing and secrecy is the fifth theme—privacy,
transparency, and accountability in both policing and national security intelli-
gence contexts. Since 2013, intelligence studies scholars have become increasingly
focused on the impact the Snowden leaks had on bringing these issues to the pub-
lic and political consciousness (Walsh 2011a; Walsh and Miller 2016; Miller and
Walsh 2016; Walsh 2017a; Omand 2008: 593–607; Omand and Phythian 2018;
Patman and Southgate 2016: 871–887; Johnson 2018). However, as significant as
the Snowden (and to a lesser extent Wikileaks) episodes were, historical sources pro-
vide useful reminders that privacy, transparency, and accountability issues have long
been features of the historical landscape, including notably during the Cold War.
It was clear to varying levels of intensity in each ‘Five Eyes’ country that by
the 1960s the tension between secrecy, privacy/liberty, and transparency/account-
ability was already fraying between citizens, governments, and the intelligence
communities that served them. Following the 1973 Watergate scandal, the New
York Times ran with a story that the CIA were involved in domestic spying—
a violation of the National Security Act of 1947. These revelations led to the
Church Committee which ‘discovered that the misuse of power by the nation’s
secret agencies had been far more extensive than suggested by the already eye-
popping accounts in the Times’ (Johnson 2018: 1). The Church Committee also
discovered various abuses of power by the FBI in the surveillance and counter-
intelligence operations against African-American civil rights activists, anti-war
students amongst others (Johnson 2018: 120). The Church Committee heralded in
the US the establishment of two congressional intelligence oversight committees
(the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee for Intelligence) in the 1970s, which continue to this day to play an
important if not always an effective role in promoting oversight and accountability.
In Canada, a series of inquiries, the Mackenzie Commission (1966), the Keable
(1977), and the McDonald Commission (1981), also investigated oversight,
accountability, and organisational performance issues of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP), which up until 1984 had carriage of domestic security
intelligence in Canada (Gill 1989; Whitaker 1991, 1992; Sayle 2010: 862–867;
Hewitt 2002, 2018). In Hewitt’s work (2002, 2018: 67–83), we see how the RCMP
Security Service’s inability over decades to ‘understand the new forces and threats
associated with the 1960s—including terrorism or even to qualitatively assess its
traditional targets’ along with its involvement in illegal and unethical activity in
Quebec and elsewhere in Canada resulted (following the McDonald Commission
inquiry into the RCMP) in the government creating in July 1984 the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) (Hewitt 2002: 166). CSIS then took primary
responsibility for domestic security intelligence away from RCMP, including its
work on counter-subversion and counter-terrorism to the new agency.
This historical notion of locating the balance between effective security
(including secrecy), privacy, and liberty remains an important debate because it
impacts on how to preserve the effectiveness of ICs against complex and emerg-
ing threats yet also maintains privacy, civil liberties, and trust of citizens in liberal
democratic countries. How issues of privacy, transparency, and accountability
have been dealt with both by political decision-makers and their intelligence lead-
ership cadre are clearly relevant to understanding effective leadership in the cur-
rent post-9/11 era (Walsh 2011a, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).
While concerns about privacy, secrecy, transparency, and accountability have
often coalesced in historical accounts of unethical, illegal, or over-reach by ICs,
there are other dimensions of transparency and accountability that in some respects
show a gradual and more positive desire by political and intelligence leaders to be
more open about aspects of their operation to the tax payer citizenry. As discussed
earlier, it seems clear that one of the impacts of the 2013 Snowden leaks has been
efforts made (to varying degrees) by either political or intelligence leaders across
‘the Five Eyes’ intelligence communities to appear publicly in order to defend
and explain in unclassified ways the positive role their agencies play in promot-
ing national security and public safety. For example, in 2014 the then Director
General of ASIO, David Irvine, appeared in front of the media to explain the role
and need for the new meta data retention laws going through Australia’s parlia-
ment at the time (Walsh 2017a). Similarly, Loch Johnson’s interview with the
then Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper, which was later published in
the Intelligence and National Security journal, is another example (Johnson 2015:
1–25).
The combined effect from the ‘intelligence failures’ of 9/11, Iraq, and the
Snowden leaks have resulted in the need for intelligence leaders to play a greater
public role (sometimes willingly sometimes less so) via media appearances and
responding to inquiries. In particular, after Snowden there is now greater public
distrust and political and IC leaders have had to come out more publicly and
explain the actions of the IC (to the extent they can) in order to sustain or regain
trust, legitimacy, and even funding (Walsh and Miller 2016; Johnson et al. 2014;
Walsh 2017b). The fallout of Snowden also pressured to varying degrees across
each ‘Five Eyes’ country’s government to be more responsive to public concerns
about unchecked surveillance by ICs. This included efforts to examine intelli-
gence-related legislation that put more ‘trip wires’ in governing access to warrants
and interception, and further efforts by all to review accountability mechanisms
(Walsh and Miller 2016).
Importantly though, historical studies focusing on events prior to 9/11 or
Snowden also show efforts in some ‘Five Eyes’ ICs to be less secretive and more
transparent. For example, in the UK and Australian intelligence communities a
greater openness in the 1990s emerged about the existence of what have been
exclusively secret agencies such as MI5/MI6 (in the UK) or Australian Secret
Intelligence Service (ASIS), in Australia, and public acknowledgement of their
heads. Such a change in the political and policy atmosphere provided further
encouragement for the development of intelligence studies. In particular, a move
towards greater accountability and transparency across many ‘Five Eyes’ coun-
tries included some historians being granted access to archival records of key
intelligence agencies.
Increasingly since the 1990s to the present, much can be learnt about contem-
porary intelligence leadership from official, semi-official and extensive histories
of particular intelligence agencies across the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. Official histories
are generally authorised by the agency. They may be completed by in-house his-
torians (e.g. Michael Warner’s extensive work (e.g. 2001; 2004) on the history
of the CIA as part of its history staff) or commissioned by the agency allowing
external historians access to restricted archives and staff to interview. Examples
of the latter have included Christopher Andrew’s Defence of the Realm (History
of MI5) and Keith Jefferey’s 2010 volume The British Secret Intelligence Service
1909–1949. In the case of Andrew, it was required that he become an MI5 officer
to gain access to material. Others include Michael Goodman’s Official History
of Joint Intelligence Committee (2014). Similarly in Australia, three volumes
chronicling the history of the ASIO—Australia’s domestic intelligence agency—
are the result of historians having unrestricted access to ASIO’s archival records
for the periods 1949 up until 1989 (see Horner 2014; Blaxland 2015; Blaxland
and Crawley 2017).
Blaxland (2015), like Jeffery’s (2010) work on MI6, is also instructive in pro-
viding insights into the earlier leadership profiles of ASIO Director Generals and
how they influenced organisational change at the time. Blaxland refers to Charles
Spry as staying too long in the DG position, and his successor Peter Barbour being
too ineffective in managing problems with recruitment of officers and other work-
force issues as being partly due to a lack of organisational reform and professional
training in ASIO (2015: Chapter 1).
In contrast to official and authorised histories, much is to be learnt about IC
leadership issues by reading non-official histories, which can provide a compre-
hensive analysis of material accessed via archives. Examples include Christopher
Andrew’s works The Secret World A History of Intelligence (2018) and Her
Majesty’s Secret Service (1987), Richard Aldrich’s GCHQ The Uncensored
Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (2010), and Frank Cain’s
(1994) The ASIO: An Unofficial History. Similarly, Jensen’s (2008) Cautious
Beginnings Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939–51 is a Canadian example of
recently non-official historical studies examining archival material that has not
been reviewed extensively to this point. Additionally, two excellent edited his-
torical volumes have been published focusing on ‘spy chiefs’ in the US and UK
(Moran et al. 2018) and in the Middle East and Asia (Maddrell et al. 2018),
respectively.
We will come back to other themes official and non-official histories reveal
about leadership in remaining parts of this chapter, but Section F (after the Cold
War and after 9/11) of Christopher Andrew’s Defence of the Realm provides a
good example of how political events and leadership interact in ways that from
the 1990s changed MI5 to primary a counter-terrorism rather than counter-espi-
onage agency (Andrew 2009: 771). It also shows how Stella Remington, who
became the first female head of any of the world’s leading intelligence or secu-
rity services in 1992, developed an openness program. The program included
the publication of the first ever booklet on MI5’s work with the first official
photo of the DG, increased media engagement, and public lectures—all of which
helped shape a more informed attitude and demystification of the service (Ibid:
776–777).
Both official and non-official histories show not only the bureaucratic develop-
ment of intelligence agencies and the security environment operating at the time,
but also glimpses of the leader’s personalities and how they shaped the future of
their agencies. The ability of intelligence leaders to wield power through their
personalities, and to influence both internally their agency and externally their
political masters, is critical, the latter point being particularly important. No one
can argue the profound impact personalities like J Edgar Hoover had on the devel-
opment of the FBI or William J Donovan, Allen W Dulles, and William Casey on
the evolution of the CIA.
Similarly in the UK, Jeffery’s The History of the Secret Intelligence Service
1909–1949 explains the role of the first three chiefs: Mansfield Cumming,
Hugh Sinclair, and Stewart Menzies in the first 40 years of MI6 were critical
to the survival of the new scarcely resourced agency. In the case of Cumming,
Jeffery describes him as ‘not much more than a one man band who (for the
survival and independence of the agency) during World War I had to fend off
the predatory attentions of the Admiralty and War Office’ (Jeffery 2010: 725).
Jeffery also talks about the particular qualities of Sinclair—‘his strengths as
a leader—charisma, decision and dynamism.’ Such qualities according to
Jeffery, engendered a fierce loyalty on the part of subordinates, together with
his inclination to press ahead with ventures without perhaps fully anticipating
all the possible consequences at times led him and SIS into crossing existing
Whitehall boundaries and trespassing into the territory of other departments.
(Ibid: 735)
Michael Goodman’s work on the history of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
is another good historical analyses on the political, military, and bureaucratic fac-
tors that influenced the development of the JIC and the role of leadership in its
development (Goodman 2008: 40–56).
Moving beyond the world war years (1945 to the present), and in addition
to historical analysis of heads of intelligence agencies completed from archives,
there is also much to be learnt from memoirs written by former heads them-
selves. In the last few decades a steady growth in memoirs show heads are talk-
ing more publicly about their own leadership experience, such as former DCI
James Woolsey, who believed he had little influence given he had no relationship
with President Clinton. In 2005, Admiral Stansfield Turner wrote Burn Before
Reading, Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret Intelligence, where he provides
some useful insights on a range of leadership issues including management of the
IC and CIA centralisation, the role of political leadership, and cleaning up after
the Church Committee in the late 1970s.
More recently, George Tenet’s (2007) memoir At the Center of the Storm:
My Years at the CIA, Michael Hayden’s (2016) Playing to the Edge: American
Intelligence in the Age of Terror, and Jim Clapper’s (2018) Facts and Fears. Hard
Truths from a Life in Intelligence are also instructive on how leaders present their
own leadership skills and the role they play in organisational change. Former CIA
Deputy Director Michael Morell’s (2015) The Great War of Our Time. The CIA’s
Fight Against Terrorism From Al Qa’ida to ISIS is also a fascinating insight on
IC leadership from a senior insider. Tenet’s memoir has received mixed reviews,
though Sir David Omand, a former UK intelligence leader, suggested the book
despite lacking detail was ‘essential in understanding how and why the leader-
ship structure of the US IC has taken the form it now has’ (Omand, Prados and
Jeffreys-Jones 2009: 292).
The sixth historical theme relevant to understanding contemporary leadership
is organisational design. There are several issues relevant to this theme, includ-
ing but not limited to organisational structural change, technology, collection and
analytical methodologies, and organisational culture. There is insufficient space
to assess each of these in detail, however, and like other themes discussed earlier,
we will come back to more detailed discussion of these in subsequent chapters.
But to provide some contextual understanding of organisational design-related
issues, I will briefly mention some key ones here. First, it’s clear that intelligence
historians and other scholars working in the field show how a combination of fac-
tors such as changes in the security environment, political influence, and the lead-
ership within each ‘Five Eyes’ IC work together to forge changes over time in the
organisational design of ICs. In the US, historical studies chart the gradual evolu-
tion of centralised and civilian-based intelligence agencies from what in the early
20th century was mainly a function of army and naval intelligence. During World
War II, greater efforts were made by the Roosevelt administration for a more cen-
tralised intelligence structure with the appointment of William J Donovan, who
in 1942 created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the precursor to the CIA
(Leary 1984: 3–5).
The creation of the CIA in 1947 and its historical development is in part a
story of organisation design and redesign—with perhaps the first major re-
organisation of the agency implemented in 1952 in part influenced by an ear-
lier report (the Dulles, Jackson, and Correa Report to the National Security
Council on the CIA and National Organisation for Intelligence released in
1949).
(Ibid)
Later in the post-Cold War period, further changes to the security environment
impacted on the organisational structure of ‘Five Eyes’ ICs, particularly resulting
in more centralised and coordinated approaches to all source assessments. Hager
paints a picture in New Zealand of a gradual coordination of some intelligence
functions away from individual agencies starting in 1975 (mainly assessments)
and into the centre of government (1996: 132), but such shifts in approaches to
organisational design were also underway in Australia during the 1970s (Walsh
2011a). At the end of the Cold War there is also evidence in MI5 that changes in
the security environment resulted in increased strategic planning for the service
post-Cold War to be better equipped to handle new and emerging threats such
as countering WMD, supporting police against organised crime, protecting the
UK’s economic wellbeing, and investigating animal rights extremists. The so-
called Cold War peace dividend also resulted in budget cuts in MI5, SIS, and
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) which undoubtedly had
an impact on organisational design and leadership (Andrews 2009: 780; Walsh
2011a).
Earlier discussion also included how catastrophic or significant intelligence
failure (Pearl Harbor, Bay of Pigs, 9/11, Iraq) often results in agency or IC-wide
organisational redesign. The 9/11 Commission Report in particular referred to the
need for IC-wide organisation redesign—including the need for more effective
leadership in order to see such change come into reality. The connection between
the urgent need for organisational change and leadership can be found in the fol-
lowing two sections:
modernization of our IC cannot be slow or timid. Reform must be undertaken

with a sense of urgency. It must be broad, deep and authentic. America’s intel-
ligence professionals are capable and dedicated. They often do their jobs in
dangerous and difficult circumstances. They need strong leadership, a renewed
focus on mission, and clear lines of authority and accountability to excel.
(2004: 509)
The need for structural reform and leadership are also clear in comments made by
Senator Barbara A Mikulski:
structural, organisational and jurisdictional reforms must be made and will be

made. But the goal ultimately is to create an environment and a culture where
truth to power is spoken from the bottom to the top.
(Ibid)
But as historical events demonstrate frequently, politically sponsored IC redesign

does not always result in ‘fit for purpose’ architecture. Again, historical studies
are helpful in highlighting how the latest attempts to ‘fix’ intelligence failure—
whether they be legislative or policy measures or a combination of both—can
arguably make matters worse because some scholars argue the design of some
intelligence agencies was flawed from the start. Hammond argues in the case of
the organisation of the US IC that the same contributory historical problems from
1947 that led to the creation of the CIA in response to Pearl Harbor have contin-
ued post-9/11, with the 2004 creation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (IRTPA) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) and beyond (Hammond 2010; Gentry 2015: 637–661). Of course, other
commentators such as Tim Weiner argue that the CIA is so flawed historically by
design that it seems there is no ‘organisational cure’ that can fix design flaws. This
is not a helpful end point for thinking about reforming IC organisational design,
however, as even if such an agency ceased to exist tomorrow another would need
to be created to continue its functions.
Post-9/11, as will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, the
scale and intensity of new emerging transnational threats such as radical Islamic
jihadist terrorism groups continues to influence ‘Five Eyes’ government’s imple-
mentation of a range of new policy organisational design initiatives in response.
In the US, as noted earlier, the Bush administration sought to transform the US IC
with the enactment of the IRTPA and the creation of the ODNI and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). In contrast, early policy initiatives in the UK, Canada,
and Australia in the initial period after 9/11 (2001–2005) resulted in more gradual
reform to the architecture of their ICs. In Australia, both the Flood Report (2004)
and Smith Review (2008) came to the conclusion that the fundamental structure
of the IC was fit for purpose—though greater coordination was needed along with
improved assessment and collection capabilities (Walsh 2011a, 2011b: 109–127).
Similarly in New Zealand, the 2009 Murdoch review of the IC ‘focused on the
ongoing need to integrate the IC and the requirement to govern the intelligence
system on behalf of ministers at a cross agency level’ (Murdoch 2009: 4; Whibley
2014).
The challenge of course is to build on historical and contemporary sources
for intelligence organisational design. How can researchers and IC leaders build
on existing sources discussed here that promotes better IC communities (Walsh
2011a, 2015; Omand 2010; Hammond 2010; Brunati 2013) in ways that make
them more resilient to ‘failure’? As Hammond asks, ‘can an alternative design
do better?’ What is better—centralisation vs decentralisation—particularly in the
way intelligence and data is configured (Hammond 2010: 681)? One increasingly
common structural configuration for intelligence since 9/11 has been the prolif-
eration of fusion centres (Walsh 2011a, 2015; Lewandowski et al. 2017; Taylor
and Russell 2012: 184–200). These centres are not of course a post-9/11 ‘inven-
tion,’—coming into existence during World War II. What can a deeper analysis
of fusion arrangements in history teach us about similar efforts being made now?
In its broadest sense, what should fused organisational designs look like? There is
still insufficient research on this point outside of inquiries of intelligence failure
(Taylor and Goodman 2004; Walsh 2011a, 2015).
Another issue related to organisational design is how collection technologies
and methodologies since World War I to the present have shaped both what ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs do and how they are structured. History shows that the two world wars
followed by the Cold War produced a rapid development in technical forms of
intelligence collection, particularly SIGINT and geospatial methods (GEOINT).
In the post-9/11 era, there has also been a proliferation of technical collection
methods such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) deployed in counter-ter-
rorism intelligence operations (Walsh 2017c). Such technology does shape the
structural arrangements of ICs and where investments are made. Intelligence lead-
ers in SIGINT agencies have been successful in arguing for increasing budget-
ary allocations in technical areas—particularly in the Cold War period. However,
other scholars argue that there has been a lack of HUMINT investment across ICs,
which has impacted on the organisational design and operations of these agencies.
Some have even suggested that the lack of HUMINT has been a recurring prob-
lem and led to failures in the twentieth century (Margolis 2013: 43; Hitz 2015).
This point seems to be a little over-generalised, though looking across various
stages of modern history it does have some accuracy, particularly in the immedi-
ate post-Cold War period where there was a reduction in HUMINT investment
across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs (Walsh 2011a).
Leaving aside the need to avoid over-generalising about the relative lack of
a collection capability such as HUMINT on the historical development of ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs, it is clear that in some communities the importance or lack thereof
placed on HUMINT collection capabilities, particularly foreign intelligence col-
lection, did play a role in shaping the organisational design of certain agencies to
this day. For example, the history of the Canadian IC shows evidence in the late
1930s and early Cold War period of how Canadian governments and officials saw
value in foreign intelligence (HUMINT) collection, particularly due to concerns
about the impact of an atomic war. HUMINT efforts were made by collecting sci-
entific and technical information about the Soviet Union by debriefing Canadians
who have travelled abroad or via its embassies (Jensen 2008). However, in the
early post-World War II years, Canadian governments did not seem to give any
detailed consideration of HUMINT collection internationally, which relied on
espionage for secret intelligence. As Anderson suggests, ‘the ability to conduct
foreign espionage especially to collect HUMINT was not thought to be necessary
for the protection of national security’ (1994: 465). This was because Ottawa
believed it did not have a geopolitical environment, where it faced more imme-
diate threats such as Australia did in the Asia Pacific—and it could rely on its
allies to provide this kind of information—as long as Canada continued to make
considerable efforts in sharing its SIGINT (Anderson 1994: 464; Rudner 2001). In
summary, Canada’s approach to foreign clandestine HUMINT collection histori-
cally remained different from other ‘Five Eyes’ partners such as Australia (ASIS),
Britain (MI6), and the US (CIA), who saw the need to develop specialised for-
eign intelligence collection agencies as part of their broader IC design (Anderson
1994: 448–471; Walsh 2011a; Farson and Teeple 2015; Jensen 2004, 2008).
A final thread relevant to our organisational design theme is organisational
cultural issues. Our focus in this section has been on the value historical analy-
sis of ‘Five Eyes’ ICs can bring to understanding the role of leadership in the
contemporary post-9/11 world. A critical factor in what can be learnt from his-
tory is how events, policies, and intelligence leaders themselves have shaped the
culture of the organisations in which they lead. Is it possible, for example, to talk
about organisational cultures for the CIA, MI6, or the RCMP? How have they
evolved and how do they differ from other agencies within the respective US,
UK, and Canadian intelligence community (Bean 2009)? In the case of Canada,
the origins of its security service (prior to the establishment of CSIS in 1984)
were also entwined as far back as 1914 with the early development of federal
police forces (Dominion Police and the Royal Northwest Police) and the estab-
lishment of the RCMP in 1920 (Kealey 1992: 179–210), which had the primary
responsibility for domestic intelligence and counter-subversion. To what extent
did an identifiable police culture impact on the early development of key aspects
of the Canadian intelligence community? Additionally, can one discern a par-
ticular US IC-wide culture that may differ or indeed be similar for instance to the
Australian intelligence community? Historical case studies such as Pearl Harbor,
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and 9/11 have all referred to ‘organisational cultural’
factors explaining intelligence failure. From an organisational cultural perspec-
tive, such cases and others show that people in our ICs are subject to confirma-
tion bias whereby as Dan Kahan suggests they ‘assign weight to new evidence
based on its consistency with what they already believe.’ ‘This tendency limits
the likelihood or speed with which people will revise mistaken beliefs’ (Kahan
cited in National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2018: 8).
Group think or affinity groups within and across intelligence agencies are clearly
powerful influences on the evolution of organisational culture. The role lead-
ers have played historically in shaping group think and organisational identity
is important in understanding contemporary organisational outlooks in all ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs.
Our discussion on the historical impact of organisational culture so far has
focused only on the national security intelligence agencies within ‘Five Eyes.’
However, as mentioned in the ‘introduction’ (Chapter 1), one key objective of
this book is to look at the nature of IC leadership from both the national security
and law enforcement contexts. In this context, one clear historical factor that has
shaped how intelligence is integrated into national security vs. law enforcement
is that in the latter intelligence is not the core function. In general, as history
continues to show, intelligence plays a supportive role to the primary law enforce-
ment functions of investigation and prosecution. This fundamental difference
in the priority and purpose intelligence plays in law enforcement compared to
national security agencies has had a profound impact on the development of intel-
ligence in broader policing/law enforcement cultures in ‘Five Eyes’ countries.
Space does not allow a detailed exploration of all the law enforcement organisa-
tional cultural and leadership factors that have shaped the role of intelligence in
such agencies from the twentieth century to the present. There are many factors
(such as political, philosophical, fiscal, technological, and training) which need
to be considered and these will be explored further where relevant in subsequent
chapters (Walsh 2011a, 2007; Ratcliffe 2005). But just restricting our overview
here to cultural factors impacting on intelligence in law enforcement agencies
from the late 1990s to the present, it’s clear how political and policy imperatives
(e.g. problem-orientated policing, community policing, zero tolerance policing),
public sector budgetary efficiencies, technology, and increased specialisation in
law enforcement have all changed the organisational cultural fabric of many law
enforcement agencies across the ‘Five Eyes’—including leadership beliefs about
the role of intelligence.
From the 1990s, starting in the UK but gradually influencing law enforcement
intelligence reform in other ‘Five Eyes’ countries, a new model of intelligence—
intelligence-led policing (ILP) swept across law enforcement. For the first time
in the history of modern law enforcement, ILP held the potential to influence the
organisational culture of law enforcement agencies by giving intelligence a more
central role in decision-making about crime reduction. It’s clear though that this
potential is still to be realised at the national law enforcement level of ‘Five Eyes’
countries. The rhetoric and efforts to affect cultural change underpinning the ILP
philosophy is at best a work in progress (Walsh 2011a; James 2014; Darroch and
Mazerolle 2013; Ratcliffe 2016). ILP may be achieving more headway in some
serious and organised crime types (e.g. counter-terrorism, child sex exploitation),
but it’s less clear whether it is having a significant and sustained impact in more
high-volume crime areas (Innes et al. 2017; Innes and Sheptycki 2004). Attempts
to embed ILP models in law enforcement agencies across the ‘Five Eyes’ coun-
tries is in many respects a good case study of how law enforcement leaders and
their intelligence leadership subordinates have attempted to transform or resist
changes to the dominant investigatory and prosecution culture of law enforcement
agencies.
From our brief review earlier of historical sources for IC leadership, it’s
clear a number of common themes have emerged, which are critical to under-
standing intelligence leadership in the contemporary post-9/11 world. Not all
historical cases of leadership-related issues discussed above (e.g. attributes of
certain political and IC leaders or specific security threats) are equally rele-
vant or transferable to understanding leadership in the contemporary setting.
But the examination of the six common historical themes shows that issues
such as intelligence failure, integration, or organisational design remain rel-
evant regardless of what temporal or spatial characteristics they may have at
the particular moment they occur in history. It’s the broad relevance of such
themes, which will be developed further in the remaining chapters. However,
as essential as many historical sources are, they are insufficient on their own in
explaining or understanding contemporary IC leadership. Leadership as a con-
cept is inherently cross-disciplinary and a full investigation and understanding
of what intelligence leadership means in the contemporary setting is not possi-
ble without also exploring other cross-disciplinary knowledge areas about lead-
ership. It is to these other cross-disciplinary knowledge perspectives we now
turn. In particular, in the following section the focus is on leadership theory.
Then the remaining two sections will survey other relevant knowledge areas
such as organisational theory and leadership and leadership psychology, which
will also likely be useful for ICs and researchers seeking to improve IC leader-
ship knowledge and skills.
Cross-disciplinary perspectives
Leadership theory
If we are to understand intelligence leadership in the contemporary sense, then
intelligence studies scholars, in addition to going back to historical sources also
need to investigate the broader context of leadership theory (Walsh 2017b: 441–
459). Given there is an almost endless array of management and leadership theo-
retical perspectives, I will restrict discussion here to areas where some empirical
work has been conducted. Although one could start this survey of the leadership
field by examining Greek and Roman philosophers such as Plato— who wrote
about leadership, or Niccolo Machiavelli in the renaissance, who advised his
prince on how to rule—our discussion commences in the late 1940s. It was at
this time that the early theoretical perspectives now discussed in modern leader-
ship theory began to emerge in the literature (Ibid: 442). Leadership theories are
influenced by social and political factors of their day and in the 1940s this was no
exception.
World War II showed an oscillation between leadership approaches that were

‘scientific’ (meaning leaders were the repository of all knowledge to manage
workers and costs)—to less normative models—where workers were driven
by leaders, who could get them to adhere to a collective organisational vision.
(Ibid)
By the end of the war, theorists began to investigate leadership in the military to
assess whether the armed forces may help leadership in other contexts such as
industrial organisations (Ibid).
Given the diversity of leadership theoretical perspectives that developed since
World War II, I will use three thematic categories (neo-charismatic theories,
follower-centric theories, and team leadership theories) to clump together like-
minded theories. But in reality, leadership theories are underpinned by a vast
number of different theoretical perspectives—some of which have elements of
one or more of the categories that will be discussed. Readers looking for a more
comprehensive and global understanding of leadership theory in all its variants
can access detailed analyses of these in the following excellent edited volumes
and handbooks: Bass and Bass (2008) The Bass Handbook of Leadership Theory,
Research and Managerial Applications, Nohria and Khurana (eds) (2010) Hand
Book of Leadership Theory and Practice, Day (2014) The Oxford Handbook
of Leadership Organisations, and Bryman’s (2011) edited volume, The Sage
Handbook of Leadership. For intelligence studies, scholars, and IC leaders these
edited volumes are good places to start if you do not have any background in
leadership theory.
Neo-charismatic theories
The most common neo-charismatic theories are transformational leadership,
charismatic leadership, and transactional leadership. I will limit the discussion
to transformational leadership as it has produced the most empirical work out of
neo-charismatic theories. Charismatic and transaction leadership theoretical per-
spectives cross over significantly with those found in transformational leadership
(Walsh 2017b: 443).
Transformational leadership theory has developed over 30 years and as noted
above is one of the more empirically successful theories. In an earlier article I
wrote on IC leadership, a search of the Scopus data base search from 2000 to 2015
revealed over 2326 articles—which is a good indicator of research activity around
this theory (Ibid: 443; House and Antonakis 2013: 3–33). Within transformational
theorists there is a great diversity of perspectives that focus on leaders in different
contexts (e.g. CEOs of large private sector companies, military leaders, leaders in
health and education sectors) (Ibid).
Regardless of the different perspectives transformational theorists have about
leaders working in various contexts, most argue that transformational lead-
ers ‘share common perspectives that effective leaders transform or change the
basic values, beliefs and attitudes of followers so that they are willing to perform
beyond the minimum levels specified by the organisation’ (Podsakoff et al. 1990:
107–142). Many transformational leadership theorists, as noted earlier, adopt
an empirical design approach to their research by using quantitative empirical
instruments such as the multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ) developed
by Bernard Bass to measure leadership by assessing a series of behavioural char-
acteristics of leaders and the extent of influence they have on follower’s perfor-
mance (Bass and Avolio 1993; Bass and Riggio 2006).
There has been some empirical success amongst transformational leadership
scholars, who have used quantitative metrics like the MLQ, but traditionally there
remains a healthy divergence amongst its users on which behavioural charac-
teristics of leaders should be measured and what actual influence these have on
follower’s performance (Walsh 2017b: 443). In summary, while progress has
been made in the quality of empirical research on transformational leadership,
theory critiques have identified several deficiencies impacting on the validity of
results in transformational studies. First, critiques suggest that transformational
leaders give too much credit to the leader and their influence on individual fol-
lowers rather than other leader influences over groups or organisational processes.
Second, criticisms include that most empirical studies are heavily quantitative and
psychology driven—with fewer derived from other disciplines such as sociology
or qualitative studies. Finally, critiques agree that progress has been made with
transformational studies, but argue advancement has been slowed somewhat due
to a fragmented research agenda in the field (Ibid).
Follower-centric theories
While the bulk of leadership theories have focused on the leader, there has been
another cluster of theories running parallel with neo-charismatic theories like
transformational leadership. The work of follower-centric scholars challenge the
neo-charismatic adherent’s view that leaders are always critical to the leadership
processes (Bligh 2011; Hansen et al. 2007; Howell and Shamir 2005). Follower-
centric theorists argue that understanding leadership dynamics is insufficient if the
focus is merely on trying to understand what makes a ‘great leader’ or what they
do. And in the 1990s, follower-centric adherents such as James Meindl began to
challenge that leaders and followers are always different actors with distinctive
characteristics and behaviours, and that the leadership process was more an interac-
tive relationship between the two (Meindl cited in Bligh 2011: 427). Like transfor-
mational leadership theorising, follower-centric researchers also represent a broad
church of theoretical perspectives. Bligh argues that research streams tend to fall
into three broad categories: (1) follower attributes (identity, motivation, follower
perceptions, and values); (2) leader-follower relations (e.g. how active a role fol-
lowers play in the leadership process); (3) follower outcomes (e.g. how leadership
behaviour influences follower performance and creativity (Bligh 2011: 425–436).
There is insufficient space to provide a deep exploration of the follower-centric
field; instead the discussion will briefly list three research agendas (authentic, ethical,
and servant leadership) given these potentially will have more value to understand-
ing leadership in the IC context rather than others such as ‘romance of leadership’ or
‘aesthetic leadership’ (Walsh 2017b: 444). Each of these will be briefly defined and
like other theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter, many aspects of these will
be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent substantive chapters.
As with most leadership theorising, defining clearly what authentic leader-
ship means is difficult (Ibid: 444–445; Cooper et al. 2005: 475–493). In 2003,
Luthans and Avolio defined authentic leadership as ‘a process that draws from
both positive psychological capacities and a highly developed organisational con-
text, which results in greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behav-
iours on the part of leaders and associates, fostering self-development’ (Luthans
and Avolio 2003: 243). Authentic leadership scholars argue that a leader’s posi-
tive values, beliefs, ethics, and their ability to develop transparency amongst
other characteristics impact on whether followers are more likely to adopt such
qualities—resulting in a better organisation (Walsh 2017b: 444). Walumbwa et
al. (2008: 89–126) came up with the authentic leadership questionnaire (ALQ)
comprising leader characteristics such as self-awareness, relational transparency,
internalised moral perspective, and balanced processing. However, again ongoing
difficulties in defining authentic leadership and how authentic leadership behav-
iour actually and specifically engenders positive emotions in followers remains
unclear (Walsh 2017b: 445).
Briefly, the second follower-centric perspective—ethical leadership—is con-
cerned with how the leader’s actions result (or not) in ethical outcomes and how
these impact on the organisation they lead. This strand of follower-centric leader-
ship is clearly relevant to how IC leaders negotiate the many ethical dilemmas they
face in running intelligence agencies. Earlier in the historical sources discussion,
we mentioned issues of privacy, transparency, and accountability. In these and
many other issues explored in later chapters there is an ethical dimension to the
leaders’ decision-making and actions that need to be understood. The third exam-
ple of follower-centric leadership theory is servant leadership. Van Dierendunck
(2011: 1228–1261) provides a useful summary of its main theoretical strands. In
short it is concerned about how leaders serve others. While it was first introduced
in the 1970s, it didn’t gain much traction until the early 2000s.
Servant leadership has been applied in different leadership contexts, such as
the health and education sectors (Middlehurst 2008: 322–339). Some critiques
still question whether it is a distinct, viable, and valuable theory for organisa-
tional success (Parris and Peachey 2013: 377–393). Others claim that its empiri-
cal assessment instruments are improving—according to some scholars (Ehrhart
2004; Dennis et al. 2010: 169–179). For example, Ehrhart’s 2004 study developed
14 item scales that make up different categories and dimensions of servant leader-
ship. Ehrhart argued that certain attributes of servant leadership can be shown to
have a distinct influence on followers compared to those seen in transformational
leadership (Ehrhart 2004: 73).
Team leadership theories

The third and final cluster of leadership theories argue that leadership emerges
from the group rather than an individual. Again, like neo-charismatic and
follower-centric theories there is a diverse array of theoretical perspectives. These
tend to be on a continuum—either focusing on the role of the team leader at one
end or the shared, collective, or distributed leadership theories at the other (Walsh
2017b: 445). Distributed leadership is devolved, shared, or dispersed leader-
ship. The empirical base underpinning many of the new ideas or theories in team
leadership, including distributed leadership, remain either weak or non-existent
(Harris 2007: 315–325). Interpretations vary significantly and there is conceptual
ambiguity about units of analysis for empirical studies. For example, how does
one define a team, which could be anything from a global to a small functional
team, that is part of a bigger organisation (Walsh 2017b: 445)?
Organisational theory and leadership

In the last section, we briefly introduced some of the main leadership theories that
seek to define what leaders are and do and how they impact on the organisation
they lead. The central question from this discussion regardless of what strand of
leadership theory one is examining is what is the relationship between leadership
and organisational effectiveness. Our earlier review of leadership theory suggests
it is difficult to prove empirically (Parry 2011: 54). Parry suggests that leadership
impact is ‘easier to discern at lower levels of analysis and more difficult to prove
at the organisational level’ (Ibid: 55). Further, he argues that while ‘the links
between leadership and organisational outcomes are real, they are complicated
and the complexity arises because the links are complicated.’ ‘Complexity arises
because the links are mediated by other aspects of the system such as the perfor-
mance of subordinates, the teams they compose and the organisation in which
they are embedded’ (Ibid: 54).
So while understanding the activities and behaviour of the leader are critical,
further consideration needs to be given on how leadership at varying levels within
an organisation impact collectively on organisational outcomes. A deeper knowl-
edge of organisational theory nonetheless provides another critical dimension for
constructing better knowledge about leadership in the IC context. Like leadership
theorising, there is no single truth in organisational theory. It has been drawn
from many academic disciplines ranging from ‘the natural and social sciences to
the humanities and arts’ (Hatch 2006: 7). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
provide a detailed description of the intellectual pedigree of organisational theory.
Hatch’s volume provides a good snapshot of the intellectual sources of modern
organisational theory for readers looking for more detail (Ibid: 3–59). But suf-
fice it to say, the field has been particularly shaped by influential sociology and
political thinkers of the twentieth century: Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Later in
the 1950s, organisations theory became influenced by biologists such as Ludwig
von Bertalanffy, who created the general systems theory, which sought to under-
stand how parts of a system or organisation related to each other (Ibid: 38). In the
1960s, organisational theory was influenced by cultural anthropologists such as
Clifford Geertz and the German-inspired social construction theory was proposed
by sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman (Ibid: 43). Anthropological
perspectives gave organisational theorists an organisational culture to map and
social construction approaches provided perspectives on how social activity
within a group generates personal and shared realities (Ibid: 44). Finally, social
psychologist Karl Weick used social construction to create sense-making theory,
which in short is concerned with how individuals within an organisation find
meaning from how their environments are socially constructed. It is their con-
struction of meaning in the organisational environment rather than any objective
reality of it that is crucial to sense-making theory (Ibid).
Organisational theory can build on leadership theories discussed above by
assessing the impact of the leader on organisational variables such as strategy,
technology, change, knowledge management, organisational learning, opera-
tions, communications, marketing, and human resources. For example, how does
technological change (see Chapter 6 ICT) within an intelligence agency promote
or dissipate closer team cohesiveness both in virtual and physical settings?
In terms of strategy, how do IC leaders improve the value of ‘products’ to
decision-makers? Effective leadership is in part, as we shall see in Chapter 8 (The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges), having a cohesive strategy—that
in turn results in organisational structures and processes that are effective and sus-
tainable. Similarly, and informed by strategy and governance, is knowledge about
how the security environment is changing and then how IC leaders need to adapt
workforce programs to meet these changes (see Chapter 7 Human Resources).
Marketing may at first glance seem more relevant to private sector enterprises
than the IC, but organisational theory principles suggest that just like private sec-
tor companies, intelligence agencies need to create a successful ‘corporate brand.’
While governments may set the agenda of what the broad parameters of an intel-
ligence agency’s activities are, IC leaders do play a critical role in developing
the ‘brand identity’ and operations of their agencies compared to others in the
community. For example, in the United States, one could ask what role IC lead-
ers and managers play in creating successful brands for the FBI compared to the
DHS, which in some respects have overlapping functions. Again, many of these
organisational variables and how they interact with leadership will be revisited in
subsequent chapters.
Leadership and psychology

There is an overlap between our earlier discussion of leadership, organisational
theory, and the final broad knowledge area to be discussed in this chapter—lead-
ership and psychology (Leonard et al. 2013; Locander and Luechauer 2005).
Psychology is a critical dimension to understanding how leadership personality/
behavioural attributes impact on organisational performance. Different ‘types’ of
leadership styles/behaviour result in different objectives that determine organisa-
tional effectiveness. One of the early works on leader’s behaviour was undertaken
in 1939 by German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin, who identified three dif-
ferent leadership styles (autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire) that applied to
decision-making (Billig 2015: 703–718; Michael 2015). Autocratic were often
speedy decisions made without any consultation with team members. Democratic
styles sought input, but may in the end result in slow decision-making; and finally
laissez-faire decision-making meant that the leader stood back and allowed the
team to make decisions. Other theoretical approaches from social psychology
have also built on Lewin’s early work to assess the impact of a leader’s behaviour.
For example, Parry refers to ‘change-oriented behaviours include monitoring the
environment to identify threats and opportunities, articulating an inspiring vision,
building a coalition of supporters for major change and determining how to imple-
ment a new initiative or major change’ (Parry 2011: 56). Parry also describes two
other behavioural styles. Task-oriented behaviours are most useful for improving
efficiency and relationship-orientated behaviours are most useful for improving
human resources and relations (Ibid).
Other social psychology theories have been more inspired by evolutionary psy-
chology rather than the social context, which may influence the development of
various leadership behaviours. For example, Vught and Ronay (2014) apply the
principles of evolutionary biology and behavioural psychology to better under-
stand psychology. They argue that the mind and body are products of evolution
through natural selection. This means that leadership and followership evolved in
humans and in other species to solve ongoing social problems that require coor-
dination such as conflict resolution, punishment, promoting social cohesion, and
leading in warfare (Ibid: 76).
Vught and Ronay further contend that there are two principal barriers to
improving leadership. One relates to discrepancies between the modern and ances-
tral environment, and the other involves psychological mechanisms to dominate
and exploit other individuals. In summary they suggest that leadership is partly
‘heritable’ and that further research (survey data, behavioural and neuro-science
data) might show if exposure to transformational leaders increases satisfaction
and activates ancient reward areas in the brain (Ibid: 82–90). It is a bold supposi-
tion that leadership might be partly heritable and by understanding ‘the evolved
psychological mechanism this may be help us select the right leaders and design
more effective organisations’ (Ibid: 90). There is no question that such evolution-
ary leadership theories require a great deal more evidence to demonstrate reliably
a connection between biology and the psychological mechanisms that both influ-
ence leadership and follower behaviour.
Turning briefly back again to social psychology theories that look at the social
rather than biological factors driving leadership behaviour, there have been dis-
tinctions made between ‘old/traditional’ vs ‘new psychology’ of leadership
approaches. The former are similar to the leadership traits we have discussed
above in the historical perspectives of both political and intelligence leaders. Old/
traditional psychology of leadership approaches emphasise the characteristics of
the individual leader and how they influence the situation. In short, traditional
approaches leadership is ‘treated very much as an “I”’ thing (Haslam et al. 2010:
xxi). In contrast, in new psychology of leadership approaches, leadership is a ‘we
thing’ (Ibid: xxii). For new psychology of leadership theorists, ‘the we thing’ is
most important because effective leadership does not come from the leader telling
followers what to do in any authoritarian way, but rather in the leader being able
to create and participate in a shared social identity in the group. So unlike the
heroic leader or, as evolutionary psychologists seem to suggest, one born with
innate special qualities that no one else in the group possesses, new psychology
of leadership approaches emphasise effective leadership as being one where the
leader is skilled in what they call ‘identity leadership’ (Haslam et al. 2010: 197).
Identity leadership means leaders need to be seen as one of the group, their actions
should be in the interests of the in-group, and finally leaders must ‘craft a sense of
us’ in terms of the group’s norms, values, and priorities (Ibid: xxii). This ‘identity’
concept seems similar to the principle of ‘intelligence governance’ that we will
now turn to.
Effective intelligence framework

In this final section, the aim is to bring together the four leadership knowledge
areas discussed earlier (history, leadership theories, organisational theory, and
psychology of leadership) with my own recent theorising on intelligence leader-
ship and organisational reform.
As argued earlier, historical cases about leadership in the IC context are valu-
able in understanding contemporary leadership challenges. For example, it’s
clear from the earlier discussion that in intelligence failure, regardless of whether
one looks at historical or contemporary cases, similar variables may be at play.
Political failure, failure in adequate collection, analysis, and leadership are all
common variables involved in producing intelligence failure through history and
into the present. However, exercising care in the extrapolation of lessons learnt
from historical cases for the present is warranted given events—whether histori-
cal or contemporary—have their own unique characteristics. For one, the leaders
involved in these events have their own unique set of attributes and the security
environments in which they are operating are different in time and space.
It is for this reason that the other three knowledge areas discussed earlier (lead-
ership theories, organisational theory, leadership and psychology), should also be
mined for their potential value in understanding what it means to be an IC leader
and how they impact their agencies and communities today (see Chapter 8 The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges). All three areas offer cross-disci-
plinary perspectives from non-intelligence contexts that together provide norma-
tive, behavioural, and social insights into what leaders do and how this impacts
on their organisations.
Again, casting the net wide can only be helpful in understanding more broadly
what factors inform effective IC leadership in the contemporary context. What
remains missing, however, and is a critical gap that this book seeks to fill, is to
what extent the four broad knowledge areas outlined here can improve theorising
about leadership in the contemporary intelligence context. Additionally, given
the fertile and diverse debates in each of these four knowledge strands, it is not
surprising that in the broader theorising on the concept of leadership there are no
grand theories to understand reliably leadership. Accordingly, intelligence studies
again as it has always done will need to build its own theories about leadership in
the intelligence context. The four broad knowledge areas of leadership theorising
discussed in this chapter will help in this theory building exercise, but this book
will also introduce other discipline areas that may be relevant to theorising about
leadership in the intelligence context (Walsh 2017b).
The vast array of discipline perspectives, however, which intelligence stud-
ies could draw from in constructing its own leadership theorising, do need to be
organised in ways to ensure researchers can systematically organise both the data
and analysis of knowledge from multiple fields. For this objective, I offer my
effective intelligence framework—developed originally in 2011, but with further
enhancements and applications in later research (Walsh 2011a, 2015: 123–142;
2017b: 441–459, 2018). The effective intelligence framework provides a diag-
nostic framework for exploring whether an intelligence agency or community is
operating effectively—as well as the extent to which it is likely to show signs of
positive or negative adaptation and sustainability to the changing security envi-
ronment. There is insufficient space to provide a full description of the research
process that led to the development of the effective intelligence framework.
Other sources provide the detail for readers seeking more background (Walsh
2011a, 2015: 123–142). But in brief, the framework was developed by examin-
ing five intelligence contexts across the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities.
The research resulted in 61 interviews across the relevant ‘Five Eyes’ countries
and the analysis of common themes (e.g. tasking and coordination, collection,
analysis and intelligence production, strengths, and weaknesses). The analysis of
the themes resulted in the effective intelligence framework, which incorporated
together both the structural and functional aspects of each intelligence context
studied (Walsh 2017b: 441–459).
As shown in Figure 2.1, all intelligence contexts regardless of the parameters
(national security, law enforcement, military, private sector) are concerned with
interpreting threats and risks in the security environment so this central concern
is represented in the middle. The framework is then completed with two addi-
tional outlays. The inner circle consisting of tasking and coordination, collec-
tion, analysis, production, and evaluation are the core intelligence processes,
or the major activities involved in the assembling of intelligence products. The
outer circle consisting of governance, ICT, human resources, legislation and
research are the key enabling activities of the intelligence enterprise. These are
the structural components of any intelligence framework, which support the core
intelligence processes. In short, without the key enabling activities it would be
impossible to produce intelligence products. The naming convention of each key
enabling activity is mostly self-explanatory. For example, ICT is concerned with
all the information architecture and ecology used in the agency/community—
and human resources includes recruitment and other activities such as continuing
professional development. Full descriptions of each core intelligence processes
and key enabling activity can be found in Walsh (2011a, 2015: 123–142).
The most important aspect of the effective intelligence framework is intel-
ligence governance, which I define as ‘a set of attributes and rules pertaining
Figure 2.1 Effective Intelligence Framework. Source: Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence
Analysis, p.148.
to strong leadership, doctrine design, evaluation and effective coordination,

cooperation and integration of intelligence processes’ (Walsh 2011a: 135).
Ultimately, effective intelligence governance relies on sound organisational
(and community) leadership that can marshal both an organisation’s core
intelligence processes and key enabling activities in ways that make organisa-
tions effective, adaptive, and sustainable as the security environment changes.
Intelligence governance has an external and internal dimension. External gov-
ernance is that imposed on the intelligence leader by the political leadership.
Internal governance are the activities, policies, processes, and initiatives that the
intelligence leader is able to influence directly. Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader
and Governance Challenges) will build on discussions here by identifying what
key intelligence governance challenges IC leaders are confronting and how they
may be addressed.
In summary, the effective intelligence framework provides a ‘theoretical scaf-
fold’ by bringing together multi-disciplinary leadership perspectives discussed
above and assessing their significance to theory building in an IC leadership con-
text. The framework also informs the overall structure of the book.
Conclusion
This chapter provides the broad canvass upon which I argue any conceptualising
of IC leadership needs to occur. Understanding contemporary IC leadership, much
less any attempts to progress its theorising, will require a deeper understanding
of the five perspectives discussed and how they relate to leadership practice in
the IC context. These perspectives are historical, leadership theorising, organisa-
tional theorising, leadership, and psychology, which are informed by theoretical
perspectives like the effective intelligence framework. Combined they allow a
multi-disciplinary synthesis of all knowledge areas likely important in progress-
ing our understanding of contemporary IC leadership. Chapter 2 has painted a
large canvass. However, I do believe at this very fledgling point in the field of IC
leadership theory and practice such a wide terrain is warranted.
While the canvass has been wide in this chapter, in Chapters 3 (Tasking and
Coordination), 4 (Collection), and 5 (Analysis) we begin to break it down into
areas to better assess the specific challenges IC leaders will be confronted with.
You will recall tasking and coordination, collection, and analysis are all core
intelligence processes and in all three chapters the objective will be to assess
briefly relevant developments and the governance challenges IC leaders are now
confronted with.
Starting with Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination) and framing the discussion
in the post-9/11 contemporary environment, we explore what role IC leaders play
in promoting effective tasking and coordination. In particular, what factors (lead-
ership, political, and organisational) influence the ability for leaders to oversee
effective tasking and coordination across the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communi-
ties? Chapter 3 will demonstrate that the ability of the leader to implement and
oversee effective tasking and coordination processes are not just routine bureau-
cratic processes, but are crucial in providing coherent strategies for the collection,
analysis, production, and evaluation of intelligence.
Note
1 The ‘JIC’ or the UK Joint Intelligence Committee is an inter-agency body responsible
for intelligence assessment to assess events and situations relating to external affairs,
defence, terrorism, major international criminal activity, scientific, technical and inter-
national economic matters, and other transnational issues, drawing on secret intelli-
gence, diplomatic reporting, and open source material.
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Zegart, A. (2007). Spying blind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3 Tasking and coordination
Introduction
In this chapter, I outline key tasking, coordination, and integration challenges
intelligence communities (IC) leaders will be confronted with as the security
environment becomes increasingly more complex. More specifically, Chapter 3 is
about how leaders, both those external to the IC (i.e. political decision-makers)
and internal (IC leaders), navigate through the complexities of tasking, coordina-
tion, and integration both at the agency and the entire community level. Tasking
and coordination are interrelated functions within intelligence. There can be no
intelligence processes or products without a decision-maker tasking our ICs to
provide them. Tasking, once initiated, requires the effective coordination of other
core intelligence processes (e.g. collection and analytical assets) to ensure the
intelligence enterprise has the best chance to support taskers/decision-makers
within requested timeframes. In this chapter, therefore, I will refer to tasking and
coordination together as both are inextricably linked and rely on each other. We
also talk about ‘integration’ as the chapter progresses as it is linked also to tasking
and coordination.
In Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Leadership) we saw how the creation of the
modern ‘Five Eyes’ ICs after World War II developed. The modern history of
these ICs, influenced how intelligence was tasked and coordinated, and this in
turn over several decades impacted on the strategies, structures, organisational
cultures, technology; and workforce development of these communities. Political
and IC leaders have both shaped tasking and coordination policies, activities,
and processes and this chapter will explore how leaders’ interventions have both
attempted to improve tasking and coordination as well as how these measures in
some cases have fallen short of their intentions. It is not feasible to provide a full
assessment on the merits or otherwise of all tasking and coordination activities
currently operating across each ‘Five Eyes’ community. Much of this is classified,
but it is possible based on primary (interviews, the IC leadership survey) and sec-
ondary sources assembled for this research to provide general insights into how
leaders have engaged with tasking and coordination activities and identify where
the challenges remain. Our analysis of tasking and coordination across the ‘Five
Eyes’ communities is organised around four broad themes that arose both from
primary and secondary research sources. These are: Theme 1 Intelligence Policy
Reform Post-9/11, Theme 2 Risk and Threat Analysis, Theme 3 Role of Science
and Technology, and Theme 4 Strategic Intelligence, Tasking, and Coordination.
I will briefly discuss the role of leaders in each and their impact on tasking and
coordination activities after which some general implications will be made in the
conclusion. In Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance) we will come
back to how IC leaders will deal with the most critical tasking and coordination
issues raised here.
Theme 1 Intelligence policy reform post-9/11

Theme 1 surveys the broader policy, operational, organisational, and cultural
issues that impact on effective tasking and coordination across ‘Five Eyes’ intel-
ligence communities from 9/11 to the present. All of these issues continue to
play a role to varying degrees in how intelligence is tasked and coordinated. The
impact of such issues—good or bad—goes beyond how effectively intelligence is
tasked and coordinated. Poor tasking and coordination can have broader knock-on
effects, such as wasting limited collection and analytical resources—or the failure
by governments and their ICs to fully identify the likelihood and consequences of
emerging risks in the security environment.
In the remaining discussion here, we first refer to some broader policy, organi-
sational, and cultural issues as they relate to external factors of tasking and coor-
dination. External dimensions refer to how the political leadership in each ‘Five
Eyes’ country drives tasking and coordination of intelligence and how they have
sought since 9/11 to reform issues that relate to or impact on tasking and coordi-
nation. Secondly, we will explore the internal factors of tasking and coordination
to see how IC leaders have sought to improve such activities. In each case, the
aim is to examine the most important key broad policy, operational, and cultural
factors and how they continue to impact on tasking and coordination processes
and outputs.
External factors
Chapter 2 described how since the end of World War II (with varying levels of
intensity and success) ‘Five Eyes’ governments have orchestrated policy, organi-
sational, and legislative initiatives to bring greater integration, centralisation, and
coordination of intelligence. Indeed, as far back as the Truman administration
successive US governments have expressed the desire to see better intelligence
coordination (Best 2014: 254). In the United States alone, at least 14 IC studies
have been conducted over the years and despite each recommending reforms, few
resulted in significant changes. Only the Dulles Report (1949), Schlesinger Report
(1971), Church Committee Report (1976), and 9/11 Commission Report (2004)
achieved any substantial change (Warner and McDonald 2005). Additionally,
and more recently, just on the issue of terrorism and intelligence performance
alone ‘there was 12 major bipartisan commission, governmental studies and think
Tasking and coordination 45
tank task forces that examined the US IC and its counterterrorism efforts’ (Zegart
2007: 27).
The objective here is not to provide a detailed assessment of pre-9/11 policy reform
efforts in each ‘Five Eyes’ country. Some of these were highlighted in Chapter 2 and
although many pre-9/11 policy reform efforts were influential in the development
of ‘Five Eyes’ ICs, the focus here will be on how ‘Five Eyes’ countries responded
to 9/11 and post-9/11 failures. Turning to the United States first, a large volume of
sources document the concerns that drove the Bush administration, reluctantly at
first (Goodman 2003: 60), and Congress to implement an intelligence reform policy
agenda post-9/11. Detailed analysis of how the US political leadership understood
the causes of 9/11 as an intelligence failure and what the policy remedies might be
can be found in several sources (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Zegart 2007;
Goodman 2003: 60; Marrin 2011: 182–202; Posner 2005; Best 2014: 253–333).
Amongst these sources there are a range of perspectives on the main drivers of intel-
ligence failure leading up to the events of 9/11, including but not limited to the FBI
and CIA not sharing information sufficiently, coordination issues, policy failures,
intelligence collection failures, and analytical deficiencies. Furthermore, even a cur-
sory review of the Bush administration and Congressional statements demonstrate
what many politicians in Washington, DC thought were the main causes in the fail-
ure of intelligence around the events of 9/11. For example, members of the legisla-
tive branch referred frequently to a fragmented, uncoordinated response by the IC
pre-9/11, which required both a strategy and structure that would facilitate a more
integrated approach by the IC against Al Qaeda and other threats moving forward.
In the 2002 Report of the Joint Inquiry of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee into Intelligence Community Activities
Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, there were several refer-
ences underscoring views that radical changes to the IC was required. For example,
the inquiry reported the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had failed to integrate
resources from across the IC against al Qaida, which
suggests a fragmented intelligence community that was operating without a

comprehensive strategy for combating the threat posed by Bin Laden, and a
DCI without the ability to enforce consistent priorities at all levels throughout
the community.
(HPSCI 2002: 40)
Language used by senior political leaders such as a ‘fragmented intelligence com-

munity,’ ‘no comprehensive strategy,’ and a ‘lack of integration’ amongst agencies
in the US IC highlighted that both effective tasking and coordination, particu-
larly as it related to bringing together domestic and foreign intelligence, was not
effective (HPSCI 2002; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004: 402; Walsh 2011a,
2011b, 2015). The Bush administration’s policy response to a lack of coordination
and integration was legislative with the creation first of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 designed to link the national intelligence community with domestic
state and local law enforcement. This led to the establishment of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). Two years later, the administration enacted the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). The full Act is acces-
sible in the ODNI’s 2009 published legal guide reference (ODNI 2009).
The IRTPA created a new over-arching coordination agency, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), to be led by a new Director of National
Intelligence who was meant to be the leader of the entire US IC. It also created the
Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and other measures for improving ana-
lytical capabilities (see Chapter 5 Analysis). However, our discussion here will be
restricted to an assessment of the type of authority invested in the new DNI role
by the IRTPA and whether this newly legislated position has improved tasking
and coordination. I will come back to another important aspect of the IRTPA—the
ISE in the next heading, ‘internal factors.’ While the ISE was initially a politically
driven initiative in the IRTPA, its implementation by the US IC also demonstrates
well how IC cultural issues within have at times impeded externally and politi-
cally driven structural change to the IC.
Turning back to the discussion of the role of the DNI, as outlined under the
IRTPA, the DNI was meant to establish objectives and priorities for the IC and
manage and direct tasking of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination
of national intelligence. The Act also detailed the role of the DNI in developing
personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operation and
facilitate staffing of IC management functions (in consultation with the heads
of the other agencies or elements of the IC). The spirit of the act envisioned a
DNI who would accomplish major structural reforms, including how intelligence
was tasked, coordinated, and integrated. However, while some progress has been
made this overall vision has not materialised. The end result on the tasking, coor-
dination, and integration front has been more mixed. Successive DNIs have made
some progress in producing more integrated intelligence missions. However, the
IRTPA did not provide this new ‘head of the US IC’ with sufficient power to
implement structural reforms originally foreseen as necessary by the Bush admin-
istration (Gentry 2015; Johnson 2015b, 2017; Allen 2013). As Harknett and
Stever argue, ‘schisms between the legislature and the executive also hampered
reforms’ (Harknett and Stever 2011: 705).
Despite the early limitations placed on the DNI position, DNIs have attempted
to implement initiatives and processes that would better set intelligence task-
ing priorities, coordination, and integration. For example, the first DNI John
Negroponte started the process and developed in October 2005 a national intel-
ligence strategy to prioritise what information to collect and analyse (Lowenthal
2012: 32). More recently, efforts to improve the alignment of the IC’s resources
and capabilities continued under former DNI James Clapper (Johnson 2015a).
In a 2019 interview with Director Clapper, he elaborated on some of the ways
he tried to improve tasking, coordination, and integration. In particular, on inte-
gration he said:
I used the considerable budget and programmatic authority the DNI has to
induce the desired behavior among the IC components. Other tools included
IC ITE and joint duty. I stayed in weekly contact—by email—with all
16 components, as well as the ODNI staff. Very time-consuming, but being
informed about what was going on all over the IC is almost mandatory if
you are going to lead it, and promote integration. Also, visits to each compo-
nent periodically (which often included a Town hall with the respective work
force also afforded me the opportunity to push integration directly to the rank
and file. As well, I focused on ICD’s (Intelligence Community Directives)
to push policies. I had a lot to do, of course, with picking component lead-
ers, another way to foster integration. In sum, no one silver bullet—rather, a
series of things both big and small.1
At the time of writing (during the Trump administration), it is less clear how
successive DNIs (Dan Coats) and the current DNI John Ratcliffe have built on
Clapper’s reforms to better integrate whole IC approaches, including improving
tasking and coordination processes. Indeed, increasingly since commencement of
the Trump administration in January 2017, the President has expressed varying
attitudes to the IC at best tolerance, though often neglect, suspicion, and even
hostility. Outgoing senior US IC leaders such as John Brennan (CIA) and DNI
Jim Clapper have periodically raised concerns that the President has not only
played down the role Russia took in interfering in the 2016 US elections, but that
the President fails to see the broader threat from cyber in Russia, Eastern Europe,
and Syria. Also concerning is reports that President Trump early in his presidency
rejected a regular written or orally delivered presidents daily brief (PDB). This
was delegated to others—reducing the IC’s direct access to the President and
their ability to provide assessments to him. This can have the effect of not in
return receiving back coherent and consistent executive-level intelligence tasking
(Strategic Comments 2017).
Although efforts have been made, particularly under Clapper’s time as DNI,
to produce a comprehensive IC strategy and articulated strategic priorities, these
initiatives have not yet achieved the desired unity of effort throughout the enter-
prise (Johnson 2015b; Harknett and Stever 2011). In the end, rather than provide
a single point of authority within the US IC, the IRTPA created another layer of
bureaucracy with the DNI given little more power than the former DCI had over
the US IC to affect alignment of resources and mission across the IC. The DNI
by political and bureaucratic design could not be entirely a single point of author-
ity to ensure a whole of IC tasking and coordination approach could be achieved
across the community.
In contrast to the United States, structural reform initiatives of other ‘Five Eyes’
intelligence countries, the IRTPA represented ‘major surgery’ compared to what
governments in Australia, the UK, Canada, and New Zealand implemented after
9/11. In Australia, the Flood Review may have been the earliest substantial review
of the IC since 9/11 commissioned by an Australian government. However, its
focus was not on how to restructure the Australian intelligence community after
9/11—rather its central remit was to examine intelligence assessments made in
the lead up to the coalition invasion of Iraq (Walsh 2011a: 16; Flood 2004b; Jones
2018). In Australia, the UK, Canada, and New Zealand, the immediate post-9/11
policy reform response was more legislative—reviewing definitions of terrorism
offences and giving ICs greater and proactive surveillance and collection powers
than setting up new standalone bureaucratic structures within their ICs (Walsh
2011a: 218–227). In short, in the non-US ‘Five Eyes’ countries, the political and
policy response was not to affect large-scale structural reform of their intelli-
gence communities right away but to achieve improved integration via legislative
reforms. In Australia, the evolving complexity of transnational threats such as
Al Qaeda sparked the implementation of several pieces of legislation to improve
the collection of intelligence. From 11 September 2001 to 11 September 2011,
the Australian Parliament passed 54 pieces of anti-terrorism legislation—much
more than Canada, New Zealand, and the UK (Walsh 2016: 51–74; Williams
2011: 1144). Australia’s key anti-terrorism laws are enshrined in Division
100 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which has been amended several times.
Sections 100–105 deal with: definition of terrorism; receiving and providing
training (Australian Government, Criminal Code Act 1995, p. 137). Other new
amendments to the Criminal Code included terrorist financing offences (Division
103), speech offences (i.e. urging violence) (Part 5.1), as well as new powers to
allow the Attorney General to prescribe a terrorist organisation (Division 102).
The other significant intelligence collection and counter-terrorism response dur-
ing the early post-9/11 years (during the Howard conservative government) were
control and preventative detention orders. Division 104 of the Criminal Code now
allowed control orders against individuals not suspected of any criminal offence
that may be subjected to restrictions (equivalent to house arrest). These meas-
ures were thought by government to be reasonably necessary to protect the public
from terrorism. Views on the need for control orders varied at the time these
reforms were introduced (see for example, McDonald 2007: 106; White 2012;
White 2007: 116–25). The preventative detention measures under Division 105 of
the Criminal Code allowed for an individual to be detained for up to 48 hours if
there was a reasonable expectation this would prevent imminent terrorist acts or
assist in preserving evidence relating to a recent terrorist act. The initial 48-hour
period could be further extended under state law by 14 days (Walsh 2016: 51–74).
A more detailed survey of Australian and Canadian counter-terrorism and intel-
ligence legislation can be found in Walsh (2016: 51–74).
Similar to the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000, Australia also separated
terrorism laws from other criminal offences, while the criminal law was expanded
to deal with association with terror groups and participation in a terrorist act (Misra
2018: 108). Immediately after 9/11 in the UK, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act was passed, described by one expert as ‘surely the most draconian
legislation Parliament has passed in peacetime in over a century’ (Phythian 2005:
668). Controversially, this legislation introduced a system of indefinite detention
without trial for immigrants and asylum-seekers, who could not be deported, but
were certified by the Home Secretary, on the basis of intelligence, to be a ‘sus-
pected international terrorist’ and so a threat to national security. Hence, a politi-
cian, not a judge, would rule on indefinite detentions.
Similarly in Canada, the most immediate and widely recognisable response to
9/11 was the introduction of Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act. An omnibus piece
of legislation, Bill C-36 provided a three-pronged response to terrorist threats
facing Canada: it enacted a legal definition of terrorism and related activities as
criminal offences; it provided for the public designation and outlawing of terror-
ist groups; and it instituted measures to better facilitate the identification, pros-
ecution, conviction, and punishment of terrorist operatives and co-conspirators
(Shore 2006: 457).
Additionally, efforts were made in all countries (just as the US had done)
to establish counter-terrorism fusion centres: the National Threat Assessment
Centre (NTAC-Australia), the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC-UK), the
Integrated Terrorism Assessment Center (ITAC-Canada), and the Combined
Threat Assessment Group (CTAG-New Zealand). The function of each is to bet-
ter coordinate and integrate in one location counter-terrorism intelligence col-
lection and analytical priorities across their ICs (Walsh 2011a). Other initiatives
sought to strengthen existing intelligence coordination institutions at the centre
of governments in the Prime Minister and Cabinet offices of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the UK. None of these measures were, at least initially after
9/11, wholesale attempts by the political leadership to refashion their ICs. For
example, in Australia several smaller-scale reviews in addition to the legislation
changes described above were carried out such as the 2004 Flood Report, the
2005 Taylor Review into ASIO’s technical and proficiency gaps, and in 2008 the
Smith Review (Misra 2018). The Smith Review was significant not for any major
surgical reinvention of the IC, but more for what it rejected than recommended.
The review recommended against a new homeland security super agency to coor-
dinate Australia’s IC. It suggested instead better coordination of existing arrange-
ments by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the creation of a new
national security advisor (Walsh 2011a, 2011b). However, in December 2017 the
Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) was finally created—though there
remains a lack of compelling independent evidence for the need of this kind of
super-coordinating agency.
It remains difficult to assess with accuracy whether the more ‘micro-surgical’
interventions by non-US ‘Five Eyes’ countries resulted in better tasking and coor-
dination of intelligence. Providing a full assessment will not be possible until
further details of reform outcomes become unclassified, which could be decades
away. However, subsequent inquiries in all ‘Five Eyes’ countries suggest that the
ability for political leaders to affect via post-9/11 legislation and policy measures
effective and consistent improvement in a range of intelligence capability areas
(including tasking and coordination) remain works in progress.
In Australia, since the 2004 Flood Report, which was an independent review of
Australia’s intelligence capabilities, there have been periodic reviews (every five
to seven years) of IC capability. These are the 2011 Independent Review of the
Intelligence Community by Rufus Black and Robert Cornall and the most recent—
the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review of the Intelligence Community by
Michael L’Estrange AO and Stephen Merchant PSM (L’Estrange and Merchant
2017). In each review, suggestions have been made on how to strengthen the
coordination and integration of the IC, which also serves to improve the efficient
tasking of intelligence. The Flood Report referred to the need for the community
to bolster effectiveness, communications, and interoperability. It recommended a
strengthened coordination role for the Office of National Assessments (now called
ONI) and suggested the creation of a foreign intelligence coordination commit-
tee.2 The Committee would be chaired by DG ONA and have representations of
all IC heads to discuss coordination, capability, and intelligence policy (Flood
2004: 60). The 2017 L’Estrange and Merchant report did not specifically identify
any major improvements in tasking and coordination required by the AIC. The
report indicated that:
over recent years, the AIC has worked collaboratively in specific areas to
deliver more focused and timely intelligence, particularly for operational
decision makers. Through enhanced co-ordination initiatives and fusion cen-
tres, agencies have addressed particular areas of interaction that reflect the
changing nature of Australia’s national security environment. L’Estrange and
Merchant added that an important feature has been the growth in ‘mission
approaches’ to tackle complex issues through whole-of-government opera-
tional and policy responses.
(2017: 42)
However, the reviewers recognised managing the ongoing challenges in effective

coordination of the AIC is both necessary and desirable in the pursuit of a range of
critically important objectives. These include the provision of IC leadership and
broad strategic direction-setting for intelligence as a national enterprise; the clear
identification of national intelligence priorities in support of the policy priorities of
the government of the day; effective cross-agency implementation of those priori-
ties, maximising the efficiency of resource allocation (particularly in terms of the
impact of the accelerating pace of technological change); and the robust evaluation
of individual agency and broad-based AIC performance. Effective coordination also
requires the development of relevant joint capabilities and assets across the AIC, a
strategic focus on AIC workforce planning requirements, and accountability to the
Prime Minister and other Ministers for the AIC’s output and performance (Ibid).
Given all the challenges identified above, L’Estrange and Merchant concluded
that in their ‘view across all these benchmarks of effective AIC co-ordination
more can be achieved. In particular, they argued that the IC leadership is impeded
by the absence of an appropriate explicit remit, by the nature of the current deeply
‘federated’ intelligence structure, and by an insufficient number of individuals
with comprehensive cross-agency appreciation of the full range of Australian
intelligence capabilities, activities and potential synergies’ (Ibid: 44). The
L’Estrange and Merchant 2017 review of the AIC is the most significant com-
pleted in several decades and its 23 recommendations (at time of writing) are still
being implemented. The 2017 Independent Intelligence Review throws up other
intelligence governance challenges, not just in the areas of tasking, coordination,
and integration. We will come back to these in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader
and Governance Challenges).
Similarly, in the UK the Butler Inquiry identified areas in the UK IC where
there could be better coordination of counter-proliferation activity:
we consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use
of new information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together
the various sources of expertise in Government on proliferation and on activ-
ity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each
other easily.
(Butler 2004: 158)
In Canada, in the aftermath of 9/11 and in addition to legislative changes, the

government invested more significantly in the capabilities of foreign intelligence
capabilities of Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and CSIS as well
as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).3 The government set up a new
cabinet committee on security, public health, and emergencies to better manage
national security and intelligence matters and ‘to better coordinate a government
wide response to all emergencies’ (Shore 2006: 459).
The government also created the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Canada (PSEP), which brought together national security, polic-
ing, border and emergency management under the one department—allowing
for an optimised coordination of national security and intelligence resources
(Ibid). Also, although a much smaller community compared to the US or even
Australia, the government of New Zealand’s first independent review of its
IC—the 2016 Cullen and Reddy review remarked that despite colocation of
the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the New Zealand
Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and the National Assessments Bureau
(NAB) into a single building in Wellington, products don’t always meet needs of
decision-makers—intelligence priorities can be inadequately defined and there is
a lack of understanding of the needs and priorities of decision-makers (Cullen and
Reddy 2016: 62).4
Cullen and Reddy made a series of recommendations to oversee and coordi-
nate GCSB, NZSIS, and NAB including the establishment of a national intel-
ligence and security advisor (NISA). The NISA would become the principal
advisor to government on intelligence and security matters (Ibid). Post the review,
New Zealand governments thus far seemed to have opted for strengthened over-
sight of priority setting and coordination within the national security group of the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet rather than appointing a NISA.
The final externally driven factor impacting on effective tasking and coordina-
tion is the politicisation of intelligence. Like the policy-driven structural reform
agenda of ‘Five Eyes’ governments discussed above, politicisation also has its
historical precedents. Chapter 2 showed how politicisation of intelligence in all
its forms extends back in history before the modern evolution of intelligence in
the 20th century. For the purposes of this section, which is to explain how external
policy factors impact on effective tasking and coordination, I will not embark on
a full discussion of how various types of politicisation have revealed themselves
across the historical record since 1945. There are other good sources which pro-
vide detailed analysis of historical cases of politicisation (Hastedt 2013: 5–31;
Rovner 2013: 55–67; Lucas 2011: 203–227). Instead I will briefly explain the
main types of politicisation since 9/11 and how they have impacted on building
better tasking, coordination, and integration. As the literature shows, politicisation
(of intelligence) remains a vague and contestable term, but there is at least some
agreement that it can come in a range of forms—some clearly more obvious while
others are more subtle (Walsh 2011a: 204–210; Treverton 2008: 91–106; Marrin
2013: 32–54; Rovner 2013: 55–67; Lucas 2011: 203–227). For example, there can
be pressure or interference by policy makers directly in the intelligence assess-
ment process to change, amend, and leave out relevant information. Politicisation
can also be more subtle such as political leaders self-selecting or cherry picking
‘bits’ of intelligence to support policy objectives. Hastedt has provided a frame-
work for studying politicisation of intelligence analysis by introducing soft vs
hard politicisation. A historical or contemporary case can be studied by examin-
ing its context for how soft and hard politicisation might impact on intelligence
analysis (Hastedt 2013: 6). Soft politicisation is defined as ‘deliberate attempts
to alter the assumptions underlying an analysis, the decision rules by which an
analysis moves forward and institutional setting within which these deliberations
are made’ (Ibid: 10). In contrast, hard politicisation involves the use of coercion
to eliminate options and if need be impose an outcome. In this case, there are
deliberate attempts to coerce analysts into adopting a certain set of assumptions,
conclusion, or in the extreme overruling analysts imposing a conclusion on the
analysis (Ibid). As was seen with the various announcements made by senior offi-
cials in London and Washington about the imminent threat posed by Saddam
Hussein and his WMD—a flurry of political announcements about every single
piece of intelligence found (reliable or otherwise) resulted in a hyper-sensitised
IC analytical processes.
Despite all that has been written about the intelligence assessments into
WMD of Iraq and whether they resulted in political directed amendments to
assessments per se, it seems clear enough that this highly politicised envi-
ronment gradually saw an evolution of political judgements that eventually
either matched or supported the policy makers perceptions of the threat.
(Walsh 2011a: 206)
Jervis suggests in situations such as the Iraq WMD assessments, the evolution
of analytical judgements to match political judgements creates a motivated bias
‘where the analyst seeks to avoid the painful value-trade-off between pleas-
ing policy makers and following professional standards’ (Jervis 2009: 212). In
essence, they are motivated in favour of producing assessments that support or at
least do not undermine policy (Ibid). The many public pronouncements by senior
members of the Bush administration, particularly Vice President Dick Chaney,
about the links between Iraq and Al Qaeda and that Saddam Hussein had WMD
underscore the politicised environment in which intelligence was being produced
and used (Walsh 2011a: 206). The various public announcements about what the
intelligence was saying about WMD in Iraq as noted earlier produced a politicised
environment and the administration’s cherry picking of intelligence are examples
of Hastedt’s hard politicisation (Hastedt 2013: 10, 26–27).
While the political leadership can ignore intelligence assessments and make
decisions based on other information or their own world view, this can be a dan-
gerous situation in some circumstances, for example, if political leaders in doing
so still refer to aspects of the intelligence to justify their preferred course of action
out of context or spin the significance of a threat or risk that the intelligence
community has still not made a final assessment on. These actions can subvert
the proper tasking of collection and analytical assets based on spurious political
belief—thereby wasting resources and possibly lives and producing damage to
the IC reputation and further policy failure.
Another type of intelligence politicisation is bureaucratic politicisation, which
has an impact on the normal running of tasking and coordination processes par-
ticularly when political leaders actively seek to obtain intelligence from either
not the usual appropriate suppliers of that information in the IC—or receive raw
intelligence that has not yet been processed. In the US we saw how the Pentagon
shortly after 9/11 established an Office of Special Plans (OSP), which utilised raw
intelligence from the field. The intelligence was fed into the offices of Secretary
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy-Secretary Defense), and the Vice President’s
Office. The information was not filtered or vetted by other member agencies of
the IC, who would normally assess its reliability against other sources. The OSP
underscored a battle within the IC between the CIA and DIA versus the Pentagon
for control over US foreign policy on the WMD in Iraq issue (Walsh 2011a:
207–208). The net effect of the OSP case was that some unreliable sources from
certain Iraqi opposition groups (e.g. the Iraqi National Congress) were being used
to make policy, whereas they had been discounted by the CIA earlier. The OSP
raw intelligence was stove piped to the highest ranking cabinet level, while other
processed intelligence was blocked or ignored by the Pentagon. Blocking the filter
of all source intelligence assessments on as many issues as possible might have
helped certain figures in the Bush administration continue their agenda over WMD
in Iraq—but it also meant other senior cabinet leaders including the President
were not getting good quality or reliable intelligence in which to task correctly
foreign, military, and intelligence assets (Walsh 2011a: 208). The OSP establish-
ment might well be a case of Hastedt’s soft politicisation as it was non-coercive,
but it did set out to ‘alter the assumptions and institutional settings within which
analytical deliberations occurred’ (Hastedt 2013: 10, 26–27).
I do not want to skew arguments about the impact of the politicisation of intel-
ligence on IC processes, including tasking and coordination. Clearly in liberal
democracies, IC activities should be at arms lengths from political decision-mak-
ers (or the hand that feeds them). But intelligence is by definition a politicised pro-
cess. While intelligence assessments should not from a good practice perspective
be written around policy dilemmas or specific outcomes, they nonetheless need
to be aware of the policy issues decision-makers are grappling with to ensure
they assess priority issues in ways that can inform the policy making process.
Nonetheless, since 9/11 there is sufficient evidence to suggest that at times the
arm’s length gap between the political leadership and the IC is closing (e.g. Iraq
2003; Afghanistan, the Trump administration, and Russian collusion in elections
and over the nature of the Russian threat). In the United States, the intelligence/
policy gap is closing in perhaps ways yet to be fully understood—through the
interference with the way normal cabinet-level decisions about intelligence task-
ing of top priorities are made but also by pressuring senior intelligence officials
to paint a rosier picture of current operational activity—or worse still the Trump
administration’s downplaying (for personal political reasons) of the growing
malignant threat posed by Russia to American electoral systems and other critical
infrastructure. At the January 2016 briefing of President-elect Trump at Trump
Tower, DNI Jim Clapper, Director CIA John Brennan, and FBI Director James
Comey briefed the incoming President about the strong intelligence confirming
Russian influence operation in the recent presidential election. Clapper, in his
2018 memoir Facts and Fears. Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence, records
that the President-elect accepted initially this intelligence, but was seeking confir-
mation that the interference did not have any effect on the outcome of the election.
Clapper replied that ‘we had neither the authority nor capabilities to assess what
impact—if any—the Russian operation had’ (Clapper 2018: 375). As Clapper
and his team began to leave Trump Tower, he overheard some of the President-
elect’s staff get to work on a press briefing saying aloud ‘the IC assessed that the
Russian interference did not change the outcome of the election—which he says
was very different from our acknowledgement that we hadn’t and couldn’t assess
its impact’ (Ibid: 376). The Trump administration was starting to cherry pick the
intelligence even before taking office.
In addition, we have seen in the Trump administration the public disrespect,
denigration, and even hostile comments about the ‘trustworthiness’ of the IC over
the extent of Russian involvement in US internal affairs and in contrast the will-
ingness to trust Vladimir Putin over the President’s own IC. The President also
accused the FBI of wire-tapping Trump Towers just before his victory as well as
the firing of James Comey, the FBI director, in May 2017, which again under-
scores a distrust and hostility to the IC. Former intelligence leaders such as John
Brennan, Jim Clapper, and Michael Hayden amongst others have since come out
in the media and in print to criticise President Trump’s ongoing politicisation of
intelligence. In summary, all of these developments are yet additional layers of
the politicisation of intelligence, which potentially can significantly damage the
relationship between the number one ‘intelligence tasker’—the US President and
the IC. They can also have an effect on the democratic institutions of the US if the
truth to power that the IC seeks is dismissed by the political leadership as ‘fake
news’ (Hayden 2018).
What can intelligence leaders do about different forms of politicisation is dif-
ficult to know. Different circumstances may require varied approaches, which
suggests there is no magic off the shelf panacea to politicisation in all its forms.
There are all the usual things managers and IC leaders should do related to quality
control of products and assigning the most ‘accurate’ probability of certainties
around collection sources and analytical judgements. We will come back to these
issues in subsequent chapters. There is no doubt also that leaders of ICs and the
agencies therein need to continue to publish whole of IC assessments on issues
not just at the strategic level, but where possible at the operational level as well.
Of course you want to avoid political decision-makers receiving a bland lowest
common denominator product that every agency will agree on. There still needs to
be contestability in products, but with some major political decisions, particularly
around whether the country will go to war, robust whole of IC products that don’t
gloss over the uncertainties may still in some instances guard against politicisa-
tion. If the political leadership sees that the IC speaks with one voice on an impor-
tant issue this can be compelling for at least some politicians (though not all as the
Trump administration has shown) to deal with the assessment provided whether
politically advantageous or not. Agencies can still provide appendix notes if they
disagree on a judgement of other IC member agencies. Accountability mecha-
nisms are also important ways to diagnose and treat politicisation of intelligence
in ‘Five Eyes’ countries. We will briefly return to the subject of politicisation and
the ways IC leaders may deal with it in the future in Chapter 8 (The Future IC
Leader and Governance Challenges).
Internal factors
The types of politically sponsored major redesign of the US IC post-9/11 and
the initially less dramatic policy and legislative reform measures to achieve bet-
ter coordination across the other ‘Five Eyes’ countries has no doubt improved
tasking and coordination across ICs in some areas. The growing complexity of
many threats, both state and non-state variants, in a way is bringing IC agencies
within and across ‘Five Eyes’ countries to share resources, identify priorities, and
take more a mission approach to specific threats (Walsh 2011b). How political
and policy-driven reform measures discussed above are implemented within ICs
is of course largely in the hands of senior leadership. In this section, we briefly
explore how ‘Five Eyes’ IC leaders have sought to implement the broader policy
and legislative measures constructed by their political leadership post-9/11 and
how these have impacted on the tasking and coordination of intelligence. As with
the earlier discussion of external factors, this section provides only a short sum-
mary of three inter-related issues: organisational structure, information sharing,
and cultural matters as these continue to influence how effectively intelligence is
being tasked, coordinated, and integrated post-9/11.
If the clarion call (to varying degrees) from political leaders since 9/11 has
been for more centralised, coordinated, and integrated intelligence processes
within and across IC agencies, senior leaders have had a large leeway on how to
achieve such policy and legislative directives. One of the key leadership-driven
internal organisational reform responses since 9/11 has been the proliferation of
fusion centres. This has been one way that IC leaders can demonstrate to the
political leadership their broader concerns about organisational structure, infor-
mation sharing, and effective intelligence support to decision-makers are being
addressed. Of course, as noted in Chapter 2, fusion centres are not new. In their
modern manifestation they appeared on a more regular basis during World War
II and continued their expansion on during the Cold War—both in the national
security and law enforcement contexts. But there is no doubt after 9/11 there has
been an even greater proliferation of fusion centres. As noted above, particularly
in the counter-terrorism area in the United States after 9/11, but also the other
‘Five Eyes’ countries’ political decision-makers funded large fusion centres like
the NCTC (US), NTAC (Australia), ITAC (Canada), CTAG (NZ), and JTAC
(UK) were established to better coordinate the tasking, analysis, coordination,
and integration of all intelligence across government relating to terrorism and
counter-terrorism.
Post-9/11, fusion centres became a kind of ‘insurance policy’ for both the
political and IC leadership that there was now, at least in theory, a much more
coordinated, integrated approach to collection, analysis, and operational activity.
Fusion centres again theoretically would fill in the silos identified by the 9/11
Commission as well as deconflict effort across entire ICs. With the potential ben-
efits in mind there has been a further proliferation of fusion centres in the US.
There are now over 72 across the United States in metro and regional areas that
seek to fill another important gap between federal government intelligence and
intelligence extracted at the state and local level largely by law enforcement agen-
cies (Masse and Rollins 2008). While there are less fusion centre operations in the
other ‘Five Eyes’ countries, fused arrangements have emerged across Australia,
UK, Canada, and New Zealand in national security and law enforcement priority
areas in counter-terrorism, anti-money laundering and terrorism financing, border
protection, and organised crime amongst others. However, how IC leaders have
established and managed a range of fusion centres since 9/11 shows that not all
function as intended for a range of reasons. Arguably chief among these has been
poor governance (i.e. the coordination of resourcing, business rules, the establish-
ment of a communal identity and issues related to making collective decisions).
Governance issues in turn impact on whether intelligence is tasked and coordi-
nated in ways that can maximise the results of many agencies being co-located
physically or virtually. Of course I am mindful not to over-generalise the gov-
ernance issues to the point of inaccuracy. Not all centres have poor governance
issues or are racked with other performance challenges (Carter and Carter 2009:
1323–1339).
For example, Van Puyvelde explored the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
in EL Paso, Texas—a 30-year-old fusion centre of federal and local authorities
focused on countering drug trafficking (Van Puyvelde 2016: 888–902). His article
demonstrates that fusion centres can be an effective force multiplier for more effec-
tive tasking and coordination of intelligence beyond what might be achieved if
these agencies were working exclusively out of their own headquarters. However,
my own research, which included visits to two very different fusion centres back
in 2009 (the JRIC and the ROIC), show how diverse such centres can be. Both
these centres differed in several factors including how they were led as well as
how leaders navigated intelligence governance issues. These factors impacted on
the ability for the fusion centres to identify tasking priorities and support robust
coordination of intelligence collection, analytical and operational action once pri-
orities have been tasked (Walsh 2011a, 2015: 123–142). More recent evidence
showed that many fused arrangements in the US have not necessarily resulted in
identification of tasking, collection, analytical, or operational priorities because
of leadership and governance issues, limited resourcing, or poor training. In late
2012, the US Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations released an uncomplimentary assessment of US
fusion centres that provided further evidence about the challenges they face—par-
ticularly on a range of governance issues. For example, the Senate report found
poor leadership efforts on improving information sharing, funding oversight (at
the fusion centres and in the DHS headquarters), and questions about the ‘value
added’ that fusion centres intelligence was providing from an analytical perspec-
tive (US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
2012). These issues have also been identified by other researchers along with
concerns about privacy, security, and the implications of a greater number of
agencies—particularly local law enforcement having access to national security
intelligence (Carter and Carter 2009; Newkirk 2010: 43–60). Additionally, it is
less clear how fusion centres build effective partnerships between the centre and
local agencies. In particular, in the case of law enforcement fusion centres there
are questions about how they facilitate actionable intelligence products that can
result in intelligence-led and data-driven policing strategies (Lewandowski et al.
2018: 177–193).
In addition to how IC leaders have developed organisational structures such
as fusion centres for better tasking and coordination of intelligence, a big factor
in their proliferation since 9/11 has been to provide an integrated or fused intelli-
gence picture for decision-makers. This relies on having the right type and volume
of intelligence collected, and making sure in order to create that fused picture
all intelligence has been shared across the fusion centre or broader IC to all that
need to see it as quickly as possible. Optimal intelligence sharing is a function of
many factors including types and capabilities of various collection methodologies
(Chapter 4) and the supporting ICT architecture (Chapter 6). For the purposes of
our discussion here though, we will restrict our discussion to cultural barriers,
which can restrict adequate information sharing. The knock-on effect of cultural
barriers can be decision-makers making less informed tasking decisions or an
uncoordinated and insufficient response to intelligence collection and analysis.
There are several cultural factors that impact on information sharing across
‘Five Eyes’ ICs including in fused arrangements or joint task forces that were
set up to improve information sharing. Some, as noted earlier, relate to the
mandates of different agencies, bureaucratic history (e.g. national security vs
law enforcement organisational and cultural identities), funding, and leader-
ship dynamics (Cotter 2017: 173–187; Catano and Gauger 2017: 17–34; De
Castro Garcia et al. 2017: 736; Herman 2003: 50–52). As seen with inclusion
of the ISE in the IRTPA, cultural issues cannot be legislated easily away in any
prescriptive sense in the short term given the longstanding bureaucratic priori-
ties and cultural differences between agencies across the US IC. The wording
within the IRTPA outline both the intent, attributes, and steps required for the
enactment of the ISE across the US IC. For example, in terms of the attributes
of the ISE:
the President shall, through the structures described in subparagraphs (B) and
(C) of paragraph (1), ensure that the ISE provides and facilitates the means
for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, local,
and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guide-
lines and technologies. The President shall, to the greatest extent practicable,
ensure that the ISE provides the functional equivalent of, or otherwise sup-
ports, a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment that…
(ODNI 2009: 152)
While extensive progress has been made on information sharing, it still remains
difficult to overcome the cultural organisational barriers across the US IC that
would allow the fullest expression of ISE sentiments expressed in the IRTPA.
Since 9/11 and across the ‘Five Eyes’ there are a number of other examples of how
organisational cultural issues impact on information sharing. Tromblay’s survey
of the FBI’s IT development process, for example, highlights the implementation
of several IT capabilities such as the case management system Sentinel in 2012,
and how these are indicators of larger cultural problems across the organisation.
In his words, ‘information systems have been historically cobbled together in an
uncoordinated fashion’ (Tromblay 2017: 828).
Information sharing problems that demonstrate cultural issues have been raised
in Australia and Canada as well. In Australia, a 2012 Parliamentary Inquiry, which
I provided testimony to and identified a number of IT architectural and cultural
impediments, prevented the sharing of criminal intelligence across Australia’s
law enforcement agencies (Walsh 2012). In Canada, a 2012 externally funded
government report suggested that ‘support requests that specific organizations
receive from consumers are also often not shared with other organizations and
potentially several agencies might be tasked to produce intelligence on the same
“hot” topic’ (Adams et al. 2012: 18). This suggests that information sharing may
not be as sufficient in some instances as it needs to be. On the point of information
sharing, the report pointed out that:
the Canadian intelligence community, having a relatively small size, is

particularly prone to the problem of overextending its resources, and that
unclear or overlapping mandates among organizations can create unneces-
sary redundancy. IC members participating in the research noted that hav-
ing more clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, promoting more of
a cross community view, endorsing joint projects within the community as
well as developing better information sharing mechanisms could facilitate a
higher level of coordination.
(Ibid)
Another dimension on information sharing across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs is how cultural
issues play out in the broader homeland security and law enforcement communi-
ties. As noted earlier, since 9/11 in each ‘Five Eyes’ country, governments have
enacted policy and legislative reforms aimed at broadening the corporate identity
of IC communities beyond the traditional national security and defence agencies
involved in national intelligence to include a broader church of agencies such
as those responsible for border protection, immigration, financial intelligence,
organised crime, and to some extent state and even local law enforcement. The
ISE, fusion centres, ODNI, and DHS all represent efforts by successive US admin-
istrations to not only restructure the US IC architecture, but provide frameworks
that allow a larger number of agencies, particularly state, regional, and local law
enforcement, to potentially play a greater role in a broader reconceptualising of
the national intelligence community. Similar efforts have been made incremen-
tally by governments in Australia and Canada as well to create more whole of
government ministerial and policy responses to intelligence, national security,
and law enforcement issues (Walsh 2011b: 109–127; Shore 2006: 456–479).
It is hard to argue at least against the policy efforts of ‘Five Eyes’ governments
that try to engender a broader IC enterprise that includes increasingly at least at the
margins more law enforcement agencies, who are often best placed to collect and
operationalise intelligence about threats in local settings that may have national
or even international importance. Having therefore structures, systems, and cul-
tural customs in place that facilitate the sharing of intelligence in both directions
between the traditional IC agencies in each ‘Five Eyes’ country with their law
enforcement counterparts is critical. Yet, as discussed earlier, one policy solution
to facilitate intelligence and information sharing—the creation of fusion centres
have not always been an exemplary approach for the promotion of information
sharing, even when agency representatives may be co-located in the same physi-
cal space. Federal, state, and local agencies have their own legislative, resourc-
ing, and management issues, which influences how intelligence and information
sharing takes place. There are also, in many cases, a diverse array of historical
and organisational cultural issues which can constrain sharing. Lambert’s study
on the sharing of homeland security information outlines some of the obstacles to
information sharing at the state and local levels, including inter-agency and intra-
agency issues that arise for police agencies. Lambert explores the complexities of
information sharing across highly decentralised policing systems in the US. Many
police departments lack a formal intelligence function that limits their ability to
share information (Lambert 2019). There have been several other studies which
have examined the various constraints for optimal information sharing including
organisational cultural factors (Best 2011; Walsh 2011a; Maras 2017: 187–197;
Jones 2007: 384–401). While in all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs, efforts have been made from
a digital information and ICT network perspective to address information sharing
issues, research shows that the role of improving trust in social networks amongst
intelligence agencies is as important as ICT technology solutions (Cotter 2017:
173–187).
Finally, as outlined in Chapter 2, we saw from the 1990s onward how intel-
ligence led policing models have influenced the broader organisational cultures of
‘Five Eyes’ law enforcement communities, particularly how intelligence is tasked
and coordinated through the broader non-intelligence parts of law enforcement.
As noted, efforts by intelligence leaders in various law enforcement agencies to
use intelligence-led policing strategies aimed at putting intelligence more front of
centre of the ‘policing business’ continues to be largely a work in progress. Right
from the early implementation of intelligence led policing strategies such as the
national intelligence model in the UK, efforts were being made by heads of intel-
ligence functions within law enforcement agencies to integrate intelligence into
all aspects of the policing business—particularly in how intelligence was tasked
and coordinated with and by other non-intelligence functions of policing such as
investigations (Sheyptycki 2004: 307–332). It was clear though that there were
challenges in getting new ILP inspired tasking and coordination processes off the
ground in UK policing (John and Maguire 2004; Flood 2004a: 37–52; Bullock
2012: 1–20). In the UK and in other ‘Five Eyes’ countries such as Australia,
Canada, and the United States, the implementation of intelligence-led policing
models that can inform better tasking and coordination of intelligence across law
enforcement agencies have also met with their challenges. These have included
senior and non-intelligence law enforcement staff not knowing how to—or not
wanting to maximise strategic, operational, or tactical tasking and coordination
meetings and processes to direct resources in more proactive ways to reduce crime
(Walsh 2011a; Crous 2012: 3–16; Ratcliffe 2008, 2016; James 2014; Burcher
and Whelan 2018: 1–22; Darroch and Mazzerole 2013: 3–37). Again, care needs
should be exercised in avoiding over-generalising to the point of inaccuracy the
many challenges ‘Five Eyes’ countries have experienced in the implementation
of ILP strategies. However, many studies examining the implementation of intel-
ligence-led policing in these countries show that one critical challenge remains
building in sustainable ways tasking and coordination processes. Sustainable
tasking and coordination mean placing intelligence capabilities at the centre of
law enforcement decision-making rather than exclusively relying on input solely
by investigators. The inability in many cases to develop viable intelligence-led
tasking and coordination processes is linked to law enforcement leadership cul-
tures. These are in turn linked to how intelligence has been viewed as a supportive
function compared to law enforcement’s main functions of investigations.
Theme 2 Risk and threat assessment

The ability of IC leaders to oversee the development of better risk and threat
methodologies also has an impact on effective tasking and coordination across
‘Five Eyes’ ICs. While it can be difficult to assess risk and threats in an increas-
ingly complex threat environment (particularly emerging threats), ICs still need
to allocate resources to do so. Risk and threat assessment clearly remain critical
tools for political decision-makers in apportioning resources in managing threat
and risks. In addition to apportioning resources for policy interventions, deci-
sion-makers will use risk and threat assessment methodologies for tasking ICs
and their collection, analytical, and operational assets. Likewise, IC leaders and
other managers in their agencies will also rely, at least partially, on risk and threat
assessments to determine internal tasking priorities.
This section will not provide a detailed analysis of the range of threat-and-risk
methodologies used across ‘Five Eyes’ countries. There are too many to examine
adequately in this book and many are classified. Instead, the objective here is to
discuss in a general and unclassified sense some of the problems that have been
identified in the application of threat-and-risk assessment methodologies both in
the national security and law enforcement contexts and the impact these have on
how intelligence is tasked, coordinated, and integrated. A second objective is to
then reflect on what some of the consequences of these challenges are for contem-
porary IC leaders.
Since 9/11 in particular, a greater understanding of methodologies, which
might be useful for assessing both threat and risk, has emerged (Meloy and
Hoffman 2014; Monahan 2012; Otto and Douglas 2010; Strang 2005; Kebbell
and Porter 2011). Both threat and risk are interrelated with threat focused on
the actor(s) intentions and capabilities. In other words, how likely and capa-
ble are they to conduct a criminal or terrorist act? Risk assessment is focused
on the consequences, harm, or impact of the threat being carried out against
a range of factors, including political, economic, physical, psychological, and
environmental interests of a nation, community, or individual. However, across
and within each ‘Five Eyes’ country, several threat-and-risk methodologies have
developed resulting in a lack of consistent approaches to ‘measuring’ threat and
risks of both simple high volume crimes and more complex ones such as terror-
ism and organised crime. In both national security and law enforcement agen-
cies, some threat-and-risk methodologies have demonstrated more durability,
reliability, and validity than others. For example, Project Sleipnir, developed
by Stephen Strang and colleagues at Canada’s RCMP to assess threats posed
by different organised crime groups (Strang 2005), has been one methodology
that has gained traction over the years in several ‘Five Eyes’ countries though
others remain either flawed or works in progress. For example, the FBI’s Threat
Review and Prioritisation Process (TRP) seems to focus on disrupting reactively
‘here and now’ threats rather than providing a methodology for the Bureau
to collect intelligence systematically against the US’s National Intelligence
Priorities Framework (NIPF). A more systematic intelligence collection driven
approach would help the FBI ensure its strategic and operational work is aligned
to national priorities in a way that can identify threats that are priorities before
they coalesce (Tromblay 2016: 769). Using risk and threat methodologies to
drive intelligence priority setting also become difficult when threats and risk
involve an understanding of the significance of particular variables such as tech-
nology—and how it may facilitate or inhibit the realisation of emerging threats
and risks. For example, in complex and emerging threat areas such as cyber and
biotechnology the ability of ICs to develop robust threat-and-risk methodolo-
gies can be hampered by technological determinism and a failure to sufficiently
reach out to outside experts in the research community and private sector—who
may have a better understanding of particular technologically enabled threats
and risks (Walsh 2018).
Of course in some cases, reaching outside the IC to external experts may not
result in better understandings of threat and risk. For instance, in the areas of vio-
lence and radicalisation, researcher contributions have been picked up by parts of
the IC and law enforcement agencies, but the validity and reliability of their meth-
odologies vary considerably. Some methodologies have solely relied on clinical
assessments or actuarial approaches, which have resulted in false positives and an
inability to assess whether an individual is at high risk of becoming an offender or
terrorist (Dean 2014: 1–2). More recently though, other structured clinical judge-
ment approaches (SPJ), which are a combination of empirical knowledge and
clinical professional judgement, have been used with some success to assess high-
risk violence in adult, forensic populations (Ibid: 3). For example, the Violent
Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) has been developed to assess the risk of
violent political extremism. However,
it is not clear if VERA can discriminate between all of the individuals identi-
fied through its set of defined risk factors with a risk score indicative of future
terrorism from those more likely to go to actively engage in terrorist actions.
(Ibid: 6)
Threat-and-risk terminology can also be poorly understood within the IC, which
can contribute to a lack of rigour around assessing risk and threat. Other research-
ers have pointed to threat assessment methodologies, where a diverse number
of threat actor categories have been blurred—potentially over or under measur-
ing the significance of actual or potential threats. For example, leading up to the
Vancouver Olympics in 2010, Canada’s terrorism fusion center ITAC (mentioned
earlier) created a classifier multi-issue extremism matrix (MIE), which in addition
to jihadi terrorism included other social dissenting movements (Monaghan and
Walby 2012: 147).
Since 9/11, threat-and-risk assessments have also fallen down due to the lack
of information flows within agencies, across the community, and even outside the
IC. As Cormac suggests, analysis of threats has often been incremental rather than
a broader picture being developed and disseminated to decision-makers (Cormac
2013: 488). Another potential issue with some threat-and-risk methodologies that
can be promoted, however unintentionally, is via a kind of racial profile or ran-
dom selection data collection process rather than an approach which is the result
of evidence-based choices (Kebbell and Porter 2011). It’s clear that leaders need
to sponsor the development of better risk and threat assessments, particularly in
areas of emerging threats and risks such as cyber and biosecurity. Finally, assess-
ment methodologies also need a greater focus on measuring the harms associated
with threat actors and risks across the entire national security and crime con-
tinuum (Sherman et al. 2016: 171–183; Ratcliffe 2015: 164–182).
Theme 3 Role of science and technology

As discussed in Chapter 2, science and technology have always under-written the
development of ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence capabilities and this has only become
more so from the Cold War onwards (Warner 2014: 165). In this book, across all
chapters, we will talk a lot about science and technology and how IC leaders work
with it to improve outcomes for decision-makers. But for the purposes of this
chapter, and for this section, I will focus on how the use of science and technology
by ICs impacts specifically on intelligence tasking and also its influence on how
core intelligence processes are coordinated.
The best way to illustrate the role of science and technology on intelligence
tasking and coordination is by exploring case studies. Given the pervasiveness
of technologically enabled threats such as cyber and the ongoing and rapid
uptake of new science and technology to improve intelligence capabilities there
is potentially an infinite number of case studies that could be explored. For
example, the explosion in telecommunications, and digital communications in
particular, is just one area where decision-makers can task ICs to extract threat
information in order to better understand threats and risks. Digital communica-
tions provides a suite of technologies for interception of threat actor’s com-
munications (Walsh 2011a; Walsh and Miller 2016: 345–368; Sims and Gerber
2005: xi). Data mining and knowledge discovery is another cluster in the sci-
ence and technology area where decision-makers can task ICs to extract threat/
risk information from an ever increasing volume of data. As discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6 (ICT), for at least the last three decades ICs have been invest-
ing heavily in more advanced knowledge discovery techniques, knowledge, and
infrastructure to better classify threat patterns and hopefully in some threat/
risk types attempt to ‘predict’ future events (Walsh 2011a: 246–253; Skillicorn
2009).
All these areas have consequences for intelligence tasking and coordination
and their management is a leadership responsibility for ICs mainly. Governments
may fund new science and technology capability for ICs or be interested in how
the same technology facilitates the reduction of risk and targeting of threat actors.
However, it is the IC leadership that are ultimately responsible for understanding
technologically enabled threats and the incorporation of science and technologies
into current capabilities to deal with them. In this short section we focus on foren-
sic science and technologies as a case study. First, from a threat actor perspective,
it remains less clear how aspects of forensic science are being exploited to com-
mit simple and complex crimes. A better understanding of how offenders may
exploit forensics used by the IC and the broader law enforcement community to
avoid detection or facilitate illicit activity will improve the processes under which
intelligence tasking of collection and analytical assets take place across a range of
national security and law enforcement threats and risks.
Secondly, how forensics sciences and technology are incorporated into the
IC and law enforcement communities’ existing capabilities can both facilitate or
inhibit core intelligence processes. If used well with other intelligence processes,
forensics can strengthen IC outcomes. However, if poorly used, coordinated, or
integrated into mainstream IC activities, then this can have negative consequences
on how tasking and coordination occur within and across ICs on a range of threat-
and-risk issues, where the inclusion of forensic knowledge is crucial for better
decision-maker support.
For the purposes of this chapter, when discussing forensic science and technol-
ogy I am referring to a diverse array of techniques and knowledge such as match-
ing fingerprints, DNA profiling, chemical, biological analysis, ballistics, digital
images, footprints, and other environmental factors which generate data that can
reveal patterns of criminal activity and can augment other intelligence sources in
the investigation of crimes. In addition to the development in forensic techniques
and knowledge, over the last two decades there has also been a flourishing of the
field of forensic intelligence. Forensic intelligence as defined by Oliver Ribaux
is the accurate, timely and useful product of logically processing forensic

case data. Of importance is the implication of an additional level of consid-
eration, where collectively (across numerous investigations or various disci-
plines) the outcomes of forensic analysis become the source of intelligence.
(Ribaux cited in Milne 2012: 1–2)
Forensic intelligence to varying degrees across each ‘Five Eyes’ country has
moved both the practice of intelligence and investigations beyond merely analys-
ing a substance forensically for the evidence it alone contains. Rather, the objec-
tive now is to go beyond the single specimen or forensic data to assess how it
can be examined holistically against a range of other forensic data and then to
use the evidence gained with other sources of intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT,
open source) to build a stronger case for prosecution or disruption. Forensic intel-
ligence is also concerned with how various forensic data sources can be used to
‘reveal patterns of criminal activity and the production of intelligence products for
action’ (Milne 2012: 2–3). It is beyond the scope of this section to provide an ana-
lytical breakdown of the reliability and validity of various forensic techniques and
knowledge that may be applied across the full spectrum of crime—from simple
high volume crimes such as burglaries to more complex variants such as terrorism
and cyber hacking. What can be said in a general sense is that there are two issues
with the application of forensic science, knowledge and intelligence, that impact
on how it is used across ICs and law enforcement agencies. Both of these broad
issues impact on how intelligence is tasked (if forensic intelligence is used or not)
and how its capability is coordinated across the IC.
First there are a general set of issues and debates about forensic methods, their
characteristics, and how reliable and valid they are. Related to this is how to opti-
mise the use of forensics in an intelligence and investigative context, and what
barriers prevent the optimal exploitation of forensic data, particularly as another
intelligence source. In terms of the first issue, the ‘CSI (crime scene investiga-
tion) factor’ now for several decades has become glamorised by several television
shows—sometimes over-selling the capabilities of various forensic techniques.
Even with now well-established forensic techniques such as DNA profiling, false
positives can occur in crime scenes or in cases where DNA may have been planted
at a scene to implicate an innocent person rather than the offender. Similarly, the
field of digital forensics, which has been in existence for 30 years, while produc-
ing great benefits in the investigations of complex digital crime, has increasingly
caused concern amongst political leaders, ICs, and law enforcement agencies as
the growing use of encrypted technologies have facilitated terrorist attacks and
other criminal offences. For example, in 2015 MI5 Head Andrew Parker said
individuals were engaging now in computer acts which were beyond the control
of authorities (Horsman 2017: 449). Other senior intelligence officials such as
former director CIA Michael Morrell have raised concerns that one of the impli-
cations of media sensationalism in response to Edward Snowden has been the
development of a security and privacy-conscious public and this allows terrorists
to communicate without detection (Ibid). Additionally, in the microbial forensics
field, which has increasingly developed after 9/11 to attribute the origin of vari-
ous dangerous pathogens in actual or potential bioterrorism events, there is still
a great deal of refinement required in various forensic techniques (Walsh 2018:
113–114).
The second issue outlined above is how forensics sciences and technology are
incorporated into the IC and law enforcement communities along with other capa-
bilities and how this can either facilitate or inhibit core intelligence processes such
as effective collection and analysis. There are many issues that could be discussed
here, but for the sake of brevity the main issue is one of organisational integration
of forensic capabilities into the broader collection and analytical structures and
functions of ICs and law enforcement agencies. There are examples in the litera-
ture that show how some agencies have done a good job of integrating forensic
intelligence along with other criminal or national security intelligence. Rossy and
colleagues refer to efforts by six states in the western part of Switzerland in shar-
ing a common data base for the analysis of forensic data (e.g. DNA, shoe marks,
images) and criminal intelligence in high volume crimes (Rossy et al. 2013: 137–
146). Similarly, in the national security context the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive
Device Analysis Center (TEDAC)—an international inter-agency collaboration
coordinating effort by law enforcement, intelligence, and the military to gather
and share intelligence about explosives and their role in regional insurgencies and
domestic intelligence—has made progress in aligning forensic intelligence with
criminal intelligence sources (Walsh 2018: 253).
But there remains for many ‘Five Eyes’ IC agencies limitations in how foren-
sic intelligence is integrated into the broader intelligence collection and analytical
enterprise. While there may be good reasons to integrate forensic intelligence
into broader intelligence databases in allowing a greater and more explicit col-
laborative approach between forensic specialists, intelligence analysts, and inves-
tigators, there remain in many agencies structural impediments to allow this to
occur. Both forensic specialists and intelligence analysts can be siloed in their
practice. A forensic specialist in fingerprints is more likely to see themselves as
a fingerprint analyst rather than part of a broader identity specialist or a forensic
intelligence analyst (Walsh 2018: 249). A more siloed linear approach by forensic
scientists does not make collaboration with the broader intelligence enterprise
easy particularly if this is also imbued with other professional attributes of foren-
sic specialists, who traditionally see themselves as conservative and evidence ori-
entated (Ibid).
However, the complexity of the most serious threats and risk in the post-9/11
environment as noted earlier can no longer just rely on a pathway to prosecution.
All ‘Five Eyes’ ICs now need to look for opportunities for disruption and harm
reduction and forensic specialists are increasingly relied upon at early stages of
intelligence operations and investigations. This will require still a cultural shift for
both forensic specialists and intelligence analysts, who have tended to connect on
a more ad hoc basis—mainly at the end of an intelligence operation or investiga-
tion at the prosecution stage. The challenge for leaders is how to build organi-
sational structures within and across the IC that integrates forensic intelligence
more seamlessly into other national security and criminal intelligence collection
and analysis. This integration is not just an ICT architecture problem, but also a
training, legislative, and cultural issue.
Finally, how can intelligence leaders better anticipate strategically what
forensic and other science and technology capabilities will be required to manage
both the known and unknown threats and risks (Walsh 2018: 253)? Arguably,
it may well be this last point that will impact on how well forensics and other
science and technology capabilities can improve the effectiveness of tasking
and coordination of intelligence over the next several decades. If leaders are
able to better anticipate what kinds of threats and risks may emerge and what
science and technology capabilities will be needed to collect and analyse these
threats—political leaders and ICs themselves will have a better understanding of
how to task, coordinate, and integrate the intelligence enterprise to work these
threats/risks.
Theme 4 Strategic intelligence, tasking and coordination

Strategic intelligence has periodically played an important role in how ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs task and coordinate intelligence priorities and processes from the end of
World War II onwards. Several authors illustrate the origins of strategic/estima-
tive and early warning intelligence in the US, which included the establishment of
the Office of National Estimates (O/NE) by DCI Walter Bedell Smith in October
1950 at the CIA. Later, Sherman Kent, a former Yale University history profes-
sor, took over as chief of the O/NE from 1952 to 1967 (Gentry and Gordon 2019:
73–74; Walsh 2017: 548–562; Fingar 2011; Marrin 2017: 725–742; Johnson
2015).
In his 1949 book Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Kent
clearly states the importance of strategic intelligence for decision-makers.
He says amongst other things; ‘to begin with knowledge which strategic
intelligence must produce deserves a more forbidding adjective than “use-
ful.” You should call it the knowledge vital for national survival, and as such
it takes on sombreness and stature.’ (Kent 1949: vii)
Strategic intelligence also became widely used in Australia, the UK, Canada,
and New Zealand, with each IC establishing agencies and/or committees to bring
together all source-strategic assessments on emerging threats and risks (Walsh
2011a; Walsh 2017). However, the role of strategic intelligence across the ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs has been a story of mixed success—with arguably even less success
across their law enforcement agencies. There are a range of policy maker, aca-
demic, and practitioner opinions on why strategic intelligence has not played an
optimal role in decision-maker support (Gentry and Gordon 2019). In the US con-
text and to some extent in the UK and Australia, strategic assessments have been
either fairly or unfairly associated with historical intelligence failures. Earlier in
the chapter, mention was made of the 9/11 and WMD Iraq intelligence failures
and it’s clear in both that policy makers believed some of the analytical deficien-
cies attributable to either absent or poor strategic analysis.
According to the 9/11 Commission report, the September 11 attacks exposed
the inability of analysts and agents to perform strategic analysis. Aligned with
this was the conclusion that ‘no agency in the IC could imagine a terrorist opera-
tion conducted inside the United States, using commercial airplanes as weapons,
although Al-Qaeda had planned such operations in the mid-1990s in Europe and
Asia’ (Goodman 2003: 62). A ‘failure of imagination’ became one of the catch
phrases from the 9/11 Commission report. Implicit in such a phrase is that per-
haps strategic intelligence analysis is about analysts improving their imagination,
which does seem a little absurd given the trajectory of many emerging threats are
beyond the confines of either analytical probability or plausibility. This does not
negate that improvements in analysis were not possible or desirable after 9/11, but
linking a failure of imagination to strategic intelligence practice does not lay out
a valuable direction or metric for improvement.
Others have suggested additional factors behind specific intelligence fail-
ure events like 9/11 and WMD in Iraq. In the case of 9/11, others have accused
Commission investigators of misrepresenting the IC’s strategic intelligence
capability, which had been strong at the time (Pillar 2006: 1022–1044), and that
policy failures were the main breakdown pre-9/11 rather than strategic intelli-
gence (Marrin 2011: 182–202). In between historical cases of intelligence fail-
ures, where perhaps a more forensic examination of the strengths and limitations
of strategic intelligence can be made, senior intelligence leaders, scholars, and
practitioners have raised several other issues, which may explain the varying uti-
lisation of strategic intelligence assessments, particularly in the national security
space across ‘Five Eyes’ countries. Marrin raises a number of issues which are
also documented by others. These range from the irrelevance many decision-
makers see in using strategic assessments to make ‘the big policy decisions’ such
as war and peace. He argues that intelligence analysis at that most senior policy
level is seen as a duplicate step in the policy process—it ‘supplements but does
not supplant policy assessment’ (Marrin 2017: 727). Having strategic intelligence
as a ‘nice to have add on’ to the main policy assessment process is itself due
to a number of factors—some of which have already been raised earlier and in
Chapter 2. Political leaders have confidence in their world view. They have their
own biases, agendas, and political calculations, which are independent and often
more compelling (for them) than any intelligence assessment they may receive.
Decision-makers at the executive cabinet level have an entire policy and bureau-
cratic support structure around them in addition to the service provided by the IC.
This support structure often reads the raw intelligence itself and will bring in other
information sources that the IC may or may not possess, which can challenge
strategic intelligence assessments. All of these factors impact on how and when
strategic intelligence is tasked and coordinated across the IC.
Marrin suggests that perhaps the value of strategic intelligence may come at
the lower bureaucratic working level, where policy is fashioned ‘by giving gov-
ernment an aggregate picture enabling the government to learn about threats and
problems over time’ (Ibid: 732).
There are several other issues too that have contributed to the mixed success
of improving the tasking and uptake of strategic intelligence across ‘Five Eyes’
ICs over several decades. Probability, training, and organisational support have
also been identified as issues. Given strategic intelligence relies on making key
analytical judgements about evolving threat-and-risk factors, assessments are typi-
cally based on probabilities given the body of evidence tends to be less robust or
clear compared to operational and tactical assessments. In the intelligence stud-
ies literature there is an ongoing debate about how to more accurately ‘measure’
probability attached to levels of certainty for both analysts and decision-makers.
Across ICs up to recently, there has been a diverse set of probability criteria used
by various agencies to convey probability levels, which can confuse decision-mak-
ers (Rosenberg 2008: 139–152; Barnes 2016: 327–344; Dhami 2018: 257–272).
These debates are ongoing and unresolved, but it is clear that more refinement in
quantitative and qualitative descriptors of probability are required. Another issue
is the value of structured analytical techniques that have been the bedrock of a lot
of strategic analysis, and horizon scanning work completed in ICs over several
decades. More recently, a few studies in the United States and United Kingdom
have emerged questioning the value of these techniques in strategic analysis and
other non-strategic products (Coulthart 2016: 933–948; Whitesmith 2020: 1–20).
A further set of issues relate to the extent and quality of strategic analytical train-
ing offered across each ‘Five Eyes’ country. From my own experience of teaching
strategic intelligence in Australia and other ‘Five Eyes’ countries, some intelligence
agencies offer better training than others and this impacts on the quality of key
judgements. In particular, sound training and experience are critical to whether
analysts are able to go beyond the descriptive summary of information to answer
clearly ‘the so what question’ and whether the judgements can provide a firm bridge
between policy and operational action (Walsh 2011a; Walsh 2017: 548–562; Walsh
and Ratcliffe 2005). Establishing in the organisational structure of IC agencies a
strategic intelligence capability also takes consistent focus by the leadership and
even in agencies where there has been a long tradition of a strategic analytical capa-
bility such as the CIA and INR (US), JIO (UK), ONI (Australia), IAS (Canada),
and NAB (New Zealand), these capabilities need to be constantly strengthened and
demonstrate their value against the greater demands and pull of current or ‘here and
now’ intelligence (Gentry and Gordon 2019; Gustafson 2010: 589–610).
Generally speaking, strategic intelligence has played a less central role in the
allocation of strategic or operational priorities in law enforcement (Walsh 2011a).
In many respects the reasons for this are similar to those discussed above for
national security intelligence agencies. In particular, the impediments are linked
to organisational cultural issues in many law enforcement agencies, which as seen
earlier are historically linked to attitudes about the role of intelligence. As dis-
cussed under Theme 1, efforts to reset the traditionally peripheral and supportive
role of intelligence in law enforcement to one where it is more central and proac-
tive has been constrained by a range of factors including the value placed by law
enforcement leaders on their intelligence functions compared to other law enforce-
ment disciplines such as investigations. What strategic intelligence capability that
has developed in ‘Five Eyes’ countries has failed to be consistently supported by
law enforcement leadership. This is because it hasn’t been invested in consistently
in terms of analytical training—or if training has been provided law enforcement
leaders have not understood how to engage with the product. Even in cases where
law enforcement leaders have engaged with strategic analysis, the products have
not been easily transferable into setting operational priorities. In cultures, where the
value of intelligence itself in some agencies is still being questioned it is difficult
for strategic intelligence to play a fully effective role in setting strategic tasking and
coordination within law enforcement agencies let alone operational priorities—the
latter of which tend to drive the business of law enforcement. The ‘here and now’
of most law enforcement work continues to create a tactical drag where there may
be periodically good intentions to invest in strategic intelligence capabilities yet
analytical staff find themselves re-tasked on tactical and operational investigations.
This creates a failure point for many law enforcement agencies if they are not able
to build up a sustainable strategic intelligence capability that can help law enforce-
ment and political leaders identify early and emerging threats and risks.
The above issues related to the implementation and nurturing of a strategic
analytical capability beg the question what role can strategic intelligence and hori-
zon scanning play in improving decision-maker tasking for strategic, operational,
and even tactical action. Can strategic intelligence improve coordination of intel-
ligence at these lower levels? Can political decision-makers and IC leaders see
more value in the future by investing in and improving strategic intelligence and
horizon scanning?
Conclusion
Since all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs operate in an external environment filled increasingly
with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA), it is critical that
they can align key organisational processes such as tasking and coordination with
other core intelligence processes (collection, analysis) and key enabling activi-
ties. As shown in the discussion of all four themes (policy reform, science and
technology, risk and threat, and strategic intelligence), the tasking and coordi-
nation process may have improved in some respects after 9/11. But the analysis
of issues here show that broader IC initiatives to improve tasking and coordi-
nation in many cases are works in progress. Further integration, collaboration,
and sharing is still required. Improving tasking and coordination structures and
processes within ICs will likely never reach a state of perfection. The volatile
and uncertain security environment will conspire against it. Perfection is not a
realistic objective, but IC leaders can and will need to do more to improve tasking
and coordination structures, processes, and initiatives in the future. In Chapter 8
(The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges), we will come back to the
key intelligence governance challenges raised as they relate to tasking and coor-
dination and how IC leaders may begin to address them. The following chapter
(Chapter 4 Collection) explores some of the key challenges IC leaders face in
optimising the vital role intelligence collection plays in improving intelligence
outcomes for decision-makers.
Notes
1 The IC ITE, or the Intelligence Community, Information Technology Enterprise (IC
ITE), was created by the ONDI in 2012. It is a digital platform for the IC to store,
process, analyse, and share intelligence of all forms.
2 The ONI was established in 2018 and was the key recommendation of the
2017 Independent Intelligence Review.
3 CSE is Canada’s national cryptologic agency. It provides the Government of Canada
with information technology security (IT Security) and foreign signals intelligence
(SIGINT) services. CSE also provides technical and operational assistance to federal
law enforcement and security agencies. CSIS or the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service is Canada’s security and intelligence service. Its role is to investigate activities
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and to report these to the
Government of Canada. CSIS collects and assesses threat-related information, which
is typically disseminated to government partners through intelligence reports and other
intelligence products. Key threats include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, espionage, foreign interference, and cyber-tampering affecting criti-
cal infrastructure. The RCMP, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, is Canada’s
federal policing agency.
4 GCSB, NZSIS, and NAB are New Zealand’s SIGINT, security intelligence and assess-
ments agencies, respectively.
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4 Collection
Introduction
Intelligence collection is the second critical node of intelligence production.
Effective leadership over collection processes, both within agencies and across
intelligence communities (ICs), has always been vital to good intelligence out-
comes—at tactical, operational, or strategic levels. However, since 9/11 the chal-
lenges for maintaining and improving collection platforms and processes are
increasing. These include how leaders navigate technological issues that can both
facilitate and inhibit collection efforts against increasingly technologically nimble
threat actors. Other challenges include the impact of IC history and culture and
how both influence efforts for effective coordination and integration of informa-
tion and collection platforms. Notably as well, perhaps the Snowden episode has
like no previous leaks exacerbated the dilemmas for IC leaders between enhanc-
ing proactive collection capabilities and attempting to reconcile this with the pub-
lic’s increasing questioning of what should be legitimate secrets and the impact
of collection on privacy.
In order to understand the myriad of collection challenges, I have organised this
chapter into three broad thematic areas: technological and methodological, intel-
ligence collection and governance, and intelligence collection ethics and efficacy
challenges. The analysis of both primary and secondary data sources in this study
underscores how these three themes remain critical for IC leaders to understand if
they wish to continue to deploy effective collection strategies against the evolving
security environment. In the conclusion, I summarise briefly the general implica-
tions of all three thematic areas. However, as mentioned earlier, a more detailed
discussion of how leaders may address collection challenges will be explored in
Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges).
A final note before we begin discussing the three themes. This book is pitched
primarily at the IC leader, so a certain level of knowledge about collection plat-
forms and methodologies is assumed. However, if you are new to the world of
intelligence collection, there are several good sources which explain both the his-
torical development of collection, technologies, platforms and methodologies and
how they are used (e.g. Lowenthal 2012; Clark 2014; Gill and Phythian 2018;
Higgins 2009: 85–107; Johnson and Wirtz 2015; Shulsky and Schmitt 2002).
Collection 77
Technological and methodological challenges
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Leadership), the history of each mod-
ern ‘Five Eyes’ IC is entwined with the technological developments that marked
the decades following World War II (Warner 2012: 137–138). Advances and
investment in larger-scale technological collection platforms started in World
War II. The wartime ‘British codebreaking enterprise, which penetrated Enigma
resulted in more than 30,000 decrypts a month at the beginning of 1943 and
nearly 90,000 a month by the end of that same year’ (Brantly 2018: 564–565). As
Brantly points out:
the scale and complexity of communications globally at the end of the war
were significant, though the coming expansion of communications mediums
and the diversity of their use and applications were set to grow substantially
in the decades following the war.
(Ibid)
Brantly provides a good overview of later technological developments and how

they impacted on intelligence capabilities during the Cold War, such as ‘the first
electric programmable computers Colossus Mark 1 and later Mark 2 demonstrated
high levels of efficiency well in excess of their human computational counter-
parts’ (2018: 564–565). The use of computers to process large volumes of data
was of critical importance in the early Cold War period for intercepting commu-
nications as well as predicting how Soviet nuclear weapons would perform (Ibid).
But while the development of larger more capable computers for collection dur-
ing the Cold War period is fascinating, our focus here is on the technological and
methodological challenges of post-9/11 intelligence collection.
In the remaining discussion, therefore, we will focus on several collection
methodologies, which grew in prominence towards the end of the Cold War and
into the current post-9/11 period. We will briefly discuss data mining and machine
learning, social media, the internet of things (IoT), and the dark web, including
the challenges that surround each of these collection platforms and associated
methodologies. You will recall in Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination), under
the sub-heading ‘Theme 3 Role of science and technology,’ that some of these
(e.g. data mining) were discussed. However, that discussion focused on how vari-
ous technology platforms influence the identification of intelligence priorities and
shape how decision-makers task the IC. In contrast, the emphasis here is not on
how collection priorities are set at the policy level, but rather the discussion below
is an exploration of what benefits and problems different technologically enabled
collection platforms present to IC leaders.
Before we begin, it’s worthwhile keeping in mind that the collection platforms
explored in this chapter are not isolated pieces of technology; and their individual
significance should be understood as part of a bigger narrative—perhaps best
captured as part of the digital revolution which emerged towards the late twenti-
eth century. If the Industrial Revolution provided mechanical power, the digital
78 Collection
revolution has provided humans with computer power. Starting in 1995, more
powerful and faster computers have provided all sectors of the global economy
with technologies that have replaced or supplemented the mundane mental pro-
cesses humans had to do (Seel 2012; Lamarre 1998). The digital revolution is
particularly marked by the invention of the internet and smaller, cheaper, speedier
computer and communication devices such as smart phones. The explosion in the
uptake of the internet has naturally recast the way IC collection takes place, as we
shall see in the following sub-sections.
Big data and machine learning

As noted in Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination), big data and machine learn-
ing capabilities do play a role in shaping how decision-makers understand
intelligence priorities and gaps. As a set of collection capabilities, big data and
machine learning has been an operational feature of ICs for over two decades,
though its adoption remains comparatively more recent in many law enforce-
ment agencies. Importantly, as mentioned earlier, large data sets in the intelli-
gence collection context are nothing new—going back before the end of World
War II. However, during the digital revolution ‘big data’ has become associ-
ated with very large volumes, velocity, and variety of data (i.e. unstructured and
structured) that can be stored and whose value and ‘meaning’ can potentially be
more quickly extracted than was ever possible in the early Cold War years. As
Lim notes,
the key vector for the rise of Big Data is the digitization of information. In
2000, only a quarter of the world’s stored information was digital. In 2013,
this figure rose to over 98 per cent of the approximately 1200 Exabyte (1
Exabyte equalling 1 billion gigabytes) of information stored worldwide in
all forms.
(Lim 2016: 622)
It’s hard to not think of an economic sector particularly in transport, commerce,

medicine, business/finance and communications that has not been shaped in the
last two decades by big data and machine learning. The advantages to business are
well documented in the ability to correlate data sets to maximise profits in tightly
competitive markets where strategic edge is everything. Big data can link goods
associated with purchaser sentiment across different demographics and/or geo-
graphic locations to detect patterns and opportunities for increased market share
over competitors. A more recent extension of big data capability of course has
been the explosion of social media. We will come back shortly to a more detailed
discussion of social media, but it too has demonstrated enormous capabilities to
correlate google queries or Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon likes/dislikes and net-
works—all providing opportunities for companies to identify patterns of human
behaviour to better target products. In many of these cases, ‘big data can infer the
“probabilistic associations” of future events by relying on a variant of inductive
Collection 79
(Bayesian) reasoning and repeated historical patterns (historical corpora)’ (Lim
2016: 623).
There are now several sources surveying how big data and machine learn-
ing techniques have been incorporated over the last three decades into IC and
law enforcement collection capabilities. There is insufficient space to provide a
detailed analysis of the various techniques employed and the contexts in which
they are used. Suffice it to say, there are sources which the reader can refer to that
describe in detail the range of techniques used such as link analysis, text mining,
social network analysis, neural networks, and machine learning (e.g. Skillicorn
2009; Pramanik et al. 2017; Van der Hulst 2009: 101–121; Masys 2014; NRC
2013; Olson and Delan 2008). There is also an increasing volume of unclassified
sources on how big data and machine learning techniques are deployed in particu-
lar threat and risk contexts such as terrorism (Zijuan and Shuai 2017: 320–322;
Ding et al. 2017; Skillicorn and Reid 2014: 1–16), and in a range of organised
crime and crime prevention issues (Purda and Skillicorn 2015: 1193–1223).
In general, big data has allowed ICs and law enforcement agencies to do three
things according to Lim (Lim 2016: 627). First, big data collection and then
analysis has acted as a kind of ‘applied grounded theory’—allowing the data to
speak for itself, which in turn facilitates analysis of possible general trends and
anomalies. Second, Lim suggests that the application of big data in the IC and law
enforcement contexts allows the generation of hypotheses about what might hap-
pen. Finally, and related to generating hypotheses: big data analytics ‘allow the
intelligence analyst to cut through the overwhelming morass of supporting facts
in order to adduce those with refutative value.’ In Lim’s words,
the benefit of big data being—the search for that one black swan also being
naturally far more defined than for the thousandth white one—and this pos-
sibly in real-time, is an invaluable advantage in intelligence work.
(Ibid)
Of course, finding that black swan or outlier in many threat contexts remains very
difficult for reasons we will turn to shortly. It’s clear that big data has increasingly
facilitated the automatic and manual collection of volumes of data particularly
in sensing, communication, and information processing systems. It frees up the
time spent on analysis and sense-making in relation to collection—providing of
course analysts are able to make sense of the data—a point we come back to in
the following chapter (Chapter 5 Analysis). Bigger more capable computers to
rapidly ‘do the collection’ can potentially identify anomalies in anything from
energy usage, vehicle number plates, social media, and bank records, which may
indicate actual or potential criminal activities. However, a downside to big data,
which continues to be a problem for ICs and law enforcement agencies, is to effi-
ciently analyse these data sets (see Chapter 5). Pavlin encapsulates the challenge,
arguing ‘the problem remains how more rapidly and accurately ICs can “decode”
threat behaviour patterns consisting from ever increasing volumes of heterogene-
ous types of data generated at different locations and points in time’ (Pavlin 2013:
80 Collection
137–146). The impressive inroads in being able to collect ever large volumes
of big data has resulted in what Lim describes a kind of ‘data asphyxiation and
decision paralysis’ (Lim 2016: 628). He gives the examples of the US National
Security Agency (NSA), where SIGINT technology far outpaces the organisa-
tion’s human analytical capabilities. Even the US Navy, he suggests, in order to
track the movement of seagoing vessels worldwide, alone collects 200 terabytes
of data approximately every 48 hours (Ibid).
Despite this data deluge, all technical intelligence forms (SIGINT, MASINT,
and IMINT (now GEOINT) and other emerging fields of CYBINT and SOCMINT
(Social Media Intelligence) are expanding at near exponential rates, according to
Brantley. This means that ‘the signal to noise ratio within this data is very low, and
vast collections of data make analysis extremely difficult’ (Brantly 2018: 566).
This is not to suggest that big data analytics has not improved and found mean-
ingful correlations between data sets leading to preventing or disrupting threats.
Certainly in areas such as money laundering, fraud, and high volume crimes (e.g.
burglaries), gains have been made—but in more serious organised crime or terror-
ism—correlation much less causation can be more difficult to find. Equally too,
the notion of ‘predictive analytics,’ which has worked well in some commercial
settings such as marketing, are currently less able to show threat actor intent or the
planning of serious crimes such as terrorist attacks without of course other intel-
ligence (HUMINT) and investigative sources being thrown into the mix.
Nonetheless, given the diversity, volume, and speed of big data compared to
other intelligence feeds (e.g. HUMINT), one key strength is that it ‘often can pro-
vide more value in its exhaust (data captured as a residual) than in its deliberate
data collections.’ ‘This exhaust can (still) prove useful to future analysis efforts.
In particular, as Brantly suggests in addressing questions not yet formulated by a
given client’ (2018: 566).
Perhaps, as Lim argues, big data analytics might be particularly useful for
‘surveillance and warning against unlikely but nonetheless high-impact events or
“black swans,” as they are now referred to in the popular literature’ (Lim 2016:
629). We have seen how for decades big data analytics has helped provide surveil-
lance for a range of diseases in public health and biosecurity—but even in these
contexts the systems are not perfect or necessarily ‘predictive’ (Walsh 2018).
I expect/hope though that after the global COVID-19 pandemic even greater
improvements can be made in big data-driven health security surveillance sys-
tems to improve early warning on further novel catastrophic infections (Ibid).
While it might become possible in some complex threat contexts to more
quickly correlate patterns in a variety of data sources that could indicate potential
threat pathways such as planning of a terrorist event, I remain sceptical whether
big data analytics can reliably on its own lead IC agencies to sufficient predic-
tive or early warning in such complex threat contexts. In contrast, Lim is of the
view that big data analytics can take on this strategic/predictive role—arguing it
might be ‘best suited in discerning long-term developments, including generating
intelligence hypotheses, and adduce refuting facts’ (Ibid: 619). However, I think
Lim’s point remains contestable.
Collection 81
The ‘predictive power’ of big data analytics applied to complex threats is ham-
pered by data sets that are usually historic and/or incomplete. While patterns in
historical data may infer the existence of a pattern of threat behaviour, terrorism
and organised crime behaviour are complex and historical patterns are not nec-
essarily a judge of future ones in a correlational let alone causational sense. In
addition to not easily inferring or explaining the future potential of threat actor
groups, generating hypotheses from historical data may just reinforce ‘noise’ in
already overwhelmed data systems in our ICs. In addition, there is a problem in
data analytics algorithms resulting in false positives. Advancements in machine
learning have also resulted in biases within algorithms. These biases can be self-
reinforcing and result in even less accurate analysis. The role of a human analyst
therefore remains critical in correcting bias generated by automated learning algo-
rithms and making the necessary adjustments to reduce the significance of error.
So for the moment, algorithms alone cannot replace other collection methodol-
ogies. Human subject matter experts, SIGINT, GEOINT, and Open-source intel-
ligence (OSINT) all offer opportunities to triangulate the validity and reliability
of big data analytics. This is not to marginalise the importance big data analytics
has played in our IC and law enforcement agencies over the last two decades in
particular. However, IC leaders need to see big data as merely another tool in the
collection toolbox. An important tool perhaps in many contexts but nonetheless
just another tool. Each tool, technology, and technique have potential utility but
they also each have their own limitations. How they are applied depends on the
threat context.
Efforts continue in ICs to improve the anticipatory and predictive reliabil-
ity of big data analytics that assess events and information. While much of this
is classified, some of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity’s
(IARPA’s) work is illustrative of what is being done to improve ‘forecasting’
of big data analytics used in ICs. IARPA funds a variety of research initiatives.
Just two of many examples include the Aggregate Contingent Estimation (ACE)
and Forecasting Science and Technology (ForeST) (Brantly 2018: 567). ACE
was ‘designed to focus on probabilistic assessments for contingent events, the
aggregation of events by multiple human analysts and the representation of these
forecasts and their distributions’ (Ibid). ForeST was ‘designed to fund projects
that could accurately forecast significant advances or milestones in science and
technology’ (Ibid). There have been several other projects as well to improve the
collection and automated analysis of publicly available data to better anticipate
events, as we shall see below in the discussion on social media.
Regardless of these research improvement efforts, the sheer volume of big data
and enhanced technologies to improve the speed of which it can be collected and
analysed still makes a lot of big data analytics ‘reactive’ rather than properly get-
ting to the intention, causes, and prediction of threats. Our ICs will still struggle
to make sense of the relentless data feeds (Pannerselvam et al. 2015) in ways that
allow them to understand intention and causes better. As discussed in Chapter 6
(ICT), artificial intelligence (AI) advancements could be used to exploit the power
of machine learning to even higher levels, thereby automating or speeding up the
82 Collection
analytical capability of current machine learning capability. This point was ech-
oed by one IC leader surveyed, who said: ‘the use of big data, deep learning and
eventually artificial intelligence will help to speed up the processing of unstruc-
tured data (video/audio) for analysis’ (survey respondent reference 30).
And despite the volume of data, which will impact on the ability to efficiently
analyse it, machine learning technologies, techniques, and methods (leaving aside
some of their shortcomings) will be increasingly relied upon to assist intelligence
analysts to exploit more efficiently patterns in massive data sets. In addition to
efforts being made by government-funded research agencies such as IARPA,
the IC and private sector are also looking at other ways of meeting some of the
challenges the intelligence agencies have with extracting more sense-making and
forecasting capability out of big data. But what other approaches are being devel-
oped and will they help ICs analyse the volumes, velocity, and variety of data? A
US National Academies of Science workshop report on big data suggested three
approaches would be useful in improving IC analytical capability, including for
the remote detection of weapons of mass destruction and improved methods of
cyber command and control (NRC 2013: 39). Their report suggests that
first, streaming algorithms that can process data in one pass with limited
memory are clearly important. Second, for data at rest, transactional data-
bases are generally not needed, but highly usable systems for hosting and
querying massive data, including data distributed across multiple sites will be
essential. Third, the NRC report argued that better visualization tools are also
needed to conserve the scarce and valuable time of human analysts.
(Ibid)
Additionally, big data techniques may be increasingly deployed to exploit data

from the internet of things (IoT) as other communications ‘go dark’ to the ICs.
However, it’s less clear how the explosion of data available from the IoT will be
captured in a way that can allow it to be analysed in real time or integrated perhaps
with other intelligence collection sources. As Brantly says, ‘what is more remark-
able is not the number of users going online, but rather the increase in the num-
ber of internet-enabled devices that received Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.’
‘Cisco estimated that between 2008 and 2009 the Internet of Things (IoT) first
exceeded the number of human beings on the planet’ (Brantly 2018: 563). ‘Cisco
continues to estimate that by 2020 the number of internet-enabled devices will
reach approximately 50 billion’ (Ibid). IoT sensing, processing data aggregation
systems in people’s homes, cars, personal devices, private sector, and government
systems could all potentially be sources of collection. However, the development
in IoT is far outstripping SIGINT and other IC agency’s ability to target them—
leaving aside for the moment the privacy issues (Jani and Soni 2018: 183–203;
Kaul et al. 2018).
New innovations in improving big data analytics will increasingly rely on
cross-disciplinary approaches (computer science, engineering, statistics, and even
social sciences) in order to provide intelligence analysts and ICs more broadly
Collection 83
with even better designed systems for massive data analysis that can operate more
reliably in real time. Computer scientists need a better understanding of statistical
ideas and improving their understanding of risk when designing algorithms and
statisticians need a better understanding of computational ideas (NRC 2013: 39).
Clearly one major task for the future IC leader will not necessarily be to reengi-
neer themselves as data scientists—though in some contexts that might be required.
But regardless of where they sit in the IC, they will need a better understanding
of data science than the current generation of leaders—as machine learning and
AI will likely loom ever larger in the twenty-first century ‘Five Eyes’ ICs (see
Chapter 6 ICT). Additionally, leaders will need to make better evidence-informed
decisions about what mix of data scientist capabilities (in-house vs external con-
tractors) they need. In other words, in addition to having the right kind of training
in computational and statistical skills data, scientists will need relevant domain
knowledge and apply their knowledge flexibly to adapt solutions to data analytics
problems as the threat environment changes. In the future, as the data sets con-
tinue to grow, the future cadre of ‘whizz kid data scientists’ will need to demon-
strate clearly to the IC leadership opportunities and limitations for improving the
inferential accuracy of data sets in the IC—particularly relating to more high risk
and complex threats. What other challenges future intelligence leaders will face
in the broader data, information communications, and technology areas will be
discussed in Chapter 6 (ICT). Additionally, in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader
and Governance Challenges) we will come back to an assessment of the collection
challenges future IC leaders will face and what can be done about them.
Social media
Social media data sources are increasingly providing our ICs with a range of
information that can be integrated with other data sources on a person or group.
Lim provides a useful description of the variety and utility of social media for ICs:
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, LinkedIn and sundry social media

applications have melded into a ‘vast digital social commons’ capable of
facilitating complex analyses of sentiments, semantics, clusters and networks,
for instance, in the effort to map, among other things, global Jihadist activity.
(2016: 629)
In particular, over the last two decades, social media sources or social media
intelligence (SOCMINT) has seen an explosion in development as well as users
facilitated by breakthroughs in smart phone and tablet technology. Not counting
all the diverse social media platforms and applications that seem to emerge on an
almost daily basis, just two of the major social networking sites (Facebook and
Twitter) are estimated to have reached a worldwide user number of 2.5 billion
people (Hayes and Luther 2018: 9). Facebook alone has an active user number of
over 1.5 billion people (Ibid). Social media provides several platforms for people
to communicate for personal and commercial reasons.
84 Collection
There is insufficient space to provide examples of all the contexts in which
SOCMINT may be a useful collection source for ICs. Here we will summarise
some instances where SOCMINT has been used, but as with earlier discussion in
this chapter the focus is on what challenges SOCMINT presents to IC leaders in
the future. We will come back to the challenges shortly, but one obvious advan-
tage of SOCMINT’s various platforms (e.g. Facebook and Twitter) is that many
provide real-time crowd-sourcing information. In crisis situations such as natural
disasters or fast-moving security environments such as pandemics, riots, radicali-
sation, or a terrorist attack, citizens can take on the role of journalists—quickly
relaying information in real time or near real time that can provide emergency
responders, police, and the IC situational awareness (Stottlemyre 2015: 578–589;
Richey and Binz 2015: 347–364). For example, in late April 2020 the Australian
government launched its COVIDSafe app designed for the public to receive alerts
about whether people in their vicinity have been exposed to COVID-19. The app
speeds up the contacting and tracing process carried out by health authorities and
within the first two days of its release two million Australians downloaded the
non-mandatory app onto their smart phones. Such a real-time social media appli-
cation can (and leaving aside the privacy issues) allow for better operational and
tactical responses by ICs and emergency responders. As Omand et al. suggest,
the rise in use of social media, together with the rapid development of ana-
lytics approaches, now provides a new opportunity for law enforcement to
generate operational intelligence that could help identify criminal activity,
indicate early warning of outbreaks of disorder, provide information and
intelligence about groups and individuals, and help understand and respond
to public concerns.
(Omand et al. 2012: 805)
It is not just the variety of SOCMINT in real time that is potentially of interest
to the police and ICs, it is also that many social media platforms work with geo-
location capabilities that bring together a potential behaviour of concern and a
map of areas where such behaviours might be of greatest concern.
The IC’s ability to access SOCMINT varies. Open source information from
Twitter feeds for example are public and therefore easily accessed, while other
platforms require legal authorisation to remove privacy settings and encryption.
As we shall see in our later discussion of intelligence collection, ethics, and effi-
cacy, the ability of ICs to override privacy settings and encryption has increas-
ingly become a strident policy and community debate exacerbated further after
the Snowden leaks in 2013.
Despite the increasing exploitation of social media for intelligence purposes,
SOCMINT technology uptake and analysis continue to present ongoing chal-
lenges for IC leaders and the agencies or communities they manage. Examples
can be seen in the last decade when ICs were struggling to keep up with the mas-
sive Facebook and Twitter feeds emanating from North Africa and the Middle
East during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011–2012 (Rovner 2013: 260–271; Newham
Collection 85
and Bell 2012: 36–50). While harvesting an ever greater volume of SOCMINT
has increasingly become a mainstay of IC collection strategies, Omand and col-
league’s seminal SOCMINT article plainly outlines the two major challenges
with its application. The first is methodological. In other words, does the social
media source ‘rest on solid methodological bedrock of collection, evidence, veri-
fication, understanding and application’ (2012: 801). Second, ‘can the moral haz-
ard it entails be legitimately managed’? Again, we will come back to the second
point shortly.
On point one, it’s clear that a great deal of work is being done within ICs
and the broader research community to improve the reliability and validity of
various SOCMINT sources. In particular, research into understanding how ter-
rorists use social media for communication, intelligence, and operational plan-
ning is of central importance to ICs. Are there, for example, as Omand et al.
speculate, ‘thresholds, indicators and permissive conditions of violence; path-
ways into radicalization; an analysis of how ideas form and change’ that can
improve early warning and response to terrorist attacks (2012: 805–806). An
increasing volume of research is now looking at tracking pathways to violence
by radicalised individuals. In particular, there is a growing body of research into
understanding grievance analysis using machine learning to identify clusters or
anomalies in large data sets for behaviour that correlates statistically with emo-
tions suggesting radicalisation (Al-Saggaf 2016: 13–27; Al Saggaf et al. 2016:
45–56).
However, as Omand et al. correctly point out, a ‘crucial consequence of the
rise of machine learning approaches within social media analytics is that we are
currently much better at counting examples of online human behaviour than criti-
cally explaining why they are and what it might mean’ (Ibid: 811). Importantly
too, Omand reminds us that ‘language is textured: the intent, motivation, social
signification, denotation and connotation of any utterance is mutable and depend-
ent on the context of situation and culture.’
The accuracy of any interpretation depends on a very detailed understanding

of the group or context that is being studied. For example, most groups of
people use vernacular and group-specific language that a generic or standard-
ized sentiment lexicon or thesaurus would often misinterpret.
(Ibid)
As in the interpretation of SIGINT, therefore, analytical judgements about rela-

tionships and cultural nuances will remain key into the future.
The true meaning arising from social media analytics is fraught with other
ongoing methodological difficulties. As noted in our earlier discussion of big
data, ICs are in danger of misunderstanding the knowledge derived from machine
learning if social media analytics solutions are developed solely by computer sci-
entists and statisticians away from other disciplines that are better equipped to
understand human behaviour such as psychology, political science, sociology,
and anthropology.
86 Collection
The realisation by ICs and some law enforcement agencies is that if SOCMINT
is ‘to be methodologically robust enough to base decisions on and change policy,’
a cross-disciplinary approach is required (both computer and social sciences).
Such cross-disciplinary research efforts are underway particularly in ‘Five Eyes’
defence, science, and technology portfolios and in agencies such as IARPA
(Omand et al. 2012: 816). However, future IC leaders and governments will need
to continue making wise strategic investment decisions about what kinds of cross-
disciplinary industry/research partnerships will best ensure ICs adapt and improve
their social media collection methodologies.
Dark web
The dark web is the last example of methodological challenges we will discuss
before turning our attention to the governance issues IC leaders will face in build-
ing sustainable and effective intelligence collection platforms and processes.
There remains an ongoing concern amongst ICs about threat actor’s communica-
tions ‘going dark’ either through exploited encrypted devices or using the dark
web, which is a smaller part of the internet that is hard to access without the
use of special browsers like Onion Router–Tor and passwords (Walsh 2018: 95).
ICs and law enforcement agencies in recent years have had increasing success in
penetrating, disrupting, and taking down several dark web Tor ‘onion’ domains,
which have been used for a variety of criminal activity including terrorist com-
munication and planning, drug trafficking, cyber-attacks, and child sexual exploi-
tation. The FBI’s 2014 takedown of Silk Road 2.0 used by multiple illicit drug
networks, the 2016 disruption of the Avalanche syndicate (a global trafficker in
botnet malware which infected over 180 countries), and the 2017 disruption of
Alphabay (a dark web criminal market place) are recent examples of greater IC
understanding and operational success against criminal dark web sites (Weiser
2014; European Union 2016; Broadhead 2018: 1180–1196).
It is difficult to gain outside the IC a full understanding of how ‘Five Eyes’
agencies are exploiting the dark web. However, there is now an increasing volume
of openly available research that provides insights into the types of techniques and
technologies ICs are using to collect information about dark web threats. Jardine
lists a number of techniques currently in use by IC and law enforcement aimed
at ‘developing attacks on dark web hosting service to compromise the anonym-
ity and privacy of the Tor network (including traffic correlation, protocol-level
attacks, and website fingerprinting)’ (Jardine 2018: 3). A number of machine
learning techniques and web crawlers can also be used to categorise content on
dark web forums (Dilip and Sharma 2018: 114–137; Chen 2012). Several other
approaches such as passive surveillance of chatroom conversations are useful in
providing details of criminal involvement and familiarity with cryptocurrencies
and dark web markets (Jardine 2018: 3). Passive observation of dark web mar-
kets can provide opportunities to develop detailed case studies on both the inten-
tions and capabilities of threat actors operating on illegal forums. Additionally,
Jardine notes ‘ethnographic investigations can reveal the catalytic effect of illegal
Collection 87
markets on drug users and survey methods can be used to pinpoint perceptions of
drug use among dark web market patrons’ (2018: 3).
While the methods and approaches discussed above provide greater understand-
ing of a diverse multitude of illicit markets, as Broadhead points out, the dynamic
nature of the dark web, or one defined by a ‘continuing transformation of the cyber-
crime eco-system remains the only constant’ (Broadhead 2018: 1180). The ability
to get a really granular collection and analysis of both illicit vendors and users
across various threat types is an ongoing challenge. The high churn rate for Tor hid-
den sites in real time conspires against research and IC efforts to improve analytical
generalisability about ‘market size,’ threat assessment, and operational disruption.
An enduring challenge for IC leaders therefore is to know how best to support
research and operational capabilities that will allow both a faster collection of
dark web information—despite ongoing efforts by threat actors to use this part
of the internet for increasing obfuscation and anonymity. Deep web information
extraction has relied on several web crawling techniques to varying levels of suc-
cess and research investment into other extraction protocols such as open frame-
work protocol for collection could be considered in their place (Dilip and Sharma
2018: 133). Efforts also need to be made to improve knowledge about both the
supply and demand side of illicit dark web markets and comparing these sources
with surface web information and other more traditional collection sources. As
noted in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges), IC lead-
ers will need to work with external experts and researchers to improve collection
capabilities against threat actors operating in the dark web.
Intelligence collection and governance challenges

In addition to some of the technical collection challenges leaders will face, a sec-
ond set of issues relate to what kinds of organisational design within and across
ICs best optimise collection capabilities. Related to this question also is how
organisational cultural issues will inhibit and/or facilitate collection efforts in
the future. As we saw in Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination), organisational
structure and cultural identity have been powerful influencers historically in how
intelligence is tasked, coordinated, and integrated. Both have also influenced
significantly approaches to collection and analysis across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. The
role of organisational structure and culture are related to intelligence governance,
which was defined in Chapter 2 as the strategies, habits, attributes, normative
behaviour, and technical knowledge that leaders use to coordinate effective intel-
ligence functions, processes, and outputs. In the following section, we will discuss
both organisational structural and cultural factors that influence how IC leaders
manage collection processes and capabilities.
Collection and organisational structure

Future IC leaders will need a keen understanding of not only how to build efficient,
cost-effective and mission-focused collection capabilities, but also identify what
88 Collection
organisational structural and cultural issues need addressing to achieve future col-
lection requirements. As noted in Chapter 2, the Cold War saw the build-up of
large SIGINT collection capabilities. Similarly, the post-Cold War and post-9/11
environment also required the development of additional digital collection capa-
bility responses. However, throughout all these stages advances in IC collection
capability have not just been the result solely of technological transformation. It is
true decisions made by IC leaders about investing in new collection technologies
are usually made in order to adapt to changes in the security environment. But the
adoption and integration of new collection capabilities have also been about how
technologies have been integrated and adapted into the organisational structures
and cultures of ICs.
For example, in the case of post-9/11, the security environment has become
increasingly defined not just by state-based threats, but non-state-based global
outlaws such as terrorists, drug and weapons traffickers as well as people smug-
glers. The question remains, though, has this changing security environment
resulted in different organisational structures—ones better adapted to devel-
oping more effective collection capabilities to meet this complex post-9/11
environment?
Looking back to the early post-9/11 period, a common view by some observers,
such as former senior intelligence officer Charles Cogan, was that the US IC ‘a
year after 9/11, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond
to a catastrophic terrorist attack on US soil’ (Cogan 2004: 305). In this context,
Cogan added, ‘we have to ask ourselves some urgent questions as to how we
are organised and conditioned to conduct intelligence in the twenty-first century’
(Ibid: 305). We have seen in previous chapters that in all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs a combi-
nation of policy, bureaucratic, and legislative reforms continue to raise questions
about how ICs are structured and whether they are organised in ways that will
result in effective intelligence collection on an increasingly mutable security envi-
ronment. Cogan’s question, therefore, is not just relevant to assessing whether the
IC’s organisational architecture was right immediately after 9/11, but it remains
germane for future IC leaders as we advance further into the twenty-first century.
In terms of how leaders need to re-organise collection capabilities within
their organisations, this will always be defined by context (national security, law
enforcement, military), legislation, and function (SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT
amongst others). But older definitions about what different types of collection
mean has become increasingly blurred—such as the difference between foreign
and domestic intelligence. Collection against threats that have both domestic and
foreign dimensions such as terrorism continue to challenge older Cold War silo-
ing of collection capabilities and organisational structures making IC structural
redesign difficult in some cases (Walsh 2011). As too does collection against
human security issues (e.g. pandemics, disasters, and human rights). Issues such
as ‘health security’ while on the collection agenda of most ‘Five Eyes’ ICs have
generally been peripheral issues. However, the significant health and national
security threat posed by the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic again illustrates that IC
leaders will need to at least in some contexts re-calibrate collection capabilities
Collection 89
and organisational/structural responses to better deal with such health security
threats in the future (Walsh 2020).
But is Cogan correct in his analysis that collection, particularly covert action,
‘in the twenty-first century likely will be characterised by what could be termed
an offensive hunt strategy’ (2004: 305)? Or in his words: ‘intelligence operatives
in the twenty-first century will become hunters, not gatherers’ (Ibid). His point
implies that perhaps pre-9/11, IC’s organisational structures including collection
platforms waited passively for the information to come in rather than actively
going out to get it. Of course this is not entirely true. Even during the Cold War,
which relied heavily on vacuuming up large volumes of SIGINT, this period was
also very much an aggressive HUMINT war, where each side actively hunted
for information about the other. Nonetheless, Cogan’s point is compelling in the
sense that after 9/11 global outlaws like terrorists are frequently ‘off the grid.’
They also did not have large standing armies operating in locations that would be
easily visible by IC geospatial assets.
Organisational structures, therefore, need to accommodate more flexible
approaches to collection—ones as Cogan suggests ‘hunts for intelligence’ rather
than just passively gathering it. Hunting for terrorists as we have has included
a greater focus on special forces—often operating in countries that ‘Five Eyes’
countries were not officially at war with. Starting with the Bush administration,
but continuing on in subsequent administrations, this hunter-focused collection
approach has also seen the proliferation of paramilitary operations by some ‘Five
Eyes’ IC agencies such as the CIA. The ‘hunter collection’ approach included the
use of drones for enhanced surveillance and targeted killings of high-value targets
(Walsh 2017: 429–433; Johnson et al. 2017: 411–440). As noted in Chapter 3
(Tasking and Coordination), in addition to a move towards a more hunter approach
to foreign intelligence collection, legislative, policy, and greater integration of
collection capabilities has also produced a hunter approach to domestic intelli-
gence collection. The latter in particular as we shall see shortly, of course, has not
been without its ethical, privacy, and community trust consequences.
While there is no doubt all ‘Five Eyes’ IC structures have changed to some
extent in order to prosecute a hunter or proactive approach to intelligence collec-
tion, it remains difficult to know precisely how significantly each IC has changed.
In short, it is difficult to know from the outside looking in whether current struc-
tural arrangements are optimal for the kind of proactive collection approaches now
required against the evolving security environment. As discussed in Chapter 2
(Intelligence and Leadership), the history of all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs and the agencies
therein are deeply imbued with institutional legacy constraints, including political
cultural influences and organisational cultural issues. For example, one point of
difference between the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs is that the US political culture is distrust-
ful of government and institutions responsible for domestic security. This impacts
on both the organisational structure of the US IC and to what extent security agen-
cies can be active hunters of intelligence.
Chapters 2 (Intelligence and Leadership) and 3 (Tasking and Coordination)
have already covered extensively many of the organisational cultural issues that
90 Collection
have impacted on the structural development of our ICs. Similar cultural con-
straints also come into play when it comes to intelligence collection—particu-
larly in areas of designing collection technology platforms, intelligence sharing,
and identifying areas where collection sources can be more effectively fused
to support a common mission (Tromblay 2017: 817–832). Future leaders will
need to find ways to move through the negative or constraining aspects of their
agency’s cultural histories to improve collection outputs. As noted in earlier
chapters, recent history shows inadequacies within intelligence collection meth-
ods and the way they have been organised structurally leading up to 9/11 and
in the pre-war assessment of WMD in Iraq. This underscores the need for IC
leaders to continually improve and test traditional approaches to collection, their
validity, and relevance to a particular threat problem. The challenge is cultural
and technological, but it is also how leaders manage the creation and distribu-
tion of knowledge across their agencies and the broader IC (Dearstyne 2005).
For example, one of the aspects of collection failure leading up to the invasion
of Iraq was whether other ‘outside’ sources such as the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors could have been taken more seri-
ously by ICs over the traditional sources they have always been comfortable
with, such as SIGINT and HUMINT (Morrison 2011: 513–514). Will organi-
sational cultural bias and preferences over traditional collection sources blinker
how future leaders arrange collection efforts against an increasingly complex
security environment? This is not to suggest that traditional collection plat-
forms like HUMINT are no longer required, in fact, the latter arguably is lack-
ing against several threats—including terrorism and state-based ones such as an
emboldening of Russia and China. But future leaders will need to continually
review collection capabilities and structures against all threats to ensure that
they remain fit for purpose, and collection strategies are based on the most effec-
tive way to retrieve the intelligence required. This will require a leaders’ ability
to implement organisational structures and responses that are more informed
by evidence about how best to collect effectively against increasingly hardened
targets and threats that mutate or are resilient over time. Part of their response
will need to be a more agnostic perspective to long-cherished organisational and
culture-bounded views about the merits of one kind of ‘INT’ over another. In
the context of being constrained by history and culture, one IC leader surveyed
summarised well what response was needed by future leaders when it comes to
intelligence collection:
Don’t be arrogant. Do not assume that anyone/company/group that does

not have a TS SCI clearance has less information, expertise, insights, ideas
about how to use innovative methods to collect information. Embrace OSINT
and social media—but know its pitfalls. Understand what big data can do
and cannot do. Reach out to the private sector OSINT community that is
doing amazing “forensic” work (i.e. Bellingcat). Innovate, understand how
technology can help collection, but also poses risks. Don’t rely on old tech-
niques, don’t be hemmed in by CI concerns (people who are locals, but do not
Collection 91
have a high level clearance can be valuable sources of information (survey
respondent 78).1
Indeed, given the impact of the digital revolution globally, advances in cyber and
biotechnology and now arguably a revolution in AI, IC leaders will need to as sug-
gested in the above quote engage even more with the private sector and research
community to gain knowledge and ‘hard ware’ in an attempt to stay ahead of
emerging threat trajectories. In some cases, leaders will need to work closely with
‘IC outsiders’ in order to prolong ‘old traditional INT’ platforms, while in oth-
ers they will seek advice on how they can be supplemented or replaced with a
better fit for purpose-collection systems (Walsh 2018; Makridakis 2017: 46–60).
Additionally, private-public partnerships between technology and knowledge
providers, which can result in better collection capabilities, are already a major
part of the post-9/11 ‘Five Eyes’ IC landscape. In a global competitive market,
as governments divest their interest in sensitive areas of critical infrastructure
(telecommunications, energy, water, roads, airports, and ports), IC leaders will
need to also demonstrate a broader understanding of ‘security’ at the same time
as they look for opportunities to burden share-collection efforts with the private
sector. This will require adept leadership that can reconcile the interest of gov-
ernments and the private sector—yet still produce collection strategies that are
ethical and aligned with liberal democratic principles (Petersen and Tjalve 2018:
21–35). Above all, managing the complexity of collection into the future will
require, as noted by one IC leader surveyed for the project: ‘being future focused,
not thinking about current collection, but what will we need in 5 years’ time’
(survey respondent 60).
Intelligence collection ethics and efficacy

The third ongoing collection challenge for IC leaders will be as threat actors
become more difficult to intercept, the ‘Five Eyes’ IC’s proactive collection
approaches will increasingly raise complex ethical and privacy issues. As we
move further into the twenty-first century, several related issues will become
more pressing. For example, the community discussion around what is considered
legitimate surveillance and secrecy in liberal democratic states will gain further
momentum. IC leaders in the decades to come therefore will likely be even more
engaged in public discussions about the ethical and efficacy issues relating to the
collection of intelligence than their post-9/11 colleagues. Limited space does not
allow for a detailed discussion of the various ethics and efficacy collection issues
that leaders will need to become more adept at understanding and handling.
For readers interested in detailed analyses of ethical challenges associated with
intelligence collection, particularly since 9/11, there is now a growing body of work
examining these issues in different collection applications, including electronic
collection, covert action, and interrogation amongst others (Bellaby 2012; Omand
and Phythian 2013; Omand and Phythian 2018; Walsh 2011; Walsh and Miller
2016). Many of these works have framed ethical challenges related to intelligence
92 Collection
collection by using amended versions of ‘Just War Theory,’ often referred to as
‘Just Intelligence Theory’ (Bellaby 2012; Omand and Phythian 2012; Omand and
Phythian 2013: 38–63). Although intelligence collection naturally occurs during a
military conflict, wars morally should be a last resort, whereas other collection of
course is enduring–occurring day to day in the absence of war conditions. Hence,
at this stage it is less clear whether ethical principles governing military conflict
are neatly transferrable to all the complex collection issues we have been discuss-
ing in this chapter.
While, as noted in Chapter 2, ICs have always had to contend with ethical
dilemmas in the collection of intelligence; the advent of a more proactive and
permissive collection culture; the digital revolution and now increasingly AI com-
bined has taken historical ethical challenges to new levels. Added to this as men-
tioned earlier, both WikiLeaks and more significantly the 2013 Snowden leaks
have also had a catalytic effect on ethics and efficacy debates within ICs and
in the community about the legitimacy of various collection activities in liberal
democratic states.
We will come back to the issue of ethics and intelligence collection in Chapter 8
(The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) and discuss how future IC
leaders might engage further in managing them. But its clear researchers and
political and IC leaders need clearer theoretical and practitioner frameworks in
which to understand the ethical risks posed by increasingly complex technologi-
cally enabled collection platforms. This means all interested parties need to move
away from historical and simplistic continuums for thinking about ethics in the
intelligence collection context—such as privacy vs security—to frameworks that
are both more nuanced and empirically informed.
At the heart of such a framework should be a careful analysis of three key
aspects of intelligence collection (methods, context, and target) (Walsh and Miller
2016). In each case the methods (e.g. wiretaps, metadata, social media), the con-
text (e.g. wartime, counter-terrorism) and the target of collection activity (e.g. the
Chinese military vs economic espionage) throw up unique and distinct ethical and
efficacy dilemmas that IC leaders will need to nimbly address in the future than
hitherto has been the case up to now. In short, different methods, contexts, and
targets of collection activity will raise their own unique ethical dilemmas and the
IC leader will require a greater understanding of them and how principles such as
necessity and proportionality apply or not in each case.
Conclusion
Chapter 4 introduced three themes (technological and methodological, govern-
ance, ethics, and efficacy) to frame our discussion on challenges IC leaders must
navigate through if collection platforms and processes are to remain ‘fit for pur-
pose’ against an increasingly complex security environment. The promise and
potential of emerging technological innovation opens up for ICs other sources
for collection as others may become more difficult to access due to encryption
and counter-intelligence campaigns by threat actors. Yet governance issues such
Collection 93
as organisational structure and culture will also impact on the kind of institu-
tional progress ICs will be able to make on integrating new collection strate-
gies and technologies. In Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance
Challenges) we will return to the collection governance themes raised here
(technology, organisational structure, and ethics) to see how IC leaders will
need to reconcile them in ways that can continue to facilitate adaptive collection
platforms.
In the next chapter (Chapter 5 Analysis), we explore a sample of analytical
methodological issues and how their application by analysts and others impacts
on IC capabilities. The focus is not on how to improve the professional capabili-
ties of analysts (i.e. training and education) as this will be a subject discussed in
Chapter 7 (HR). Rather, Chapter 5 will investigate what methodologies, prac-
tices, and domain knowledge could improve analysis in the workplace and what
developments in these areas might be most beneficial for IC leaders to embrace
and why. It also explores what key governance challenges may arise as IC leaders
seek to improve both human and technological analytical capabilities.
Note
1 Bellingcat is an independent international collective of researchers, investigators,
and citizen journalists using open source media investigations to probe a variety of
subjects: crime conflicts, corruption, secret operations, mis and disinformation, and
extremist groups.
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5 Analysis
Introduction
Analysis—both its cognitive and its technical dimensions—are at the heart of
all core intelligence processes regardless of the context in which intelligence is
practiced (e.g. national security, military, law enforcement, or the private sector).
This chapter investigates common analytical techniques currently utilised in ‘Five
Eyes’ countries and what the IC leadership (rather than analysts) need to know
about them from a broader organisational perspective. Hence, the focus is not an
in-depth discussion from an analyst’s practice point of view of all analytical tools
currently being deployed in our ICs. There is now an ever growing number of
sources the reader can turn to for detailed background knowledge on both analyti-
cal techniques and general progress being made in the intelligence analysis area
since 9/11 (see for e.g. Dahl 2017; Frank 2017: 579–599; Chang and Tetlock
2017: 903–920; Marrin 2007: 821–846, 2017, 2020: 350–366; Phythian 2017:
600–612; Lahneman and Arcos 2017: 972–985; Shelton 2014: 262–281; Walsh
2011, 2017; Pherson and Heuer 2020). Instead of attempting to provide a detailed
evaluation of all available analytical techniques (which would be next to impos-
sible), Chapter 5 provides a thematic exploration of a few well-known analytical
techniques along with their strengths and weaknesses. Following this discussion,
the chapter concludes with an assessment on how both the validity and utility of
various analytical techniques impacts on broader leadership (governance) chal-
lenges within ICs.
For the sake of simplicity, I have decided to deliberately use the word ‘tech-
nique’ as a catch-all for what really is an increasingly diverse range of analyti-
cal methods, tools, approaches, and technologies in use or being developed for
deployment in ICs. Methods, tools, and technologies are not the same thing as
‘techniques,’ nonetheless the latter does share commonality with all the former in
that techniques are ways of doing something. ‘Tools,’ ‘methods,’ and ‘approaches’
also convey a similar meaning. Using the one word ‘technique’ to discuss a range
of analytical methods, tools, approaches, and techniques together allows for a
conceptually neater discussion—one less focused on the semantics between ana-
lytical techniques vs analytical methods and more on how in each case they ena-
ble or inhibit intelligence analysis of an increasingly complex threat environment.
98 Analysis
As highlighted above, an assessment of the validity and reliability of analyti-
cal techniques discussed in this chapter reveals several governance issues for IC
leaders. The most critical analytical governance issues will be highlighted here.
However, in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges), we
will revisit what governance challenges are likely to be the most pressing for
future leaders to solve and how they might do so.
Analytical techniques
Before starting a thematic exploration of analytical techniques, it is necessary first
to frame the discussion by defining how I will define ‘intelligence analysis’—
given that analytical techniques are primarily applied in support of it. Again, there
is a healthy growing volume of research—some historical and others contempo-
rary—that have sought to define what ‘intelligence analysis’ is and what analysts
do (Walsh 2011; Marrin 2011, 2017; George 2010; George and Bruce 2008).
A key strand in the intelligence studies literature over several decades has been
to demonstrate that understanding ‘intelligence analysis’ requires a fuller explo-
ration of its multi-disciplinary heritage. In other words, understanding fully the
role of intelligence analysis is dependent on practitioners and researchers map-
ping how it is informed by different disciplines, and which of these may assist in
improving analytical outcomes for decision-makers. Another strand in the ‘intel-
ligence analysis’ literature asks whether intelligence analysis is an art or science
(Richards 2010). While this second strand may be intellectually engaging, I argue
that its actual application to improving analysis within ICs is limited. It may be
still interesting to debate for some how much an art or science intelligence analy-
sis is. But I think it is largely self-evident with even a cursory understanding of
how intelligence analysis is practiced in different intelligence contexts that it is
informed by both social scientific and natural science perspectives. In short, intel-
ligence analysis is an amalgamation of the two broad branches of knowledge,
and the practice context determines how aspects of social or natural sciences are
deployed. Leaving this debate aside, it’s clear that ‘intelligence analysis’ can be
conceptualised from a variety of different perspectives depending on one’s own
disciplinary or practitioner background. For the sake of simplicity, I define ‘intel-
ligence analysis’ as ‘both a cognitive and methodological approach to processing
and evaluating information—some of which is privileged—in order to produce an
assessment for a decision-maker about the security environment’ (Walsh 2011:
236). This definition is sufficiently vague that it can be applied in different intel-
ligence contexts.
The analytical techniques we focus on in the following section are explored
using three themes: social network analysis, structured analytical techniques, and
data mining/machine learning and behavioural sciences. A brief discussion will
introduce how each theme has been used in different intelligence contexts. We
will not spend much time on data mining/machine learning techniques as these
were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 (Collection). Data mining/machine learning
will also be raised again in Chapter 6 (ICT). In the final section, the advantages
Analysis 99
and disadvantages of each analytical technique will be explored along with the
critical governance challenges IC leaders will have to navigate as they relate to
improving analytical practice.
Social network analysis

Social network analysis (SNA) is a broader theme category for a range of related
analytical techniques seeking to assess the associations between threat actors
(and other people), activity, and places. The principles underlying SNA are not
new with ‘the advent of modern social network analysis generally attributed to
Jacob L. Moreno, a sociologist, who became interested in social psychology in
the 1930s (NAS 2019: 89).’ ‘Moreno attempted to explain and understand social
behaviour using “socio-grams”—graphical representations of the links between
an individual and others’ (Ibid: 89).
While SNA has been used in national security and law enforcement contexts
across the ‘Five Eyes’ for several decades (e.g. Sparrow 1991; Koschade 2006;
Ressler 2006; Leuprecht et al. 2017: 902–921), its intellectual heritage can be
sourced back to a broader range of disciplines such as social psychology, sociol-
ogy, mathematics and anthropology (Scott and Carrington 2011; Wasserman and
Faust 1994: 10). As Van Der Hulst (2009) highlights, SNA has for many intel-
ligence agencies become a critical analytical investigative tool for studying adver-
sary networks—regardless of whether these are terrorist or criminal in nature.
There may be:
motivational and group dynamic differences between organized crime and

terrorist groups, they (nonetheless) share the same loosely connected and
fluid ad hoc organizational principles. Hence, social ties and connections
are to a large extent crucial determinants for the performance, sustainability
and success of both criminal and terrorist organizations.
(Van Der Hulst 2009: 102)
In terms of SNA practice in law enforcement, Strang makes the distinction that
law enforcement since the 1970s has actually been deploying ‘network analysis’
and only more recently SNA (Strang 2014: 2). He defines link analysis as ‘explor-
ing the connections between individuals involved in criminal activity through
their links to each other and through their links to organisations, objects, places
and events related to the crimes’ (Ibid: 2). In contrast, Strang’s definition of SNA
as ‘the study of patterns of social connections, communications, exchange, friend-
ship, trust, cooperation, kinship also secrecy, competition, mistrust and enmity’
(Ibid: 5) suggests a tighter focus concentrating on the relationships between peo-
ple. The social interaction between criminal actors is clearly useful for targeting
recommendations, intelligence collection, and operational disruption.
The large volumes of criminal intelligence accumulating in law enforce-
ment agencies and the complexity of organised crime has seen the automation of
SNA in many agencies using analytical software such as I2, Palantir, and others.
100 Analysis
Researchers are also increasingly focused on computer-driven SNA that can more
rapidly detect, for example, gang networks and counter their associated violence.
For example, Paulo and colleagues (2013) documented their development of new
software called the Organizational, Relationship, and Contact Analyzer (ORCA)
‘that is designed from the ground-up to apply new techniques in social network
analysis and mining to support law enforcement.’ The software combines tech-
niques from logic programming, viral marketing, and community detection in
a usable application custom-tailored for law enforcement intelligence support.
The authors note their ‘work is inspired by recent work in law enforcement that
recognizes similarities between gang members and insurgents and identifies
adaptations that can be made from current counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy
to counter gang violence’ (Paulo et al. 2013: 1). The research team evaluated
ORCA on a police data set of 5418 arrests from a single police district over three
periods of time, finding 11,421 relationships among the arrests (Ibid: 3). From
this data, Paulo et al. 2013 used ORCA to assemble a social network consisting of
1468 individuals (who were members in one of 18 gangs) (Ibid: 3–4).
ORCA was able to complete this assembly in addition to all analysis (deter-
mining degree of membership, finding seed sets, and developing ecosystems)
taking 34.3 seconds to do so on a commodity laptop (Windows 8, B960 2.2
GHz processor with 4 GB RAM).
(Ibid: 4–5)
This kind of research shows the potential of automated SNA techniques, but fur-
ther work is required to improve their speed and accuracy.
SNA techniques have also been deployed for several decades in assessing the
interaction within and between terrorist groups (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2002).
In the 1960s, the CIA deployed network analysis to understand the relation-
ships between families and communities in communist strong areas of Thailand
(Ressler 2006: 6). After the 9/11 attacks, there has been an increased interest
in SNA from some IC agencies such as the CIA and NSA along with a greater
number of scholars attempting to do SNA research on terrorist groups using open
source information (Ibid: 3). Shortly after 9/11, Valdis Krebs mapped Al Qaeda’s
network using publicly available data on the AQ hijackers and running basic net-
work principles through computer software (Ressler 2006: 3). Marc Sageman’s
2004 book Understanding Terrorism Networks also provided a detailed under-
standing of clusters of regional AQ groups using open sources (Sageman 2004).
Large databases now exist such as the Global Terrorism Database and the Profiles
of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) database (Binder
and Ackerman 2019: 4–5), which provide scholars with additional opportunities
to conduct SNA research on various terrorists and criminal groups. Researchers
within and outside the IC continue to experiment with how best to use SNA tech-
niques to destabilise and disrupt terrorist groups, and for understanding recruit-
ment and resilience (Choudary and Singh 2015; Bright et al. 2020: 638-656).
Increasingly, this research involves attempts to improve algorithms that can both
Analysis 101
automate and assess the significance of social interactions between threat actors
closer to real time using YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media
(Klausen et al. 2012; Ball 2013: 147–168; Zeng et al. 2015: 13–16; Chen 2008).
Other research is looking at how computational networks can reflect changes
in terrorist activity based on the implementation of counter-terrorism policies
(Horne and Bestvater 2016: 87–110). In summary, it’s clear that attempts are
being made to improve the accuracy and automation (using big data and machine
learning) of various SNA techniques. Equally though, as we shall see in the sec-
ond section (intelligence governance issues), not only analysts but intelligence
leaders will increasingly be challenged in their understanding on which machine
learning-driven SNA techniques will be most useful and how they can be effec-
tively deployed in ways that optimise collection and analytical processes.
Structured analytical techniques

The second cluster of analytical techniques explored here is structured analyti-
cal techniques (SATs). Structured analytical techniques include a diverse number
of analytical tools (e.g. analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH), key assump-
tions check, red teaming, foresight analysis, and scenario generation) that devel-
oped originally and mainly in the US IC (particularly the CIA), but have also
been picked up by other ‘Five Eyes’ countries over the last few decades (Walsh
2011, 2017; Heuer 1999, 2009: 529–545; Heur and Pherson 2010; Beebe and
Pherson 2014; Pherson and Pherson 2017; Pherson and Heur 2020). SATs are
informed by an amalgamation of a number of quantitative and qualitative social
science methodologies: from cognitive psychology to political science as well
as other disciplines such as business and engineering. SATs remain an evolving
knowledge area in the intelligence studies field and within ICs. Their propaga-
tion across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs have waxed and waned in the last four decades for a
range of reasons. There are lots of complex factors involved in both their utilisa-
tion and under-utilisation—one of which relates of course to whether IC leaders
have been willing to fund training in SATs and their integration into work prac-
tice. Additionally, the extent to which SATs are used in some IC agencies has
also varied due to differing organisational cultural attitudes about their utility to
improving analysis. The key objectives of SATs is that they provide a structure
for analysts to both enhance their critical thinking and contest cognitive biases,
which may lead to faulty judgements. They also promote greater collaboration
among analysts whose thinking and expertise can become siloed when writing
products. For several decades now and particularly since 9/11, SATs have been
promoted and analysts trained in them as a response to significant intelligence fail-
ure (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis, 9/11, Assessment of WMD in Iraq). Anecdotally,
from SATs analytical training sessions I have run in Australia and in other ‘Five
Eyes’ countries, some analysts have reported to me that their use in the work-
place have helped them think more critically and improve analytical judgements.
Though, from an evidence-based perspective, there is less empirical evidence of
whether SATs can improve both the reliability and validity of judgements made.
102 Analysis
For example, in what ways do they add value to the analytical process beyond
giving analysts systems and structures to think critically about complex issues?
Some SATs such as ACH have been used for several decades now, but do they
significantly improve validity and reliability of analytical judgements? In simple
terms, what expectations should IC leaders, practitioners, and researchers have
about their strengths and limitations in various analytical contexts?
We may now be starting to get some answers to these questions. More recently,
empirical studies have investigated the value of SATs to improving the accuracy
of analytical assessments and/or reducing cognitive biases. To date these stud-
ies have suggested they may be of limited value (Coulthart 2017; Whitesmith
2020). Both of these studies were mentioned briefly in Chapter 3 (Tasking and
Coordination) in the context of how IC leaders need to address capability issues
within strategic intelligence. However, we did not go into any detail about either.
It’s worth here in the context of our discussion of various analytical techniques
that IC leaders need to evaluate for impact to briefly discuss each. In the US-based
study, Coulthart systematically reviewed several sources in the literature as well
as surveying 80 analysts at the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) for evidence that particular SATs improve analysis. Looking
at six SATs in particular (e.g. devils advocacy, futures analysis, brainstorming,
ACH, red teaming, team A/B), he concluded that ‘in the aggregate there is low to
moderate credible evidence that 6 techniques improve analysis most of the time’
(2017: 384). Whitesmith’s study in the UK is a little more detailed. Whitesmith
conducted an experimental study to test whether one structured analytical method
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)—taught by the Cabinet Office to the
United Kingdom’s intelligence community—provides effective mitigation of the
cognitive biases of serial position effects and confirmation bias during intelligence
analysis. She found that ACH had no statistically significant mitigative impact on
the proportion of participants that exhibited serial position effects or confirmation
bias, or the impact of confirmation bias on the analytical process. The most sig-
nificant factor that influenced participants’ judgements of the credibility of infor-
mation was the possibility of deception or dishonesty (2020: 380-405).
Data mining/machine learning techniques

A third cluster of analytical techniques which IC leaders will continue to grapple
with yet benefit from are data mining/machine learning techniques. In Chapters 3
(Tasking and Coordination) and 4 (Collection)—but particularly the latter—we
discussed in detail how data mining, machine learning/AI is now continually
driving both the tasking/coordination and collection of intelligence for analysis.
Hence, there is no need to repeat that discussion here. But in brief, and based on
discussions in earlier chapters, it’s clear that data mining, machine learning/AI
techniques are also changing the ways many of the analytical techniques covered
above are now being applied. Data mining, machine learning/AI is helping to
automate in some ways traditional analytical techniques as well as providing new
capabilities in areas such as social network analysis, artificial neural networks,
Analysis 103
text mining, computational intelligence, swarm intelligence, and link analysis
(see Chapter 3 Tasking and Coordination; Skillicorn 2009; Pedrycz and Chen
2014; Agarwal and Sureka 2015; Leuprecht et al. 2017: 902–921).
However, as highlighted in previous chapters, while big data analytical tech-
niques are in many contexts improving the speed in which some data and intel-
ligence can be collected and assessed, the signal to noise ratio within data can be
low in many complex threat types such as terrorism and organised crime (Pedrycz
and Chen 2014; Agarwal and Sureka 2015; Pramanik et al. 2017). Additionally,
the predictive power of algorithms in complex multi-actor threat types such as
terrorism and organised crime is not yet able to correlate confidently either what
could be just data noise from signals or able to estimate future activities of threat
actors. So regardless of the data mining techniques being used, there are signifi-
cant governance issues remaining in how these techniques are deployed within
ICs. These are briefly summarised in the final section of this chapter, but is also
discussed again in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges),
along with key governance issues identified in other chapters.
Social and behavioural sciences

Several psychological and other social sciences perspectives have also become
relevant to intelligence analysis. In the earlier two sections, the focus was on
SATs and how technical analytical tools (big data/machine learning) can improve
analysis. In the next chapter (Chapter 6 ICT), we will come back to how social-
behavioural sciences (SBS) can help improve the technical support for analysis.
SBS can also help inform analytical workforce issues and these will be discussed
in detail in Chapter 7 (Human Resources). In this third and final sub-section,
(before the focus is shifted to a summary of key governance issues), we explore
how SBS can improve analytical processes and outcomes. There are several SBS
disciplines (e.g. psychology, economics, criminology, demography, political sci-
ence, philosophy, and sociology) which can inform how intelligence analysts
understand complex threat and risk issues (Fischoff 2011). As now underscored
several times in previous chapters, the list of threat and risk issues since 9/11 have
expanded both in volume and complexity. Nation states such as China and Russia
are challenging the post-World War II order, which is bringing increased uncer-
tainty and the possibility of mis-calculation in relations with others such as the
United States. Jihadist terrorism, transnational criminal networks, border security,
cyber security, and exploitation of dual-use technology for WMD/CBRN are also
becoming more complex to understand. All of these threat/risk issues have at their
core the need for ICs to understand the human behaviour that is behind them. The
SBS discipline in a sense has long helped ICs to understand various aspects of
human behaviour, but the links between both communities has been ad hoc and
often at arm’s length. The SBS academic community and analysts working in ICs
while having much in common in terms of trying to understand human behaviour
are different in other key ways. One point of difference is culture. Analysts, for
example, generally have less time to research extensively topics given the often
104 Analysis
short deadlines in providing assessments for senior policy leaders. Intelligence
analysts will often have to go with what information they can assemble in the
available time without the luxury SBS researchers have in extensive collection
of data to test hypotheses or generate theories. Additionally, intelligence analysts
do not have the time to consider different methodological approaches to improve
reproducibility, reliability, and validity of results as SBS researchers generally do.
Despite these workplace cultural differences, the growing complexity of
threat/risk issues, particularly how threat actors are interacting with technology, is
demanding that analysts embrace more formally SBS researchers in their assess-
ment of evolving security threats. Since 9/11, there has been a greater awareness
in ICs about how various SBS, particularly psychology, political science, and
sociology, can help them understand threat actors. Nowhere has this been more
obvious in SBS research than in studies of social media behaviour, which has
helped shape IC understanding of terrorist’s communications, propaganda, radi-
calisation, and operational planning. But also SBS studies of political (sentiment)
behaviour is helping ICs understand emotions/behaviour in regime change and
state failure. As noted earlier, social network analysis has also been informed by
a range of SBS fields (anthropology, communication, sociology, and political sci-
ence). It is increasingly the combination of different disciplines rather than one
approach that is providing ICs with increasingly sophisticated network analysis
for ‘identifying key actors, their group identifications, and other network features’
such as network adaptation (NAS 2019: 89).
The 2019 National Academy of Sciences Decadal Survey of the Social and
Behavioural Sciences provides a detailed survey of SBS disciplines that may help
intelligence analysts improve assessments across a range of threat/risk issues
(NAS 2019). A similar, smaller report on the same topic as the NAS report (Social
Science Research and Intelligence in Australia) was commissioned by Australia’s
ONI in 2019 (Withers et al. 2019).1 In addition to understanding social network
analysis of different state and non-state actors, the NAS report provides insights
into other cross-disciplinary SBS areas such as the emerging field of social
cybersecurity, which seeks to understand the human behaviours and motivations
behind various types of cyber-attacks (e.g. malware, denial of service attacks, data
breaches, disinformation campaigns, deception, and manipulation). SBS research-
ers can work with computer scientists to understand ‘cyber-mediated changes in
individual, group, societal, and political behaviours and outcomes, as well as to
support the building of the cyber infrastructure needed to guard against cyber-
mediated threats’ (Ibid: 141–142). The objective of SBS researchers working in
social cybersecurity is not just to understand behaviour or inform more robust
protective cyber infrastructure, but to develop technology (e.g. cyber-forensics,
social-media analytics, text mining, spatiotemporal data mining) and knowledge
that will help ‘assess, predict and mitigate instances of individual influence and
community manipulation in which either humans or bots attempt to alter or con-
trol the cyber-mediated information environment’ (Ibid: 142). In summary, social
cybersecurity researchers are increasingly useful for intelligence analysts trying
to understand the socio-political context of cyber activity that seeks to influence,
Analysis 105
persuade, and manipulate behaviour in the cyber realm—such as hostile state
actors involved in foreign interference seeking to manipulate elections or non-
state actors seeking to recruit or communicate with other like-minded individuals
or groups. In the next section, the focus will shift from a summary of key analyti-
cal techniques to the governance challenges associated with their application in
ICs. Space does not allow a full discussion of all the challenges, though there are
several common governance problems to all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs which are raised
briefly in the next section. The challenges raised here will also be revisited in
the context of what IC leaders might do about them in Chapter 8 (The Future IC
Leader and Governance Challenges).
Intelligence governance issues

In the discussion of analytical techniques above, one clear and common govern-
ance challenge is how IC leaders can promote innovation in these techniques (and
others not discussed here) in an integrated, strategic, and sustainable way. There
are several strands to this innovation challenge. One relates to addressing work-
force and capability issues, including the education and training of analysts in
various analytical techniques and/or facilitating the creation of operational envi-
ronments that allow analysts easier access to external expertise. Analytic work-
force issues will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (Human Resources). Another
challenge in implementing analytical innovations is the ability of ICs to assess
the performance of various analytical techniques such as those discussed above
(e.g. SATs, machine learning and social-behavioural applied knowledge to intel-
ligence analysis). Resources are limited and IC leaders will come under greater
pressure to not only defend analytical capability investments, but demonstrate
they are effective. George refers to ‘a taxonomy of errors in intelligence analysis
that impact on improving tradecraft (2010: 297).’ These are cognitive, organisa-
tional, cultural, and political errors (Ibid). A key governance challenge, therefore,
is how IC leaders can influence in a positive way the reduction of these errors in
order to maximise the organisational integration of various innovative analyti-
cal techniques. All four of George’s errors have played roles in poor implemen-
tation of various analytical techniques in ICs and law enforcement agencies in
the past. Even potentially really useful techniques such as SNA have been either
poorly implemented or as Van der Hulst (2009) argued ‘neglected by law enforce-
ment, intelligence and policy research, which has hampered the ability to coun-
teract organized crime and terrorism’ (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004; Coles 2001;
Chattoe and Hamill 2005; McIllwain 1999). Part of this neglect can be explained
by the lack of experienced staff within ICs and law enforcement agencies of SNA
and poor understanding of the most appropriate methodology to analyse networks.
Additionally, the introduction of various analytical techniques, particularly
ones which require significant investment, are not solely decided by analysts
because as George (2010) reminds us analytical performance is determined by a
broad range of variables beyond the analyst’s cognitive abilities such as organisa-
tional, political, and cultural factors. IC leaders also need to consider how from an
106 Analysis
agency or community perspective analytical innovation is evaluated to investigate
whether they can make demonstrable improvements in the analytical processes
and products. These questions will be returned to in the context of a range of other
governance challenges future IC leaders will need to deal with in Chapter 8 (The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges).
A second key governance issue related to the uptake of innovations in analytical
techniques is how IC leaders ensure these tools can not only result in more skilled
analysts, but also promote improved collaborative environments between analysts
within agencies and across ICs. An increasingly complex security environment
will require not only greater use of innovative analytical techniques, but a cross
agency and community team-based approach to using them to maximise their util-
ity in assessing emerging threats/risks. Since 9/11, there has been an increase in
the number of collaborative tools and communities of practice established that
can help analysts come together to make better use of analytical techniques and
processes. For example, in the US IC, collaborative tools such as Intellipedia
and A-Space have enabled the creation of living documents that can be updated
and peer-reviewed periodically (Fingar 2011: 16–17). There are a myriad of other
technical solutions being investigated to enhance analytical collaboration at tacti-
cal, operational, and strategic levels (e.g. Bier et al. 2010; Svenson et al. 2010;
Wollocko et al. 2013). Given many collaboration tools are software or web based,
a key challenge for IC leaders will be determining which systems can genuinely
promote new and more efficient ways for analysts to work together that improves
analytical reliability and validity, while at the same time does not add extended
periods of time, particularly in circumstances when assessments are time sensitive.
A third governance challenge related to intelligence analysis and use of ana-
lytical techniques concerns whether analytical innovations can result in better
evidence that underpins assessments. It should not just be up to analysts alone
to determine at an agency or community-wide level how to improve the systems
and processes for assessing analytical information quality, including how this is
communicated, particularly strategic assessments which involve probability and
forecasting (Dhami et al. 2015, 2018; Barnes 2016: 327–344; Mandel and Barnes
2018: 127–137; Tetlock & Mellers 2011). As noted earlier, improving the quality
of information, including a stronger integration of more evidence-based infor-
mation from SBS and the scientific community, should increase the reliability
and validity of intelligence assessments. In terms of increasing the reliability and
validity of assessments in the future, the governance challenge is two-fold. First,
IC leaders will need to identify strategies which can better integrate quality evi-
dence-based knowledge from within and outside ICs. Second, IC leaders will also
need to implement initiatives that monitor and evaluate how the uptake of new
analytical knowledge and techniques is improving assessment outcomes. There
were a number of suggestions by IC leaders who completed the survey for the
study on how to improve assessment outcomes. For example, one said:
intelligence analysis tradecraft can be improved by integrating evidence-

based assessment methodologies, exercising, war gaming, red teaming,
Analysis 107
and case studies to assess accuracy and relevancy of intelligence products.
Formal review workshops including decision makers and analysts should be
considered. (survey respondent 4)
Another survey respondent suggested IC leaders needed to promote evidence-

based approaches to determine how analytical innovations impact on performance
and ultimately improve assessments (survey respondent 22). It is pleasing to see in
the survey data IC leaders expressing the importance of validating analytical inno-
vations, though there are few comments from participants on areas in particular
that such an approach should be applied. Another important aspect of evaluating
analytical performance and outcomes should include building on studies within
decision-science. As Dhami et al. argue, this is ‘because of its quantitative meth-
ods for measurement and testing cognition and behaviour, its theoretical models
of human judgement and decision making, and its history of dealing with applied
problems’ (2015: 756). The growing complexity of the security environment and
creeping volume of deceptive or ‘fake’ open source material creates additional
risks to the rigor of the analytical process. Accordingly, it is likely IC leaders
will be increasingly focused on how to improve agency/community systems for
monitoring analytical performance over time to reduce significant episodes of
cognitive bias or poor decision-making based on fake, deceptive, or low evidence
information sources.
Related to better IC wide monitoring systems for evaluating analytical judge-
ments is another metric—time. A key focus for IC leaders in the future will not
just be how to increase the reliability and validity of analytical judgements, but
also the speed in which analytical outcomes can reach decision-makers. Policy
makers are saturated with information from various sources including ICs. A key
governance challenge in an increasingly competitive information environment is
how IC leaders can not only increase the value of assessments, but the speed in
which they can be consumed by policy makers. Increasing the speed of analysis is
both a cognitive and technological consideration. Improving the cognitive aspects
will be addressed in the broader context of workforce planning issues discussed
in Chapter 7 (HR). The technological aspects of ‘speeding up analysis’ will be
considered in Chapter 6 (ICT).
Conclusion
This chapter explored thematically key analytical techniques used by ICs to
support analytical processes and judgements. In each case, their strengths and
weaknesses were identified. Second, the chapter discussed how innovation in
analytical techniques and processes is the responsibility of both analysts and IC
leaders. The increasing complexity of the security environment, limited resources,
and a competitive information environment places more pressure on IC leaders
now to adopt whole of agency and enterprise wide initiatives. In the case of ana-
lytical innovations, this means ones that are cost effective and can demonstrate
empirically (to the extent that this is possible) how they increase the validity and
108 Analysis
reliability of assessments. This is not to suggest that all analytical techniques
and innovations can or should be amenable to ‘empirical testing.’ Intelligence
analysis will remain an art and science. However, the complexity of the secu-
rity environment will demand additional analytical innovations that can augment
traditional tradecraft. Innovations are likely to come from SBS and the scien-
tific community whose traditions of deploying empirical methods for testing the
validity and reliability of data sources will improve IC assessments. And indeed
a number of IC leaders surveyed echoed the greater need for them to engage
with SBS academics and the broader academic community (survey respondents
7 and 36). It will be up to IC leaders, however, to assess what constraints in
their organisational structures, processes, and cultural environments might be
limiting progress on analytical innovations—both endogenous and exogenous to
IC—including their evaluation and implementation. How will IC leaders address
the institutional obstacles to analytical innovation and create sustainable com-
munities of analytic practice that result in more reliable and valid assessments for
decision-makers? In the following chapters (Chapters 6 ICT; 7 HR; and 8 The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges), we will address aspects of these
questions further.
In the next chapter (Chapter 6 ICT), the focus shifts away from the leadership
aspects of core intelligence processes (e.g. tasking and coordination, collection,
and analysis) to two chapters which are centred on two key enabling activities
(ICT, HR).2 Chapter 6 will discuss the leadership challenges associated with
information communications and technology (ICT) which support core intelli-
gence processes. It will primarily focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI)
given this topic remains an enduring priority for ICs to manage and because its
implementation is linked as noted earlier to our discussions on analytical innova-
tion, but also other topics in the rest of the book.
Notes
1 I peer reviewed the Social Science Research and Intelligence in Australia report.
2 You will recall from Chapter 2 we mentioned there were five key enabling activities:
ICT, HR, Legislation, Research, and Governance. While the book’s next two chapters
focus exclusively on ICT and HR, the other activities (research, legislation, and govern-
ance) cross over all chapters and are also explored more deeply in Chapter 8 (The Future
IC Leader and Governance Challenges) and Chapter 9 (Leadership Development).
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6 Information and communication
technologies (ICT)
Introduction
In Chapters 2–5, the discussion focused on the challenges leaders face in direct-
ing and optimising various core intelligence processes (tasking and coordination,
collection, and analysis). You will recall from Chapter 2 that the core intelligence
processes combined are like the machinery on the ‘factory floor.’ Without each
of the component parts there is no process or product which can ultimately pro-
duce the intelligence decision-makers rely on. Chapters 2 to 5 highlighted several
governance challenges and it should be clear by now that these do not have sim-
ple solutions particularly as the ever changing and increasingly complex security
environment conspires further against ‘hard and fast’ remedies. In the next two
chapters, I discuss several additional governance challenges, but these relate to
key enabling activities (ICT and Human Resources). Again, you may recall that
key enabling activities are those activities that provide the structure and support
upon which core intelligence processes take place—whether that is within just
one intelligence agency or across an entire community.
Having effective ICT systems, architecture, and processes has always been
vital to the intelligence mission. Data, information, and knowledge may represent
the lifeblood of the intelligence enterprise, but even the most valuable informa-
tion in the world becomes redundant if it cannot be stored, accessed, shared, and
integrated through reliable and adaptable ICT systems and processes.
Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Leadership) presented a number of themes that
spoke to the kinds of ICT issues intelligence leaders have had to manage histori-
cally. In many respects, the ICT challenges remain persistently similar to the ones
that emerged following the establishment of modern ICs from 1945 onwards. You
will recall in Chapter 2 several themes were discussed, and the critical roles each
played in the evolution of IC institutions from 1945 to the present. The fourth
theme mentioned was ‘knowledge management and information sharing.’ Under
this theme several issues were presented. As technological innovation facili-
tated a greater collection of open and covert information sources (particularly
SIGINT)—the challenge for intelligence leaders quickly turned to finding tech-
nical and institutional solutions for extracting meaning from abundant sources.
The other main difficulty became managing information overload and having
114 ICT
organisational cultural and knowledge systems available to promote information
sharing across ICs.
Similarly, Chapter 4 (Collection) presented a detailed discussion about techno-
logical and methodological approaches to information collection and processing.
In particular, a significant amount of time was spent on how rapid changes in ICT
facilitated the uptake of new collection platforms including using big data and
machine learning, social media, and the exploitation of the dark web. In summary,
discussion of ICT-related issues in Chapters 2 and 4 have provided much of the
historical context for understanding what challenges IC leaders have faced in col-
lecting, managing, and sharing information. This chapter builds on that founda-
tion by focusing exclusively on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in our ICs. It
explores the likely challenges intelligence leaders will confront with the integra-
tion of AI into other ICT processes.
While the incorporation of AI technologies and processes into ICs are not new,
I argue that understanding the opportunities and downsides for the further integra-
tion of AI remain complex, uncertain in many cases—and will continue to occupy
current and future leaders into the next decade. Given the integration of AI into
existing IC systems, processes, and cultures is likely to be consequential, it is fit-
ting that we focus on it in this chapter, and the role intelligence leaders have in
integrating it into various core intelligence processes. Simply put, as far as being
the major ICT challenge IC leaders will face well into the next decade and longer,
AI is the stand out.
Intelligence and AI
For many, AI is not just another trajectory in global technological change that
all sectors of our societies need to both understand and harness. But is AI that
consequential a change? Klaus Schwab, the former executive chairman of the
World Economic Forum, argued that a series of technical, economic, and scien-
tific changes begun to usher in AI at the turn of this century. But these changes
were not just an ‘add-on’ to the digital revolution that brought rapid and sig-
nificant innovation in computers from the 1960s and the internet in the 1990s.
For Schwab, the rise of AI embodies what he refers to as the Fourth Industrial
Revolution. Why a fourth revolution beyond the first (Industrial Revolution
1760–1840), second (mass-production late nineteenth century to early twentieth),
and third (computer/digital 1960s to 1990s)?
Schwab argues that current and future developments in AI are ushering in a
distinct and fourth revolution because of the velocity, breadth, depth, and trans-
formative systems impact of change being facilitated by AI (Schwab 2017: 3).
He suggests that it is not just the critical role of AI in bringing about this fourth
revolution, but breakthroughs in closely related fields such as robotics IoT,
autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nano-technology, biotechnology, materials
science, energy storage, and quantum computing are also contributing to ongo-
ing, major disruptions to economies and societies in ways never seen before
(Ibid).
ICT 115
Whether Schwab is correct and the cumulative impact of all AI innovations
from the turn of the century to the present and beyond represents a fourth revolu-
tion globally is not entirely clear. It is likely that the significance of change can
only be fully assessed in the rear vision of history. Regardless, as will be seen
shortly, there is no question AI has and continues to be transformative across most
economic and social sectors nationally and internationally. While the true extent
of any transformative impact of AI globally cannot be known at least in the short
to medium term, expectations are high across many economic and social sectors
that AI will bring a profound change in nation-states and globally. For example,
just in the commercial sector alone, business researchers Davenport and Ronanki
(2019: 1) surveyed 250 executives familiar with their companies’ use of cognitive
technology and it showed three-quarters of them believed that AI will substan-
tially transform their companies within three years.
Suggesting that AI is and will continue to bring substantial change to compa-
nies, industries, and society as a whole seems clear enough, but given the rapid
development in multiple AI technologies it is less clear what we mean by AI. Lu
suggest that AI is ‘any theory, method, and technique that helps machines (espe-
cially computers) analyse, simulate, exploit, and explore human thinking process
and behaviour’ (2019: 1–2). It involves ‘the computation and computing of data
in intelligent ways in order to construct intelligent systems that allow computers
to complete tasks that only humans were able to do in the past’ (Ibid). Lu also
describes AI as involving the application of ‘computer hardware and software to
simulate the underlying theories, approaches and techniques of human behaviour’
(Ibid).
Nilsson in his historical study of AI defines it as ‘that activity devoted to mak-
ing machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality that enables an entity to
function appropriately and with foresight in its environment’ (2010: preface). His
account details the AI’s contributions to achievements in multiple fields, includ-
ing but not limited to biology, linguistics, psychology and cognitive sciences,
neuroscience, mathematics, philosophy and logic, engineering and computer sci-
ence. Lu’s definition above is not dissimilar to Nilsson’s, particularly on AI being
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary of natural sciences and social sciences
consisting of many diversified disciplines (Lu 2019: 1–2).
Other definitions of AI emphasise the human and rational dimensions of what
this kind of technology is meant to achieve. Russel and Norvig lay out eight defi-
nitions of AI against two dimensions that typify its objectives. The first (human
dimension) is how machines might think humanly (i.e. problem solving, learning)
or act humanly (i.e. creating machines that perform functions that require intel-
ligence). The second dimension (rationality) refers to whether an AI system’s
performance can be ‘rational.’ This means it does the ‘right thing’ given what it
knows (2016: 1–2).
What AI is and does can also be understood by surveying its historical devel-
opment, which stretches back now for more than 60 years. It is not germane to
our discussion of AI in the intelligence context to provide an exhaustive historical
survey of AI. There are now an increasing number of good sources that do just
116 ICT
that (see for example: Lu 2019; Flasinki 2016: 3–13; Russel and Norvig 2016).
However, a quick historical overview is useful in providing a foundation and con-
text for how AI has developed so that discussion in the next section (AI: National
Security and Military Applications) is more meaningful for the reader.
Lu (2019) describes the evolution as being in three phases. The three develop-
mental steps are the initial phase (1956–1980), the industrialisation phase (1980–
2000), and the explosion phase (2000–) (2019: 7). In the initial phase (1956 to
1980), AI was only used to solve algebraic problems and prove geometric the-
orems. Nonetheless, progress was made during this earlier period. In 1956, at
Dartmouth University in the United States, scientists participated in a conference
to study and explore the use of machine simulation intelligence. The Dartmouth
conference became a watershed moment and is also known as the origin of AI
(Ibid: 7). In the second major development of AI (1980–2000), “knowledge pro-
cessing” became the focus of AI research (Ibid: 8). Several European countries,
Japan, and the United States started to allocate larger sums of money to support
AI. A key goal was to ‘create machines that support human-machine dialogue,
translation and image recognition’ (Ibid).
The third major developmental phase in AI (2000 to the present) was fuelled
on the back of an increasing volume of data since the development of the internet.
Sensors too were collecting a lot of different data, and in the first ten years of the
twenty-first century the AI field built the foundations of machine learning tools
to process the explosion in the volume and variety of data. Lu argues that at this
time algorithms that have gone through generations of trials and errors started to
produce impressive results. In the public arena at least, AI and machine learning
began to grab extensive attention with IBM’s “Deep Blue” defeating Kasparov
in chess games and Google’s AlphaGo defeating world champion Li Sedol. In
essence, this third phase of the AI evolution has encapsulated a growth in deep
learning and deep learning algorithms.
Deep learning can be thought of as a branch of machine learning which has
pushed the boundaries of AI to higher levels. Deep learning techniques simulate
large-scale structures of the cerebral cortex through large-scale data training and
design complex multi-layer artificial neural networks (Lu 2019: 9–11). Artificial
Neural Networks (ANNs) enable robots to learn and think like humans and to han-
dle more complex tasks. In essence, progress in deep learning techniques is now
allowing the development of even more complex machine learning models that
can work on (train) ever increasing volumes of data to improve the accuracy of
classification or prediction possible from such models. After now several decades
of development, deep learning has produced many algorithms and models. Lu
categorises deep learning into two types: supervised and unsupervised learning.
Supervised learning makes full use of AI prior knowledge to build robust data
analysis models. Supervising training and learning models can improve the
universality of model applications and improve the accuracy of data analysis.
Unsupervised learning does not require any prior knowledge. Data analysis
models can automate information mining and automatically build learning
ICT 117
models. Unsupervised learning has been widely used in speech recognition
and text retrieval.
(Lu 2019: 12–14)
The advancements in deep learning and big data now means AI applications are
expanding across several commercial sectors including in monitoring water,
energy, the stock market, logistics, health care, transport, retail, agriculture, and
education. And naturally several deep learning and big data models continue to
be developed across the national security and intelligence sectors. In the next sec-
tion, we focus on a brief survey of how AI technology and knowledge is being
applied across national security intelligence and the military sectors. In addition
to exploring what kinds of AI innovations are being used by the broader national
security intelligence and military enterprise, the section shows how these poten-
tially strengthen intelligence capabilities by creating enhanced opportunities for
more effective collection and analysis of information.
AI: national security intelligence and military applications

The discussion here is not exhaustive; rather the objective is to provide sufficient
context to allow a more detailed exploration of the challenges AI poses for IC
leaders. The discussion is organised around three broad sub-headings: national
security, cyber, and military applications. I recognise using these headings is
fairly arbitrary given how the issues discussed under each frequently intersect
across all three. Nonetheless, using sub-headings provides some organisation—
particularly in how AI has improved intelligence capabilities across different
areas of both the national security and military enterprises. After a discussion of
how AI/machine learning has been applied by ICs, the final section will explore
the challenges leaders confront with integrating such technology, methodologies,
and processes into their agencies. On this last point, Chapter 8 (The Future IC
Leader and Governance Challenges) also reflects further on the implications of
challenges raised here and how IC leaders might begin to address them.
National security
For decades now, but particularly since the digital revolution of the 1990s, ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs have not been able to analyse the burgeoning volumes of information
available to them despite increased capabilities to collect it. The volume, veloc-
ity, and variety of information now available, particularly unstructured sources
(documents, social media, digital pictures, videos), and an increasing volume of
information from sensors (i.e. IoT) means more information is collected than can
be analysed by any IC (Brantly 2018: 566). This point was also made earlier in
Chapter 4 (Collection).
Most of this new data is unstructured sensor or text data and stored across
unintegrated databases. For intelligence agencies, this creates both an opportunity
and a challenge; there is more data to analyse and draw useful conclusions from,
118 ICT
but finding the needle in so much hay is getting tougher. All ‘Five Eyes’ ICs each
day collect more raw intelligence data than their entire workforce could effec-
tively analyse in their combined lifetimes. So analysts must prioritise and triage
which collected information to analyse, and increasingly this has meant relying
on computer searches and databases to more quickly access, manage, and assess
the information. The ability to quickly interrogate databases has clearly been
advantageous for the analysis of SIGINT, but the other trend has been the partial
automation in the analysis of some kinds of GEOINT such as satellite recon-
naissance using machine learning techniques. Machine learning techniques will
likely continue to be useful in processing SIGINT and ELINT, but also allow even
more sophisticated pattern recognition across data sets (Allen and Chan 2017: 27;
Horowitz et al. 2018). Further, as discussed in the next section, it’s increasingly
clear that AI will continue to play a significant role in cyber security and defence
issues (Payne 2018: 7–32).
Additionally, over the last decade several AI and machine learning projects
have been developed to improve predictive analytics and sense-making capa-
bilities of ICs. In the United States, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Activity (IARPA) has sponsored several programs to improve the forecasting
of complex and emerging events. Many programs have used forecasting tourna-
ments involving people from around the world to generate forecasts about ‘thou-
sands of real-world events.’ ‘All of our programs on predictive analytics do use
this tournament style of funding and evaluating research,’ according to Jason
Matheny, IARPA’s former director (Seffers 2015: 19–22). Matheny cites sev-
eral programs that have demonstrated ‘predictive success’ including the Open
Source Indicators program, where he suggested they were able to predict disease
outbreak earlier than traditional reporting (Ibid). This program used a crowd-
sourcing technique in which people across the globe offered their predictions
on several events (e.g. political uprisings, disease outbreaks, and elections). The
data analysis relied on social media trends and web queries indicating potential
behaviour suggestive of a disease outbreak or political uprising. The collection
methods were automated and used machine learning to filter through several bil-
lions of data points looking for a signal that an event may be about to happen
(Ibid).
Other IARPA sponsored AI/machine learning analytical programs have been
developed to improve IC’s capability to detect earlier cyber-attacks. One program
looked not just at suspicious activity on a computer, but data outside of a network
that might indicate an impending cyber-attack. Such external indicators sources
could include patterns of web search queries and black market activity relating to
malware (Ibid). Still other programs such as the Scientific advances to Continuous
Insider Threat Evaluation (SCITE) program examines a broad array of insider
threats, including mass shootings, cyber-attacks, and industrial espionage. The
objective again is to use AI/machine learning methodologies to look for indicators
for insider threat detection that could include kinetic attacks in IC (including mili-
tary facilities) as well as cyber-attacks resulting in the loss of intellectual property
(Seffers 2015: 19–22).
ICT 119
The next section expands on how AI/machine learning applications have been
used to improve cyber capabilities of ICs. For the remaining space here, the dis-
cussion focuses on AI/machine learning and counter-terrorism. The increase in
the scale and reach of global terrorism since 9/11 has shown that ‘Five Eyes’
ICs needed to develop faster ways to collect and analyse vast amounts of data
and information in real time in order to prevent and disrupt as much as possible
attacks in their homelands or abroad. IC’s traditional reliance on SIGINT and
even HUMINT to some extent has made getting a close to real-time picture of ter-
rorist activities, plans, and movements increasingly difficult. Counter-intelligence
awareness by AL-Qaeda and the Islamic State of IC’s interception capabilities and
the growth in sophistication and their use of encrypted communications is making
traditional physical and technical surveillance challenging. Against this backdrop,
advancements in data mining, AI/machine learning have provided ICs new plat-
forms to collect and synthesise information useful in identifying terrorist activity
in real time. As Ganor suggests, ‘everyone has a digital footprint (e.g. cell phones,
email, biometrics, social network, smart phone applications) that can be tracked
and processed’ (2019: 3). In particular, certain kinds of social media such as
Twitter can be studied to better understand terrorist communications, particularly
operational planning—but also individuals that may be in the process of becoming
radicalised (Ibid). For ‘Five Eyes’ ICs, collecting or accessing bulk digital data as
will be discussed later is not without its ongoing concerns about what is appropri-
ate, proportionate, and what might become an excessive invasion in the privacy
of other law-abiding citizens. These privacy issues were flagged previously in
Chapter 4 (Collection). But the increasing advances in the collection and ana-
lytical synthesis of big data/AI/machine learning systems clearly will continue to
have benefits for ICs in identifying more quickly and accurately those suspected of
terrorist activities. It is not just tracing the digital footprint of individuals working
in larger terrorist groups such as the Islamic State that this type of technology will
continue to be useful, but also in harder counter-terrorism cases involving lone
actor attacks, which in some cases can be more spontaneous. AI/machine learning
applications may not have the capability to predict ‘the next lone actor’ attack,
but they can be used to develop a pattern of life on suspects, which can increase
the chances that ICs can detect and disrupt their plans. Another application of
AI/machine learning technology in the counter-terrorism context—autonomous
drones—has been in place now for several decades. The CIA and US Department
of Defense has used them in para-military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and West
Africa and more broadly globally for surveillance and targeted killing of high-
value terrorist targets from the Bush administration onwards (Johnson et al. 2017).
Other ‘Five Eyes’ countries such as Australia are now more actively deploying
drones too for counter-terrorism operations overseas (Walsh 2017: 429–433).
AI and cyber applications

The effectiveness of various AI/machine learning techniques to ‘predict’ indica-
tors for an impending cyber-attack—whether state or non-state-based—in origin
120 ICT
remains an open question. However, what is clearer is how the development of
various cyber tools has significantly increased ICs, defence and law enforce-
ment agencies’ surveillance and espionage capabilities (Leenen and Meyer 2019:
42–63). Physical surveillance, i.e. people following persons of interest in physical
spaces, is not extinct, yet advances in digital surveillance reduces the number of
intelligence officers now required to collect intelligence on people.
To put this in perspective, Schneier shows the significance in the lift in AI
capabilities by comparing how:
the exceptionally paranoid East German government had 102,000 Stasi surveil-
ling a population of 17 million: that’s one spy for every 166 citizens. By com-
parison, using digital surveillance, governments and corporations can surveil
the digital activities of billions of individuals with only a few thousand staff.
(cited in Allen and Chan 2017: 18)
Increased adoption of AI in the cyber domain will further augment the power of
those individuals operating and supervising these surveillance tools and systems,
which brings with it not only efficacy issues, but also ethical ones, particularly
related to reasonable expectations of privacy and free speech in liberal democratic
countries. The challenges and downsides to enhanced AI/machine learning appli-
cations to cyber and other threats are discussed in greater detail below. We also
come back to the broader ethical dilemmas IC leaders will confront in Chapter 8
(The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges).
But what about other AI/machine learning applications to improve IC cyber
capabilities? For some time now, cyber security/defence has been relying on the
capabilities of AI and big data processing (Leenen and Meyer 2019: 42–63; Seker
2019; Alazab and Tang 2019). Big data provides the huge sets of data AI algo-
rithms require to train data and to learn, i.e. to determine what normal behaviour
is and thus to be able to detect abnormal events. These technologies are used for
intrusion detection, malware classification and attribution, attack prediction, and
other applications. There are several military applications of AI, but that discus-
sion will occur under the next section. One area, however, that is critical to the
ongoing effective functioning of all ICs is the protection of information security.
AI/machine learning innovations have improved security protection capabilities
for ICs by searching in real time through large volumes of data for cyber-attacks,
system vulnerabilities and failures, IoT security, and other network anomalies
(Lu 2019: 20). Along with advances in information security, however, adversar-
ies will also be able to use similar AI machine learning technology for offensive
cyber-attacks by deploying email phishing and botnet attacks (Johnson 2019:
151).
Military applications of AI
In a broader sense, several militaries are now employing at an increasing rate
aspects of AI into their capabilities and broader doctrines. In particular, three
ICT 121
countries—the United States, China, and Russia—are reported to be developing
serious military AI technologies, which likely in the future will provide signifi-
cant military advantage to these nation’s militaries. Strategic military plans and
increased investment for the development of and investment in AI/machine learn-
ing of course is not just about advantage, but larger powers seeking to grow mili-
tary superiority over other similar powers. Vladimir Putin has publicly announced
Russia’s intent to pursue AI technologies, stating, ‘whoever becomes the leader
in this field will rule the world’ (cited in Hoadley and Lucas 2018: 1). Russia has
targeted reportedly 30 per cent of its entire military force structure to be robotic
by 2025 (Johnson 2019: 148).
Further, in July 2017, China’s State Council issued the new generation Artificial
Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP), which is meant to enhance national (eco-
nomic) competitiveness and protect national security (Allen 2019: 5). The AIDP
also clearly articulates a role for AI technology becoming even more embedded in
the field of national defence innovation (Ibid). In February 2019, the United States
Department of Defense also launched a defence strategy, which included amongst
other things an increased focus on speed and agility, improving situational aware-
ness, and creating a leading AI workforce (DOD 2018: 7). This strategy has
built on earlier work done in the Pentagon such as the 2016 release of a National
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Plan (Johnson 2019: 149).
Such military AI strategies attempt to provide a more coordinated approach to
research and development and application of AI/machine learning than hitherto
has been the case in the last two decades in the United States and other ‘Five
Eyes’ countries. In the last two decades, AI/machine learning has been applied
to a range of military objectives at the strategic level (e.g. managing cognitive
heuristics and group think) and operational tactical levels (e.g. reducing command
decision-making time, improving situational awareness, and autonomous weapon
systems).
Several sources provide detailed summaries and analysis of various applica-
tions (Wasilow and Thorpe 2019; Johnson 2019: 147–169; Lele 2019: 29–42;
Payne 2018: 7–32). In this section, however, I will summarise thematically some
of the ways AI/machine learning have been applied in military contexts as both
force enablers and multipliers (Johnson 2019: 148) rather than providing detailed
analysis of specific technology. Readers looking for more in-depth analysis of AI/
machine learning technology can explore the references listed in the preceding
paragraph. The first thematic area (surveillance) is not dissimilar to some of the
AI developments discussed above (see national security and cyber sections). AI/
machine learning applications have automated some of the surveillance functions
soldiers and military intelligence personnel may traditionally have carried out.
For instance, neural networks can scrutinise surveillance video and alert soldiers
to specific frames that contain objects of interest such as vehicles, weapons, or
persons (Wasilow and Thorpe 2019: 37). Additionally, as noted in the context of
counter-terrorism, facial recognition software is also useful in alerting military
forces when a person of interest emerges in video surveillance. Just as in the
national security and cyber contexts, the application of AI/machine learning also
122 ICT
holds the promise potentially of fusing more effectively large amounts of dispa-
rate structured, unstructured as well as data from sensors in the battlefield. The
key advantages are less manual processing and the possibility of more informed
and quicker decisions in the battle space.
A third discernible AI/machine learning theme in the defence context is the
development of AI enhanced autonomous weapons and robotic systems that ‘can
be given dull, dirty, and dangerous jobs, reducing physical risk to soldiers and
enabling them to concentrate their efforts elsewhere’ (Wasilow and Thorpe 2019:
37; Payne 2018: 7–32). For example, it is likely soon that leaving aside the ethi-
cal and legal issues, several larger states may deploy fully autonomous armed
aerial and marine vehicles. Israel is already operating a variant of this kind of
AI enabled technology, the Loitering Attack Munitions (LAM), which can loiter
over targets (enemy radar or ships) and is pre-programmed with targeting criteria
(Johnson 2019: 151).
Developments in swarm technology will also be able to deploy weaponised
drone swarms in the battle space—making it difficult even for larger militaries to
counter them. It is increasingly possible that development in lethal autonomous
weapons systems (operated by robots instead of humans) may result in the obso-
lescence in some military platforms over the next five to ten years. As Wasilow
and Thorpe note:
as of 2013, the United States possessed 14,776 military aircraft, some of

which cost more than $100 million per unit. A high-quality quadcopter UAV
currently costs roughly $1,000, meaning that for the price of a single high-
end aircraft, a military could acquire one million drones.
(2019: 21–22)
Given the growth in the robotics market, prices for autonomous vehicles with
military applications such as drones are expected to decrease further this decade.
Leaving aside the investments larger countries such as the United States, China,
and Russia can spend on this technology, advances in the precision of drones with
larger payload present military advantages to smaller states with weaker mili-
taries as well. Such AI/machine learning-enabled technology is likely to present
force posture and protection challenges for all militaries as they seek to train and
re-train personnel and develop counter-measures to lethal autonomous weapons.
IC leadership challenges
It should be clear from the summary above there are plenty of advantages in
the application and integration of AI/machine learning across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs.
Nonetheless, with advantages comes challenges that both the current and future
IC leadership cadre will need to address. Left unaddressed they will result in the
reduction of the capability dividend many AI/machine learning applications can
offer ICs. A failure by IC leaders to engage with the many AI/machine learn-
ing challenges will also increase the friction of non-technical factors associated
ICT 123
with AI in ICs, and potentially degrade the legitimacy of the work intelligence
agencies do in liberal democratic states. In this last section, I summarise key
challenges for leaders using three broad sub-headings: technology, counter-
intelligence, and social and ethical challenges. Limited space does not allow a
‘deep dive’ into all the issues associated with each sub-heading. The key objec-
tive instead is to contextualise and summarise the key leadership challenges
going forward, particularly those that create intelligence governance issues
into the foreseeable future. Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance
Challenges) will pick up on what leaders will need to do to address the govern-
ance issues raised here.
Technology challenges
As noted, AI advancements in the form of deep learning and machine learning
have shown significant breakthroughs for supervised learning applications includ-
ing, for example, in computer vision, speech recognition, chatbots, and auton-
omous driving (Zhao and Flenner 2019: 35). While many supervised learning
applications are improving, there remain technological constraints on using them
when precision, rigor, and deeper clarity is required in many security applications
ICs are confronted with. As Payne (2018: 10) suggests, at least in the military
context:
there is considerable wariness that the hype and publicity surrounding deep
learning will not pan out as dramatic breakthroughs in cognition that might
approach human-level capacity—for example in satisficing between conflict-
ing goals, or in using imagination and memory flexibly to cope with novel
scenarios. The AI of today is rather narrow and brittle—adept in its area
of expertise, but not at shifting to new tasks. Nevertheless, the rapid pro-
gress in AI research, especially of hybrid approaches that utilise multiple
AI techniques, along with increasingly powerful hardware on which to run
algorithms, suggests the potential for AI to significantly affect existing mili-
tary activities in the short to medium term, even if it falls short of simulating
human-level cognition any time soon.
It may be that in more high-volume crimes such as break and enters or credit card
fraud, there is growing confidence in the ability of algorithms by end users that
their performance can demonstrate irregularities in large volumes of crime which
are indicative a crime is committed or about to be committed. However, in other
complex security threats (e.g. organised crime and terrorism) which require more
sophisticated use of deep learning algorithms, IC end users cannot yet trust in all
circumstances their performance or ability for them to classify relevant exam-
ples. For example, to ‘find a terrorist pattern’ or ‘predict’ the likelihood of such
an offence requires the algorithmic classification of a range of data, but in many
cases there is insufficient data for data scientists to build high confidence level
deep learning networks for such an offence.
124 ICT
As noted earlier, in the United States, IARPA has funded several AI/machine
learning analytical programs to improve IC’s capability to detect earlier more
complex threat and events such as cyber-attacks and political instability. While
progress is being made in improving the confidence levels of deep learning net-
works, there is still a lot more understanding required about how deep learning
algorithms perform and how to get them to perform better. As Zhao and Flenner
note:
it is easy to find examples that are easily classified by humans but misclassi-
fied by deep learning algorithms. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that
a small but visually imperceptible change to a correctly classified image will
result in the misclassification of the image. Therefore, there exists a funda-
mental instability in the learned functions.
(2019: 36)
In summary, Zhao and Flenner highlight four of the main challenges in applying
the AI revolution to security applications: ‘the lack of adequate samples for clas-
sification tasks, short timescales for learning, fewer computational resources, and
adversarial behaviour’ (Ibid). At a high level, national and international security
needs AI in a wide range of forms but the results and the limitations of deep
learning continue to raise many questions with respect to applications in security
contexts (Ibid). Other key questions that IC leaders and military commanders will
need to address from future developments in machine learning techniques relate
to critical operational areas where lives may be at stake. For example, how well
are autonomous systems going to be at not only processing data but perceiving,
learning, deciding, and acting on their own? Will future AI/machine learning tech-
nology deployed in the IC and broader security context also be unable to ‘explain
their decisions and actions’ to human users? Both questions are important because
they go to the ‘intelligent reliability,’ safety, and explainability power of autono-
mous capabilities in critical life and death situations. DARPA defines explainable
AI as ‘AI systems that can explain their rationale to a human user, character-
ize their strengths and weaknesses, and convey an understanding of how they
will behave in the future’ (Gunning and Aha 2019: 44–58). DARPA launched
its explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) program in May 2017 to address such
issues.
Another challenge with AI/machine learning technology in general, but par-
ticularly applied to IC and security issues, is how to integrate a variety of big data
sets with other existing intelligence information systems. A related problem to
the integration of AI/machine learning is how to improve semantic technology so
that there exists common vocabularies for information and shared understanding
of domains in how information is described before it is automated for process-
ing and decision-making. Current improvements in some semantic technologies
will likely improve the management and integration of different data sets by
extracting commonly understood meaning and insights—thereby reducing large
numbers of false positives in areas such as cyber security and terrorism. But IC
ICT 125
leaders will need to keep abreast of these developments to ensure a coordinated
approach to technical solutions across their agencies and their broader intelli-
gence communities.
Counter-intelligence challenges
In addition to IC leaders being able to navigate the inevitable technological chal-
lenges arising from applying AI/machine learning systems in their agencies, they
will also need to address several counter-intelligence issues that will likely rise
with the use of such technology and by others—particularly adversaries. The
development of AI has relied on access to cloud computing, the internet, and big
data, but as Lu suggests on the other hand, internet-based hackers and viruses can
pose a huge threat to AI (2019: 22–23). Many applications of AI in the military,
national security, and intelligence context are also dual-use technology—mak-
ing them open to malignant exploitation by state and non-state actors of concern
for ‘Five Eyes’ countries. Machine learning advancements to protect from cyber-
attacks could make intelligence and national security information systems vulner-
able to newer kinds of attacks— given bad actors could have access to similar
knowledge and skills than ICs. The automation of systems, particularly in cyber
to detect threats, could be targeted for disruption or distributing fake information.
Allen and Chan list several examples of how developing AI/machine learning
applications could pose counter-intelligence issues for IC leaders, who will be
responsible for preventing, disrupting, and reducing them. For example, the train-
ing data used in machine learning systems for facial data, voice, videos, audios,
and documents could be manipulated, enhanced, or forged (2017: 25).
We have also seen in recent years an increasing volume in and sophistica-
tion of state actors such as Russia prepared to manipulate social media sources
with fake information in order to influence the 2016 US presidential election. It
is likely that Russia and other state actors (China, North Korea) will continue to
exploit new AI/machine learning developments in ‘Five Eyes’ countries, includ-
ing as Allen and Cohen suggest:
using hackers to take control of an official news organisation website; or

social media account being used to spread not only false text, but also false
video and audio. A network of social media bots could then be used to spread
the fake messaging rapidly and influence a broad number of individuals.
(Ibid)
In summary, as the growth in AI/machine learning generated data and other infor-
mation available to ICs grows, so too does its vulnerability to non-state and adver-
sarial state actor exploitation. This complicates an already difficult environment
ICs face about how to assess the provenance of intelligence collected and the
impacts it has on analytical assessments. IC leaders along with their military coun-
terparts will need to design counter-intelligence strategies that can more effec-
tively detect, disrupt, and manage malevolent exploitation of AI/machine learning
126 ICT
automated collection and analytical systems. However, as seen in other dual use
technology areas that could be weaponised, such as biotechnology (Walsh 2018),
there remain critical uncertainties around how ‘Five Eyes’ adversaries will exploit
dual use AI technology in ways that weaken capabilities or present new threats
to their ICs.
Social and ethical challenges

The rapid development of AI is bringing significant change, much of it positive
across a range of economic sectors—but on the other hand, there are now equally
profound concerns about many of its potential downside effects—many of which
present social and ethical challenges. From a social and ethical perspective, sev-
eral open questions have now been raised by the public, commentators, policy
makers, and researchers. The objective in this final section is not to provide a
detailed analysis of all the social and ethical challenges associated with AI appli-
cations in either ‘Five Eyes’ ICs or society more generally. Instead, given limited
space, it is more germane to raise in a general sense some of the key questions that
IC leaders will need to think about when applying AI/machine learning to support
and/or lead intelligence capabilities and activities.
One key question is whose responsibility is it to ensure increasingly automated
and robotic systems remain both secure and controllable by humans? Who for
instance is responsible for accidents and deaths that occur when a robot is oper-
ating, for example, a vehicle or as noted earlier a surveillance drone? Secondly,
although different intelligence contexts may raise specific ethical dilemmas, in
a broader sense what kinds of ethical risk management of AI is needed in ‘Five
Eyes’ ICs? Thirdly, while AI systems have demonstrated their ability to increase
productivity in several sectors by releasing humans from monotonous work such
as collating or monitoring information sources, the automation of aspects of some
roles in the workplace including in ICs will continue to impact on labour markets
and potentially on the structure of society itself (Lu 2019: 22–23).
It’s not yet possible to provide a complete answer to the first question on who
is responsible legally or ethically for the security and control of AI systems. It’s
clear that the international community, nation-states, and the public and private
sector likely all have a role. The increasing incorporation of AI/machine learning
applications into ICs means that their leadership needs to consider the ethical
and legal dimension of using them, particularly those that act autonomously in
defence and intelligence contexts, which can have privacy or lethal consequences.
We have seen in other chapters how ICs’ improved data mining capabilities have
sped up and expanded intelligence collection—yet has also raised concerns about
how even anonymised data can disclose personal privacy of citizens (Walsh and
Miller 2016). Continued advances in AI systems that can be used for surveillance
beyond data such as biometrics will only compound further the ethical dilemmas
IC leaders currently face in using a range of collection platforms.
The second question posed above: what kind of ethical risk management of AI is
needed in ‘Five Eyes’ ICs? Again, a definitive answer to such a question is difficult.
ICT 127
It is likely that ethical dilemmas will be contextually driven for different agencies
depending on their mission and legislative framework. AI technological develop-
ment is rapid and it’s also likely that IC leaders will need to adopt ethical risk man-
agement frameworks that can be revisited in some cases in real time as opposed to
necessarily via set and forget guidelines. It’s clear that in some countries such as
China many of the ethical risks associated with AI applications in national security
and broader societal contexts have been put aside as Beijing seeks to build further
its social credit scoring system—a system which results in a greater ‘digital repres-
sion’ of citizens via intrusive AI enabled surveillance systems (Feldstein 2019;
Allen 2019). In liberal democracies such as the ‘Five Eyes’ countries, IC leaders of
course should not be expected, nor is it advisable that they develop risk manage-
ment frameworks on their own. AI/machine learning scientists, policy makers, and
ethicists should collaborate with leaders to ensure that frameworks will identify
risks to privacy and human rights—yet still promote the use of new AI technologies
in ways that improve collection and analytical functions. Encouragingly, in recent
years some research is emerging which seeks to inform the kinds of frameworks IC
leaders and those also in the broader military and national security context might
need to consider in order to navigate ethics and efficacy issues related to AI appli-
cations (Babuta et al. 2020; Yu et al.: 1–7; Akerkar 2019: 1–18; Tuffley 2019:
170–189; Wasilow and Thorpe 2019; Iphofen and Kritikos 2019: 1–15).
For example, research by Wasilow and Thorpe developed an ethics assessment
framework for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) ‘to help technology develop-
ers, policymakers, decision makers, and other stakeholders identify and broadly
consider potential ethical issues that might arise with the military use and integra-
tion of emerging AI and robotics technologies of interest’ (2019: 37–38). The
assessment framework includes 12 principles, which are compliant with Canada’s
Department of National Defense and Defense Force code of values and ethics.
The 12 principles are based on Jus Ad Bellum criteria. In other words, just as in
the conventional warfare sense, the use of AI in conflict should still be justifiable
(in self-defence) and proportional (Ibid).
Similarly, it is encouraging that AI ethics assessment research is not just
being generated by social scientists, but also technical experts such as computer
scientists and engineers in the private sector, who are also raising the impor-
tance of designing in ethical principles into algorithms/AI systems (Yu et al.
2018; Whittlestone et al. 2019). Whittlestone et al. (2019) provide a road map
for working on the ethical and societal implications of algorithms, data, and
AI. Whittlestone et al., like others, offer a set of high-level guidelines such as
personal data access, embedding values into autonomous intelligence systems,
ethical research, and design, safety and benefit, addressing economics and legal
issues (Ibid). But how any of the principles articulated in recent studies can be
implemented across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs or agreed to by nations more universally
remains unclear. It’s clear though that IC leaders now and into the future have the
opportunity to encourage and learn from a cross-fertilisation of ideas across aca-
demia, the public, and private sector to more proactively address potential ethical
issues that will arise with the application of AI into their intelligence enterprises.
128 ICT
The third key question that will need consideration by IC leaders is while auto-
mating some collection and analytical functions will likely improve efficiencies
and in some case even accuracy it is less clear what the impact of adopting AI
technology will have for the workforce across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. It is difficult to
know precisely whether impacts on workforce will be mainly positive or negative
in the short to medium term. It is likely intelligence agencies across each IC will
be affected in different ways depending on their missions (e.g. military, national
security, and law enforcement) and functions (analytical, collection, or mixed).
Another important variable will be the level of decision-making that the intel-
ligence agency is using its AI capability for. In other words, you might expect at
least in the short to medium term, machine AI/machine learning technology will
automate more tactical and operational rather than strategic intelligence activities.
As discussed earlier, AI/machine learning applications are already either supple-
menting or replacing humans in a range of high volume data collation activities
in SIGINT and IMINT.
But will robots take over more complicated tasks in ICs such as making ana-
lytical judgements, which go beyond merely assembling data or looking for pat-
terns, but also require higher cognitive assessments about human thinking and
understand human intentions? This question is currently the subject of extensive
research. A key part of this research is can robots ever learn like humans. This
question itself requires a deeper epistemological reflection, understanding, and
agreement about what constitutes learning. Already, advances now in AI applica-
tions suggest machines like humans use rules to learn, but human learning is also
highly contextual, intuitive, and socio-culturally bounded (Hasse 2019: 335–364).
Nonetheless, larger-scale AI applications in ICs will inevitably see the devel-
opment of more intelligent machines that may replace certain analytical skills and
knowledge of humans (Hare and Coghill 2016: 858–870). But this trend is neither
linear nor can technological determinism be the only lens in which IC workforce
changes are determined. IC leaders and policy makers will have a significant role
in engineering how enhanced intelligent machines replace parts of the workforce,
rather than it being a case of humans being removed completely in for example
two decades. It is likely that as some traditional IC analytical workforce roles
will be replaced by AI applications (e.g. filtering, categorising, and searching) yet
other human knowledge and skill sets will grow in demand, particularly in assess-
ing complex emerging threats and in assessing counter-intelligence vulnerabili-
ties ‘Five Eyes’ IC will face as state and non-state actors attempt to use AI against
them. But workforce changes will bring anxieties and require adept management
by IC leaders—a key theme to be explored in our next chapter (Chapter 7 Human
Resources).
Finally, AI work force changes will not just impact on individuals in ‘Five
Eyes’ who may lose their jobs or retrain for new roles, AI/machine learning will
result in organisational cultural change. In particular, how ICs collaborate in using
AI applications will likely require IC leaders to steer cultural change as their
organisations move away from more rigid, closed, conventional intelligence and
military doctrines that have underscored ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence operations from
ICT 129
the start of the Cold War to the present. To grasp the opportunities and minimise
the downsides of AI innovations, IC leaders will be challenged to foster more
open, flexible, and agile organisational cultures that allow even greater collabora-
tion and information within ‘Five Eyes’ communities and externally where the
bulk of AI innovation is taking place.
Conclusion
Chapter 6 focused on both the advantages and challenges AI/machine learning
applications will pose for IC leaders. Integrating, managing, and coordinating
new AI capabilities will not of course be the only ICT challenge for leaders in
the foreseeable future, but I argue it will remain the primary challenge as it will
impact profoundly on existing and traditional ways ICs have managed, collected,
and assessed information. At this stage, it’s impossible to assess what the full
impact of AI will be on IC’s core intelligence processes, or indeed other key ena-
bling activities (e.g. human resources, research, and legislation). It’s wise I think,
to avoid much of the hyperbole that AI will be so revolutionary that it will do
away with the humans in ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. Regardless of whether ongoing AI
technological development is revolutionary or evolutionary, the key point is that
IC leaders will need to become even more adept in their understanding of AI/
machine learning technological development and be able to along with their ICT
staff identify what investments to make. However, the even bigger challenge for
most IC leaders will not be understanding necessarily or selecting the required AI
technology, but how to integrate this strategically operationally and tactically into
their organisations so AI research and technology has the intended and meaningful
difference on the ground. Achieving integration of AI operational capability will
require both doctrinal and organisational change. This will be the biggest leader-
ship challenge and history demonstrates that when it comes to ICT transformation
in ICs, these don’t always reach the intended potential due to various reasons but
including leadership coordination and change management failures, resourcing
issues, and institutional cultural factors. ICT transformation tends to be built on
existing legacy systems rather than a complete rethink of systems and processes.
The cultural barriers to ICT innovation and change in ICs is another key intelli-
gence governance issue that we come back to in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader
and Governance Challenges). In Chapter 7 (Human Resources), we explore the
second key enabling activity and the governance challenges associated with it.
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7 Human resources
Introduction
This chapter explores another key enabling activity (human resources), which
like information communications technology (ICT) (Chapter 6) is also critical
to supporting core intelligence processes (tasking and coordination, collection,
analysis, production, and evaluation). Any public or private sector organisation
will eventually fail if leaders cannot attract, develop, and keep human talent that
can progress its mission. ICs and the agencies that make them up are no different.
Chapter 6 (ICT) focused on the technological impact AI/machine learning will
likely have for ICs in the future. The chapter also discussed the impact of technol-
ogy on the workforce and underscored how both technological changes in ICs and
the workforce are linked. The introduction of any significant technological change
will always impact the workforce—sometimes positively and on other occasions
negatively. In this chapter, we explore the critical role IC leaders will need to play
in addressing evolving workforce planning issues against the backdrop of an ever
increasingly complex technological and security environment.
At this point you may be asking, but haven’t IC leaders always had to turn
their minds to workforce planning as their operating environment changed? Yes,
but I argue now and even more in the future the pace, variety, volatility, and
complexity of the security environment will require IC leaders to demonstrate an
even greater ability to respond and adapt quickly to workforce planning require-
ments. IC leaders will need to implement both strategic and operational work-
force planning responses that are flexible to the velocity and complexity now
seen in the security environment. Naturally, workforce planning strategies, plans,
and the necessary resourcing are required for all aspects of IC operations. This
includes but is not limited to those that support analysts, intelligence operations,
technical services, science and technology, and administration areas. Given space
limitations, however, and also because of the centrality of the analyst’s role to
the IC mission, this chapter focuses on workforce planning issues as they relate
to the recruitment, training, and retention/attrition of analysts. It’s clear also that
workforce planning issues are both influenced and impacted by other broader IC
leadership governance challenges discussed in earlier chapters as well as organi-
sational cultural factors. The chapter highlights some of the governance issues
Human resources 133
as they relate to human resource planning. However, Chapter 8 (The Future IC
Leader and Governance Challenges) discusses in greater detail the significance of
these governance issues and how IC leaders may begin to address them. In par-
ticular, it explores three inter-related workforce areas (recruitment, training and
education, and retention and attrition) and provides a thematic discussion of the
key governance challenges in each workforce area.
Workforce planning issues

Chapter 5 (Analysis) discussed several analytical techniques and methodologies
such as social network analysis, structured analytical techniques, data mining/
machine learning, and behavioural sciences, amongst others. One key point aris-
ing from that discussion was that IC leaders will be called upon to bear greater
responsibility for the earlier integration of new analytical techniques in ways that
can optimise mission priorities—but also in a manner that is sustainable from
a human resource perspective. However, also noted in Chapter 5, what is best
practice or even good practice is unclear in the application of many analytical
techniques and technologies. Being able to define ‘good practice’ is also depend-
ent on a clear articulation of strategic planning that identifies ways to improve
capabilities. The role of IC leaders in sponsoring and evaluating innovation is a
defining leadership attribute for future IC leaders—a point we come back to in
the next chapter (Chapter 8 The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges).
Harnessing innovation more proactively and effectively will be determined in no
small measure by how IC leaders can promote a skilled and adaptive workforce.
Workforce planning is as we see in this chapter complex, but in simple terms it
is about how IC leaders build human capacity to meet organisational missions by
making good decisions around recruitment, training, and retention. In other words,
what knowledge and processes can IC leaders invest in that hires, nurtures, and
holds onto the ‘right kind’ of human capability? In the space available and noting
that much of the detail of specific HR initiatives for ‘Five Eyes’ ICs is close-held
or classified—this chapter examines the workforce issues and challenges IC lead-
ers will continue to be confronted from an open sources perspective.
The objective is to present a normative discussion of what IC leaders need to
consider in promoting effective workforce planning of analysts into the future.
Every IC will continue to develop its own approaches to workforce planning that
works best for them. However, for reasons we will discuss shortly, specific ‘home-
grown’ workforce planning strategies should be underpinned as much as possible
by both normative and better practice evidence-based processes to improve IC
HR outcomes.
Recruitment
The first workforce planning issue—recruitment—is arguably the most critical to
get right. Training and retention strategies that keep good talent is important, but
if you do not have a clear picture of the role you expect people to do now or in the
134 Human resources
future then recruited staff will not be fit for purpose. At best this might be a waste
of resources for that recruitment round—at worst poor selection processes have a
cumulative effect that degrades IC agencies’ ability to adapt to the fast-changing
security environment. If we glance across all ‘Five Eyes’ countries, a lot of syner-
gies in practice and collaboration have been forged over several decades between
agencies across all five nations. But it is also true that the size, missions, and polit-
ical institutional structures upon which each ‘Five Eyes’ IC operate shows a great
deal of diversity. For example, just going by one metric—‘size’—at both ends of
the extremes there is the US IC with 17 and at the other the NZ IC with three agen-
cies. While it is difficult to get an accurate number on the total headcount of the
US IC, ODNI reporting on the number of secret and top secret security clearances
being actively used in the United States in the FY 2017 was 2.8 million (ODNI
2017a: 3). This was for the entire US federal government including intelligence
staff and contractors—though a large portion of them would be working for civil-
ian or military intelligence agencies. In comparison, the NZ IC with its three core
intelligence agencies has perhaps no more than 1,000 personnel—the later not
including NZ Police or the NZ Defence Force (Whibley 2014). Somewhere in the
middle is the ICs of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Given key dif-
ferences in size, number of personnel, missions, and funding of agencies within
and between ‘Five Eyes’ countries, there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach
to recruitment. But are there broader normative attributes across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs
about the role analysts play, which can inform workforce planning issues such as
recruitment?
In a 2019 US National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine
report (commissioned by the ODNI), the authors provide an overview of a num-
ber of broad factors defining the role of analysts (NAS: 65–79). The authors argue
that the role of the analyst hasn’t changed significantly in the last two decades. I
am not sure I would agree with this observation entirely. It may have been true
to some extent, but as discussed in Chapter 6, over the last two decades, I argue
that AI/machine learning and data mining technology has impacted on the way
analysts have traditionally done their jobs in ways not completely understood.
Nonetheless, the NAS report authors provide a good list of the skills and activities
most ICs would expect from their analysts. Unsurprisingly, these include things
like the ability to ‘recognise patterns in behaviours, trends and relationships
among actors’ (Ibid: 67), critical thinking, sense-making, communication skills,
and the ability to coordinate and collaborate with peers and decision-makers (Ibid:
65–79).
Demonstrated research skills are of course also critical when recruiting per-
sonnel to analyst’s positions. But like the general skills and activities analysts
are expected to learn that are mentioned by the NAS report and others (Johnson
2017: 881; Walsh 2017b: 1005–1021; Caddell and Caddell 2017: 889–904; Dylan
et al. 2017: 944–960; Kreuzer 2016: 579–597; Shelton 2014: 262–281; Dahl
2017; Lowenthal 2017: 986–994), IC leaders will need even clearer articulation
of what we want an analyst to do in the future as the security environment rap-
idly changes. For example, no one would argue that IC recruitment strategies for
Human resources 135
analysts would no longer be looking for essential skills, knowledge, and behav-
iours such as ‘critical thinkers.’ But there needs to be a lot more granularity and
clarification amongst IC leaders and their recruiters on what is meant by such
terminology both organisationally and externally as job descriptors get rolled out
the door in position wanted advertisements (Clarke 2010).
Being able to pass a psychometric test might be one indicator of critical think-
ing, but on its own may not be sufficiently diagnostic to determine recruitment
decisions in the future. Does the IC, for example, want critical thinkers who can
flexibly move from one (analyst) account to another quickly? And/or do ICs need
other types of critical thinkers—the so called ‘slow thinking’ variety that decision-
making psychologists Kahneman (2011) and Tversky have raised that might be
better at assessing complex strategic analytical problems? Similarly, IC recruiters
and leaders need to develop greater clarity by what they mean behind statements
such as ‘must have advanced research skills.’ What research skills are required
for an analysts role are contextual. For example, if recruitment is for a tactical
analyst working in a national law enforcement agency that has an intelligence
function such as the FBI or Australian Federal Police (AFP), the research skill set
required may look very different from one where the role is for a strategic analyst
in a national security intelligence agency that has an assessment function like
Australia’s Office of National Intelligence (ONI) or the US State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Leaving such contextual issues to one
side and on the question of research skills and activities, more broadly IC leaders
and recruiters will also need to reflect deeply on the complexity of the security
environment and whether the research skills current analysts have will continue
to be fit for purpose (Walsh 2017b: 548–562). While some research skills such
as collation activities that were once core duties of analysts might become auto-
mated—others may become more important, such as recruits having stronger
backgrounds in qualitative social research and quantitative analysis (Ibid).
In addition to assessing the kinds of attributes, skills, and knowledge ICs might
need from analysts in the future, there are other important recruitment criteria
that require further consideration by leaders and HR officials. Recruitment is not
just about what the ‘day job’ is. It is also about where ICs find the analytic staff
needed. Given the increasing complex range of current and emerging threats in the
security environment, ICs must develop the ability to adapt to it by hiring analysts
whose skills are applicable—but also have personal and cultural backgrounds that
assist in understanding a diverse spectrum of threats. Some ICs have struggled
historically to recruit a sufficiently broad spectrum of personnel not just for ana-
lyst’s roles—but others such as undercover roles and linguists. George (2011: 79)
and Lieberthal (2009) have both argued that the US context, particularly in the
CIA recruiting and vetting processes, have ‘ruled out hiring many ethnic-Ameri-
cans—who have exactly the kinds of cultural experiences that would make them
better analysts of foreign cultures and decision-making styles’ (George 2011: 79).
George’s quote raises two inter-related recruiting issues. IC leaders may have
in some instances legitimate concerns about proceeding with security vetting of
individuals from certain ethnic backgrounds. However, an overly prescriptive or
136 Human resources
cautious approach increases the possibility of not employing suitable candidates
whose rich ethnic and cultural backgrounds would only enhance the validity and
reliability of analytical outputs in a range of areas. All ‘Five Eyes’ ICs need to
continually assess how they risk manage relevant security vetting procedures to
ensure candidates, who have much needed ethnic and cultural backgrounds, are
not overly disadvantaged on applying and gaining positions. In 2014, the US DNI
under Jim Clapper launched a US IC Human Capital Vision 2020—a strategic
plan to restructure workforce planning and policies across the IC (ODNI 2014)1.
It was built around three central themes: shaping an effective workforce, embrac-
ing continuous learning, and embedding agility, innovation and inclusion (Ibid:
3). The 2014 strategic plan looked like the first significant attempt by the US IC
to draft and address a comprehensive set of standards for a range of workforce
planning issues, including in areas of ensuring compliance with EEO require-
ments and building cultural competencies in agencies (Ibid: 7–8). For example,
the plan referred to a workforce strategy that ‘would give careful consideration of
each individual’s unique situation using the ‘whole of person’ concept’ (Ibid: 5).
Assuming the latter quote referred to the recruitment of individuals from ethni-
cally and culturally diverse backgrounds, such rhetoric is important to see from
IC leaders. But with all strategic plans, of course the real test is how strategic
objectives are actioned in the workforce planning activities of individual ICs
over time. Roughly at the same time that the 2014 US IC Human Capital Vision
2020 was released, the ODNI implemented in 2016 the IC Equal Employment
Opportunity Enterprise Strategy (2015–2020). The Strategy provided in contrast
to the broader 2014 (Human Capital Vision) plan more specifics on how ICs
could operationalise plans to increase the employment of minorities and diversity
groups—including but not limited to African-Americans, Hispanics, women, per-
sons with targeted disabilities, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders (ODNI
2016). Again there is less detail in the 2016 ODNI publication on how strategic
measures are being implemented when it comes to recruiting minority groups. A
further 2017 ODNI report (Annual Demographic Report—Hiring and Retention
of Minorities, Women and Persons of Disabilities in the US IC) suggests improve-
ments are being made. The report cites for FY 2017 there was a 2 per cent increase
up from FY 2016 in the recruitment of minority groups by the IC, though the
overall percentage of minorities working in the US IC is 22.5 per cent compared
to 35.4 per cent for other federal agencies and the broader population of 38.7 per
cent (2017b: 1–3). So clearly there is more progress to be made and at the time
of writing it remains unclear how all 17 US IC agencies are performing against
ONDI strategies and their own workforce planning objectives.
In the United States, ODNI has also established other programs aimed at
broadening the ethnic and cultural diversity of recruits coming into the IC. One
example is the IC Centers for Academic Excellence program (IC CAE) that com-
menced in 2005. IC CAE’s objective was to create an increased pool of culturally
and ethnically diverse job applicants for intelligence community agencies. It also
sought through grants to help universities establish intelligence training programs
aligned to the mission skill sets and competencies of the IC. It was originally
Human resources 137
operated by the DNI, moved to the DIA in 2011, and recently the DNI has taken
back its management. Recent research, which received survey returns from 19 out
of 40 college grant recipients of the IC CAE program, suggests the IC CAE pro-
gram has had impact. Of all college program managers surveyed, 36 per cent said
their graduates were able to get intelligence jobs (federal and state) and 58 per
cent of their program managers believed that they were supporting the ODNI’s
mission of diversifying the workforce (Landon-Murray and Coulthart 2020: 270–
275). However, the US Congress independent auditing agency—the Government
Accountability Office (GAO)—also reviewed this program in 2019 and deter-
mined it was still unclear to what extent all US ICs engaged in its objectives and
whether it really has created the increased pool of culturally and ethnically diverse
job applicants its architects hoped for (GAO 2019). Deficiencies in ethnic inclu-
sion and diversity recruitment issues are also seen across other ‘Five Eyes’ ICs
though public discussion of them has lagged somewhat compared to those that
have taken place in the US IC. Space does not allow a comprehensive coverage of
these issues as they are playing out in the other four countries (e.g. UK, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand). But in brief, the UK’s intelligence oversight com-
mittee—the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)—released a detailed
report on diversity and inclusion issues in that country’s IC (Grieve 2018). It
stated that though ‘significant progress has been made in recent years with IC
agencies adopting more innovative recruitment campaigns that seek to attract a
more diverse range of applicants from under-represented groups and other meas-
ures, much more needs to be done’ (Ibid: 1, 5). Just looking at one group, the
report stated that 35 per cent of MI5’s senior positions were women, but for other
IC agencies it dropped down to only 25 per cent (Ibid: 1). The UK Government
responded later in the same year with how the IC was going to enact further
improvements in addressing these issues (UK Government 2018). In Australia’s
IC, it’s clear that individual agencies have been focusing on improving ethnic,
cultural, and inclusion recruitment barriers—but a community-wide approach is
needed. With the creation in 2018 of the Office of National Intelligence (ONI),
which has a legislative mandate to provide enterprise management oversight for
all agencies in the IC—hopefully such a community-wide strategy to all recruit-
ment and broader workforce planning issues can be implemented.
In addition to IC leaders working on recruitment strategies that increase both
the ethnic and cultural diversity across ‘Five Eyes,’ ICs also need to give further
consideration to inter-generational factors (Constanza et al. 2012). As at the time
of writing, the last cohort of the baby boomers (born 1964) will likely retire by
2030. Their earlier-born generational compatriots would have mostly worked in ICs
where the Cold War dominated analyst’s attention and upon retiring will take with
them valuable corporate memory. I recall my own experience working as an analyst
just prior to 9/11 in the late 1990s ‘peace dividend period.’ During this time, older
Afghanistan and Soviet analysts seemed to have disappeared overnight along with
their much-needed experience that was required only a few years later. In contrast,
Generation X (1965–1976), depending when they were born, have now accrued
between 20 to 30 years professional experience working as analysts—or have
138 Human resources
moved onto other senior analytical or non-analyst roles. Those Generation X cadre
born earlier would have gained extensive analytical experience just prior to 9/11.
Many Generation X analysts have probably lived and breathed post-9/11 counter-
terrorism for most of their careers. Again, many are close to retirement, while others
in their forties are now in middle-ranking manager positions as analysts or moved
onto non-analyst jobs. Like their predecessors, Generation X on retirement will take
a lot of corporate knowledge with them. Their seniority and experience once gone
also reduces the number of highly skilled senior analysts who can mentor and man-
age younger junior staff—most of whom are now millennials/Gen Y.
In contrast, Generation Y (or millennials) analysts have no direct working
knowledge of the Cold War and some will not have lived through 9/11. Depending
on when they were born some careers would overlap those of Generation X and
have been shaped by the post-9/11 ‘war on terror.’ However, those born after
1982 may likely need to pivot their careers to respond to new demands in the ever
increasingly complex security environment—beyond counter-terrorism wars in
the Middle East. The growing uncertainty of a multipolar rather than the Cold
War bi-polar security world order will require re-skilling by late Generation X
and Ys as other threats equal to terrorism demand analytical attention (e.g. resur-
gence of bad state actors and foreign interference).
Again, Generation Y analysts, depending on when they were born, would now
be in the 10–20 year range of professional experience in ICs. There is a grow-
ing body of human resource research on the differences between generations and
how this impacts on recruitment strategies in the private sector, though there is
next to no research on why millennials/Gen Y might be interested in applying
for a job in the IC (Weinbaum 2016). Many studies on Gen Y attributes in other
non-IC industries emphasise them as being technologically savvy than earlier
generations, which is advantageous to ICs as they confront a range of challenges
including rapid changes in AI/machine learning in the workplace. However, the
research is not settled on all the attributes Gen Y embody (both good and bad). It’s
clear that knowing the general personality attributes of a generation demographic
may be helpful to a point. But there are variations between individuals which IC
leaders need to take into further consideration when trying to attract and recruit
young people to the changing workforce (Sharma 2020; Hobart and Sandek 2014;
Walker et al. 2010).
Finally, there is Generation Z (born 1996 to 2012)—the oldest of which are
now just leaving university—some of whom may be contemplating working in the
IC as an analyst. They are likely to be better educated and skilled in AI/machine
learning than even their Gen Y predecessors, but by the time the youngest in this
cohort enter the IC workforce in around 2050 the challenges they will face and
the skills required will be different again. While IC leaders need to develop an end
to end (recruitment to retirement) continuing professional development program
for analysts born in earlier generations, recruitment strategies now need to plan
for Generation Z and beyond to ensure personalities, beliefs, values, skills, and
experience can be best matched up to how the job of an analyst is likely to change
in the next one to two decades.
Human resources 139
Several researchers suggest that Generation Z are even more focused on ‘cor-
porate responsibility’ and want to believe the organisation has an ethical mission.
Like Generation Y they want to quickly obtain autonomy and expect inclusion
based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion to be fully normalised
and integrated into the fabric of society and their potential employer. Generation
Z are also carrying large college debt and expect a potential employee to be
generous with remuneration. This expectation might be more difficult to meet
in the foreseeable future, particularly after the global impact of the COVID-19
pandemic. But nonetheless, expectations need to be managed in proactive and
transparent ways.
Interesting too, they are less likely to be influenced by recruitment advertise-
ment and will look to friends to provide advice on whether an employee is likely
to deliver on their key personal and professional goals (Robinson 2018; Adamy
2018; Williams et al 2010: 21–36). Many Generation Y/millennials, accord-
ing to Weinbaum et al.’s study (2016: X), ‘have a lack of trust in government,
yet believe it has a responsibility to respond to war, terrorism, social unrest
and political instability.’ So for both Generations Y/millennials and Z to come,
how do IC leaders attract suitably qualified personnel, who may have an interest
in national security issues, yet have concerns about notions of secrecy, intel-
ligence collection, operations, or even the legitimacy of IC activities in liberal
democracies?
No one has a crystal ball about how exactly the security environment will evolve
in the next two decades. But as seen with the development of machine learning/AI
over the last two decades, a number of macro trends will begin to emerge in the
security environment. In response, the focus of IC leaders should be on the imple-
mentation of reliable risk and foresight analytical frameworks in order to inform
recruitment planning and strategies for analysts. Inter-generational attributes and
skills variations between workforce generations are also important considerations
for recruiting other positions, including IC leaders and managers. But we will
come back to what skills and attributes IC leaders will need in Chapters 8 (The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) and 9 (Leadership Development).
There is one final important question on recruitment which IC leaders need to
consider in the future. This is how the mechanics of workforce selection is done
across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs, and if these processes are the most optimal approaches to
matching the right person to analyst’s position (Nemfakos et al. 2013). IC work-
force selection, like other non-IC recruitment, has been informed for several dec-
ades by extensive psychological and cognitive testing tools to try to predict how
an individual may perform in an analyst’s role. In addition to assessing cogni-
tive functioning, psychological testing also provides recruiters with insights into
personality, values, and interest—all of which are critical things to know about
when determining if a candidate is a good fit for working in the closed IC working
environment. Psychological testing is also relevant to security vetting require-
ments, such as determining good character, probity, and life history. In addition to
psychological testing, other selection tools rely on interviews, assessment centres,
and working candidates through scenarios with problem solving.
140 Human resources
IC selection testing is underscored by over a century of research in broader
industrial organisational psychology and human resource management. Though
the recruitment selection practice has grown organically in a lot of agencies across
‘Five Eyes’ ICs, there is less evidence-based knowledge available about what
practices are most effective and why this is so. As Ployhart et al. suggest, the
efficacy of recruiting practices have been well researched by applied psycholo-
gists. But even in a field that has improved empirically the recruitment practice
in a range of industries, methodological challenges still preclude consensus by
researchers on how best to assemble evidence of validity in studies and put-
ting theory into practice (2017: 299; Farr et al. 2017; Ryan and Derrous 2016).
Ployhart et al. also correctly point out that improving evidence-based research on
recruitment strategies needs a two-pronged approach. The first is further refine-
ment of traditional recruitment research, which seeks to assess which people have
the best skills against the position. The second and likely increasingly important
approach is given personality traits of Gen Y, Z, and beyond—research is needed
that can help IC leaders understand how candidates respond to different recruiting
and selection strategies (Ibid).
Again, IC leaders can look to the research in applied psychology disciplines
that over several decades have been assessing behavioural changes and their rela-
tionship to job performance in different industries. Although research progress
has been made in non-IC industries, evaluating how someone is likely to perform
pre-recruitment and after is difficult given the complex inter-play of a range of
organisational and individual variables (Ones et al. 2018; Sackett et al. 2017).
Leaving aside differences in knowledge, skills, and abilities, there are also indi-
vidual behavioural differences impacting on job performance including ability,
personality, interests, emotional intelligence, and motivational traits (Sackett
et al. 2017). Researchers also point out a number of other behavioural traits that
may impact on an individual’s performance. One key distinction being made is
between what some psychologists refer to as the difference between a typical per-
formance (the choices about what people will do in the workplace) compared to
maximum performance (or what people can do when they are highly motivated to
do so) (Ones et al. 2018: 156). In the recruitment of analysts and indeed any other
position across the IC, as argued earlier, context will greatly inform recruitment
strategies; understanding such variations in an individual’s performance is about
recruiting the ‘right candidate’ with the right mixture of behavioural traits.
Accordingly, it’s clear that IC leaders can do more to engage in research that
assesses behavioural characteristics of both potential and actual job performance.
It’s also clear that IC leaders and their HR departments need to articulate both
a normative approach to what knowledge/skills and personality attributes they
are looking for. Additionally, in the future consideration must be given to how
both inter-generational change and individual behavioural traits impact recruit-
ment. Given the changing security environment, assessing likely performance and
matching to organisational culture will need to look more deeply at key differ-
ences in a person’s typical and maximum performance pre and post recruitment.
It will also be important to match assessing individual typical job performance
Human resources 141
against how they may potentially perform in a range of crisis situations. Again,
IC leaders need to either fund or access relevant/translatable evaluation research
that can assess how to improve selection systems and psychological evaluation of
personal attributes in other work contexts to see how they can be better integrated
into IC recruitment strategies.
Training, education, and competency

As discussed earlier, the chapter’s objective is to identify broad normative prin-
ciples that IC leaders and their HR staff can use to anchor their strategic and
operational workforce planning in the future. Since 9/11, an ever increasing
body of work addressing various aspects of training and education has emerged.
Though I would argue there is still less focus on competencies required in analyti-
cal training/education as well as evaluating the various pedagogical approaches
to the training and education of analysts (Walsh 2017a: 1005–1021; Harrison
et al. 2020). In other words, how do we tie curriculum development ultimately to
what skills analysts need to demonstrate on the job? And how can we be sure that
teaching strategies deployed whether inside or external to ICs are developing the
professional performance required (Walsh 2017a: 1005–1021)? Making the right
calls about how to map an entire continuing professional development program
for analysts at varying stages (i.e. during training, education, and demonstrating
competency) will remain a difficult challenge and responsibility for IC agency
heads and their HR teams. Across and within the ‘Five Eyes,’ diverse roles, func-
tions, and agency mandates will always require different approaches to analyst’s
training, education, and building of competencies. There will never be a ‘one
size fits all.’ However, just as IC leaders can identify normative approaches to
recruitment there are likely also discernible common principles to guide training,
education, and competencies for analysts regardless of where they are working
across the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. The literature provides some ideas on what principles
might help frame training, education, and competencies relating to the profes-
sional development of analysts. Space limitations precludes a detailed discussion,
though the intelligence training and education literature seems to have coalesced
around a few key themes: curriculum, accreditation, continuing professional
development, teaching and learning, and content and assessment (Walsh 2017a:
1006).
In the United States, it’s clear that efforts have been made over the last two
decades to operationalise policies and processes underpinning many of the themes
raised in the intelligence training and education literature. For example, after 9/11,
with the establishment of the ODNI a series of common IC-wide analytical stand-
ards and directives (e.g. ICD 203 and ICS 610–3) were progressively released
to provide guidance on analytical standards and competencies.2 The eventual
establishment of the National Intelligence University (NIU) and developments
in other universities saw a proliferation of intelligence analysis majors or whole
degree programs (Spracher 2017: 231–243). The 9/11 Commission seemed to be
a major catalyst by some within the IC and externally (contract trainers and places
142 Human resources
of higher learning) that analyst’s training, education, and competencies needed
overhauling. Such clarion calls for improvements in training and education are
not unique just to the events of 9/11, however, they go back decades. For example,
previous US-independent reviews such as the Jeremiah Review commissioned by
then CIA Director George Tenet into the intelligence failures contributing to the
United States’ surprise at the Indian nuclear tests suggested improvements to bet-
ter coordinate analytical expertise and training.3
Other ‘Five Eyes’ countries have also implemented efforts to improve train-
ing, education, and competency levels of analysts after major independent
reviews. After the Butler review, for example, the position of Professional Head
of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) was established to promote a greater sense of
intelligence professionalism in the UK IC, including helping coordinate and lead
improvements in analytical standards and training (Devanny et al. 2018: 86).
Similarly, the 2004 Flood Report, which examined intelligence assessments pro-
vided to the Australian government prior to the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003,
also made comments on the need for further development of analysts, particularly
strategic analysis (Flood 2004: 2–3). But on the whole, post-review reforms to
training, education, and competency in non-US ‘Five Eyes’ ICs at least in the first
decade after 9/11 have been more incremental and modest compared to their US
counterparts. It is difficult to know how each ‘Five Eyes’ IC will approach future
training, education, and competency reforms moving forward. The 2020 COVID-
19 crisis has resulted in significant fiscal stress for their treasuries and this could
impact substantially IC leaders’ ability to implement training, education, and
professionalisation initiatives for analysts and other staff. Equally though, and
despite resource constraints, the enduring and unrelenting demands of the chang-
ing security environment could be a driver for ‘Five Eyes’ ICs to implement fur-
ther root and branch reviews and renewals of analytical training and education.
As mentioned earlier, intelligence failures (e.g. 9/11 and Iraq) and the exten-
sive legislative and independent reviews that inevitably follow them have a way
of escalating the actual or perceived need for urgent IC reform. Reform meas-
ures of course can include a range of areas, better collection, coordination, and
analysis, which were discussed in previous chapters. And as discussed briefly
here, they can also include recommendations for improving analyst training and
competencies. But often these reviews make only general suggestions such as
‘more training’ or ‘better training’ without necessarily providing the IC leader-
ship with specific suggestions on how or where actual or perceived deficiencies
can be addressed.
Independent and legislative branch IC reviews post an intelligence failure
event can generate a sense of urgency in and pressure on ICs to quickly address
sometimes vague recommendations on what training and education deficiencies
need fixing. Such pressure situations, however, when there is political and/or pub-
lic imperative to do something can often be the wrong environment for IC leaders
to address actual/perceived weaknesses in training and education measures. This
is because under political pressure IC leaders may make reform decisions that
are about being seen to be doing something rather than implementing measures
Human resources 143
in slower time—when there has been more time to gather sufficient evidence for
what will work longer term.
Now at the end of the second decade after 9/11, other independent and govern-
ment reviews across some ‘Five Eyes’ ICs continue to highlight ongoing defi-
ciencies about analytical training and broader workforce capability issues. I have
already mentioned earlier the 2019 US NAS study commissioned by the ODNI
that examined analytical workforce issues, including training and education. A
similar report was released in 2019 by Australia’s Office of National Intelligence
(ONI). ONI commissioned the Australian Academy of Social Sciences a similar
study which I was asked to peer review. The report summarised the views of a
number of Australian social scientists about ways for the IC to gain more capabil-
ity and expertise from social-behavioural sciences, but also raised analyst work-
force issues (AASS 2019). In the UK, a recent annual report of the Intelligence and
Security Committee of Parliament quoting the then acting chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Committee conceded by the middle of this decade the Assessment
Staff had become under-funded, under-staffed relative to priorities, and was ‘no
longer at the cutting edge of where we should be’ (Devanny et al. 2018: 80).
As noted above, this chapter cannot go into the minutiae of what every ‘Five
Eyes’ IC is (or is not) doing specifically to address deficiencies in training and
education. The literature listed above provides a road map for readers wanting
to drill down on different approaches to training, education pedagogy, and insti-
tutional reforms across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. In summary though, two decades out
from 9/11, some concerted efforts have been made across the intelligence train-
ing and education sector to build on training and education programs. Different
sectors have played a role. For example, some improvements have been made
around accreditation of training and education programs by professional organi-
sations (IAFIE, IALEIA).4 And as mentioned, ICs and individual agencies have
promoted the establishment of universities or seeded grants to promote applied
intelligence analysis programs in universities. Universities, ICs, and other exter-
nal training providers too across the ‘Five Eyes’ are having better conversations
about what is best taught within and outside ICs and who might be better placed
to deliver content.
As a former intelligence analyst and now educator for the last 17 years, it’s
pleasing to see greater reflection in ICs and by external education providers on
what factors may lead to better training and education outcomes for analysts.
Nonetheless, I still assert both in the literature and in practice there needs to be
a greater strategic focus on curriculum development than currently is the case.
It’s not just that training and education stakeholders should collaborate more in
order to holistically assess how to improve curriculum development. It’s even
more fundamental than that. In short, IC leaders need a strategic focus to ana-
lytical workforce issues including training and education. Such a focus must be
underpinned by an evidence-based approach that determines what educational/
training factors specifically improve workplace capabilities (Walsh 2017a: 1014).
In a 2017 article, I outlined in greater detail core features for an evidence-based
framework that could be used to evaluate training and education programs for
144 Human resources
analysts. I also argued that any framework should be informed by a multi-discipli-
nary approach (education theorists, intelligence studies, and workplace learning
experts). Additionally, any framework ideally would include evaluation research
of a range of inter-connected training and education issues: curriculum, accredita-
tion, continuing professional development, teaching and learning, and content and
assessment (Walsh 2017a: 1014–1016). IC institutional change and how agencies
can adapt to the changing security environment will demand a concerted and con-
sistent strategic approach to curriculum development and continuing professional
development. How IC leaders build training and education frameworks in the
future will be crucial.
Retention and attrition

Managing retention and attrition is the third and final workforce planning issues
we will discuss. Retention and attrition of course are linked but not the same
thing. In short, effective retention strategies should result in maintaining the right
amount of skilled people who are matched to the organisation’s key values and
remain motivated to meet its objectives. Attrition, in contrast, results in either
natural loss of head count (when people retire) or when the organisation’s leaders
are unable to address staff turnover due to a range of personal, financial, or organi-
sational cultural factors. Since the foundation of the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs in modern
history (1945) to the present, all IC leaders have had to deal with not just who to
recruit and how to train them but how to keep them.
Managing both retention and attrition in any organisation (large or small) pre-
sent challenges and these are no different in our ICs. A loss of expertise, corporate
and tacit knowledge, and potentially greater workloads and stress on remaining
employees are all adverse and impactful by-products from poorly managed reten-
tion and attrition strategies. The exact rate of attrition in agencies across all ‘Five
Eyes’ at this point is difficult to know. Some IC agencies in their public annual
reports to government will provide head count or articulate the broad details of
their capability frameworks that include workforce issues. I have not yet seen
any details on exact attrition numbers. This is understandable to some extent as
it is a sensitive matter for any organisation, but this kind of information even if
it was only provided publicly from a IC-wide perspective would provide greater
transparency in annual reporting—and help researchers engage with ICs on how
potential issues could be addressed. In summary, it seems that without perhaps a
few exceptions (Treverton and Gabbard 2008), there is both a lack of research and
absence of detailed studies commissioned by agencies within ICs that evaluates
retention strategies in use and how best to reduce attrition of skilled useful staff.
I emphasised in the earlier two sections (in recruitment and training and educa-
tion) that IC leaders and their HR departments should reach out to social research-
ers to help benchmark their processes on these issues, including learning from
them what factors are causing retention and attrition issues in other industries and
what to do about it. There is an increasing body of research from the health sector,
particularly doctors, nurses, and surgeons, on how students progress through their
Human resources 145
training and clinical practice. For example, Salles et al.’s (2017: 288–291) study
assessed grit (a measure of perseverance) and wellbeing and found they were pos-
itively correlated with general wellbeing. Likewise, a lack of grit was inversely
correlated with depression and attrition from a surgical residency program. There
would also likely be lessons IC leaders could learn from researchers who are
investigating factors that contribute to retention and attrition in other knowledge
sectors of the economy such as education, IT, and the research community. Other
workforce researchers are now focusing on whether it’s possible to assess risk of
attrition within an organisation using predictive analytics. Predictive analytics as
discussed in Chapter 6 (ICT) employs a range of statistical analysis, data mining,
and machine learning techniques to ‘predict’ potentially future events based on
past or current trends (Srivastava and Nair 2017).
Such data-driven approaches may have their merits, but rely on designing algo-
rithms based on reliable and valid data. At the time of writing, I would argue that
such data (both quantitative and qualitative) is insufficient and incomplete in most
agencies across the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. So the first step for IC leaders and HR teams
is to audit current data holdings on attrition and retention to diagnose where cur-
rent data deficiencies reside and then assess the best strategies to collect missing
data. This is the logical place to start before any evaluation can be made about
whether current IC retention programs are reducing attrition to organisationally
acceptable levels. While each IC agency should collect their own relevant data for
their future operational planning purposes, it makes sense if a central coordinat-
ing body in each ‘Five Eyes’ (e.g. in the US ODNI and in Australia ONI) IC can
ensure these efforts allow a whole of community picture, which identify where
for the entire IC are the main attrition risks—and what strategic level capability
measures can be put in place to mitigate emerging risks.
Assessing attrition risks means being able to understand employee retention,
career mobility, and transition factors, which are equally not well understood in
non-IC industries as well (Chudzikowski 2012). Organisations may have devel-
oped the right rhetoric around how they maintain talent retention, but this can be
different from the reality or what is actually required (Tlaiss et al. 2017: 426–
455). Technological and digital changes in the workplace continue to change the
way people work with more people collaborating virtually or from home. Beyond
technological factors, research in non-IC contexts does suggest that several other
factors also influence staff retention and reduce attrition rates. Corporate culture,
development and progression opportunities, role, incentives and rewards, and
relationships with managers and colleagues are all key factors. This can make it
difficult for an organisational leader to gauge what personal and organisational
factors influence staff to stay or leave a job.
As with developing better recruitment, training, and education strategies, IC
leaders can look to and collaborate with external researchers from organisational
psychology fields, sociologists and intelligence studies that can bring cross-
disciplinary perspectives on the retention and attrition issues. Again, workplace
research that is investigating generational influences on retention and attrition
suggest there are differences in values and behaviours between generations that
146 Human resources
frame how they view their interest and commitment to remaining with an organi-
sation. Baby boomers and to a slightly lesser extent Generation X have tended to
value staying in the one organisation—resulting in fewer organisation transitions
than Generation Y (Millenials) (Culpin et al. 2015; Lyons et al. 2012: 333–357;
Constanza et al. 2012). In starker contrast, the millennial rate of job turnover is
much higher. Seibert et al.’s (2013: 177) study of 337 participants (with an aver-
age age of 25.5 years) showed that 34.4 per cent left employers after a 16-month
period. Further, as discussed earlier, Generation Y and possibly Generation Z also
care about the ‘brand value’ of where they work. ICs are no doubt starting to think
about designing retention strategies for Generations Y and Z, but their success
will be contingent on how adeptly leaders can provide a rewarding, supportive,
flexible, and value-focused working environment.
While the bulk of this chapter has focused on how IC leaders might address
workforce planning issues as they relate to analysts, there are other specialisations
within ICs (e.g. collectors, technical, legal, and administrative) that the executive
must also develop. The common denominator, however, for all workforce plan-
ning regardless of the position falls back on how well the IC leadership can navi-
gate through difficult governance issues that may impact on the effective delivery
of the recruitment, development, and retention of staff.
Conclusion
This chapter outlined the broad challenges IC leaders will confront as they relate to
the recruitment, training, and retention of analysts. There is now growing evidence
that IC leaders in most ‘Five Eyes’ countries are giving much more of their capa-
bility thinking time to workforce planning issues. While at this point a lot of this
thinking is going on behind the closed doors of our ICs, this chapter has provided
examples in broad terms of the kinds of issues, challenges, and remedies leaders are
developing to address workforce planning. There are no quick fix or ‘one size fits
all’ solutions to addressing the many workforce challenges to come as the security
becomes even more uncertain and volatile. Indeed, resolving any HR challenge
leaders face will be a function of how equipped they are personally to manage them
and these are dealt with in the context of intelligence governance issues raised in
the next chapter (Chapter 8 The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges)
where we shift the focus away from specific areas of leadership responsibility (e.g.
tasking and coordination, collection, analysis, ICT, and Human Resources) towards
a broader analysis of what key governance issues IC leaders will need to deal with.
Chapter 8 also includes a discussion on how IC leaders may address the many gov-
ernance challenges identified before concluding with an exploration of what kind of
leadership attributes are likely to be more effective in tackling governance issues.
Notes
1 The 2014 Strategic Human Capital Plan was built on an earlier and first attempt at
laying the groundwork for workforce planning and innovation—the Strategic Human
Capital Plan (2006).
Human resources 147
2 Intelligence Community Directive 203– Analytic Standards sets out broad stand-
ards (such as objectivity, independence from policy makers, and timeliness) meant
to embody the production and evaluation of analytic products, as well as provide
foundations for analytic training and education. ICD 610 provided a list of com-
petencies for the entire IC workforce, not just analysts. ODNI Intel Community
Directive Number 610 Competency Directories for the Intelligence Community
Workforce.
3 While the full text of the Jeremiah Report remains classified, a summary of its recom-
mendations has been declassified by the CIA. See Director of Central Intelligence,
‘Recommendations of the Jeremiah Report,’ June 1998, <https://nsarchive2. gwu.edu/
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB187/IN38.pdf>, accessed 19 November 2018.
4 IAFIE, or the International Association For Intelligence Education, was formed in
2004 with a mission to expand research, knowledge, and professional development in
intelligence education. It seeks to exchange ideas and advance the intelligence profes-
sion by focusing on intelligence studies. IALEIA, or the International Association for
Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, has a similar mission but focuses more on law
enforcement.
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8 The future IC leader and
governance challenges
Introduction
As noted earlier, intelligence community (IC) leadership, particularly at the oper-
ational level, may play out differently in a range of diverse organisational contexts
such as the national security, law enforcement/homeland security, military, and
private sectors. Given the diverse roles of IC leaders across these sectors, it should
come as no surprise that there is no single source of truth or ‘leadership map’
pointing to how to lead within and across the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. Hence, all leaders
regardless of the level of responsibility (team, branch, agency, or entire IC) will
be shaped by the unique organisational contexts in which they work. However,
while an IC leader working within a specific context might be called upon at times
to demonstrate particular behavioural and technical competencies, leadership in
any IC environment is nonetheless informed by common normative personal and
technical attributes. As we will discuss shortly, what these personal leadership
attributes are remains an open debate.
Based on a synthesis of key governance challenges identified from primary
(survey results, semi-structured interviews) and secondary data sources (scholarly
literature, government reports, documents), this chapter and the following one
(Chapter 9 Leadership Development) circle back on the book’s four objectives
listed in Chapter 1 (Introduction). First, given the many governance challenges
raised in earlier chapters, what will be the most critical for IC leaders to manage
in the future? Second, in what ways can IC leaders seek to address key govern-
ance challenges?
Third, what personal attributes are more likely to result in leadership behav-
iours that impact positively on the key intelligence governance issues identified?
And based on a synthesis of the data collected, what attributes, skills, knowledge,
and practice can we develop in the next IC leadership cadre that can address gov-
ernance challenges in ways that result in resilient and adaptive ICs? The answers
to this fourth question are addressed in Chapter 9 (Leadership Development).
The chapter is organised into three main headings: key governance challenges,
addressing governance challenges, and leadership attributes. While the chapter
is a synthesis of both primary and secondary sources, the analysis here will draw
heavily on insights gathered from the 208 former and current IC leaders who
152 Future IC leader and governance challenges
participated in the study’s survey. Finally, just to remind the reader, I define intel-
ligence governance as ‘a set of attributes and rules pertaining to strong leadership,
doctrine design, evaluation and effective coordination, cooperation and integra-
tion of intelligence processes’ (Walsh 2011: 135). Attributes and rules of course
need not only be prescriptive or directives set by the leader. In many or even most
cases, strong leadership will be about making collective decisions on doctrine,
integration, and coordination of intelligence processes.
Key governance challenges

There were a number of governance challenges identified in the preceding chap-
ters. In this section, and given space limitations, we will explore thematically those
that seem to be the most difficult or urgent for IC leaders to address. However, it’s
important to keep in mind that the actual number of governance challenges—par-
ticularly in larger IC agencies and across communities—are likely to be an even
more extensive list than the summary provided here. Determining what govern-
ance challenges are discussed here was also informed by a qualitative thematic
analysis of both primary and secondary data collected, particularly the insights
gathered from survey participants. In short, the identification of the governance
challenges below is meant to provide a foundation for further deeper theorising,
research, and practitioner reflection on whether they represent sufficiently areas
where future IC leaders should be concentrating their efforts. The challenges are
discussed thematically and grouped under the names of previous chapters (task-
ing, coordination and integration, collection, analysis, information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT), and human resources).
Tasking, coordination, and integration

In Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination), several governance issues were raised
which could impact on effective tasking, coordination, and integration. For exam-
ple, the role politicisation can play in influencing intelligence processes such
as tasking and coordination within the ICs will be an ongoing concern for IC
leaders. As we saw, in some contexts the malignant effects of politicisation can
be mitigated against by IC leaders building constructive engagement strategies
with policy makers and having the presence of strong independent oversight and
accountability mechanisms to help address actions by decision-makers that result
in excessive interference in IC activities. But as many IC leaders surveyed indi-
cated, ‘tasking and requirements are driven by policy makers and customers, not
intelligence chiefs’ (survey respondent 55). Ultimately, tasking and priority set-
ting is bounded in politics and as in the past so too in the future IC leaders will
need to adeptly as possible navigate the political/policy world in ways that allow
for effective tasking, coordination, and integration of intelligence activities within
and between the agencies they lead. Unfortunately, there will never be straight-
forward solutions for IC leaders seeking to deflect completely the increasingly
malignant influence of some political leaders on the intelligence enterprise.
Future IC leader and governance challenges 153
Chapter 3 also raised several other governance issues related to organisational
risk/threat assessment, structure, and cultural issues and how they impact on the
tasking, coordination, and integration of intelligence. However, the key govern-
ance issues arising out of the research in tasking and coordination seem to be
how do IC leaders create and adapt their organisational structural environments
in ways that can use very broad national intelligence priorities set by policy mak-
ers ‘to establish multi-dimensional (tactical and strategic) tasking, collection and
assessment priorities’ (survey respondent 56). Or put another way, the key gov-
ernance challenge is determining how ICs organisationally can ensure that opera-
tionalising national intelligence priorities ‘is happening in a way that is effective
and efficient’ (survey respondent 86).
Collection
Chapter 4 (Collection) highlighted three themes—technological and methodo-
logical, collection strategies, and intelligence collection and ethics and efficacy
challenges. All of these raise governance challenges that will continue to occupy
the attention of IC leaders into the future. For example, the intersection of issues
within both the technological and collection strategy themes raises critical gov-
ernance challenges. In particular, there will be ongoing challenges around how
ICs can improve their knowledge and use of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
and social media capabilities. In future this will be critical for not just enhancing
collection, but for ICs being able to check rapidly and accurately the provenance
of these sources for assessment verification and counter-intelligence reasons.
Another key collection governance issue that will consume IC leaders’ energy
will be responding to what Lim refers to as ‘data asphyxiation and the decision
paralysis that can come from the collection of large volumes of data’ (2016: 628).
From a collection perspective too, it’s clear that many ICs are taking big bets on
big data, machine learning, and AI to more effectively manage collection and
assessment processes and capabilities. We will come back to the key kinds of gov-
ernance challenges posed by investing in AI shortly under the sub-heading ICT.
Finally, it’s also clear from discussions in Chapter 4 (Collection) that IC leaders
will continually be challenged by hardened threat actor/targets who are increasing
their use of encrypted platforms and the dark web for communications and illicit
markets. It is likely that ongoing advances in AI and other science and techno-
logical solutions will provide new collection platforms for ICs to help ameliorate
some encryption barriers. However, IC leaders will continually need to balance
investments in these capabilities against more informed ethical risk assessments
that can evaluate effective surveillance/interception collection strategies against
privacy, trust, and legitimacy in liberal democratic states.
Analysis
In Chapter 5 (Analysis), two broad governance challenges were identified. One
related to promoting collaboration and the other can broadly be described as
advancing innovation. On collaboration, the analysis of primary and secondary
sources (including comments from surveyed IC leaders) suggests that improve-
ments have been made since 9/11 in ICs to promote better collaboration between
analysts. However, several survey comments highlighted further progress was
required to promote more effective collaboration that would result in stronger
cross agency virtual and physical communities of analytical practice. A key gov-
ernance challenge for IC leaders, therefore, is how to build on what analytical col-
laborative tools currently exists that promotes efficiencies and are most likely to
be utilised by multi-agency analysts. In the context of the need for further devel-
opment of collaboration strategies to promote analytical collaboration, several IC
leaders surveyed also commented that collaboration required the regular inclusion
of outside experts (survey respondents 7, 20, 85). The inclusion of outside experts
has been a recurring theme throughout this book concerning a range of capability
issues, not just analytical innovation.
The second key governance challenge for analysis is innovation. Innovation
includes improving knowledge, skills, and the acquisition of technology that can
increase the validity and reliability of analysis. It also includes IC leaders being
able to validate through evidence-based research or other means that innovations
are making a demonstrable effective difference to analysis. Chapter 5 (Analysis)
discussed examples of recent evidence-based studies such as Dhami’s work on
improving analytical probability and forecasting (2018: 205). But there are now
several other issues impacting on the reliability and validity of analysis, such as
‘fake news’ and foreign interference, where it will be important to evaluate their
impact on analysis as a result of analytical bias, poor evidence, and deception.
Finally, resolving analytical collaboration or innovation challenges naturally will
not just be dependent on technological solutions. Often improving existing analyt-
ical processes and innovation will rely on IC leaders reaching out to analysts and
other staff at the ‘coal-face,’ who may have simple, elegant solutions to managing
challenges. In the words of one IC leader surveyed:
Intelligence and security agencies are notoriously slow to change and adapt
to an ever changing tactical environment. A reliance on traditional practices
have shown to be ineffective. Leaders must maintain relationships with front-
line practitioners and be fully cognizant of emerging challenges and the ad
hoc ‘workarounds’ that personnel in the field have self-developed. Often
leaders surround themselves with other leaders and insulate themselves from
the work of front-line practitioners, thereby creating a disconnect from per-
ception and reality. (survey respondent 31)
ICT governance issues

In Chapter 6 (ICT) we discussed how IC leaders are increasingly investing in AI;
and the chapter provided examples of how AI has been applied in cyber, military,
and national security settings. As expected there were a number of insights from
survey respondents on the advantages of a greater uptake of AI technologies by
ICs in order to drive collection and analysis (survey respondent 74). Aligned with
discussion in Chapter 6 (ICT), several IC leaders surveyed mentioned the critical
role AI will have in managing what one referred to as ‘the tsunami of data avail-
able to intelligence organisations’ (survey respondent 14). Additionally, others
suggested that training, integrating, and working with AI-enabled bots in the intel-
ligence workforce would be important in overcoming other ongoing ICT govern-
ance issues, including ‘the cost of resolving technical debt from the maintenance
of legacy systems, and the absence of an “enterprise” intelligence architecture’
But as discussed in Chapter 6 (ICT), there are several intelligence governance
challenges related to the adoption of AI technologies into existing ICT platforms
within ICs. For example, there are technological issues. In short, AI algorith-
mic performance needs to be more reliable and has failed in simpler applications
like facial recognition. So the question going forward for IC leaders is to decide
on where machine learning/AI applications can most reliably perform for criti-
cal missions. The incorporation of AI into ICs raises other challenges that will
demand the attention of IC leaders, such as counter-intelligence, legislative, and
social-ethical issues. Several comments from IC leaders surveyed demonstrated
a level of scepticism and caution about AI. A general concern was that some IC
leaders do not fully understand AI and will take a ‘techno-centric’ view in its
integration to existing ICT and other organisational processes. One respondent
said AI ‘will challenge a range of leadership demands and skills as senior execu-
tives place more dependence on technology at the expense of the human operator
without a solid understanding of the pros and cons of establishing such reliance’
Other respondents suggested leaders were being pressured by vendors and
governments to invest further in AI. One said that the ‘government and business
seem to be obsessed with big data and AI in an attempt to make the best use of
money expedited to acquire information, but responding to external pressures to
adopt AI will be a balancing act’ (survey respondent 15). Several respondents
also made the point that it was up to IC leaders to make stronger cases for the
integration of AI into existing ICT, collection, and analytical processes. One IC
leader suggested that being able to articulate the real value of AI was an ongoing
challenge. Further elaborating their point, the respondent admitted that ‘with AI
one may be able to collect more information and faster. However, when one is
looking for a needle in a haystack, to quote Tom Fingar, one does not need more
hay’ (survey respondent 72).1
Others pointed to the many technological challenges related to identifying
new AI capabilities ‘and figuring out the interaction between hardware and soft-
ware development and AI. There are so many complex possible outcomes that
anticipating issues is very difficult’ (survey respondent 66). Part of the many
challenges, as identified several times in Chapter 6 (ICT) and by survey respond-
ents, was how to understand both the advantages of new AI capabilities for ICs
yet ‘also mitigate risk created by adversaries acquiring new technology’ (survey
respondent 87).
In addition to specific concerns about AI, a number of survey respondents
made general observations about the limited capability development of ICT sys-
tems in ICs—which in some agencies will likely compound the introduction and
effective integration of next generation machine learning/AI technologies for ICs.
One IC leader surveyed said:
The intelligence community is years behind in capability development com-

pared to industry. The future of building in house for intelligence operations
is dead, and they have not seen this yet. To scale, co-develop and innovate
and the pace of their adversaries, they need to work in a trusted eco-system
to get things done. Joint R&D goes a long way to delivering on new tech-
nologies and capabilities. Government is often years behind in technology
because they think they know how it works, but fail to understand its inter-
related aspects globally with its broader ecosystem on both access to addi-
tional functionality and capabilities. (survey respondent 73)
On this issue of ICT capability being well behind industry standards, other survey
respondents suggested this was compounded by a lack of flexibility in funding
arrangements, particularly in the law enforcement context. As survey respondent
10 remarked:
no criminal group ever had to write a business case to acquire new technol-
ogy so if law enforcement in particular is to avoid losing pace, a more flex-
ible approach has to be allowed to the flow of funding. This might require
governments to cede more authority to intelligence leaders to have discretion
over funding use, but new policy proposals simply delay the process and flag
to the target what it is that the community might be capable of in 3–4 years
hence.
Other survey respondents also commented on the level of skills, knowledge, and
competence of IC leaders to implement and oversee existing ICT systems let alone
a broader suite of deep learning AI systems now in the research and development
pipeline. In the context of analytical technology, one IC leader suggested how:
multiple cycles of intelligence leaders with very little background in intel-

ligence practice have overseen a major decline in the capabilities of analyti-
cal software and related tradecraft of practitioners. Analysts have less ability
now to interrogate and compare data holdings than they did ten years ago.
(survey respondent 29)
On the same point of whether IC leaders are effectively managing ICT implemen-
tation, one former IC leader (in the Australian context) said:
Intelligence agencies will still grapple with ICT as they fundamentally have
old school thinking and it would be wise to have new blood from outside to
refresh their thinking. I would go back in as a senior executive, as would oth-
ers, happy to take a pay cut, but really show them how to do Joint Technology
Capability Development across the intelligence community properly exploit-
ing domestic and international partners. (survey respondent 73)
Several respondents also raised a number of counter-intelligence challenges

IC leaders face in managing ICT capabilities. In particular, there were several
observations made about both the security and encryption of ICT systems and
devices of interest to ICs. On the security perspective, one respondent said: the
‘increased proliferation of smart devices in the internet of things and industrial
internet constructs will lead to increases in cyber-attacks that will impact (IC)
operations’ (survey respondent 56). Additionally, as noted earlier, the greater use
of encryption and the move to block chain technology will also provide secure
and deceptive opportunities for threat actors that require capable IC leaders to
manage (Ibid).
On the technological advantages of various freely available ICT (both social
media and secure/encrypted devices), another respondent argued that this was due
in part to:
risk aversion and poor investment in developing secure inter (IC) agency
communications. The fact that the average person now has secure commu-
nications (WhatsApp, Signal etc) and instant ability to search across open
source domains limits the competitive advantage intelligence agencies have
in addressing threats. (survey respondent 34)
Other survey respondents also noted the demands on IC leaders to manage adeptly
the need to ‘disseminate secure information on phone tablets and other smart
devices; while simultaneously overseeing capabilities to obtain information from
similar encrypted devices’ (survey respondent 46). Still others mentioned the
impact of fake news and foreign interference on ICT systems used by ICs (survey
respondent 37).
In addition to the technical and counter-intelligence issues raised, other survey
respondents suggested that the main ICT governance issues IC leaders will face
are not technical, but legislative. As mentioned in the explanation of the effec-
tive intelligence framework outlined in Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Leadership),
‘legislation’ is one of the five key enabling activities in the framework. This is
because legislation enables the activities of all ICs, including what information
agencies can share. One IC leader suggested that while there is a technical ability
often to share information:
unfortunately, the understanding of some intelligence leaders around what

they are legally able to share is lacking. The biggest challenge is not ICT but
legislative—what are we allowed to share legally and ensuring that intel-
ligence leaders are across the legislation that enables and limits their work.
(survey respondent 55)
An IC leader from Canada also highlighted how legislative challenges will impact
on the development and maintenance of ICT systems.
I think the continuing challenge we will confront in Canada will be the

absence of the appropriate legislative basis to deal with many of the infor-
mation, communication and technology challenges. While we may, in some
cases, find ‘work-arounds,’ others will not be resolved and will lead to intel-
ligence gaps. (survey respondent 82)
Another critical intelligence governance issue related to ICT, which came out of
the survey results—but was not discussed in Chapter 6—is that some IC leaders
still felt intelligence sharing remains a core challenge for ICs. Survey comments
suggested that this was again a technical issue, i.e. ICs needing to find better plat-
forms to facilitate sharing internally and across the ‘Five Eyes’ countries (survey
respondent 67). However, others suggested that it was also an organisational cul-
tural issue. One respondent argued, for example, that there was still continued
siloing and dissociation of agencies between those traditional/original agencies
within Australia’s intelligence community and those that have more recently
joined. They argued this dissociation was ‘beyond what is actually required for
security purposes and is self-defeating’ (survey respondent 5). Survey respondent
5 went on to add: ‘the need for effective synergistic integration and inter-operation
is paramount. This does not require combination of two or more agencies into one,
but an appreciation of where such opportunities exist and a willingness to act on
them. This needs to happen before we can integrate sophisticated AI platforms.’
A final noteworthy observation made by one survey respondent that I think
will remain a critical ICT governance challenge is how IC leaders can invest in
organisational IT capabilities in ways that can also help attract and retain Gen Y/
millennials, Gen Z, and beyond who have higher expectations about technology
in the workplace than older leaders (survey respondent 64).
HR governance issues
In Chapter 7 (Human Resources), we had a normative discussion about what IC
leaders needed to consider in promoting effective workforce planning of ana-
lysts (and others) in the future. This discussion was informed by an assessment
of the workforce literature and identifying broad attributes and better practice
evidence-based processes that need to be considered in order to improve IC HR
outcomes. Several themes were identified from the literature, such as diversity,
inter-generational factors, training, and education. It seems from a number of
survey respondent’s comments that the relevance of these themes to managing
human resource issues well are also shared by current and former IC leaders. For
example, one said:
If I learned one thing in my time as director, it was that human resource issues
were amongst the most important issues for which I was responsible. Because
of the immediacy of the consequences of an operation gone bad it is easy to
be swept into worrying about operational issues, but it is human resource
issues broadly writ that, if not well managed, can make an operational failure
inevitable or, in and of themselves, damage an agency. (survey respondent
104)
Given space is limited, it is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of all com-
ments provided by survey respondents as they related to the governance challenges
in HR. Instead I will just mention briefly some key themes identified from the sur-
vey—many of which are aligned to themes raised in Chapter 7 (HR). However,
before getting to a brief outline of those themes, it is worth prefacing that discus-
sion with one interesting cluster of survey comments, which referred to the vari-
ation in the levels of authority some IC leaders had across the national security,
military, and law enforcement sectors. In this context, survey respondents made
the point that ‘authority’ is relative and can impact on the extent that some lead-
ers can initiate meaningful HR reforms in the workforce. Two respondents—one
from a military and the other from a law enforcement background—made the
point that seniority of IC leaders in some of their working environments stops
at a certain point and other more senior leaders not necessarily with any intel-
ligence expertise make the decisions about overcoming HR governance issues
(survey respondent 65). These insights remind us that in some cases, critical HR
workforce decisions in some IC contexts could be made with little or no input or
expertise from senior intelligence staff members.
Arguably, one overarching HR governance theme arising from the analysis of
survey results was an even greater focus on strategic workforce planning capabili-
ties (survey respondent 108). However, on other more specific themes, there were
a number of comments raised expressing concern that the pool of intelligence
professionals was still relatively small on an agency basis and that HR governance
challenges such as recruitment and training and education needed a greater com-
munity-wide rather than agency response (survey respondent 6). Additionally,
there were several insights about skill sets, training competencies, and specialisa-
tions analysts needed and the challenges of employing sufficient generalists vs
subject matter experts (survey respondent 51). Much of this discussion is aligned
to points made previously in Chapter 7 (HR). Some IC leaders surveyed pro-
vided examples of areas of specialisations, which they argued were critical work-
force shortages including CBRN, region, country specialists, and cyber (survey
respondents 7, 20, 21). Unsurprisingly, diversity and recruitment practices and the
challenges associated there were also identified by a number of respondents. One
said ‘diversity. Simple as that. Standing in front of intelligence forums, looking
out at all those white arts graduates scares me sometimes’ (survey respondent 41).
Another suggested we still seem ‘to be recruiting to obtain a clearance and not for
diversity’ (survey respondent 42).
A final cluster of HR governance challenges identified related to recruitment and
retention practices. Again, many of the survey comments were aligned to issues
raised in Chapter 7 (HR). A number of survey respondents made observations
about the validity and reliability of existing IC recruitment practices to attract and
retain the next generation of analysts and other workers needed to meet the chal-
lenges of the volatile security environment. These comments expressed concern
about not only whether current practices were reliable or ‘fit for purpose,’ but
some also argued that the continuing outsourcing of IC HR (including recruit-
ment) was likely not to improve recruitment outcomes. One said ‘a one size fits
all cookie cutter approach to the types of people we need will not serve the com-
munity well into the future’ (survey respondent 48). On the recruitment process
of analysts and diversity, one IC leader said:
the latest trend is to outsource recruiting; to hire third party companies to

‘test’ candidates via ill-formatted online questionnaires (testing analytical
ability using traditional find the pattern questions, etc.). This is a cost cutting
measure that also destroys the potential diversity of the team and commu-
nity. Diversity must be increased. Currently, diversity is defined as diversity
in gender, ethnicity, age, and similar physical attributes. Diversity of back-
ground, education, and cognitive ability is needed—it is this diversity that
HR practices effectively destroy. (survey respondent 30)
In addition to several insights about the challenges related to recruitment, several

IC leaders made comments about the difficulties in retaining and growing a skilled
IC workforce. On the inter-generational factors that impact on effective retention
discussed in Chapter 7 (HR), the following quote from one IC leader encapsulates
well the many challenges associated with the changing nature of the workforce.
there is an assumption of a need for pathways, of career development, and

of long-term association with the discipline. Intelligence professionals might
not jump across employment sectors as much as some other professionals but
there is no reason to suppose that the transient nature of the workforce will
recede. We need to recognise that people might now work in intelligence
for much shorter periods than their predecessors and, with that, comes the
loss of knowledge, the loss of investment, and indeed the risks to sensitive
information being known across a greater number of people. But that is the
nature of employment today and probably tomorrow. An associated issue is
the need to step away from rigid public service classifications for remunera-
tion: if intelligence agencies need talent, they might have to start paying for
it at competitive rates. Again, cue government and adequate funding. (survey
respondent 12)
Addressing intelligence governance challenges

In this second section, we shift the focus from summarising the big intelligence
governance challenges IC leaders are confronting towards how these may be
addressed in the future. As with the previous section, the objective here is not to
provide a specific and detailed menu of options for IC leaders to adopt. Rather, the
goal is to synthesise some of the analysis provided in earlier chapters and insights
from IC leaders who responded to the survey about potential initiatives that may
improve IC performance against the various governance challenges identified.
Accordingly, the points raised here should not be seen as either fully compre-
hensive or sufficiently detailed enough to offer solutions to the many challenges
identified above and throughout the book. In many cases, time-bounded solutions
to governance issues such as organisational structure, cultural or technological
challenges don’t exist. They are either in some cases no definite solutions, or if
an ultimate resolution of the governance challenge exists, it is likely a longer-
term prospect if a number of external and internal variables can be aligned. The
dynamic nature of the security environment also suggests that IC leaders will need
to constantly work to improve incrementally a number of large governance chal-
lenges over time. Incremental and consistent improvement may have more value
than revolutionary transformations that overpromise and under-deliver. And any
improvements made today will need to be re-examined regularly as events will
likely render them ineffective and potentially harmful to IC missions in shorter
periods of time in the future. This section uses the same sub-headings as the one
above—only this time the focus is on how IC leaders address the key governance
challenges identified above.
Tasking, coordination, and integration

The one governance challenge we are going to discuss here is organisational struc-
ture. As mentioned in Chapter 3, structure is critically important in all aspects of
the intelligence enterprise, but particularly so in the tasking, coordination, and
integration of intelligence products and processes. IC leaders do have influence
within the constraints of legislation and funding on how their organisations are
structured to respond to nationally set intelligence priorities. For example, we
have seen how after 9/11 there has been a growth in fusion centres, mission intel-
ligence officers, and other inter-departmental taskforces to allow IC agencies
to better coordinate and integrate on mission tasking, collection, and analysis.
Such initiatives, however, are often added onto existing larger IC organisational
structures without necessarily greater reflection on whether any of these structural
responses are aligned sufficiently well enough to mission outcomes. What we
have also seen is that attempts to improve tasking, coordination, and integration
through new organisational structural arrangements (e.g. fusion centres) have not
always brought about what they were intended to do—but rather some have added
to inefficiencies, duplication, and poor information sharing (Walsh 2015). There
is likely no completely optimal organisational structure IC leaders could engi-
neer to comprehensively manage challenges related to tasking, coordination, and
integration. But in the future, and as noted earlier, IC leaders will preside over
increasingly volatile security environments in periods where significant funding
increases are likely to be the exception than the rule. So IC leaders will need
to move more explicitly than in the past in developing metrics that can assess
whether organisational alignment within teams, branches, agencies, and across
the entire community are fit for purpose. Set and forget organisational structures
will no longer serve IC mission performance into the future as more agile institu-
tional responses will be required.
As indicated earlier, a range of vulnerabilities (e.g. resource limitations, tech-
nical, and cultural constraints) can impact on organisational performance, particu-
larly how intelligence is tasked, coordinated, and integrated. Some ‘Five Eyes’
ICs, particularly those that have developed formalised centralised agencies (e.g.
ODNI in US and ONI in Australia) to examine tasking, coordination, and mission
integration, have made progress in ‘measuring’ organisational performance, but
there is still a lot of room for improving on existing initiatives.
Improving agency and community-wide metrics around organisational (struc-
tural) performance will require IC leaders to adopt a systems-wide approach that
can monitor and evaluate how intelligence is tasked, coordinated, and integrated
at strategic, operational, and tactical levels in real time. IC leaders should consider
investing in or strengthening existing organisational performance teams that can
evaluate the interdependence of requirements, priorities, and agency/IC response
to these. As a general approach, performance teams should measure organisa-
tional/structural alignment to mission priorities of key decision-makers, which
may change close to real time—rather than solely and slavishly sticking to annual
checking off bureaucratic and mechanistic exercises to determine whether endur-
ing collection and assessment priorities have been met.
A real-time monitoring capability will help identify and remedy more quickly
problems with tasking, integration, and coordination, and whether there are either
capability gaps or changes required in the organisational response of a structural
nature. IC leaders are likely to gain increased awareness of whether organisa-
tional structure is fit for mission by investing in organisational monitoring teams
that can examine work flow allocation in both short and longer-term priorities
and how resources are being allocated within their own and other agencies in the
IC. Research from social network analysis might provide some clues on how to
inform the work of these teams, particularly how resources and collaboration (or
the lack thereof) are brought together on priorities, outcomes, and outputs. IC
leaders will need to align their own organisational performance team’s work with
any centrally coordinated initiative monitoring overall tasking, coordination, and
integration efforts by the entire community. In short, IC leaders will increasingly
need to demonstrate that performance stays focused on priorities and reduces
duplication of effort. One IC leader summed up nicely the responsibilities of such
a performance team:
1) Priorities must be set according to organisational/legislated key performance

indicators. All priorities must link to key performance indicators (KPIs).
2) Resources and activities must be tasked according to the KPIs. If it counts, it
should be measured.
3) Outputs must contribute to outcomes.
4) Proper governance requires the identification of trends and issues affecting
different intelligence capabilities (survey respondent 29).
Collection
As noted above, there are a number of collection related governance challenges IC
leaders will continually need to negotiate in the future. Reflecting back to Chapter 4
(Collection) and the analysis here of the survey data, in many ways the kinds of
challenges are not new. They relate to sourcing better information, managing the
role of technology that supports collection platforms, and handling the increasing
‘data asphyxiation’ that has been the reality for most ICs for several decades now.
Similar to organisational performance measures discussed above, IC leaders in
different agencies will likely have to address specific aspects of these collection
challenges as they relate to their own particular operational environment. But the
way IC leaders initiate measures to improve collection challenges clearly needs to
be in concert with other agencies and must be a ‘whole of community approach.’
Importantly as well and reflecting back to Chapter 4 (Collection), you may recall
one IC leader surveyed made the simple point that dealing with collection chal-
lenges must be about ‘being future focused, not thinking about current collection
but what will we need in 5 years’ time’ (survey respondent 60). From my perspec-
tive, this simple statement is a logical yet important point to make in terms of
how IC leaders begin to address the many challenges associated with intelligence
collection now and in the future.
IC leaders need a conceptual and strategic framework to think more system-
atically about collection challenges rather than trying to respond to every single
difficulty when they arise. This is akin to trying to putting out spot-fires as an even
larger fire is just over the horizon. In some contexts, such as tactical intelligence
that supports counter-terrorism or military deployment, IC leaders may frequently
be asked to resolve problems quickly associated with insufficient collection, legis-
lative restrictions, or technological and capability constraints. However, the type
of conceptual and strategic framework I am proposing here would seek to provide
a more global understanding of particular governance challenges at all levels:
tactical, operational, and strategic. In the discussion earlier, several critical gov-
ernance issues for collection were identified. However, for the sake of brevity
many of these can be broadly categorised into two areas: knowledge management
and counter-intelligence. IC leaders in agencies and at whole of community level
should focus on the most pressing issues in both areas in their conceptual and
strategic frameworks. Knowledge management challenges include a number of
issues that are inter-related and cannot be effectively addressed in isolation. They
include regularly auditing information sources and actively managing data over-
load both technically and culturally. Reviewing knowledge management chal-
lenges includes introducing management processes that help IC staff work smarter
with what they have, while at the same time being quicker to identify other and
often external sources. As mentioned, resolving collection issues is often as much
about managing cultural attitudes towards collection sources and methodologies
as it is a technical capability issue. Indeed, in the context of improving collec-
tion capabilities, any conceptual and strategic framework will need to articulate
actions IC leaders can take to affect organisational cultural change that allows
new ways of thinking about collection and addresses biases staff may have about
the relative value of different information sources. On this matter, one IC leader
underscored, albeit a bit bluntly, the cultural barriers in some IC environments
that work against effectively improving collection/knowledge management. They
said: ‘don’t be arrogant. Do not assume that anyone/company/group that does not
have a TS SCI clearance has less information, expertise, insights, ideas about how
to use innovative methods to collect information’ (survey respondent 78).
While cultural issues impact on effective collection/knowledge management
measures, collection governance issues as mentioned above and in earlier chapters
also need to be informed by a greater focus on research and industry collaboration
for identifying new collection technologies and techniques. Outreach should not
just be on the STEM side (e.g. AI), but also critically needs to include tapping
social-behavioural sciences that can help ICs better understand how threat actors
interact socially and with technology. So enhancing the leveraging of industry and
academia as noted already will be critical to all facets of improving knowledge
management in the collection context. The optimal utilisation of industry and aca-
demia will of course be dependent on IC leaders implementing comprehensive
innovation strategies as part of the conceptual and strategic collection framework
discussed above. This is not to suggest that ICs are not currently engaging indus-
try and academic in effective ways—clearly they are. However, a comprehensive
innovation strategy would mean IC leaders develop a much more holistic under-
standing of their entire capability ecosystem to identify gaps and through regular
fora identify an even broader array of industry and academic providers that can be
engaged consistently to address capability gaps beyond the often usual suspects
(providers) that win IC contracts.
Finally, from a counter-intelligence perspective, any conceptual and strate-
gic collection framework will need to address how the increasing availability of
external sources to help close difficult collection/knowledge gaps may also raise
CI concerns. As noted in Chapter 4 (Collection) and other survey comments made
earlier in this chapter, embracing OSINT and social media and academic engage-
ment will be even more vital collection sources for ICs in the future. However, the
rise in fake news, deception, and foreign interference in open sources will require
more detailed CI risk management than is currently the case in many ‘Five Eyes’
ICs. Ironically, though, it may likely be experts in the private and academic sec-
tor that are best placed to advise ICs on CI risks in using open source collection
platforms.
Analysis governance issues

As mentioned in Chapter 5 (Analysis), since 9/11 all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs to vary-
ing degrees have increased their investments in enhancing analytical practice.
For example, there has been an increased focus on training analysts in structured
analytical techniques than seen pre-9/11, and some agencies have instituted vir-
tual and physical collaboration initiatives to help analysts develop communities
of practice aimed at improving assessments. However, it’s less clear how such
capability investments have improved the reliability and validity of analytical
judgements—points made more recently by several scholars (Dhami 2018; Chang
and Tetlock 2016). With this background in mind, the key analysis governance
challenge as discussed above is how ICs know whether capability investments in
analytical innovations are good practice and make a demonstrable positive impact
on analysis. While IC leaders should seek the expert counsel of analysts in what
capability investments are made, it’s clear that analysis is linked to other core
intelligence processes (tasking and coordination and collection) as well as key
enabling activities (ICT and HR). This means decisions made about how best to
improve and innovate analytical practice impacts on these other areas and vice
versa. In short, IC leaders need to both drive and support future analytical innova-
tion initiatives because investments made impact on all aspects of organisational
performance in ICs. IC leaders if sufficiently engaged should have a 360 degree
view of the interdependencies between investing in analytical innovation and how
this may then require investments or capability reviews in other areas such as col-
lection or ICT and vice versa.
I do not want to imply that thinking about analytical innovation means neces-
sarily immediate or radical change to every analytical principle ICs have been
using for generations. As noted in Chapter 5 (Analysis), there are a number of nor-
mative principles that under-gird all analysis, such as critical thinking, research,
and writing skills, which will always govern good analysis. Yet given the growing
volatility in the security environment, IC leaders will need to prioritise analytical
innovation strategies that can improve the validity and reliability of judgements
decision-makers use. As discussed, fake news and foreign interference are just
two growing areas of concern that will increasingly impact on the analysis of a
range of complex security threats. While some IC leaders are thinking about how
best to garner analytical innovation, it’s clear a more consistent and enhanced
conceptualisation of what analytical innovation means within and across ICs is
needed. Indeed, given limited resources, the ‘Five Eyes’ IC network provides an
ideal environment to foster enhanced analytical innovation that benefits all mem-
bers. As one IC leader surveyed put it:
there is already a strong body of knowledge and decades of Five Eyes collab-
oration that can be leveraged. Integrating these into a common, continuously
improving ‘canon of intelligence analysis’ would allow them to be enriched
and adapted over time—similar to practices among the scientific communi-
ties (survey respondent 69).
In summary, to address key analytical governance challenges, IC leaders will need

to implement an analytical innovation strategy that can identify opportunities for
capability investments in this area. The strategy should also include mechanisms
for assessing organisational learning by sponsoring research programs that can
evaluate the evidence for the value in implementing analytical innovations over
time. Analytical innovation strategies at an operational level will likely mean dif-
ferent things across the diverse ‘Five Eyes’ agencies. For an assessment agency,
it may mean investing in a particularly emerging subject matter area, in another
it could be building up analysts’ abilities to exploit AI data-driven technologies.
The operational detail will need to be decided by IC leaders in their own particular
context, but ideally leaders should also aim to achieve an IC-wide vision of key
priority areas for an analytical innovation strategy and what agencies should take
the lead on certain measures. The resilience and relevance of any strategy will
also naturally rely on the ability of IC leaders to engage their analytical work-
force in its implementation. A strategy should not be something imposed on the
analytical cadre, rather it is something that analysts would be included in as key
stakeholders and collaborators—in order to harness their expertise and build trust
in the workforce. As correctly noted by another survey respondent: ‘leaders need
to be able to take their analysts on a journey. Analysts need to trust that their lead-
ers will treat them with respect and give them support which means analysts are
prepared to go the extra mile’ (survey respondent 52).
ICT
Several ICT governance challenges were identified above and IC leaders will play
a central role in addressing all of them. Given that space is limited, however, I
focus on the implementation of AI capabilities in ICs. Chapter 6 (ICT) outlined
in detail the many dimensions to integrating AI capabilities within ICs. These
include several factors such as addressing technical issues, managing counter-
intelligence, social-ethical issues, legislative, workforce, and organisational cul-
tural issues. Also, as we saw earlier, one additional governance challenge in the
AI area is the opinion of some survey respondents that there may not be sufficient
competence amongst IC leadership ranks to steer the development of further AI
capabilities across ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. It’s important to avoid hyperbole around the
promise of AI in the IC context. But nonetheless for many IC agencies its incorpo-
ration is likely (eventually) to result in significant changes to the way intelligence
is collected and assessed. And so there remains a concern about whether IC lead-
ers are prepared for the coming change. As one IC leader said:
AI and quantum computing will change the reality of security and intelligence
at a global level. Leaders must begin investing in the research and develop-
ment of practices that assume that reality will take hold within the next five
years. Most agencies are ill prepared for the future in this regard and there
is an element of ignorance and misunderstanding on how this will reshape
the security and intelligence landscape. While much discussion and effort
is placed on better improving current practices, very little attention is being
paid to how the intelligence community will be forever altered with the intro-
duction of game changing and society changing technology. Unfortunately,
countries like the PRC and Russia are taking progressive and leading-edge
approaches to this new paradigm, while the West continues to reinforce cur-
rent practices and make superficial changes with limited outcomes. (survey
respondent 34)
Again, there are no simple, glib prescriptions for remedying a lack of prepared-
ness by some IC leaders to manage change brought by the adoption of AI tech-
nologies. However, as noted in Chapter 6 (ICT), it’s clear from the many survey
comments that some progress is being made by IC leaders in considering the
multi-dimensional impacts AI will have on ICs. For example, there has been some
consideration of technical and counter-intelligence issues. But what so far seems
to be missing at the time of writing is a complete IC AI strategy that considers all
the organisational variables that will be influenced by the incorporation of AI and
how to maximise the benefits while minimising the risks.
Some ‘Five Eyes’ militaries and governments have adopted national AI strate-
gies, but these do not seem to address IC enterprise issues in any detail. IC leaders
should develop national IC AI strategies that can coherently identify how such
emerging technologies, practices, and processes will be integrated into core intel-
ligence processes and key enabling activities. Within any national IC AI strategy,
leaders will need to pay close attention to developing strategic and operational
KPIs around many areas of AI technical development, particularly in areas of
surveillance, robotics, space assets, and quantum computing. But the clear articu-
lation of KPIs will also be required to track performance of these technologies
against hostile AI that could promote ‘deception, disruption, fake news or algo-
rithmic training data being manipulated’ (survey respondent 13). An IC AI strat-
egy will also need to, as mentioned earlier (Chapter 6 ICT), set objectives on how
social and ethical challenges will be addressed to ensure the efficacy of new tech-
nologies and practices within ICs—whilst at the same time promote transparency
and legitimacy in liberal democratic states. Finally, as noted in Chapter 6 (ICT)
and 7 (HR), IC leaders will also need to include KPIs on resolving workforce
implications of AI integration into existing processes.
HR
In the earlier section on HR governance challenges, a number of issues were iden-
tified relating to promoting diversity, inter-generational change, and workforce
planning. All of these and others discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 (HR) are
subsets in a larger mission of IC strategic workforce planning. Again, as noted
earlier, since 9/11 progress has been made on a number of workforce issues, but
the increasingly complex security environment will demand IC leaders develop
further holistic and integrated strategic workforce planning. Each IC will have
their own approach, but again, as hard as it might be there needs to also be a
‘whole of IC framework’ adopted for workforce planning as well that can pro-
mote better HR standards and identify vulnerabilities. Much of the issues that
need to be addressed by IC leaders in strategic workforce planning has already
been mentioned in Chapter 7 (HR) and again summarised above in this chapter.
Accordingly there is no need to repeat that detail here.
But it is worth making a few observations about what should inform an IC stra-
tegic workforce plan. First, it’s important to simply note that trying to plan both
for the current and the workforce of the future will always be difficult. Leaving
aside the very real resource constraints many ICs operate under, how the security
environment will evolve—and therefore what kind of workforce is required—
cannot be estimated accurately. It is possible, however, for ICs to develop better
research and foresight analysis capabilities to frame more holistic, evidence-
based and integrated approaches to workforce planning. Such knowledge could
be used to inform KPIs for diversity, inter-generational change, recruitment, train-
ing, retention, and other HR objectives to better pivot human capabilities to the
changing mission.
A second observation is that designing workforce planning, if it is not just
to be a cosmetic process, will require IC leaders accumulate better evidence in
which to make investment decisions in HR. Where should this evidence come
from? Again, IC leaders will need to adopt a best practice approach to gather evi-
dence, which will increasingly mean in the future looking outside their agency to
benchmark better HR practices. Doing this hard work does not necessarily mean
IC leaders turn to the ‘usual suspects’ (e.g. large accounting or defence contract-
ing or consulting firms) to provide advice on HR workforce issues. Arguably,
ICs paying substantial sums of money for cookie-cutter approaches to workforce
strategies may be a bad investment in the future. The research gathered for this
study suggests other external sources such as more targeted engagement with
academia and researchers would be useful and possibly cheaper in exploring
how to evaluate what works better in improving diversity, recruitment, training,
and retention. Again in Chapter 7 (HR) there were a number of examples given
on how a multi-disciplinary research approach to a number of workforce chal-
lenges could generate solutions. Of course IC leaders in designing better strategic
workforce planning frameworks will as in the past confront technical, resourcing,
cultural, and human constraints to actioning such plans. Perhaps the greatest chal-
lenges may lay in attracting and retaining Generation Y, Z, and beyond to ICs in
ways that reliably address capability gaps into the future. How can IC leaders, for
example, better align the values and missions of their agencies with the values,
ethics, and professional aspirations of an increasingly young and diverse recruit-
ment pool who may not see themselves devoting their entire work life to the IC?
As succinctly put by one IC leader:
people want flexible careers and we should accommodate that. People may
not want a 30 year career in one organization. People also want to lead mod-
ern lives and do not want to have to isolate themselves in a vault just to do
their work. (survey respondent 102)
Given this reality, what are the common value denominators that ICs can use
that will have real resonance for the next generations as they consider employ-
ment in ICs? This remains a difficult question to answer. IC leaders can look to
other industries such as finance, medicine, law, and IT to see how HR depart-
ments are tapping into next-generation values and expectations. But after reflect-
ing on trends in other industries, they will have to implement initiatives, which
still make sense in the relatively closed IC workplace. What could such initiatives
be? Perhaps greater flexibility will be key rather than a dogmatic full time (9–5)
approach to filling roles. Could IC leaders adopt strategic workforce initiatives
that offer more flexibility to work arrangements yet still benefit the IC? For exam-
ple, a part-time role either in the private or academic sector as well as the IC
could be of mutual benefit. For recruiting next-generation employees, could IC
leaders set up HR arrangements that provide intern positions at lower levels as
part of a recruitment strategy—a kind of ‘try before you buy’ approach for young
workers? Internships could be temporary and offered at lower levels of security
classification in some work environments. Interns who have the right skill sets
and see their values aligned to IC missions could be offered ongoing employment.
A strategic workforce planning framework would also need to promote greater
workforce flexibility and professional development opportunities for mid and sen-
ior career staff. This could be ‘more opportunities and career time dedicated to
‘sabbatical training,’ when experts can update and expand their knowledge and
learn new approaches to analysis (and other areas) without the pressure to produce
operational materials on a constant basis. Time out to refresh and to think’ (survey
respondent 65).
Leadership attributes
This last section shifts the focus away from IC governance challenges at the
organisational level back to the personal attributes of leaders themselves. Now
that we know a bit more about what kind of governance challenges leaders will
face; this section explores whether it is possible to know what kind of individual
leadership attributes are more likely to have a positive impact on the challenges
identified. Following this discussion, Chapter 9 (Leadership Development) will
then reflect on all aspects of IC leadership explored in the study and provide some
tentative conclusions about how to conceptualise future IC leadership develop-
ment programs that foster both the individual leadership attributes and knowledge
required to negotiate the many governance challenges identified.
In simple terms, what kind of personal attributes do IC leaders need to steer
and adapt their teams, branches, agencies, or entire communities to the increas-
ingly complex security environment? In this section we reflect back on key points
made in Chapter 2 about IC leadership from historical, organisational, psycho-
logical, and individual perspectives; and connect it with what former and current
IC leaders surveyed believe are critical leadership attributes. The objective is to
progress knowledge about leadership in the IC context by bringing together theo-
retical perspectives from the more established leadership field with insights from
both former and current experienced IC leaders. Can a broader synthesis of tra-
ditional leadership theorising discussed in Chapter 2 and insights gathered in the
IC leadership survey advance both theoretical and practitioner knowledge about
how one can best produce the next cadre of effective IC leaders? It’s important
to build on the theory, but better theorising can also help inform strategies for the
developing future generation of IC leaders—the topic of Chapter 9 (Leadership
Development).
You will recall in Chapter 2 several leadership theories and their associ-
ated research agendas were discussed (e.g. neo-charismatic/transformational
and follower-centric). With all types of leadership theories, several characteris-
tics have been identified by researchers and attempts made to test empirically
how they inform leadership behaviour in a range of industries. For example, in
Chapter 2 transformational leadership was described as someone who can trans-
form or change basic values, beliefs, and attitudes so followers are willing to
perform beyond the minimum levels. Transformational leadership characteristics
such as the ability to change basic values and beliefs could, for example, be useful
for an increased understanding of the motivations, drivers, and behaviours of the
changing inter-generational workforce discussed in Chapter 7 (HR). But just how
applicable are transformational leadership theoretical approaches to understand-
ing leadership in the IC context? Having charisma and influence are considered
important attributes in transformational leadership theories. But do leaders need
to be charismatic to have effective influence within ICs?
Question 8 (of the IC leadership survey) asked respondents to select from a
range of options what attributes they thought are most important for current and
future leaders of our ICs. On the matter of charismatic attributes, 87.6 per cent
of respondents (n = 128) indicated that charismatic qualities are either somewhat
important, important, or a very important attribute for an IC leader to have. Yet
interestingly, only 2.74 per cent (n = 4) thought that it was essential for IC lead-
ers to be charismatic to shift followers values. Why did most IC leaders surveyed
believe it was important to very important, but not essential for leaders to be
charismatic? Some survey respondents provided insights into why they believe
being charismatic is important. One respondent said being charismatic ‘excites
followers, shows you are interested in the field enough to energize others, and are
visibly interested in leadership’ (survey respondent 2). Others respondents also
commented that it was somewhat important to be charismatic though not neces-
sarily essential ‘so that you can engage and relate to the team and the executive
as well as those outside your immediate sphere of influence’ (survey respondent
3). Yet other comments suggested the extent that being ‘charismatic’ is impor-
tant was likely contextual to different IC agencies or even within agencies. Such
comments seem to challenge the critical importance of the single, all, and mighty
omnipotent charismatic leader. The following comment from survey respondent
1 encapsulates well some of these views:
I believe that leadership attribute requirements can be different at different

stages of an organisation’s development. A stable well-functioning agency
might not have the same requirements for charismatic leadership as might a
new agency that is setting up relationships with other agencies, still develop-
ing its budget base, etc. Additionally, it can also be a question of the overall
skill mix of the leadership team rather just of individual leaders.
It’s not possible to expand on all insights collected in the survey relating to char-
ismatic leadership attributes. But a closely connected attribute is transformational
leadership, which as discussed in Chapter 2 has been the most empirically tested
theoretical approach in leadership studies. Similar to charisma being seen as
important/very important, 70.95 per cent of respondents (n = 105) also thought
it was important for leaders to exhibit transformational leadership behaviours in
the IC context. Of interest and in contrast to the low number (2.74 per cent) that
thought it essential for leaders to be charismatic, however, 24.32 per cent (n = 36)
of participants believed that IC leaders should be able to demonstrate transforma-
tional attributes. What accounts for the slight increase in the essential ranking for
transformational leadership attributes? At this point there is no clear answer to
explain the rating differences between charismatic and transformational leader-
ship. The low ranking (2.74 per cent) of respondents indicating the importance of
being charismatic as ‘essential’—yet the higher level (24.32 per cent) of others
suggesting being transforming as ‘essential’ at least in the survey context suggest
IC leaders see being able to transform people’s values and behaviours as most
important. So if this is true and an IC leader need not necessarily display charis-
matic qualities, what other behavioural characteristics will allow transformative
change?
A number of comments from respondents suggested that IC leaders must
have basic values that underpin any transformational behaviours in ICs. One
respondent encapsulated this point well, adding ‘one cannot lead if one does not
understand what is guiding and motivating those working beneath them.’ ‘More
important, one must have a strong set of personal values and standards that guide
how best such a transformation process can be implemented without sacrificing
integrity’ (survey respondent 78). Others also raised the importance of leaders
having values and beliefs that are in themselves ‘transformative’ that can chal-
lenge the conservatism of IC cultures, which are often resistant to change (survey
respondent 85).
These comments indicate some participants link the importance of leaders
having a strong set of personal values to being transformational leaders in the IC
context, yet do not specify what the values should be. However, other insights
provide clues of what specific values might promote transformational leader-
ship including trust, ethical behaviour, transparency, and authenticity (survey
respondents 15, 208). Other behaviours were also listed as being important, such
as mentoring.
What the survey results show is that it remains unclear how useful charis-
matic/transformational leadership theorising is to developing current and future
IC leaders. The survey sample size (n = 208) is obviously not representative of all
possible leadership perspectives from either former or current IC leaders across
the ‘Five Eyes’ countries. A more extensive collection of IC leader’s views on
various leadership attributes is required before accurate assessments can be made
about the relative weightings given to various attributes and why. It should also
be pointed out that survey question 8 was not designed to elucidate respondent’s
understanding of a particular leadership theory. It is possible that if the ques-
tion provided specific definitions of leadership theories respondents may have
weighted levels of attribute importance differently.
Two factors influenced the more exploratory rather than empirical approach
adopted in the survey to garner insights about leadership attributes from IC
leaders. First, given the contestability and overlap in many leadership theories
about what attributes are most important, it made sense to allow IC leaders to
demonstrate their own understanding of leadership characteristics rather than
require them to respond through a particular theoretical prism. Second, due
to the absence of any substantial theorising currently on leadership in IC con-
texts, I took the view that designing survey questions should be influenced by
a grounded theory approach that would allow them to express their own val-
ues, beliefs, and practitioner perspectives on leadership. This would allow a
comparing and contrasting of insights with other non-IC leadership research (in
Chapter 2) yet at the same time help develop much needed leadership theorising
in the IC context.
The final two leadership attributes we are going to focus on here are ethical
behaviour and self-awareness by IC leaders. Out of all the nine leadership attrib-
utes survey respondents were asked to rate the relative importance of (from not
at all important to essential), 72.67 per cent (n = 109) believe IC leaders having
ethical attributes is essential. Or in total by adding those that stated it ‘essential’
to those that rated it either ‘somewhat important,’ ‘important,’ and ‘very impor-
tant,’ 99 per cent (n = 140) stated that it was important for IC leaders to be ethical.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, ethical leadership attributes are seen as important
to a range of follower-centric leadership theorists, particularly the research
perspectives of authentic, ethical, and servant leadership. Ethical attributes are
linked to both ethical and authentic leadership perspectives. Ethical leadership
is concerned with how IC leaders may negotiate the many ethical dilemmas they
face in running intelligence agencies. In several chapters we explored how ethi-
cal issues have historically intersected with intelligence leadership practice and
the impact this has on privacy, transparency, and accountability in liberal democ-
racies such as the ‘Five Eyes’ countries. Several comments from IC leaders sur-
veyed underscore the core role ethics plays in IC leadership. Simply put, one
said ethics is ‘fundamental to the profession and practice of intelligence’ (survey
respondent 21).
Briefly, the second follower-centric perspective—ethical leadership—is con-
cerned with how the leader’s actions result (or not) in ethical outcomes and how
these impact on the organisation they lead. This strand of follower-centric lead-
ership is clearly relevant to many other issues explored in this study given most
have an ethical dimension to the decisions leaders need to take. Additionally,
another respondent referred to the importance of being an ethical leader particu-
larly as the environment for collection and analysis becomes more difficult:
Being an ethical leader is essential as we all try and navigate a changing

world view and environment. Understanding that all is not what it seems, that
‘facts’ are fluid and that sources may have their own agendas are important.
It is only through being ethical, having integrity in how we conduct ourselves
and present our findings that we can try and provide useful information to
stakeholders and not adversely contribute to the already difficult operating
environment. (survey respondent 26)
Several survey comments indicated the importance of ethical leadership in the con-
text of negotiating the integration of new technology into ICs (see Chapter 6 ICT).
Of interest, one respondent highlighted the problems associated with the intersec-
tion of new technology and technology and ethics as well as what other lead-
ership behaviours might strengthen ethical leadership. One said: ‘as technology
advances, intelligence practices may be ‘extra-legal.’ Ethical intelligence prac-
tices compliment other attributes like being ‘transparent and authentic’ (survey
respondent 27). This quote raises a critical point as IC leaders will continually
be called upon to understand not only the legal powers they can operate in, but
also how to ethically risk manage an increasingly complex and technologically
enabled operating environment.
It is likely that IC leaders will increasingly be faced both with a legislative per-
missive operating environment and/or one which does not keep up with techno-
logically enabled threats or collection methodologies. So referring back to survey
respondent 27’s comment, being able to assess the ‘extra-legal’ risks in operating
in such an environment will be a crucial leadership attribute and skill. Finally, in
the context of ethical attributes several IC leaders link this attribute to transpar-
ency in directing the mission and the leading and mentoring of others (survey
respondents 23, 60, 69).
Transparency as mentioned in Chapter 2 is also a key attribute of authentic
leadership. It remains difficult, however, to define this kind of leadership. In 2003,
Luthans and Avolio defined authentic leadership as ‘a process that draws from
both positive psychological capacities and a highly developed organisational con-
text, which results in greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behav-
iours on the part of leaders and associates, fostering self-development’ (Luthans
and Avolio 2003: 243). Authentic leadership scholars argue that a leader’s posi-
tive values, beliefs, ethics, and their ability to develop transparency amongst other
characteristics impact on whether followers are more likely to adopt such quali-
ties—resulting in a better organisation (Walsh 2017: 444).
Another attribute of authentic leadership theory which scored highly in
the IC leadership survey was the need for the leader to be self-aware. Out of
150 respondents who answered question 8 (about leadership attributes), 54.67 per
cent (n = 82) thought that it was essential for IC leaders to have self-awareness.
Overall, 100 per cent (n = 150) stated that it was somewhat important, important,
very important, or essential for IC leaders to have self-awareness. But what does
it mean to ‘have self-awareness’ in the IC leadership context?
Four themes were discernible from the survey comments that provided some
clues about what self-aware leadership could mean in ICs. The first theme was
about being able to make evidence based and ethical decisions that allowed the
leader to know (to the extent that this is possible) they have made the right call.
Secondly, self-awareness was linked to the ability by leaders to promote a team
(less hierarchical) environment in order to navigate the increasingly complex
security environment. Third, being self-aware was associated with effective inter-
personal skills and being positive and optimistic. Finally, several survey respond-
ents associated being self-aware to the leader knowing their own strengths and
weaknesses in order to better mentor others. Space does not allow a full detailing
of the various comments made by IC leaders surveyed about the importance of
self-awareness. However, the following two comments encapsulate the types of
sentiments expressed by several survey participants. On the theme of being able
to make evidence-based decisions, a point made now several times in this study,
one participant said a leader needs:
to be able to make decisions based on evidence and experience, which may

not always be held by the one person. Therefore one needs to be self-aware,
promote a team environment with the ability to gain a cross section of infor-
mation, making evidence-based ethical choices and mentoring others to do
the same. (survey respondent 7)
On the theme of knowing one’s own strengths and weaknesses, another respond-
ent said:
A leader who is not self-aware will usually fail to perform as a strong leader.
To be self-aware one must actively seek out constructive critique and respond
faithfully to what is received. Very good leaders actually develop a network
of sensors within their organization who can provide honest feedback on how
well they are performing and how they are being perceived. (survey respond-
ent 88)
In summary, 150 survey respondents addressed question 8, which asked

them to rate the relative importance of nine leadership attributes. Out of 150,
96 respondents provided detailed textual responses that generated further insights
into why they weighted the importance of some leadership attributes over others.
Regrettably, space does not allow a detailed discussion here of all their insights.
But in general, it is pleasing that many IC leaders have reflected extensively on
their own experiences about what they think are important leadership attributes.
Many have also provided insightful comments, which underscore why they
believe some attributes are more important. It is also clear that many of the com-
ments, while not necessarily explicitly linked to various mainstream leadership
theoretical perspectives, can be associated with the different research agendas
discussed in Chapter 2.
However, it is also clear that the sample of data collected for question 8 (lead-
ership attributes) is very small (n = 150) and is no way representative of the larger
number of former or current IC leaders across the ‘Five Eyes.’ Additionally, the
results cannot at this point accurately rate which leadership attributes are the most
important and why. Larger sample sizes collected within and across IC agencies
would allow for more valid and reliable analytical generalisations on the relative
importance of various leadership attributes. This would be an important first step
before ICs spent valuable resources investing in more elaborate programs (if they
were so inclined), such as empirical leadership testing regimes (e.g. multifac-
tor questionnaires or authentic leadership questionnaires) to assess behavioural
characteristics of IC leaders. Indeed, the next step in gaining further empirical
evidence for what leadership attributes the next generation of leaders should
embody is not elaborate workplace ‘testing’ of the influence of various leadership
behavioural attributes. Rather, a more achievable first step would be for ICs to
engage with trusted external researchers (not generic business consultants) who
can through a Delphi process help agencies to come to ‘a whole of IC view’ on
how to define attributes and then agree on which ones are the most important for
leadership developmental programs.
What the results for questions 8 and 9 and indeed more broadly the insights
gathered from the entire survey (23 questions) suggest is we are still a long way
from any grand theories that allow an understanding of how to improve leadership
in the IC context. Nonetheless, the analysis of all the data collected for this study
does allow more scaffolding in which to build larger studies that will progress our
theorising—but also more importantly the transfer of knowledge into designing
better leadership development programs in the IC workplace.
Conclusion
This chapter assessed the significance of three significant and inter-related issues as
they relate to leadership in the IC context. First, it summarised the key governance
challenges that will continue to occupy the minds of likely generations of IC lead-
ers. Secondly, the chapter—while avoiding offering glib ‘silver bullet’ solutions
to the many governance challenges—provides strategic road maps so they could
start to be addressed in more systematic ways. Finally, Chapter 8 moved away
from the organisational governance issues and back to the individual IC leader. It
brought together the traditional leadership theorising discussed in Chapter 2 with
the insights gathered from IC leaders surveyed. The hope here is to generate deeper
conversations both in the IC workplace and with researchers about what leadership
attributes are important to improving outcomes across the ‘Five Eyes’ IC. Using
the insights gained about governance challenges and the significance of various
leadership attributes, Chapter 9 (Leadership Development) briefly explores what
principles could inform a leadership development framework for ‘Five Eyes’ ICs.
Note
1 Thomas Fingar was the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and
a Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
References
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10.1080/02684527.2017.1394252
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9 Leadership development
Introduction
In this final chapter, based on the synthesis of all the data including insights gath-
ered from the 208 former and current IC leaders who participated in the study’s
survey, I explore what leadership principles are potentially most germane to the
implementation of IC leadership development programs. A second objective is to
use these principles in order to provide the reader with a broad leadership devel-
opment framework. The hope is that the framework offered here will help inform
leadership development programs for ‘Five Eyes’ ICs and others across similar
liberal democracies.
Neither the discussion below on leadership development principles nor the
framework, however, should be construed as either exhaustive or immutable.
Indeed, I would welcome hearing from scholars and IC leaders on how this frame-
work can be built upon further to better inform leadership development programs
in ICs. In short, the framework should be seen as a catalyst for further research
and discussion, not an endpoint in itself.
Leadership development
As mentioned in the introduction (Chapter 1), I deliberately choose a very broad
definition of IC leaders (from team level up to executive heads of agencies or
communities). Given such diversity, one should expect to see a cross spectrum
of opinions about the attributes, skills, and competencies IC leaders need to
develop—depending on one’s own professional journey and levels of seniority.
I did wonder when analysing the data whether it would have been better to have
pitched the relevant survey questions on leadership development to a particular
career stage (early, mid, or senior). This could have provided a more focused set
of suggestions—perhaps on what a certain level of IC leader requires developmen-
tally. It would be useful in a subsequent study to focus on one particular level of IC
management—for example head of agency or middle-management—to identify
more granularity in leadership development frameworks relevant to these levels.
Nonetheless, as a starting point, and given there still is an absence at least
publicly on what kinds of attributes, skills, and competencies should inform IC
leadership development, I argue having a broader, diverse set of views from dif-
ferent levels of seniority captures important information about both what senior
leaders expect of themselves as much as what lower level leaders expect of them-
selves and vice versa. Putting a leadership development framework forward, how-
ever tentative, will hopefully generate discussion on how development should be
sequenced through the advancement of current and future IC leaders’ careers. The
hope is that a working framework can also provide a taxonomy of principles to
guide more in-depth empirical reflection on what works best in developing our
leaders and why.
Before getting into detail about what the development framework might
include, it’s worth briefly mentioning two additional survey questions included
in the study—the results of which though requiring further analysis could influ-
ence how ICs conceptualise leadership development programs. The first question
(question 20) posed a series of five sub-questions about leadership background,
experience, and training. The first sub-question posed a negatively worded ques-
tion: that IC leaders did not need a background in intelligence to be an effective
leader. A total of 71 per cent (n = 71 out of a total of 91 respondents) either strongly
disagreed or disagreed with this statement. This implies that most respondents
believed IC leaders did need an IC background to be effective leaders in this
context. Question 20 also asked IC respondents to rate the importance of length
of experience (five years or more), as well as if a leader from a relevant national
security/law enforcement policy area would be just as effective being an IC leader
than those who climbed through the ranks. On length of experience, 66.6 per
cent (n = 66) stated they thought at least five years (and more) was a reasonable
time frame for IC leaders to develop leadership expertise. Regarding the question
whether a senior leader from a policy background (e.g. national security or law
enforcement) will more than likely be an effective IC leader—44 per cent (n = 44)
strongly disagreed/disagreed with this statement. The results were more mixed. A
large proportion of respondents (32.32 per cent n = 32) were neutral on the ques-
tion, and only 22.22 per cent agreed that a leader from a policy area could be an
IC leader. I would have thought that there would have been a closer association
between the 71 per cent who argued that leaders should have a background in the
IC versus the 44 per cent who disagreed that someone with a policy background
would be an effective IC leader. I would have expected the latter to be higher in
line with those who overall rated the necessity for IC leaders to have an intel-
ligence background.
The relatively high number of respondents (32.32 per cent) or around one-third
of the total 99 responses who clicked ‘neutral’ for whether leaders from policy
backgrounds would be effective IC leaders could be interpreted as a belief overall
that effective IC leaders should come from the community, but there remains a
lack of clarity based on the survey results of whether those from policy back-
grounds could make effective IC leaders with only 22.22 per cent (n = 22) agree-
ing that they would be good leaders. At this point, it’s unclear what is behind the
discrepancies in some of question 20 responses. A larger sample response may
help explain further IC beliefs in regards to IC vs policy background for future
Leadership development 179
IC leaders. Additional targeted interviews of all IC leaders who completed the
survey might have also helped resolve these different views. However, in reality,
we know that across the ‘Five Eyes’ IC leaders often come from policy roles and
vice versa, so the more instructive question might be the length of experience a
leader can accrue within the IC in addition to any other professional experience
they bring to the role. The fifth and final sub-question (for question 20) asked
whether respondents agreed with the statement that there was insufficient training
for aspiring leaders in ICs. A total of 81.81 per cent of 99 respondents (n = 81)
either strongly agreed or agreed with this statement with only 3 per cent agreeing
that there was sufficient training for our future IC leaders.
Again to emphasise, this is a very small sample size of all potential IC leaders
who may have an opinion one way or the other on this matter. Further sampling
and targeted interviewing would be the next step to fully assess how reliable this
view was for the greater population—particularly lower level IC leaders. It is
clear there are a number of diverse and even conflicting views about whether IC
leaders had sufficient training—or indeed even needed any training. For example,
two respondents believed that IC leaders didn’t need any type of training—yet
then suggested they receive training in management, research, and government
experience beyond the IC (survey respondents 10 and 113). It is likely that ‘train-
ing’ and ‘experience’ mean different things to people and how IC leaders under-
stand and use terminology in the context of leadership development also requires
further investigation. Nonetheless, the results discussed above underscore at least
some belief amongst the IC leadership cadre that currently training initiatives are
lacking across the broader IC.
IC leadership development principles

Out of the over 80 per cent who believe there is insufficient leadership training
opportunities for IC leaders, what knowledge, skills, and competencies do they
think should inform developmental programs? Using NVIVO—a qualitative ana-
lytical software package—I coded 138 detailed textual references to issues related
to leadership training. This was the second highest number of texts related to one
theme after ‘governance challenges,’ which had 197 references. This was a pleas-
ing result because it was clear many respondents care sufficiently about leadership
training and how it can be improved to draft in many cases paragraph responses
to the relevant survey question.
The rich textual detail provides an additional tranche of insights in addition to
analysis from earlier chapters to provide the IC leadership development frame-
work outlined below. Within the 138 textual responses to the issue of leadership
training, several themes emerged. I grouped these into six broad thematic and
inter-related areas: individual behavioural attributes, technical training, strategic
and business planning, mentoring, evaluation, and lastly training and education
strategies. In the remaining space, I briefly illustrate some of the issues IC leaders
raised under each of these six themes before presenting a summary of the analysis
in the form of the IC leadership development framework.
Individual behavioural attributes
Many of the behavioural attributes mentioned by respondents in the context of
leadership development are similar to the various leadership attributes discussed
in Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Intelligence Governance) so there is no
need to repeat them here. Suffice it to say though, strategies to promote ethical
behaviour, self-awareness, authenticity, and team-based work were mentioned by a
number of respondents (e.g. survey respondents 43, 60) in the context of leadership
development. Interesting too, there were a few comments about the importance of
mindfulness and EQ (survey respondent 43). But how do you foster in development
programs the more positive behavioural attributes discussed in this study? How do
aspiring leaders become more authentic or ethical leaders? It is after all difficult
to change one’s behaviours, which are often linked to enduring values, personal
beliefs, and organisational culture. Improving leadership capabilities, which rely
on, for example, greater awareness of ethical dilemmas working in ICs or being
more authentic and team based cannot be recalibrated overnight. Addressing per-
sonal behavioural attributes that may be reducing a leader’s capabilities to effec-
tively influence IC outcomes for the better will be for any aspiring leader a gradual
process. It is difficult to generalise about the types of specific training strategies that
could be employed across all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs given the different operating contexts.
This study has not been able to take a ‘deep dive’ into the various leader-
ship attribute training initiatives that might currently be operating across all ICs.
There are likely some leadership strategies such as 360 degree feedback tools
and competency frameworks that aspiring leaders across both the broader public
and private sectors—not just those working in IC—may be able to use to manage and
lead self, others, and organisations. It is also difficult to know for sure what types
of specific self-awareness analytical tools are being already used in ICs. But
reflecting on the survey data collected, the interviews conducted, and the analysis
of other secondary sources, it seems true enough to suggest one key principle of
any IC leadership training development framework should be a greater focus on
leadership attribute training. How this is achieved might be IC-wide or agency
specific, but the focus needs to promote three broad strategies to identify and
modify (where necessary) behavioural changes in the IC leader. These strategies
are self-reflection, team reflection, and external feedback and support. Of greatest
importance will be opportunities for current and aspiring IC leaders to be given
formal and informal mentoring opportunities to self-reflect fundamentally on who
they are and why they want to be in a leadership role in the IC. In his now-famous
2009 TED talk and first book Start with Why, Simon Sinek asks people to be clear
about what makes them fulfilled. This is a more fundamental question than asking
how we do something and what we do (Sinek, Mead and Docker 2017: 12–13).
Leaders need to know personally ‘their why’ before they can articulate the why,
what, and how of their teams. Managers might ask the ‘what’ and ‘how’ but lead-
ers always need to know the ‘why’ and the latter might change significantly in
their careers as different governance challenges arise because of the increasingly
complex security environment.
Similarly, on being more aware of the ethical dimensions associated with man-
aging both the core intelligence and key enabling activities within ICs, IC leaders
need additional opportunities (e.g. workshops and scenarios) to discuss various
ethical scenarios arising from an increasingly complex operating environment. As
raised in previous chapters, particularly in the management of AI-enabled collec-
tion and analytical capabilities, IC leaders will need to understand and respond to
actual or potential ethical dilemmas that inevitably arise. Joint IC and academic
workshops run in collaboration with trusted applied ethicists will assist in helping
IC leaders identify practical ethical decision-making options. As noted earlier,
some colleagues and I are currently progressing an Australian Research Council
research project that is investigating whether ethical guidelines for use by ICs can
be identified in security intelligence collection. This kind of research could be
used to inform ethical decision-making workshops run in collaboration with ICs.
One final area of leadership attribute training that is worth pointing out is emo-
tional intelligence awareness. The importance of emotional intelligence (EI or
EQ) in leadership theory and practice has grown in the last 30 years (Goleman
1998; Bar-On 1997; Mayer and Salovey 1997: 3-31; Cooper and Sawaff 1998;
Petrides et al. 2007:151-166; Petrides and Furnham 2001, 2003). There remains,
however, conflicting definitions of EI and EQ models—as well as less certainty
how EQ impacts on organisational outcomes across industries. A leader who has
a high EQ has highly developed self-awareness, self-regulation, social aware-
ness, empathy levels, and motivation. The literature suggests there is a close link
between emotionally intelligent leadership and employee performance and sat-
isfaction. This is why understanding EQ is important for IC leaders because if
they can identify emotional information (good and bad) and how it impacts on
other leadership attributes, they can progress in more positive ways their own
emotional regulation and that of their teams in productive ways. There are several
EQ assessment tools such as MSCEIT and Genos which could also be included as
part of the self, team, and external reflection and feedback activities in a leader-
ship development framework.1
Technical training
Not surprisingly, several IC leaders surveyed for the study suggested a range of
technical issues current and aspiring leaders needed ‘training’ in. There were
diverging views on what this training should consist of and how it should be deliv-
ered. Some comments were also vague and offered little details such as ‘IC lead-
ers needed to stay current and take time out for training’ (survey respondent 70),
though at times there were comments that were a lot more granular and provided
specific areas where IC leaders thought knowledge, skill, and capabilities were
lacking. Again, there was no surprise given earlier comments made about the
importance of AI that several respondents highlighted the need for greater under-
standing about AI, but also in the context of IC leaders being more competent
in STEM subjects. Greater investment in specialised in-house training combined
with higher education was mentioned frequently by respondents as ways to help
improve STEM capability gaps. In addition to AI, several STEM areas were also
listed that IC leadership training programs could consider incorporating, includ-
ing but not limited to big data, biometrics, encryption, and the dark net (survey
respondent 70). In the social-behavioural sciences (political sciences/international
relations, sociology, psychology, and criminology), some respondents suggested
that in addition to ‘on the job experience’ IC leaders should be given opportunities
to complete an MA or even a PhD in a relevant area study (survey respondent 23).
However, there was less detail provided in what areas of study are more critical
over others.
Mentoring
Mentoring is linked to the first theme above (individual behavioural attributes).
First, in order for leaders to be able to reflect deeply on their behaviours, self-
mission, and be able to clarify values, there needs to be as part of this process
opportunities to receive mentoring from more senior leaders. Learning from
others’ experience has to varying degrees of intensity been done within ICs.
However, in addition to receiving mentoring from other more senior IC leaders,
I would suggest further opportunities be considered outside the agency—poten-
tially in another agency/industry or someone in academia to expand their thinking
on how to promote more helpful leadership styles and how these impact their
staff. There may be the need for some background vetting of external mentors,
but I think ICs could risk manage such exercises in ways that allow an aspir-
ing leader opportunities to reflect generally and non-operationally on leadership
identity and challenges yet at the same time not breaking any secrecy laws. The
importance of mentoring in any IC leadership development framework was well
underscored by two IC leaders: ‘mentor the most promising people and provide
opportunities for cross organisational assignments to broaden a future senior man-
ager’s perspective. For senior analysts put them in close contact with their clients
and customers so that they learn their needs and constraints’ (survey respondent
79). ‘Every intelligence organisation I have served with is a team. Mentorship
is how we build the next generation’ (survey respondent 122). This later quote
from survey respondent 122 sums up well the importance of IC leaders learning
to mentor staff not as a perfunctory bureaucratic exercise, but in ways that can
actually impact positively on the personal professional growth of individuals and
their organisations.
Strategic and business planning

As far as strategic business planning is concerned, there are several knowledge,
skills, and competencies that could be considered for inclusion on an IC lead-
ership development framework. A full audit of current strategic and business
planning development opportunities already available within the IC and broader
government service is a necessary first step prior to designing targeted develop-
ment programs. This is because it is not uncommon for both public and private
sector agencies to have access to several learning programs broadly related to
strategic and business planning issues including environmental and business plan-
ning, risk management, and workforce/capital development. Such generic pro-
grams may be more suitable in training programs for lower levels to provide an
initial knowledge of management principles in the IC context—before they rise
to middle ranking and beyond leadership roles. However, although some generic
public sector management principles would be useful for early career leaders to
take advantage of, it’s critical for IC leadership development planners to ensure
they continually do the ‘fit for purpose’ test for any basic training. Can the train-
ing, for example, be sufficiently contextualised to allow IC leaders to see how
learning outcomes could be applied in their context as much as a policy or private
sector environment?
Based on the analysis of the research gathered for this study, however, I argue
that just sending IC leaders off to generic leadership training programs is not suf-
ficient and careful thought needs to be given on how to supplement generic man-
agement training with IC contextually relevant cases and examples. It’s clear that
differences in strategic priority setting processes, operational activity, legislative,
and other technical issues more peculiar to ICs rather than other public and private
sector agencies will need to be considered and injected into early, mid-career, and
senior generic leadership training programs. Nonetheless, there is likely to be a
range of leadership and management knowledge areas practiced in the private
sector such as strategic stakeholder management, marketing, communication, and
influence, which can also provide IC leaders with new ways to improve their
practice in such areas.
One key deliverable in any strategic and business planning will be improving
the skills, knowledge, and competencies of mid-career, but also senior execu-
tive IC leaders to improve their understanding of workforce planning in the vola-
tile security environment. Workforce planning challenges as illustrated in both
Chapters 6 (ICT) and 7 (Human Resources) will remain difficult and enduring
governance challenges for IC leaders to manage. They include recruitment, diver-
sity, continuous professional development pathways, retention and attrition, and
how to strategically manage them.
The final important area that needs considering when exploring strategic and
business planning skills, knowledge, and competencies required in an IC leader-
ship development program is intelligence governance. As noted in Chapter 2 in
the explanation of the effective intelligence framework, intelligence governance
is the most important key enabling activity because it is fundamentally about how
leaders lead by coordinating laws, rules, processes, and organisational culture in
ways that hopefully improve core intelligence processes and other key enabling
activities. As theorists remind us, governance both in theory and practice is about
how IC leaders make collective decisions (2008: 3). There is always ‘a leader’ at
the apex of an IC agency who formally ‘makes a decision.’ However, in reality,
even final executive decisions come about through a broader, collective decision-
making process. This fact will become even more the norm in the more volatile and
less uncertain security environment. The several complex governance challenges
raised in previous chapters will rely on future leaders who understand what effec-
tive intelligence governance means in their context and more broadly across the
entire IC enterprise. I first started using the term ‘intelligence governance’ in 2011
in the context of developing the ‘effective intelligence framework’ outlined in
Chapter 2. But governance has broader multi-disciplinary origins—and each dis-
cipline has its own definitional perspectives (e.g. political science, the law, and the
corporate sector) on what ‘governance’ means. Leaving aside the multiple ways it
can be defined, most theorists at least agree that governance implies both a formal
and informal set of rules and conventions about how decisions are made (Pierre
and Peters 2000: 7; Hyden et al. 2004; Kaufmann and Kraay 2007). There may
eventually be a set of normative theoretical perspectives that future IC leaders
can rely on to help them identify what good intelligence governance is. Further
theorising and practitioner reflection may help us get there, which is one reason I
embarked on this study. But in reality, applying good governance solutions will
be more messy affairs rather than neat formulations—frequently changing as the
political (external governance) and institutional IC (internal governance) actors
attempt to adapt to the ever dynamic and uncertain security environment. In par-
ticular, major existential changes such as the COVID-19 pandemic, but also less
impactful new and emerging threats, underscore the importance of developing
good IC leaders that can identify solutions to the myriad of governance issues
raised in this book. We are only at the beginning of understanding how to improve
intelligence governance across ICs in ways that create transparency, value, flex-
ibility, sustainability, and institutional adaptedness.
Future IC leaders will need to understand how to improve collective decision-
making in ways that are flexible to the operating conditions. Better decision-
making will be even more informed by IC leaders’ ability to tap into institutional,
individual, and group strengths—yet at the same time checking the influence of
cultural pathologies. Achieving good intelligence governance will not just be
about considering ways group decision-making ownership can drive long-lasting
reform at the agency level, but also how governance challenges can be addressed
at the whole of enterprise and across the ‘Five Eyes’ levels. Likely a critical met-
ric for good intelligence governance in the future will be how IC leaders as a
matter of habit, not of sporadic exception, build institutional arrangements that
foster a larger volume and variety of external expertise to assist in addressing the
number of governance challenges identified in previous chapters. There will not
be one way to develop intelligence governance skills of the next leadership cadre.
Agency and IC context as always will inform specific development strategies,
but a combination of in-house seminars, industry placements, and higher-degree
learning that focuses on governance theory/practice and working through sce-
narios relevant to the IC context would be worth exploring further.
Evaluation
Somewhat expectantly there were a number of comments from IC leaders sur-
veyed about the need for leaders to improve their own skills, knowledge, and the
capabilities of their agencies in measuring what is working and what isn’t. This
was encouraging as a critical point that has emerged throughout this study is that
IC leaders can only solve the many governance challenges identified by evaluat-
ing evidence for what works in ameliorating them. In terms of evaluating one core
part of the IC business, for example, the ‘effectiveness’ of analytical products,
several respondents described the need for products to be timely, objective, use-
able, ready, complete, and accurate (survey respondent 43). Such measures as
listed here are of course largely subjective—meaning different things to the vari-
ous ICs and decision-makers who use the various products. While the crude ‘tick
and flick’ product evaluation forms that used to be attached to most intelligence
products have gone the way of the dodo bird, IC leaders will still need to over-
see the implementation of less course qualitative metrics to evaluate intelligence
products in the future and adjust format and style—but not of course analytical
rigour. More recently we have seen how the distillation of text products into info-
graphics or shorter dot points delivered on iPads is partly due to decision-maker
feedback, but it is also the result of decisions taken by IC leaders to improve prod-
ucts based on internal evaluation. Another IC leader raised a further qualitative
metric ‘value’ for evaluating product—though again it remains difficult to define
uniformly, their answer did suggest ways IC leaders could further define ‘value’
for decision-makers.
A leader must seek out value promoting data and information to always be
consolidating their team efforts and products. Where possible tasking prod-
ucts with the additional benefits of risk reduction, cost effectiveness, loss
prevention, for example. Utilising various industries methodology to value
tangible and intangible benefits. For example, identifying that failures may
cost lives, property, ongoing health issues, lost revenue, disruption to com-
merce, political support loss, and reputational loss. As much as being an
“incident” without included costs (survey respondent 38).
Being able to provide products, however, that allow for enhanced empirical and
qualitative analytical judgements that better estimate harms or identify opportuni-
ties for intervention will require IC leaders to, as noted in Chapters 5 (Analysis)
and 7 (Human Resources), invest in analysts who can do this as well. In addi-
tion, IC leaders as noted earlier should expand academic outreach programs that
can help bolster evidence-based analytical approaches. Of course, as some survey
respondents remarked, not everything can be quantified (survey respondent 70),
nonetheless the evolving security environment will demand that IC leaders in
the broader institutional sense (not just in products) can demonstrate value add
and value for money invested. Hence, IC leader development programs should
include modules on various multi-disciplinary approaches to evaluating perfor-
mance of core intelligence processes and key enabling activities. Mid-career lead-
ers, for example, would likely benefit from having some literacy in evaluation
research principles and how they have been applied in other fields (e.g. polic-
ing, health, and corporate settings). IC leaders should learn both internally from
their strategic, policy, and governance units and from academic researchers how
to construct meaningful KPIs for different aspects of strategic, operational, and
tactical activities, particularly as they relate to the various governance challenges
identified. Evaluation planning learning modules should also include foresight
analysis that helps IC leaders map likely capability investments that are five years
away and how well they are progressing toward these requirements bi-annually.
Finally, no evaluation skills, knowledge, and competencies module would be
complete without inclusion of material, which can get IC leaders to reflect on
current communications/stakeholder influencing strategies and how they can
improve value to decision-makers in more agile ways.
Training and education strategies

The fifth and final leadership development theme that arose from surveying IC
leaders was not what leaders should be trained in but how. As shown below
in Table 9.1, I make suggestions on how the various leadership development
content discussed above could be delivered. As some respondents suggested,
military command training including with intelligence provides some structure
for IC leadership development programs, but it may not suit other civilian-
based agencies given differences in mission and organisational culture. Others
referred to training and education as being something that should be conducted
jointly with other agencies to create a good understanding of where the intel-
ligence function sits within the whole process. For example, one said: ‘some of
the training should be “immersive” and all should be duly assessed to enable
personal development’ (survey respondent 56), though the respondent did not
mention what training in particular could be immersive. Other respondents
emphasised the need for formal higher education pathways in international rela-
tions or management (survey respondents 23, 3). But in short there were few
details provided by survey respondents on how training and education could be
delivered.
Since 9/11, there have been some efforts to establish internal IC leadership
programs such as the NIU Certificate in Leadership and Management of the IC
established in 2011 by (at the time ODNI Chair) Dr Barry A Zalauf, who is cur-
rently the IC Analytic Ombudsman at the ODNI. The certificate Zalauf created
is a four-week program consisting of four courses: leadership and intelligence,
intelligence and national security policy, national security law and ethics, and
organisational management (pers comms Zaluf 2020: 25 April). The Certificate
combines a series of business, management, and organisational principles with
contemporary IC challenges that the students learn. Guest presenters and IC staff
deliver course content. Assessment includes experiential activities, case studies,
personal reflection, and facilitated group discussion. DNI Jim Clapper during his
tenure described the Certificate as ‘the gold standards of leadership education
in the IC’ (Ibid), though it seems more recently that the NIU is running fewer
Certificate courses, which is concerning given the program is the only US IC
enterprise-wide leadership development program available.
Table 9.1 IC leadership development framework
Mid-Career Skills, knowledge and Delivered by and additional

Leadership competencies comments
Program
(min 5 years’
experience)
Leadership 1. Self and team reflec- IC and external facilitation (1 to 4)
attribute tion (360 degree and EQ IC and external experts (1 to 4)
training testing, and evaluating (case studies, and crisis exercises to
resilience) be used for 2 and 3 and 4)
2. Ethical risk management
principles
3. Contemporary IC issues
4. Leadership theory and
practice in IC and non-IC
contexts
Strategic business 1. Strategic planning IC and external collaboration with
planning principles leadership higher education
2. Team building provider (1 to 8)
3. Analytical methods and IC and external social psychology
writing provider (2,4,7)
4. Governance knowledge Senior analysts (3)
5. Workforce planning Seminars, case studies, cross agency
6. Stakeholder engagement placement, and post-graduate
and influence study (2, 4, 5–8)
7. Crisis management IC-wide approach, foresight
8. Academic and research analysis, collaborate with higher-
engagement strategies education provider (5)
IC, marketing, and PR experts (6)
IC and multi-disciplinary inputs
including running crises scenario
exercises from relevant external
SMEs, collaborating and
overseeing IC-related research
projects (7 and 8)
Mentoring 1. Mentoring early career IC and external training provider (1)
staff Senior leadership mentoring mid-
2. Mid-career mentoring career leaders (2)
External placements (2)
Technical For example: AI, cyber, Candidate specific planning
training— biotechnology, Basic to advanced training in IC and
STEM WMD, forensics, via higher learning depending
research collaboration, on job role and likely future
counter-intelligence career placements. Knowledge/
competencies to be assessed in
the workplace by SMEs
(Continued )
Table 9.1 (Continued)
Mid-Career Skills, knowledge and Delivered by and additional

Leadership competencies comments
Program
(min 5 years’
experience)
Technical Social psychology, Candidate specific planning
training—SBS anthropology, IR/security Basic to advanced training
studies, area specialisation, depending on supervisory
(country, region, role and likely future career
transnational), languages placement. Knowledge/
competencies to be assessed in
the workplace
Evaluation Project management, cross- IC internal programs, plus cross-
disciplinary evaluation disciplinary workshops on
knowledge from research promoting evidence-based
fields, engineering, and governance measures
organisational theory about
evaluating outputs and
outcomes in the IC context
At the time of writing, Australia’s Office of National Intelligence (ONI) is

also developing a mid-career leadership program, but at this point its content is
unknown. I have not been able to find out whether other ‘Five Eyes’ countries
have established enterprise-wide leadership development programs. It is likely
that many have their own internal (agency only) programs, but I suspect most
of these may be focused on management rather than leadership development.
However, regardless of the exact number and nature of IC leadership develop-
ment programs that may be in existence, responses from survey respondents
suggest ICs are not doing enough and need to invest more resources and exper-
tise into such programs. Externally, in higher places of learning there does
not seem to be (with a few exceptions) many courses and subjects offered in
aspects of IC leadership. In Australia, Charles Sturt University offers an intel-
ligence management subject as part of its MA (Intelligence Analysis) and the
Australian National University also offers short executive courses to mid and
higher-ranking IC staff. Executive courses have also been offered in a range
of other ‘Five Eyes’ countries such as the Canadian Security and Intelligence
Leadership Program at the University of Ottawa. Again, this is not an exhaus-
tive list. There may likely be a few more programs, but I suspect many offer
generic leadership/management courses that IC staff can enrol in as any other
student can do so. Such programs at business schools are no doubt potentially
useful in nurturing future IC leaders, but they are not focused on the intersec-
tion of leadership theory and managing the types of governance challenges
discussed in this study.
Reflecting now on all the IC leadership issues raised in this study, and as a
point for further discussion, I offer a framework below that includes the types
of topics that may be considered in conceptualising IC leadership development
programs in the future. Table 9.1 depicts elements for an IC leadership devel-
opment pitched at IC staff with a minimum of five years with some supervi-
sory experience. Based on the analysis of all the data collected for the study,
I believe it is at the mid-ranking management level, where the greatest need
is for further development. Five years of overall service may be long by some
people’s perspectives given post-baby boomers tend to spend less at one place
of employment. But by focusing on those that have stayed in long enough, but
are not towards the end of their careers—you are hopefully investing in the
next generation of leaders who via the development program and other profes-
sional experience will be equipped with the attributes, skills, knowledge, and
competencies to navigate the array of intelligence governance issues discussed.
Above all, the framework is underpinned by a philosophy that an effective mid-
career development program should be an enterprise-wide IC initiative in order
to promote diversity and challenge potential organisational cultural pathologies.
While officially the IC would manage the program, the overall approach should
be a hybrid model. This means some content such as simulating a crisis situation
might be delivered using classified material; other modules such as leadership
attribute learning could be taught using unclassified learning material. Hybrid
also means that teaching on the program should be a mixture of IC and non-IC
experts.
The framework below is not meant to be concise or exhaustive and again will
need to be contextualised to the particular operating environment. More than any-
thing the framework is designed to spark further debates about how to develop
better IC training development programs and curricula for our future IC leaders.
As I wrote back in 2017 in the context of analyst’s training, designing rigor-
ous training and education can be difficult and is labour intensive. To do it well
requires trainers, educators, and the ICs themselves to engage actively in a range
of important and interrelated aspects including curriculum, accreditation, continu-
ous professional development strategies, teaching and learning, and content and
assessment (Walsh 2017b: 1005–1021). The brief framework is only a first step
in conceptualising potential content for leadership development courses. Much
larger, challenging, but nonetheless critical discussions need to occur about cur-
riculum, delivery, accreditation, and how programs fit into a wider continuous
professional development for IC leaders.
Conclusion
This chapter provided a synthesis of all the analyses presented in previous chap-
ters in order to identify leadership principles that should inform an IC leadership
development framework. It is hoped that the IC leadership development frame-
work presented in Table 9.1 will be used to generate further theorising about
leadership development in the IC context. However, even more importantly, it is
hoped that the framework can help inform discussions within ICs about designing
much needed leadership development programs. In Chapter 10 (Conclusion), I
summarise the key findings of the study and suggest some next steps for schol-
ars and practitioners who are interested in advancing the next generation of IC
leaders.
Note
1 The MSCEIT (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso EI Test) measures reasoning ability of an
individual given emotional information and series of problems and assesses their solv-
ing competencies based on emotions or problems that require the use of emotions to
be solved. Genos is an emotional intelligence testing instrument that examines a set of
emotionally intelligence competencies that according to its creator are measurable and
observable. The six core emotional intelligence competencies to be assessed are: self-
awareness, awareness of others, authenticity, emotional reasoning, self-management,
and positive influence.
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10 Conclusion
Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1 (Introduction), this book had four research questions:
1. What is leadership in the contemporary IC context?

2. Is ‘intelligence governance’ a useful theoretical construct to understand IC
leadership, and what are the key governance challenges IC leaders will need
to navigate through?
3. How can IC leaders address intelligence governance challenges to improve
organisational effectiveness and adaptation?
4. What individual attributes, skills, and capabilities are critical for the next
generation of IC leaders to develop, and what principles could underpin lead-
ership development programs?
The preceding chapters went some way to addressing the four questions. However,
as noted several times in different chapters, it is difficult to answer them fully. The
knowledge gained from both the primary and secondary sources has moved the
needle slightly in the direction of understanding different aspects of IC leadership.
But the questions are complex and largely open ended. To be fully answered, it
will take a concerted effort by researchers and the ICs themselves to address the
still significant knowledge gaps related to all four questions. In this final chapter,
I provide a summary of key outputs and show how they have addressed aspects of
the four research questions. The final section (future IC leadership practice) then
provides a short summary of how scholars and ICs can continue to build on the
research laid out in this book.
With regards to the first research question, (what is leadership in the con-
temporary IC context)—several chapters provided insights into this. Chapter 2
(Intelligence and Leadership) went a long way to addressing the question by adopt-
ing a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding IC leadership. By using five
multi-disciplinary knowledge areas (historical analysis, leadership theory, organi-
sational theory, leadership psychology, and the effective intelligence framework),
the chapter argued for a broader approach to understanding leadership in the IC con-
text rather than through the lens of just one discipline. This approach is important
192 Conclusion
because at this stage contemporary IC leadership is significantly under-theorised
and a multi-disciplinary approach to studying it will bring richer perspectives—
beyond a narrow intelligence studies perspective. Additionally, Chapters 8 (The
Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) and 9 (Leadership Development)
provided further insights into both individual and organisational aspects of IC
leadership. In particular, significant insights about ‘what is leadership in the IC’?
was gathered from the 208 IC leaders who responded to the survey. The thematic
analysis (facilitated through the qualitative software NVIVO) did show a num-
ber of leadership attributes leaders thought were important. Many of these were
aligned with attributes traditional leadership theorists also view as critical to vari-
ous leadership styles and research agendas (e.g. transformational and authentic
leadership), though the relevant survey questions did not ask respondents whether
they thought a particular leadership theoretical perspective was important. This
question was avoided in the survey because even in mainstream leadership theory
there remains significant contestability about what attributes constitute different
theories and how they impact on followers. The objective, therefore, was not to
provide respondents with a pre-ordained theory upon which they had to weigh
in on its significance or not. Had I asked respondents which leadership theory is
most important and why, I suspect I would have gotten fewer richer insights from
IC leaders about what attributes they thought most important—particularly from
those who may not have formally studied leadership theory.
The second research question asked whether ‘intelligence governance’ is a
useful construction to understanding IC leadership, and what are the key gov-
ernance challenges IC leaders will need to navigate through. As noted earlier,
‘intelligence governance’ was a term I began using in 2011 in the context of the
effective intelligence framework (see Chapter 2 Intelligence and Leadership). The
framework was first published in my book Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis,
and a key conclusion I came to at that time was ‘intelligence governance’ was a
useful construct to think about how leaders coordinate core intelligence processes
and key enabling activities to ensure IC effectiveness and adaptability over time.
This means that to be a good leader you also have to understand intelligence gov-
ernance. Without a good grasp of ‘intelligence governance’ it seems less likely
that IC leaders are able to make effective collective decisions, which consider
the inter-connectedness of both core intelligence processes and key enabling
activities.
In this study, I have been able to build further on this concept of ‘intelligence
governance’ by asking surveyed IC leaders about whether they thought this con-
cept was relevant to understanding IC leadership and its organisational impact.
Question 15 asked four sub-questions. The first was stated negatively—that
developing good intelligence governance of an intelligence organisation or func-
tion was not related to having a good leader in charge. Combined, 75.35 per cent
(n = 79) indicated they either strongly disagreed or disagreed with this statement—
suggesting that most respondents believe good governance was linked to having
an effective leader in place. The second sub-question asked respondents whether
they believed that ‘intelligence governance’ was the most critical element in
Conclusion 193
bringing effective coordination, cooperation, and integration of intelligence pro-
cesses. Of the 106 who provided an answer, 70.1 per cent said they either strongly
agreed or agreed that intelligence governance was the most critical element in
bringing many of the key core intelligence processes together, particularly those
mentioned in Chapter 3 (Tasking and Coordination), Chapter 4 (Collection), and
Chapter 5 (Analysis). The third sub-question sought to discover whether IC lead-
ers surveyed also thought if leaders who gained skills and attributes would result
in effective intelligence governance. Out of 106 responses, 67 per cent either
strongly agreed or agreed that if IC leaders had relevant skills, experience, and
attributes this would result in effective intelligence governance in their workplace.
This is an important validation of the link between improving leadership skills
and effective intelligence governance—one which was developed further in both
Chapters 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) and 9 (Leadership
Development). The final sub-question on intelligence governance asked whether
IC leaders thought political leaders rather than themselves had more impact on
intelligence governance outcomes. Out of 106 respondents, 43 per cent disagreed
with the statement, but a similar amount agreed with it. It’s clear this last sub-
question does not provide any meaningful result. In Chapter 2 (Intelligence and
Leadership) and 3 (Tasking and Coordination), we did note the powerful influ-
ences of external governance actors (political leaders) on IC operations and
reform. But it was also pointed out that IC leaders still have significant leeway
in directing internal governance in their ICs. In summary, the survey results on
the importance of intelligence governance to IC leadership suggest most IC lead-
ers (who participated in the survey) believed it was critical to improving various
organisational outcomes—and that having good governance meant having good
leaders in place.
Turning now to the second part of research question 2 (what are the key gov-
ernance challenges IC leaders will need to navigate), Chapters 2–9 explored sev-
eral that will consume the attention of leaders well into the future. In each chapter,
specific governance challenges were clustered around several themes including,
but not limited to, organisational structure and culture, collaboration, information
sharing, technological innovation, ethics and efficacy, and workforce planning.
Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges) provided a sum-
mary of governance challenges detailed in earlier chapters and assessed how they
are related. More importantly, Chapter 8 suggests several strategic initiatives IC
leaders could consider to begin tackling the governance challenges identified. I
will not repeat the complete list of strategic initiatives listed in Chapter 8—but
they ranged across the full set of key governance challenges in tasking and coor-
dination, collection, analysis, ICT, and human resources. In brief, they included
initiatives from implementing performance teams that can evaluate the interde-
pendence of requirements, priorities, and agency/IC response (for tasking and
coordination)—to analytical innovation strategies (analysis)—and also to IC AI
and workplace strategic planning (ICT and human resources).
The fourth and final research question asked what individual attributes, skills,
and capabilities are critical for the next generation of IC leaders to develop, and
194 Conclusion
what principles could underpin leadership development programs. This ques-
tion was partly addressed in the last section of Chapter 8 (The Future IC Leader
and Governance Challenges), but more significantly dealt with in Chapter 9
(Leadership Development). As noted in Chapter 8, respondents were asked what
leadership attributes they think are most important and why. The two standout
attributes IC leaders rated most highly were ethics and self-awareness, though
several other attributes were also identified and rated by respondents as also being
important, such as the ability to embody key values that allow a leader to trans-
form an organisation.
The analysed survey data on leadership attributes in some ways aligned to vari-
ous leadership theoretical and research agendas discussed in Chapter 2 (Intelligence
and Leadership). But as noted earlier, the results do not indicate whether IC lead-
ers were rating attributes based on prior knowledge of any traditional leadership
theories outside of the IC context. Regardless, what the survey results do provide
is a foundation upon which to build larger studies about what ICs think are the
most important leadership attributes to develop in the next generation of leaders.
The Future IC Leader and Governance Challenges, Chapter 8’s discussion of lead-
ership attributes, then informed analysis in Chapter 9 (Leadership Development)
about what principles could be included in a leadership development framework
for future leaders. As noted, the principles are individual behavioural attributes,
technical training, strategic and business planning, mentoring, evaluation, and
lastly training and education strategies.
Future IC leadership practice

With the key outcomes of the study now summarised, in this final section I want
to provide some ‘next steps’ suggestions for ICs and researchers who are inter-
ested in leadership development. As noted in Chapter 1 (Introduction), this book
is a clarion call to ICs and intelligence studies researchers to focus more on IC
leadership development. The book does not pretend to have all—indeed any of
the answers—but hopefully it will spark more informed discussions on this topic.
Therefore, the ‘suggestions’ that follow are just that— ‘suggestions’—on how to
progress this work beyond this point.
I see two broad agendas (an internal IC leadership development and an aca-
demic research agenda) that will likely provide useful places to start progressing
theory and practice in IC leadership. Both the internal IC and external academic
research agendas should be ideally linked. But it is the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs themselves
who will substantially need to steer efforts in leadership development. In crisis
situations such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, real reform, particularly in
areas such as improving capabilities, like leadership can be seen by some as less
of operational importance. IC can always make the claim that other priorities and
resources need to be directed elsewhere. But as noted several times in previous
chapters, the increasing complexity of the security environment will require ICs
to bite the bullet sooner than later and begin to make a longer-term, strategic
investment in IC leadership capabilities. While a post-COVID-19 world may see
Conclusion 195
less resources from governments to all public sector agencies (with perhaps the
exception of health authorities), ICs can nonetheless do a lot to progress IC lead-
ership development that doesn’t rely on large outlays or hiring expensive external
consultants. The key will be to decide how to make a start in improving IC leader-
ship development in ways that are consistent, modest, incremental, and doable for
the foreseeable future. In terms of internal capability development, ICs could do
two things in the short to medium term. First, they could use the IC leadership sur-
vey designed for this study to improve their own understanding of what staff think
are the more important leadership attributes and governance challenges future
IC leaders will need to address. If the survey, or a variation of it, could be used
across all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs, it would provide a rich amount of data to help them
understand leadership in order to address broader capability issues and develop
leadership development programs.
Second, ‘Five Eyes’ ICs could consider using the IC leadership development
framework outlined in Chapter 9 (Leadership Development) to identify compre-
hensive ways to build evidence-based and fit for purpose leadership develop-
ment programs. The framework hopefully can steer discussions about curriculum
development, learning, and assessment and teaching strategies. It promotes a
hybrid approach to leadership development that engages the best of the internal
IC to deliver such courses with targeted, relevant, and trusted external providers.
In addition to what ICs should do internally to progress knowledge about IC
leadership issues externally, I hope the book will expand interest from intelli-
gence studies scholars to increase their research focus on contemporary IC leader-
ship issues. At this point, it seems that there are only a few scholars doing work
in this area. In particular, it is hoped that the book provides a foundation where
cross-disciplinary teams of scholars can begin to expand knowledge about the
range of topics discussed here.
Index
Page numbers in italics represent figures, while page numbers in bold represent tables.
accountability 15 laws 17; Department of Home Affairs

Aggregate Contingent Estimation 49; Flood Report (2004) 21–22, 47,
(ACE) 81 49–50, 142; Independent Review of
Al Qaeda 45, 48, 53, 67, 100, 119 the Intelligence Community (2011) 49;
Aldrich, Richard, GCHQ The Uncensored Independent Review of the Intelligence
Story of Britain’s Most Secret Community (2017) 49–51; National
Intelligence Agency 18 Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC)
Allen, G. C. 125 49, 56; Office of National Assessments
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) 50; Office of National Intelligence
101–102 (ONI) 50, 69, 104, 135, 137, 143, 188;
analysts 103–104, 118, 134, 140–144, 156, preventative detention measures 48;
160, 164, 185 Smith Review (2008) 21–22, 49; Taylor
analytical collaboration 106, 154, 165 Review (2005) 49
Anderson, S. 23 Australian Federal Police 5, 135
Andrew, Christopher: Defence of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
Realm 17; Her Majesty’s Secret Service (ASIS) 17
18; The Secret World A History of Australian Security Intelligence
Intelligence 18 Organisation (ASIO) 14, 17–18
‘applied grounded theory’ 79 authority 159
artificial intelligence (AI) 83, 91–92, 102– Avalanche syndicate 86
103, 114–116, 129, 153–158, 166–167, Avolio, B. 28
182; advancements in 81–82, 116–117;
counter-intelligence challenges Barbour, Peter 18
125–126; cyber applications 119–120; Bass, Bernard 27
ethical/social concerns 126–129; behavioral sciences 98, 103–105
military applications of 120–122; and Berger, Peter 29
national security 117–119; technological bias 81, 90
challenges 123–125; and the workforce big data 78–83, 120, 124, 153, 155
128; see also machine learning biotechnology 126
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) 116 Black, Rufus, Independent Review of the
The ASIO: An Unofficial History (Cain) 18 Intelligence Community (2011) 49
At the Center of the Storm (Tenet) 19 black swans 80
Australia 14, 20, 48, 50, 67, 104, 134–135, Blaxland, J. 18
137, 156–157; anti-terrorism legislation Bletchley Park intercepts 11
48; Charles Sturt University 188; Bligh, M. 27
COVIDSafe app 84; Criminal Code Act Brantly, A. F. 77, 80
(1995) 48; cultural issues in 58; data Brennan, John 47, 54
198 Index
The British Secret Intelligence Service Coulthart, S. J. 102
(Jefferey) 17 counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy 100
Broadhead, S. 87 counter-intelligence issues 157
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) counter-terrorism 119, 138
102, 135 counter-terrorism intelligence
Burn Before Reading, Presidents, CIA operations 22
Directors and Secret Intelligence counter-terrorism policies 101
(Turner) 19 COVID-19 4, 80, 84, 88, 139, 142, 184
Bush administration 21, 45–46, 53, 89, 119 critical thinking 134–135
cultural matters 55, 57–59, 89–90, 164
Cain, Frank, The ASIO: An Unofficial Cumming, Mansfield 19
History 18 cyber-threats 63, 65
Canada 23, 48, 67, 134, 158, 188; AI in CYBINT 80
127; Bill C-36 49; Communications
Security Establishment 51; CSE 70n3; dark web 77, 86–87, 153
cultural issues in 58–59; HUMINT DARPA 124
collection by 22–23; Integrated Dartmouth University conference 116
Terrorism Assessment Center (ITAC) data, unstructured 117–118
49, 56, 62; Keable Commission 16; data asphyxiation 153
McDonald Commission 16; Mackenzie data mining 77, 98, 102–103
Commission 16; Minister of Public databases 100, 118
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Davenport, T. 115
Canada (PSEP) 51; Royal Canadian decision-making 28
Mounted Police (RCMP) 16, 23, 51, 61, deep learning 116–117, 123; see also
70n3 machine learning
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Defence of the Realm (Andrew) 17
(CSIS) 16, 51, 70n3 demographic cohorts 137–140, 146, 158, 168
Casey, William 18 Department of Defense 5
Cautious Beginnings Canadian Foreign Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Intelligence 1939–51 (Jensen) 18 21, 30, 45–46
Chamberlain, Neville 11 Dhami, M. K. 107
Cheney, Dick 52–53 digital communications 63, 65
China 103, 121–122, 125, 127 digital revolution 77–78, 91, 117
Church Committee 16, 44 Directors of National Intelligence 46
Churchill, Winston 11 diversity 160, 168; see also workforce
CIA 16, 20–21, 89 planning; workforces
Clapper, James 17, 46–47, 54, 136, 186; DNA profiling 65
Facts and Fears 19, 54 Donovan, William J 18, 20
Coats, Dan 47 drones 119, 122, 126
code-breaking technology 12, 77 Dulles, Allen W 18
Cogan, Charles 88–89 Dulles Report 44
Cold War 12, 15, 56, 63, 77, 88, 137–138
Comey, James 54 education 143–144, 159, 179, 181–184,
computer science 82–83, 85 186, 187–188, 189
computers 77, 79, 116; see also artificial effective intelligence framework 4–5,
intelligence (AI) 32–33, 34
coordination 43, 57, 152–153, 161–162; Ehrhart, M. G. 28
see also tasking ELINT 118
core intelligence processes 113 emotional intelligence 181
Cormac, R. 62 espionage, and HUMINT 23
Cornall, Robert, Independent Review of ethics 8, 16, 84, 91–92, 120, 126–129, 153;
the Intelligence Community (2011) 49 and leadership 27–28, 172–173, 181;
corporate culture 145 see also privacy
Index 199
Facebook 78, 83–84, 101 health security threats 88–89; see also
facial recognition software 121 COVID-19
Facts and Fears (Clapper) 19, 54 Her Majesty’s Secret Service (Andrew) 18
failures of imagination 67 Hewitt, S. 16
fake information 125, 157, 165 The History of the Secret Intelligence
FBI 16, 30, 54, 61, 65 Service 1909–1949 (Jefferey) 19
Five Eyes 2, 5–6, 12–13, 33, 49, 86, Hitler, Adolf 11
88–89, 134, 162, 165, 188; adversaries Homeland Security Act (2002) 45
125–126; AI in 127–128, 167; attrition/ Hoover, J Edgar 18
retention 144–146; and collection House Permanent Select Committee for
technology 22; cultural concerns in Intelligence 16
58–59; and data 118–119; and forensic human resource planning 132, 158–159,
intelligence 64; and HUMINT 22–23; 167–169; see also workforce planning
information sharing 57; organisational HUMINT 22, 80, 90, 119
changes in 20, 24, 49, 142–143; policy
reform efforts 45; recruiting in 137, IC Human Capital Vision 2020 136
139–140; security/vetting processes identify leadership 32
135–136; strains between 15; strategic IMINT see GEOINT
intelligence 69; and structured analytical Industrial Revolution 77–78, 114
techniques 101; see also specific information and communication
countries technologies (ICT) 113, 154–158,
Flenner, A. 124 165–167; see also artificial
Forecasting Science and Technology intelligence (AI)
(ForeST) 81 information security 120
forensic intelligence 64–66 information sharing 15, 55, 58–59,
forensics 63–65 113–114, 157–158
Fourth Industrial Revolution 114 Information Sharing Environment (ISE)
freedom of speech 120 46, 58
fusion centres 22, 49, 56–57, 161 innovation 154, 165–166
Instagram 83
Ganor, B. 119 integration 14, 152–153, 161–162
GCHQ The Uncensored Story of Britain’s intelligence 24, 54, 89; and policy 52–53,
Most Secret Intelligence Agency 67–68, 107, 152; politicisation of 12,
(Aldrich) 18 51–52, 55, 152
Geertz, Clifford 29 Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Gentry, J. A. 11–12 Activity (IARPA) 81–82, 86, 118, 124
GEOINT 22, 80–81, 118, 128 intelligence agencies: published histories
George, R. Z. 105, 135 of 17–19; see also specific agencies
Goodman, Michael, Official History intelligence analysis 97–98, 106–108,
of Joint Intelligence Committee 153–154, 164–166; see also techniques
17, 19 Intelligence and National Security
Government Accountability Office journal 17
(GAO) 137 Intelligence Assessment Secretariat
group think 23–24 (Canada) 6
intelligence collection 76, 88, 153; and
hacking 125 future leaders 90–91; governance
Hager, N. 20 challenges to 87–91, 105–107, 163–164;
Hammond, T. H. 21–22 methodological challenges 77–87; post-
Handel, Michael 11 9/11 76, 88; technological challenges
Harknett, R. J. 46 77–87
Hastedt, G. 52–53 intelligence communities 3, 59
Hayden, Michael 54; Playing to the intelligence community leaders 2–3, 19,
Edge 19 55, 151; and AI 122–123; and analytics
200 Index
106–107; attributes of 3, 10–11, 151, leadership questionnaire (MLQ) 27; and
169–175, 180; and forensics 66; public organisational outcomes 29; personal
role of 17, 19; responsibilities of 63; characteristics for 171–173; psychology
suggested backgrounds for 178–179 of 31–32; self-aware 173–174; training
intelligence failures 13–14, 17, 20–21, 23, 179, 181–182, 186, 187–188, 188–189
101, 142–143 leadership development 177; evaluation
intelligence governance 4–5, 33, 34, 184–186; frameworks for 178, 187–188,
105–107, 151–161, 183–184 189; leadership backgrounds 178–179;
intelligence-led policing (ILP) 24, 60 mentorship 182, 187; strategic business
intelligence/policy gaps 53–54 planning 182–184, 187; training
Intelligence Policy Reform Post-9/11 181–182
44–60 leadership theory 10, 25–29, 170;
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism authentic 27–28, 173; charismatic
Prevention Act (IRTPA) 21, 46–47, 58 26, 170–171; critiques of 27; ethical
intelligence sharing 15, 57 27–28; follower-centric theories 27–28,
internet of things (IoT) 77, 82 172; neo-charismatic theories 26–27;
Iraq invasion 12 servant 27–28; team theories 28–29;
Iraq WMD intelligence failure 3, transactional 26; transformational
52–53, 67 26–27, 170–171
Irvine, David 17 leaks 15–17
Islamic State 119 legislation 157
Israel 122 L’Estrange, Michael, Independent Review
of the Intelligence Community (2017)
Jardine, E. 86–87 49–51
Jefferey, Keith: The British Secret Lewin, Kurt 30–31
Intelligence Service 17; The History liason 14–15
of the Secret Intelligence Service liberal democracies 3, 16, 53, 91, 120,
1909–1949 19 127, 153
Jensen, K., Cautious Beginnings Lieberthal, K. 135
Canadian Foreign Intelligence Lim, K. 78–80, 153
1939–51 18 LinkedIn 83
Jervis, R. 52 Loitering Attack Munitions (LAM) 122
Johnson, Loch 17 London, Metropolitan Police 13
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Lu, Y. 115–117, 125
reports 11 Luckman, Thomas 29
‘Just Intelligence Theory’ 92 Luthans, F. 28
Kahan, Dan 23 machine learning 77–83, 98, 102–103,

Kahneman, D. 135 118, 120, 124, 153, 155; see also
Kent, Sherman 66; Strategic Intelligence artificial intelligence (AI); deep learning
for American World Policy 66–67 McQueen, Michael 4
knowledge management 15, 113, 163–164 Mao Zedong 12
Krebs, Valdis 100 Marrin, S. 67–68
MASINT 80
Lambert, D. E. 59 Matheny, Jason 118
law enforcement 24, 59, 60, 69, Meindl, James 27
99–100, 156 Menzies, Stewart 19
leadership 10, 25; attributes of 3, 10–11, Merchant, Stephen, Independent Review
151, 169–175, 180; autocratic 30–31; of the Intelligence Community (2017)
barriers to improvement 31; democratic 49–51
30–31; effective 30; and emotional microbial forensics 65
intelligence 181; and ethics 172–173, Mikulski, Barbara A 21
181; laissez-faire 30–31; multifactor minorities, recruiting 135–137
Index 201
Morell, Michael 65; The Great War of Our organisational design 14, 19–20, 22
Time 19 organisational redesign 20–21,
Moreno, Jacob L. 99 142–143, 161
MSCEIT test 181, 190n1 organisational structures 55, 93, 153, 161
organisational theory 10, 29–30
National Academies of Science, organised crime 80–81, 99
Engineering and Medicine report (2109) Organizational, Relationship, and Contact
134, 143 Analyzer (ORCA) software 100
National Academies of Science report 82
National Academy of Sciences Decadal paramilitary operations 89, 119
Survey of the Social and Behavioural Parker, Andrew 65
Sciences (2019) 104 Parry, K. 29, 31
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Paulo, D. 100
(NGA) 5 Pavlin, G. 79
national intelligence agencies 24 Payne, K. 123
National Intelligence University (NIU) 141 Playing to the Edge (Hayden) 19
National Security Act (1947), CIA Ployhart, R. E. 140
violations of 16 policy, and intelligence 52–53, 67–68,
Negroponte, John 46 107, 152
New York Times 16 policy failures 13
New Zealand 15, 20, 48, 134; Combined political leaders 68
Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) 49, politicisation of intelligence 12,
56; Cullen and Reddy review (2016) 51–55, 152
51; Government Communications post-Cold War era 20, 22
Security Bureau (GCSB) 14, 51; ‘predictive analytics’ 80–81
Murdoch Review (2009) 22; National privacy 15–16, 57, 76, 84, 119–120, 126,
Assessments Bureau (NAB) 51; 153; see also ethics
Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) Project Sleipnir 61
14–15; tensions with the US 15 psychology 10, 30–32
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service psychometric tests 135
(NZSIS) 51 Putin, Vladimir 54, 121
Nilsson, N. 115
9/11: increased interest in SNA after 100; radicalisation 85
intelligence failures of 3, 45, 67 Ratcliffe, John 47
9/11 Commission 141–142 Remington, Stella 18
9/11 Commission Report 20–21, 44, 67 Report of the Joint Inquiry of the House
North Korea 125 Permanent Select Committee on
Norvig, P. 115 Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee into Intelligence Community
Office of National Estimates (O/NE) 66 Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Office of Special Plans (OSP) 53 Attacks of September 11 (2002) 45
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 20 research questions 3
Office of the Director of National Ribaux, Oliver 64
Intelligence (ODNI) 5, 21, 46, 134, 136, risk analysis 61
141, 186 Risk and Threat Analysis 44, 60–63
Official History of Joint Intelligence risk management frameworks 127
Committee (Goodman) 17, 19 Role of Science and Technology 44, 63–66
Omand, Sir David 19, 84–85 Ronanki, R. 115
Onion Router–Tor 86–87 Ronay, R. 31
Open Source Indicators program 118 Roosevelt administration 20
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) 81, Roosevelt, Franklin 11
90–91, 153 Rossy, Q. 65
organisational cultures 158 Rumsfeld, Donald 53
202 Index
Russel, S. J. 115 tasking 43, 57; governance challenges
Russia 54, 103, 121–122, 125 152–153, 161–162; see also
coordination
Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terrorism taxonomy of errors 105
Networks 100 techniques 97–98; behavioral sciences
Salles, A. 145 98, 103–105; data mining/machine
Schlesinger Report 44 learning 98, 102–103; and intelligence
Schneier 120 governance 105–107; social network
Schwab, Klaus 114–115 analysis 98–101, 104; structured
Scientific advances to Continuous Insider analytical techniques 98, 101–102
Threat Evaluation (SCITE) 118 Tenet, George 142; At the Center of the
Scopus data base 26 Storm 19
The Secret World A History of Intelligence terrorism 80–81, 100, 103
(Andrew) 18 Thorpe, J. B. 122, 127
security environments 88 transparency 15
Seibert, S. E. 146 Tromblay, D. E. 58
Senate Homeland Security and Trump administration 12, 47, 54
Governmental Affairs Permanent Turner, Stansfield, Burn Before Reading,
Subcommittee on Investigations 57 Presidents, CIA Directors and Secret
Senate Select Intelligence Committee 16 Intelligence 19
SIGINT 14, 22, 80, 81, 85, 88, 90, 113, Twitter 78, 83–84, 101, 119
118–119, 128
Silk Road 2.0 86 UKUSA treaty 14
Sillitoe, Sir Percy 14–15 Understanding Terrorism Networks
silos 56, 66, 88, 101 (Sageman) 100
Sinclair, Hugh 19 United Kingdom 17–18, 20, 48, 49, 51, 56,
Sinek, Simon, Start with Why 180 60, 67, 102, 134, 137, 142
Smith, Walter Bedell 66 United Nations Special Commission
Snowden, Edward 3, 65 (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors 90
Snowden leaks 15–17, 66, 76, 92 United States 15, 30, 56, 59, 88, 89, 119,
social construction theory 29 121, 134, 142
social media 77–78, 83–86, 101, 104, 157 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 22
social network analysis 98–101, 104 US Navy 80
social sciences 98, 103–105
SOCMINT 80, 83–85 Van Der Hulst, R. C. 99, 105
Spry, Charles 18 Van Dierendunck, D. 28
Stalin, Josef 12 Van Puyvelde, D. 56
Start with Why (Sinek) 180 Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
statistics, author’s survey 5–6 (VERA) 62
Stever, J. A. 46 von Bertalanffy, Ludwig 29
Strang, Stephen 61, 99 VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity,
strategic intelligence 67–69 and ambiguity) 69–70
Strategic Intelligence for American World Vugt, M. 31
Policy (Kent) 66–67
Strategic Intelligence, Tasking, and Warner, Michael 12, 17
Coordination 44, 66–69 wars 92
structured clinical judgement approaches Wasilow, S. 122, 127
(SPJ) 62 Weick, Karl 30
studies 2, 5, 32–33, 44–45, 68 Weinbaum, C. 139
supervised learning 123 Weiner, Tim 21
surveillance 17, 80, 119, 126–127 Whitesmith, M. 102
surveys 5–6 Whittlestone, J. 127
swarm technology 122 WikiLeaks 3, 15, 92
Index 203
Wilson, Woodrow 11 146, 168, 189; minority recruiting
Wolfowitz, Paul 53 135–137, 168
Woolsey, James 19 World War I 11–12, 19
workforce planning 132, 136, 158–159, World War II 11–12, 20, 22, 25–26,
167–169, 183; attrition/retention 144– 56, 77
146, 168–169; recruitment 133–141,
159–160; training 141–144; see also YouTube 83, 101
human resource planning
workforces 160; and AI 128; Zalauf, Barry A 186
generational knowledge 137–140, Zhao, Y. 124

Intelligence Leadership and Governance: Building Effective Intelligence Communities in The 21St Century

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Intelligence Leadership and Governance: Building Effective Intelligence Communities in The 21St Century

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Studies in Intelligence

‘Australian scholar Patrick F. Walsh is one of the most thoughtful contributors

This book explores the challenges leaders in intelligence communities face in an

Patrick F. Walsh is an Associate Professor in Intelligence and Security Studies,

Interrogation in War and Conflict

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

2 Intelligence and leadership 10

3 Tasking and coordination 43

6 Information and communication technologies (ICT) 113

7 Human resources 132

8 The future IC leader and governance challenges 151

9 Leadership development 177

Modernization of our intelligence community cannot be slow or timid.

The co-ordination that Australia’s intelligence agencies require in the twenty-

We suggest that the government consider establishing a National Intelligence

Objectives and overview

1. What is leadership in the contemporary IC context?

The four research questions underscore several aspects of ‘leadership’ in the

The book’s points of difference

Historical intelligence leadership dimensions

From general histories of intelligence we also get assessments of the attrib-

modernization of our IC cannot be slow or timid. Reform must be undertaken

structural, organisational and jurisdictional reforms must be made and will be

But as historical events demonstrate frequently, politically sponsored IC redesign

World War II showed an oscillation between leadership approaches that were

Team leadership theories

Organisational theory and leadership

Leadership and psychology

Effective intelligence framework

to strong leadership, doctrine design, evaluation and effective coordination,

Theme 1 Intelligence policy reform post-9/11

suggests a fragmented intelligence community that was operating without a

Language used by senior political leaders such as a ‘fragmented intelligence com-

However, the reviewers recognised managing the ongoing challenges in effective

In Canada, in the aftermath of 9/11 and in addition to legislative changes, the

the Canadian intelligence community, having a relatively small size, is

Theme 2 Risk and threat assessment

Theme 3 Role of science and technology

is the accurate, timely and useful product of logically processing forensic

Theme 4 Strategic intelligence, tasking and coordination

Brantly provides a good overview of later technological developments and how

Big data and machine learning

It’s hard to not think of an economic sector particularly in transport, commerce,

Additionally, big data techniques may be increasingly deployed to exploit data

Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, LinkedIn and sundry social media

The accuracy of any interpretation depends on a very detailed understanding

As in the interpretation of SIGINT, therefore, analytical judgements about rela-

Intelligence collection and governance challenges

Collection and organisational structure

Don’t be arrogant. Do not assume that anyone/company/group that does

Intelligence collection ethics and efficacy

Social network analysis

motivational and group dynamic differences between organized crime and

Structured analytical techniques

Data mining/machine learning techniques

Social and behavioural sciences

Intelligence governance issues

intelligence analysis tradecraft can be improved by integrating evidence-

Another survey respondent suggested IC leaders needed to promote evidence-

AI: national security intelligence and military applications

AI and cyber applications

as of 2013, the United States possessed 14,776 military aircraft, some of

using hackers to take control of an official news organisation website; or

Social and ethical challenges

Workforce planning issues

Training, education, and competency

Retention and attrition

Key governance challenges

Tasking, coordination, and integration

ICT governance issues

The intelligence community is years behind in capability development com-

multiple cycles of intelligence leaders with very little background in intel-

Several respondents also raised a number of counter-intelligence challenges

unfortunately, the understanding of some intelligence leaders around what

I think the continuing challenge we will confront in Canada will be the

the latest trend is to outsource recruiting; to hire third party companies to