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NSHQ MANUAL 80-003

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP MANUAL

REFERENCES: See Annex K

1. Status. This publication supersedes NSCC 80-003, Special Operations Task Group
Command Manual, dated 11 Dec 09.

2. Purpose. To provide fundamental concepts and principles for a special operations task
group (SOTG). It is a tool for developing a common understanding of an SOTG, its structure,
implementation, responsibilities, and procedures within the joint operational construct. It also
explains how the SOTGs plan and execute special operations in a comprehensive environment
as part of a special operations component command (SOCC).

3. Applicability. Recommendations within this manual are based upon reference

publications and best practices. The guidance is meant to be informative rather than
authoritative. It does not supersede existing doctrinal publications. Primarily written for NATO
special operations forces (SOF) leadership and staff at the tactical level, information in this
manual is of benefit for SOF and non-SOF personnel at all levels in understanding and
coordinating NATO SOF employment.

4. Publication Updates. The publication will be reviewed at least annually by the

proponent and updated as needed. Suggestions for updates should be directed to the
proponent.

5. Proponent. The proponent of this publication is the NSHQ Training and Readiness
Division, J10 Directorate.

Marshall B. Webb
Lieutenant General, USA Air Force
Commander

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE PARA

PREFACE 11

CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP

ORGANIZATION
Introduction 13 1-1
NATO Comprehensive Approach to Operations 13 1-2
Special Operations Forces 13 1-3
Special Operations Task Group 13 1-4
NATO Organization and Command Structure 13 1-5
The Special Operations Component Command 14 1-6
Special Operations Component Command Headquarters Functions 15 1-7
The Special Operations Task Group 16 1-8
Combined Special Operations Task Groups 18 1-9
Organizing the Special Operations Task Group 20 1-10
Special Operations Task Unit 20 1-11
Special Operations in the Land Environment 21 1-12
Special Operations in the Maritime Environment 24 1-13
Special Operations Task Group Enablers 29 1-14
Special Operations Task Group and Conventional Force Integration 29 1-15
Summary 31 1-16

CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

General 33 2-1
Command Structure and Responsibilities 34 2-2
Command Organization 34 2-3
Command and Control Options 35 2-4
Command Relationships 35 2-5
Supported and Supporting Relationship 38 2-6
Supported Commander 38 2-7
Supporting Commander 38 2-8
Command and Control Considerations 39 2-9
Command and Control of Deployed Forces 40 2-10
Special Operations Task Group Headquarters 41 2-11
Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Staff Considerations 41 2-12
Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Layout 42 2-13
Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Staff Functions and 44 2-14
Responsibilities
Operational Geometry 46 2-15
Summary 48 2-16

CHAPTER 3 – TARGETING AND EFFECTS

General 50 3-1
Joint Targeting 50 3-2
The Targeting Process 50 3-3
Targeting Categories 50 3-4
Target Lists 52 3-5
Targeting Audiences 53 3-6

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PAGE PARA

Find, Feel, Understand, Influence, and Disrupt 53 3-7

Target Prioritization 59 3-8
CARVER 59 3-9
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse, and Disseminate 62 3-10
Pillars of Kinetic Targeting 68 3-11
Consequence Management 70 3-12
Informational Targeting Effects 71 3-13
Summary 72 3-14

CHAPTER 4 – INTELLIGENCE
General 73 4-1
Intelligence Support to NATO Special Operations 73 4-2
Special Operations Component Command/Special Operations Task Group 78 4-3
Intelligence Operations Relative to the Intelligence Process
Counter-intelligence at the Tactical Level 82 4-4
Intelligence Support to the Mission Planning Process 83 4-5
Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process 85 4-6
Intelligence Sharing in the NATO Special Operations Forces Community 86 4-7
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance 86 4-8
Process
Geospatial Intelligence Procedures 87 4-9
Intelligence Collection Management 87 4-10
Technical Exploitation Operations 87 4-11
Summary 88 4-12

CHAPTER 5 – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

RECONAISSANCE SUPPORT
Introduction 89 5-1
Key Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Definitions 89 5-2
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Requirements 90 5-3
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems 90 5-4
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Sensors 92 5-5
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems Limitations 93 5-6
Types of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Targeting 93 5-7
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Tasking Process 94 5-8
Synchronized Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 95 5-9
Summary 96 5-10

ANNEX:
5A. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Example

CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Introduction 97 6-1
Future Plans 97 6-2
Future Operations 100 6-3
Contingencies 114 6-4
Current Operations 116 6-5
Force Protection 122 6-6
Summary 123 6-7

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PAGE PARA

CHAPTER 7 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR LAND INTEGRATION

General 125 7-1
Core Missions 126 7-2
Airspace Control Means 127 7-3
Fire Support Coordination Measures 128 7-4
Special Operations Air Land Integration Team 128 7-5
Special Operations Air Land Integration Equipment 129 7-6
Special Operations Air Land Integration in the Maritime Environment 130 7-7
Training 131 7-8
Summary 131 7-9

CHAPTER 8 – COMMUNICATIONS
General 133 8-1
Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations Forces Communication 133 8-2
Systems
General Principles of Communication and Information Systems 135 8-3
Responsibilities
Special Operations Task Group Commander Responsibilities 135 8-4
Joint Communication and Information Systems Control Centre 136 8-5
Special Operations Component Command Signal Centre 136 8-6
Special Operations Task Group Communication Control Centre Elements 136 8-7
Joint Network Operations Control Centre Requirements 137 8-8
Communication System Planning Considerations 138 8-9
Special Operations Task Group Communication Backup Package 140 8-10
Intelligence Communications and Network Capability Requirements 140 8-11
Combined (Multinational) Communication Systems Standardization and 141 8-12
Procedures
Global Command and Control System 142 8-13
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems 142 8-14
The NATO Special Operations Forces Network 143 8-15
Summary 145 8-16

CHAPTER 9 – KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

General 147 9-1
Information Management Cycle 148 9-2
Special Operations Task Group Common Reference Point 151 9-3
Information Sharing 151 9-4
Summary 151 9-5

CHAPTER 10 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP LOGISTICS

General 153 10-1
Special Operations Task Group S4 Responsibilities 154 10-2
Logistics Functional Areas 155 10-3
Logistics Support 157 10-4
Special Operations Task Group Logistic Planning Considerations 158 10-5
Role Specialization 158 10-6
Base Operating Support 159 10-7
Prior to Base Operating Support 159 10-8
Host-nation Support 159 10-9

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PAGE PARA

Summary 159 10-10

CHAPTER 11 – MEDICAL SUPPORT AND MEDICAL OPERATIONS

Medical Support Fundamentals 161 11-1
Operational Medical Support Capabilities and Organization 162 11-2
Common Medical Planning Considerations 166 11-3
Diving Medical Planning Considerations 168 11-4
High-altitude Parachuting Medical Planning Considerations 169 11-5
Occupational Medicine, Sport Medicine, and Human Performance 170 11-6
Optimization
Summary 174 11-7

CHAPTER 12 – PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT

Introduction 175 12-1
Pre-deployment Planning 175 12-2
Redeployment 180 12-3
Summary 180 12-4

ANNEXES:

A. Capability Requirements
B. Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Position Functions and Responsibilities
C. Special Operations Task Group Battle Rhythm
D. Battle Drills
E. Target Intelligence Package Template
F. Example of Special Operations Task Group Concept of Operations
G. Formats, Reports, and Returns
H. Logistics Preparation of the Theatre
I. Logistics Estimate
J. Lexicon
K. References

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“Remember, when the time of crisis comes, 40 selected men can shake the world.”

- Yasotay, 13th Century Mongolian Warlord

The silence is broken as the SOTU troop commander keys his sabre radio. “29er this is 21,
phase line green.” “21 this is 29er, Acknowledge phase line green, WAIT … 21, you have
control, OUT!” The captain and his warrant officer exchange a confirmatory glance. “21 ack, …
All call-signs this is 21, I have control … stand by … stand by … GO! GO! GO!” Simultaneous
explosive breaches rock the darkened target; relative superiority is achieved immediately
through a combination of speed, surprise and target saturation; a cacophony of diversionary
devices and short, laser designated surgical bursts indicates the battle is joined. Assessments
of risk to mission, men or self are made within milliseconds of encountering an unknown inside;
life or death is thus determined as operators flow through the target. The Capture-Kill mission is
successful; the HVI is taken alive. “29, this is 21. JACKPOT secure, SITREP to follow.”

- Former CO JTF2 (CANSOF)

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PREFACE

1. As NATO special operations continue to evolve, the requirement for additional references
to aid the development of the NATO land and maritime special operations task groups (SOTGs)
continues to grow. The primary purpose of the SOTG Manual is to provide a single reference
that reflects the key concepts for land and maritime SOTGs deployed to support a NATO
special operations component command (SOCC) during joint operations. The SOTG Manual is
intended for use by SOTG commanders, staff, and subordinate leaders from special operations
forces (SOF) troop-contributing nations (TCNs) for education, training, and deployments.
Although the primary focus of the SOTG Manual is on NATO SOTGs, it provides a useful
reference for special operations task units (SOTUs), other NATO components, non-NATO SOF,
and for all special operations and support personnel serving outside an SOTG.

2. SOF are specially selected to conduct high-risk, high-payoff missions. They are
characterized by their speed, agility, precision, and flexibility. Their success at the tactical level
requires detailed intelligence, planning, coordination, synchronization, execution, and
consequence management. Successfully integrating special operations into multinational
operations begins with a thorough understanding of special operations and the ability for SOF to
use various processes and procedures while fully integrating into the joint force. The SOTG
Manual describes the fundamental aspects of special operations and provides guidance on
integrating SOF at the tactical level with operational-level tasks and objectives.

3. The SOTG Manual, as depicted in Figure 1, is written at the tactical SOF level but may
be used at the operational and component levels as well. This manual incorporates recent
changes in special operations doctrine, to include AJP-3.5(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special
Operations, dated 17 Dec 13. The SOTG Manual is not a doctrinal publication but directly
supports all applicable Allied joint publications and is subordinate to the NATO Special
Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) SOCC Manual, dated 20 Oct 14.

4. The SOTG Manual is designed to assist commanders and staff with resourcing, planning,
and employment specific to land and maritime special operations. The manual focuses on
NATO SOF interoperability at the tactical level. It does not attempt to dictate size of and
resource list for any SOTG element; rather, the focus is on the capabilities of units for
operational deployment. The SOTG Manual is not intended to replace any country’s doctrinal or
reference manual, to serve as a standard operating procedure (SOP), or to be considered a
mandate or regulation.

5. This manual provides SOTG commanders, staff, and subordinate units with concepts for
providing and supporting special operations land and maritime power. It also encourages the
user to apply their intuition, experience, and judgement to complex military problems. The
manual supports and aids the commander’s decision-making by promoting collaborative
planning among the staff and with the other component commands (CCs). The checklists,
briefing guides, and examples in this manual illustrate important concepts; however, they are
provided only as a starting point for critical thinking, mission planning, and execution. SOTG
commanders, staff, and subordinate units must adjust as needed to best meet the SOCC
commander’s (COM’s) intentions while executing the mission.

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NSHQ 80-003

Figure 1. Hierarchy of NATO SOF Publications

6. Important information is highlighted throughout this manual. The following icons focus
the user’s attention on the crucial pieces of information and best practices.

Best Practice. This icon highlights ideas and processes that

have proven successful during real-world operations and
exercises. Best practices offer tips and strategies that may
help the user succeed.

Important Note. This icon highlights the most important (key)

concepts that users will want to remember and offers
reminders of information provided elsewhere in the manual.

Red Flag. This icon serves as a warning to users, highlighting

common pitfalls so that users can avoid making the mistakes
others have made in the past.

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CHAPTER 1 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP ORGANIZATION

1-1. Introduction. This chapter details where the SOTG fits into the NATO organization and
NATO Command Structure (NCS).

1-2. NATO Comprehensive Approach to Operations. NATO military units, to include SOF,
must prepare for operations within a non-contiguous battlespace marked by the integration of
political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information operations (Info Ops). As
SOF enter the 21st century, this new comprehensive battlespace provides a catalyst for change
that must be embraced by all if we are to be successful on the field of battle. SOF familiarity
with combined and joint operations and asymmetric warfare gives them a great advantage over
most conventional forces in the comprehensive environment. The nations of NATO will expect
all of NATO SOF from the NSHQ; the SOCC Core; SOF advisors (SOFADs) at the joint force
command headquarters (HQs) and CCs; and the SOF land, maritime, and air task groups and
units to always be poised and ready to react appropriately anywhere in the world. The tactical
action units of NATO SOF, more commonly known as the SOTGs and SOTUs, will provide the
bulk of face-to-face engagements with the local nationals and organizations that will ultimately
help NATO and its allies win or lose the next war or conflict.

1-3. Special Operations Forces. SOF are small, specially organized units manned by people
carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful
conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment and unconventional applications of
tactics. They are specially selected to conduct high-risk, high-payoff missions. Special operations,
in contrast to conventional operations, are generally small, precise, adaptable, and innovative, and
can be conducted rapidly in an overt, discreet, or covert manner. Special operations differ from
conventional operations in degree of political risk, modes of employment, independence from
friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. SOF
provide the deployed joint task force commander (COM JTF) with a unique, flexible, and versatile
capability, whether employed alone or complementing other forces or agencies to attain military
strategic or operational objectives. The NATO SOF characteristics of speed, agility, precision, and
flexibility are what separate SOF from conventional forces.

1-4. Special Operations Task Group. The SOTG is the tactical element of the SOCC. It is
trained and equipped to conduct the principal NATO SOF tasks of military assistance (MA), special
reconnaissance (SR), and direct action (DA). While there is no rule that a nation must follow when
building an SOTG, there are minimum requirements laid out by NATO and the nations that dictate
SOTG capabilities. This chapter details the challenges faced in each of the respective operating
environments, the recommended SOTG task organizations, and the requirement for SOTG and
conventional force multipliers that play a vital role in the SOTG’s success.

1-5. NATO Organization and NATO Command Structure

a. The NATO organization and NCS have been streamlined over the past few years
to ensure that when called upon the SOTG can be identified and tasked through the
appropriate chain of command and deployed quickly into a theatre of operations (TOO) to
conduct MA, SR, and DA as required by its political, strategic, and operational masters.

b. Figure 1-1 depicts the current NCS. As one can see, the SOTG is the SOF action
arm designed to operate in land, maritime, and air environments.

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Figure 1-1. NATO Command Structure

1-6. The Special Operations Component Command

a. A SOCC is a multinational or national joint CC tailored to command and control (C2)

1
SOF. The size of the SOCC depends on the number of SOTGs and SOTUs, the scope of
the SOTGs/SOTUs’ capabilities, the size of the joint operations area (JOA), the expected
duration of the operation, and any national considerations. Figure 1-2 depicts a notional
SOCC. A SOCC comprises a combination of command, liaison, and force elements;
however, it is not a standing HQ. Unlike other CCs, a SOCC is formed by an agreed
framework nation (FN) and augmented with personnel from contributing nations. The SOF
FN forms the nucleus of the SOCC HQ by providing, as a minimum, the commander, key
staff personnel, and base life support functions for the SOCC. In accordance with MC
437/2, Special Operations Policy, on some occasions the NSHQ SOCC Core can initially
form the nucleus of the SOCC until the FN is ready to take control. The FN is expected to
coordinate the combat service support (CSS) functions for the component. The FN or
NATO-enabled command and control information systems (C2IS), depending on the
situation, must be provided down to the SOTG level. The SOCC employs and controls
SOF and can act as a supported or supporting command as directed by the designated
COM JTF.

b. Other TCNs may provide special operations land task groups (SOLTGs), special
operations maritime task groups (SOMTGs), special operations air task units (SOATUs),
or special operations air task groups (SOATGs) to the SOCC. The deployed SOATUs
may be organic to the SOTGs or organized in an SOATG or in a special operations air
command (SOAC) when multiple SOATGs are assigned.

1 Refer to the SOCC Manual, dated 20 Oct 14, for more detailed information about the SOCC.

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Important Note. The acronym SOTG will be used generically

throughout this manual and can refer to either an SOLTG or
SOMTG.

1-7. Special Operations Component Command Headquarter Functions. Once the FN

stands up the SOCC, the SOCC HQ has command responsibility for planning and coordinating
special operations and is granted the authority necessary to accomplish such missions as may
be assigned by COM JTF. The following functional responsibilities and related activities will be
conducted:

a. Deploy and establish a SOCC HQ capable of conducting NATO J1 through J8

staff functions and exercising C2 of assigned task groups.

b. Plan SOF campaign.

c. Plan for, direct, monitor, and assess special operations.

d. Coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations into the JOA, campaign,
and major operations.

e. Plan, task, and C2 air SOF.

f. Exchange and incorporate liaison officers (LOs) as required.

g. Provide C2IS down to the task group level.

h. Coordinate basic support infrastructure; provide protection for the SOCC HQ, as
required.

i. Coordinate and monitor CSS for deployed SOF.

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Figure 1-2. Notional SOCC

1-8. The Special Operations Task Group

a. An SOTG (land or maritime) is a self-sustaining, national grouping of land or maritime

SOF that is normally generated from a single nation. If nations choose to form a
multinational SOTG, appropriate pre-deployment training is required. The SOTG is directly
subordinate to a SOCC.2

b. There are several options for organizing the SOTGs. Figure 1-3 depicts a notional
SOTG. COM SOCC and the TCNs all have a say in organizing SOTGs. NATO has
SOLTGs, SOMTGs, and SOATGs in addition to combined SOTGs. It is important to note
that it is the SOCC mission and TCN capabilities that largely impact the choice of SOTG
type. SOTGs are by nature land based; however, the SOMTG would be capable of
operating from a sea base for longer durations. The need for control and coordination

2 This manual will not discuss the SOATG, but for more information, refer to the SOATG Manual, dated 2 Sep 13. More
information about special operations air land integration (SOALI) elements can be found in Chapter 7 or the SOALI
Manual, dated Jul 14.

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measures depends heavily on the other military/civilian actors in the area of operations
(AOO). SOF are flexible, and control and liaison entities will change from operation to
operation.

c. An SOTG is normally composed of:

(1) A HQ that is capable of conducting the S1-S8 staff functions.

(2) Up to six subordinate SOTUs.

(3) Combat support elements.

(4) CSS elements.

d. An SOTG will have the following capabilities:3

(1) Description. Capable of planning and conducting the full spectrum of special
operations (including the three principal tasks of MA, SR, and DA) across the full
spectrum of military operations, unilaterally and independently, as directed by a
SOCC or in support of a regular commander.

(2) Principal Capabilities

(a) Capable of establishing procedures and employing equipment for air-

land-maritime integration at the tactical level.

(b) Capable of employing multinational joint special operations capabilities

by day and night in all terrains and environments, in all weather conditions,
and under austere conditions.

(c) Capable of implementing non-lethal measures.

(d) Capable of contributing to the joint functions (including time-sensitive

targeting/dynamic targeting) throughout the JOA, as well as conducting
and/or deconflicting joint functions for subordinate forces.

(e) Capable of intelligence fusion by using planning, mapping, network

analysis software, and infrastructure to support the timely management of
all available intelligence.

(3) Enabling Capabilities

(a) Capable of deploying liaison elements to higher HQs and other

entities in the JOA.

(b) Capable of retaining full operational capability by providing protection

for vital HQ elements in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) environments and maintaining sufficient command, control,
communications, and computers intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) redundancy to sustain operations post-CBRN events.

3 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated Oct 11.

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(c) Capable of providing an appropriate level of force protection (FP).

(d) Capable of integrating and employing FP assets and procedures,

including implementing operations security (OPSEC), information security
(INFOSEC), communications security (COMSEC), CBRN, and health
protection policies and standards (including restrictive security procedures
for sensitive or compartmentalized SOF operations).

(e) Capable of integration within the overall Alliance joint ISR capability
to permit effective collection tasking, cross-cueing of other collection
capabilities, and dissemination of collected information to users.

(f) Capable of insertion into the JOA as a fully integrated entity, when
part of the initial entry capability.

(g) Capable of providing sustainment across all classes of supply for up

to 30 standard days of supply (DOS). Unit on-hand stocks should amount
to 10 standard DOS.

(h) Capable of employing measures to minimize the vulnerability to a

cyberattack, to maintain the degree of continuity of operation acceptable to
the commander during an attack, and to restore services to full operational
capability after an attack.

(i) Capable of automatically updating logistic/operations chains of

command regarding ammunition, fuel consumption, and manpower, as well
as combat and non-combat related major damages.

(j) Capable of providing an appropriate level of improvised explosive

device (IED) protection.4

1-9. Combined Special Operations Task Groups. Combined SOTGs are not common and
should be considered carefully to capitalize on habitual tactical-level relationships or the
requirement for certain capabilities. In these instances, a single commander is designated for the
combined SOTG. Regardless of these considerations, combined SOTGs should only be
authorized when an appropriate level of combined training has been achieved and with the proper
approval by the SOF FN and SACEUR. When establishing a combined SOTG, a single
commander will be designated.

4 ACIEDP-01(A), Counter-improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Training Requirements, dated 18 Apr 13.

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Best Practice. Combined SOTGs are workable and may be

preferable for smaller nations wishing to contribute to the
campaign. During the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) mission and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, many
combined missions were conducted with two or more tactical
units from different nations, particularly when target sets
required a larger SOF combat force. In order to be successful,
this grouping of SOTUs must have compatible rules of
engagement (ROE), high interoperability, no caveats
restricting operational flexibility, clear C2, and clear physical
delineation of targets between tactical units on the ground.
Mixing below the SOTU level is not recommended.

Figure 1-3. Notional SOTG

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Best Practice. Some nations have opted to create an

additional task unit within the SOTG known as a special forces
support group (SFSG). The SFSG (or SOF combat support or
direct fire support unit) can consist of SOF or highly trained
light infantry, commando, or airborne troops who regularly
train with and support SOF Tier One units. They can conduct
a wide range of SOF support tasks to include quick reaction
force (QRF), cordon, and blocking forces. They can also,
depending on their national training regime, conduct some
SOF DA activities such as raids, ambushes, and assaults.
They are very suitable for certain MA train, assist, and advise
tasks.

1-10. Organizing the Special Operations Task Group. COM SOTG has the authority to
organize forces over which he has national command or NATO forces over which he has tactical
command (TACOM) to meet mission requirements.5 COM SOTG is also responsible for organizing
the SOTG HQ in a manner to effectively assist in the control of SOF and provide support to
subordinate units. Refer to Chapter 2 for SOTG HQ organization and functions.

1-11. Special Operations Task Unit

Important Note. The acronym SOTU will be used generically

throughout this manual and can refer to either a special
operations land task unit (SOLTU) or special operations
maritime task unit (SOMTU). The full listing of requisite
capabilities that NATO requires from these elements will be
shown in this manual.

a. An SOTU is the lowest level of a SOF tactical-level combat element that deploys
by air, land, or sea and is able to conduct MA, SR, or DA. Figure 1-4 depicts a notional
SOTU. An SOTU, depending on actual strength, may be capable of split-team
operations.

b. It is up to a nation to define the size of an SOTU. Regardless of its size, an SOTU

should have the following capabilities:

(1) Plans and conducts special operations separately, as part of an SOTG, or

in conjunction with conventional forces.

(2) Infiltrates and exfiltrates to/from specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.

(3) Conducts operations in remote areas and all types of environments (desert,
arctic, alpine, jungle, urban) and in hostile areas for days with minimal external
support.

(4) Develops, organizes, equips, trains, and advises or directs indigenous forces.

5 Refer to C2 relationships in Chapter 2, Figure 2-1.

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(5) Conducts offensive operations to destroy, kill, or capture personnel,

equipment, or infrastructure (does not have the hold capability).

(6) Provides commanders with real-time information from all types of areas
(ground truth).

(7) Directs fires from air, land, and maritime platforms.

(8) Operates discreetly, covertly, or overtly.

(9) Supports time-sensitive targeting, combat search and rescue (CSAR),

personnel recovery (PR), and a QRF.

(10) Conducts technical exploitation operations (TEOs).

(11) Able to receive resupply from air, land, and maritime assets.

(12) Interoperable with all SOTUs operating under the same SOTG HQ.

c. Multiple nationalities at the task unit level is not recommended.

Figure 1-4. Notional SOTU

1-12. Special Operations in the Land Environment

a. The land environment is the primary operational environment in which all SOTGs,
land and maritime, must be able to operate. While the land environment will be part of
the overall JOA (see Chapter 2, para 2-15), the area is predominantly controlled by the

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land component, and SOF operating within the area must coordinate, deconflict, and
synchronize their plans and actions accordingly so that SOF and conventional forces
complement each other and avoid situations that could be detrimental to the battlespace
owner’s (BSO’s) objectives.

b. In the majority of cases, SOF will be operating within conventional boundaries, and
effective liaison is a critical requirement. If required, SOTGs will have to rely on LOs at the
division and/or brigade level to deconflict, coordinate, and synchronize SOF operations
within their boundaries. COM SOCC may assign special operations command and control
elements (SOCCEs) to areas of greatest operational friction or isolation where he believes
there will be C2 challenges. The SOCCE can serve both a command and coordination
function. Figure 1-5 demonstrates the complexity of the land environment.

Figure 1-5. SOTG in the Land Environment

c. Special Operations Land Task Group. The SOLTG is a national or combined

grouping of land SOF employed to conduct special operations (MA, SR, and DA) as
directed by the SOCC across the operational continuum. The SOLTG must possess all
the SOTG HQ capabilities necessary to establish coordination measures, such as liaisons,
communication and information systems (CIS), CSS, and combat support. Levels of Allied
SOF capabilities for the SOLTG can be found in Annex A to AJP-3.5(A).

d. Special Operations Land Task Unit Capabilities. The SOLTU is composed of

national land-capable SOF that can conduct special operations (MA, SR, and DA) across

22
NSHQ 80-003

the operational spectrum. SOLTUs must deploy with a minimum of 10 days of all classes
of supply and necessary life support.

(1) Military Assistance. SOF may be required to provide MA to friendly or allied

forces. This can be provided directly or indirectly to a designated force or to an
indigenous military or paramilitary force to protect their society. MA tasks can include:

(a) Training, equipping, supporting, and, if necessary, directing friendly

forces to exploit opposing forces’ political, military, economic, or
psychological weaknesses.

(b) Training, advising, and assisting host nation (HN) military and
paramilitary forces so they can unilaterally assume responsibility for
controlling their internal stability.

(c) Supporting and advising other members of the Alliance.

(d) Providing immediate technical advice and assistance during a crisis

or disaster situation.

(e) Facilitating a coordinated multinational approach to conflict resolution

through liaison teams.

(2) Special Reconnaissance. SR is a SOF intelligence function that places

eyes on target in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. SOF may conduct
these tasks unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. SOF may use
advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques or equipment, and/or
sophisticated covert or discreet collection methods. SR tasks may include:

(a) Area assessment.

(b) Reconnaissance and surveillance in advance of operations by

conventional forces.

(c) Target acquisition.

(d) Collection/reporting of critical information about the movement and

intent of opposing forces in or adjacent to the AOO.

(e) Identification of location and conducting surveillance of critical or

sensitive facilities in hostile or denied territory.

(f) Ability to conduct surveillance of target area of interests (TAIs),

where the enemy is thought to be, and named areas of interest (NAIs),
where information requirements (IRs) can be gathered, using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).

(g) Conducting CBRN reconnaissance using accredited metering systems.

(h) Conducting signal intelligence (SIGINT) gathering operations.

(i) Ability to obtain information by using cross-cultural and linguistic

capabilities by local people.

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NSHQ 80-003

(3) Direct Action. DA operations are normally limited in scope and duration
and usually incorporate a withdrawal or handover from the objective area. SOF
may conduct these tasks unilaterally or in conjunction with conventional
operations. These actions are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and
often time-sensitive operations of operational significance. DA tasks may include:

(a) Attack on critical targets (materiel or personnel).

(b) Interdiction of critical lines of communication (LOCs) or other target

systems.

(c) Location/capture/recovery of designated personnel or materiel.

(d) Seizure/destruction/neutralization of critical facilities/equipment.

(e) Conducting DA against critical targets identified within the

infrastructure of opposing forces.

(f) Conducting air terminal attack.

(g) Directing and/or effecting terminal guidance control of precision-

guided munitions (PGM).

1-13. Special Operations in the Maritime Environment. The maritime environment is

rightfully considered one of the harshest environments in which the SOTG will operate. Unlike
the land environment, operations in the maritime environment must be supported by SOF and
conventional assets. Operations in this environment are typically very complex, as can be seen
in Figure 1-6, and require a very high level of operational readiness. Maritime SOF skills are
typically the most perishable, and without frequent and realistic individual and collective training
and exercise events, skill fade will result, especially in areas that involve subsurface activities.

a. Maritime Special Operations

(1) Maritime special operations (MSOs) offer nations the ability to conduct
special operations in an environment that covers three quarters of the earth’s
surface. MSOs are conducted in the following maritime environments:

(a) Open/deep (blue water).

(b) Coastal (green water).

(c) Riverine (brown water).

(d) Wet obstacles (any combination of land and water where military
forces are required to negotiate).

(2) One of the unique values to maritime manoeuvre is the capability for SOF to
leverage oceans and waterways to quietly gain access to a particular target or
region. When combined with air mobility, 71% of the earth’s surface becomes a
natural drop zone (DZ).

24
NSHQ 80-003

(3) MSOs are dependent on a number of key platforms and specialized

equipment that allow for infiltration on or below the surface and, when linked to air
mobility, can produce one of the most powerful combinations of SOF capabilities.

(4) MSOs are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise application of force.
They may be focused on, but not restricted to, the following activities:

(a) Insertion/extraction by sea.

(b) Discreet and covert beach reconnaissance (hydrographic survey) in

advance of an amphibious operation.

(c) Discreet assault route preparation in advance of an amphibious

operation.

(d) Recovery or protection of ships and maritime oil installations.

(e) Coastal reconnaissance.

(f) Other activities performed in support of an amphibious operation or

any other maritime operation.

Figure 1-6. Complexities of Maritime Special Operations

25
NSHQ 80-003

b. Maritime Special Operation versus Maritime Interdiction Operation

(1) It is important for the SOCC, maritime component command (MCC), and
COM SOTG to understand the fundamental difference between MSOs and
maritime interdiction operations (MIOs).6 Doing so will ensure a smoother
workflow when the time comes for the SOCC, SOMTG, and MCC units to start
coordinating planning, requesting enabling assets, and determining C2
relationships during and after the operation.

(2) COM SOCC is the supported commander during MSOs. MSOs use stealth,
speed, and precise application of force under, on, and over the sea. They include
SR and DA against static or moving maritime targets, as well as
insertion/extraction against land targets. The commanders of the MCC, air
component command (ACC), and land component command (LCC) are the
supporting commanders and ensure the coordinated provision of enablers, such
as surface vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, air transport, subsurface assets,
follow-on forces, specialists (CBRN/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)), and prize
crew, to name but a few.

(3) COM MCC is typically the supported commander during MIOs. MIOs
include anti-piracy, vessel search and seizure, and unopposed, non-cooperative,
and opposed boarding operations. If the threat environment dictates and credible
intelligence suggests terrorist activity or the presence of contraband on a suspect
vessel, COM SOCC may be tasked as the supporting commander and provide
subject matter experts (SMEs) and SOF to resolve the issue. An MIO could turn
into an MSO if hostages are taken. SOF may be employed as a QRF.

c. Maritime Special Operation Planning Considerations. Due to the complex

nature of the maritime environment, MSOs require additional considerations when
planning, such as:

(1) Target type, location, and intent.

(2) Environmental/geographic conditions.

(3) Size of maritime SOF units.

(4) Duration of operation for sustainment.

(5) Friendly forces and assets (MCC, ACC, LCC).

(6) Battlespace management (BSM).

(7) Legal considerations in international waters.

(8) Maritime hostage release operations.

(a) Number of perpetrators and hostages.

6 Refer to ATP-71(A), Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations, dated 20 Sep 13.

26
NSHQ 80-003

(b) Immediate action plan and options to consider while setting the
conditions for success.

(c) Complex evacuation.

(d) Media.

d. Special Operations Maritime Task Group. The SOMTG must be capable of

operating from a sea base. The high seas, littoral waters, and riverine environment are
areas where these SOMTGs are specialized and utilized. Infiltration and exfiltration
capabilities use equipment under, on, and from the sea. The ability to perform opposed
boarding operations is a prerequisite for appointment as an SOMTG. This capability
includes requisite training, specialized equipment, and watercraft, including rigid inflatable
boats, to accomplish SR and DA tasks. The SOMTG must also be capable of establishing
coordination and enabling measures, such as liaisons, CIS, and CSS. See AJP-3.5(A),
Annex A, for levels of Allied SOF capabilities for the SOMTG.

e. Special Operations Maritime Task Unit. The SOMTU is a national maritime-

capable SOTU that can conduct special operations (MA, SR, and DA) across the
operational spectrum. SOMTUs must deploy with a minimum of 10 days of all classes of
supply and necessary life support. SOMTUs possess special waterborne
infiltration/exfiltration equipment and capabilities.

(1) Military Assistance. All MA land capabilities.

(2) Special Reconnaissance. The SOMTU will normally have the full SR land
capabilities, although not as specialized as the SOLTU. In addition, the SOMTU
will have the following capabilities:

(a) Conduct optical surveillance of TAIs and NAIs by day;

reconnaissance/establish landing sites and coordination points.

(b) Conduct amphibious advance force reconnaissance using handheld

equipment on global positioning system (GPS) datum. Conduct beach
obstacle reconnaissance.

(c) Conduct amphibious advance force reconnaissance using technical

systems.

(d) Conduct amphibious advance force reconnaissance, either remotely

or without using surface swimming, using technical systems.

(3) Direct Action. All DA land capabilities, plus:

(a) Conduct offensive operations using watercraft.

(b) Conduct combat swimming operations using closed-circuit breathing

apparatus.

(c) Conduct combat swimming operations using swimmer delivery

systems to enhance range and weapon payloads.

27
NSHQ 80-003

(d) Conduct offensive maritime attack/interdiction operations from fast-

attack craft with support weapons and/or stand-off weapon systems.

(e) Specialized breaching capabilities, such as high-speed torches and

gas-operated grinders for cutting through steel hatches and bulkheads.

Best Practice. During Exercise COLD RESPONSE in

Norway, the SOCC successfully employed the special
operations boat task group (SOBTG) concept, much like
having an SOATG/SOAC, making it easier for SOTGs and
their subordinate SOTUs to request and be apportioned SOF
watercraft to support their missions.
COM SOCC may from time to time, depending on operational
and environmental requirements, decide to form an SOBTG in
much the same way that the SOATG is formed. The intent of
the SOBTG is to form all surface and subsurface watercraft
into one grouping to facilitate the effective planning,
apportionment, and sustainment of a scarce SOF resource.
This may require that in some instances COM SOCC direct
the respective COM SOTGs with boat units to detach their
boats/watercraft to the SOBTG under the command of a
designated SOBTG commander.
The roles of the maritime SOF boat units are predominantly
focused on, but not restricted to, the open seas, littoral, and
riverine domains, including:
 Covert and overt infiltration and exfiltration by different
types of boats/vessels.
 Coastal reconnaissance and covert beach reconnaissance
(hydrographic survey) in advance of amphibious assault.
 Covert route preparation in advance of amphibious
assault.
 Recovery or protection of ships, static and underway, and
oil installations subject to hostile state or non-state
(terrorist) action.
 Maritime counterterrorism (CT).
 Support to MIOs.
 Support to civil authorities.

f. Maritime Special Operations Realities. All SOF operations are inherently risky;
however, MSOs, because of the environment, pose a number of obstacles that are not
easy to overcome. In the end, it is up to the commander to decide whether the gains will
outweigh the costs. SOTG commanders must make higher HQs understand that when it
comes to conducting SR and DA against a maritime target, there is:

(1) No guaranteed insertion method (environmental/range realities).

(2) No guaranteed covert infiltration method (battlespace/target realities).

28
NSHQ 80-003

(3) No guaranteed capability to deliver significant assault forces (platform

limitations).

(4) Extreme difficulty in achieving synchronized, mass saturation of the target

(target size and superstructure).

(5) Trouble with extraction from the target vessel (an entire plan unto itself).

Important Note. Redundancy in planning is required for risk

management. For example, COM SOTG may decide to use a
heliborne assault force (HAF) and a surface assault force
(SAF) to recapture a ship underway, with the understanding
that if one insertion method fails fully or partially due to
weather conditions, the other will get sufficient assaulters on
target to accomplish the mission.

1-14. Special Operation Task Group Enablers. SOF are typically a scarce resource in each
of our respective nations. Much time and effort have been devoted into designing our national
SOTGs so that each may conduct operations as directed by their national chain of command.
While SOTGs can operate independently, most SOTGs do not own the additional resources
needed to support them within a joint operational environment. Additional conventional assets
or enablers, such as ISR, air, and joint fires, will be required for SOF to be effective.

1-15. Special Operations Task Group and Conventional Force Integration

a. When properly integrated during “If the band played a piece first with
planning, conventional forces and SOF the piccolo, then with the brass horn,
can capitalize on their inherent strengths then with the clarinet, and then with
to achieve the operational-level the trumpet, there would be a hell of a
commander’s intent. Successful lot of noise but no music. To get
conventional force and SOF integration harmony in music, each instrument
should ideally begin during the early must support the others. To get
planning stages. Ignoring conventional harmony in battle, each weapon must
force and SOF integration issues in support the others. Team plan wins.”
planning may introduce operational
complexities that either increase risk or General George S. Patton
lessen potential complementary effects.

b. The conventional force commander must recognize that SOF normally operate in
small elements and do not possess sufficient combat power to confront enemy forces for
a sustained period. However, properly used SOF offer specialized, yet complementary,
capabilities to the conventional force commander. To ensure that conventional forces
are effectively supported by SOF, operational-level commanders/supporting SOF
commanders and their staff:

(1) Bring SOF liaison support early into the planning and coordination process.

(2) Conduct an assessment to determine if the operational mission criteria are

met.

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(3) Ensure SOF provide input on how they can support the conventional force
commander’s intent and operation plan (OPLAN).

(4) Recognize the characteristics and capabilities/limitations of each other’s

forces, including C2 and staff capacities, mobility, survivability, firepower, and
communications.

(5) Establish clear tactical-level command relationships.

c. There are many ways that SOF can support conventional forces during a campaign.
SOF support should be directed at operational-level centres of gravity (COGs) and
vulnerabilities, not at tactical targets that have no operational or strategic effect. SOF tasks
could include long-range reconnaissance (RECCE) to get eyes-on and ground truth, and
DA against key targets, such as HQs, air defence radar systems, airbases, surface-to-
surface missiles, etc. One must avoid the misuse of SOF and any tactical direction of SOF
operations by conventional commanders.

Figure 1-7. Integration of SOF and Conventional Forces

d. Conventional forces conduct operations to defeat enemy forces and to control

land, air, sea, and space, including populations and resources. They possess a variety
of capabilities, including a greater number of personnel that can be used to support SOF
in the accomplishment of core tasks. To ensure that SOF are effectively supported by
conventional forces, operational-level commanders/supporting component commanders
and their staff:

30
NSHQ 80-003

(1) Conduct a feasibility assessment to determine the viability of a proposed

mission/target for conventional force employment.

(2) Determine if the tasking is an appropriate use of conventional forces.

(3) Determine if required resources are available.

(4) Bring conventional forces into “I once had a machine gun open up
the planning and coordination on one of my SOTU call signs during
process early. a passage of lines with my LO
standing right there in the Infantry
(5) Recognize the characteristics
Coy TOC. When it comes to effective
and capabilities/limitations of each
liaison, there are no guarantees.”
other’s forces, including C2 and
staff capacities, mobility,
Former Canadian SOTG Commander
survivability, firepower, and
Afghanistan 2006
communications.

(6) Establish clear tactical-level command relationships.

e. The complexities of support by conventional forces should not be underestimated.

Any conventional integration for tactical action requires a high level of interoperability,
rehearsals, clear coordination measures on the ground, LOs at key friction points (in
particular passage of lines), and clear C2.

f. Conventional forces can sometimes support SOF operations by conducting an

adjoining manoeuvre that causes a reaction that SOF can exploit, e.g. causing a
leadership target to move and be vulnerable to DA and fires. Also, SOF members can be
placed in a conventional unit to conduct routine patrols while at the same time covertly
gathering information and conducting close RECCE on a difficult and sensitive target for
future execution. Many permutations are possible short of tactical integration. SOF
commanders must use their imagination.

g. Above and beyond organic assets and CSS elements, the SOTG may
occasionally require support from specialists due to the scope of the tasks related to their
mission. For example, when explosive hazard or mobility tasks exceed their integral
capabilities, conventional forces may temporarily assign specialists to support them.
Normally these specialists will be assigned to non-conventional groupings and specific
command relationships. This support is normally required during insertion and extraction
but could also be required for other specific parts of SOTG missions. This support
includes, but is not limited to, medical, counter-CBRN, engineering, logistics, military
police, intelligence, and component elements (sea, land, air).

1-16. Summary. The SOTG is a scare resource and not easily replaced if rendered combat
ineffective. Its effective employment should always be considered at the JTF, SOCC, and
SOTG levels with respect to the following special operations operational mission criteria:

a. Permissible. The mission must be in line with the mandate and legal framework
for the operation, including implemented ROE. The objectives set have to be achievable
within the legal authorities given. If the necessary ROE have not been implemented,
they have to be requested.

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b. Appropriate. Is the mission suitable for SOF capabilities, and does it accord fully
with the operational-level commander’s objectives? Could another asset be used? The
mission must have a unique aspect that requires the special skills and capabilities of SOF,
and which renders the mission unsuitable (or less suitable) for action by other assets.

c. Feasible. If the mission is appropriate, can it feasibly be accomplished by the

SOF assets available? Does the SOF element have the appropriate training, skills,
planning, and rehearsal time, as well as the required cultural understanding?

d. Sustainable. Are the resources adequate? Is the intelligence sufficient? Is there

adequate insertion, logistic sustainability on the ground, extraction, survivability, and CIS
support? Even if the target is appropriate, feasible, and vulnerable to SOF, a lack of
dedicated support resources may prevent the execution of a special operation.

e. Justifiable. Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Commanders should
recognize the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of
successful task execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the
task. Assessment of risk must take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF
units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on Alliance interests should the
mission fail.

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CHAPTER 2 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-1. General

a. SOF’s ability to operate independently, as part of the overall plan, or in support of

a conventional commander requires effective coordination and integration of the SOF
effort and is dependent on a robust C2 structure. Successful execution of special
operations requires unity of command and a clear and uncluttered C2 relationship
between the SOCC and subordinate SOTGs. The time-sensitive nature normally
associated with SOF missions, as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions,
requires a C2 structure that is, above all, flexible and responsive to the needs of the
SOTG. There must be no doubt within the SOTG of the mandated and delegated
approval authorities needed to make timely decisions to achieve the desired SOF effects.
Direct access to the appropriate level of command is paramount for achieving success.
Capable and well-positioned LOs are also critical for SOF to integrate and operate
seamlessly, and to establish and maintain networks in the joint battlespace.

b. The terms command and control are closely related and often used together;
however, they are not synonymous.

(1) Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual to direct,

coordinate, or control military forces. It is the process the commander uses to
assert his will and intentions upon subordinates to achieve the desired objectives
and end state.

(2) Control. Control is that authority exercised by a commander over part of

the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally
under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing
orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.
Control is how the commander and his staff organize, direct, and coordinate the
actions of assigned forces to implement orders and directives.

c. There are two different options that may affect the C2 of and within an SOTG.
Both are given and cannot be influenced by the SOTG.

(1) NATO Response Force. Based on the NATO Response Force (NRF)
concept, nations offer SOTGs to a SOCC provided by a SOF FN. Within this
construct the generic C2 is given and stated in the respective NATO documents.
Normally, the SOCC will have operational control (OPCON) of a designated JTF
HQ, and the subordinate SOTGs are normally delegated OPCON to COM SOCC.
Based on this framework, it is the responsibility of the SOCC to prepare and train
its forces and to move into the standby phase after certification by the JTF HQ.
Inherent requirements and procedures are stated and do not need further direction
and guidance.

(2) Crisis Response Planning and Force Generation. While the NRF is a
force and capability package at-ready, the situation might require crisis response
planning at the strategic and operational levels beyond the capabilities of the NRF.
During this planning process, there is the potential for different or additional SOF
requirements as identified. A SOCC (or the NSHQ at the initial stage) will provide
expertise and advice, including C2. This will be the starting point, and normally,
COM SOCC will have OPCON of his assigned forces as delegated by COM JTF.

33
NSHQ 80-003

Further C2 arrangements will follow, pending the development of campaign

execution, and will most likely be based on supported-supporting relationships as
directed by the JTF HQ joint coordination order (JCO).

Important Note. COM SOCC has to accept that there are

factors affecting his C2 over his subordinate forces that he
cannot always influence and has to exploit as best as possible
to achieve mission success. It is again important to note that
by definition an SOTG is a national unit tailored to the mission
and is based on national decisions for capability requirements
and respective caveats.

2-2. Command Structure and Responsibilities

a. In NATO, nations retain full command (FULLCOM) of their military forces

contributed to a NATO operation. Nations normally delegate operational command
(OPCOM) of assigned forces to SACEUR, who retains this authority until transfer of
authority (TOA) back to the TCNs. In certain cases, nations may choose to grant
SACEUR only OPCON.7

b. SACEUR normally delegates OPCON of assigned forces to COM JTF as soon as

appropriate. Unless otherwise restricted by national caveats or other political
considerations, COM JTF can further delegate OPCON to a subordinate commander.
Therefore, it is expected that COM JTF delegates OPCON of national SOTGs and
SOATGs contributed to a NATO operation to COM SOCC.

c. COM SOCC normally retains OPCON of assigned SOTGs and SOATGs, but may
delegate tactical control (TACON) of tactical units for limited periods or for specific missions.

d. COM SOCC reports to the highest appropriate operational-level commander,

normally the joint force commander, as directed by SACEUR. In the event of the activation
of a JTF HQ, the SOCC is placed OPCON under the designated COM JTF. SOF
commanders at all levels should:

(1) Provide a clear and unambiguous chain of command using accepted

special operations C2 structures and practices consistent with NATO SOF policy.8

(2) Provide sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and
support operations.

(3) Ensure the SOCC is fully integrated into the strategic- and operational-level
planning processes.

(4) Match unit capabilities with mission assignments.

2-3. Command Organization. The NATO military structure allows for three models of
command. Each model offers a C2 option that may be appropriate for specific operations.9

7 AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, dated 16 Mar 11, pp. 1-26, para 0194a.
8 SOF policy is detailed in MC 437/2, Special Operations Policy, dated 21 Apr 11.

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NSHQ 80-003

a. Fully Integrated. Fully integrated forces are based on proportional shares. This
often results in a binational or multinational construct at the CC-level HQs. The working
language within the HQs is agreed to by the contributing nations. Commanders of such
multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational basis.

b. Lead Nation. One nation assumes responsibility for the planning and execution of
an operation. The lead nation (LN) normally provides the commander, key staff, C2,
information and communications capacities, structure, doctrine, and logistic coordination
of the force. Other nations can assign contributions to this force and can fill staff
positions in the LN’s HQ.

c. Framework Nation. One nation provides the C2 framework. The key elements of
the HQ’s staff and support come from the FN. The working language and procedures are
based on Alliance standards. Criteria and requirements for NATO SOF FNs are detailed
in AJP-3.5(A).

2-4. Command and Control Options. According to AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, there
are two broadly defined options for C2 of forces within NATO operations.

a. Deployable Operational-level Command. This option is essential to preserve

NATO’s ability to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs).
Operational-level command is normally exercised by a COM JTF from a JTF HQ. It is
possible to split the command between an element that remains at the primary HQ
location and another that deploys forward and uses technology to reach back to the main
HQ. COM JTF determines which staff functions will be represented in the forward
deployed staff element. This option allows the JTF HQ to command more than one
concurrent operation, if required.

b. NATO Response Force. The NRF option allows COM JTF to deploy an element
of the JTF HQ that is not dual-hatted with the main HQ. Those J1-J9 staff functions
needed by the commander to establish a physical presence in theatre would be
represented in the deploying element of the HQ staff. The NRF also makes use of
technology to extend its capabilities and reach-back to the main HQ.

2-5. Command Relationships10

a. Within the SOTG the normal command relationship should be COM SOTG having
TACOM of the subordinate SOTUs. In some situations, there may be other units (SOF or
conventional) under COM SOTG’s TACON for a specific task and for a specific period of
time or when operating in a specific geographical area.

b. Command is the authority to direct, coordinate, and control assigned units; implicit
is the ability to assign missions, issue directives, and allocate force groupings. Control is
inherent in command. A common understanding of the degrees of authority is a
prerequisite for effective cooperation under NATO military command structures. See
Figure 2-1. The following terms form the basis for this common understanding.

(1) Full Command. FULLCOM is the military authority and responsibility of a

commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military
9 AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, dated Dec 10.
10 AJP-3(B).

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NSHQ 80-003

operations and administration and exists only within national services. Nations
that assign forces to a NATO operation always retain FULLCOM of those forces.

(2) Operational Command. OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander

to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to
reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or TACON as the
commander deems necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration
or logistics.

(3) Operational Control. OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander

to direct assigned forces so that the commander may accomplish specific missions
or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units
concerned; and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include
authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned
nor does it include administrative or logistic control.

(4) Tactical Command. TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to

assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission
assigned by higher authority.

(5) Tactical Control. TACON is the detailed and, usually, local direction and
control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish assigned missions
or tasks.

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NSHQ 80-003

Least Control
Most Control
AUTHORITY
NATO NATO NATO NATO
FULLCOM
OPCOM1 OPCON TACOM TACON
Direct authority to deal with
nations, diplomatic missions, X
and agencies
Delegated to a commander X X X
Assign/reassign subordinate
X
commanders/officers
Assign separate employment of
X
unit components
Reassign forces X
Assign missions/designate X
X
objectives (limited)2
Assign tasks X X X
Local direction/control X
X X X
designated forces (limited)3
Directive authority for logistics X4 X5
Directive authority for
X
administration/discipline
Directive authority for joint
X6 X7
training

The national authority will LEGEND

always retain FULLCOM as per FULLCOM – Full Command
AJP-3(B). OPCOM – Operational Command
OPCON – Operational Control
TACOM – Tactical Command
TACON – Tactical Control
COM JTF – Joint Task Force
Commander

Has this authority – X

Denied authority/not specifically granted –

Notes:
1. For NATO SOF, OPCON is delegated through SACEUR (AJP-3.5(A) refers).
2. Limited due to national caveats.
3. Limited due to national caveats.
4. National assets through national support elements only.
5. Under COM JTF and through a military integrated logistics unit.
6. For training under national authority, e.g. pre-deployment training.
7. For training under COM JTF authority, e.g. in-theatre training.
Figure 2-1. C2 Relationships

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2-6. Supported and Supporting Relationship11

a. A supported/supporting relationship is not a command relationship, but it does

allow for great flexibility as organizations aid, protect, complement, or sustain other
forces. A supported commander may be designated for an entire operation, by phase of
an operation, by function, or any combination of phases, stages, events, and functions.

b. Supported/supporting relationships afford an effective means to weigh various

phases of NATO operations. Within a joint force, components or elements can support
or be supported based on assigned tasks. Therefore, commanders may be both
supported and supporting at the same time.

2-7. Supported Commander. The supported commander has the authority to establish the
general direction of the supporting efforts. General direction includes the designation and
prioritization of targets and objectives, timing and duration of supporting actions, and other
instructions necessary for coordinated and efficient operations. The establishing authority
(normally COM JTF) is responsible for specifying the degree of authority granted the supported
commander. The establishing directive is essentially an order that provides the purpose of the
support relationship, the desired effects and objectives, and the scope of actions to be taken.
At a minimum, COM JTF’s establishing directive should include:

a. Time, place, and duration of the supported effort.

b. Priority of the supported mission to other missions given to supporting

commanders.

c. Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to deviate from the supporting

mission in the case of an opportunity or emergency.

d. Degree of authority granted to the supported commander.

e. Control measures.

f. Air support processes.

g. Campaign synchronization.

h. Intelligence collection planning.

i. Non-organic logistic support.

j. FP responsibilities.

2-8. Supporting Commander. The supporting commander determines the tactics, methods,
procedures, and communications to be employed by the supporting forces. The supporting
commander advises and coordinates with the supported commander on employment and
limitations, such as logistics; assists with planning; and ensures that support requirements are
appropriately communicated to the supporting commander’s organization. The supporting
commander must fully understand the needs of the supported force and must take all actions
possible to fulfil those needs within existing capabilities that are consistent with the priorities and
requirements of other assigned tasks.

11 AJP-3(B).

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2-9. Command and Control Considerations

a. Preparation. During the preparatory phase, there may be a delay in assigning a

JTF HQ,12 which could cause a corresponding delay in identifying and activating the
SOCC. The NSHQ may assume responsibility for initial SOF planning and preparation in
consultation with the SOFAD at the expected JTF HQ and the proposed SOCC FN. At
the appropriate point, the NSHQ transfers responsibilities to the SOFAD and SOCC FN.

(1) The command relationship between COM JTF and COM SOCC should be
specified in the initiating directive issued by the establishing authority. C2
arrangements among the components and specific responsibilities should be
established during the operational-level planning process.

(2) Annex K, Special Operations, to the operational-level OPLAN, provides

broad guidance to the joint force, including the SOCC, concerning command,
control, and organization of SOF.

b. Deployment

(1) Nations are responsible, in close coordination with SACEUR, for the
deployment of their national contingents. The JTF HQ is often only able to monitor
the progress of unit movements until TOA. SHAPE develops the multinational
detailed deployment plan, then monitors and coordinates the use of strategic lift
assets through the Allied movement coordination centre (AMCC). The NSHQ
places a liaison element in the AMCC to represent SOF and to coordinate,
synchronize, and deconflict the movement of NATO SOF into and out of the JOA,
in consultation with the SOCC FN and the JTF HQ’s SOFAD.

Important Note. The joint logistics support group (JLSG) is

in charge for reception, staging, and onward movement
(RSOM) in theatre and assigning priorities for intra-theatre
airlift. The SOCC has to deal with the JLSG as coordinating
authority. (Details are fixed in the JTF HQ OPLAN
Development/Campaign Planning, where the special
operations planning and liaison element (SOPLE) J4
representative has a critical role.)

(2) Once Alliance political authorities approve the OPLAN and release the
execution directive, SACEUR issues the activation order, which initiates the
deployment of forces and the release of national SOF to SACEUR.

c. Employment. C2 of subordinate SOTGs, SOATGs, and conventional forces

should be clearly established in the SOCC’s concept of operations (CONOPS) and
subsequent support plan (SUPPLAN). C2 arrangements are modified as required during
the employment phase.

12 AJP-3(B), paras 0305, 0307, and 0308.

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d. Termination and Transition

(1) Termination and transition considerations should be addressed in the

planning process, before deployment, or as soon as possible during the initial
phase of the campaign. Transitions between SOTGs normally take the form of
relief in place (RIP) and should address all aspects of C2, employment,
sustainment, FP, and strategic communications.

(2) The keys to successful transition include:

(a) Early planning with the in-place SOTG TCN, as well as the other
actors in the operational environment, including HN, international
organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as
applicable.

(b) Establishing realistic objectives, goals, and end states.

(c) Providing seamless transition of intelligence and communications

systems and processes.

(d) Maintaining unity of effort and purpose.

(e) Establishing robust C2 infrastructure, such as people, equipment,

and processes, to manage the transition.

(3) SOF are encouraged to utilize the TOA process to enhance the arriving
SOTG’s situational awareness (SA), develop relationships with the other actors,
and continue progress toward the operational-level end state.

Important Note. A common method of transition is for the

incoming unit to shadow the outgoing unit, either partially or
completely, for half the transition period and then to switch
roles for the remaining time to complete the transition process.
This is often referred to as a left-seat/right-seat ride.

e. Redeployment. C2 of redeploying SOF out of the JOA is very complex. The

same level of effort should be applied to redeployment as was given to deployment
planning. SACEUR retains OPCOM of all assigned forces until TOA to their contributing
nations. Depending on the desires of the contributing nations, TOA can be upon
departure of forces from the JOA or their arrival at the point of debarkation.

Best Practice. It is also good practice to have the incoming

SOTG HQ staff overlap and/or conduct a planning cycle with
the outgoing HQ staff.

2-10. Command and Control of Deployed Forces

a. COM SOCC exercises C2 of his SOF and conventional forces within the
authorities specified by nations through SACEUR and COM JTF. Likewise, COM SOTG
will exercise C2 of the SOTUs or subunits assigned to the SOTG. A thorough

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understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each of these units is necessary to

conduct effective and successful special operations.

b. COM SOTG should ensure that lateral and higher HQs have a complete
understanding of the SOTG’s operational capabilities. It is useful to brief the
conventional force HQ operating in the same operational area as NATO SOF, as this
fosters mutual support and trust, harmonizes goals and objectives, and synchronizes
operations. Likewise, it is also beneficial for the SOTG to request and receive a
capabilities briefing from the conventional force HQ for the same reasons. Suggested
topics for these capabilities briefings include mission, intent, and purpose; battle rhythm
and coordination requirements; task organization; operational area assessment; overview
of specific capabilities and equipment, such as C2IS, air capabilities, and organic ISR;
unique support requirements; and projected timeline for deployment and employment.

Important Note. Providing an LO to the appropriate level

conventional HQ is a must-have, not a nice-to-have. Given
the layout of the SOCC, COM SOTG must determine the
appropriate level where this LO must be placed to facilitate the
SOTG’s day-to-day operations in the most likely operations
area, probably at division or brigade level. SOTGs may use
additional LOs to support specific operations for limited
durations at key friction points.

c. Using the conventional QRF to support SOF operations is also a possible

coordination point. Also, the SOTG tactical operations centre (TOC) should be
monitoring conventional force radio nets to enhance SA within conventional boundaries
or sending an LO to the conventional BSO.

2-11. Special Operation Task Group Headquarters. The SOTG HQ commands and controls
the SOTG and all subunits permanently assigned within, as well as those attached temporarily
to the SOTG for specific operations. To facilitate this C2, COM SOTG is responsible for
organizing the SOTG HQ in a manner to effectively assist in the control of SOF and provide
support to subordinate units.

2-12. Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Staff Considerations. There is no set
template for the SOTG HQ. The COM must decide prior to deployment what the HQ has to be
capable of, based on the assigned mission from the SOCC, and configure it accordingly. The
staff should be organized in the array of staff functions similar to that of the SOCC structure.
The notional SOTG HQ in Figure 2-2 is only one of many possible ways that the HQ can be
staffed and organized. In this example, the S5 and S7 functions have been placed under the
S3 for short-term planning and indigenous partnering issues, because there exists a need to
balance the SOTG operations with that of the training, assisting, and advising of HN forces as
part of the MA mission assigned to the SOTG. Other SOTG commanders may choose to keep
S5 and S7 functions separate or not to have an S7 function at all, and include those
functions/responsibilities within S3 to S5’s terms of reference.

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Figure 2-2. Notional SOTG HQ

2-13. Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Layout

a. There is no given template or structure on how to organize an SOTG HQ for mission

execution. It is up to the commander and his second in command or chief of staff (COS) to
decide what works best for their nation and/or the operational environment. Location and
type of infrastructure may be dictated for them by the SOCC or the conventional BSO
located there. Whatever the circumstances, the SOTG HQ must, at a minimum, be able to
operate 24/7 and provide the following functions:

(1) Monitor and track ongoing operations.

(2) Maintain secure communications throughout the execution phase to all

necessary entities.

(3) Contact the force on the ground if required.

(4) Coordinate with respective counterparts at BSO and SOCC level and, if
authorized by a specific situation, with the combined air operations centre
(CAOC)/special operations liaison element (SOLE).

(5) Manage movement and fire in close coordination with the SOCC.

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(6) Keep the SOTG LO to the SOCC informed.

(7) Manage the battlefield information systems.

(8) Ensure the provision of reports and handle the returns.

(9) Activate contingencies if required.

b. Permanent tasks for attached or nearby support centres and signal centres remain
unchanged. These elements have to be able to provide real-life support (RLS) as well as
functional expertise as required or as the situation dictates. They should be aware that
they are mission critical enablers during execution, as especially the signal centre will
preserve the operations centre’s ability to C2 the operation and to exchange information
with lateral and higher HQs, both in routine and emergency situations.

c. A notional structure of an SOTG HQ is depicted in Figure 2-3 and shows a generic

outlay of an SOTG operations centre.

Figure 2-3. Notional SOTG HQ Layout

Best Practice. SOF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have

shown that the SOTG HQ layout should be based on open
concepts as much as possible. While secure containerized
intelligence facilities for the elements of the joint intelligence
support element (JISE) or special operations intelligence
centre (SOIC) are still required, fewer walls between
operations and intelligence sections means reduced likelihood
of organizational blink.13

13 Organizational blink is a term unofficially coined by the U.S. joint special operations task force during operations
in Iraq that can be described as an organization’s inability to react quickly in a collaborative and unified manner to
solve a situation. In this section of C2, the organizational blink can be caused by an ineffective SOTG HQ layout
that is not conducive to quick cross collaboration between intelligence and operations/plans personnel when
executing a fleeting target during a find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate (F3EAD) cycle.

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d. Augmentees. When mission requirements exceed the SOTG HQ’s capabilities,

COM SOTG should request assistance through national channels first, and if that doesn‘t
help, through the SOCC. COM SOCC supports the manning shortfalls either internally or
by requesting additional forces. Conventional forces support personnel can augment the
SOTG in non-SOF billets. COM SOTG should request augmentees based upon desired
effect rather than particular units or military specialties. Early planning for augmentation
requirements provides a basis for programming resources and training.

2-14. Special Operations Task Group Headquarters Staff Functions and Responsibilities.
COM SOTG is provided a staff to assist him in the decision-making and execution processes.
They are an extension of the commander; their primary function is to C2 the SOTG subunits
and its authority is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will
free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and
maintaining SA. Normally there is a second in command/COS who is able to take over in the
commander’s absence and direct the staff on a daily basis. A detailed list of SOTG HQ staff
responsibilities can be found in Annex B.

a. Liaison. NATO operations require significant coordination, integration, and

collaboration. Differences in languages, cultures, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and
procedures are some of the challenges that require close cooperation. The maximum
use of liaison personnel, especially in operations with non-NATO contributing nations,
enhances interoperability and contributes significantly to mission success.

(1) Special Operations Task Group Liaison. Liaisons from the SOTG to the
SOCC are a fundamental part of the current operations picture, especially in a
multinational context. The liaison will typically conduct the task group CONOPS
approval briefing for COM SOCC or J3. The liaison will work closely with the J33
current operations officer or joint operations centre (JOC) director to ensure the
current SOTG status (SOTU disposition, SOTG logistics status, etc.) is up to date.
The liaison is responsible for communicating COM SOTG’s concept and intent to
the SOCC. Additionally, their ability to effectively communicate resource requests
will impact the degree and speed of the support the SOTG receives. For these
reasons, special consideration should be given when selecting the SOTG liaison.
In certain situations the SOTG may be required to provide liaisons to conventional
forces, HN, or other higher HQs. In addition, liaisons should be exchanged with
the HN and any local, regional, or IOs involved in the campaign or operating in the
battlespace with the SOTG, as required. The impact of the liaison on SOTG
operations cannot be overstated.

(2) Special Operations Task Unit Liaison. Liaisons from the SOTUs may be
necessary, particularly when an SOTG has several multinational subordinate units.
These liaisons are responsible for bridging the language and national doctrine
barriers that might exist. The liaison may be part of SOTU personnel or
additionally tasked SOTG personnel. If an SOTG has attached air assets, an air
liaison will certainly be necessary to address air platform-specific issues.

b. Liaison Officer Responsibilities

(1) Special operations LOs represent COM SOTG and his staff to the receiving
commanders. Liaisons promote understanding of the commander’s intentions to
both the sending and receiving HQs.

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(2) LOs should have the authority to speak for COM SOTG and should be of
sufficient rank to influence decision-making in the HQ to which they are assigned.

(3) Liaison personnel must have sufficient knowledge of the SOTG capabilities
and limitations and of the intentions and priorities of the staff sections they represent.
LOs should be innovative and tenacious, but also diplomatic and sensitive to the
operational challenges, staff processes, and battle rhythm of the receiving HQ.

(4) The receiving HQ should provide the ability for the LO to communicate back
to COM SOTG up to the NATO SECRET level.

c. Coordination with Higher Headquarters14

(1) COM SOTG should provide a senior officer who is vested with the authority
to make recommendations and facilitate decision-making during the planning
process. The earlier the SOTG can provide liaisons to the SOCC or any additional
organizations requiring SOTG expertise, the greater the opportunity to influence
the final plan.

Red Flag. The SOPLE would be sent from the SOCC HQ to

the JTF HQ during campaign planning. Its main effort would
be to produce Annex K. SOTG staff should only augment a
SOPLE as an absolute last resort.

(2) The SOPLE contains sufficient qualified SMEs to represent the SOCC staff’s
interests at the various sub-boards, meetings, working groups, and other coordination
mechanisms. The SOTG may be asked to augment the SOPLE, e.g. a complex
maritime CT operation being conducted by a nation but supported by the SOCC.

d. Coordination with Lateral Headquarters

(1) Placing liaisons among the SOTGs, SOATGs, or with conventional forces is
the primary method of coordination and ensuring critical information is rapidly
assessed and disseminated up and down the chain of command.

(2) The requirement for liaison elements is likely to require a large number of
highly qualified or most experienced personnel within an organization. This is
especially true for a relatively small organization such as the SOTG. Still, the
ability to synchronize activities among the SOTGs and SOATGs makes this a
valuable utilization of quality individuals.

e. Special Operations Command and Control Element

(1) A SOCCE is a C2 element with OPCON or TACON of SOTGs or SOTUs

operating in an AOO belonging to a land or maritime BSO. The SOCCE can receive
SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed
SOTGs/SOTUs. A SOCCE is tailored as appropriate, usually 8-10 personnel, and
exchanges liaison with the appropriate conventional HQ. Note: Until such time as a

14 Based on liaison guidance in AJP-3(B).

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SOCCE is required at the LCC or MCC, SOCC LOs will be positioned at the LCC and
at the MCC to establish a minimum but permanent liaison.

(2) SOTGs operating within the SOCCE’s AOO must provide an LO to the
SOCCE to ensure that SOTG plans are coordinated, deconflicted, and
synchronized with those of the conventional forces and other SOF.

2-15. Operational Geometry

a. Operational geometry (see Figure 2-4) provides a common understanding of how

the JOA is organized and labelled. The modern operational environment continues to
expand beyond traditional boundaries and is becoming more dispersed and non-
contiguous as adversaries conduct operations simultaneously on global, regional, and
local scales.

b. Designing and establishing effective operational geometry is key to any C2

arrangement and success of mission for both SOF and conventional forces. COM
SOTG, supported by the SOCC, must ensure that a clear operational geometry exists
from which to operate in conjunction with land and maritime forces or to operate
independently without intrusion by forces not involved with the SOF operation. All those
working within the respective AOOs and joint special operations areas (JSOAs) will
ensure C2 relationships are fully articulated and understood by all concerned.

c. All boundaries and areas are mission related, temporary, and limited by agreed-
to parameters, such as time, location, and function. COM JTFs do not have an area of
responsibility (AOR); SACEUR defines their JOA as required by their mission.

Figure 2-4. Operational Geometry

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(1) Joint Operations Area. A JOA is a temporary area defined by SACEUR in

which a designated COM JTF plans and executes a specific mission at the
operational level. A JOA is mission specific and is normally associated with a joint
force. The designated COM JTF plans and conducts military operations within a
JOA to accomplish a specific mission.

(2) Area of Operations. An AOO is an operational area defined by COM JTF

within a JOA for the conduct of specific military activities. Normally an AOO does
not encompass the entire JOA of COM JTF, but is sufficient in size to accomplish
assigned missions and protect forces.

(3) Area of Interest. The area of interest (AOI) is the area of concern to a
commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including
the commander’s areas of influence, operations, and/or responsibility, and
adjacent areas.

(4) Amphibious Objective Area. An amphibious objective area is a

geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive for purposes of C2, within
which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This
area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task
force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air,
and land operations.

(5) Joint Special Operations Area. A JSOA is an area of land and/or sea and
airspace assigned by a COM JTF to the commander of a joint special operations
force to conduct special operations.

(a) COM JTF establishes a JSOA when requested and justified by the
SOCC. COM SOCC may further assign a specific AOO within the JSOA to
a subordinate commander. The scope and duration of the special
operation, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations
all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed
into a JSOA. A JSOA may be limited in size to accommodate a short
duration DA mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing
broad range of special operations. COM JTFs may use a JSOA to
synchronize and facilitate simultaneous employment of conventional forces
and SOF in the same general area. When a JSOA is designated, COM
SOCC is the supported commander within the JSOA.

(b) Establishing a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent

operations simplifies the control of special operations. A JSOA usually
reduces the likelihood of collateral damage and fratricide as well. However,
COM SOCC should consider the perceived value of isolating SOF against
the possible greater benefit of integrating SOF into the overall campaign.

(c) A JSOA is the best possible control measure to facilitate SOF

operations and have full control of the battlespace. However, it must be
mission specific and limited in size, scope, and duration. The risk of
isolating SOF from the overall campaign is minimized if proper campaign
planning is conducted.

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(d) Use of JSOAs should be carefully considered because, although they

provide a three-dimensional battlespace to SOF, COM SOCC must also
manage the battlespace. This responsibility normally includes managing
displaced personnel, collecting and managing prisoners of war (POWs),
and managing airspace and fire support coordination. A SOCC is not
normally manned or equipped to operate as a battlespace control centre
without significant augmentation and liaison support from the other
components. One technique to avoid unnecessary interference with ACC
operations is to significantly limit the JSOA’s size and altitude.

(6) Restricted Operating Zone. A restricted operating zone (ROZ) is an area

of defined dimensions designated by the control authority in response to specific
operational situations.

Red Flag. SOF should avoid these additional responsibilities

at all costs. Some areas are not conducive to establishing a
JSOA, e.g. a city or major built-up area, as the likelihood of
collateral responsibilities is higher. The SOTG must be able to
coordinate fires and airspace at the joint terminal attack
controller (JTAC) level and through the SOAC.15

d. When operating within the AOO of another commander, in the absence of an

assigned operational area for their own exclusive use, SOF must comply with that
commander’s authority. Targeting, fires, force tracking, and air/land management must be in
accordance with the direction provided by the AOO commander. To reduce the risk of
fratricide, it is paramount that SOF air and ground units operating within an AOO keep the
AOO commander apprised of their locations and recognize that the AOO commander retains
the authority for establishing fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) and clearing fires.

Important Note. SOF should not be under any illusion that

working with conventional forces is easy. This can be difficult
as many conventional commanders are not educated on SOF
and think they can do it all within their own boundaries and
responsibilities. This normally requires a close working
relationship with conventional commanders and close liaison
throughout. It is highly recommended that these working
relationships be established prior to deployment if possible. In
certain cases COM JTF or COM LCC/MCC may have to direct
subordinates to support a SOF operation depending on its
degree of importance.

2-16. Summary. The SOTG must establish a solid SOTG HQ and be able to effectively plug in
to various levels of authority and coordination. COM SOTG must ensure his staff and subunit
commanders are proactive in ensuring SOF are properly understood and employed within the
conventional battlespaces. The importance of effective liaison cannot be overstated. COM
SOTG must make every effort to ensure close coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization
are achieved so that his SOF personnel and resources are positioned for success. Establishing
and maintaining effective networks at various levels of authority and coordination are vital and
cannot be overstressed.

15 Most NATO SOF nations are starting to adopt this term.

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CHAPTER 3 – TARGETING AND EFFECTS

3-1. General

a. Within complex operating environments, the key to success is directing limited SOF
resources to achieve a significant targeting effect that supports the commander’s intent for
the operation engaged in. It is this requirement for detailed target development and
potential effects analysis that demonstrates one of the key differences between SOF and
conventional operations, as highlighted in Figure 3-1. To achieve the desired results, time
must be spent using all available intelligence and information sources (civilian and military)
to build a multilayered picture of the operating environment.

Figure 3-1. Conventional Targeting versus SOF Targeting

b. It can be detrimental to leap directly into the hard kinetic targeting process,
particularly in a theatre dominated by non-conventional warfare. A true understanding of
the operational environment must be developed and all actors, good or bad, need to be
mapped out. Without the knowledge of how all of these elements work, how they are
linked, and the relationship that one has to another, it is impossible to determine the true
effect of potential operations. Fundamental to this process is the requirement to conduct
detailed intelligence and target analysis. There are various tools and methods that can
be used to develop this picture. This chapter outlines the tools that can be used at the
SOTG level.

c. Targets may be nominated at any level. In targeting, there are three levels:

(1) NATO, the JTF HQ, and CCs, to include the SOCC, direct and manage the
higher levels of the joint targeting policy, procedures, and cycles.

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(2) The SOTG builds the detailed target intelligence package (TIP), develops the
CONOPS, controls the assets, and manages the battlespace around the target.

(3) The SOTU, designated ground force commander (GFC), JTACs, and
forward air controllers (FACs) apply the targeting tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) to attack a deliberate or dynamic target with lethal effect.

3-2. Joint Targeting. Joint targeting is the process by which all interested parties (military,
interagency, and HN) nominate targets and determine the effects required to achieve the
desired objective. Joint targeting translates political and military guidance into desired effects
against the enemy at the tactical level. See Chapter 3 of the SOCC Manual for details on joint
targeting and the joint targeting cycle.

3-3. The Targeting Process. The targeting process starts at the highest levels within NATO
for certain targets. Some may be approved as high as the North Atlantic Council (NAC) while
others are approved at component level. For the purposes of this manual we will look at those
targets selected by the SOTG, as depicted in Figure 3-2, or assigned by the JTF HQ down
through the SOCC when deployed for a NATO operation.

Figure 3-2. SOTG Target Nomination Process

3-4. Targeting Categories.16 Targeting in NATO falls into two broad targeting categories,
deliberate and dynamic (as depicted in Figure 3-3), regardless of the desired lethal or non-lethal
effect. Time-sensitive targets (TSTs) transcend target categorization.

16 AJP-3.9(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, dated 2014, para 0109.

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Figure 3-3. The Engagement Continuum

a. Deliberate Targeting. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets known to

exist in an operational area with lethal and/or non-lethal actions scheduled against them.
Targets may be engaged in accordance with a timed schedule or held on call to be
prosecuted if the situation demands it. In all cases, target data has sufficient detail to
allow the capability matching and force assignment elements of the joint targeting cycle
to be planned and conducted. This enables COM JTF to establish the means for
achieving his objectives and is often sequenced to include actions to be taken over a
number of days. Resources are subsequently assigned corresponding to the level of
effort dedicated to this category, which can vary over the length of the campaign or
operation. This is most effective when target parameters, such as location, are well
known or predictable.

b. Dynamic Targeting. The dynamic approach normally prosecutes targets known

to exist in the AOO. They have received some target development, but were not
detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in the deliberate
process. Sometimes unexpected targets emerge that meet criteria specific to operational
objectives. On these occasions, additional resources will be required to complete the
target development, validation and prioritization, although they can be prosecuted by
redirecting existing assets.

c. Time-sensitive Target. TSTs are derived from NAC-approved time-sensitive

targeting categories, and from these, specific targets are designated by COM JTF. Once
identified, they are given the highest priority, requiring an immediate response because
they are either highly lucrative, fleeting targets or pose a threat to campaign objectives.
TSTs can be prosecuted using both the deliberate and dynamic approaches.

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d. Combat Engagement. Combat engagement, more commonly known as troops in

contact (TIC), is not part of the joint targeting process. It usually includes attack against
an adversary and normally involves joint fires coordinated at the tactical level in
accordance with ROE. Combat engagement should not be confused with dynamic
targeting.

3-5. Target Lists.17 The SOTG nominates and prosecutes targets. Therefore, the SOTG HQ
staff must understand the different target lists and the desired effects associated with each.

a. Joint Target List. The joint target list (JTL) is a comprehensive list of targets
compiled by the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB); each target on the JTL is
scrutinized to ensure it complies with strategic targeting guidance, national limitations,
and national caveats. Targets on the JTL will not be cleared legally against ROE and
international law criteria until selected for engagement and nominated on the joint
prioritized target list (JPTL). Once compiled, all further joint targeting activities will be
derived from the JTL.

b. Joint Prioritized Target List.18 The JPTL, a subset of the JTL, is a prioritized list
of targets produced by the JTCB as an output of the target development phase of the
joint targeting cycle. Targets on this list have been scrutinized to ensure legal, strategic
targeting guidance, national caveat adherence, and risk assessment compliance. The
draft JPTL is submitted to the joint coordination board by the JTCB for review and for the
commander’s approval. Once approved, the JPTL provides direction on which
component is responsible for target prosecution, the proposed means of attack, and the
lethal/non-lethal effect required to neutralize the target.

(1) Lethal Effect. Lethal targeting requires the “application of force (including
deadly force), whose aim is to achieve the neutralization of a target. Will generally
consist of kinetic means, although may include methods deliberately designed to
bring about the same result.”19

(2) Non-lethal Effect. Non-lethal targeting is not defined but is considered to

include all other means apart from kinetic, e.g. Info Ops, show of force, civil-
military cooperation (CIMIC), reintegration/reconciliation, influence activities,
electronic warfare (EW), cyberattack, economic sanctions.

c. Prioritized Target List. The prioritized target list (PTL) is a subset of the JPTL
and allocates prioritized targets to each component. It is, in effect, the JPTL broken
down into a component target list and should include all targets that were on the
component target nomination list (TNL), unless excluded by the JTCB, as well as other
targets that may have been reallocated from one component to another by the JTCB.
The PTL should mirror the JPTL in providing direction on the proposed means of attack
and the lethal/non-lethal effect required to neutralize the target.

17 AJP-3.9(B), section VI. More target lists and databases are available in joint targeting; only the most common
relevant to the SOCC and SOTGs are listed in this chapter for reference purposes. For additional information, see
AD 80-70, Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting, dated 27 Apr 10, pp. 47.
18 During recent NATO campaigns, this has been called the joint prioritized effects list.
19 AD 80-70, pp. M-3.

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d. Restricted Target List. The restricted target list (RTL) is a subset of the JTL;
some targets on the RTL may be on the JPTL. Targets on the RTL are legal targets that
are either temporarily or permanently restricted by the joint targeting process.

e. No-strike List. The no-strike list (NSL) is a subset of the JTL; it lists the targets
that must not be engaged due to international law considerations or for strategic policy
reasons as directed by the NAC. Targets on the NSL cannot be prosecuted until
transferred to the JPTL.

f. Target Nomination List. A TNL is compiled by each component in accordance

with direction contained in the JCO. It is a prioritized list of component targets that is
forwarded to the JTCB as part of the joint targeting process. The TNL contains new
targets that have yet to be included on the JTL (and that may also be nominated for the
JPTL) as well as existing targets on the JTL that the component wishes to nominate for
the JPTL for engagement.

3-6. Targeted Audiences. Before anything or anyone is targeted, the affected audience
levels must be understood. This is an important factor and must be considered in both
deliberate and hasty planning to determine decisive points/conditions, desired effects,
objectives, and end states.

a. Political/Strategic. This level includes the political, NATO strategic, and

international community audiences, as well as the populations within the Alliance nations,
that influence decisions.

b. Operational. The operational level includes the in-theatre infrastructure, HN

government, and security forces.

c. Tactical. Targeting of physical infrastructure at the local level in asymmetric

conflict is sometimes necessary to deny the enemy an advantage, but physical targets
should be carefully analysed to ensure tactical necessity, decisiveness, and impact to
audiences. During the prosecution of physical targets, every effort must be taken to
reduce collateral damage, thus denying an Info Ops victory to the adversary.
Additionally, audiences may be the intended targets of both direct and indirect means.

(1) Unopposed or Friendly. Audiences who support the government, security

forces, and are not hostile or violent against international support to the counter-
insurgency efforts.

(2) Opposed or Hostile. Audiences who oppose the government, its security
forces, and any external assistance to counter the insurgency. This may include
both active and passive supporters of the insurgents who are unwilling to take up
arms or to participate in violence or attacks.

(3) Undecided or the Fence Sitters. The audience that is uncommitted or

largely neutral but whose support is sought by both the friendly and hostile audiences.

3-7. Find, Feel, Understand, Influence, and Disrupt. Find, feel, understand, influence, and
disrupt (F2UID) is a macro-level targeting tool that can be used at various SOF levels to develop
an operational picture and to describe the operational environment. It provides the baseline
understanding of the indigenous population and the complex network of connections formed by
family, tribes, economics, crime, and internal conflict. Once the information is displayed and

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processed, it allows the user to develop ways to influence and disrupt the target through kinetic
or non-kinetic means. This cycle relates to the concept that the targeting process is intelligence
driven, but command led. The cycle needs to be continuously reviewed and refocused to
coordinate with operational developments, operational intent, and updated priority intelligence
requirements (PIRs). The F2UID cycle (see Figure 3-4) can be seen as an aggressive cultural
intelligence model. All available sources must be used and targeted in the right way to build a
comprehensive picture for the SOTG of the AOO.

Important Note. F2UID and F3EAD are now the accepted

SOF targeting processes in accordance with AJP-3.5(A).
NATO SOF commanders at all levels should become familiar
with and make every effort to use them.

Figure 3-4. F2UID Cycle

a. Step 1 – Find

(1) In line with the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment

(CPOE), the initial find stage is the opportunity to set the scene, establish the
operational AOI, and start to understand the environment. Once this information is
obtained, the relationships between each variable must be identified. Various
networks that are active within the AOO may be identified; these may be
supportive networks that can provide positive influence and information or possible
threat networks intent on disrupting local stability and security. Based on the
results of the initial find activity, collection requirements are identified based on
gaps in knowledge. Without collection efforts to fill these gaps, it is unlikely that
desired objectives will be achieved. The J2 and J3 targeteers should work closely
to develop collection requirements that meet the operational objective.

(2) The J2 has the tools available to process, exploit, and disseminate
information; however, the J3 has the ability to acquire additional information that
may be vital to understanding the situation from the operational perspective. All
resources and relationships should be exploited to provide increased clarity to the

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developing operational picture at each level of targeting. While ISR is the key to
many aspects of target system analysis, information provided through partnering,
MA, and key leadership engagement (KLE) becomes increasingly significant as
operations develop. This information also gains significance during HN-led
evidence-based operations where human intelligence (HUMINT) becomes a key
information source.

(3) This first step identifies various influencing factors and actors included in
eight operational variables for analysis and assessment.

(a) Political. Since modern warfare at its base level is about political
power, an understanding of the political landscape within the HN is critical.
This includes both formal and informal political leaders within the AOO. Key
officials and parties within the formal political system need to be identified.
Within the informal arena, tribal and ethnic groups and other informal
leaders should be recognized.

(b) Military. Identify capabilities of the security sector, including armed

forces and police, along with the capabilities of the enemy.

(c) Economic. Gather general information regarding the standards of

living and economic variables within the AOO, including cost of living,
labour market, energy provision, etc. Often the perception of the economic
situation influences a population’s level of support for central governance
and/or the enemy.

(d) Social/Cultural. An important aspect to success for hostile actors

and coalition forces (Alliance and HN) in modern conflict is the support of
the population. A common tactic of the opposition is to create friction
between different groups within society to gain or to increase the level of
support from any faction that shares a common element with the opposition.
Groups may be aligned due to various influencing factors, including
ethnicity, religion, race, social rank, language, tradition, etc. Key to
countering opposition efforts and to avoid alienating the local populace is to
ensure an understanding of this local environment and the cultural
landscape within an AOO.

(e) Information. Opposition leaders seek to control, manipulate, and

distribute information within the population they wish to influence. An
understanding of how information is being accessed and used is needed to
counter and target this activity and area of influence.

(f) Infrastructure. This relates to the basic facilities required for the
community to function. Key infrastructure may include electricity, sewers,
medical facilities, water, academic provision, etc. The degradation or
destruction of local infrastructure often assists the opposition since it
negatively affects both the HN and its population.

(g) Physical Environment. Consider the factors of terrain, weather,

and climate.

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(h) Time. This can be a key factor due to its influence on nearly all
aspects of the battlespace. Each actor within an AOO may look at time in a
different way. Activities of the insurgents may be timed to influence local
politics or undermine the local security situation. Alliance forces may be
hindered over time by deteriorating support for an ongoing campaign.

b. Step 2 – Feel. To appreciate the AOO, it is useful to utilize the areas, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) concept (defined below).
During this process, a number of civil considerations are analysed from various
perspectives: the population, the opposition, and the forces involved. This helps identify
areas of influence and weakness, leading to more accurate and effective targeting. This
analysis also identifies those areas, groups, and individuals that may be of interest for
exploitation, influencing purposes, or direct targeting.

(1) A – Areas. Develop knowledge on demographics and where particular

tribes, ethnicities, religious communities, or criminal enclaves exist and operate.
These different areas may be supportive, permissive, or hostile. There are a
number of social network analysis tools that include population support and ethnic
support overlays.

(2) S – Structures. Consider how certain structures of interest are used by the
opposition and friendly forces. If the SOCC plans to use a structure, ensure that
the impact on the local populace is low or mitigated. This becomes an important
CIMIC task. Examples are government buildings, television and radio stations,
electrical power plants and dams, oil refineries, sewage treatment plants,
churches/mosques, and schools.

(3) C – Capabilities. The ability of the local authorities to provide the essential
services that impact the quality of life, especially for the neutral population. If the
local government cannot provide the basic services, the area becomes an AOI for
the opposition. Examples include administrative, security, emergency services,
public health, food, water, and sanitation.

(4) O – Organizations. Analyse all the key organizations within an area. This
can include religious, political, loyalists, labour unions, criminal organizations, and
community organizations. Also evaluate other actors within IOs, NGOs, and other
coalition forces that may have differing aims, objectives, and purposes.

(5) P – People. Build on the previous steps to determine the background,

motivations, and goals of the human infrastructure within the AOO.

(6) E – Events. Certain events trigger emotions within the population. Some
examples are national and religious holidays, changing seasons, and elections.

c. Step 3 – Understand. The flow of information does not stop, and all information
must be analysed and fused if it is to be used for operations. For this reason, the
understand phase of F2UID is the most important. It requires a level of cooperation
between the intelligence and operations cells. Again, intelligence drives the process of
understanding, but it is led by operations. Analysts have a variety of tools and processes
to develop, display, and manage information to mould it into a usable form for
understanding purposes.

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(1) Predictive Analysis. Analysts can plot and display information on network
activity, for example, to identify patterns that assist in predicting future events.
Once patterns emerge, it is easier to focus collection and operational activity to
potentially disrupt future actions.

(2) Link Analysis. Understanding links at the social and network levels is
fundamental to predicting what type of effect can be achieved through
operationally focused targeting.

(3) Network Analysis. Once various actors and organizational networks are
identified, develop an understanding of how each is related to the other by using
social network analysis methods. It is not sufficient to simply draw a line on a
network diagram. It is important to appreciate why that link exists and how it has
developed within the structural and social process. There are a number of goals
for a social network analysis approach:

(a) Visualize relationships between actors and uncover organizational

structures.

(b) Study factors that influence and define strength of relationships, such
as age, cultural background, previous history, and experience.

(c) Identify critical vulnerabilities in information flow and decisive points

or conditions.

d. Step 4 – Influence
Info Ops are a military function to provide
(1) To influence is the action advice and coordination of military information
or process of producing effects activities in order to create desired effects on
on the actions, behaviour, and the will, understanding, and capability of
opinions of an actor. A detailed adversaries, potential adversaries, and other
target analysis identifies actors NAC-approved parties in support of Alliance
who may be affected. Once a mission objectives.
potential target is identified,
activities should be coordinated – AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations, dated 23 Nov 09
through the targeting process.

(2) All kinetic and non-kinetic actions generate a message, whether intended or
unintended. Info Ops are integral to the successful execution of military
operations. The goal of the joint force is to shape the information environment to
achieve information superiority. Info Ops contribute to information superiority by
both defending military decision-making from adversary attacks and by influencing
and degrading an adversary’s decision-making capability, thereby producing an
information advantage. Achieving information superiority requires integrating Info
Ops capabilities into the planning process, into the commander’s intent and
CONOPS, and applying Info Ops across the range of military operations.

(a) Psychological Operations. The primary purpose of psychological

operations (PsyOps) is to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour
of selected individuals or groups in accordance with NAC-approved PsyOps
objectives, and to induce or reinforce behaviours favourable to overall
Alliance objectives. Unlike public affairs (PA), PsyOps retain direct control

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over content, dissemination, and audience. Effective PsyOps require timely

provision of intelligence and resources, such as linguistic support, graphics
and print capability, broadcasting capability, and other delivery mechanisms.

(b) Civil-military Cooperation. CIMIC involves the resources and

arrangements that support the relationship between commanders and the
national authorities, civil and military, and civilian populations in areas
where military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements
include cooperation with non-governmental or international agencies,
organizations, and authorities. COM JTFs need to establish relationships
with a variety of civilian authorities and organizations since CIMIC may be a
central part of the mission, as in the case of disaster or humanitarian relief.
The force may be partially dependent on the civilian population for
resources and information, and may rely on the civil authorities to provide
security in certain areas. It may even be impossible to gain full freedom of
action and movement without their cooperation. However, merely
establishing good relations might be enough to deny the same advantages
to hostile or potentially hostile forces. Whatever the situation, commanders
have a moral and legal responsibility toward the civilian populations in their
areas that can only be met by cooperating with the civil government and
international bodies.

(c) Public Affairs. PA and Info Ops are separate but related functions.
Both directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation,
and deter adversary actions; however, the efforts of PA and Info Ops differ
with respect to audience, scope, and intent. Therefore, coordination
between PA and Info Ops must be assured at all times and at all levels to
ensure consistency in the message released by the military to outside
audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the
campaign. Beyond coordination of efforts and messages, PA has no role in
performing the Info Ops function.

Important Note. COM SOTG does not develop Info Ops

objectives for his task group; the BSO in which the SOTG
operates does. Therefore, it is imperative that COM SOTG
and his staff meet the BSO Info Ops objectives and
understand the Info Ops themes, then design operations in
such a way that they complement or support the BSO. Failure
to do so can result in information fratricide and can undermine
ongoing influence or disrupt operations being conducted by
conventional units.

(d) Information Operations Activities. SOF and the SOTG are

intrinsically part of the Info Ops campaign. When the three main Info Ops
activities, defined by NATO doctrine, are examined, it is clear that much of
what SOF are designed and resourced to do through MA, SR, and DA is, in
some way, tied to these Info Ops activities. This makes integration of Info
Ops into SOF planning easier.

(e) Counter Command Activities. These activities are direct, action-

specific, and deal with neutralizing key enemy organizations, networks, and

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cells. Physical destruction is coordinated through the joint targeting

process, with the aim of destroying or degrading rather than influencing the
adversary’s C2. Total destruction of an adversary’s C2 nodes is rarely
achievable, is only effective for a short time, or is undesirable because it
denies other exploitation opportunities. Political constraint may also impede
achieving the desired effect through these activities. The key to counter
command activities target planning is a thorough coordination and
identification of critical and vulnerable nodes.

(f) Operations Security. OPSEC is the process that gives the

appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny adversary
knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of friendly forces.
The OPSEC process is not an assured protection of all information;
balancing risk is a commander’s decision. Oppressive OPSEC rules may
be counterproductive in terms of resource costs and limitations on friendly
activity. Conversely, relaxed OPSEC rules allow greater freedom of action
for friendly forces but increase the risk of compromise.

(g) Influencing Actions. Influencing activities are those actions whose

primary purpose is to influence will. This may be achieved by the promotion
of identified themes to approved audiences through verbal and non-verbal
messages. Influencing activities seek to predispose, persuade, convince,
deter, disrupt, compel, or coerce approved audiences to adopt or reinforce
options or to create inaction. Influencing activities can capitalize on, increase
the effectiveness of, or, in some cases, remove the need for kinetic attacks.
As part of a comprehensive approach, influencing actions focus the impact of
existing actions against vulnerabilities to ensure that their effect is coherent,
supports joint force objectives, and conveys the desired message.
Influencing activities also generate actions (tasks), ranging from a show of
force to the dropping of leaflets, specifically intended to promote themes and
thus influence will. Influencing activities must be fully synchronized with
strategic communications to ensure maximum effectiveness.

e. Step 5 – Disrupt. To disrupt is to prevent effective interaction or the cohesion of

the enemy combat and combat support missions. If the desired effect is not possible
through indirect or influence means, lethal or non-lethal kinetic operations may need to
be conducted to disrupt an adversary’s activities. It is at this point where F2UID links into
the F3EAD cycle as outlined in paragraph 3-10.

3-8. Target Prioritization. Each level of the targeting process is required to prioritize their
targets. At the SOTG level, the prioritization is based on operational guidance and direction
developed at the JTF HQ level and pushed down through the components. For example,
operational targets for the JTF HQ might be in the insurgent Network X as Priority 1 and Network
Y as Priority 2. The SOCC may focus on the sub-networks of Network X, such as their IED cell
as Priority 1, human trafficking cell as Priority 2, criminal cell as Priority 3, and smuggling cell as
Priority 4, while the SOTG targets the IED builder as Priority 1, the suicide vest IED recruiter as
Priority 2, the IED planner as Priority 3, and the IED cell leader as Priority 4.

3-9. CARVER. CARVER is a tool that can be used by the SOTG to prioritize targets as
described in the example above. It is based upon a weighted scoring system that can be
applied to people and objects. Each category is given a score, then the total is calculated and

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compared to dictate priority in relation to desired outcome. CARVER can be used for collective
target prioritization (Figure 3-5) and for individual target effect options (Figure 3-6).

a. Collective CARVER Rating Scale. The most obvious target is not always the
right target. Typically used at the SOTG level, collective CARVER forces the COM and
his staff to look at all the key enemy targets (military or infrastructure) or players within a
network and identify who or what is best to target up front within the capabilities and
resources available to the SOTG.

b. Individual CARVER. Also used at the SOTG level, this level of CARVER forces
the targeteer to analyse and prioritize an individual for the best targeting effect such as
kill, capture, or do nothing. Furthermore, it can help determine how best to kill via
covert/discreet operations, such as using a sniper or conducting a precision night raid, or
overt operations, such as kinetic strike in plain view for all to see. CARVER scoring
categories are:

(1) Criticality. Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in

targeting. Criticality is related to how much a target’s destruction, denial,
disruption, and damage impair the adversary’s political, economic, or military
operations, or how much a target component will disrupt the function of a target
complex. In determining criticality, individual targets within a target system must
be analysed with relation to the other elements critical to the function of the target
system or complex. Critical targets may also be selected for SR missions.

(2) Accessibility. To damage, destroy, disrupt, deny, or collect data on a

target, SOF must be able to reach it with the necessary equipment, either
physically or via indirect means. During SR missions, SOF not only must observe
the target, but must also remain in the area undetected for extended periods of
time. The SOF unit must be able to safely exfiltrate once the mission is complete.
Weather, light data, physical security measures, and the adversary disposition at
the target area are all considered. In some cases, accessibility is judged as either
feasible or infeasible.

(3) Recuperability. In the case of DA missions, it is important to estimate how

long it will take the adversary to repair, replace, or bypass the damage inflicted on
a target. Primary considerations are spare parts availability and the ability to re-
route production. A target is not a valid SOF target if it can be repaired or
bypassed in a short amount of time or with minimal resources.

(4) Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if SOF have the means and expertise
to attack it. At the strategic level, a broader range of resources and technology is
available to conduct the target attack. At the tactical level, resources may be
limited to organic personnel, weapons, and munitions or assets that can be
attached, borrowed, or improvised.

(5) Effect. The target should be attacked only if the desired effects can be
created to achieve the objective. These effects may be of a military, political,
economic, informational, or psychological nature. The effect on the populace is
viewed in terms of alienating the local inhabitants, strengthening the resistance
movement, or triggering reprisals against the indigenous people in the immediate
target area. The effect on the populace may also impact SOF’s infiltration,
exfiltration, and evasion and recovery routes. Collateral damage must be

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calculated and weighed against the expected military benefit to determine if an

attack would be advisable under the concept of proportionality. Collateral damage
includes, but is not limited to, civilian injuries, deaths, and adverse economic
impacts of the proposed attack.

(6) Recognizability. The target must be identifiable under various weather,

light, and seasonal conditions without being confused with other targets or target
components. Sufficient data must be available for SOF to find the target on the
ground and to differentiate the target from similar objects in the target area. The
same requirement exists to distinguish target critical damage points and target
stress points from similar components and their parent structures and
surroundings. With appropriate training or augmentation, SOF also should be able
to recognize appropriate computer programs, communications circuits, or similar
targets of Info Ops missions.
CARVER VALUE RATING SCALE (NOTIONAL)
C A R V E R
Loss would be Easily Extremely SOF definitely Favourable Easily recognized
mission stopper accessible and difficult to have the means sociological by all with no
5 away from replace with and expertise to impact; OK confusion 5
security long down attack impact on
time (1 year) civilians
Loss would Easily Difficult to SOF probably Favourable Easily recognized
reduce mission accessible replace with have the means impact; no by most with little
4 performance outside long down and expertise to adverse impact confusion 4
considerably time (< 1 year) attack on civilians

Loss would Accessible Can be SOF may have Favourable Recognized with
reduce mission replaced in the means and impact; some some training
3 3
performance relatively short expertise to adverse impact
time (months) attack on civilians
Loss may Difficult to gain Easily SOF probably No impact; Hard to recognize,
reduce mission access replaced in a have no impact adverse impact confusion
2 2
performance short time on civilians probable
(weeks)
Loss would not Very difficult to Easily SOF do not Unfavourable Extremely difficult
affect mission gain access replaced in have much impact; assured to recognize
1 1
performance short time capability to adverse impact without extensive
(days) attack on civilians orientation
Note: For specific targets, more precise, target-related data can be developed for each element in the matrix.

Figure 3-5. Example of Collective CARVER Value Rating Scale

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AMIR JON (OBJ NIGHTINGALE)

Figure 3-6. Individual CARVER Example

3-10. Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse, and Disseminate. F3EAD, as depicted in Figure 3-7,
has replaced the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess cycle in NATO SOF targeting doctrine
as the high-value individual (HVI) targeting process. The important emphasis within this cycle is
the relationship between the operations and intelligence functional areas, which are both
intimately involved in the process.

Figure 3-7. F3EAD Targeting Cycle

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a. Find. Before the find phase is begun, the target needs to be nominated and
approved in accordance with the joint targeting cycle. Intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) or F2UID produces the information that generates the find. The SOTG
will conduct much of the find phase for different targets over the first few months of its
deployment into a new AOO. As both threat networks and social networks are
developed, understanding of the operational environment expands and produces key
information that leads to further refinement of the intelligence required to transition from
the find to fix phase.

Figure 3-8. Find Phase

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b. Fix. Once a target has been found, the full gamut of intelligence collection
examine capability is applied against the target to develop operational triggers to fix the
target in space and time. The SOTG through the GFC will confirm the pillars of targeting
(see paragraph 3-11) based on established positive identification (PID), pattern of life
(POL), collateral damage estimate (CDE), ROE, and approval authorities. The GFC
supported by the various targeting centres at the SOTG, SOCC, BSO, CAOC, and JTF
HQ will give the final stand-by to his team(s) to execute the deliberate or dynamic plan to
kill or capture the target.

Figure 3-9. Fix Phase

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c. Finish. The finish phase is the application of force against a target via kinetic
means to kill or capture him/her. Under legacy targeting methodologies, the finish phase
was considered the main effort. This made sense in prior wars that were focused more
on physical destruction of enemy forces and infrastructure as a means to end the
enemy’s will to resist. However, in an information-age era of protracted conflicts, risk
aversion, non-state actors, and networked warfare, the main effort cannot be on finishing
enemy forces in a traditional sense, in large part because the nature of warfare has
changed. Therefore, F3EAD does not end in the finish phase; indeed, with finish, the
main effort of F3EAD is just beginning.

Figure 3-10. Finish Phase

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d. Exploit. The exploit phase is considered to be the most critical single step in the
process as it leads to the finding, fixing, and finishing of the next target and the
perpetuation of the cycle. In the F3EAD model, exploitation is the process of examining,
interrogating, and processing captured enemy personnel, equipment, and materiel for
intelligence purposes. The overall aim of the exploitation effort is to produce enough
actionable intelligence and/or prosecutorial evidence to perpetuate the F3EAD process
as rapidly as possible. A relatively new addition in such a cycle is the inclusion of
prosecution of enemy forces within the exploitation phase, which sees intelligence being
turned into evidence that can enable future prosecution under national or international
law. This process begins here and is followed through into the next analyse phase.

Figure 3-11. Exploit Phase

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e. Analyse. The analyse phase is where the information gained in the find, fix,
finish, and exploit phases turns into intelligence that can be used to drive operations.
Analysis can be performed by SOF in theatre or passed to alternative fusion centres via
reach-back for further in-depth analysis.

f. Disseminate. The last step in the F3EAD process is the disseminate phase.
Dissemination of intelligence information gleaned through the SOF targeting process
helps to create a friendly network to defeat an enemy network throughout the intelligence
enterprise and helps eliminate intelligence stovepipes. Wider dissemination to
conventional, coalition, and even HN military forces, interagency partners, and civilian
leadership contributes enormously to the success of F3EAD by expanding the
intelligence and operations networks in support of SOF missions.

Figure 3-12. Analyse and Disseminate Phases

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Figure 3-13. High-value Individual Targeting Process: F3EAD Within D3A

3-11. Pillars of Lethal Targeting. The SOTG, through its deployed SOTU/GFC, has the
ultimate responsibility of having eyes on a target and ensuring that the lethal action soon to be
taken is commensurate with the mission objectives and the realities of the battlespace. Staff
officers in TOCs and JOCs can only see what is on a screen. Their job is to take the
information passed on by the SOTU/GFC and ensure that it is passed up the targeting chain so
that the required targeteers, weaponeers, legal advisors (LEGADs), and target engagement and
national approval authorities can make the final decision based on all available information. To
aid all parties concerned and to ensure the information is passed on quickly and decisions
made accordingly, a number of targeting pillars have been developed that outline the criteria
that must be satisfied before kinetic action can be taken.

Figure 3-14. Pillars of Lethal Targeting

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a. Positive Identification. Once

What constitutes PID?
POL information has been collated
and analysed, at some point it will be SIGINT, for example, can locate a target
possible to determine a specific but may not be able to discern who it is.
location where the target will be An airborne sensor with full-motion video
located, in other words, to fix the (FMV) can track but not necessarily
target. Once satisfied that the fix is identify the target.
valid, it will be possible to engage the
target via whatever lethal or non- HUMINT can provide intent but may not be
lethal means have been planned and able to fix a target to a precise location.
approved or, in the case of a However, these disciplines working
dynamic target, assets available to together are able to focus the spotlight on
conduct the task. PID of a target as foes who are hidden in the general
lawful is a fundamental requirement, population so they can be captured or
in particular for any targeted killing killed.
operation. If the target cannot be
positively identified, no operation will take place. As with the development of POL, the
ability to fix a target and positively identify it requires multiple sources of intelligence and
coordination of assets.

b. Pattern of Life. One of the critical intelligence requirements when targeting an

individual or objective is to gain a clear picture of the routines and movements associated
with that target. By developing this POL information, we gain information that can identify
potential opportunities to target, as+[3 well as providing information associated with
CDEs and mitigation of risk factors. The resources required to undertake this activity,
whether an SR task or the use of ISR, can be very intensive and specialized, requiring
early consideration and planning. Any ISR requirements should be coordinated through
the SOCC via an ISR support request.

c. Rules of Engagement. Along with international laws of armed conflict (LOACs)

within any campaign there will be specific ROE that outline the basis by which targeting
activities are conducted, whether based upon the principle of self-defence, military
necessity, or equipment denial. If a target does not fit within the boundaries of the ROE,
action will not be authorized. Therefore, when planning, all activity should relate back to
the ROE principles associated with the campaign.

d. Collateral Damage Estimate

CDE cannot account for:
(1) The CDE has become a  Weapons malfunction
fundamental part of both the pre-
planned and dynamic targeting  Operational delivery errors
process. It is a methodology that  Altered enemy tactics
provides the process to predict and
mitigate collateral damage from  Unknown transient non-
conventional, non-nuclear kinetic combatant personnel and/or
strikes. When employing joint fires, a property
CDE is required on every target in
accordance with ROE. The target is weaponeered to balance accomplishing the
mission with the risks to friendly forces and the risk of collateral damage. The
CDE methodology attempts to ensure limited risk to non-combatants while
balancing the risk versus priority and significance of the mission.

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(2) Within each operation there will be different CDE levels that are decided
upon by calculations and estimates based upon the questions in Figure 3-15.
Depending upon what level an operation is deemed to fall within, differing levels of
approval will be required to authorize the target for strike.

Have I got PID of the individual or target I want to attack?

Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or non-combatant

personnel, involuntary human shields, or significant environmental
concerns within the effects range of the weapon I would like to use to
attack the target?

Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by attacking the target

with a different weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still
accomplish the mission? If not, how many civilians and non-combatants do
I think will be injured or killed by the attack?

Are the collateral effects of my attack excessive in relation to the expected

military advantage gained, and do I need to elevate this decision to the
next level of command to attack the target based on the ROE in effect?

Figure 3-15. Key CDE Questions

(3) Field CDE can be applied in situations where time precludes the application
of formal CDE methodology during hasty offensive operations/TST. However,
commanders must be cognizant of the additional risk imposed by applying field
versus formal CDE methodology.

e. National Approval Authority. Within any operation there are a number of different
approval processes that will apply within pre-planned and dynamic or time-sensitive
scenarios. These will be based upon national and operational caveats, including weapon
type and CDE calculations. The operational approval authority required for particular
target sets will be outlined within the operational ROE. In addition, different nations may
have their own restrictions and caveats pertaining to indirect fire. These will need to be
considered if requesting support, since not only will the ground commander need to have
knowledge of assets and their capabilities, he will also need to be aware of the possible
restrictions applied to their usage, depending on national caveats.

3-12. Consequence Management. Not all targeting effects are positive. Planning within the
SOTG must assess the various consequences of planned actions and attempt to mitigate those
consequences before, during, and after each operation. The following areas should be
considered by the mission planning element, included in the SOF CONOPS, and briefed to
COM SOCC before mission execution. It is important to note that the executing unit is asking
COM SOCC to accept the risks identified and to be prepared to provide support if and when the
requirement to mitigate consequence of action exists.

a. Most Likely and Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action. It is difficult to

pinpoint the exact action an enemy will undertake to win or to survive. By understanding
who the enemy is, their capabilities and resources, and their overall support from other
actors, intelligence personnel are in a better position to consider the enemy’s most likely
and most dangerous reactions to a plan of action, and from there develop ways to

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overcome or to mitigate that risk. Enemy reaction (physical and non-physical) must be
assessed based on structure, capabilities, resources, and links.

b. Risk to Friendly Forces. Operations that are designed to achieve desired

second and third order effects are typically complex in planning and execution. The more
complex an operation, the greater the potential for risk to friendly forces. Detailed
analysis must be conducted to ensure the risk to friendly troops is worth the desired
effects. If it is not, additional planning may have to be done to reduce or mitigate the risk.

c. Risk to NATO Mission. Every NATO member’s physical actions are seen as a
NATO message by all targeted and non-targeted parties. Special operations personnel
at all levels must be cognizant of this fact. In today’s informational environment, an
individual tactical action may have strategic level impacts. For SOF, planning at all levels
must demonstrate that direct and indirect effects will not undermine the NATO mission
and objectives.

d. Risk to Host Nation’s Government. All NATO deployed forces, including SOF,
must understand the potential effects their actions may have on the HN’s government.
NATO actions must not undermine the support of the population toward their government
and security forces.

e. Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage. Civilian causalities (CIVCAS) and

collateral damage should be avoided at all costs. When the risk is considered high,
approval must be sought through the appropriate levels of delegated authority in
accordance with respective NATO targeting directives and any mission-specific tactical
directives. Special operations units must be able to demonstrate that all efforts are made
to avoid CIVCAS and collateral damage. If they cannot be avoided, appropriate
consequence management planning must be put in place.

3-13. Informational Targeting Effects. As discussed in para 3-7d, once Info Ops objectives
are defined at the various levels (strategic, operational, and tactical), SOF must ensure that
targets and actions planned complement or support those objectives. This requires a predictive
approach to ensure that the follow-on effects are anticipated and considered fully. It also may
require effects to be mitigated prior to, during, and after mission execution. The ability to
analyse second and third order effects is essential to evaluating measures of effectiveness as
part of the assessment phase of targeting. Figure 3-16 demonstrates how informational
targeting effects can be determined. When done correctly and, more importantly, subjectively, it
becomes another valuable tool in determining the best targeting effect and complements the
individual CARVER.

a. First Order Effect. The physical or direct effect that a lethal or non-lethal action
has on the target or those around the target. The first order effects of destroying a target
such as a bridge may be cutting off a vital line of C2 for the enemy but also crippling a
critical line of supply for humanitarian aid or displaced personnel movement.

b. Second Order Effect. The indirect effect on a system or parts thereof provided
by the passage of information. Accuracy is not relevant as opinions and rumours present
the event in a negative or positive light. In the case identified in the first order effect, the
population may believe the bridge was targeted to stop the flow of displaced persons and
are not concerned with the disruption of the enemy C2.

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c. Third Order Effect. Another indirect effect that impacts the cognitive plane with
all audiences, targeted and non-targeted. The third order effect is based on the final
message or information being reinforced by post-operation actions as well as information
promulgated by the targeted audience. The stronger of the two eventually prevails,
regardless of the facts. Friendly forces must predict the opposing messages to mitigate
them effectively. In the case identified above, friendly forces must demonstrate that the
bridge was used by enemy C2 and that another route for the movement of humanitarian
aid and displaced personnel will be established.

Figure 3-16. Information Targeting Effects

3-14. Summary. The employment of F2UID and F3EAD, as well as a thorough understanding
and application of informational effects, targeting pillars, and consequence management, is
essential at the SOTG and SOTU levels. The SOTG must also know how to plan for and
leverage non-kinetic targeting assets, such as Info Ops, to include CIMIC, PsyOps, and public
information resources, that are typically required to enable kinetic targeting actions within the
same F2UID and F3EAD cycles.

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CHAPTER 4 – INTELLIGENCE

4-1. General. SOTG planners must have conceptual knowledge of the joint intelligence
environment to effectively participate and use the information to its fullest extent. It is essential
that the SOTG have timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence in identifying
relevant special operations targets, course of action (COA) development, and mission planning
and execution. The ability to interface with theatre and national assets is critical to success. By
their nature, SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more
detailed than needed in conventional operations. SOF require a high threshold of intelligence to
operate effectively. Operations, including operations for intelligence purposes, must be
intelligence driven but command led. Accurate intelligence is the single greatest enabler for
SOF. SOF often require intelligence to avoid adversary forces, regardless of size or
composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage the
adversary. Additionally, intelligence support to SOF requires increased focus of various
intelligence disciplines to include political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and
specific data related to SOF targets. Because SOF missions are particularly sensitive to
adversary collection efforts, counter-intelligence (CI) support must be considered in protecting
SOF missions across the range of military operations.20

4-2. Intelligence Support to NATO Special Operations

a. Theatre-level Intelligence Support. The joint intelligence centre (JIC) is the

primary intelligence organization that provides intelligence support to joint warfighting at
the JTF level. The JIC fuses the main support capabilities of all NATO, JTF, combat
support, and combat units into a one-stop shop for intelligence support and passes the
information to senior, subordinate, and supporting commands. The JIC is the single
source for request for information (RFI) processing and validation and in-theatre
intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination. The JIC coordinates support from
other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon for those RFIs it is unable to
support. The JIC has the mission of providing direct intelligence support to a deploying
joint force.

b. Joint Force Command-level Intelligence Support Responsibilities. COM JTF

provides the conduit for intelligence flow to and from the SOCC and theatre and national
supporting agencies. The mechanism to provide that support is a tailored intelligence
organization provided by COM JTF.

20 SOCC Manual.

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Figure 4-1. Intelligence Support Flow

c. Special Operations Component Command Joint Intelligence Centre

(1) Activation. Once a SOCC is activated, an all-source centre (ASC) will be

formed under the SOCC J2 to provide a robust capability to support the SOCC’s
critical mission functions and COM SOCC’s mission requirements. Joint
personnel augmentation for the JIC will be requested by the SOCC.

(2) Functions. The ASC is the primary centre that serves COM SOCC, the J2,
the SOCC staff, and the SOTG/SOATGs for all intelligence requirements. The
ASC has reporting requirements up the intelligence chain, through the JTF HQ
JIC, laterally across the intelligence chain to other component intelligence
structures, and down the chain to the SOTGs. The SOCC has a limited organic
collection capability and is dependent on theatre intelligence systems for indicators
and warnings. All functions relative to the intelligence process are managed
through the JIC.

(3) Responsibilities. SOCC intelligence responsibilities are derived from the

supported commander’s intelligence requirements. While the SOCC J2 retains
certain duties for the immediate J2 staff, there is a great dependency on the
synergy of an all-source analytical support entity that can manage the flow of
requirements and information. ASC responsibilities include:

(a) Develop threat assessments.

(b) Determine the adversary situation.

(c) Evaluate the operation’s effectiveness.

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(d) Provide operational intelligence support to SOCC components and

subordinate SOTGs.

(e) Focus the intelligence effort downward in support of the forward-

deployed SOF components.

(f) Develop TIPs.

(g) Conduct future target development.

(h) Coordinate with the LEGAD to ensure compliance with intelligence

oversight requirements.

(i) Fuse and share all available intelligence to provide timely, accurate
information downward to SOTGs.

(j) Provide information collected by SOCC assets to the JTF HQ J2.

Information of CI interest, particularly information derived from military
source operations, must be coordinated first with the SOCC J2 to effectively
forward to and integrate the information with the JTF HQ J2.

(k) Within a multinational environment, declassify national information or

geo-national products to Allied units.

d. NATO Special Operations Task Group Intelligence Support

(1) Activation. Once an SOTG is activated for deployment, an SOTG

intelligence section will be formed under the S2 to provide a robust capability to
support COM SOTG’s critical warfighting functions. Personnel augmentation for
the SOTG may be assigned by the SOCC.

(2) Functions. The intelligence section is the primary centre that serves COM
SOTG, the S2, the SOTG staff, and the SOTUs for all intelligence requirements.
The SOTG intelligence section has reporting ties up the intelligence chain, through
the SOCC JIC, and to the supported JTF HQ; laterally across the intelligence
chain to other conventional force intelligence structures; and down the chain to
SOTUs. The capabilities of the SOTG intelligence section are largely determined
by manning and C2IS assets. Properly staffed and equipped, an SOTG
intelligence section can process reporting from its subordinate SOTUs and
enhance it with resources and information from the SOCC.

Important Note. An SOTG should be a major collector in its

AOO. The deployment of intelligence collection assets, such
as HUMINT and tactical SIGINT, well forward with the
operators will prove to be highly effective. A good SOF unit is
always proactively collecting, no matter the mission, every
time it is deployed. Select operators should have tactical
questioning and interrogation training for this reason. This is
how you get to know your enemy.

(3) Organization. Though national SOTGs will vary greatly in size, a typical
SOTG S2 cell/ASC includes the positions of director (the S2), intelligence

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analyst(s), and a collection manager. The SOTG S2 is ultimately responsible for

the action and activity of the intelligence section and the COM’s advisor on all
intelligence matters. During mission execution, the S2 should always be in the
TOC along with the LEGAD. His purpose is to fuse what is happening on the
ground with what is being reported on the classified network to enhance SA and
provide a more cohesive intelligence picture both to COM SOTG and the GFC.
The analyst(s) review SOTU reporting, facilitate SOCC support, and, as directed,
provide further analysis of the SOTG AOO. The collection manager is responsible
for focusing collection efforts and provides guidance through the S2 to the SOTUs
for further collection. Additional augmentees who may prove useful are
exploitation specialists who will assist the SOTG/SOTUs in exploiting information
gathered during SOF missions.

Best Practice. Several NATO nations have employed the

SOIC concept. A robust all-source SOIC should consist of the
following capabilities: imagery to include geomatics and
geospatial, analysts, SIGINT, HUMINT (an operational
HUMINT section), CI, and liaison with other governmental
departments (OGDs) and HNs. The SOIC should also be able
to generate a sensitive site exploitation (SSE)/technical site
exploitation when required. The SOIC should also have a
reach-back capability to NATO and national systems. This
decentralization of assets allows the SOTG to perform proper
F2UID and obtain proper SOF ground truth for target
development. All intelligence assets of whatever nature in the
SOTG must be under the C2 of the S2.

Red Flag. If the S2 section/cell or SOIC is not properly

manned and equipped, it will easily become overwhelmed.
Several nations have made the mistake of assuming their
intelligence needs would be satisfied by the higher SOCC.
Not true. It is up to the nation to man and equip the S2
section/cell according to the approved mission and complexity
of the operational environment based on their pre-deployment
site survey.

(4) Responsibilities. SOTG intelligence responsibilities are derived from COM

SOCC’s intelligence requirements. While the S2 retains certain duties, there is a
great dependency on the synergy of an all-source analytical support entity that can
manage the flow of requirements and information. SOTG intelligence section
responsibilities include:

(a) Develop threat assessments.

(b) Determine the adversary situation.

(c) Evaluate the operation’s effectiveness.

(d) Provide tactical intelligence support to SOTUs.

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(e) Focus the intelligence effort downward in support of the forward-

deployed SOF units.

(f) Develop TIPs and future target development.

(g) Coordinate with the LEGAD to ensure compliance with intelligence

oversight requirements, if needed.

(h) Provide information collected by SOTG assets to the SOCC J2,

including information of CI interest.

(i) Provide information collected by SOTUs to the SOCC J2 based on

the HUMINT collection plan at the SOTG level.

(5) Theatre-level Intelligence to Support NATO Special Operations Task

Group Operations

(a) Role and Responsibilities. The SOTG is an end-user of the

intelligence support and resources acquired by the SOCC. The SOTG must
understand the capabilities and procedural requirements to effectively use
SOCC assets. Due to the sensitive nature of some collection assets, the
SOTG should not be afraid to request a capability that has not been openly
offered throughout the SOCC. The SOCC ASC is the theatre-level asset to
support the SOTG’s operations. SOTG planners must work with the ASC
and submit RFIs. Withholding information for fear that another unit will
action the intelligence will only slow the overall progress. One of the most
important contributions that an SOTG can make to the campaign is the
sharing of information with other units, such as SOF, conventional, and HN
security forces, who are in a better position to action it. If the SOTG is
concerned about operational sensitivity, these issues should be discussed
directly with COM SOCC or J3. Integration of SOTG and SOCC
intelligence pictures is key to COM SOCC and COM SOTG’s SA and
employment of resources.

Important Note. COM SOCC, supported by the SOTG, must

have the best SA in theatre to serve COM JTF well and to
have a high degree of credibility with the components.

(b) Contributions. Although the SOTG is the tactical end-user for much
of the SOCC intelligence, the SOTG can and does play a key role in
HUMINT collection. The SOTG and its SOTUs are in frequent contact with
the indigenous population. This contact provides the atmospherics and key
bits of information necessary to conduct and evaluate SOF operations.

e. External Support to NATO Special Operations

(1) National Intelligence Centres. The primary role of national intelligence

centres (NICs) in a NATO theatre is to support deployed national assets, but they
also provide releasable national intelligence and information in support of the
NATO mission. SOCC J2 requests that might be answered by NICs are submitted

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via collection coordination and intelligence requirements management (CCIRM)

through relevant classified systems and networks. The NICs are requested to
respond back to the SOCC J2 (via CCIRM), and the J2 disseminates the
intelligence to appropriate SOTGs and/or SOTUs as required. Connectivity to
CCIRM and access to appropriate NATO intelligence systems and software, as
agreed through the intelligence architecture, are essential for both sharing and
coordinating issues.

(2) NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NSHQ has a standing SA

centre and is linked to SHAPE through the Director Special Operations Office,
guaranteeing a direct link to the strategic level.

(3) Special Operations Intelligence Division/NATO Intelligence Fusion

Centre. The Special Operations Intelligence Division of the NATO Intelligence
Fusion Centre provides timely, effective, network-enabled intelligence in support of
planning and execution of NATO operations. This includes gathering, processing,
and dissemination of intelligence products. Additional support is provided in the
form of a responsive RFI database.

(4) Strategic Agencies. Strategic-level agencies may provide additional

collection, processing, and dissemination support to NATO SOF. Requests for
strategic agency support are coordinated by the SOCC J2 and are submitted
through the appropriate intelligence processes.

(5) Other Support. NGOs, host-nation support (HNS), etc.

4-3. Special Operations Component Command/Special Operations Task Group

Intelligence Operations Relative to the Intelligence Process. The intelligence cycle is the
dynamic process culminating in distribution of finished intelligence products. The sequence is
cyclical in nature since intelligence requires constant reappraisal and updating if it is to remain
current and relevant to COM SOTG’s needs. The intelligence process is depicted in Figure 4-2.21

21 AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security Doctrine, dated Dec 03.

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Figure 4-2. SOF Intelligence Cycle

a. Direction. During the direction stage, intelligence requirements are determined,

collection efforts are planned, requests to collection agencies are issued, and the
productivity of such agencies is continually checked. The direction stage of the
intelligence cycle implements COM SOCC’s direction and guidance with respect to
assigned and attached intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
(ISTAR) capabilities. Once COM SOCC has directed his ISTAR priorities (usually
distilled from COM JTF guidance) for utilization of assigned and attached ISTAR
resources, SOTG planners are able to structure the information requests and input to
higher HQs’ CCIRM processes.

(1) Intelligence Planning. In conjunction with the CPOE, the intelligence staff
prepares the intelligence annex. The intelligence annex of the operations order
allows the intelligence staff to draft the intelligence requirements and a collection
plan for COM SOTG’s approval and dissemination by the operations staff.

(2) Monitoring. As operations develop, SOTG commanders require new

information and intelligence to plan future operations or alter current operations.
New and yet unanswered IRs form the basis for the continual updating of the
collection plan.

b. Collection. Collection is the second stage in the intelligence cycle. It is the

process of gathering information, intelligence, and target data through tasked
organizations. The collection stage involves development of the collection plan and
exploitation of assigned, attached, or allocated collection assets and capabilities. An

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example of the collection plan as used in a land operation is shown in AJP-2.1(A),

Intelligence Procedures, dated Sep 05.

(1) Information. Information is gathered from organic and non-organic

sources and agencies. Information from technical sources will often have to be
pre-processed to be of use to non-technical staff. However, it must be
remembered that all information and intelligence are perishable. Timeliness in
delivery is of the essence. Pre-processing cannot be allowed to affect the
timeliness of the sensor data or information.

(2) Perishable Information and Intelligence. The combat intelligence system

often serves COM SOTG by fulfilling mission intelligence requirements in fast-
moving situations. For the system to meet the needs of COM SOTG, combat
information must be delivered as quickly as possible to SOTGs/SOTUs for
processing and dissemination before the intelligence loses its value as an indicator
of adversary capabilities and intentions. Intelligence must also be quickly
disseminated before it loses its predictive value as a planning aid to COM SOTG,
operations staff, and units. A major part of COM SOTG’s direction to his
intelligence system is the establishment of timelines for intelligence reporting.

(3) The Intelligence Database. The intelligence database is the central focus
of the unit combat intelligence system. The database contains basic intelligence,
combat information, and intelligence reports provided by sources and agencies,
and finished intelligence products disseminated to users. Intelligence databases
are interconnected for the automatic exchange of information and intelligence at
various security classification levels in accordance with the NATO standard.

(4) Collection Disciplines. These sources are the means or systems used to
observe, sense, and record or convey information on conditions, situations, and
events. Additional intelligence disciplines and details on those listed below can be
found in AJP-2.1(A).

Important Note. At a minimum, a CONOPS will typically

require at least two corroborating sources with a relatively
good degree of credibility from two different disciplines
(HUMINT, SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), etc.) to give
the green light to mission execution.

(a) Human Intelligence. HUMINT is a type of intelligence derived from

information collected and provided by human sources. The range of
HUMINT sources is enormous. Every person—friendly, adversary, or
neutral—is a potential source of HUMINT. HUMINT collectors are
personnel trained in the acquisition of information from human sources in
response to intelligence requirements. HUMINT collectors may include
specially trained interrogation personnel, intelligence officers, CI agents, or
SOF personnel who use human collection techniques in the course of their
duties. HUMINT is of particular value in the confirmation or augmentation of
imagery and signal intelligence.

(b) Imagery Intelligence. IMINT is intelligence derived from imagery

acquired by sensors, which can be ground based, seaborne, or carried by

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air or space platforms. The information conveyed by an image is clear,

concise, and largely unequivocal, and will often serve to support or confirm
intelligence derived from other sources. The bulk of IMINT is derived from
sources such as satellites, aircraft, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).
RPVs are most effective when providing FMV at all levels in the
organization due to the long loiter capability they provide (see Chapter 5).

(c) Open-source Intelligence. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is

intelligence derived from publicly available information, as well as other
unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access.
OSINT is collected from sources such as the media, state propaganda,
learned journals, technical papers, the Internet, technical manuals, and
books. Contrary to popular belief, there is considerable archival evidence to
confirm that the intelligence community has always used open sources in
the production of intelligence. Freedom of Information legislation around
the world has unlocked all but the most valuable of nations’ secrets, and the
ability to reach remote information provided by systems such as the Internet
has provided rapidly growing and easily accessible sources of intelligence.
OSINT is most likely to be the source of basic intelligence although, with the
capabilities of modern news gathering equipment, there will be occasions
when on the spot television reporting will be used to produce current
intelligence.

(d) Signals Intelligence. SIGINT is intelligence derived from the

electromagnetic spectrum and is defined as the generic term used to
describe communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence
(ELINT) when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two
types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.

(e) Exploitation. Exploitation includes intelligence derived from data

collected in the field, such as forensics, biometrics, cell phone, and
document and media exploitation. The key tenets of exploitation are to link
people to locations, materials to locations, and people to materials.

c. Processing. Processing is the part of the intelligence cycle where the collected
information is converted into intelligence. Processing is a structured series of actions
that, although set out sequentially, may also take place concurrently. These actions are
outlined below.

(1) Collation. Collation involves grouping together items of related information

to provide a record of events and facilitate further processing.

(2) Evaluation. Evaluation involves determining source reliability and

information credibility.

(3) Analysis. Analysis involves identifying significant facts, comparing them

with existing facts, and drawing conclusions about them.

(4) Integration. Integration involves fusing significant facts to build a more

complete picture.

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(5) Interpretation. Interpretation is deciding what the integrated information

means in terms of what is likely to happen in the future.

d. Dissemination. Dissemination is the fourth stage of the intelligence cycle and

consists of timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable
means, to those who need it. Intelligence is useless if it arrives at its destination too late.
The majority of intelligence at the operational and tactical levels is time sensitive.
Intelligence decays or loses its value with the passage of time. The intelligence must
answer the requirements of the users. It must be in a format and language relevant to
the needs of the recipient and disseminated by a common system.

4-4. Counter-intelligence at the Tactical Level

a. Special operations missions are particularly sensitive to adversary collection

efforts. CI support assists in protecting sensitive SOF missions. An effective CI
programme can detect, counter, and, where possible, exploit intelligence collection
activities directed against SOF. CI contributes to the overall aspects of OPSEC and FP
by detecting and dealing with possible breaches in security. CI activities support COM
SOTG by detecting, evaluating, counteracting, and preventing hostile intelligence
collection, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, or assassination operations from occurring.

b. CI focuses on:

(1) How the adversary’s intelligence structure works.

(2) What intelligence systems and platforms are available to the adversary.

(3) How vulnerable NATO forces are to adversary intelligence.

(4) How the adversary has been known to target NATO, as well as how
planners can anticipate where the adversary might target NATO.

(5) FP and combating terrorism support.

Important Note. CI is a critical element of FP, particularly

when the SOTG is staging in high threat areas. Properly
resourced and employed, they can help prevent attacks and
reconnaissance efforts against SOTG forward operating bases
(FOBs).

(6) How successful adversary intelligence has been, as reflected by:

(a) Adversary knowledge of NATO equipment and how it can be

defeated.

(b) Adversary knowledge of NATO deployments.

(c) Adversary knowledge of NATO commanders and their intentions.

(d) Adversary knowledge of NATO patterns of operations (e.g. patrols,

FP).

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4-5. Intelligence Support to the Mission Planning Process

a. Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment. At the SOTG

level there are certain aspects of the CPOE process which should be highlighted.

(1) Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment Begins with

a Battlefield Area Evaluation. Battlefield area evaluation is an assessment of the
battle area that considers the overall nature of the friendly and enemy forces and the
operational environment. During this function, the SOF planners begin to collect data
to fill basic intelligence requirements in the following areas:

(a) Political

(b) Military

(c) Economic

(d) Social

(e) Climatology

(f) Geographic

(g) Psychological

(h) Cultural

(i) Friendly forces

(j) Hostile forces

(k) Non-belligerent third-party forces

(2) Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment Steps.

SOF considerations for various sections within the four steps of CPOE are
highlighted below.

(a) Step 1: Define operational environment and establish the limits of

the AOI.

(b) Step 2: Describe the effects of the operational environment and

analyse the battlespace population.

(c) Step 3: Evaluate the threat and determine threat strengths and
weaknesses.

(d) Step 4: Determine threat COAs, including the most likely and most
dangerous COAs. Collection requirements should be designed to help
identify which COA the threat will adopt.

b. The Planning Process at the Special Operation Task Group Level. While
steps in the SOCC Planning Process (SOCC-P2) may depend on the size of the national
SOTG and individual national planning procedures, the S2 is typically responsible for the
following suggested tasks during the stages of the SOCC-P2:

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Table 4-1. S2 Special Operations Component Command Planning Process Tasks

Planning Phase Steps Intelligence Tasks

Situation Awareness  Commander initiates CPOE  SA monitoring
and develops knowledge  Support to CPOE development
requirements
Appreciation  Receive initiating directive/  Review initiating directive
warning order (WNGO)  Database review
 Commander starts own  Send initial RFI(s)
planning process in anticipation  Stage operations planning group (OPG)
of receiving a mission  Prepare initial briefing for OPG (CPOE)
 Commander organizes planning  SA monitoring
staff or staff does it for him
Orientation  Commander’s initial guidance  Receive initiating directive/WNGO
 Mission analysis/brainstorming  Take initial OPG briefing/joint IPB and
 Produce draft mission expand into mission analysis briefing;
statement focus on situation, enemy intent,
 Mission analysis briefing deployment, capability, COGs,
 Prepare commander’s planning weaknesses, strengths, likely actions,
guidance (CPG) other key factors, desired end state, key
Info Ops targets (target sets)
 Stage and participate in mission
analysis briefing
 Ensure staff understands the mission
 Prepare intelligence portion of CPG
 SA monitoring
CONOPS Development  Review CPG  Review CPG
 Staff analysis  Staff estimate – expand on key adversary
 Develop COAs factors and identify others (cultural,
 Decision briefing political, social, time, space, etc.)
 Approve friendly COAs  Develop adversary COAs – minimum
most likely and most dangerous
(develop more as time permits)
 Adversary COAs must lead toward
attacking friendly COGs
 Develop synchronization matrix for each
adversary COA
 Determine wargame technique to be used
 Stage/conduct wargame
 Ensure that key enemy results are
recorded
 Record all major friendly decision points
and anticipate collection requirements
to support these decisions
 Prepare intelligence portion of decision
briefing
 Finalize adversary COAs based on
commander’s direction and disseminate
 Develop high-value target (HVT) list
 Develop target intelligence (Targeting)
 Help develop/write CONOPS
 Write intelligence annex
 SA monitoring
Plan Development  Develop CONOPS  Intelligence plan development
 Force identification  Ensure intelligence plan is synchronized
 Develop plan from CONOPS with other plans
 Support joint targeting process
 Support the development of high pay-off

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Table 4-1. S2 Special Operations Component Command Planning Process Tasks

Planning Phase Steps Intelligence Tasks

target (HPT) list
 Seek approval of intelligence plan(s)
 SA monitoring
Execution and  Force deployment  SA monitoring during deployment
Assessment  Conduct special operations  Review intelligence plans, especially
 Combat assessment collection plan
 Plan review and assessment  Further analyse intelligence plans –
 Revised decision briefing for wargaming, rehearsal, or operational
commander (if required) research modelling
 Support revised decision briefing for
commander
 Execute intelligence plan
 Ensure integration of intelligence assets
Transition  Prepare for next phase and/or  SA during transition
redeployment of forces

c. Contingency Planning. During contingency planning, the S2 develops mission-

specific intelligence requirements that support the operational objectives of the plan. The
S2 should consider:

(1) PIR and other intelligence requirements.

(2) Existing all-source intelligence collection requirements and collection

priorities against the priority and other intelligence requirements.

(3) Gaps in the basic intelligence databases for recommended changes in

collection priorities.

(4) Unique intelligence production requirements to execute the assigned

special operations.

(5) Dissemination of intelligence products.

(6) Intelligence communication and reporting requirements.

d. Crisis Response Planning. Time constraints become a key factor in intelligence

support to time-sensitive planning. Moreover, there may be a lack of specific intelligence
data because of these time constraints. The S2 must accurately interpret indications and
warning data to anticipate potential special operations intelligence requirements. Crisis
response planning requirements must be more precise than contingency planning
requirements due to the immediacy of the mission. Rapid coordination, timely
production, and reliable dissemination are essential.

4-6. Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process. The primary function of the SOTG S2
in support of the targeting process is to identify and recommend critical adversary vulnerabilities
that can be exploited to attain objectives. Support includes locating and portraying the
components of a target or target complex and providing the information required to effectively
apply friendly capabilities to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, or otherwise dissuade or coerce
the adversary. The SOATG intelligence targeting officer collaborates with other targeting
personnel in the operations directorate and is responsible for creating the TIPs. Chapters 3 and
5 provide more information on targeting.

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4-7. Intelligence Sharing in the NATO Special Operations Forces Community

a. Key Definitions for Intelligence Sharing

(1) Release: a nation gives the intelligence to another nation.

(2) Disclosure: a nation shows the intelligence to another nation.

b. Problems Involved in NATO Intelligence Sharing. NATO has very few organic
intelligence and information collection capabilities. It relies on the Alliance, other nations,
the NATO military structure, and open sources for the provision of its intelligence. The
issue of need-to-know versus need-to-share is usually a sensitive one. Several NATO
nations have an official intelligence-sharing relationship that works well. For some
nations, intelligence sharing is a major issue that has the potential to restrict the
employability of their SOF unit with other nations.

4-8. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance Process

a. ISTAR is an operations-intelligence activity that integrates and synchronizes the

planning and operation of sensors and assets, and the processing, exploitation, targeting,
and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. The
direction of ISTAR effort and determination of priorities must be driven by COM SOTG.
Unless COM SOTG devotes significant effort and resources to these requirements, he
may not receive the intelligence required.

b. Key ISTAR characteristics include:

(1) Command driven

(2) Centralized coordination

(3) Robust/tailorable sensor mix

(4) Interconnectivity

(5) Source protection

(6) Accuracy

(7) Responsiveness/timeliness

c. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance at the

Tactical Level. The objective of ISTAR planning at the tactical level is to collect
information about the adversary that will allow COM SOTG to fight and win the battle.
The collection plan will coordinate the efforts of all available information collection
resources into one collection effort. The collection plan may include an ISTAR overlay.
The ISTAR planning process includes:

(1) Determining requirements.

(2) Assigning priorities.

(3) Developing the plan.

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(4) Collecting.

(5) Processing.

(6) Redirecting collection resources.

d. Chapter 5 provides further information on SOTG involvement and tasks within the
overall ISR process.

4-9. Geospatial Intelligence Procedures. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in NATO

consists of hardware, software, data, operators, communications, and analytical tools brought
together in an organization that collects, stores, disseminates, and exploits geodetic,
geomagnetic, littoral, cultural, and place name data accurately referenced to a precise location
on the earth’s surface. Geospatial information plays a significant role in military operations in
providing the foundation upon which all other battlespace information and intelligence are
superimposed. When coupled with intelligence, information about friendly forces, weather, and
the logistics situation, GEOINT aids COM SOTG in visualizing the battlespace, in planning and
conducting operations, in navigating, and in accurately targeting the adversary.

4-10. Intelligence Collection Management

a. CCIRM is the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection

requirements; establishing, tasking, or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or
agencies; monitoring results; and re-tasking, as required.

b. Intelligence requirements management begins with the formation of COM SOTG’s

PIRs that, once identified, are initially formed into a series of questions in the form of an
IR. The methods pursued to answer these questions form the basis of a collection plan.

c. IRs will be forwarded by customers to their appropriate CCIRM staff with an

information copy distributed to the wider CCIRM network. This request must state:

(1) The requirement, preferably as one or more focused questions.

(2) The type of response required (if known).

(3) The latest time information is of value.

(4) Whether a single answer or regular reporting is required.

d. SOTG staff participates at all levels of the collection management process,

whether by forwarding RFIs from the SOTUs to the SOCC, or PIRs from the SOCC down
to the SOTUs for collection. Additionally, COM SOTG develops his own IRs based upon
his assessment of the AOO. These IRs are then forwarded to the SOCC and if positively
adjudicated may become theatre-level PIRs.

4-11. Technical Exploitation Operations

a. TEOs assist greatly with the intelligence process, which in turn supports the SOF
targeting process. If assigned, the TEO coordinator will advise COM SOTG regarding
theatre-wide exploitation operations and will be the point of contact for the establishment
of SOTG-level exploitation protocols and procedures. The SOTG TEO coordinator will
also help direct exploitation planning efforts, employment of exploitation equipment, and

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procedures for subordinate units to follow to ensure a systematic approach to the

methods of collection, exploitation, control of collected items, and immediate analysis of
materials of interest. Collected items will be forwarded to an exploitation analysis centre
or a forensics laboratory located within theatre for more detailed analysis. Exploitation
results must be processed in accordance with evidence control procedures established
by the SOTG TEO coordinator and must follow a specific chain of custody, to include
detailed documentation of relevant items.

b. The resulting analysis and rapid exploitation of materials on the battlefield (Level
1), upon mission completion (Level 1+), and in field laboratories (Level 2) will result in
information to assist the intelligence, targeting, and planning cycles.

Important Note. This information and any resulting

intelligence will assist the SOTG and SOCC in the prosecution
of TSTs when combined with pre-existing intelligence and will
contribute to the validation of executing evidence-based
operations.

4-12. Summary. SOF rely on accurate, up-to-date intelligence to ensure that plans meet the
precise situation in the intended target area. It is essential that the SOTG have timely, detailed,
tailored, and fused all-source intelligence in identifying targets, COA development, and mission
planning and execution. SOTG operations and plans personnel must have a solid
understanding of the joint intelligence environment to effectively participate and use the
information to its fullest extent. At the same time, SOTG intelligence personnel must have a
solid understanding of the F2UID and F3EAD targeting cycles so that they may help the SOTG
and SOTUs transition quickly from fix to finish and avoid operational blink. Additionally, SOF
require an increased focus on the political, informational, economic, and cultural aspects of the
operating environment. SOTG missions are particularly sensitive to adversary collection efforts,
and CI support must be considered in protecting intelligence capabilities.

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CHAPTER 5 – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT

5-1. Introduction. The goal of ISR is to provide accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence to
decision-makers and the target acquisition process in order to provide the SOTG with the
necessary means to find, fix, finish, and exploit targets successfully. This goal is best achieved
through effective employment of ISR capabilities and by capitalizing on interoperability with ISR
systems, as well as non-traditional ISR (NTISR) sources, to create synergy through integration.
Specifically, ISR links ISTAR systems to cue assets, with the focus on timely and accurate
targeting information. In addition, the ISR process encompasses the collection, coordination,
and management of information, intelligence, and SA to support SOTG operations. This
chapter is intended to:

a. Provide guidance for NATO SOTG commanders, their staff, and their components
to effectively employ assigned, attached, or supporting ISR assets and forces.

b. Lead to a better understanding of ISR operations in directly supporting specific

SOTG missions.

5-2. Key Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Definitions

a. Accuracy. Accuracy is a crucial requirement for all aspects of the ISR targeting
cycle. ISR assets should provide unambiguous, undistorted, and complete information,
and be resistant to deception. Accuracy requirements may be driven by the purpose of
the mission, level of need, and customer requirements. These requirements may in turn
determine the selection of the collection system(s).

b. Battlespace Surveillance. Battlespace surveillance is the systematic observation

of the battle area for the purpose of providing timely information and combat intelligence.

c. Persistence. If required, ISR assets must be able to provide comprehensive 24/7

coverage in poor visibility conditions, over varying terrain, and in all electromagnetic
environments. The capability to loiter and observe targets over a prolonged timescale
ensures support is available when needed.

d. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual

observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of
an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

e. Reliability. ISR systems must be able to provide reliable information despite

enemy deception measures, such as camouflage and decoys. This may require the
employment of other reconnaissance and surveillance systems to verify the information
acquired by previous systems. The development and evaluation of these systems should
be initiated as soon as potential enemy concealment and deception capabilities are known.

f. Sea Surveillance. Sea surveillance is the systematic observation of surface and

subsurface areas by all available and practical means, primarily for the purpose of locating,
identifying, and determining the movement of ships, submarines, and other vehicles,
friendly and enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the world’s seas and oceans.

g. Standardization. Standardization is a critical aspect of any ISR system.

Interoperability, commonality, and compatibility of sensors, datalinks, and supporting CIS are
crucial to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall effectiveness of a reconnaissance

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and surveillance system. SOTG commanders will be deprived of information if the

components of the system are dissimilar, or if connectivity among sensors, supporting
systems, and supported systems is too fragile to withstand the stress of combat.

h. Suitability. Suitability is an important consideration in planning for the

employment of collective reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Tasking must be
based on an asset’s capability and its suitability within the context of the overall collection
plan. Suitability also applies to the transmission, exploitation, and dissemination of the
collected information or processed intelligence. Both the information and the format must
be useful to the user and easy to interpret.

i. Survivability. Survivability must be examined in the context of the entire

reconnaissance and surveillance system—collection platforms, sensors, communications
and datalinks, ground stations, processing facilities, and personnel. Not all systems, or
components of the systems, require the same degree of survivability. For those systems
that cannot transmit information during a mission, the safe return of these assets is
especially important. Survivability must be matched to the threat to which these systems
will be exposed during the operation and their importance to the entire reconnaissance
and surveillance system.

j. Timeliness. ISR assets must be responsive to the needs of the requester. These
assets should be made available to collect information when and where it is required.
Timeliness should be looked at in the aggregate and is driven by the purpose of the
mission, level of need, and customer requirements. The period of time between the
arrival of a request and the requested time over target may limit the time available for
planning, preparation, choice of asset or sensor, and execution of the mission.

5-3. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Requirements. The accuracy,

timeliness, and level of detail of special operations intelligence requirements place unusual
demands on ISR systems. The scope of special operations intelligence requirements supports
F2UID. The primary customers of airborne ISR are the SOCC for operational-level planning
and the SOTG for tactical preparation, execution, and exploitation. The SOTG’s intelligence
requirements compete with the other components for limited collection resources, and all
requirements may not be satisfied at times. The SOTG should anticipate ISR mission
requirements early in the planning stage, then forward requests through their operations staff to
the SOCC ISR coordinator. It is at the JTF operational level that ISR assets are selected and
allocated to meet the desired effects of the tactical environment using the targeting process.

a. Operational Level. ISR requirements drive the support for all current and future
SOF SOCC operations and are also used to initiate the overall intelligence process as
discussed in Chapter 4. Specifically, the intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (IPOE) enables the intelligence team to focus on the ISR requirements to
support F2UID.

b. Tactical Level. ISR support at the tactical level of SOF operations is primarily
focused on the F3EAD targeting process for deliberate and dynamic targets. ISR,
ground or air based, is critical to the SOTU GFC in satisfying the pillars of targeting.

5-4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. There are several types of
systems employed to satisfy IRs through the ISR process that include manned and unmanned,
aerial, ground, and sea-based assets to go along with space assets. Currently, airborne ISR
systems still remain the primary source of ISR capabilities available to support the increasing

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demand for SOF intelligence requirements. In addition, there are two general areas of ISR
systems: surface and subsurface systems.

a. Surface Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. Surface

platforms vary greatly in size and complexity, with great differences between land-based
and sea-based assets.

(1) Land-based Systems. Land-based ISR systems provide a diverse mix of

capabilities that can range from a small force conducting a reconnaissance patrol, to
dedicated SIGINT units, to highly sophisticated surveillance radars. Such assets
can be employed to support operations across the full range of military activities and
can obtain extremely diverse types of information. For example, a reconnaissance
patrol can determine the extent and location of obstacles and defensive positions
while also performing counter-reconnaissance operations to deceive the enemy and
deny friendly force dispositions. They can also cue and be cued by other high
resolution assets. As with aerial platforms, there are advantages and
disadvantages to land-based reconnaissance systems. The primary advantage is
that as they are generally organic to the land component; they are usually forward
deployed and responsive to its needs; and they are not easily prone to deception,
can be properly debriefed, and have the ability to interpret information. Manned
reconnaissance assets, e.g. patrols, have additional advantages: they can carry out
other actions while on a primarily reconnaissance mission and can use their
initiative to investigate sightings further, e.g. suspected deception measures. They
can also be debriefed on other matters not included in their original mission.
However, their range is usually limited by physical constraints, personnel safety, the
military situation, and the ability of combat support systems to sustain assets over
extended ranges and timescales. Additionally, land-based ISR assets now include
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).

(2) Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver. The remotely operated

video enhanced receiver (ROVER) is a system that allows ground forces, such as
JTACs, to see what an ISR aircraft or UAV is seeing in real time. See Chapter 7
for more information on ROVER.

(3) Sea-based Surface Platforms. Sea-based surface systems have varying

degrees of ISR capability, including organic manned and unmanned air and
underwater systems. Part of this capability, for example, radar, sonar, and
underwater acoustic surveillance, is required for defence of maritime forces.
These facilities monitor enemy submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and surface
targets. Other capabilities, such as SIGINT-gathering assets, can support a broad
range of military activities ranging from monitoring arms control treaty compliance
to establishing enemy orders of battle and preparation of combat strike plans.

b. Subsurface Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems.

Subsurface systems vary greatly in size, complexity, and capability. These include
sensors generally best suited for long-term surveillance of a specific and limited
geographic region. Seismic detectors, for example, can indicate that enemy forces might
be moving in an area, making further reconnaissance of the area useful. Submarines are
invaluable platforms for clandestine reconnaissance operations within waters peripheral
to enemy territory. Submarines are dispatched on independent patrols to collect a range
of data from hydrographic features to enemy activities. These patrols also assist in filling
in gaps from other collection systems, such as long-range aircraft.

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5-5. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Sensors. There are several types of
ISR sensors available to the SOTG through the SOCC and JTF HQ. Understanding what each of
these sensors brings to the F2UID and F3EAD processes is critical to COM SOTG and his staff.

a. Human Observation. Reconnaissance and surveillance by human observation is

the oldest method of gathering military information and remains a valued source of
information. Human observation is done by visual and acoustic detection, recognition,
and even identification. The human eye has a far greater field of view than most sensors
and can be adjusted to changing points of interest instantly. Human sources can rapidly
evaluate and assess observed information, draw conclusions, and direct actions.
Gathered information can be transferred expeditiously to the requester or other users.
Technical devices can assist the human eye or ear in extending their range, minimizing
disturbances, and increasing their sensitivity or resolution. Human sources can
complement the results of other sensors by providing additional data not covered by the
sensors and also replace them if they malfunction. The value and the reliability of human
sources are highly dependent upon the degree of training and experience they have, as
information gleaned from human sources may possess a certain degree of subjectivity.
The performance of human sources generally decreases with the growing duration of the
operation and can be adversely affected by stress factors. These factors also increase
the tendency of human beings to see what they expect or wish to see and the
susceptibility to measures of camouflage, concealment, deception, and masking.

b. Technical Sensors. Technical sensors can generally be divided into two

categories, imaging and non-imaging. Both operate in the electromagnetic and acoustic
spectrums and cover frequencies not perceptible by the human eye or ear. Technical
sensors not only collect, but also record data for repeatable recalling, transmission,
copying, and even enhancement for specific purposes. Additionally they are able to
provide auxiliary data which may include information such as the parameters of the
carrying platform (speed, height, bank, and time) or the specifications of the sensor itself.
Different sensors can be used at the same time in various configurations and suites.
Sensors can be pre-programmed or operator directed. Generally, technical sensors are
highly reliable and may be less susceptible to efforts of concealment or deception than
human sources. Technical sensors may be degraded by malfunction and operator error,
and their products may be impacted by atmospheric and other natural factors.

c. Imaging Sensors. Operating within a certain frequency spectrum, imaging

sensors are able to produce an image of targets or objects of interest. Optical and non-
optical images are permanently recorded on a medium such as film or tape, and may be
transmitted from a platform to the requester, thus significantly improving the timeliness of
the information. Imaging sensors for reconnaissance and surveillance operate
traditionally in the frequency of visible light, infrared, or radar, providing pictures or
photos and videos highly similar to what is seen with the human eye.

d. Optical Sensors. Optical sensors are passive and receive light from artificial and
natural sources reflected by the target or object of interest. They use electronic scanning
devices or conventional lenses with a broad range of focal length, in single or multiple
configurations. They can take imagery from the vertical or oblique view, including side,
forward, or even rear oblique perspectives. Some sensors have the capability to collect
imagery across the horizon or along a specific track.

e. Infrared Imaging Sensors. Infrared imaging sensors are also passive and scan
infrared radiation, emission, or reflection, which basically accompanies heat or thermal

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radiation. Infrared sensors are able to detect and recognize information that is hidden
from visual sensors, e.g. energy flows. If thermal traces still exist, infrared sensors may
be able to indicate activities already past. Although they can penetrate darkness and
artificial smoke, their performance may be degraded by moisture in the atmosphere and
some natural substances, such as chlorophyll. Infrared sensors are an ideal supplement
to, and therefore often used with, optical sensors. Infrared sensors can look vertical,
sideways, or forward oblique.

f. Imaging Radar Sensors. Imaging radar sensors for reconnaissance and

surveillance are mainly air or space based and are capable of covering considerably
more targets or area than other sensors. They illuminate the target, area, or object with
high-powered wavelengths, receive reflected returns, and convert phase and amplitudes
into a visible image. Some microwave systems only look sideways, e.g. sideways
looking aperture radar (SLAR). State-of-the-art systems use a synthetic aperture radar
(SAR) vice the older ones using a real aperture radar. SLAR or SAR systems have long-
range all-weather capability. They are able to detect and differentiate moving targets
(moving target indicator) to determine heading and speed. Inverse SAR, interferometric
SAR, and forward-looking systems are highly specialized variants. The latter is also
used as a terrain-following radar and has target tracking capabilities.

g. Passive Microwave (Radiometric) Systems. Passive microwave systems are

mainly used for civil applications of remote sensing. They also produce an image by
scanning and recording the natural microwave radiation of the earth’s surface.

h. Non-imaging Sensors. Non-imaging sensors search for, intercept, record, identify,

and often analyse natural and artificially radiated electromagnetic energy. They can be
sensitive to radio waves, microwaves, infrared radiation, X-rays, and gamma rays. Sensors
for specific military use operate in the frequency range of radio waves and microwaves.
Passive sensors intercept communications or other transmitters, such as radars or
navigation aids. COMINT systems can identify adversaries by analysing voice patterns or
the particular use of a communications code. ELINT systems provide electronic fingerprints,
such as signal strength or bandwidth of the intercepted type of radar, and may also identify a
specific piece of such equipment. Active sensors, such as radar, facilitate the continuous,
systematic collection of information on position, movement, origin, and, to some extent, the
identity of objects (e.g. aircraft, ships) within a given area.

5-6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems Limitations. SOTG

commanders must be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and numbers of their assigned and
supporting reconnaissance and surveillance systems. This is required to ensure systems are
not placed at unnecessary risk or the wrong asset tasked to satisfy a collection need. If the
required capability does not exist within the commander’s assigned force, other external
collection capabilities can be requested to support the commander’s collection requirements.
Reconnaissance and surveillance systems possess a wide variety of characteristics,
specifications, and limitations. They have two common limitations: they are scarce resources
and are generally high-value assets. These two factors require commanders to employ assets
judiciously. Different reconnaissance and surveillance assets and systems can complement
each other and eliminate specific limitations when used in mixed or combined applications.

5-7. Types of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Targeting. With regard to

the execution of a reconnaissance operation, NATO distinguishes between the following target
designations: pinpoint or single target, line searches, strip searches, and area searches.
These are described below.

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a. Pinpoint. A pinpoint is a target or object whose location is already known

precisely and can be expressed with an accurate geographical reference. Examples are
permanent targets, such as airfields, barracks, bridges, or railway stations.

b. Line Searches. Line searches are defined by a start and end point and are part
of LOCs, roads, railroads, or waterways. Such lines should not exceed 25 nautical miles
(NM) in length. Start and end points must be confirmed by image. Detected targets can
be confirmed by visual observation and/or imagery. Imagery confirmation can be
obtained by pre-planned sensor coverage of the suspected location or by an aircrew.

c. Strip Searches. Strip searches are straight lines between a defined start and end
point and should not exceed 10 NM. Target confirmation is obtained in the same manner
as for line searches.

d. Area Searches. Area searches are conducted in areas defined by exact border
point locations or at a given radius from a centre point. Target confirmation procedures
are the same as those for line and strip searches.

5-8. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Tasking Process. The ISR tasking
process supports the F3EAD targeting cycle for both deliberate and dynamic (to include TSTs)
targets. It is the process by which reconnaissance and surveillance assets are requested,
integrated into the overall operations plan, and tasked to satisfy information or intelligence
requirements. The steps in the ISR tasking cycle are tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED); these are described in more detail below and depicted in Figure 5-1.
The request should provide sufficient information on the area or object of interest. Additionally,
requests should include information detailing the reason for or intended use of the data, priority,
timelines, product types, and means of transmission.

Figure 5-1. TPED Process

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a. Tasking. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are tasked in essentially the

same manner during peacetime, crisis, and war, except for tailoring the approval and
execution process for the scope of operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are
tasked once information or intelligence requirements have been established. This may be
accomplished through request messages. In cases where real or near real-time (NRT)
information is required, it may be necessary to establish ad hoc procedures in theatre to
satisfy the immediate requirements. Most important to the requesters of information is to
clearly articulate their requirements and allow the collection managers and operations
planners to decide the best way to meet their requirements. Within the commander’s staff,
the intelligence collection managers will coordinate with the operations planners to determine
what available reconnaissance and surveillance asset(s) should be tasked to satisfy the
given intelligence requirements. If organic assets are available, the appropriate unit will be
tasked. If organic assets are not available to satisfy the request and the request is still
considered valid, the request is forwarded to the next higher level for consideration. Assets
may also be tasked or re-tasked while the mission is ongoing. Changing situations may
dictate that reconnaissance and surveillance assets be reassigned from their planned
mission to support a new requirement. Reassigning assets that are executing their planned
mission must be considered carefully.

b. Processing. The collected or transmitted information may not always be in a form

suitable for direct use by the requester. Information may need to be processed and
exploited by specialist agencies before dissemination to the requester. Reconnaissance and
surveillance mission taskers should always ensure that the appropriate agency is tasked in
parallel with the collection mission. Processing is the transfer of collected/transmitted and
recorded raw data of the sensor (primary imagery or data) into usable/visible information
(secondary imagery or data). This includes the chemical process of exposed wet film in the
negative or positive state, the processing of radar data into radar imagery, the
decompression of compressed data, and also the enhancement of the data or imagery.
Imagery is interpreted and, generally, the results are included in a report.

c. Exploitation. Exploitation is the conversion of collected information into forms

suitable to the production of intelligence. Once the data satisfying the requirements is
collected, it undergoes processing and exploitation. Through exploitation, the collected
raw data is transformed into information that can be readily disseminated, used,
transmitted, and exploited by other intelligence analysts. Relevant critical information
should also be disseminated to the commander and joint force staff to facilitate time-
sensitive decision-making. Exploitation time varies depending on the characteristics of
specific collection assets.

d. Dissemination. This step involves transmission of the collected, processed, and

exploited information to the requester. It may take on various forms: real time or NRT
datalinks directly from collection platform to requesters, broadcast transmissions from
collection platform to multiple agencies, or standard reporting procedures.

5-9. Synchronized Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Persistent and high-

fidelity intelligence is the key to supporting the ISR targeting cycle. In contrast to major force-
on-force operations, where the purpose is to find and destroy enemy ships, tanks, airplanes,
and infrastructure, the most difficult task in asymmetric warfare is finding the enemy. ISR
assets have become critical to the SOTG because they offer persistent and low-visibility sensing
capabilities. Additionally, the capability of airborne ISR effectiveness grows exponentially when
other tactical ISR sources of intelligence, such as HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities, are used in

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conjunction. Without a robust collaborative intelligence network to guide them, sensors are
often used in reactive modes that negate their true effectiveness to support the targeting cycle.

5-10. Summary. The ISR and targeting process links ISTAR systems to cue ISR and
offensive strike assets, with particular emphasis on the timely passage of both critical and
targeting information. It encompasses the collection, coordination, and management of
information and intelligence as discussed in Chapter 4. The SA provided by tailored ISR
capabilities is fundamental to good decision-making. The SOCC and SOTG remain influential
actors within the joint force, capable of conducting both kinetic and non-kinetic effects-based
targeting. The fusion of both intelligence and operations, coupled within a well-established
targeting process, enhances special operations impacts on COM JTF’s desired effects.
Understanding the defined joint force objectives at the operational and tactical levels assists all
those involved in the targeting process to develop well-defined targets based on logical
assessments of the anticipated effects. Applying the F2UID process is key to understanding the
overall effects that targeting actions will have on the enemy within the AOO. Furthermore,
determining target prioritization ensures scarce SOF and joint force resources are apportioned
and allocated appropriately before the ISR process is applied to specific targets. It is important
that every action taken by any NATO SOF asset generates an effect and, therefore, becomes a
significant goal for achieving decision superiority. Decision superiority is a competitive
advantage and is enabled by ISR assets that are constantly updating information and tactical
SA. ISR processes allow warfighters to observe, orient, decide, and act faster and more
effectively than the adversary.

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 5 OF
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE EXAMPLE

1. Background. Objective ALPHA, an HVT, plans to visit Nimroz (identified as N in figures)

within the next 96 hours to discuss a future arms smuggling strategy with senior enemy
leadership (see Figure 5A-1). It is not known who among the enemy leadership will meet with
ALPHA. Speculation is that Objective BRAVO, the enemy’s chief IED planner, may be seeking
to purchase new stand-off, side-attack, shaped-charge technology for use as IEDs against
some of the new ISAF armour in Nimroz, most notable the U.S. Marine Corps M1A2 Abrams
main battle tanks. According to several HUMINT sources and one A1 SIGINT source, ALPHA
will travel in a small convoy of five vehicles. Intelligence on Objective ALPHA indicates he
typically convoys with a forward security. The main convoy body consists of a personal escort
of two small armoured pickup trucks. ALPHA normally rides in one of the trucks along with his
personal driver and a protection guard. A fourth vehicle, believed to be a larger truck, follows
behind the escort section by about 500 metres and acts as a counter-attack force in order to
react if ALPHA is ambushed or needs assistance. Additionally, a rearguard section follows
behind the main body by two to three kilometres (km) to ensure no one is tracking the main
body. HUMINT has determined that ALPHA will use one of three potential ingress routes when
the moon is full. ALPHA believes a full moon is to his advantage as he is aware of the
limitations of certain NATO ISR and close air support (CAS) platforms, which include RPVs.
COM TF 99 intends to conduct a vehicle interdiction operation to capture or kill ALPHA. He
plans to use all of the SOTG ISR assets to support the operation. An RPV will assist with ISR
coverage and locate and provide PID of Objective ALPHA. Additional ISR will be provided by
manned ISR assets to help with vehicle follow and provide battle damage assessment (BDA)
during the possible strike. Furthermore, SOTU 999 will provide inner cordon support and SOTU
991 will be the HAF for the planned attack on Objective ALPHA. Every effort will be made to
capture ALPHA alive; however, ROE for this operation will permit eliminating Objective ALPHA
if he resists. TF 99 will alert PR for this operation as a possible contingency operation.

Note: When using

the F3EAD process,
the find and fix are
the two steps that rely
on ISR capabilities.
The find and fix steps
play a significant role
for planning and
executing the above
ALPHA mission example.
Obj ALPHA (HVT) may The following
use one of three routes to description and
the meeting. ISR and figures provide a
non-traditional ISR assets graphical snapshot of
are used during the find
and fix phases of the
what the SOTG may
F3EAD cycle. require in terms of
ISR support.

Figure 5A-1. ISR Mission Example

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a. Step 1 – Find

During the find step,

ISR assets may be
used to hunt in the
general area for
ALPHA. Also
geospatial assets may
be used to provide
imagery of the terrain.

Figure 5A-2. Find Step

(1) During this step, emerging targets are detected and classified for further
prosecution. Recommended ISR assets for Step 1 include geospatial satellites
and/or RPVs to find Objective ALPHA (see Figure 5A-2).

(2) The find step involves intelligence collection based on IPOE. The use of
traditional and non-traditional ISR (such as aircraft targeting pods), HUMINT, or
SIGINT capabilities may provide initial detection of an emerging target.

(3) Input to the find step

(a) Clearly delineated SOCC dynamic targeting guidance and priorities.

(b) Focused IPOE, to include identified general areas of interest, known

individual targets of interest such as HVTs, and cross-cueing of intelligence
support to identify potential targets within the tactical environment.

(c) Collection plans based on the IPOE.

(4) Output of the find step: potential targets detected and nominated for further
prosecution in the targeting process.

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b. Step 2 – Fix

During the fix step,

fighter aircraft use
non-traditional ISR
and ISR assets, such
as RPVs’ cross-cue
sensor capabilities, to
establish the exact
positions of ALPHA.

Figure 5A-3. Fix Step

(1) A fix is a position determined from terrestrial, electronic, or astronomical

data. The fix step of the targeting process includes actions to determine the
location (fix) of an emerging target. Recommended ISR assets for this step
include RPVs or fighter aircraft using NTISR capabilities to provide an exact
location for objectives ALPHA and BRAVO (see Figure 5A-3).

(2) The fix step begins after emerging targets requiring further targeting are
detected. When an emerging target is identified, ISR sensors are cross-cued to
confirm target identification and location. The synchronization and fusing of ISR
data then confirms the target that may be classified as a TST requiring further
prosecution in the targeting process.

(3) Input to the fix step

(a) Potential targets requiring dynamic targeting.

(b) Sensor information on the target.

(4) Output of the fix step

(a) Target identification, classification, and confirmation.

(b) Target location accuracy refined to level required for target

engagement.

(c) Determination or estimation of target time characteristics.

(d) Target prioritization scheme.

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c. Step 3 – Finish

During the finish step,

fighters or armed ISR
assets may be used to
eliminate Obj ALPHA.
This is accomplished
after his exact
location has been
determined in the
preivious fix step.

Figure 5A-4. Finish Step

(1) During this step, the target(s) is eliminated while activity and movement are
monitored. Recommend using fighter and/or RPV weapon systems for this step of
the targeting process to accomplish the effects desired against objectives ALPHA
and BRAVO (see Figure 5A-4).

(2) The finish step begins once a definite fix is obtained on the target and ends
when the engagement’s desired effect upon the target is determined. Note that
some targets may require continuous tracking upon initial detection as a dynamic
target. Weapons systems may be coordinated to maintain SA.

(3) Input to the finish step

(a) Confirmed target.

(b) Target location and plot of movement (if applicable).

(4) Output of the finish step

(a) Tracking, if required for the finish step, is maintained on a target by

an appropriate ISR sensor(s).

(b) BDA reports.

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d. Step 4 – Exploit

(1) ISR is critical for the exploit phase of F3EAD. Because many operations
are of a strike to develop nature, having ISR on station after the target has been
finished is crucial for two key issues:

(a) It ensures the SOTG has ISR assets over the target and target area
to watch and listen for information as a result of the hit that may lead to a
quick transition to another fix and finish opportunity.

(b) When CIVCAS or collateral damage has been caused, it helps to

maintain SA on the target and facilitates in BSO handover if follow-on action
has to be taken to mitigate CIVCAS and collateral damage. If ISR is not on
station for a period of time after a CIVCAS or collateral damage incident,
the enemy may use the ISR gap to contaminate the CIVCAS or collateral
damage scene for their own Info Ops campaign.

(2) In this example, members of the personal security detail forward or behind
the HVT may initiate cell phone calls to other insurgents or facilitators in the area
to let them know that their convoy has been attacked.

(3) Input to the exploit step

(a) Duration that ISR is required for exploit phase.

(b) Info being sought: cell traffic, associated target movement based on
predicted effects of the finish.

(4) Output of the exploit step

(a) Collection of intelligence for analysis and onward dissemination

(steps 5 and 6 of F3EAD).

(b) New tracking, if exploitation reveals new targets.

(c) CIVCAS and collateral damage monitoring to facilitate battlespace

handover and mitigate negative Info Ops against NATO.

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THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK.

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CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

6-1. Introduction. Many of today’s SOF operations are in environments facing non-
traditional threats that require the military to ensure security and to support comprehensive
efforts and indirect approaches to contribute to stability and achieve the desired end state. This
complex operating environment leads to a different approach for an SOTG to operations than in
traditional warfare. When executing SOF missions, an SOTG has to integrate a variety of
conventional and non-military factors into its planning process to mitigate negative effects as
well as to exploit opportunities and achieve potential synergy. This includes a timely and
thorough integration of the SOCC HQ and conventional military and non-military actors as
required. Therefore, key command group and planning staff members of the SOTG HQ must
be familiar with the SOCC-P2 used by higher HQs so it can support SOCC planning and
integrate seamlessly into higher level battle rhythm, boards, working groups, and meetings. On
the SOTG level, the special operations decision-making process or modified combat estimate
for SOF may be the primary tool for tactical-level planning to enable this integration.
Nevertheless, the planning process rests with the SOTG as it is a national responsibility and
decision on what kind of planning and respective decision-making process is applied.

6-2. Future Plans. SOTG staff must include various planning considerations to cover
deployment, employment, integration, security, intelligence, to include ISR and targeting,
logistics and sustainment, and legal aspects. Therefore, it is key to have a robust SOTG staff
with the appropriate SMEs and planners, as well as a liaison structure tailored to the mission.

a. Campaign Planning. SOTG planners have various commitments throughout the

different phases of campaign planning and execution. Specifically in the phases of
appreciation (of the strategic environment) and estimate within CONOPS and OPLAN
development, these planners have to ensure:

(1) Adequate integration, advice, and input as required.

(2) Timely and accurate planning on the SOTG level.

(3) Permanent coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization with the SOCC

planning group.

b. Information Sharing. A precondition to success is information sharing and the

persistent exchange of products between the various levels of the SOF community
(NSHQ, SOCC, and SOTG).

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Figure 6-1. SOCC-P2 and SOTG Activities22

c. Collaboration with Special Operations Component Command Headquarters.

Extensive planning efforts of the SOTG are driven by national regulations as well as by
NATO documents, agreements, and standards. In particular, the strategic deployment
and sustainment of the SOTG are national responsibilities. This does not exclude the
possibility of establishing mutual support agreements to share tasks, responsibilities, or
resources with other nations or entities to achieve synergy. Nevertheless, the SOTG
staff has to integrate and coordinate with the respective SOCC
branches/divisions/directorates across several fields of planning to include:

(1) Tactical employment and capabilities.

(2) Capability shortfalls and requirements.

(3) Legal requirements (like ROE) for the tactical level with the
recommendation for the appropriate level of approval authority.

(4) Deployment, as SOCC J4 has to coordinate RSOM, intra-theatre airlift, and

respective priorities with JTF HQ J4.

(5) Consideration and application of logistic and medical direction and

guidance, including the integration of national support elements (NSEs) to ensure
sustainment.

22 SSA stands for SACEUR’s strategic assessment.

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(6) CIS support, including provision of hardware/software and establishment of

interoperability.

(7) Ways and means of information exchange.

d. Liaison. Aside from regular exchange and provision of information, a deployed

SOTG liaison element to the SOCC HQ is decisive for both high-end SOCC OPLAN and
for effective SOTG integration based on available means and capabilities. This liaison
will answer the majority of the SOCC planner’s questions and will also ensure the high
value of output from wargaming to optimize the SOCC COA and CONOPS development.

e. Support to Special Operation Component Command Planning Process.

Throughout the complete SOCC-P2, the SOTG will be requested to support with advice
and expertise, and, parallel to that, develop its own CONOPS and OPLAN for approval
by COM SOCC. As the SOTG is normally a national SOF assigned to the SOCC via the
NATO force generation process and recommended combined joint statement of
requirements (CJSOR), it will be up to the respective nation to decide on final force
composition and the planning process to be used.23 This does not negate the
requirements for accurate and timely provision of SOTG inputs and products.

Red Flag. COM SOTG has to be aware that selection of the

LO to the SOCC is critical for effective integration throughout
the whole campaign. SOTGs may send someone not suitable
for the job, lacking operational experience or the required
language skills. This LO must carefully monitor SOCC daily
business, follow any planning activities, and should have the
authority, on behalf of COM SOTG, to provide input or make
decisions, depending on the topic. Additionally, the SOTG has
to keep him informed on all aspects of SOTG activities or
planning, as he is the primary interface to the SOCC for any
initial questions. He will be tasked to brief the majority of
SOTG CONOPS for COM SOCC approval.

f. Planning Considerations. During campaign planning, there is a significant

difference in type and detail of planning considerations for the SOTG planners. A major
challenge for the SOTG staff is the planning of deployment and sustainment, as the
majority is national responsibility and needs detailed coordination and deconfliction, both
between the SOTG’s TCN and SOCC’s FN, as well as between the TCN and NATO. As
this is mainly done beyond the SOTG level, there is the main effort for the SOTG in the
provision of tactical-level advice and expertise for the SOCC and in the development of the
respective SOTG CONOPS and OPLAN in support of the SOCC OPLAN. Therefore,
SOTG planners have to consider and reflect in the planning and support of the SOCC-P2:

(1) National caveats and restrictions.

(2) Capabilities, shortfalls, and limitations.

23CJSOR lays out the recommended size and type of SOTG needed for a generic NRF mission. If and when a
mission is NAC approved, a revised CJSOR, based on the operational environment and potential SOF mission
sets, will be forwarded to the respective nations slated for the NRF. The nation will make the final decision on size
and composition based on national restraints and constraints imposed by their national planners.

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(3) Requirements and force structure (SOF, force multiplier, enabler, medical,
logistics).

(4) Operational environment (land, maritime, situation, permissive/non-permissive).

(5) Actors including population and the potential for exploitation and synergy.

(6) Risks and threats and ways to mitigate (to include FP considerations).

(7) Contribution to higher targeting, FP, intelligence, assets/capabilities, liaison,

logistics, or communications.

6-3. Future Operations

a. When an SOTG is deployed into the AOO, its general structure under COM SOTG
may consist of an operations centre (OPSCEN), support centre (SUPCEN), and a signal
centre (SIGCEN), all tailored to the mission (see Chapter 2). This enables the SOTG to
plan and execute assigned missions. Other organizational structures are also possible,
as described in Chapter 1.

b. After the SOTG is operational within the assigned AOO, it will receive its missions
and tasks from the SOCC HQ, either as an operation order (OPORD), fragmentary order
(FRAGO), or verbally if appropriate. Additionally, the SOTG may generate its own
missions based on the outcome of previously conducted missions. Ideally, the SOTG
should have the resources and capabilities to develop its own target sets and missions
from the bottom up in accordance with higher command intent.

Figure 6-2. Notional FRAGO Development

c. SOTG planners and staff have to understand that many missions are generated
on a higher level. As the operational-level JTF HQ will assign missions to the SOCC, it
respectively will provide the framework, including the required C2 relationship (e.g.
supported or supporting command) and necessary capabilities and assets under
command or under control. The primary task of the SOCC HQ, in close coordination and

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conjunction with LOs from the SOTGs and conventional components, is to assess the
given mission and to develop the FRAGO for the SOTG that is best suited for the
mission. This includes the apportionment of resources as deemed necessary.

(1) Special Operations Task Group Planning Cycle

(a) The SOTG Planning Cycle is heavily dependent on interaction with

other activities within the organizational structure of the JTF in theatre.
Intelligence and targeting cycles are the determining elements of what kind of
capabilities are required and later assigned for plan and target development.
Both are the key tools to identify which ISR capabilities are required for each
phase and what is required to progress the target to the next phase. The
targeting cycle drives the SOTG Planning Cycle as the fix to finish provides the
tempo for the SOTG. The SOTG Planning Cycle has to be flexible enough to
await the final pieces of actionable intelligence or other triggers. Throughout
these different interacting and permanently ongoing cycles, the SOTG has to
engage, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize its own activities and requests
to proceed in the planning. If successful, this will lead to an appropriate
reflection of SOTG requirements in the air tasking cycle to get all required
capabilities (ISR, air support) onto the air tasking order (ATO) and air
coordination order (ACO). The SOCC HQ has the critical role, as it is the level
authorized to engage JTF HQ boards and working groups for prioritization and
allocation to fulfil SOTG requirements.

Figure 6-3. SOTG Planning and Integration

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(b) When executing the SOTG Planning Cycle, planners have to be

aware of functions and responsibilities and how they are executed on the
SOCC and JTF HQ level. As the SOCC has to integrate its own activities
into the JTF HQ battle rhythm and therefore adjust their own, the SOTG has
to coordinate its battle rhythm in reference to time and type of activity.
When done appropriately, this will ensure the most effective collaboration
and integration and will facilitate and optimize the SOTG planning process.
Figure 6-4 depicts the major topics the SOTG has to implement into the
system for planning success.

Figure 6-4. SOF Battle Rhythm and Integration

(c) Once the SOTG staff has received a WNGO or the FRAGO tasking
them to plan and execute a mission, they will start their respective planning
processes. This will be initiated by analysing the mission, commander’s
intent, additional planning guidance, and any necessary suspense. Based
on initial planning, the SOTG will submit a CONOPS on how it plans to
execute the mission. Within this CONOPS, the SOTG will pass any
requests (e.g. air support request (AIRSUPREQ), support request
(SPTREQ)) to the SOCC HQ, which will forward these to respective staff
within the JTF HQ. If required, based on type and priority of target or
allocation of theatre resources to support the mission, the CONOPS may
also be submitted to the JTF HQ for approval. An example of a CONOPS
can be found at Annex F and details the minimum IRs to be briefed to the
BSO, SOCC, or JTF HQ coordination and approval authorities.

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(d) While the CONOPS is in the staffing process for approval, the SOTG
will continue with detailed mission planning, briefings, and rehearsals as
required. COM SOTG will finally request permission for mission execution.
Throughout the CONOPS approval process, the SOTG LO to SOCC HQ
has a critical role. He will have to brief COM SOCC, or at least the J3 and
J35, about the concept, and therefore needs to have all details of the SOTG
planning to be prepared to answer all upcoming questions. Pending a
specific CONOPS level or a target, he even might be tasked to brief the
respective approval authority at the operational level (JTF HQ).

Important Note. Recent operations have shown that it is

good practice for the SOTG to brief the CONOPS to the BSO
just prior to it being pushed forward to the SOCC for approval.
This affords the BSO the opportunity to understand what is
about to happen within his battlespace and if there are issues
that need coordination, deconfliction, or clarification that can
be addressed early. An effective liaison structure within the
BSO’s C2 and planning structure will help build and maintain
trust. To maintain OPSEC, the information briefing should
only be given to key staff of the BSO, normally the COM or
deputy commander, COS, and his J33.

Figure 6-5. Notional SOTG Mission Planning Process

(2) Special Operations Task Group Planning Activities

(a) Once the SOTG has received the task to plan a mission (or when it is
generated by the exploitation phase of the operation and included in the
operations summary (OPSUM) of a previous SOTG mission), COS SOTG,
together with his plans section and additional SMEs as required, may
analyse the assigned mission and will present the results and

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recommendation to COM SOTG for approval. Example of an OPSUM can

be found at Appendix 3 to Annex H. Once COM SOTG has approved the
mission, the staff will initiate detailed planning.

(b) The plans section will develop a CONOPS (based on a given

template) for approval by COM SOCC. As the detailed tactical planning is
conducted by the SOF team that is designated for execution, it is
recommended that the team leader is involved as soon as possible to keep
the plans team fully in the loop. With the delivery of the CONOPS, the SOTG
will generate additional requests for support (SPTREQ, AIRSUPREQ,
airspace control means request (ACMREQ)) as required. Finally, the team
will receive the mission in-brief and the respective mission folder. With this,
the responsibility will pass to the operations section of the SOTG.

(c) The operations section, with a respective mission manager, will

support the detailed tactical planning of the team in their mission
preparation and will function as a link between the team and SOTG staff.
Any additional requirements developed during planning will be supported by
the SOTG or passed to the SOCC for support and later confirmation.
Specifically, confirmation of all requests previously passed to the SOCC,
such as the provision of critical enablers and the related incorporation and
synchronization, is of utmost importance. During this phase of planning, the
mission folder will grow as more details of the mission are generated. It will
incorporate all phases of the mission, appropriate intelligence, and all
necessary procedures for contingencies and emergencies, and is the
baseline for monitoring and handling the execution. SOTG intelligence
personnel must be responsive throughout the planning process with the full
spectrum of possible products (such as imagery or geometrics).

(d) The designated SOF team will present its mission concept to COM
SOTG to ensure that the COM’s intentions and requirements are met and
incorporated. He will also want to ensure that the plan is fully integrated
into the overall concept. Finally, the team will backbrief COM SOTG on the
final version of the plan for approval. This plan should be based on the
principle of PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency). This is the
last chance for final adjustments. Depending on the complexity of the target
or the time available, COM SOTG may decide there is a need for
rehearsals.

(e) Once the SOTG has the CONOPS approval from higher HQs, COM
SOTG will order mission execution. The respective mission execution
checklist will be submitted via the SOTG to the SOCC JOC for monitoring
the mission once it has started. The SOTG LO in the SOCC will sit in the
JOC, monitor the mission, and brief the J33 accordingly as milestones on
the mission execution checklist are met.

(f) When COM SOTG has ordered the execution of an assigned

mission, the responsibilities of future plans are finished and the task is
passed to the current operations section of the SOTG HQ.

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Best Practice. Generally the SOTG should practise and

provide mission-type orders and commander’s intent to permit
subordinates’ flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness. This
will ensure best use of SOF-specific skills and training
together with the unique SOF mindset.

(3) Special Operations Task Group Planning Considerations

(a) Mission planning/execution and mission success require a high level

of SOF-specific detailed planning that is beyond the level of conventional
forces planning. The baseline is the multitude of actors, target audiences,
and the different environments the SOTG will operate in, which will
generate factors and deductions in relation to required capabilities, space,
time, phasing, etc. This makes it mandatory to apply a comprehensive
approach to planning. As non-military actors (IOs, NGOs, governmental
organizations (GOs)) are an expanding and influential factor in today’s
operational environment, SOTG planners have to identify, assess, and
utilize these organizations for best effect. This includes shaping the
environment, getting a feel for atmospherics, and considering their influence
on the outcome of SOTG operations (affecting the information environment
with the potential to negate positive SOF effects). F2UID, as detailed in
Chapter 3, is key to developing and understanding the links between all the
different actors, target audiences, and environmental factors.

(b) Once these deductions are identified, SOTG planners will implement
the respective conclusions in the plan, generate additional tasks in
preparation of the mission, and pass the requests to the SOCC for further
processing. Figure 6-6 shows the decisive principles for success:
integration, deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization.

Figure 6-6. SOTG Planning Considerations

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(c) When the SOTG initiates mission planning, planners have to assess
the assigned mission and available information. They have to identify:

1/ The type of mission (MA, SR, DA, or a mix).

2/ The environment the SOTG will have to operate in (land,

maritime).

3/ Existing conditions (terrain, weather, obstacles, infrastructure).

4/ Enemy and civilian situation (location of forces, capabilities,

social/tribal structure, etc.).

5/ Restraints, constraints, and tasks assigned by the SOCC

influencing planning and execution.

6/ Preconditions the SOCC has to establish as its principal tasks

(coordination with JTF HQ and other CCs, processing requests).

7/ Restraints, constraints by JTF HQ with impact on the tactical

level (HN face, targeting procedures, and regulations).

8/ Limitations imposed by HN.

(d) Once these factors are identified, they need to be assessed on their
potential impact to tactical planning. Major assessments have to be made on:

1/ Type of capabilities required for the mission (for

infiltration/exfiltration, during execution).

2/ Appropriate SOF AOO (size and type depending on static or

dynamic SOTG mission).

3/ Informational effects (What are the JTF or BSO Info Ops

objectives tied to the potential SOF AOO? The SOF mission must
complement and support these Info Ops objectives.).

4/ Duration depending on the type of mission (will determine

sustainment efforts).

5/ Requirements for effective C2 (establishing a SOCCE or

additional liaison elements).

6/ BSM (SOTG ROZ/restricted-fire area (RFA)/no-fire area (NFA),

airspace control means (ACM) such as corridors or orbits for gunships).

7/ Potential fire support.

8/ FP, including requirements for OPSEC and deception.

(e) Finally, the professional assessment from the SOTG will direct the
detailed planning. The SOTG will support the employment plan of its
SOTUs with all mission-essential capabilities, coordination and deconfliction

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requirements, and necessary external support throughout all phases of the

mission. This may temporarily affect the general C2 structure if the
situation dictates.

g. Below is a brief summary of major planning considerations the SOTG staff

members should have in their minds when developing the plan.

(1) Operational Environment. As described in Chapter 1, the operational

environment drives the majority of planning considerations.

(a) Land

1/ Operating in this kind of environment requires the planners to

assess a number of factors to be reflected in further planning.
Terrain, including the population, will influence capability
requirements and planning for all phases of mission execution.
Driven by the type of mission (SR, DA), the assessment on distance
to the target area, infrastructure, obstacles, behaviour of population,
or concealment and cover will define the degree of risk and the ways
and means to execute the mission, as well as requirements to
mitigate risks by planning for contingencies.

Important Note. The relationship between the enemy and the

local population is critical for a permissive or non-permissive
environment for the SOTU. Previous operations have shown
mission failure because of insufficient analysis of mentality
and social and economic behaviour of the local population
causing compromise early in the execution of SOF missions.

2/ When SOTG planners start, they have to ensure they consider

and, if required, integrate conventional forces operating in the
designated AOO. This will avoid friction and the potential for
fratricide, as well as provide the potential for synergy of effort. The
SOTG has to be aware of conventional capabilities and limitations
and should exploit them to the best effect possible. The BSO may
provide fire support or logistical support in addition to SOF organic
resources. Additionally, the conventional BSO may support the
establishment of a temporary SOF FOB for forward staging or
holding prior to mission execution. All this requires SA, timely
interaction, including exchange of information, and liaison for critical
deconfliction and coordination (e.g. BSM, joint fires).

3/ A critical element for SOTG planning is the available

information about the target and the enemy in general. As
information becomes available on the type of target, force location
and laydown, capabilities and limitations, and potential intention,
SOTG planners will have to assess the inherent threat. This will
drive force composition, required enablers, and employment of the
SOTU, and will shape the plan in relation to coordination of BSM and
joint fires.

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(b) Maritime

1/ The maritime environment implies a completely different

approach to analysis. The majority of SOF operations in this
environment will either be in support of the maritime conventional
forces (for example, support to MIOs with an opposed boarding
capability) or an independent SOTG operation supported by the
maritime component. When analysing the environment, SOTG
planners will look for meteorological and oceanographic data existing
in the AOO. As missions are often affected by weather, there is a
requirement for permanent weather observation because of the
possible impact on employment of the SOTU and timing of the
operation.

2/ In most cases, SOF will be stationed on a maritime platform

serving as a floating FOB. Ideally, this will be a large naval platform
with the capability to C2 SOTU operations, as well as to
embark/disembark the force via surface, subsurface, or above
surface (aviation) assets. SOTG planners have to be aware that
staging of SOF normally implies limited available space. During
planning, the major emphasis will be on coordination of support,
specifically the staging, transportation, maritime ISR, fire support,
and logistics support. This may be complemented with additional
support assigned from other components or higher HQs.

3/ Detailed assessment of the enemy is critical. While it is

essentially up to the SOF intelligence staff to provide the details of
who will be targeted, the conventional navy will assist with providing
details of the vessel of interest, to include details of the deck layout,
like masts and aerials, that can impede fast rope insertion, ship’s draft
for hook and climb points, possible layout below deck, and for the
bridge and critical ship infrastructure, such as the engine room, etc.

4/ Detailed coordination with the navy is vital for extraction

planning and the insertion of follow-on forces (EOD, medical teams)
and a prize crew to control the ship after it has been seized.

(c) Air. The requirement for air is heavily dependent on terrain,

distance, and type of mission, including the threat situation on the ground.
This will dictate the type of asset/capability required for insertion and
extraction (fixed-wing (FW) or rotary-wing (RW)), type of suitable ISR or
NTISR, and potential fire support (like pre-planned CAS). All these
requirements need the respective request to higher HQs and timely
integration into the air component’s ATO, ACO, and respective ACM.
These ACM, especially those beyond the fire support coordination line
(FSCL) of the conventional BSO, have to be deconflicted and published in
the ATO, for example, the infiltration/exfiltration corridors, gunship orbits, or
NFA/RFA. The SOTG should have an S3 air/air liaison officer (ALO) who
will handle the request and coordination with SOCC J3 Air and other air-
related agencies/centres. The overall SOALI process, including the SOTG
contribution, is explained in detail in Chapter 7.

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Important Note. Even when the ACC is working along the 72-
hour timeline for ATO development and execution, there is the
opportunity for SOF to integrate their own air closer to the
deadline. It requires a sound knowledge of air processes and
procedures and the network to deal with it. The result is a faster
SOF planning process and a better chance to maintain OPSEC.

(2) Host Nation. One of the biggest concerns for SOTG planners can be
restraints or constraints imposed by the HN. This could be the integration of a
host face in planning and/or execution, as well as the approval by HN authorities
prior to execution. The resulting challenge is the balance between maintaining
OPSEC and fulfilment of given regulations. Additionally, there may be the
requirement to rely on or to use HN forces. This will require a more detailed BSM
and coordination due to different mentalities, doctrine, TTP, or level of
performance, and should be mitigated by intensive training and rehearsal and a
tailored to the mission C2 structure. If the SOF mission is MA and training of
indigenous security forces, the relationship built between the SOTG and the HN
security forces will be critical.

(3) Command and Control. The C2 structure between the SOCC, SOTG, and
SOTU is defined in principle in Chapter 2; however, there may be the requirement
to temporarily adjust it to satisfy the mission specifics. Assigned missions for the
SOTG can result in the task to support others (mainly conventional land or
maritime forces) or to be supported by them. This command or
supported/supporting relationship leads to a critical assessment of what is needed
to ensure an effective SOF C2. At a minimum, the C2 structure applied has to
ensure the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of battlespace activities and
joint fires. The SOTG planners may recommend a temporary instalment of a
SOCCE or a simple exchange of liaison, as the SOTG will maintain its capability to
exercise C2 of temporarily dispatched SOTUs. Both options are feasible but have
to maintain a clear chain of command and flat hierarchy to ensure unity of
command, clear responsibilities, and, finally, flexibility. Challenges may arise due
to limitations within the availability of qualified SOF personnel, existing
conventional forces capabilities (such as SOF C2 afloat on a maritime platform), or
lack of interoperability to coordinate and deconflict.

Best Practice. SOF operations are often time sensitive and

sensitive in relation to the target. Therefore, it is useful to
understand existing conventional capabilities in advance to
avoid friction close to and during execution. The challenge will
be the balance between OPSEC and necessary in-advance
preparations in close coordination with the conventional forces.

(4) Intelligence. As Chapter 4 details, SOTG operations rely much more on a

high threshold of intelligence than conventional forces do. Detailed intelligence is
the single greatest enabler for SOF. This encompasses detailed knowledge on
geography, weather, terrain, the environment, and people and actors operating in
the potential AOO. This supports the requirement for thorough operations
planning by the SOTU (affecting methods of insertion/infiltration/action on
target/exfiltration/extraction, planning for contingencies and emergencies, and

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resupply). SOTG planners have to understand that intelligence is key for sound
mission planning. While the planning process proceeds, the requests for
intelligence to build up the mission folder increase. To facilitate the information
collection and the provision of intelligence for planning, the SOTG has to establish
an all-source network (NSHQ, SOCC, BSO, national intelligence agencies) to
exploit all means and resources to support the SOTU/SOTG.

(5) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. ISR is critical to the

needs of an SOTG. Many countries’ ongoing conflicts have become GO/NO-GO
criteria because of the links to target development and mitigation of collateral
damage. It enables CONOPS approval, supports mission planning, and multiplies
combat effectiveness of the ground force during execution. Planners in all
functional areas (intelligence, operations, SOF air/ALO) must have detailed
knowledge of capabilities, limitations, strengths, and weaknesses of available ISR
assets and other assets potentially suitable for NTISR. This knowledge is critical
for requesting the right capability for specific purposes. ISR coverage should be
directed, massed, and layered for effect. Directed means that it must be prioritized
correctly, as per the current operational demands, and cross-cued to provide the
required effect. Massed means redundancy in sensor coverage with sufficient
coverage to accommodate contingencies, such as platform or sensor failure.
Layered means having a varied sensor coverage that has the utility to provide
different capabilities depending on the activity and nature of the target. Air ISR
requests have to be staffed through the air allocation process to be on the ATO.
Land-based ISR requests can be submitted to the BSO, and maritime-based ISR
requests can be submitted to the maritime BSO. Chapter 5 provides more detail
on ISR support planning.

Best Practice. The SOTG should build a relationship

between the operator and the provider. The wrong product
may be requested or produced because of poor
communication. Discussing the requirements before the
operation allows both sides a better understanding of what is
reasonably possible. Subsequently, it is recommended to
have all players from the lowest tactical elements present
during planning and at orders. This facilitates smooth
execution and mitigates risks.

(6) Targeting

(a) SOTG planners have to be familiar with the designated targeting

process F3EAD and respective procedures for target development and
prosecution. Target development is heavily linked to the use of ISR, and
there may be additional ISR requirements during execution. This leads to
cross-functional planning to coordinate and synchronize the needs of
intelligence and operations planners. As a growing target folder may
generate a mission for the SOTG, planners have to accept and apply the
restraints and constraints linked to target prosecution. Preconditions
normally imposed by higher HQs have to be met and qualified personnel
have to be available. Specifically important is integration of the SOCC
targeting cell and consideration of its battle rhythm to avoid delays in the
process.

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(b) Through their intelligence cell, the SOTG can develop several potential
target packages within their AOO. COM SOTG may have to set priorities for
his intelligence cell and direct SOTUs to conduct operations strictly for
intelligence collection to assist with target development. Targeting and SOF
role and contribution are described in detail in Chapter 3.

Important Note. Current operations show that external

influence and existing sensitivities affect target prosecution. A
TST may exist, but because of political constraints the
designated target approval authority may rest with someone
outside the JOA. The SOTG staff and the deployed
SOTU/GFC must be familiar with the joint targeting process
and procedures and understand that in some circumstances
there might be a time delay due to higher approval levels and
political and strategic sensitivities of the specific target.

(7) Battlespace Management. SOF are users of land, sea, and air space.
Establishment of effective BSM in conjunction with FSCMs is critical for SOF
success especially when operating in a conventional BSO’s AOO. It is the tool of
minimizing interference and negative impacts on one’s own operations by blue
forces and preventing fratricide. The combination of both will provide the SOTG
the agility and responsiveness best suited for mission success. For this purpose,
joint fires have to be integrated into the BSM. The SOTG, via the SOCC, will
request the best-suited type of battlespace, and the JTF HQ will decide and
approve and will inform the respective CCs. Whatever the type of control measure
assigned (JSOA, kill boxes, ROZ, RFA, or NFA) for all this space, there is the
requirement for C2 of that space both on the ground and in the air. This requires
suitable communications and datalink systems, as well as qualified personnel,
such as JTACs or forward observation officers/FACs, etc., to execute this required
C2. Additionally, a timely liaison exchange with the conventional BSO and
affected units may be useful to ensure coordination and deconfliction, as well as to
avoid fratricide. Chapter 7 provides more detail on equipment and personnel best
suited for BSM.

Best Practice. A ROZ has proved to be an effective control

measure for reserving land, maritime, and air space to COM
SOTG. It can be pre-planned or permanently established and
activated on request.

(8) Joint Fires. SOTG combat power is limited, and there will be times
(mission compromise, downed aircraft, large TIC with a numerically superior
enemy) when the SOTG has to rely on fire support from other components. The
SOTG has to pre-plan ways and means to handle these potential situations. This
may include conventional capabilities, like artillery from the BSO, FW or RW from
the air component, or organic capabilities like gunships. Just like air and ISR,
joints fires resources and qualified personnel must be planned for accordingly and
integrated fully in the SOF plan. Knowledge of capabilities, limitations, and
procedures of these potential joint fires providers is key for proper employment of

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this combat power multiplier for the SOTG. It is important to be smart about
resources and capabilities and leverage them to their full potential.

Important Note. For SOF, the JTAC is the life insurance

during any operation, as he has the training and authority to
call and direct air support and joint fires. Smaller nations may
ask for external JTAC support provided by other nations, but
this requires detailed joint training and rehearsal to mitigate
risk and frictions. At a minimum, the SOTG should ensure that
there are air assets (and ISR) on station during
infiltration/exfiltration and all actions on the objective. The
SOTG has to be aware that some assets and some AOOs
may require JTACs with specific training and skills in
combination with a certification to be used during operations.
Certification may depend on the nation providing the air/ISR or
joint fires asset, or may be imposed by the JTF HQ due to
environment or incidents. Therefore, the SOTG should clarify
any requirements prior to deployment or in the early days after
arrival in theatre. NATO uses combat enhancement training
(CET)/force integration training (FIT) opportunities to marry
assets, such as JTACs and air assets, during NRF
preparations so that little time is wasted once the order to
deploy is given.

(9) Information Operations. Influencing the environment is twofold. Kinetic

operations will miss the desired effect if they are not accompanied by supporting
Info Ops, or in the case of a counter-insurgency environment, do not support an
Info Ops objective. The SOTG staff has to analyse the higher Info Ops intention
and coordinate and integrate their objectives and themes accordingly. As Internet
and social networks provide the enemy with a unique and timely opportunity to
shape and influence public opinion, it is important for the SOTG to prepare, as part
of mission planning, the key message to be distributed before, during, and after
the mission. This can be done by PsyOps, CIMIC, or public information supporting
assets integral to the SOCC or from the BSO. The SOTG should also have
contingencies in place for mission failure and potential CIVCAS. CIVCAS is
always a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR); therefore, COM
JTF will typically have an incident response team in place to deal with CIVCAS
quickly in conjunction with the SOTG. Solid Info Ops coordination between the
SOTG, the SOCC, the BSO, the combined joint PsyOps task force, and the JTF
HQ will prevent information fratricide and reduce the likelihood of strategic
informational blowback. See Chapter 3 for more details on Info Ops.

Best Practice. Current campaigns have shown the criticality

of including culturally experienced Info Ops experts in all
phases of mission planning. Today’s complex social and
threat environments require corresponding Info Ops
approaches to multiply the effect of a kinetic SOF operation.

(10) Support. Depending on the type and duration of the mission with the
associated terrain and distance, SOTG planners have to plan for sustainment and

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contingencies. This will include organic assets or the need for conventional
support. As the majority of resupply is conducted by air, planners have to develop
the appropriate requests and ensure timely integration and coordination with the
ATO cycle. Additionally, a resistant and secure communications plan has to be
installed. This includes preparation for alternates, emergencies, and lost
communications. Planners have to be aware of effects that can be caused by
weather and terrain and plan for mitigation and contingencies.

Best Practice. Position the SOTG CSS team at the airhead

where supplies will be rigged and loaded for airdrop to ensure
SOTG resupply interests are catered to.

(11) Weather. Weather is a factor that can multiply SOF strengths or that has
the ability to reduce it to a minimum. As speed, surprise, agility, and simplicity, as
well as SOF-specific training and capabilities, are crucial for mission success,
factors like light data, temperature, rain, snow, and wind, in conjunction with soil
composition, have a severe impact on SOTG planning and execution. Weather
may deny or restrict the use of air (like brown-out) or ISR platforms (like visibility or
data transfer), may influence insertion and extraction (level of illumination for RW),
and may have the potential for mission failure. Additionally, weather is an
important factor for any upcoming PR or medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) mission
if required.

(12) Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation

(a) MEDEVAC/casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planning and integration

are mission essential requirements for all SOF operations. Failure to plan
and provide assets accordingly typically constitutes a mission NO-GO
criteria. SOF medical planners and SOF air planners must coordinate
available and/or required assets (including their integration on the ATO)
based on a thorough assessment of:

1/ Available medical treatment facilities (MTFs).

2/ Distance between target area and medical facility.

3/ Required time for MEDEVAC.

4/ Type of asset and respective capabilities.

(b) As a casualty incident occurs, it is critical that all procedures are

based on battle drills and SOPs coordinated by the SOTG, as it has the
communications, means, and capabilities to handle complex emergencies.
Mass casualty situations can be backed up with medical staff provided by
the SOCC JOC as required.

(13) Operation Security

(a) There are a lot of potential risks to OPSEC with the potential for
mission failure. The SOTG may have to brief a non-SOF target audience

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for coordination and approval; therefore, the SOTG staff has to balance
between need-to-know and the need-for-support. This challenge can be
solved by timely establishment of networks and relationships and the build-
up of trust within the operations environment. The result may be a less
detailed briefing, reducing the risk to OPSEC, and the majority of
coordination and information being passed on informally. A thorough
knowledge of non-SOF enabling procedures, like the Air Tasking Cycle, can
provide the opportunity to enforce OPSEC, as assets necessary for the
mission may be added to the ATO shortly before execution.

(b) A major challenge for OPSEC will be any integration of HN forces

into planning and execution of MA missions. Requirements may be
imposed by higher HQs or by HN authorities. It is the responsibility of the
SOCC and the SOTG to find a way to integrate operations and to ensure
OPSEC at the same time.

Red Flag. OPSEC can be achieved by using false or dummy

RFA, diverting people’s attention away from the real SOF
AOO. If deception is employed, it has to be carefully balanced
with the activities of other actors on the battlefield; otherwise it
may cause distrust and a persistent negative attitude toward
SOF.

6-4. Contingencies

a. While the SOTG is developing the plan, they will continuously ask themselves,
“What if …” in an effort to identify potential problems and ways to manage or mitigate
them. This process should cover each phase and each element of the planned
operation. Contingencies developed by the tactical SOTU element must always be
coordinated through the SOTG HQ, not developed in isolation. This ensures the HQ is
aware of what actions will be taken by an SOTU in any given circumstance, and can
support their efforts accordingly and help avoid fatal consequences.

Important Note. National SOTGs will typically develop their

own SOPs long before deployment that provide guidance to
their personnel for most eventualities. These SOPs may not
be appropriate in all situations (due to a particular operational
environment) and should be reviewed in the pre-deployment
phase, then constantly during the deployment to ensure they
remain relevant.

b. There are a number of factors to consider when determining contingency plans.

Environmental factors, such as weather, terrain, and geographical areas, will greatly
affect planning. Closely related are factors, such as light levels/hours, that may restrict
available time for conducting the operation. Additionally, it is essential that equipment,
manpower, and assets allocated for contingency plans are available and suitable for the
mission. This is in line with matching requirements and own troop capabilities. Finally, it
is critical to consider the enemy’s possible actions and capabilities prior to friendly force
planning or when considering assets or capabilities required for contingencies. Some of
the more common contingency plans at the SOTG/SOTU level are:

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(1) Insertion. Enemy, weather, or technical problems may be reason for

failure. This will lead to possible contingencies like reserve insertion platforms,
alternate insertion means, a delay, or other SOTUs in reserve. A downed aircraft
during insertion has the potential to change the mission entirely and become the
sole purpose of it.

(2) Extraction. In addition to the reasons for insertion failure, there could be
the inability of an SOTU to get to the extraction point on time or the no-show of the
SOTU, or the no-show of the extraction platform. Planners will consider the same
contingencies as for insertion but the SOTU may make use of an evasion and
recovery (E&R) contingency plan.

(3) Lost Communications. The greatest problem for an SOTG HQ when

implementing a lost comms contingency plan is ascertaining the reason why
communications have been lost, then working through the issue. Contingencies
could be caching spare radios, overflight support to establish visibility or ultra-high
frequency (UHF) communications, initiating disabled aircraft recoveries
(DARs)/E&R, or fall back on planned resupply re-entry vehicles (RVs).
Redundancy in communications planning is one of the best ways to mitigate lost
communications scenarios. Satellite communications (SATCOM) phones as
backup communications are an excellent way to maintain communications.

(4) Operational Resupply. Prearranged operational resupply should be part

of the original plan. Nevertheless, situations may arise, like lost or damaged
mission-essential equipment, unexpected extension of the duration of the mission,
heavy ammunition expenditure, or re-tasking of the SOTU, all requiring unplanned
resupply. Contingencies can be resupply by air asset, by parachute, or over land.

(5) Emergency Extraction. Usually unplanned, reasons could be compromise

or a TIC, a major change in the situation, or the SOTU is no longer able to
accomplish the mission. As this can be a major challenge for the SOTG
(especially if caused by enemy actions), contingencies are the employment of the
QRF, CAS, or special extraction equipment or assets.

(6) Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation. The mission may have to be

adjusted because of a wounded or sick SOTU member. Contingencies are similar
for emergency extraction but will likely require additional capabilities for casualty
treatment.

(7) Evasion and Recovery. Planning for E&R requires detailed coordination
among the SOTU and SOTG and must be in line with higher level E&R and PR
plans and procedures. In particular, the joint level will establish detailed plans and
procedures for CSAR and PR, including C2 of such eventualities. Timely
integration, deconfliction, and information exchange on all levels are critical. The
SOCC plays an important role, as a number of different actors and components
can be involved. The SOTG contingencies may be conventional (DARs, evasion
corridors) or unconventional (agent contact or pipeline, safe areas or houses).

c. All contingency plans should be developed in conjunction with higher HQs’ policy.
While the plans do not have to be included in the CONOPS or briefed during the
CONOPS briefing, they should be known so that if the SOCC staff asks, “What if?”, the
SOTG has a pre-planned answer. This will ensure continuity of effort and will avoid

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conflicts between resources and requirements. SOTU contingencies have to be

developed in cooperation with the relevant mission manager, because once the SOTU
gets into difficulty, the mission manager will become the primary point of contact for any
contingency to be executed. Whenever the situation for contingencies arises, the SOTG
should ensure timely information to the SOCC via the LO.

6-5. Current Operations. When planning is complete, the CONOPS is approved, and the
mission execution order (MEO) is given, all responsibility will rest with the operations personnel
of the SOTG. Once planning is complete, the SOTG HQ staff will primarily monitor, assess,
and, if required, direct ongoing operations of the SOTUs. For this purpose, the HQ will monitor
communications on different radio nets, both internally and with the conventional BSO. The
overall aim is to establish and maintain SA and to ensure timely and unplanned deconfliction
and/or synchronization. The SOTG should not interfere with the SOTU operation once it is in
the execution phase and the line of departure has been crossed. The time for good ideas has
passed and interfering would only reduce the GFC’s initiative or flexibility as the mission plays
out. Mission command is essential here, and COM SOTG must trust his GFC and SOTU to get
the job done and allow them to adjust the plan as the operational environment dictates.

a. Special Operations Task Group Organization

(1) There is no given structure on how to organize an SOTG HQ for mission

execution. Nevertheless, it must be organized so as to provide 24/7 ability to:

(a) Monitor and track ongoing operations.

(b) Maintain secure communications throughout the execution phase to

all necessary entities.

(c) Contact the ground force if required.

(d) Coordinate with respective counterparts at BSO and SOCC levels

and, if authorized by a specific situation, with the CAOC and SOLE.

(e) Establish and maintain a persistent and accurate intelligence picture,

merging the information flow from bottom up and top down.

(f) Manage movement and fire in close coordination with the SOCC.

(g) Keep the SOTG LO to the SOCC informed.

(h) Manage the battlefield information systems.

(i) Ensure the provision of reports and handle the returns.

(j) Activate contingencies if required.

(k) Provide RLS as required.

(2) Critical during execution are the availability and performance of the SOTG
S4 and S6. These elements have to be able to provide RLS as well as functional
expertise as required or as the situation dictates. The S4 and S6 should be aware
that they are mission critical enablers during execution, as the S6 especially will

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preserve the OPSCEN ability to C2 the operation and to exchange information

with lateral and higher HQs, both routinely and in an emergency situation.

b. Responsibilities Within the Special Operations Task Group During Execution

(1) The primary focus during execution has to be on the performance of the
OPSCEN. Based on COM SOTG guidance and direction and the approved plan,
the OPSCEN staff will carefully monitor mission execution and will ensure
information flow to the SOTG LO in the SOCC and to any SOF liaison elements
within the conventional HQ of the BSO.

(2) The OPSCEN mission manager, sometimes known as a battle captain, may
use tools like a mission status board, the mission execution checklist, appropriate
software, and designated mission folder to assess mission progress and
immediately react to emerging changes or emergencies that were not part of the
original plan. He will inform the responsible S3 operations officer if decisions are
required. Additionally, he will contribute to any effort where actors like the ALO or
intelligence personnel need support. If available, he can use a chat room with all
key players on the Internet (like aviation, gunships, ISR). This will promote SA
and facilitate coordination.

(3) The intelligence element of the OPSCEN will support execution as required
and has the critical role of providing immediate information in case an emergency
situation develops.

(4) Joint fires and the ALO are responsible for requesting and coordinating fire
support and will activate/deactivate FSCM (like a ROZ) according to the plan. If
the situation deteriorates, they are the critical link to their respective counterparts
at the SOCC and BSO levels. Their main task is coordination and deconfliction of
fire and air support for contingencies like emergency close air support (ECAS),
PR, CASEVAC, or TST.

c. Execution and Interaction. During mission execution, the SOTG is nested in a

complex network of actors. This network will ensure permanent support and coordination
if the situation dictates, as well as keep respective lateral or higher HQs in the loop.
Additionally, it may be critical to immediately rely on this network if the activation of a
contingency (e.g. TIC, emergency extraction) is initiated. Figure 6-7 depicts the
permanent interaction and interrelationships between all relevant SOF elements while an
operation is being executed. The SOTG HQ has the lead in monitoring (and C2 if
required) mission execution and providing routine reporting to the SOCC.
Simultaneously the assigned SOF LO to the BSO will keep the conventional JOC in the
loop in line with OPSEC requirements. Close interaction is essential to avoid fratricide
and preserve trust. The SOCC will utilize the assigned SOTG LO to maintain SA on all
ongoing operations and to ensure the ability to provide the most accurate information to
COM SOCC (and the JTF HQ if required). The SOCC JOC will only be in a monitoring
and supporting role as long as the operation is going according to plan. If the situation
deteriorates drastically, the SOCC may be required to take over certain C2
responsibilities to ensure coordination and deconfliction with the appropriate levels, such
as the JTF HQ, components, or the CAOC, are actioned accordingly on behalf of the
SOTG.

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Figure 6-7. SOTG Operational Network

d. Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) Special Operations Task Unit. Based on the approved plan, the SOTU
will report according to the mission execution checklist or based on additional
guidance given by the SOTG HQ. This does not include additional reporting due
to unforeseen circumstances. The SOTU should have the freedom of action to
decide, gain any initiative, or to improvise or adjust the tactical plan as required.
This includes any effort for call for fire if a time-sensitive, high-value, or high pay-
off target presents itself for prosecution. It is essential that the GFC is fully read in
on any theatre-level SOPs, such as those developed to guide use of CAS,
targeting procedures, actions for CIVCAS, or tactical directives (TDs) issued by
the JTF HQ that restrict or constrain certain actions (for example, targets in built-
up areas that may result in CIVCAS or civilian defence). If a serious incident
occurs, there is no excuse for “I wasn’t aware of that SOP or TD”. The same is
true for the SOTG. When the mission is complete, the SOTU will draft the
OPSUM, which is likely to include both written and storyboard (graphical) reports
on how the mission played out, and list the key issues that may require further
consequence management. This report will be forwarded to the SOTG HQ for
completion and onward routing to the SOCC. An example of an OPSUM or
storyboard is provided at Annex G.

(2) Special Operations Task Group. The SOTG HQ will monitor the ongoing
operation of the tasked SOTU. They too must understand all theatre-level SOPs

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and TDs that guide all missions. Operations personnel will receive and assess the
reports and process them accordingly. Additionally, it is critical that both the LO to
the SOCC HQ and the SOCCE or LO to the conventional BSO are kept informed
about the operation’s progress. The SOTG HQ will develop its shifts and battle
rhythm, which are driven by the operational requirements (24/7 during operations)
and IRs, both for the current operations personnel and higher HQs. Parallel to
that, the SOTG has to be aware of the SOCC battle rhythm and that of the JTF
HQ. All information for the SOCC (reports, force location, contribution to the
common operational picture (COP), status reports, OPSUMs, etc.) has to be
provided in time as it will be inserted into the commander’s update briefing, where
COM SOCC will get the most current information from his subordinate forces and
anything his staff believes he needs to know.

(3) Special Operations Command and Control Element/Liaison Officer to

the Battlespace Owner. SOF elements assigned to the BSO have a vital role in
mission success by ensuring information exchange and any required deconfliction,
coordination, or synchronization. They will keep the respective COM informed and
should be located close to the conventional JOC and its director. There the SOF
elements have the best opportunity to inform the respective JOC personnel (on a
need-to-know basis), to monitor ongoing conventional operations, and to engage
with enablers like joint fires or J3 Air.

(4) Special Operations Task Group Liaison Officer to the Special

Operations Component Command. As outlined in Chapter 2, the SOTG LO to
the SOCC HQ is the primary link for information exchange between both entities.
It is the SOTG’s responsibility to keep the LO informed 24/7 on anything of
relevance for SOCC, both mission planning and execution. The LO is the first
point of contact for any questions or issues COM SOCC or one of his directors
may have. Furthermore, the LO has the critical responsibility of keeping the
SOCC informed should circumstances require the activation of a contingency.
Therefore, he must be aware of both SOTG SOPs and SOCC battle drills and his
role and function within each. The SOTG LO will brief the CONOPS and the
OPSUM to the SOCC J35 and J33/JOC staff.

e. Support of Mission Execution

(1) Aside from the support requests developed during mission planning and the
respective confirmations prior to execution, there are a number of scenarios where
the SOTU and the SOTG HQ have to interact and coordinate with lateral and
higher HQs. There may be a requirement for target prosecution (deliberate,
dynamic, or time sensitive) or a request for fire support. The procedures for these
actions are normally pre-planned, on call, and well known to the force on the
ground, the SOTG HQ, and the respective liaison elements within the BSO
structure. An SOTU JTAC may address fire support directly to the aircraft, if
assigned to support, via the joint tactical air strike request net to an airborne or
regional C2 node for coordination or to the CAOC via higher HQs. A notional
process for joint fire support is depicted in Figure 6-8.

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Figure 6-8. Joint Fires

(2) Any call for fire support will be processed via the SOTG HQ to the (joint) fire
support coordination centre of the BSO. The fire support coordination centre will
task available organic fire support assets and ensure coordination with other
actors like the CAOC. The overall aim is to coordinate the BSM to ensure the
desired effect on the target and to avoid fratricide. Permanent coordination and
contact with the force on the ground between both the SOTU and the SOTG HQ
are critical.

(3) When the SOTU is prosecuting a target, the necessary actions and
decisions are heavily dependent on the type of target. The challenge, aside from
pre-planned targets with already assigned assets, is the prosecution of a TST. As
these types of targets are clearly defined in type, way of prosecution (kinetic, non-
kinetic), and the appropriate target engagement authority (TEA) for prosecution
(e.g. up to COM JTF if required), the SOTG and the SOTU have to be aware of
both process and procedures to handle them. Otherwise these HVTs will not be
engaged in time or at all, losing the opportunity to achieve an unprecedented
effect or causing an undesired effect with negative impact on higher mission and
intent. This emphasizes the requirement for having a qualified JTAC with the
ground force to ensure compliance with defined processes and procedures (e.g.
CAS and targeting SOPs).

(4) As detailed in Chapter 2, the application of joint fires or dynamic targeting

requires detailed BSM. As friendly forces (SOF and conventional units) are on the
ground and the enemy, potentially, will be moving, there is a higher risk of
fratricide if there are no coordination measures in place. For this purpose, the
involved actors (SOTU/JTAC, SOTG, BSO JOC, SOCC, CAOC/SOLE) have tools
and procedures available to handle effective BSM:

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(a) Common operational picture

(b) Blue force tracking

(c) FSCMs (boundaries, FSCL, free-fire area (FFA), RFA, NFA)

(d) Areas with restrictions (JSOA, ROZ, kill box)

(5) A precondition for effective utilization is access to and availability of

respective radio nets, software, and force equipment, and thorough planning and
activation. Additionally, it is key to have and to exchange the appropriately trained
personnel to operate these tools and to manage the procedures.

f. Contingency Execution

(1) The SOTG has to have appropriate SOPs and battle drills in place to deal
with contingencies effectively. It is too late to come up with a plan once the
situation has arisen. Time is critical and action must be taken immediately to
wrest the advantage back to the SOTU. SOPs and battle drills have to be in line
with the respective SOCC SOPs and battle drills. The SOCC JOC will have the
lead in all necessary coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization with lateral or
higher HQs. The SOCC JOC has to plan, direct, assess, and monitor based on
existing battle drills and with support of the SOTG. These drills may include:

(a) Request and coordination of joint fires and air support.

(b) Activation of a TST team (TST officer, target officer, joint fires officer,
SOTG LO, J2, LEGAD, etc.).

(c) Employment of QRF.

(d) Integration of SMEs (air planners, medical advisor (MEDAD), J4,

etc.).

(2) These drills will ensure that employed SOTUs will receive the essential
support to achieve mission success or be successfully extracted without loss of
personnel. Figure 6-9 depicts a notional reaction to a TIC and the request for
CAS. More details for this critical part of mission execution are provided in
Chapter 7.

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Figure 6-9. Notional Process for Air Support During a TIC

6-6. Force Protection. In today’s campaigns and operations, FP is a critical constraint in

planning and execution of SOTG operations. Therefore, it is the top priority of COM SOTG and
his staff to consider and implement this requirement. Nevertheless, it is always a balance
between the risk to the force and the operational and strategic effects that only SOF may be
able to achieve. In all kinds of planning (campaign planning, future plans, future operations), it
is essential to define ways and means to preserve the force. For that purpose, the staff needs
to identify and know those assets critical to mission execution and to evaluate the effect of
temporary or permanent loss of the SOTG or SOTU’s ability to perform its mission.

a. Force Protection Planning

(1) It is the overall responsibility of COM SOTG to decide the level of risk
acceptable for his SOTUs. Within the framework of existing guidance and
direction from COM SOCC, COM SOTG and his staff will run respective FP
planning in close coordination with the tactical planning of the SOTU. The
planning process, based on a thorough mission analysis, normally includes the
following steps:

(a) Criticality Assessment. Planners have to identify those assets,

both SOF organic or from external sources, that are critical for SOTG
mission success. Additionally, this includes SOF-specific abilities, which
are mission essential.

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(b) Threat Assessment. It has to be determined what likely threats

exist for essential SOF abilities and the critical assets already identified.
The main focus should be on conventional and unconventional threats,
terrorism, criminal organizations and activities, insider threats, and CBRN
and environmental hazards. These all have the potential to cause mission
failure.

(c) Vulnerability Assessment. SOTG staff has to identify their

respective vulnerabilities where threats can attack and exploit and affect
mission success.

(d) Risk Assessment. Based on the vulnerability assessment, planners

have to assess the risk to mission success. Planners, with the available
information and intelligence, have to apply their experience and include
external expertise from actors involved in planning and execution (like air
crews conducting insertion and extraction or responsible for gunship
support) to assess risk.

(e) Risk Management. SOTG staff, in conjunction with the SOTU, has to
develop and implement appropriate FP measures to mitigate risk and to
facilitate mission success (like specific insertion corridors, EW assets to
suppress enemy air defence). This includes development of contingencies
and emergency plans, as well as OPSEC measures and deception activities.

(2) During FP planning, COM SOTG will additionally emphasize the need for
FP measures in relation to friendly forces. The overall aim should be the
avoidance of fratricide/blue-on-blue incidents. Therefore, coordination and support
planning with conventional forces (time, space, forces, joint fires) for mission
execution is always influenced by FP concerns. It may include establishment of
the appropriate temporary LO structure, briefings to the right target audience, all
necessary FSCMs, blue force tracking, and the support of the COP. The reality of
high intensity and high tempo operations raises problems that go well beyond the
SOP-type coordination. Rehearsals between actors like the SOTG, the SOCC,
BSO, and the SOLE at the CAOC, as well as establishment and upholding of SA
on all levels, will go a long way to increasing FP.

(3) FP is critical during MA. When training and operating with HN forces or
indigenous forces the risk of green-on-blue or insider threats increases
exponentially. OPSEC measures and additional screening of personnel being
trained by the SOTG and SOTUs must be planned for and actioned accordingly.

6-7. Summary. The SOCC is the overall authority for all aspects of special operations
concerning planning and execution in support of the operational commander of the campaign.
Nevertheless, the subordinate SOTGs to the SOCC are the decisive elements in the provision
of the relevant advice, as well as in the tactical planning and mission execution on the
battlefield. Even as the SOTGs are committed to tactical engagements, they have to be aware
that they contribute, unlike conventional units, to the achievement of operational and strategic
objectives and effects. This has to be the guiding principle throughout all phases of mission
planning and execution. Additionally, the SOTG and SOTU have to be constantly aware that,
because of limited combat power, they rely heavily on external conventional enablers and
support, which implies detailed knowledge about respective conventional capabilities,
processes, and procedures to produce full and superior combat effectiveness.

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CHAPTER 7 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR LAND INTEGRATION

7-1. General

a. SOALI refers to the activities of individuals or teams who have been specially
trained and equipped to conduct unique special operations activities on land, in the air, or
at sea that integrate, synchronize, and/or control the elements of air and space power.
These include surveillance, weather forecasting, airfield or landing zone (LZ) surveying,
air traffic control, directing air strikes, directing airdrops, and PR. Successful integration
of air and space power is one of the key enablers that permit numerically inferior ground
SOF elements to achieve strategic effects within the battlespace.

Figure 7-1. SOALI Operational Environment

b. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a reference document to be used by the

SOTG and its subordinate SOTUs outlining key SOALI concepts and practices that
should be considered when conducting SOALI operations. For the purpose of this
chapter, the word air encompasses all aviation and/or space-based elements from the
different military services.24

24 SOALI Manual.

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7-2. Core Missions

a. SOALI can occur at all levels of mission complexity and at all levels within a
combat manoeuvre organization. On one end of the complexity spectrum, it may take
the form of one JTAC-qualified special forces soldier requesting CAS for a TIC situation
involving his small team. On the other end of the complexity spectrum, it could involve a
far more intricate and robust scenario in which a SOALI reconnaissance team is the
advance element to a massive airfield seizure operation involving regimental-sized
ground forces and a multitude of aircraft. In this scenario, the SOALI team could be
synchronizing and controlling multiple C-130s; conducting parachute insertion of a
regimental-sized conventional land force; controlling pre-assault fires from AH-64s,
Tornadoes, and F-16s, then collaborating with the regimental commander as they
establish the LZ for a series of C-17s landing to offload supplies for follow-on missions in
the vicinity, all of this done under the cover of night.

Important Note. SOALI operations can be some of the most

complex and lethal operations conducted. The knowledge and
proficiency required of SOALI practitioners to be successful cannot
be underestimated or considered as an afterthought. Although not
without constraints and resource limitations, the concept of SOALI
specialists, individuals who perform and practise SOALI mission
sets exclusively or at least on a regular basis, is optimal. SOTG
and SOATU commanders are strongly advised to ensure that those
individuals charged with conducting SOALI operations are
adequately trained, equipped, and proficient.

b. There are two core capabilities or core tasks that are required of SOALI that
revolve around trained operators, integrated into the ground battle scheme of manoeuvre
(SOM), who control and direct air assets to achieve desired effects on the ground: air
traffic control (ATC) and terminal attack control (TAC). While these two core tasks form
the foundation of the SOALI capability, from them other land integration mission sets,
such as LZ/DZ control and PR, are enhanced.

(1) Air Traffic Control. ATC certified individuals provide some of the same
services that one would find at a civilian aerodrome with an ATC tower. Unlike a
civilian aerodrome, however, ATC services in a SOALI operation will only extend
out to a few kilometres from the objective area, will not operate from fixed towers,
and will not involve radar control. ATC services in SOALI operations are
conducted via aircraft location reporting, visual contact, and time and space
deconfliction techniques. The most common scenario requiring ATC during
combat operations is in the execution of an airfield seizure mission, mass tactical
airdrop, or anytime multiple aircraft will converge into a small geographic area or
battlespace where deconfliction with other air and ground elements is required.

(2) Terminal Attack Control. TAC is the authority to control the manoeuvre of
and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. CAS, ground assisted air
interdiction, and close combat attack are typically the three air-centric terms used to
describe the type of air mission that flies in support of ground forces. Individuals
specially trained and certified to grant weapons-release authority may be referred to
by several titles, to include JTAC, FAC, or FAC (Airborne), commonly called FAC-A.

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FAC-As are specially trained pilots who illuminate or mark the target from their aircraft
to facilitate target acquisition and weapons release for other friendly aircraft.

Important Note. The training and authority vested in a JTAC

does not typically satisfy the requirements to be certified in
ATC. The JTAC’s focus is on his aircraft, the ordnance to be
dropped, and the target picture, which does not lend itself to
controlling airspace with various aircraft operating
independently of each other.

Important Note. Any operator, trained or not, can conduct

TAC if in an in extremis situation. In those cases, the ground
operator should state to the aircraft that he is not a JTAC,
which will alert the pilot to take additional precautions prior to
weapons release.

(3) Landing Zone/Drop Zone Operations. LZ and DZ operations are air land
integration mission sets involving aircraft landing into/departing from an LZ or
aircraft involved in airdropping ground assaulters or cargo via parachute onto a
DZ. These operations require specifically trained individuals who understand and
employ aspects of ATC, ground control, airfield surveying, marshalling, and
weather observations and forecasting to effect the coordination, synchronization,
and control of aircraft operating in the terminal area.

(4) Personnel Recovery Operations. PR is the sum of diplomatic, military,

and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. SOF
are typically the called-upon force to effect the recovery of isolated personnel and,
as a result, rely heavily on coordinated air resources to do so. SOALI will have a
prominent role in most planned recovery operations through control and
communications with the assault force, support aircraft, ISR platforms, etc.,
involved in the operation.

7-3. Airspace Control Means. The ACM enable effective and safe employment of air power
in crowded airspace that may have to accommodate both combat and peacetime
considerations. The ACM are coordinated through the airspace control plan (ACP), the ACO,
special instructions (SPINS), and battlespace C2 nodes. Various air control methods and their
respective attributes are listed below.

a. Restricted Area. A restricted area is an airspace of defined dimensions, above

the land areas or territorial waters of a state, within which the flight of aircraft is restricted
in accordance with certain specified conditions.

b. Force Air Coordination Area. The force air coordination area is an area
surrounding a force within which ACM are required to prevent mutual interference
between all friendly surface and air units and their weapon systems.

c. Restricted Operating Zone. A ROZ is established to reserve airspace for

specific activities in which the operations of one or more airspace users are restricted.
The request for a ROZ is made using an ACMREQ that is submitted to the SOLE and

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published in the ACP and the ACO. A sample ACMREQ is provided in Appendix 10 to
Annex H.

d. Special Corridor. A special corridor is an area established to accommodate the

special routing requirements of specific missions. A special corridor can be used for
infiltration/exfiltration during special operations and is only active during a given time to
keep as much airspace as possible open for other users. The request for a special
corridor is made using an ACMREQ that is submitted to the SOLE and published in the
ACP and the ACO.

7-4. Fire Support Coordination Measures. FSCMs are employed by land or amphibious
manoeuvre commanders to facilitate rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly forces. Commanders position FSCMs consistent with the tactical
situation and in coordination with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.
Several FSCMs are listed below.

a. Permissive. Permissive measures allow fire support elements to use weapons

without further coordination.

b. Fire Support Coordination Line. An FSCL is a boundary used to coordinate

fires of air, ground, or sea weapon systems against surface targets.

c. Free-fire Areas. FFAs are designated areas of free fire.

d. Restrictive. Restrictive measures require coordination with controlling agencies

prior to engaging targets. They are declared to protect teams, units, or assets, and are
activated for a specific time period.

e. Restricted-fire Areas. RFAs are designated areas of restricted fire in which

specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed those restrictions are not
delivered without coordination with the established HQ.

f. No-fire Areas. NFAs are designated areas of no fire.

7-5. Special Operations Air Land Integration Team. The SOALI team comes in many
shapes and sizes. Each one is tailored to the task assigned. It is up to COM SOTG to ensure
that the GFC has the required SOALI resources to tackle the air complexities for each mission.
Terms used for those supporting the air land integration for the GFC/COM SOTU are below.
These individuals can come from SOF or conventional forces.

a. Joint Terminal Attack Controller. A JTAC is someone who, from a forward

position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other offensive air
operations. They can be SOF or conventional forces.

b. Combat Control Team. Combat control teams, singular combat controller, are
ground combat forces specialized in a traditional pathfinder role while having a heavy
emphasis on simultaneous ATC, fire support, and command, control, and
communications in covert or austere environments. They can be SOF or conventional
forces.

c. Forward Air Controllers. Forward air control is the provision of guidance to CAS
aircraft intended to ensure that their attack hits the intended target and does not injure
friendly troops, cause CIVCAS, or cause collateral damage to civilian or HN

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infrastructures. This task is carried out by a FAC. For NATO forces, the qualifications
and experience required to be a FAC are set out in a NATO Standardization Agreement
(STANAG).25 FACs may form part of a fire support team or tactical air control party
(TACP); they may be ground based or airborne as FAC-As in FW or RW aircraft.

d. Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is a small team of air, land, or maritime
personnel who provide airspace deconfliction and terminal control of CAS at conventional
battle group level or SOTG and below. It usually consists of an officer FAC, a senior
non-commissioned officer (NCO) FAC, and usually a pair of signallers/drivers.

e. Special Operations Task Group S3 Air. SOALI starts in the SOTG HQ. The S3
Air facilitates early planning with the GFC and SOTU teams deploying. This planning will
determine if the SOTG has sufficient SOALI personnel and resources within the SOTUs
and, if not, will start the process of requesting joint tactical air requests (JTARs) for
additional JTACs, as well as air assets.26

f. Special Operations Component Command J3 Air/Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance. Ensures the SOTG JTAR is coordinated with the SOAC/SOATG
and integrated into the ACC’s ATO.

g. Special Operations Liaison Element

(1) The SOLE is a liaison team provided by COM SOCC to COM ACC (or
appropriate component air C2 organization) to coordinate and synchronize SOF
air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations.

(2) The SOLE is the SOCC’s liaison to the ACC. COM SOCC will task
organize the SOLE based on mission requirements, the operational situation, and
command relationships. The members of a NATO SOLE provide expert,
component-level planning support, operational expertise, and coordination
between the SOCC and the ACC. The SOLE will coordinate and synchronize
special operations air, ground, and maritime operations with joint air operations in
the TOO. The SOLE director will place LOs at key positions within the ACC’s
staff, regardless of how the ACC is organized, to fully integrate with the ACC’s
processes. Staff members assigned to the SOLE will be sourced primarily from
the nations contributing SOTGs/SOATGs and SOTUs/SOATUs, although SOLE
staff officers may be provided by any nation.

(3) Though most of the manpower should have an air background, all services
must be represented to ensure the SOLE is able to adequately address land and
maritime special operations, in addition to special air operations. These special
operations SMEs will coordinate, integrate, and synchronize all special operations
in the theatre, with air operations being orchestrated by the ACC.

7-6. Special Operations Air Land Integration Equipment. The single most important piece
of equipment that any SOF operator carries, with the exception of his weapon, is his radio. Any

25 STANAG 3797 (Edition 4), Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers and Laser Operators, dated 4 Feb
14.
26 Note: JTAR is the term currently used for ISAF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM by the NATO Special

Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) and joint forces ACC/CAOC. It is also one of the
slides presented in the NSOCC-A CONOPS template.

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SOALI operation, regardless of complexity, requires a satisfactory communications system that

is able to send and receive information to each entity within the force package and higher HQs.
Listed below are a few examples of equipment that is currently used by NATO countries.
Nations should strive for commonality, functionality, and interoperability as they embark on
acquiring communication equipment to outfit their teams to conduct SOALI missions.

a. AN/PRC-117F(C). The AN/PRC-117F(C) multiband radio, or multiband multi-

mission radio, is a man-portable, tactical software-defined combat net radio. The radio is
part of an Over-the-horizon Satellite Communications and Improved Dual Command and
Control Console system. It is commonly used by SOALI personnel. The AN/PRC-
117F(C) integrates the capabilities of several distinct radios into one: VHF-LO FM for
combat net radio, UHF-AM for military ground-to-air, and UHF TACSAT communications.

b. Link 16. Link 16 is a military tactical data exchange network used by NATO. Its
specification is part of the family of tactical datalinks. With Link 16, military aircraft, ships,
and ground forces may exchange their tactical picture in NRT. Link 16 also supports the
exchange of text messages, imagery data, and provides two channels of digital voice (2.4
kbit/s and/or 16 kbit/s in any combination). Link 16 is defined as one of the digital
services of the joint tactical information distribution system/military information distribution
system in STANAG 5516.27

c. Tactical Common Datalink. The tactical common datalink (TCDL) is a secure

datalink developed by the USA military and used by several NATO countries to send
secure data and stream video links from airborne platforms to ground stations. The
TCDL can accept data from many different sources, then encrypt, multiplex, encode,
transmit, de-multiplex, and route data at high speeds. It uses a Ku narrowband uplink
that is used for both payload and vehicle control, and a wideband downlink for data
transfer. The TCDL uses both directional and omnidirectional antennas to transmit and
receive the Ku band signal. The TCDL was designed for UAVs, specifically the MQ-8B
Fire Scout, as well as manned non-fighter environments. The TCDL transmits radar,
imagery, video, and other sensor information at rates from 1.544 Mbit/s to 10.7 Mbit/s
over ranges of 200 km.

d. Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver. ROVER is a system that allows

ground forces, such as FACs, to see what an aircraft or UAV is seeing in real time by
receiving images acquired by the aircraft’s sensors on a laptop on the ground or in the
back of a vehicle. There is little time delay, and usage of ROVER greatly improves the
ground reconnaissance and target identification of JTAC/FAC, which are essential to CAS.

7-7. Special Operations Air Land Integration in the Maritime Environment. When SOF
operate in the maritime environment, their air requirements do not change. Air and ISR assets
are required for the various MIOs, MSOs, maritime counterterrorism, and over-the-beach
operations conducted by maritime SOTUs. The planning, requests, and coordination are done
in the same way as described above. The maritime SOTG must request air through the
respective SOCC J3 Air and SOAC. From there, the SOLE will coordinate with the ACC/CAOC,
who will determine what component is best suited and placed to support the upcoming maritime
SOTG mission. While the MCC may be the obvious choice because of proximity to the maritime
SOTGs, the ACC will decide on behalf of the JTF HQ.

27 STANAG 5516 (Edition 5), Tactical Data Exchange – Link 16, dated 29 Sep 08.

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7-8. Training

a. An effective and comprehensive education and training programme, in line with

the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative, is essential for developing a fully trained and
capable force, prepared to assume the roles and responsibilities of an FN for SOF in
NATO.28 ACT Directive 75-2/H, SOF Joint Functional Area Training Guide, dated 26 May
05, makes it clear that for NATO to remain effective and responsive to emerging and
future threats, SOF require robust and focused training programmes. Although it remains
a national responsibility to provide trained personnel to fill posts in a NATO SOLE, NATO
makes an important contribution to this goal through training and educational
opportunities.

b. The same is true for JTAC/FAC and other SOALI personnel. It is a national
responsibility to conduct individual JTAC/FAC training. When a TCN provides SOALI
personnel as part of its CJSOR, CET/FIT opportunities should be developed by the
SOCC FN, allowing SOALI personnel the opportunity to train with the ACC/MCC/LCC
and SOCC air personnel and assets prior to deployment or during the early stages of
deployment before being declared fully operational capable.

7-9. Summary. Air to land integration is the cornerstone of any mission set involving air
power. SOALI and the specially trained operators who execute these missions are key
enablers for the SOTG and SOTU. SOTG planners and leadership who wish to use air power
to achieve desired effects within the battlespace must appreciate the complexity and
coordination required in terms of training and equipment, and ensuring that appropriate
personnel are positioned in key planning cells, coordination nodes, and on or near the objective
itself. Through habitual exercising and rehearsing of SOALI-centric mission scenarios, the
SOTG and subordinate units will truly be able to harness the full potential of air power effects to
achieve victory.

28The NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) was introduced at the Riga Summit in November 2006. It
provides focused special operations advice to SACEUR and the NATO chain of command, and provides a
collaborative, interdependent platform to enhance the Alliance SOF network.

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CHAPTER 8 – COMMUNICATIONS

8-1. General. Communication systems are vital to help a SOF unit shoot, move, and survive
in the battlespace. Communications support to the SOTG and its assigned SOF must be
flexible and mission tailored, and must add value to SOF operational capability.
Communications systems support the full range of special operations worldwide. SOF must be
able to communicate anywhere and anytime, utilizing national capabilities to the maximum
extent possible. The following summarizes the key issues with SOF communications at all
levels, to include the SOTG.

a. Communication and Information Systems. CIS is an assembly of equipment,

methods, procedures, and qualified personnel organized to effect information
conveyance up and down the C2 chain, as well as to outside agencies as required. CIS
is integral to successful military operations and must be given thorough consideration at
the beginning of all military planning. CIS must be able to be deployed and activated
according to the factors governing the operation. Speed of assembly, physical size and
footprint, and any logistical support should be a formal part of any planning process.

b. Range. Communication systems support to the SOTG must be global, secure,

and jointly interoperable. It must be flexible so it can be tailored to any mission, and it
must add value to SOF’s operational capability. The SOTG operational unit requires a
variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources,
regardless of geographic location. Information assurance must be applied to all SOTG
information systems to protect and defend friendly information and information systems.
Communication systems must never compromise the SOTG operational unit.

c. Support. SOTG communication support consists of multiple and varied groups of

systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at
different echelons, from national to unit levels. Communication systems must support
discrete, as well as collective, functions. SOTG missions are normally controlled at the
lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political
considerations may require control up to and including the NATO level. To provide for
necessary control, SOTG communication systems must offer seamless connectivity from
the lowest operational unit to the highest levels of command.

d. Interoperability. SOTG communication systems must be interoperable with each

other, conventional forces, NATO FNs and TCNs, national resources, and Allies and HNs
as determined by the scope of the operation. If necessary, they should integrate not only
with state-of-the-art systems, but must also be capable of integrating with less
sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. Multiple communication
systems may be needed to meet these objectives.

e. Communication Systems Principles. To ensure the continuous and

uninterrupted flow and processing of information, joint forces must have systems that
adhere to the communication principles of interoperability, agility, be trusted, and be
shared. Additionally, communication systems must provide information assurance
through authentication, non-repudiation, availability, confidentiality, and integrity, and
should provide for the defence of computer networks against adversary attack.

8-2. Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations Forces Communication Systems.

Special operations communication systems provide SOF components at all levels with access
to a worldwide communications network structure that allows for seamless information transfer

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through a mature, global infrastructure. The communication system combines information

sources, fusion centres, and distribution systems that are used to pursue special operations
operational objectives. Multiple SOF operational elements are connected to and supported by
these systems, which are compliant with NATO and international standards, creating a fully
automated, operationally responsive, tailored communications support system.

a. Seamless. Seamless communication must provide connectivity to SOF in

garrison, in transit, and while deployed. It must have a reach-back capability to normal
sources of information for planning, execution, and status from any location. Seamless
communication architecture is digital and supports every phase of a mission profile. It
includes requirements for entry ports, high-speed networks, and assured C2 connectivity.

b. Robust. Robust networks must be flexible, interactive networks that can adapt to
the changing IRs of SOF. Multiple means must be a part of the robust network. It
requires multiple routes, alternative sources of connectivity, bandwidth on demand, and
modularity and scalability.

Best Practice. Redundancy is particularly important with

deployed SOF. The SOTG GFC should have three
communication means, including a pager/satellite phone,
which gives COM SOTG a direct, secure line to COM SOTU.

c. Automated. SOF require information from numerous data sources that can be
rapidly integrated and analysed to make C2 decisions at all levels, from the SOCC to the
JTF and subordinate operational elements. To achieve a fully automated architecture
requires human-computer interface, data element discipline, fused databases, multilevel
secure local area network (LAN) and wide area network (WAN) capability, digital
switching, and a client server environment.

d. Standards Compliant. Adherence to standards and to the joint technical

architecture ensures a capability to interchange hardware and software, plus the ability to
interface and exchange data among SOF, with other components, or with TCN forces as
required.

e. Full Spectrum. The nature of special operations demands the use of the entire
frequency spectrum and is not limited to those assets controlled by the SOCC
operational C2 structure. Full spectrum depends on using national systems to the fullest
extent possible to drive access from the information sphere down to the lowest SOF
operational level.

f. Protected. SOF communications are lucrative targets for adversaries of all types,
including foreign military, terrorist groups, special interest groups, and hackers. It is
therefore imperative that SOF communication architectures consider the need to protect
these critical resources from Info Ops attacks. Creation and maintenance of COMSEC,
computer security (COMPUSEC), and INFOSEC programmes are a few of the methods
to provide information assurance.

g. Portable, Compact, and Lightweight. SOTG deployments can be constrained

by space/size and weight limitations for communication systems (be aware of the
mission-essential battery weight). At the SOTG level, CIS should be easily deployable

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from the most likely transportation platform and rapidly configurable at the forward
operating location to ensure rapid establishment of communication with all echelons.

8-3. General Principles of Communication and Information Systems. Emphasis must be on

the responsibility to share, balanced by the security principle of need-to-know.

Figure 8-1. CIS Support Concept

a. Resilience. Resilience is achieved by having redundant capabilities. This

includes the distribution and replication of CIS and its associated data and protection
against attack. Resilience also includes the requirement for having properly trained
personnel to run and manage CIS. In austere environments, the initial network is usually
not robust and may be severely degraded when disturbed. In those cases, the initial CIS
deployment package should provide the foundation to build the remainder of the network
incrementally.

b. Capacity. To avoid slowing decision-making processes and to meet the predicted

demand, sufficient CIS capacity should be available. In those cases where military CIS
capacity is limited, early use of commercial CIS may have to be made to increase the
capacity.

8-4. Special Operations Task Group Commander Responsibilities. COM SOTG must
identify the communication requirements to support the SOTG CONOPS. The SOTG S6
reviews candidate COAs for communication supportability and coordinates with the SOCC J6
staff during COA development. The SOTG S6 is also responsible for:

a. Providing overall technical control of all communication systems supporting the

SOTG.

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b. Ensuring that adequate and effective communication systems are available to

support the SOTG C2 architecture.

c. Publishing communication plans and instructions to support the assigned mission.

d. Reviewing and coordinating communication plans prepared by subordinate

commands.

e. Ensuring that network operations and Info Ops are conducted continuously to
preserve the integrity and security of networks and to protect nodal communication
systems and friendly information from hostile attack.

f. Ensuring compatibility and interoperability of SOTG communication systems.

g. Ensuring adequate bandwidth is available to support SOTG communication

requirements.

h. Participating in the joint planning group to support mission planning

communication requirements.

8-5. Joint Communication and Information Systems Control Centre. A joint CIS control
centre (JCCC) will implement C2 OPCON of all deployable CIS on behalf of the theatre
commander. The JCCC’s role is to act as the single in-theatre interface point for the
management and operational direction of deployable CIS that is deployed in support of the
mission. Its function includes coordination to establish internal and external (e.g. NGO, HN, IO)
CIS for the JTF. The JCCC is manned by JTF HQ J6 and NATO CIS group personnel, and the
JTF HQ chief J6 chairs the JCCC. The SOCC should consider sending an LO to the JCCC as
this centre is the focal point for operational CIS events in theatre.29

8-6. Special Operations Component Command Signal Centre. The SOCC J6 establishes
and supervises the operations of the joint network operations control centre to support the
SOCC command network control, management of tactical communication systems within the
JOA or JSOA, and strategic communication connectivity within the JOA. The SOCC may direct
that the joint network operations control centre take any organizational form that suits the
accomplishment of the mission. The final structure of the joint network operations control centre
may be dependent on resource availability. A joint network operations control centre should
consist of current operations, computer systems support, networks, HQ support, future
operations and plans elements, jobs control, frequency management cells, and supporting
administrative elements as necessary. It may also include the COMSEC custodian, who is
responsible for providing or coordinating all COMSEC material required by the SOCC, to include
changes required by the JTF HQ. In addition, the joint network operations control centre might
have an LO to serve as the interface between the SOCC J6 and theatre assets. It might also
have a regional space support LO, who serves as the primary point of contact to advise the
SOCC J6 concerning the planning and implementation of military satellite support.

8-7. Special Operations Task Group Communication Control Centre Elements

a. The current operations element serves as the joint network operations control
centre liaison with the SOCC.

29
MC 593/1, Minimum Level of Command and Control (C2) Services Capabilities in Support of Combined Joint
NATO Operations in a Land Based Environment, dated Jan 12, Chapter 3, para 3.3.7. pp. 29.

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b. The computer systems support element manages automated data processing

support to the SOCC.

c. Network elements manage and control joint communication circuits and systems.

d. The HQ support element provides all communication support for the SOCC HQ.

e. The jobs control element maintains open job ticket status for fault isolation and
restoration of communication infrastructure, tracks maintenance actions including line
replaceable unit depot orders, and conducts scheduled and unscheduled outage reporting.
It also maintains entry control, message logs, and master station logs as required. It also
downloads and uploads message traffic to and from the tactical LAN as required.

f. The security element is responsible for ensuring that the communication systems
are protected from unauthorized activity, including attack or exploitation. This element
coordinates information assurance and computer network defence activities to protect
and defend SOCC information systems.

g. The future operations and plans element supports the joint network operations
control centre elements.

h. The frequency management element prepares, publishes, and distributes the SOF
portion of the joint communications and electronics operating instructions (CEOI). In
addition, it is responsible for coordination with second party communication and
computer support providers on any changes to SOF frequencies.

i. In accordance with paragraph 8-3a, SOTG S6 will plan, in close coordination with
the SOCC J6, the delivery of the CIS equipment provided by the SOCC and the training
and support required to install and operate it.

8-8. Joint Network Operations Control Centre Requirements

a. Requirements for the joint network operations control centre are evaluated by the
SOCC J6 director. This will be based on the amount of communication required to
support operations. Normally, a joint network operations control centre should be
established to maintain control over all communication and computer support for the
SOCC. The joint network operations control centre tracks all equipment, circuits, and
systems in use by the SOCC and its subordinate units. Typically, COM SOCC will task,
through appropriate channels, for additional communication assets to assist in
accomplishing communication functions of the joint network operations control centre.
Additional joint network operations control centre requirements include:

(1) Responsibility for the development of all circuit charts, equipment status
boards, and network diagrams.

(2) Maintaining a log of events. This log will be maintained on the tactical LAN
and will contain all significant events, such as equipment outages, circuit outages,
estimated repair times, and J6 personnel status.

(3) Preparing briefings as required. Normal operations require a daily status

briefing for the commander and staff.

(4) Preparing the following messages:

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(a) Communication status summary, submitted daily and reflecting

automated information system (AIS) status as at 2359Z the previous day.

(b) Communication spot report, submitted after initial establishment of

communication and whenever a significant AIS outage or event occurs.

(c) Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution report, submitted whenever

interference, jamming, and intrusion are suspected.

(d) All messages pertaining to information conditions and computer

emergency response TIC support.

b. The joint network operations control centre will be responsible to coordinate all
COMSEC changes required by the COMSEC custodian or JTF. The joint network
operations control centre must ensure that keying material is available and under two-
person control at all times, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise. Users of
keying material must be notified in time to make the changes to ensure mission
accomplishment.

c. The joint network operations control centre will be the primary organizational
element responsible for information assurance and computer network defence (CND).
As such, the joint network operations control centre will establish and maintain COMSEC,
COMPUSEC, and INFOSEC programmes.

8-9. Communication System Planning Considerations. The SOTG S6 requires specific

information to adequately determine communication requirements and plan for the employment
of communication assets.

a. Forces and Task Organizations. What forces are in the region; what additional
forces will be deployed; and what task organizations exist or will be established? This
information provides the basis for determining communication connectivity requirements.

b. Radio Nets. The SOTG S6 must determine radio net connectivity requirements
based upon the identification and selection of SOTG and component radio nets that are
to be activated. The SOTG S6 must also determine who the subscribers are and what
media (to include specifics on type of equipment) will be supporting a subscriber on a
given net.

c. Networks and Circuits. It must be clear which NATO and non-NATO networks
exist and are operational. It should also be determined if there are commercial, HN
military, and/or civilian networks required to satisfy connectivity requirements. Planners
must also determine vulnerabilities associated with these networks and circuits, and
develop methods to address these vulnerabilities.

d. Communication Equipment. With accurate information about communication

equipment, the SOTG S6 can build interoperability into the communication system. The
J6 requires technical information on the equipment, its availability, and a list of systems
that are interoperable. The use of automated planning tools is helpful in this effort.

e. Communication and Electronics Operating Instructions. The SOTG CEOI

should be developed by the SOTG S6 in accordance with the SOCC CEOI and in

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coordination with subordinate units. At a minimum, call signs, radio net frequencies,
cryptographic material, and times of changes must be included.

f. Pre-deployment. Communication support is an incremental process beginning

with the gathering of SOTG AIS requirements. Based on these requirements,
communication personnel will attend higher and lower AIS planning meetings, conduct
pre-deployment site surveys (PDSSs) (terrestrial and shipboard as required), formally
request second party AIS support, deploy to the SOTG location to do the initial AIS set-
up, provide AIS support to the SOTG, and redeploy after the SOTG mission is
completed.

g. Communication System Threats. A communication planning consideration that

requires review prior to and during deployment is the known or suspected threats to
communication and computer systems that can be expected from within and outside of
the operational area. Intelligence and CI sources can provide valuable information on
threats to SOF communication systems. These threats impact the ability to gain and
maintain information superiority. SATCOM information, to include the type of information,
should be provided to J2, J3, and J5 personnel to identify support requirements in
ensuring space protection of these systems, as well as for establishing contingency plans
in the event that critical information provided by SATCOM is lost.

h. Second Party Automated Information System Support. The SOTG S6 reviews

all SOCC component frequency requirements and forwards a consolidated SOCC list to
the JTF J6. Pre-deployment coordination should also be conducted with the joint
frequency management office in the supported theatre.

i. Recommended Automated Information System Set-up

(1) SOTG S6 personnel should arrive with the SOTG advance element to allow
for initial set-up of AIS support. Set-up includes the integration of organic AIS at
the SOTG deployed location.

(a) Begin initial set-up and ensure that FP measures are in place.

(b) Start laying cable and access single-channel tactical satellite

communication (TACSATCOM) and high capacity multichannel SATCOM
systems.

(c) Install secure voice and/or secure telephone equipment on HN’s

commercial telephone system if available.

(d) Configure router and work through address conflicts. Establish initial
tactical telephone service.

(e) Complete tactical LAN and peripheral equipment set-up. Establish

the secure communication and unclassified but sensitive Internet protocol
router network connectivity.

(f) Establish or coordinate for information assurance and CND tools and
services (such as firewalls, intrusion detection devices, secure phones, etc.)
to protect information and information systems from attack, interruption,
compromise, and/or exploitation.

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(g) Conduct end-to-end sensitivity tests on all AIS.

(h) Resolve outstanding issues and conduct augmentee training.

(i) Ensure that all AIS are operational.

(2) As the main body arrives, the tactical LAN and all its services, to include
peripheral equipment, may need to be expanded. The timeline depends on the
size and maturity of the SOTG. Is this a displacement or a first-time set-up? Time
is of the essence when establishing communication for the SOTG.

8-10. Special Operations Task Group Communication Backup Package. Some TCN
components have an attached signal detachment that installs, operates, and maintains a
backup communication capability package that provides initial deployable communication for
the SOTG during the initial 72 hours of a contingency operation. These packages include high
capacity SATCOM; cryptographic, terminal equipment; power generation assets; UHF
TACSATCOM; international maritime satellite; high-frequency (HF) radios; secure voice; and
computer terminals. As the higher capacity SATCOM networks are established, the SOTG is
provided access to the tactical switched telephone, data, automatic data information network,
and services across a backbone of multichannel SATCOM systems. These systems tie the
SOTG, SOCC, and subordinate components together and must be managed by the joint
network operations control centre and subordinate control elements throughout the operation to
provide circuit control and operational planning support until the SOTG is stood down.

Important Note. National tactical communication systems

must be interoperable with the requirements of the theatre PR
system.

Important Note. Communication is a key component of

mission planning for SOF operations in the deep battlespace
where more discreet communication and information systems
and schedules have to be used in the face of enemy EW
threats.

8-11. Intelligence Communication and Network Capability Requirements. The SOCC J2

depends heavily on reliable communication and rapid information processing. The installation,
operation, and maintenance of intelligence communication systems require meticulous planning
and a mutually supporting execution effort by the J2 and the J6. Only through positive
interaction of these two staff sections can the intelligence needs of the commander be met.

a. Sources of Intelligence Communication Support. Sources of intelligence

communication support for the SOTG S2 essentially mirror the support available to the
SOCC or other component forces. The SOTG must be significantly augmented when
committed to an exercise or operation. Augmentation normally comes from theatre
assets and TCN SOF components. Responsive communication support is essential.
Since the SOTG and SOF may be employed at some distance from conventional forces,
S2 communication between the SOTG and subordinate aviation units that are
geographically separated represents a tenuous lifeline for the operation and members of

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the subordinate elements. Additionally, single channel anti-jam portable interface may be
used to terminate critical intelligence circuits.

b. Intelligence Communication Concept

(1) Planning. Communication planning must support the push/pull construct of

moving intelligence to the requesting organization, and the who else should know
principle of dissemination. During planning, it is critical that planners identify
specific communication requirements for point-to-point communication nodes.
Many SOF programmes may be TCN special category or close hold. Point-to-
point communication nodes may need to be established for intelligence
dissemination to limit access to only those with a need to share.

(2) Flexibility. Access to both long-range and short-range secure

communication resources is necessary to ensure support for the wide variety of
special operations missions.

(3) Interoperability. Special operations elements must be able to

communicate securely with all other special operations elements, as well as with
conventional forces involved in the mission.

Important Note. SOF should be able to monitor BSO radio

nets to gain valuable SA and coordination with conventional
forces as required.

(4) Multichannel System. A secure multichannel communication system will

be established to support the operating forces. This system consists of a tactical
satellite terminal, line-of-sight communication systems, and tropospheric scatter
systems. Parallel, redundant, and diverse routing is necessary to ensure
communication connectivity.

(5) Supplemental Communication. Commercial communication leased lines

can be used when available, if acceptable within the constraints of cost and
communication security.

(6) Telecommunication Services. These services consist of voice (secure

and unsecure), record or message services, data services from large host
computers or other authorized computers, imagery transmission services, and
facsimile transfer (secure and unsecure).

8-12. Combined (Multinational) Communication Systems Standardization and

Procedures. Frequency managers and communication personnel must be given the authority
to maintain control over communication frequency allotments and assignments, use, and
communication discipline in operations involving multinational forces. Consideration must be
given to coalition automatic data processing and information technology systems to ensure their
compatibility and connectivity to the SOCC communication architecture. The rules for foreign
disclosure must be followed.

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8-13. Global Command and Control System

a. Global command and control system (GCCS) provides the commander with a
complete picture of the battlespace and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate
communication information. Along with many other capabilities, GCCS will integrate:

(1) Contingency planning and crisis action planning.

(2) Force deployment and employment.

(3) Force status as provided in the Status of Resources and Training System.

b. GCCS provides the means for both strategic and operational direction, as well as
technical, administrative, and decision support for the C2 of NATO military forces. GCCS
does not include the operating forces, but it links with designated communication that
extend from GCCS subsystem communication facilities to subordinate commanders or
operating forces that extend one echelon below the communication-related facilities of
the NATO agencies and the CC HQ.

Important Note. Systems used must allow for full integration

of all mission elements during planning and execution. This is
particularly important when there are numerous air elements
involved. A chat system works well during execution in that
regard. Exact blue and red battle tracking is also important,
as joint fires may be requested/used in the SOF operational
area.

8-14. Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems. Battlefield Information

Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES) manages, provides, and enables cooperative
sharing and exchange of intelligence and information between and among the participants.
NATO and other Allied nations and organizations benefit through the use of an interoperable
automatic data processing based national and NATO intelligence support system. BICES
capabilities are intended for national, NATO, and coalition use in peace, crisis, and war as
determined by the participants. BICES ensures:

a. An intelligence data stream that is available to all theatres and customers at all
levels of command in a timely manner.

b. Analysis of information management requirements from the BICES community.

c. BICES operation centre of support.

d. Support to training, exercises, and operations.

e. BICES support to the intelligence community:

(1) A secure capability to exchange intelligence and information.

(2) Visibility of national contribution data.

(3) Central card catalogue via a standardized library card.

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(4) Intelligence dissemination.

(5) Connectivity between national intelligence cells/centres, NATO

organizations, and Allied national systems.

f. Capabilities and domain services:

(1) Web browsing

(2) Email

(3) National contribution data

(4) Intelligence sharing

(5) Search

(6) Access to imagery and geospatial products and services

(7) Access to intelligence databases

(8) Secure voice communication (NATO SECRET)

(9) Translation services

(10) Multi-domain directory

(11) Lessons learned database

g. Access to NATO tools:

(1) NATO SECRET HQ WAN

(2) Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) database

(3) Military intelligence publications

(4) Document management

(5) Allied intelligence and policies

Important Note. NATO Lessons Learned database with

suitable search engine should be a key part of the NATO SOF
network and an important tool for planners who can access
important planning information from others who have worked
in the area or conducted similar operations.

8-15. The NATO Special Operations Forces Network. The NATO SOF Network (NSN) is a
BICES-connected network that provides SOF-specific services. It is connected to the BICES
network core, operates at the NATO SECRET level, and provides access to all information
services available from BICES. The NSN adds the capability to provide SOF-specific
information, intelligence, and collaboration. It provides email, file, web, and collaboration
services including Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephony, chat, and web conferencing.

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Figure 8-2. SOF-BICES (NATO SOF Network)

a. Strategic Level. National SOF HQs across NATO (and non-NATO partners)
should connect to BICES through their national BICES representatives. After
connectivity to BICES is implemented, these SOF organizations will be able to access
SOF-relevant information from the NSHQ’s SOF-BICES portal, otherwise known as the
SOF community of interest.

b. Operational and Tactical Levels. At the operational and tactical levels, SOF-
BICES will be deployed with direct connectivity into the SOF-BICES network. This
connectivity can be made by SATCOM or over the Internet.

c. Connectivity over Satellite Communication. Using super HF (SHF) SATCOM

as a bearer managed by the NSHQ, deployed forces can connect to SOF-BICES. SHF
communications are intended for operational-level HQs where high bandwidth
requirements are necessary. At the tactical level where mobility and transportability are a
must, UHF and commercial international maritime satellite services can be used for
reaching SOF-BICES services.

d. Connectivity over Internet. The SOF-BICES architecture has been established

to provide services over the Internet with appropriate encryption devices. This allows
flexibility in connection options and enables mobile teams to use existing infrastructure
when necessary.

e. Management. SOF-BICES is planned, managed, and maintained by the NSHQ

J6. Formal requests for services should be delivered to COM NSHQ with coordinating
actions with the NSHQ J6.

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Important Note. The communication link between COM

SOTG and his LOs is critical, both during planning and
particularly during execution when it could be time sensitive.
As an example, a reallocation of CAS may be required to
support a large TIC. This could be facilitated through VoIP
and chat, but may have to be done through secure satellite
phone, depending on the sensitivity of the matter.

8-16. Summary. SOF communication support consists of multiple and varied groups of
systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at
different echelons, from JTF to unit levels. Communication systems must support discrete as
well as collective functions. SOF communication systems must be interoperable with each
other, with conventional forces, with NATO resources, and with Allies and HNs as determined
by the scope of the operations.

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CHAPTER 9 – KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

9-1. General. Knowledge and information management provides quality information to the
right user at the right time in a usable form that facilitates understanding and decision-making.
The goal of knowledge and information management is to provide relevant and precise
information that supports SA and understanding, facilitating timely and effective decisions made
before the adversaries. The knowledge and information management system and processes
encompass the organization, users, and consumers, including the different forms of
communication, information, and data encountered on a daily basis. The procedures and
information systems assist with the collection, processing, storage, protection, access (display),
dissemination, and disposition of information. Individual users are the starting point of
information management; they have a baseline of information along with knowledge of the
SOTG’s information management process that guides their daily decisions as they receive new
data and information. Leaders decide what information is of the greatest value, how to manage
the knowledge discerned from that information, and how to display, disseminate, and utilize the
knowledge to assist with operational decisions.

Figure 9-1. Daily Information Flow (from/to the SOCC)

a. Information Management. Information management is the collection and

management of an organization's information resources that are acquired from multiple
sources for the purpose of optimizing access and dissemination in a controlled
environment. Information management entails organizing, retrieving, acquiring, and
maintaining information that overlaps with the practice of data management. The S3 is
responsible to COM SOTG for all information management and should task the S33 or
TOC chief to track and catalogue all information entering or leaving the SOTG. An
individual within the TOC will then be designated the information manager.

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b. Knowledge Management. Knowledge management comprises a range of processes and

procedures that identify, create, represent, distribute, and enable the adoption of insights and
experiences focused on improving the performance, sharing of lessons learned, integration, and
improvement of an organization. Knowledge management overlaps organizational learning and
leverages information management and technology to focus on best practices and information that
is critical to decision-making.

9-2. Information Management Cycle. See Figure 9-2 for the information management cycle.

Figure 9-2. Information Management Cycle

a. Information Management Planning. Early information management planning in

the pre-deployment phase of operations establishes important guidelines for information
management prior to collection. Information management planning is key during
planning; it creates protocols on how information will be managed and is the foundation
of maintaining a concrete management plan. Establishing information management
policies enables control of who can access the SOTG specific information, what they can
do with it, and how long they can retain it.

b. Data Collection and Creation. The physical act of data collection is the driving
force behind developing information that is pertinent to an SOTG and its subordinate
units. This action is conducted on an everyday basis as information is pushed and pulled
for a variety of needs. As data is collected, similar to the intelligence cycle (Chapter 4), it
is analysed and converted into pertinent information.

c. Organization and Storage. The organization and storage of collected information

allows for a unified structure to be formed, making searching for relevant information
simple and less time consuming. Various levels of organization can be found from the

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SOTG down to subordinate units. At each level, systems are established that organize
and store specific information.

d. Personal Workspace. An individual’s personal workspace is the micro level of

information organization, and members of the SOTG staff must have their workspaces
organized in a manner that is easily managed and accessible. By maintaining an
organized virtual workspace, files, data, and important information can be found if the
individual is not available to access his or her workspace.

e. Primary Work Area. The primary work area of a staff section encapsulates all
relevant information pertaining to that working group.

f. Collaborative Workspace. By establishing a collaborative workspace, users

maintain the ability to create, review, and edit information whether through physical or
virtual means. A collaborative workspace offers multiple users with access to relevant
information at the same time. The use of tools such as SharePoint and portals allows
staff members access to a net-centric collaborative tool.

Figure 9-3. Information Organization and Storage

g. Shared Workspace. Shared workspace between two primary work areas allows
multiple sections of staff to push and pull necessary information that corresponds to their
specific function.

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h. Common Access Area. Creating a common access area standardizes and

makes accessing specific genres of information easy and efficient. Using the web
information services environment establishes a common access area where users have
access to varying degrees of staff pertinent knowledge and information.

i. Use and Dissemination. Information is only valid if it is disseminated and used

appropriately. Once information is collected, it is necessary to apply it to a specific mission
to determine if and how it applies to the mission or COM SOTG’s intent. Information is
generally viewed as being goal oriented; SOTG staff members and leaders are responsible
for deciding how that information relates to a current problem. The analysis of information
ultimately leads to actionable intelligence that will be used to drive current and future
operations. Because of this, dissemination of information through the use of collaborative
tools remains an imperative task in which all members of an SOTG must participate.

Figure 9-4. Dissemination of Information

j. Protection, Maintenance, and Preservation. Establishing information

assurance, protection, and security policies is an important step in the protection of
information within the SOTG. Protection policies run deeper than simply putting
protocols into place that can safeguard information; protocols include who can access the
information and what they can physically do to it as well. Mitigation measures should be
developed by the information manager to react to information management issues, such
as reports of lost memory sticks and laptops.

k. Disposition. Analysis of information is required to convert the most pertinent

information into knowledge. Disposition routines ensure the availability of useful
information over time, while also archiving and disposing of information that is no longer
deemed to be of value.

l. Evaluation. Evaluating the current information management cycle is imperative in

critiquing the functionality of the information management plan. By evaluating the cycle,
flaws in the process may be identified and adjusted accordingly. Evaluation also allows
the effectiveness of information dissemination to be tracked, as well as any interference
that may be occurring. Creating key metrics for performance within information
management planning allows for assessing the overall effectiveness of the information
management programme.

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9-3. Special Operations Task Group Common Reference Point. The SOTG should adopt
and maintain an electronic common reference point as the principal knowledge portal for
information sharing and content management. The electronic common reference point is
functionally organized and mission-centric. It can be any system that meets the needs of the
SOTG and also provides the ability to exchange information. For example, many organizations
find that a web information centre meets its needs, while other commands with greater
resources may choose to use a portal or other web-based system. Regardless of the system
used, simplify it for the user with standardized formats. Discourage staff sections from
establishing their own duplicate electronic common reference points, which could lead to
information management challenges. Posting information on an electronic common reference
point is considered a passive means of information sharing and places responsibility on the
provider for ensuring availability of time-sensitive information. Posted information is controlled
and is considered proprietary. A new report should be posted to clarify, change, or amend any
previously posted information. Ensure information posted on the common reference point is in
compliance with local information assurance and security policies.

9-4. Information Sharing

a. Value. Information sharing entails the creation, storage, and dissemination of

information either by push or pull means. It ensures that an SOTG maintains shared SA
and has access to all relevant information. Information sharing provides the SA
foundation for everything else, such as collaboration. There are numerous push and pull
means to share information and the appropriate means is dictated by type of information
and its urgency.

b. Physical Means. The SOTG may organize around physical means such as
centres, boards, cells, and working groups to conduct the plan, direct, monitor, and assess
cycle process. Physical information sharing is done primarily by face-to-face discussions
in these forums and also shared via LOs and through various documents.

c. Virtual Means. Virtual information sharing allows the SOTG, when geographically
separated from other SOF units and staff, to have access to the same information. This
occurs both horizontally, within the SOTG and adjacent units and staff, and vertically,
with SOF components, the SOCC, and the JTF. A net-centric approach provides an
easily accessible point for information sharing. Information can be posted by all
authorized users on a webpage and easily found in either logically defined directories or
by use of an advanced search engine. Information can also be pushed via email and
message traffic or shared by video teleconferences. Members of the SOTG, LOs,
SOCC, and higher/adjacent commands can all push or pull information in accordance
with defined access permissions.

9-5. Summary. Information management is critical to facilitate understanding, decision-

making, and tracking of all information being passed around. COM SOTG must ensure that
information management is top priority for his staff. Having all information catalogued and on
hand will ensure the SOTG is well poised to action targets and answer critical IRs from the
SOCC. Information management must be well balanced with OPSEC; if it is not, it can hamper
efforts to disseminate information to the right people at the right time to facilitate the SOTG’s
operations tempo and targeting cycles.

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CHAPTER 10 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP LOGISTICS

10-1. General

a. The nature of special operations often requires independent forces operating in

austere, remote locations without a robust logistics support infrastructure. SOF logistics are
expeditionary in nature and are tailored and structured for rapid deployment into austere
environments. In order to maintain the necessary flexibility and independence in such
circumstances, a SOF logistics support element is necessary to bridge the gap to
conventional logistics support. SOF require both standard and SOF-peculiar (non-standard)
materiel and supplies, often in an accelerated manner through non-standard channels.

b. Special operations elements (SOTGs and SOATGs) are expected to operate in

any environment without support or replenishment for a minimum of 30 days (this
includes all classes of supply). Once deployed, the SOCC J4, in collaboration with the
SOTG S4, must be able to ensure the sustainment of the task group through various
methods as determined during pre-deployment planning. The SOCC J4 has the in-
theatre responsibility for coordinating logistic support for NATO SOF during planning,
execution, and redeployment, but the SOTG S4 must ensure that the SOTG’s interests
and requirements are defined early in the planning process and monitored through
mission completion.

c. Responsive and reliable operations in austere and hostile environments are a key
attribute of SOF. An SOTG’s logistic elements must be trained, equipped, and resourced
to maintain, supply, fuel, and arm SOTG units. Additional combat support functions
required to sustain SOTG units may include communications, computers, transportation,
medical, airbase defence, contracting, and civil engineering, all depending on national
requirements. These functions are key enablers of the SOTG’s missions and must be
capable of rapid deployment worldwide to support NATO SOF’s expeditionary operations.

Important Note. Each SOTG is different, and while NATO

attempts to standardize as much as possible for the success
of its operations, it is only the nations contributing their SOF
personnel and assets who truly know what logistic support
requirements they need to shoot, move, communicate, and
survive in their respective battlespace. If a nation sends its
SOTG into danger expecting to be given everything it needs
from the SOCC or JTF, it will achieve little to nothing when
deployed.

d. NATO logistics doctrine emphasizes a shared responsibility for logistics support

from both NATO and the TCN. This methodology applies directly to the relationship
between the NATO SOCC and the nations contributing special operations land, maritime,
and air capabilities. The old paradigm of nations having sole responsibility for logistics
and combat support falters in NA5CRO and expeditionary operations. While nations may
choose to maintain full responsibility for combat support of their deployed special
operations units, the deployed NATO SOCC has the authority and the responsibility to
establish a combat support organization tailored to the requirements of the situation.
COM SOCC, through the SOCC J4, develops the special operations combat support
organization best suited to coordinate logistic and support functions for the special
operations land, maritime, and air units under his C2.

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c. NATO has developed a logistic process to provide advantages during expeditionary

operations. COM SOCC will task his J4 to apply the appropriate NATO concepts of logistics
support across the entire special operations component. Just as with conventional units, the
J4 will limit competition for scarce resources and ensure the SOTGs and SOATGs are
adequately supported and able to safely perform their assigned missions. The SOCC J4
ensures supplies and services are apportioned according to COM SOCC’s intent and
priorities. Two logistics concepts the SOCC J4 will employ include:

(1) Lead Nation Logistic Support. During the force generation process, one
nation may agree to assume responsibility for coordinating or providing logistic
support to all or part of a joint force. This concept is also applied to the SOCC. The
LN will often provide common supplies, such as Class I (rations and water), Class III
(petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and Class V (ammunition), to the entire SOCC on a
prearranged, cost-reimbursable basis. The LN status is usually based on geographic
considerations rather than classes of supply, e.g. if a TOO is broken up into
multinational divisions (MNDs), then the LN in an MND will often assume
responsibility for coordinating logistic support in multiple classes of supply for all units,
including the SOTGs and SOATGs within that regional area. It is likely in a large
TOO for more than one LN to be designated, with each assuming responsibility for a
specified range of logistic support for the specific geographical area.

(2) Role Specialist Nation Logistics Support. Each NATO member nation
has particular logistic strengths and capabilities that when combined can create a
powerful combat support infrastructure to enable joint special operations. Under a
role specialist nation arrangement, one nation assumes primary responsibility for a
particular class of supply common across the entire SOCC. For example, one
nation may be best suited for providing aviation fuels or perhaps medical support.
The difference between role specialist nations and LNs is that role specialist
nations provide support in a single commodity or service while LNs will coordinate
or provide multiple commodities and services.

10-2. Special Operations Task Group S4 Responsibilities. Generally, SOF-specific

logistics is a national responsibility. RSOM is JTF HQ/JLSG’s responsibility, and SOCC J4 has
to coordinate with the TCN providing SOTGs/SOATGs. The SOTG S4 responsibilities
encompass the areas of supply and materiel services; logistic information management;
equipment and vehicle maintenance and repair; movement and transportation; petroleum
logistics; EOD; medical logistics; infrastructure engineering for logistics; medical support;
contracting; HNS; and coordination with conventional forces and HN counterparts. Further to
this, the SOTG S4 must be able to:

a. Provide logistic oversight of SOTGs and SOTUs in the JOA.

b. Comply with logistic procedures and practices established by the SOCC/JTF HQ

and JLSG.

c. Coordinate logistical support and materiel and supply requirements for SOTGs.

d. Maintain a current logistic estimate of the SOTG and subordinate units.

e. Monitor and report equipment readiness and logistical status to the SOCC J4.

f. Recommend controlled supply rates of critical resources.

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g. Ensure accountability of supplies and equipment.

h. Plan, coordinate, and monitor administrative movement of SOTG personnel,

equipment, and supplies.

i. Coordinate with the SOCC J6 to ensure that the CIS will support the logistic
operations. Identify those systems to which SOTG A4 access is required (e.g. logistic
functional area services (LOGFAS)) and to quantify additional logistic communication
requirements.

j. Recommend stock levels for SOTG support.

k. Support operational resupply of SOTG units.

l. In conjunction with SOCC J4, plan and coordinate for strategic and operational
movement of SOF via a time-phased force and deployment list. Develop logistical
requirements and considerations to OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.

m. In coordination with the senior medical officer, develop medical and health service
SUPPLANs for the treatment and in-theatre evacuation of patients, medical logistics
(including blood supplies), and preventive medicine.

n. Be prepared to engage in contracting for services with HN personnel.

10-3. Logistics Functional Areas. There are several functional areas of logistics that support
the SOCC’s subunits.

a. Supply. Each SOF element has organic support capabilities to sustain or provide
support to their units. Resupply of deployed SOF elements in remote or denied areas is
planned and executed as an operational task and may require the use of non-standard
transportation or SOF aviation assets. The JLSG and NSEs can assist the SOCC J4 in
fulfilling logistic requirements. Agreements concerning the common user item list (CUIL)
can reduce duplication of effort and greatly assist SOF logistic support. When a TCN
component or agency is designated as the CUIL lead to provide selected common items,
such as food, water, or fuel, they support multiple deployed elements by providing those
common items. The smaller timeframe between the WNGO and notice to move typical of
special operations requires SOF supply elements to maintain deployable spares kits at or
near 100% fill rates. This is especially true for those replacement parts with low mean-
time-between-failure rates for things such as SOF watercraft and ground manoeuvre
vehicles. The high operations tempo and the low numbers of special operations vehicles
and watercraft typical of recent operations necessitate a spares package robust enough
to sustain the SOTGs until the theatre logistics and national systems are able to address
the unique supply needs of special operations watercraft and vehicles. The SOTGs
should make maximum use of the NATO common supplies, specifically Class I, Class III,
and Class V items.

b. Maintenance. Equipment unique to a TCN remains the maintenance

responsibility of the TCN deployed element. Special operations elements may have the
capability to perform limited maintenance but often require deployment of specialty
personnel or support units to maintain and repair equipment that is unique to special
operations. When practicable, maintenance facilities for cross-TCN use and retrograde
procedures for returning repairable items should be established. Multinational use of

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salvage assets should be emphasized. Maintenance priorities normally emphasize

return of mission-essential weapon systems to combat readiness. Deployable
maintenance elements must be fully instilled with the ethos and mission focus of the
special operations land and maritime forces. Joint special operations depend on reliable
vehicles, watercraft, and aircraft to ensure mission accomplishment. Maintenance
shortfalls can be as much of a detractor to mission success as tactical errors. Because
each nation provides vehicles, watercraft, and communications and weapons systems
that are unique to their national requirements, the opportunities for unit-level and
intermediate-level cross-servicing and/or sharing of repairable parts tend to be few.
However, the SOTG S4 should assist, when possible, with coordinating additional
support across the theatre components and within national logistic chains, as well as with
facilitating transportation of spare parts and technicians.

c. Fuel. While most fuelling operations are included in base support, during
expeditionary operations the SOTG may require fuel support from organic resources until
NATO establishes an appropriate fuel resupply infrastructure. Fuel support for special
operations vehicles and watercraft may include testing and certification of HN fuel
supplies using NATO standards of acceptability. It is the SOTG’s responsible to ensure
the quality of HN fuel and storage procedures.

d. Forward Arming and Refuelling Point. When SOTGs are being supported by
SOATGs/SOATUs, specialized refuelling and rearming support will normally be required
to sustain long-range operations by special air warfare aircraft. Unlike forward arming
and refuelling point (FARP) operations supporting conventional air and aviation forces,
FARP operations supporting special air warfare units are normally conducted in hostile,
denied, or environmentally challenging areas, at night and using low prominence or
discreet techniques. As with other special operations support activities, it is the extra
training and the habitual relationship between the special air warfare units and the FARP
teams that infuse these elements with the special operations mindset.

e. Transportation. Given the nature of most special operations, time constraints,

planning considerations, or special mission requirements may place unique demands on
common-user transportation assets. Generally, strategic movement assets support SOF
in the deployment, resupply, and redeployment phases of the operation. SOF organic
airlift assets normally provide SOF with intra-theatre lift support (insertion, extraction, and
resupply). When SOF operations exceed organic SOF lift capability, common-user
transportation assets should be considered. The SOCC J4 is responsible for
coordinating all non-operational associated transportation. This is usually done through a
joint movement coordination centre or a similar organization established for movement
control. The SOCC and subordinate units are responsible for the coordination of
administrative transportation at their respective levels; however, transportation to and
from SOF operational areas, especially resupply or CASEVAC in support of deployed
operational elements, is often conducted as tactical operations under SOTG S3 direction.

f. Medical Support. Normally, an LN provides medical support to NATO forces in a

TOO. The SOTG medical staff coordinates preventive medicine practices to mitigate any
environmental factors that may impact the SOTGs/SOATGs. The medical staff provides
detailed medical planning and medical intelligence to the SOTG prior to deployment and
recommends organizational and personnel actions to counter potential threats to
personnel health. The medical staff also plans for and coordinates MEDEVAC
procedures. SOTGs/SOATGs maintain a Role 1 MTF, as dictated in ACO Forces
Standards (AFS) Volume X or as the tactical situation dictates. See Chapter 11.

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g. Infrastructure Engineering. The SOTG S4 coordinates SOF requirements with the

higher command’s engineering units via the SOCC J4. The higher command engineer
supervises both combat and general support engineer units and operations, real estate
activities, environmental protection, and other infrastructure support-related activities.

h. Contracting. For large scale operations, the SOTG S4 must have access to
contracting support. While the SOTG S4 can seek out contracting support on their own,
using their own contract mechanisms and procedures, the JLSG, through the SOCC J4,
should be the main point of contact for all contracting issues. Deployed task groups are
responsible for ensuring that national funds are in place before any contracting actions
are taken. While a contracting officer may support the entire SOCC, the SOTG should
deploy with organic paying agents and field ordering officers to handle small purchases.
The SOCC LEGAD should be contacted for advice on contracts and related matters if an
SOTG LEGAD is not deployed. The general rule of thumb for contracting is that costs lie
where they fall – the nations.

i. Funding. Funding is typically not fronted for contingency operations; therefore,

SOF TCN elements must record incremental costs associated with the operation for
reimbursement. Guidance for recording and filing for reimbursement should be provided
to SOF elements as early as possible. Legal advice from the SOCC LEGAD on
expenditures, to ensure compliance with regulations and fiscal law, should be sought and
special attention given to initiatives that train or equip foreign forces, including police or
security forces.

10-4. Logistics Support. Logistic requirements determination begins with receipt of the
mission and subsequent analysis. Determining requirements is critical to coordinating theatre
support. For contingency planning, these requirements are normally communicated from each
SOF unit to the SOCC in a formal statement of requirements (SOR). The most important aspect
of the SOR process is identification of requirements in sufficient time to allow for the necessary
coordination and planning. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more
of the following means:

a. Troop-contributing Nation Support. In NATO the logistic support of SOF units

is fundamentally the responsibility of their parent TCN except where otherwise provided
for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of
whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the TCN component, the JTF HQ,
or a SOCC.

b. Joint In-theatre Support. SOF missions may require joint logistic planning and
execution. When the SOTG TCN cannot satisfy its TCN SOF support requirements, the
JTF HQ, through the SOCC, determines if another TCN component can satisfy the
requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. CUIL arrangements may
also provide more efficient support and eliminate duplication.

Important Note. SOF have special support considerations

such as operating outside of normal theatre support areas and
security-related issues. SOTGs must identify these issues early
so that the SOCC J4 may inform the JTF HQ and JLSG.
Failure to do so early will hamper and slow SOTG efforts later.

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c. Mutual Support Agreements. Participating nations may consider developing

support agreements, bilaterally and multilaterally, with other nations for providing
logistical support to their forces.

d. Special Operations-Peculiar Support. Special operations-peculiar materiel,

supplies, and services are defined as those items and services required for SOF mission
support for which there is no TCN common requirement. The identification of special
operations-peculiar requirements is an operational decision that is tied to the commander’s
CONOPS and mission requirements. To ensure that the process is effective, the SOCC
should publish clear procedures for subordinate units to obtain this support. These
procedures require close coordination among the SOTGs, the SOCC, and the JTF HQ. The
JTF HQ should monitor the process to assist and expedite when required.

10-5. Special Operations Task Group Logistic Planning Considerations. Logistics

planning must be fully integrated into the SOTG estimate process. The CSS plan must be
integrated with and support the tactical plan; therefore, it is most important that the logistic staff
is brought into the planning phase at the outset as the realities of the CSS situation may have
an effect on the plan adopted.

10-6. Role Specialization. In the area of multinational logistics, there is potential for overlap
and confusion in the delineation of responsibilities between NATO commands, NATO TCNs, the
HNs, and non-NATO nations operating under NATO command. It is essential to the
establishment of a coherent logistics concept that guidelines are established to outline the
responsibilities of each element as they relate to planning and conducting multinational logistic
operations. The following are general responsibilities and planning guidelines that will assist
NATO’s multinational logistics concept and are central SOTG logistical considerations:

a. Develop operational-level logistical plan.

b. Delineate logistic C2 organization.

c. Identify communication requirements to support SOF logistic functions.

d. Provide planning guidance.

e. Budget and fund management.

f. Develop, prioritize, deconflict, and apportion logistical requirements and resources.

g. Interface with strategic and tactical levels of operation.

h. Identify IRs.

i. Identify contracting requirements.

j. Identify risk management protocols.

k. Consider route protection.

l. Consider system redundancy to avoid failure.

m. Coordinate with potential HNs.

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n. Identify infrastructure requirements.

o. Plan PDSS.

p. Plan and coordinate for RSOM within the JOA.

q. Coordinate NSEs.

r. Coordinate MEDEVAC plans.

s. Maintain logistical security, infrastructure, and facilities at forward operating

location.

10-7. Base Operating Support. This is a provision of support to SOF transiting or remaining at
a permanent or expeditionary site by a JTF or CC. Base operations support services and support
are provided on a reimbursable basis between the base operating support integrator and the SOF
organization that uses the support or service, unless otherwise directed by the JTF HQ.

a. The JTF HQ designates a representative who acts as the joint base operating
support provider for the requesting SOF organization. The JTF HQ may designate a
service component as the base operating support integrator at each operating location.
The base operating support integrator coordinates contracting support and the efficient
use of mission support resources.

b. Where shortfalls or opportunities for efficiencies exist, the JTF HQ may task
components to provide or coordinate specific capabilities. The base operating support
integrator provides master planning for facilities and real estate. Responsibilities include,
but are not limited to, collecting and prioritizing construction requirements, seeking
funding support, environmental management, FP, and hazardous waste disposal.

10-8. Prior to Base Operating Support. SOF are predominantly the first force into austere
areas. Sustained operations of 10 days or more are normal and often conducted with no cover
or sanitation for NATO forces.

10-9. Host-nation Support. While HNS may be encouraged for common support items, the
use of HNS in SOCC operations must be weighed against OPSEC and mission requirements.
Additionally, HNS authority must be coordinated with the SOCC establishing authority and the
higher chain of command (or JLSG). HNS can be a significant force multiplier as an alternative
to deploying logistic support from the airport of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. It may
also increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the burden on
scarce transportation assets required to deploy forces. The SOTG S4 should attempt to
coordinate all HNS efforts with the SOCC J4.

10-10. Summary. Logistics planning is critical to the fabric of all SOF operations and must be
considered at the earliest point of any operation. Logistics planners must integrate into higher
HQs’ staff to ensure logistical considerations and limitations are highlighted and addressed,
then promulgated down to lower echelons for further planning and adjustment.

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CHAPTER 11 – MEDICAL SUPPORT AND OPERATIONS

11-1. Medical Support Fundamentals

a. General. The aim of medical support is the conservation of manpower through

preservation of life and minimization of disabilities. This contributes to both FP and
morale.

b. Components of Operational Health Care

(1) Force Health Protection. These are actions taken to counter the effects of
the environment, occupational health risks, and disease through preventive and
reactive measures.

(2) Emergency Medicine. This is the clinical discipline specializing in the

triage and immediate care of casualties in an acute care situation.

(3) Primary Health Care. This is the provision of integrated, accessible health
care services by clinical personnel trained for comprehensive first contact and the
continuing care of individuals experiencing signs and symptoms of ill health or
having health concerns.

(4) Secondary Health Care. This is the provision of hospitalization and

specialized clinical care requiring training and equipment levels beyond that which
could normally be provided at the level of primary care.

(5) Evacuation of Patients. This is the process of moving stable patients from
a medical facility located in an area or theatre of operations by land, sea, or air
transportation to medical facilities out of harm’s way.

c. Principles of Medical Support

(1) Timeliness of Treatment. Patients must receive the appropriate medical

care at the right place and at the right time. Time is the most critical factor that will
significantly influence survival rate, complication rate, rate of recovery, and the
casualty’s ultimate quality of life.

(2) Continuity of Care. A casualty’s recovery will depend on the continuation

of appropriate care throughout the medical chain, which includes in-transit care
during evacuation to and between MTFs.

(3) Triage Based on Clinical Need. Triage (i.e. the dynamic process of
sorting casualties to identify the priority of treatment and evacuation of the
wounded, given the limitations of the current situation, the mission, and the
available resources) is based solely on clinical need, not on the patient’s
operational importance or origin.

(4) Use of Commonly Accepted Standards of Care. Medical support to

NATO forces must meet standards acceptable to all participating nations.

d. Timelines. The current NATO medical planning timelines state three key timelines,
also known as the 10-1-2 guidelines (Figure 11-1).

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(1) Haemorrhage and airway control for the most severe casualties should be
achieved within 10 minutes of wounding.

(2) MEDEVAC assets should reach the seriously injured casualty with skilled
medical aid within 1 hour of wounding at the latest.

(3) Casualties that require surgery should, where possible, be in a facility

equipped for this within 2 hours of wounding.

NATO Medical Planning Timelines

 Haemorrhage control
 Airway control
 Call for help

Flight Flight MEDEVAC Surgery

Transfer
Transfer

prepa-
ration

Time

Point of injury 10 minutes 1 hour 2 hours

Figure 11-1. NATO Medical Planning Timelines

11-2. Operational Medical Support Capabilities and Organization

a. Capabilities within the Continuum of Care. A continuum of care must be

maintained throughout the treatment-evacuation chain, providing appropriate clinical
support to the casualty at all times. Medical resources and assets are distributed into
response capabilities on a progressive basis. The minimum capabilities of each response
capability are in principle intrinsic to each higher-level response capability. While under
operational conditions, the flow of casualties generally follows the pattern of the continuum
of care; this organizational pattern is not rigid, and one or more response capabilities may
be bypassed if more appropriate for the treatment of a patient’s condition.

b. Difference from Medical Support to Conventional Operations. The nature of

special operations missions often requires small, highly skilled, self-contained operational
elements that are capable of operating on short notice in remote and hostile locations in all
geographic environments, for prolonged time periods, following insertion by land, air, or
water. The requirements to provide medical support in this context differ significantly from
those required to support conventional operations. Conventional medical capabilities are
most often unable to support special operations due to the following limitations:

(1) They are not normally maintained at high states of readiness, hence, are
not rapidly deployable with the SOF that require their support.

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(2) They are usually not designed to operate independently in remote and
hostile environments, lacking the degree of military training required to adapt
quickly and easily to respond to a variety of adversary and environmental threats
and changing situations, at extended ranges from their bases.

(3) Most often, they are inherently large and heavy when compared to SOF
operational elements, which means that they require relatively much time and
space to deploy, that they are not able to use a wide variety of assets for insertion
by land, air, or water into operational areas, that they are unable to maintain a low
profile, and that they usually lack the mobility to support highly mobile small-unit
operations.

c. Treatment Capabilities and Organization in Support of Special Operations

(1) In order to provide immediate medical care when conducting discreet or

covert operations in remote locations, advanced treatment capabilities need to be
integrated at the lowest level of SOF operational elements.

(2) Individual SOF operators should be trained as SOF advanced first

responders, capable of performing tactical combat casualty care at a level beyond
that of conventional forces combat lifesavers.

(3) An SOTU should have at least one special operations combat medic (SOCM)
(historically also known as patrol medic, paramedic, or team medic). The SOCM is
capable of performing advanced tactical combat casualty care and of managing
selected relatively common tactical medical emergencies. The availability of SOCMs
may be a key factor in an SOTU’s operational status. Depending on the type of
mission, some SOF units may require at least two SOCMs within a single SOTU. In
addition, the availability of more than one SOCM within an SOTU may be a deciding
factor in determining whether an SOTU is capable of split-team operations.

(4) Depending on the situation, an SOTU may have one or more special
operations independent duty medics (SOIDMs), capable of performing advanced
and long-term patient care for both trauma injuries and non-trauma related medical
conditions. SOIDMs are also capable of performing basic veterinary care.

(5) Depending on the situation, an SOTG or a large SOTU may have personnel
in a primarily medical support role, which may include physicians, nurses, SOCMs,
and/or SOIDMs, capable of performing pre-hospital trauma life support at either a
static location, or as part of a short duration deployable or expeditionary Role 1 or
2 capability.

Best Practice. During NATO’s Operation RESOLUTE

SUPPORT mission in Afghanistan, the NSOCC-A had several
special operations surgical teams (SOSTs) that were capable
of deploying and supporting SOF expeditionary operations that
were considered outside of the static Role 2 and 3 medical
facilities’ golden hour coverage bubble. The SOSTs included
air assets that could move the patient back to the static Role 2
or 3 facility.

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(6) At the SOCC or SOTG level, a SOST, i.e. an initial surgical capability
designed to support special operations and capable of performing damage control
surgery, may be required, depending on the timely availability of conventional
surgical facilities. Depending on the type of operation, the size of forces
employed, and the organizational structure of a SOST, a SOST may rely on lower-
level medical care capabilities (i.e. personnel from the organic Role 1 capability,
SOCMs, and/or SOIDMs) to assist in preparing, treating, and transporting patients,
especially in a multiple-casualty scenario.

(7) For levels of care beyond the capabilities found within the initial surgical
capability, conventional medical treatment capabilities or HN or national civilian
health care systems can normally be used.

(8) The special operations-specific treatment capabilities described above can

be achieved in several ways and may have differing characteristics, such as:

(a) SOCMs and SOIDMs can either be SOF operators with additional
special operations medical training, or medical service personnel with
additional special operations tactical and technical training. Regardless of
their origin, SOCMs and SOIDMs will routinely be required to provide
advanced skilled medical aid to combat trauma patients that, according to
overarching Allied medical doctrine, would normally be reserved for medical
service personnel (i.e. Role 1 capabilities).

(b) SOCMs and SOIDMs can either be organic or attached to an SOTU.

(c) SOCMs and SOIDMs, whether organic or attached, can have a

primary operational/combat or a primary medical role. When serving in a
primary medical role, they can either be combatants or non-combatants.

(d) Medical and surgical treatment capabilities, other than SOF medics
(SOCMs and SOIDMs), in support of special operations can either be
organic, attached, or in support of an SOTG. When attached or in support,
they can either be dedicated to SOF or be a dual-use capability trained to
support special operations in addition to conventional operations.

(9) In addition to or instead of some of the aforementioned special operations-

specific treatment capabilities, conventional forces treatment capabilities may be
used when SOF are operating inside conventional forces operational areas.

d. Patient Evacuation Capabilities and Organization in Support of Special

Operations

(1) The seriously injured or ill casualty needs to be reached with evacuation
assets as soon as possible, for both clinical imperatives and morale reasons, and
should be evacuated in a timely manner to the most appropriate facility for
treatment of their condition. The most appropriate facility may not necessarily be
the closest medical facility.

(2) Patient evacuation may occur under different tactical circumstances:

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(a) As a separate evacuation mission, while the main force continues

tactical operations.

(b) Along with the main force, following mission abort due to the
requirement to evacuate one or more casualties.

(c) Along with the main force as it exfiltrates from the objective, after
completion of the action at the objective.

(3) Patients can be moved from the battlefield to a higher level of care
capabilities by any ground, air, or maritime platform able to transport personnel.
Often, the use of SOF tactical platforms will be the only feasible option to transport
casualties to MTFs within acceptable timelines. SOF ground, air, and maritime
tactical platforms should routinely carry medical kits and evacuation equipment to
perform this function without having to rely on medical kits carried by SOF medical
care providers.

(4) Depending on the availability of accompanying treatment capabilities,

patient evacuation is designated as CASEVAC or MEDEVAC.

(a) CASEVAC is the non-medicalized evacuation of patients without

qualified medical escort.

(b) MEDEVAC is the medically supervised process of moving any

person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between MTFs as an
integral part of the treatment continuum.

(5) Extant doctrinal and other terminology regarding patient evacuation is often
confusing. Terms such as qualified medical escort and medically supervised
process are subject to interpretation. Regardless of the terminology used, the
most important considerations are the ability to move casualties from the hostile
and austere tactical environment in which they were injured to a more secure
location capable of providing advanced medical care and the availability of
appropriate en route care. In the context of special operations, this will often
require the use of armed and protected tactical platforms.

(6) When conducting patient evacuation, additional medical personnel should

arrive with the evacuation asset, if available. Even when SOF medics are present,
the following situations may limit their capabilities:

(a) The SOTU’s medic may be among the casualties.

(b) The SOTU’s medic may need to continue on the unit’s mission and
not get onto the evacuation platform.

(c) The SOTU’s medic may have been temporarily separated and may
not have been at the casualty’s scene.

(7) The continuum of patient care must be maintained throughout evacuation.

For casualties taken initially to a forward surgical facility with only a limited holding
capability (such as a SOST), this will usually necessitate subsequent evacuation to
a more capable facility before evacuation to definitive care. This transfer may be
necessary within a few hours of surgery, depending on the condition of the patient

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and other circumstances, particularly intensive care capability and capacity. If no

separate critical care transportation personnel are available, an SOST may have
to provide en route critical care for patients being moved to a higher level surgical
facility, following damage control surgery at a forward location.

(8) Evacuation of patients will be coordinated with the medical desk inside the
SOCC JOC and inside the operational-level HQ’s JOC.

e. Special Operations Forces Leaders Casualty Response Capabilities. The

occurrence of a casualty during special operations is not an isolated medical issue, but a
tactical medical problem in which there may be a direct conflict between what is best for
the casualty and what is best for the mission. SOF leaders at all levels should be
educated on the operational consequences of casualties and how to manage such
events. Realistic leader-directed casualty battle drills should be embedded into SOF unit
tactics and tactical training exercises.

11-3. Common Medical Planning Considerations

a. Medical Threat Assessment

(1) SOF frequently operate in remote, austere areas and may therefore be
exposed to health risks not normally seen in other areas of the JOA. This factor,
coupled with the fact that SOF are held on short response times, routinely requires
proactive planning for provision of robust preventive medicine measures, such as
immunizations against a wide variety of potential diseases.

(2) Effects of adversary tactics and associated weapons munitions systems used
affect planning of medical assets in terms of capabilities required to cope with likely
injuries and in terms of recognizing the need for protected evacuation assets. In
addition, SOF medical plans should anticipate changes in adversary tactics that may
require rapid changes in SOF medical capabilities, including fielding of new and/or
additional medical equipment and supplies to the lowest levels.

b. Special Operations Forces Task-specific Medical Support. Planning for

medical support to SOF must take into account specific factors that may be highly
variable between the different SOF principal tasks.

(1) Military Assistance. Planning considerations for medical support to MA

may include the considerations for both SR and DA (see below), since these may
be implied tasks in any MA mission. In addition, medical support to the assisted
HN security forces or local guerrilla forces, as well as to their relatives or even
their extended communities, should usually be planned for.

(2) Special Reconnaissance. Medical risks associated with SR missions are

mainly related to environmental conditions prevalent in the often austere
operational area, as well as to the physiological effects of prolonged inactivity
during extended surveillance in confined spaces.

(3) Direct Action. Medical risks associated with DA missions are mainly
related to combat trauma. In addition to medical support to the SOF element
conducting the operation, treatment of wounded non-combatants and adversary
combatants may have to be planned for.

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c. Medical Operations to Support Local Populations. When planning to provide

medical care to civilians (such as medical seminars (MEDSEMs) and other types of
medical civic action programmes (MEDCAPs)), SOF planners should ensure that these
medical operations support SOCC and JTF overall objectives, and do not undermine
them through unintended medical and tactical consequences. In counter-insurgency
operations, medical programmes are valuable tools when properly aligned with
operational objectives. MEDCAPs should fully integrate HN providers and officials, to
promote the capacity of the HN government, and should lead to greater self-sufficiency.
MEDSEMs provide education, thereby promoting self-reliance and improving the
sustainability of medical interventions. They may forge relationships and promote
interoperability through collaboration between local medical providers, governmental
leaders, HN forces, and NATO forces. While the benefit of continued relationships with
an AOO is difficult to quantify, positive impacts of successful medical programmes
usually result in better access to information provided by the local population, eventually
leading to an increase in security.

d. Casualty Estimates. Since special operations, during which contact with the
adversary is sought, are routinely conducted using surprise, and SOF do not conduct
prolonged force-on-force operations, reliable, accurate casualty estimates for the action
on the objective are not only infeasible but also totally inappropriate. Commanders and
planners should not be lured into believing they have to meet higher commanders’
expectations to provide casualty estimates. For specific actions with relatively large
forces, such as a parachute insertion conducted by a large SOF unit, more accurate
casualty estimates, based on specific factors related to the environment and the type of
equipment used (but not related to adversary action), might be feasible.

e. Evacuation Timelines. Planning for medical support is primarily driven by clinical

timelines. The timelines mentioned in paragraph 11-1d and depicted in Figure 11-1
integrate the following planning assumptions:

(1) 20- to 30-minute notice to move for RW aerial evacuation assets.

(2) Up to 30 minutes flight time to the casualty pickup point.

(3) 5 minutes ground time to load the casualty on board.

(4) Up to 40 minutes flight time to reach the MTF’s helicopter landing point.

(5) A 15-minute transfer from the landing point to the operating room.

f. Special Operations Surgical Team Employment Criteria. The planning for

employment of SOSTs will be made in the context of timely accessibility of other hospital
resources. Since these highly specialized assets are a scarce resource, their use should
be planned for those operations that carry a significant risk of trauma casualties or
difficult to ascertain risks, in the absence of more robust MTFs to which casualties can be
evacuated within established evacuation timelines.

g. Redundancy of Evacuation Assets. Evacuation plans should routinely include

the use of alternate evacuation assets. Air evacuation should never be the only
evacuation option planned.

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h. Medical Logistics. SOF medical logistics personnel should plan for and ensure
that adequate stock levels of medical supplies are maintained and that resupply of
medical items can be conducted when needed. Special consideration should be given
early to the provision of temperature-sensitive blood and blood components to be used
by the lowest level SOF operational elements. For extended operations in a resource-
constrained environment, SOF may require guidance on potential applications of expired
pharmaceuticals when no other options are available.

i. Operations Security

(1) The need for OPSEC often requires access restrictions on medical planning
information to other component or higher-level conventional medical planners.
The SOF medical planners should provide only sufficient information to ensure the
required conventional medical support is in place with the least opportunity of
mission compromise.

(2) Regardless of the other criteria that determine the requirement to use
SOSTs, there may be cases where OPSEC requires their employment instead of a
readily available conventional MTF.

(3) Selected missions may have a requirement to safeguard the patient’s identity
in order not to compromise a SOF unit’s presence and jeopardize its mission. In
these cases, alias patient tracking systems may have to be used to maintain
accountability of injured SOF personnel inside the conventional medical system.

11-4. Diving Medical Planning Considerations

a. SOCMs and SOIDMs that are part of an SOTU with combat swimmers, and SOTG
medical personnel in support of such an SOTU, must be able to deal with problems
relating to diving medicine. Specific areas include fitness-to-dive evaluations and the
recognition and treatment of diving disorders.

b. Most SOF diving operations are conducted with closed-circuit self-contained

underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA), which recycle the diver’s exhaled gas through
a carbon dioxide absorbent canister rather than allowing the exhaled gas to escape to
sea. The primary disadvantage of a closed-circuit oxygen SCUBA as compared with a
closed-circuit mixed-gas SCUBA is the depth limitations imposed by the risk of central
nervous system oxygen toxicity. This is not often a significant problem because many
combat-swimmer missions require only a dive depth sufficient to provide concealment.
Compared with a conventional open-circuit SCUBA, the use of a closed-circuit scuba has
an increased risk of diving accidents.

c. Areas that impact directly on SOF diving operations are the oxygen exposure limits,
closed-circuit SCUBA canister operating limits, and decompression procedures.
Operational exigencies may require that SOF combat swimmers go beyond the standards
of accepted peacetime military diving practice. SOF dive medical officers may be called on
to advise SOTG commanders about hazards to swimmers exceeding peacetime limits,
such as assessing and providing mitigation measures for the risk from continuing to
breathe from the SCUBA after reaching the end of the canister operating limit.

d. Potential medical threat assessments must include adversary capabilities and

likely actions in countering swimmer operations, evaluating the risk of compromise (e.g.

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the risk of longer dives versus the risk from surfacing in a hostile area), the risk of
weapons systems expected to be employed (e.g. explosive devices such as hand
grenades) versus direct fire (the latter being the lesser threat) and the risk of exposure to
underwater acoustic systems.

e. Operations involving swimmer-delivery vehicles (SDVs) and dry-deck shelters

(DDSs) on submarines provide a number of unique medical challenges. Special
decompression techniques are required for these operations. Many SDV operations
require the use of both air and nitrox mixtures on the same dive, and there is a
decompression obligation for repetitive or long bottom-time dives. National directives will
guide medical support of SDV and DDS operations. Normally, there will be a
requirement for a diving medical officer to remain at the submarine control throughout
DDS launch and recovery operations. In general, management of a medical emergency
in a DDS consists of the immediate movement of the casualty to the bubble, equalization
of the transfer trunk to the hangar depth, transfer of the casualty to the transfer trunk,
drainage of the transfer trunk to the appropriate level, casualty movement to either the
chamber or the submarine as indicated by his condition, and definitive medical treatment.

f. For anticipated diving missions, coordination must be established with the nearest
hyperbaric chamber. In remote areas where no chamber is available that can be
reached by casualty evacuation assets within required timelines, coordination with the
SOCC staff should be made to have a transportable recompression chamber deployed to
a suitable location.

11-5. High-altitude Parachuting Medical Planning Considerations

a. High-altitude parachuting is an insertion method that allows an SOTU to rapidly

and discreetly enter an operational area with relatively high precision, using steerable
square parachutes with a high glide ratio, while the transporting aircraft remains beyond
visual and auditory detection distance and outside the threat’s weapons envelope. Many
SOF units have a capability to insert personnel by airplane from high altitudes, using the
high-altitude, high-opening (HAHO) technique, or the high-altitude, low-opening (HALO)
technique. HALO is conducted by free fall, while HAHO can be conducted either by free
fall or by static-line parachuting. High-altitude parachuting requires specialized training
and entails a number of medical risks, since humans are not physiologically equipped for
survival at high altitudes. Dangers inherent in high-altitude parachuting are cerebral
hypoxia, hyperventilation, and trapped gas disorder. In addition, the risk of hypothermia
and frostbite may be present, depending on altitude and local environmental conditions.

b. Low temperatures may cause hypothermia or frostbite. Since manual dexterity

must not be impaired to be able to properly adjust the equipment prior to jumping, and to
manipulate the parachute after exiting the aircraft, suitable gloves will be required to
prevent parachutists' hands from becoming extremely cold. Additional clothing (that may
have to be removed and discarded when on the ground) may be required to protect from
hypothermia and frostbite during the ascent and subsequent parachute insertion.

c. With increasing altitude, barometric pressure decreases, which results in

decreased oxygenation of the blood and tissue hypoxia, resulting in turn in impaired
judgement and thinking, which can quickly lead to serious injury or death. From altitudes
of around 10,000-12,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), physiological support, by
means of supplemental oxygen, is needed. Above 30,000-33,000 ft AMSL, simply
breathing 100% oxygen no longer prevents hypoxia. At those altitudes, oxygen will need

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to be delivered by positive pressure breathing. Hypoxia affects people uniquely with

symptoms varying from person to person. For that reason, it is necessary that
HAHO/HALO operators conduct regular training in an altitude chamber to recognize their
hypoxia symptoms and to train in the use of their protective equipment.

d. Above 18,000 ft AMSL, altitude decompression sickness can occur, as nitrogen

(which makes up approximately 80% of the atmosphere) in the body tissues will expand
because of decreased atmospheric pressure, forming bubbles in body tissues. The
tissue affected by these bubbles generally determines the severity. Neurologic
decompression sickness (the symptoms of which may include paralysis and loss of
consciousness) is life threatening and should be treated as a medical emergency.
Without pressurization, the chance of decompression sickness can be minimized by pre-
breathing continuing on 100% oxygen. Operators should also allow at least 24 hours
between diving operations and flying at high altitude.

e. National regulations will define oxygen delivery systems requirements, altitudes

and procedures for the use of supplemental oxygen (i.e. pre-breathing consoles in the
aircraft and oxygen bottles strapped to the jumpers), and the requirement for and
procedures to be used by physiological technicians on board the aircraft. Physiological
technicians are specially trained to operate oxygen delivery systems, to monitor aircrew
and parachutists by looking for signs of impairment caused by altitude, and to treat those
taken ill by the altitude.

11-6. Occupational Medicine, Sport Medicine, and Human Performance Optimization

a. Occupational Medicine. SOTG medical personnel must be alert for the presence
of occupational medical hazards and implement whatever preventive measures are
needed to reduce their risks. Prolonged exposure to environmental extremes, exposure
to high noise levels during small arms and explosives employment, and exposure to blast
during breaching operations are common risks for most SOTGs, and will require effective
mitigation measures to preserve their operational readiness.

b. Sport Medicine. SOF are routinely required to perform physically demanding

tasks during their operations, necessitating a heavy emphasis on physical training.
Rigorous training schedules and operational employment may result in a high incidence
of traumatic and overuse musculoskeletal injuries. If these injuries are not accurately
diagnosed and treated with the most effective therapeutic measures available,
unnecessarily long recovery periods may result, affecting both the SOTG’s operational
readiness and the long-term health of the personnel involved. To ensure that the best
possible care is obtained for these injuries, long-term SOTG deployments may involve a
proactive sport medicine programme that includes the in-theatre availability of a self-
contained rehabilitation facility and regular supervision by qualified personnel. In
addition, preventive measures should be taken whenever possible, such as early pre-
deployment screening for foot and body misalignment and the provision of customized
footwear and/or insoles.

c. Human Performance Optimization

(1) Sleep. Sleep deprivation adversely affects human performance, including

attention, working memory, logical reasoning, decision-making skills, hand and
eye coordination, and motor dexterity. Extended sleep deprivation also leads to
long-term physical and mental health problems. SOTG and SOTU commanders

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must ensure that proper sleep management plans are in place to prevent the
profound negative impact on performance and health associated with the lack of
sleep. This is especially important during periods involving a high operations
tempo, with SOTGs conducting back-to-back operations for prolonged time
periods.

(2) Nutrition and Hydration. The physical and mental demands imposed by
SOF missions and in-theatre training require adequate hydration and appropriate
nutritional habits and interventions so that under the most rigorous conditions
performance is optimized and health is preserved. Overall energy intake will be
dictated by an individual’s physical parameters (weight and age), the intensity of
the activities conducted, and environmental conditions (exposure to heat, cold,
altitude, or water immersion). The environmental conditions and the timing in
relation to mission execution will determine fluid intake requirements and the
optimal composition of macronutrients (carbohydrates, proteins, and fats) to
provide a balanced energy intake, as well as requirements for micronutrients
(vitamins and minerals) intake. SOTG commanders, assisted by their senior
medical officer, should ensure that their troops are fed in accordance with their
specific mission requirements, which may include arrangements to enable
standard combat rations to be modified or supplemented with commercial products
to meet these requirements when troops are in the field. Commanders
responsible for running mess facilities on SOF forward mounting bases (FMBs) or
FOBs must ensure that a suitable variety of food is available, taking into account
cultural differences between SOTGs from different nations in the case of
multinational mess customers.

(3) Stress

(a) Stress is a natural and adaptive reaction that allows individuals to

cope and respond to threats. Stress is also a major destroyer and disabler
of a warrior, and, therefore, is a primary concern for SOF operators and
leaders. Combat stress can be defined as the perception of an imminent
threat of serious injury or death (to oneself or someone else) under
conditions where response time is minimal.

(b) Anytime the brain perceives an imminent deadly force threat, the
body’s sympathetic nervous system (SNS) is activated involuntarily,
stimulating the immediate release of stress hormones, in proportion to the
threat. The SNS is recognized as the fight or flight system and prepares the
body for survival. The most noticeable and easily monitored physiological
change resulting from this SNS arousal is increased heart rate. From 115
beats per minute, fine motor skills deteriorate (due to vasoconstriction of the
little capillaries), affecting such actions as precision shooting, evasive or
pursuit driving, the execution of subject control techniques, and reloading.
Between 115 and 145 beats per minute, optimal survival and combat
performance levels are achieved for complex motor skills, visual reaction
time, and cognitive reaction time. From 145 beats per minute, complex
motor skills deteriorate, although the breakdown in performance may not
happen when the required skills have been practised extensively
beforehand. Above 175 beats per minute, gross motor skills (such as
running or charging) are at their highest performance level, but cognitive
processes deteriorate, more generalized vasoconstriction takes place,

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bladder and bowel control is lost, and perceptual distortions occur, which
may include auditory exclusion, loss of peripheral vision (tunnel vision), loss
of depth perception, and loss of near vision. In addition, in this condition,
the forebrain (that portion of the brain which makes us human) shuts down,
and the midbrain (the primitive portion of the brain which is indistinguishable
from that of an animal) takes over.

(c) As soon as the danger and the excitement are over, a

parasympathetic backlash occurs, which takes the form of an incredibly
powerful weariness and sleepiness on the part of the soldier.

(d) While the impact of stressors such as fear, uncertainty, physiological

arousal, horror, and physical deprivation in combat should never be
underestimated, there are two key, core stressors causing the psychological
toll associated with combat: the stress of facing close-range, interpersonal
aggression, and the stress associated with the responsibility to kill another
human at close range.

(e) The stress of facing close-range interpersonal, aggressive

confrontation is so great that, if endured for months on end without any
other means of respite or escape, combatants will inevitably become
psychiatric casualties.

(f) Even greater than the resistance to being the victim of close-range
aggression can be the combatant’s powerful aversion, which exists in the
midbrain, to inflicting aggression on other humans.

(g) Historically, armed forces have successfully implemented group

dynamics and realistic training methods to overcome this natural reluctance
to kill through the use of operant conditioning techniques, i.e. training that
prepares an organism to react to a specific stimulus with a specific voluntary
motor response. This repetitious, stimulus-response conditioning will reliably
influence an individual’s midbrain processing, preparing that individual to
respond with desired actions in highly stressful circumstances.

(h) Modern conditioning techniques that have been used successfully for
stress inoculation include the use of interactive three-dimensional targets,
realistic photographic targets, and actual force-on-force encounters against
live adversaries utilizing non-lethal (yet pain-inducing) projectile training
systems. Since SOF have to be able to participate in the (potentially)
psychologically toxic activity of deliberate close interpersonal aggression,
through the application of close quarters combat during DA missions,
commanders have a moral obligation to ensure that this type of force-on-
force training (which comes as close to actual combat as possible) is
mandatory during pre-deployment training.

(i) In addition, tactical breathing can be employed to control one’s level

of physiological arousal during high-stress situations, which, when done
properly, turns off the SNS for short periods of time, allowing operators to
stay in the optimal performance zone. The breathing technique (sometimes
referred to as autogenic breathing) consists simply of a deep belly breath:
breathing in for a four count, holding breath for a four count, breathing out

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for a four count, and holding for a four count, a process that is repeated
three times. One useful technique for making someone breathe (and gain
the calming benefits thereof) is to simply have them take a drink of water.

(j) These conditioning techniques that override such a natural

resistance carry an enormous potential for psychological backlash unless
appropriate measures are taken to help operators deal with their
experiences.

(k) In addition to restoration of a certain level of normalcy in post-mission

physiological requirements, the early debriefing after any traumatic action is
important to prevent later development of chronic post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). These debriefings may be conducted at SOTU level or
can be SOTG-led and include a review of lessons learned, while clarifying
the facts of the event by getting everyone to describe what they saw and
did. Misperceptions and misunderstandings, which are common when
operating under stress, due to perceptual distortions and loss of memory
are corrected in the process, and feelings and reactions are shared openly.
When a group is allowed to ventilate fears, frustrations, and feelings about a
traumatic event, and its individuals receive the support of their comrades,
the likelihood of PTSD is decreased.

(l) Post-deployment killing experience rationalization and acceptance

processes include cool-down periods with comrades while returning home,
the presence of mature, older comrades to seek guidance and support
from, and the unconditional acceptance and reassurance from peers,
superiors, friends, family, and society that what the operator did was
honourable and acceptable. The lack of a support structure after a
traumatic event is one of the most significant causal factors in PTSD.

(m) For SOF, these processes may be challenged by the sensitivity of

many special operations that will often preclude the sharing of detailed
experiences outside the unit. This emphasizes even more the importance
of internal measures, such as debriefings, as tools to prevent post-traumatic
stress problems following critical (traumatic) events.

(n) For the combatants in every major war throughout the past century,
there has been a greater probability of becoming a psychiatric casualty than
of being killed by the enemy. A psychiatric casualty is a casualty who is no
longer able to participate in combat due to mental (as opposed to physical)
debilitation. Psychiatric casualties seldom represent a permanent
debilitation, and with proper care can be returned back to duty, although
after combat, psychiatric casualties can be strongly predisposed toward the
more long-term and more permanently debilitating manifestation of PTSD.

(o) Combat stress reactions may present as a variety of dysfunctional

behaviours, but regardless of the manifestation of combat stress, treatment
involves simply removing operators from the combat environment,
reassurance of normality, rest, and proper nutrition. This treatment should
be done as close to their unit as possible and as quickly as possible, and
must be kept simple to emphasize the normality of the operators’
experience rather than be perceived as mental illness. The goal is to

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normalize versus pathologize behaviour and responses. The fact that their
symptoms are normal and the expectation that they will recover and rapidly
return to combat should be clearly communicated. Usually, they can be
returned to duty within 1 to 3 days. The successful brief, forward treatment
of an acute combat stress casualty reduces the risk of subsequent
development of PTSD, but operators may develop PTSD without having an
antecedent history of an acute combat stress reaction.

(p) PTSD is a psychological disorder resulting from a traumatic event.

PTSD manifests itself in persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event,
numbing of emotional responsiveness, and persistent symptoms of
increased arousal, resulting in clinically significant distress or impairment in
social and occupational functioning. There is often a long delay between
the traumatic event and the manifestation of PTSD. PTSD has been
strongly linked with greatly increased divorce rates, increased incidence of
alcohol and drug abuse, and increased suicide rates, but seldom results in
violent criminal acts, as the key safeguard in this process appears to be the
discipline that the soldier acquires during military training. The operator
must understand that re-experiencing the event is normal, and that the path
to healing is to de-link the memory from the emotions. Trying to not think
about the incident may lead to mental illness. Breathing can help with
learning to de-link the memory from the emotions.

(q) Combat stress has the potential to disable the most courageous
operator, and recent findings suggest that the incidence of PTSD may be
significantly higher in SOF as compared to conventional forces, probably
due to a higher frequency of exposure to close-quarters combat, and a high
operations tempo with minimal decompression time between individual
missions and combat tours.

(r) Commanders should ensure that operators receive mental health

training and, when required, are encouraged to ask for mental health
support. It takes courage for SOF operators to ask for mental health
support, and it must be stressed that mental health problems are seen as
common combat injuries and not as a character flaw. Prevention of combat
stress casualties is primarily a command responsibility but medical support
personnel play a critical role. Commanders, medical personnel, and
operators should expect the help to help. Hundreds of thousands of PTSD
cases have been cured in western forces in the past decade, and the
treatment gets better every year. Of course medical technology moves on,
and one important ingredient in recovering from PTSD is to believe that the
help can help.

11-7. Summary. Shoot, move, communicate, and survive. Medical support to the SOTG is
crucial in maintaining the force as well as supporting operations in any operational environment.
SOF medical planning and support concerns must include preventive medicine, HNS, Role 1
and Role 2 medical support, and emergency evacuation planning. Reacting quickly and
positively to operational stress injuries must also be a medical concern of the SOTG.

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CHAPTER 12 – PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT

12-1. Introduction. Many NATO nations have limited SOF resources. Care must be taken to
ensure NATO has sufficient land and maritime SOTGs to deploy on a moment’s notice.
Effective management of personnel and equipment, combined with realistic training and
operational cycles, is vital to ensure that operations tempo is achieved without sacrificing what
makes SOF special ‒ its people. This chapter focuses on some of the best practices
associated with preparing the SOTG for the pre-deployment and redeployment processes. It
must be emphasized that pre-deployment and redeployment processes are national
responsibilities that are normally undertaken in liaison with the deploying nations’ logistics
organizations. NATO unit readiness standards and categories of force readiness are discussed
in Chapter 5 of AFS Volume X, Special Operations Forces. Furthermore, SOF evaluation
requirements and procedures are outlined in Part III of AFS Volume XI, Special Operations
Forces Headquarters and Unit Evaluations. Both volumes should be read and understood in
conjunction with this chapter.

12-2. Pre-deployment Planning

a. The nature of SOF does not always allow for early mission notification and a
lengthy pre-deployment preparation period. Therefore, it is prudent for all SOF
organizations to maintain a high state of readiness even during an extended period of low
operations tempo. The request for special operations capability can come at any time,
and NATO SOF will likely be in high demand for the foreseeable future. Maintaining a
high state of readiness can be costly and resource intensive, and might be beyond a
nation’s economic capability. This is especially true when it involves training land and
maritime SOF operators and maintaining their equipment. It may be necessary for a
nation to identify which national SOF units will maintain a high state of readiness and
which national SOF units will use hasty training or just-in-time training to get up to the
required level of proficiency before deploying.

Important Note. It is widely understood that a nation cannot

mass produce SOF once they have been notified of a potential
mission or in a time of crisis. Therefore, a nation’s SOF
should have a robust training and retraining capability to keep
up with mission demand or any surge in mission support
requirements.

b. One important factor in mission success is providing the force with the right tools.
To be successful, the force must be physically and mentally prepared to execute the
mission. This preparation starts with the individual military member’s health and well-
being. Part of every planning process is to gain SA. This includes identifying and
understanding the environment the military member will be working in and what
preventive measures can be taken to limit the risk to the health of the force. One
example to consider when examining the threats to the force can be things indigenous to
the environment, like a common disease such as malaria, or extreme climatic conditions,
such as rain forest, high altitude/mountainous terrain, desert, or artic environments. It
also includes an analysis of what equipment will be needed in this environment and how
the environment will affect the performance of the equipment, such as how the desert
impacts vehicle and weapon systems performance. Finally, COM SOTG should consider
what training requirements or opportunities are available prior to the deployment.
Mission preparedness, repetition, and rehearsal are key to successful SOF operations.

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Important Note. Annual requirements such as physicals,

dental exams, and fitness tests should be completed prior to
deployment and remain current for the duration of the
deployment. There should be no excuse for an SOTG
member becoming ineffective due to the lapse of an annual
requirement while deployed.

c. Pre-deployment preparation has been broken down into three separate categories
to consider when preparing the force: personnel, equipment, and training.30

(1) Personnel. The most important part of any SOF mission is the personnel.
Preservation of the force should be a primary goal of any commander. In order to
properly protect the force, COM SOTG should consider some of the following
factors:

(a) Disease Control. No preventive programme can guarantee 100%

success against the environmental disease threat. However, significant
disease outbreaks can be mitigated by educating the force on the local area
environmental threats. Providing immunization injections and access to
preventive medication are excellent protective measures.

Important Note. Each nation will have different views on

which immunization injections and medication are authorized
for the perceived environmental threat. COM SOTG, if
operating in a multinational environment, should be aware of
the national requirements and medical caveats that are in
place within the SOTG force. Further, medical direction may
be provided from COM SOCC. The SOCC MEDAD is critical
during operational planning at JTF HQ and is the point of
contact for any medical direction and guidance on operational-
level medical issues.

(b) Personal/Force Protection. Troops cannot operate effectively if

they are impaired and distracted by the climatic conditions. They must have
proper protection from the environment, including personal
clothing/uniforms that are properly suited for the conditions, such as
extreme cold-weather gear for an arctic environment or lightweight summer
uniforms for a desert environment. FP also includes working and
accommodation areas; SOTG personnel need a place for shelter from the
elements during the workday and to rest after work. This may include items
such as air conditioned or heated tents and mosquito netting for cots.

(c) Mental Health Preparations. On top of the busy pre-deployment

training schedules, SOTG personnel should be given adequate time for
personal preparations to ensure their families are well taken care of during
their deployment.

30For additional pre-deployment logistical information and considerations, see Chapter 4 of ALP-4.2(A), Land
Forces Logistic Doctrine, dated 4 Feb 10.

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(2) Equipment

(a) COM SOTG needs to consider what equipment the SOTG is bringing
to the deployed location and whether the equipment is suitable for the
environment in its current configuration. For example, if the AOR is in
desert or very arid terrain and operations under intense dust or sandstorms
are anticipated, vehicles and weapons fire control systems and optics
(electro-optics/infrared) may need to be modified to cope with the harsh
conditions. Another example is the harsh maritime conditions in the north
and south Atlantic during the fall and winter months. Special operations
surface and subsurface watercraft and dive equipment are susceptible to
extreme icing in cold seawater and may need to be modified to operate in
this cold, wet environment. Technical, working, and living accommodation
support equipment will also require modification to the environment.

(b) Within the framework of the CPOE, the J2 branch with the help of
meteorology has the critical role of assessing the environment, including
weather/climate, to help the operations staff make the right conclusions for
equipment and materiel.

(c) The SOTG should also consider what vehicle and equipment
maintenance inspections will expire during the deployment and decide
whether to do the maintenance prior to deployment. For long-term
maintenance delays, an extension in accordance with the national process
will be required. COM SOTG will need to be aware of the national process
in order to manage the SOTG capabilities accordingly.

(d) In other cases, specific equipment may be needed to execute the

mission. For instance, does the SOTG have the capability to communicate
with the other SOTGs or SOATGs in the AOR? If not, new communication
equipment may be needed or the existing equipment may need to be
modified to meet the requirement. In all cases, additional training may be
required to support the new requirements. This training will allow the
operators or support personnel to become comfortable and proficient with
using the equipment prior to deployment. Finally, as discussed in Chapter
10, the SOTG should be prepared to bring a minimum of 30 days’ worth of
supplies, equipment, and spare parts on initial deployment into the AOR.

(3) Training. COM SOTG cannot rely on being able to conduct or complete
required training events in the deployed location due to the possible threat, high
operations tempo, or high demand on limited assets. Therefore, it is
recommended that all required training be completed prior to deployment.
Training includes both individual training requirements and collective training
events. At times, the collective training events require the SOTG to rehearse or
validate a capability. Training is divided into two separate categories: individual
training and collective training.

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(a) Individual Training

1/ Operator Training

a/ For land and maritime SOF operators, all specialized

vehicles, watercraft, equipment, and weapons systems
qualification training, requalification training, evaluations, and
proficiency training should be completed prior to deployment.
Each operator should deploy fully qualified and current in their
individual specialities (parachute HAHO/HALO,
communications, sniper, breacher, explosives, assault diver,
etc.) for any anticipated mission profile. It is also important to
note that just being qualified in a mission does not necessarily
mean the individual operator is proficient in that mission. As
discussed earlier, mission preparedness, repetition, and
rehearsal are essential to successful SOF operations.

Important Note. Operator mission qualification, proficiency

training, evaluation, and mission certification are a national
responsibility. COM SOTG, if operating in a multinational
environment, should be aware of the national requirements to
effectively manage the SOTG force. Additionally, multinational
collaboration may require complementing training and
certification, for example, working with U.S. AC-130s in ISAF
to maximize SOTG effectiveness.

b/ If possible, all annual operator training requirements

should also be completed prior to deployment. If training
cannot be completed prior to departure, COM SOTG may
seek a waiver to the training requirement in accordance with
the individual’s national guidance and procedures. The waiver
should be valid for the anticipated duration of the deployment.
Finally, the SOTG should examine the deployment
environment and review mission planning considerations such
as fuel availability, enemy threats (if applicable), friendly force
locations, alternate landing areas such as airports or FOBs,
terrain features, weather considerations, and vehicle,
watercraft, and aircraft performance considerations and
limitations.

Important Note. If possible, the SOTG should conduct a

mass pre-deployment briefing. This briefing should cover
topics such as mission objective, environmental
considerations, threats, safety, SOPs, intelligence, and aircraft
performance considerations and limitations.

2/ Non-operator or General Force Training. Every nation has

training requirements for the general force that are applicable to all
troops regardless of occupational specialty. Pre-deployment train-up
is the ideal time to review and practise previously acquired skills such

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as weapons training; first aid; cardiopulmonary resuscitation;

survival, escape/evasion, resistance, and extraction training; CBRN
training; or firefighting techniques. This is also an opportunity to
introduce new training that is more specific to the deployed
environment. For instance, if it is a hostile environment, this is an
excellent opportunity to train the force on treating combat-related
wounds, such as gunshot wounds, shrapnel wounds, complicated
fractures, head wounds, and burns.

3/ Equipment. All personnel should be qualified to operate and

be familiar with the equipment they will be bringing with them or
anticipate using during the deployment. Whenever possible, the
SOTG should conduct interoperability and compatibility checks on all
equipment with the organizations the SOTG will be supporting,
commanding, or working with in the AOR, especially the various
watercraft within the SOBTG or the various FW and RW aircraft
found within the SOATG. These checks can identify potential
problems when working with other organizations and allow the SOTG
to correct any deficiencies prior to deployment into the AOR. This is
extremely important with regards to communication and battle
monitoring equipment for maintaining C2 capabilities.

(b) Collective Training. Whenever possible, SOF that anticipate

working in operations together should schedule an opportunity to train
together to familiarize themselves with the other organization or
organizations’ capabilities and operating procedures. These training
opportunities can be built into regularly scheduled NATO exercises or
specifically scheduled in anticipation of deploying to support an operation
together. If possible, the training exercise environment and scenario should
be similar to the deployment location to give the SOTGs, SOATGs, and
other organization(s) a realistic rehearsal of the challenges they will be
dealing with while deployed. Some of the more important capabilities that
should be exercised or rehearsed are C2; interface with the SOCC, SOAC,
and the theatre mission planning cycles (air tasking, joint targeting,
intelligence, F3EAD); communication equipment compatibility and
capability; aircraft sortie generation; reconstitution of aircraft post-battle
damage; aircrew qualifications versus requirements (Does the SOTG have
the right operator/vehicle/watercraft capability?); medical capability and
capacity; and the deployment and redeployment logistic support
requirements. These exercises can also be used for national certification
and validation, as well as being a suitable pre-deployment training vehicle.
NATO runs the SWORD series of NRF exercises where the NRF SOCC HQ
exercises and certifies its assigned SOTGs.

Best Practice. Remember, habitual rehearsal and mission

repetition with the SOTG are key to mission success, and the
SOTG should take advantage of these training opportunities.

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12-3. Redeployment

a. Returning from a deployment is primarily a logistics operation and handled by the

SOTG S4 in coordination with the SOCC J4. Redeployment planning should start as
soon as the deployment phase is complete to ensure a smooth and efficient
redeployment phase. This is even more important if a RIP is anticipated with another
SOTG taking over the mission. The RIP plan will have to consider the SOTG’s transition
period and the impact this transition time will have on facilities, housing, flight line
operations, and aircraft parking considerations. There will also be an impact on the daily
sustainment operations, such as the need for more food and water to feed the personnel,
and the impact on facilities such as shower facilities, latrines, and laundry facilities, and
recreation facilities such as the base gymnasium. These are just some of the
considerations for redeployment or RIP operations.31

b. When the SOTG is back in garrison, the mission priority should be reconstitution of
the force. Reconstitution will be driven by the national policies of the SOTG in regards to
personnel taking time off and when they are required back at work. Once the SOTG is
back to full manning, the focus should be on what training requirements were waived (if
any), what maintenance inspections were delayed (if any), and how to get the members
and equipment back to an acceptable readiness state as quickly as possible.

c. Upon redeployment, time and effort must be included to ensure successful

reintegration of SOF personnel into society and family life after operating in extremely harsh
environments, enduring operations tempos that can adversely affect the strongest operator.
Hand in hand with physical injuries, signs of operational stress injuries must be monitored.

12-4. Summary. Ensuring the SOTG is ready to conduct operations is the responsibility of
COM SOTG. Maintaining SOF at a high state of readiness is costly and manpower intensive
but a necessary sacrifice to be able to respond to the nations’ and NATO’s needs at a moment’s
notice.

31 For additional redeployment logistical information and considerations, see Chapter 12 of ALP-4.2(A).

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ANNEX A TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. NATO SOF TCNs must ensure, before committing an SOTG to NATO for an Article 5
operation or NA5CRO, that the minimum capability requirements for operating in a joint NATO
environment are followed and adhered to. National training and resourcing should be tailored to
ensure that these capabilities are met. Prior to deploying as part of a NATO SOCC, if
requested, the NSHQ will send a team of SMEs to support national or multinational evaluations
in accordance with AFS Volume XI, Special Operations Forces Headquarters and Unit
Evaluations.

2. The following appendices provide the SOTG Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and
Capability Statements for both land and maritime task groups. Every nation should make every
effort to ensure that their SOTGs meet these capability requirements before taking part in a
NATO SOCC operation.

3. This annex also provides the suggested capability requirements for subordinate SOTUs
in both the land and maritime environments. While the task unit standards are not yet official,
they provide a suggested way forward for those nations new to NATO and still developing their
SOTG.

APPENDICES:

1. Special Operations Land Task Group Capability Requirements

2. Special Operations Maritime Task Group Capability Requirements
3. Special Operations Land Task Unit Capability Requirements
4. Special Operations Maritime Task Unit Capability Requirements

A-1
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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

SPECIAL OPERATIONS LAND TASK GROUP CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Special Operations Land Task Group Level 1

a. General. Capable of conducting the essential staff area functions; commanding

and controlling subordinate SOTUs, combat support, and CSS units; deploying in support
of joint NATO operations in accordance with established deployment (10 days) timelines
with all classes of supply, and establishing liaison element on the appropriate level.

b. Military Assistance. Capable of providing SOF partner and liaison teams to train
and advise indigenous HN security forces.

c. Special Reconnaissance. Capable of conducting environmental reconnaissance,

threat assessment, target assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance for extended
periods with minimal external support, conducting optical surveillance of targets by day
and night and in adverse weather conditions, and conducting RECCE/establishing
landing sites.

d. Direct Action. Capable of conducting raids, ambushes, and direct assaults that
involve attacking critical and crucial targets, interdicting LOCs or other target systems,
capturing designated personnel or materiel, and seizing, destroying, or neutralizing
adversary facilities or capabilities.

2. Special Operations Land Task Group Level 2

a. General. As a prerequisite to reaching Level 2, the minimum capabilities of Level

1 must be accomplished. Capable of employing, as a minimum, the key enablers such
as air/aviation, joint fires, ISR, and TEO/biometrics capabilities placed in direct support
and/or attached to the SOLTG.

b. Military Assistance. Capable of providing SOF partner and liaison teams to train,
advise, and equip indigenous HN security forces.

c. Special Reconnaissance. Capable of conducting surveillance of a target using

remote sensors and optics and conducting surveillance of a target using persistent ISR
(e.g. UAVs).

d. Direct Action. Capable of conducting air terminal control tasks to NATO

standards and directing terminal guidance control of PGM.

3. Special Operations Land Task Group Level 3

a. General. As a prerequisite to reaching Level 3, the minimum capabilities of Level

2 must be accomplished. Capable of employing organic air/aviation, ISR assets, and
TEO/biometrics capabilities.

b. Military Assistance. Capable of providing SOF partner and liaison teams to train,
advise, equip, and support indigenous HN security forces.

A-1-1
NSHQ 80-003

c. Special Reconnaissance. Capable of conducting CBRN RECCE using

accredited metering system and conducting SIGINT gathering operations.

d. Direct Action. Capable of conducting recovery operations, precision destruction

operations, squadron- and/or company-level manoeuvre operations using integral tactical
mobility and support weapons.

A-1-2
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MARITIME TASK GROUP CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Special Operations Maritime Task Group Level 1

a. General. Capable of conducting the essential staff area functions; commanding

and controlling subordinate SOTUs, CS, and CSS units; deploying in support of joint
NATO operations in accordance with established deployment (10 days) timelines with all
classes of supply; and establishing liaison element on the appropriate level.

b. Military Assistance. Capable of providing SOF partner and liaison teams to train
and advise indigenous HN security forces.

c. Special Reconnaissance. Capable of conducting overt, covert, and discreet

(underwater delivery) SR missions (e.g. over the beach, over the horizon, beach
obstacle, and EOD RECCE) using handheld equipment, in the coastal, riverine, and
maritime environments by air, land, or sea, including underwater operations.

d. Direct Action. Capable of conducting raids, ambushes, and direct assaults in the
coastal, riverine, and maritime environments, and opposed boarding operations in case
of non-compliance with internationally agreed shipping procedures, using low
prominence techniques by air, land, or sea, including underwater operations.

2. Special Operations Maritime Task Group Level 2

a. General. As a prerequisite to reaching Level 2, the minimum capabilities of Level

1 must be accomplished. Capable of employing, as a minimum, the key enablers such
as air/aviation, joint fires, ISR, and TEO/biometrics capabilities placed in direct support
and/or attached to the SOMTG.

b. Military Assistance. Capable of providing SOF partner and liaison teams to train,
advise, and equip indigenous HN security forces.

c. Special Reconnaissance. Capable of conducting amphibious advance force

reconnaissance using technical systems and profile recorders based on advanced
differential GPS.

d. Direct Action. Capable of conducting combat swimming operations using closed-

circuit breathing apparatus with man-pack explosive devices employing delayed fuse
systems, and conducting swimming operations using swimmer delivery systems to
enhance range and weapon payloads.

3. Special Operations Maritime Task Group Level 3

a. General. As a prerequisite to reaching Level 3, the minimum capabilities of Level

2 must be accomplished. Capable of employing organic air/aviation, ISR assets, and
TEO/biometrics capabilities.

A-2-1
NSHQ 80-003

b. Military Assistance. Capable of providing SOF partner and liaison teams to train,
advise, equip, and support indigenous HN security forces.

c. Special Reconnaissance. Capable of conducting amphibious advance force

RECCE, either remotely or without using surface swimming, using technical systems
based on advanced differential GPS or inertial navigation systems.

d. Direct Action. Capable of conducting offensive maritime attack/interdiction

operations from fast attack craft with support weapons and/or stand-off weapon systems.

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX A TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

SPECIAL OPERATIONS LAND TASK UNIT CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. General. National land-capable SOTU can conduct special operations (MA, SR, and
DA) across the full operational spectrum. SOLTUs must deploy with a minimum of 10 days of
all classes of supply and necessary life support.

a. Military Assistance. SOF may be required to provide MA to friendly or Allied

forces. This can be provided directly or indirectly to a designated force or to an
indigenous military or paramilitary force to protect their society. MA tasks can include:

(1) Training, equipping, supporting, and, if necessary, directing friendly forces

to exploit opposing forces’ political, military, economic, or psychological
weaknesses.

(2) Training, advising, and assisting HN military and paramilitary forces so that
they can unilaterally assume responsibility for controlling their internal stability.

(3) Supporting and advising other members of the Alliance.

(4) Providing immediate technical advice and assistance during crisis or

disaster situations.

(5) Facilitating a coordinated multinational approach to conflict resolution

through liaison teams.

b. Special Reconnaissance. SR is a human intelligence function that places eyes

on target in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. SOF may conduct these tasks
unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. SOF may use advanced
reconnaissance and surveillance techniques or equipment, and/or sophisticated covert or
discreet collection methods. SR tasks may include:

(1) Area assessment.

(2) Reconnaissance and surveillance in advance of operations by conventional

forces.

(3) Target acquisition.

(4) Collecting/reporting critical information about the movement and intent of

opposing forces in or adjacent to an AOO.

(5) Identification of location and conducting surveillance of critical or sensitive

facilities in hostile or denied territory.

(6) Ability to conduct surveillance of TAIs, where the enemy is thought to be,
and NAIs, where IRs can be gathered, using UAVs.

(7) Conducting CBRN RECCE using accredited metering systems.

A-3-1
NSHQ 80-003

(8) Conducting SIGINT gathering operations.

(9) Ability to obtain information by using cross-cultural and linguistic capabilities

by local people.

c. Direct Action. DA operations are normally limited in scope and duration, and
usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the objective area. SOF may conduct
these tasks unilaterally or in conjunction with conventional operations. These actions are
designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive operations of
operational significance. DA tasks may include:

(1) Attack on critical targets (materiel or personnel).

(2) Interdiction of critical LOCs or other target systems.

(3) Location/capture/recovery of designated personnel or materiel.

(4) Seizure/destruction/neutralization of critical facilities/equipment.

(5) Conducting DA against critical targets identified within the infrastructure of

opposing forces.

(6) Conducting air terminal attack.

(7) Direct terminal guidance control of PGM.

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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX A TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MARITIME TASK UNIT CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. General. National maritime-capable SOTU can conduct special operations (MA, SR, and
DA) across the full operational spectrum. SOMTUs must deploy with a minimum of 10 days of
all classes of supply and necessary life support. SOMTUs possess special waterborne
infiltration/exfiltration equipment and capabilities.

a. Military Assistance. All MA land capabilities.

b. Special Reconnaissance. The SOMTU will normally have the full SR land
capabilities. In addition, the SOMTU will have the following capabilities:

(1) Conduct optical surveillance of TAIs and NAIs and

reconnaissance/establish landing sites and coordination points.

(2) Conduct amphibious advance force RECCE using handheld equipment on

GPS datum.

(3) Conduct beach obstacle RECCE.

(4) Conduct amphibious advance force RECCE using technical systems.

(5) Conduct amphibious advance force RECCE, either remotely or without

using surface swimming and technical systems.

c. Direct Action. All DA land capabilities plus:

(1) Conduct offensive operations using watercraft. Conduct combat swimming

operations using closed-circuit breathing apparatus.

(2) Conduct combat swimming operations using swimmer delivery systems to

enhance range and weapon payloads.

(3) Conduct offensive maritime attack/interdiction operations from fast attack

craft with support weapons and/or stand-off weapon systems.

(4) Specialized breaching capabilities required for MSOs, such as high speed
torches and gas operated grinders for cutting through steel hatches and
bulkheads.

A-4-1
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ANNEX B TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP HEADQUARTERS POSITION FUNCTIONS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Command Staff. The command staff is normally composed of COM SOTG and his
command group: deputy commander, executive officer, senior enlisted advisor, and an
information management specialist. Within the command staff, COM SOTG and his staff
coordinate and direct the daily activities of the entire SOTG organization; approve actions,
orders, and plans as authorized by the SOCC; and ensure SOTG decisions and concepts are
implemented by directing and assigning staff responsibilities.

2. Special Staff. The commander is usually supported by several special staff officers who
provide him advice on subject matter that the rest of his staff members are unlikely to be familiar
with. Key special staff members are typically:

a. Legal Advisor. The LEGAD employs legal expertise and resources to control and
exploit the legal environment across the full spectrum of operational missions. LEGADs
also provide legal counsel to the SOTG and the support staff. Additionally, the LEGAD
provides expertise and advice on issues such as HNS, acquisition and cross-servicing
agreements, international agreements, status of forces agreements, legal basis for
operations, command structure, claims, support to civilian agencies, contract law, fiscal
law, and basic legal assistance and civil law issues. The LEGAD also advises COM
SOTG on LOAC and ROE issues.

b. Public Information Officer. The public information officer (PIO) provides

accurate, timely, and unclassified information about operations to the public and military
personnel. Additionally, the PIO enables operations by mitigating against political
constraints on operations arising from false or misleading information or enemy
propaganda. Besides focusing on counterpropaganda, the PIO must also be prepared to
contend with various operational scenarios such as combat and non-combat losses,
publicized POW/missing in action situations, collateral damage events, and fratricide.

c. Political Advisor. The political advisor (POLAD) provides analysis and advice to
COM SOTG on political perspectives and foreign policy positions on political-military
issues. The POLAD conducts research and analysis on potential employment of NATO
forces in the AOR and is responsible for contact with countries in the AOR on matters of
political interest. The POLAD serves as the focal point for resolution of political-military
issues impacting air operations.

d. Medical Advisor. The MEDAD provides expert advice to COM SOTG and staff
for all medical support issues. The MEDAD plans, initiates, and helps direct the
execution of medical activities. The MEDAD reviews, recommends changes, and assists
in interpreting medical regulations, procedures, equipment lists, guides, manuals, and
other matters pertaining to all areas of medical/clinical interest in support of the entire
SOTG staff.

3. Personnel and Administration (S1). The S1 is the principal staff assistant to COM
SOTG on all manpower and personnel management issues. The S1 is responsible for
executing personnel policies, implementing procedures as required, and supervising the

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NSHQ 80-003

administrative requirements for all SOTG personnel. The S1 plans officer is responsible for the
overall management of future manning requirements in support of the SOTG SOF mission.
Finally, the S1 personnel NCO supports all S1 duties, to include monitoring SOTU strengths
and accountability by means of daily personnel status reports; maintaining records to support
recommendations for unit awards/decorations; and assisting the S1 director in identifying
available manpower resources in support of the SOTG mission and goals.

4. Intelligence (S2). The S2 is the principal staff assistant to COM SOTG for providing
intelligence on enemy locations, activities, and capabilities, and probable enemy COAs. The S2
has overall authority and responsibility for the ISR processes within the SOTG, provides
intelligence support to SOATUs within the assigned AOO, and serves as the principal advisor to
the S3 on all ISR architecture and support requirements. Additionally, the S2 coordinates
intelligence and information collection and analysis to support COM SOTG and the SOCC. The
S2 section also provides LOs to the SOCC and intelligence staff, as required.

a. Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management Officer.

Directly responsible for the CCIR process and provides a management function that
enables the timely flow of intelligence by coordinating the information collection effort and
facilitating the provision of intelligence. The CCIRM officer has two specific duties: IRs
management and collection coordination.

b. Intelligence Database Assistant. The intelligence database assistant is

responsible for the RFI process with each SOTU. This includes the collection and
subsequent coordination for each RFI.

c. Targeting Officer. The targeting officer leads, supervises, coordinates, and

conducts the targeting process in support of COM SOTG’s mission objectives. The
targeting officer also coordinates the deployment and employment of targeting personnel
and equipment, including those assigned to specific SOTUs.

d. Intelligence Officer. Intelligence officers observe threat levels, gain information

through observing the AOR, and direct security operations and other activities that
involve ISR operations. The intelligence officer collects and reports significant findings to
the S2 director in support of the overall SOTG mission. The intelligence officer also
supports all SOTUs with valuable ISR information, as required.

e. Meteorological and Oceanographic Analyst. The meteorological and

oceanographic (METOC) analyst collects, tailors, and reports weather information to
meet the short-, medium-, and long-range mission needs of the SOTG and subordinate
units. In addition, the METOC analyst evaluates the impact of terrestrial, oceanographic,
and space weather on weapons, weapon systems, and operations for both friendly and
enemy forces.

5. Operations (S3). The S3 serves as the principal staff assistant to COM SOTG in the
direction and control of all assigned and attached NATO SOTU forces. The S3 ensures all units
are mission ready and capable of performing tasked operational missions. This includes
monitoring unit deployments and bed down locations, combat readiness, mission rehearsals,
FP, and mission execution.

a. Current Operations Analyst. The current operations analyst is the primary staff
officer with the S3 staff responsible for the collection of mission and operations

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information provided to the SOTG by the SOCC and SOTUs. The current operations
analyst also manages and maintains the S3 logbook.

b. Targeting Officer. The targeting officer monitors execution of the current day’s
ATO and coordinates with the SOCC’s targeting cell to provide direct support to the
SOTU’s deliberate, dynamic, and TST mission processes. The officer coordinates with
the S2 and nominates targets to the SOCC with the desired kinetic and/or non-kinetic
effects. The officer will also likely be dual-hatted as the ISR SME and will provide
oversight, planning, and coordination of ISR operational missions in direct support of the
S3. The S3 liaison works closely with S2 intelligence officers to ensure ISR targets are
effectively and safely prosecuted in direct support of the SOTUs.

c. Joint Fires Officer. The joint fires officer oversees the application of joint fire
support, artillery, rockets, and offensive operations in support of AOR operations.
Responsibilities include coordinating and synchronizing all aspects of operational fires
with CCs, major subordinate commands, and multinational forces.

d. Information Operations Coordinator. The Info Ops coordinator conducts and

coordinates the Info Ops objectives as laid out by the higher HQs and ensures that the
SOTG and SOTUs are supporting the current Info Ops objectives and messages within
the conventional BSO AOO.

e. S35 Future Operations Officer. The future operations officer is directly

responsible to the S3 director for the planning, allocation, and tasking of SOTUs in
accordance with upper echelon guidance. The specific responsibilities of the future
operations officer should include the production, revision, and dissemination of detailed
future plans to be included in the SOCC battle rhythm so that air, ISR, and other enablers
are requested through the respective JTF HQ working groups, meetings, and boards.

f. S35 Special Operations Forces Land Planner. The SOF land planner should be
an army officer supporting the SOTG with information on army operations, tactics, and
equipment. Specific responsibilities include briefing the S3 director on all land issues,
coordinating with all SOTUs, monitoring the ground order of battle (ORBAT), assisting
and planning land airlift requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.

g. S35 Special Operations Forces Maritime Planner. The SOF maritime planner
supports the SOTG S3 in integrating naval air, naval fires, and amphibious operations
into SOTU operations. Specific responsibilities include briefing the S3 director on all
maritime issues, coordinating with all SOTUs, monitoring the maritime ORBAT, assisting
and planning requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.

h. S35 Special Operations Forces Aviation Planner. The SOF aviation planner
supports the SOTG S3 in integrating air and joint fires operations into SOTU missions.
Specific responsibilities include briefing the S3 director on all aviation issues,
coordinating with all SOTUs, monitoring the aviation ORBAT, assisting and planning
requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.

6. Logistics (S4). The director of logistics is the principal staff assistant to COM SOTG for
AOR implementation of combat support capabilities and processes. This encompasses the
coordination and supervision of force bed down, transportation, supply, maintenance, logistics
plans and programmes, and related combat support activities for the SOTUs. In general, the S4
implements guidance and policy to ensure effective logistics support to all SOTU forces. The

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S4 director also advises the commander concerning combat support issues that affect the
accomplishment of the SOTG mission.

a. Operations Officer. The role of the logistics operations officer is to support

SOTG operations with C2 during logistical movements. The operations officer also
directs distribution management operations, to include managing airlift distribution
functions, such as receiving, inspecting, tracing, tracking, packaging, and shipping of
supplies, equipment, and war-readiness spares.

b. Plans Officer. Responsible for logistics pipeline management and time-sensitive

delivery of materiel in support of SOTG mission requirements. Integrates agile combat
support and contingency planning efforts into the overall logistics plan in direct support of
the SOTUs.

7. Plans (S5). The director of plans and requirements serves as the principal staff assistant
to COM SOTG for all consolidated planning functions. In coordination with the S4, the S5
conducts comprehensive force-level movement and execution planning for the SOTUs. This
involves preparation and subsequent refinement of the force flow, bed down, and redeployment
of SOTG and SOTU personnel. The S5 may perform long-range theatre engagement
(deliberate planning) that falls outside of the SOTG’s operational focus. Close coordination
must occur between the S5 and the SOCC to ensure planning efforts are complementary.

a. Land Plans Officer. The SOF land planner should be an army officer supporting
the SOTG with information on army operations, tactics, and equipment in support of
future operations. Specific responsibilities include briefing the S5 director on all land
issues, coordinating with all SOTUs, monitoring the ground ORBAT, assisting and
planning land airlift requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.

b. Maritime Plans Officer. The SOF maritime planner supports the SOTG S5 in
integrating naval air, naval fires, and amphibious operations into future SOTU operations.
Specific responsibilities include briefing the S5 director on all maritime issues,
coordinating with all SOTUs, monitoring the maritime ORBAT, assisting and planning
requirements, and interfacing with intelligence teams.

c. Aviation Plans Officer. The SOF aviation planner supports the SOTG S5 in
integrating air and joint fires future operations in support of SOTU missions. Specific
responsibilities include briefing the S5 director on all aviation issues, coordinating with all
SOTUs, monitoring the aviation ORBAT, assisting and planning requirements, and
interfacing with intelligence teams.

8. Communications Directorate (S6). The director of communications is the principal staff

assistant to COM SOTG for communications, electronics, and automated AIS. This includes
establishing AOR communications and automated systems architecture to support operational
and mission requirements. Key responsibilities of the S6 may include coordination of all
communications and information functions of the SOTG, maintaining liaison with
communications and information functions with other components, and supporting SOATU
mission requirements.

a. Communications Officer. The communications officer is part of COM SOTG’s

support staff and is someone who has specific working knowledge of the SOF mission.
The communications officer has the following responsibilities: acts as the single focal
point for SOTG communications problems and resolutions; maintains display systems to

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track the status of all links, circuits, systems, and information networks; continuously
tracks system and circuit status, and advises the S6 director on any system outages; and
receives and consolidates reports from attached, assigned, and/or subordinate units for
transmittal to higher HQs.

b. Communications Plans Officer. The communications plans officer is the chief of

future SOTG communications planning and is responsible to the S6 director for oversight
of SOATU communications planning support. The communications plans officer has the
following responsibilities: acts as the single focal point for AOC communications
planning activities, coordinates new AOC communications requirements with the S6
director, and supports SOATUs to determine priority of activation and restoration of
systems.

9. Training and Lessons Learned Directorate (S7). Primarily responsible for developing
in-theatre training plans and capturing lessons learned. If the SOTG is tasked with an MA
mission, such as building or development of a HN security force, the S7 will also assist the S3
and S4 with the development of the partner force training, assist, and advise plans. This will
include a timeline for training, milestones to be achieved, funding issues, procurement of
equipment, etc. The S7 would likely be reinforced with several other staff officers or senior
NCOs, depending on the level of MA being conducted.

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ANNEX C TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP BATTLE RHYTHM

This figure provides a graphic overview of a typical SOTG battle rhythm.

Figure C-1. SOTG Battle Rhythm

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C-2
NSHQ 80-003

ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

BATTLE DRILLS

1. Battle drills are a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate planning
and decision-making process. The overall aim is the provision of all means and capabilities
required by the SOTG to mitigate a crisis, to prevent casualties, or to exploit an opportunity to
ensure or facilitate mission success. Characteristics of battle drills are:

a. They require minimal leader orders to accomplish and are standardized.

b. They are sequential actions that are vital to success in combat or critical to
preserving life.

c. They are trained responses to deteriorating situations, enemy actions, or leader’s

orders.

d. They represent mental steps followed by specific and already designated actions
to support mission execution or prevent mission failure.

e. They identify key actions that leaders and staff must perform quickly.

f. They provide for a smooth transition from one activity to another, often supported
by additional assets or capabilities as required or available.

g. They require the full understanding of each individual and leader and continual
practise.

2. SOTGs are national SOF; therefore, it is their responsibility to develop the appropriate
organic battle drills. Nevertheless, SOTG personnel must be aware that they have to tie into
SOCC battle drills as these are coordinated with higher and lateral HQs as well. This
emphasizes the need for timely coordination and adaption to ensure effective collaboration
between the SOTG and SOCC without loss of time. If not possible prior to deployment, it is an
urgent task once in theatre.

3. When applying battle drills, the deployed SOTG LO plays the most critical role. Based on
a thorough knowledge of all battle drills on both levels, the LO is the primary interface between
the SOTG and SOCC. He will ensure persistent information exchange, provide advice and
recommendations as required, and may be tasked to support any necessary emergency planning.

4. The following appendices are examples of battle drills of a SOCC with the tasks and
responsibilities of an SOTG LO included.

APPENDICES:

1. Time-sensitive Targets/Immediate Fires Battle Drill

2. Troops-in-contact Battle Drill
3. Emergency Quick Reaction Force Battle Drill
4. Close Air Support Battle Drill
5. Medical Evacuation/Casualty Evacuation Battle Drill

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS/IMMEDIATE FIRES BATTLE DRILL

1. Definition. TSTs are targets requiring immediate response because they pose a danger
to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity with high enough priority
to warrant immediate action to support campaign objectives.

2. Procedures and Responsibilities. Procedures and responsibilities are outlined in

Table D-1-1.

Table D-1-1. Time-sensitive Targets/Immediate Fires Battle Drill

# Who What Remarks

1 SOTG TOC  Reports target of opportunity to SOTG
LO
2 SOTG LO  Informs JOC director
 Informs TST officer
 Informs joint fires officer If an SOTG is in standby
 Informs other SOTG LOs for TST.
 Informs JOC intelligence
 Informs J35 targeting officer
3 TST Officer  Informs joint TST coordination cell of
JTF HQ and other CCs if required
4 Targeting Officer  Checks status of target on JPTL
 Gets LEGAD involved if required
5 JOC Director  Informs command group (CG)
6 TST Officer  Informs SOLE
7 SOLE  Checks ACC assets for availability and
BDA
8 All  Conduct feasibility assessment Critical factor time for
 Develop COAs COA development.
9 JOC Director  Recommends COA and
supported/supporting relationship to CG
10 CG Rep  Selects and decides COA
11 LOs of involved  Inform, coordinate, deconflict
SOTGs
12 All  Check for own forces in vicinity of target Blue Force Tracker, etc.
13 SOTG LOs  Ensure withdrawal of own forces out of
threat zone if required
14 Tasked Asset  Executes mission
15 SOTG, Tasked  Conduct BDA
Asset

D-1-1
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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

TROOPS-IN-CONTACT BATTLE DRILL

1. Definition. TIC means unexpected contact with an enemy and exchange of fire. TIC
requires support by ECAS, ISR assets, or employment of the QRF or a combination.

2. Procedures and Responsibilities. Procedures and responsibilities are outlined in

Table D-2-1.

Table D-2-1. TIC Battle Drill

# Who What Remarks

1 SOTG TOC  Reports TIC
 Provides location (grid)
 Provides situation update
 Requests type of support
2 SOTG LO  “Attention in the JOC”, (mission
designator) has TIC at (grid)
3 JOC Director  Informs CG
 Informs J35
 Informs MEDAD
4 SOATG Rep/J3 Air  Informs SOLE
5 Battle Captain  Inputs to command journal
6 JOC Director  Establishes crisis action team (CAT)
consisting of:
o SOTG LO
o Joint fires
o PR coordinator
o Intelligence
o MEDAD
o RW planner
o SOATG Rep/J3 Air
7 CAT  Conducts mission analysis
 Conducts threat assessment
 Confirms availability of assets
 Confirms availability of enabling
support
 Develops COAs
8 SOLE  Contributes to planning
9 JOC Director  Issues WNGOs to:
o SOATG
o QRF
o Others, if applicable

D-2-1
NSHQ 80-003

# Who What Remarks

10 JOC Director  Requests external support High threats or assets not
available.
11 JOC Director  Chooses COA Threat low and assets
available.
12 JOC Director  Issues MEO for support mission Check regulation for MEO
authorization.
13 JOC  Monitors progress
 Reports to JTF
14 JOC  After-action report Mission complete.
 Reports to JTF

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NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EMERGENCY QUICK REACTION FORCE BATTLE DRILL

1. Definition. Emergency QRF missions are all QRF missions not envisaged by the
supported force and therefore not included in the mission plan.

2. Considerations. The original QRF for the SOTU mission is not available or not suited
for the requirements that the new situation dictates. In cases such as these, the emergency
QRF mission can be commanded by any available SOTU or another designated QRF leader.
Before deploying the emergency QRF, there should be a clear understanding of the tactical
situation. The TOC should ensure that clear C2 means are established between the GFC and
the emergency QRF, and an ability to control additional joint fires is in place. Transportation to
and from the QRF site will be coordinated between the SOTG TOC and SOCC JOC. If aviation
is used, armed escort aviation may also be required.

3. Procedures and Responsibilities. Procedures and responsibilities are outlined in

Table D-3-1.

Table D-3-1. Emergency QRF Battle Drill

# Who What Remarks

1 Ground Force  Requests QRF via SOTG Ensure details of
Commander TOC or airborne mission tactical situation are
COM clear.
2 SOTG TOC  Requests additional support POC is SOTG LO in
from SOCC SOCC JOC.
3 SOTG LO  Ensures SOCC JOC staff is Provide QRF SOM
briefed fully on the situation; and required assets
J33 director to coordinate with to the SOTG.
SOTG LO
4 SOTG LO  Information to JOC, especially
JOC director, QRF rep,
SOATG rep, joint fires, J2
JOC rep
5 JOC Director  Information to CG, SOLE, MEDAD if wounded
others as required in action (WIA).
J1 if killed in action.
6 SOTG LO  Provides SOTU location
 Provides situation update
 Provides information about
enemy/friendly capabilities
 Facilitates communications

D-3-1
NSHQ 80-003

# Who What Remarks

7 JOC Director, QRF  Conduct feasibility
Rep, SOATG Rep, J2, assessment
SOLE
8 CG  Decides QRF release
9 QRF Rep  Drafts FRAGO for QRF Copies to QRF,
mission SOTG, SOATG,
SOLE.
10 COS/Deputy COS  Releases FRAGO
Operations
11 QRF  Conducts ground operations
planning
 Requests insertion/extraction
assets
 Requests joint fires support
12 SOATG  Conducts insertion/extraction
planning
13 J6  Communications planning
14 SOLE  Deconfliction of airspace
 ISR support
 CAS support
15 J2, SOTG LO  Provide threat assessment for To QRF and
ingress/egress routes and SOATG.
target area
16 JOC  Coordinates additional FARP,
external support if required transportation, etc.
17 MEDAD  Checks availability of medical Draft plan for
support Role 2, 3 treatment/follow-on
treatment.
18 SOTG LO, QRF Rep,  CONOPS briefing CG decision on
SOATG Rep/J3 Air,  MEO GO/NO-GO.
Joint Fires, CG Decide on on-scene
COM.
C2 arrangements.
19 JOC  Launches QRF
20 QRF, SOATG  Execute mission
21 JOC  Monitors support mission

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NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BATTLE DRILL

1. Definition. CAS is fire from FW or RW assets that may or may not be pre-planned and
where the requesting forces are in an emergency situation, usually engaged by enemy forces
and not able to suppress the enemy to complete the task or to break contact.

2. Considerations

a. Reaction time of air assets.

b. Munitions available to the air assets.

c. Resulting danger zone for friendly forces or neutrals.

d. CAS qualification in supported force.

e. Communications equipment available to supported force and supporting asset.

3. Procedures and Responsibilities. Procedures and responsibilities are outlined in

Table D-4-1.

Table D-4-1. CAS Battle Drill

# Who What Remarks

1 SOTG TOC  Requests CAS from joint fires
officer in JOC
2 Joint Fires Officer  Informs JOC
 Informs JOC director
 Coordinates support through SOLE
 Deconflicts with SOTG LO and
conventional ground forces
3 JOC Director  Engagement approval based on
joint fires recommendation
4 SOATG  Tasking of own assets if available
and suitable (e.g. AC-130)
5 SOLE  Tasking of ACC assets or tasking
of LCC assets (attack helicopter)
through BSO coordination
6 SOTG LO  Passes ECAS information to
SOTG TOC
7 Supporting Assets  Engage target
8 SOTG TOC and/or  Report results
Supporting Assets

D-4-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

MEDICAL EVACUATION/CASUALTY EVACUATION BATTLE DRILL

1. Definitions

a. MEDEVAC is usually executed by a dedicated transportation asset manned with

qualified medical personnel, often a doctor.

b. CASEVAC is the transportation of an injured or wounded soldier from the place of

injury/pickup point by a transportation asset to an MTF. The transportation asset is not
specially equipped or manned with a doctor.

2. Procedures and Responsibilities. Procedures and responsibilities are outlined in

Table D-5-1.

Table D-5-1. MEDEVAC/CASEVAC Battle Drill

# Who What Remarks

1 SOTG TOC  Reports incident and requests
CASEVAC/MEDEVAC
2 SOTG LO  “Attention in the JOC”
CASEVAC/MEDEVAC request by
SOTG #
 Informs JOC director
 Informs MEDAD
3 JOC Director  Informs CG
4 SOATG Rep  Informs SOATG
5 QRF Rep  Informs QRF
6 JOC Intelligence  Informs JIC
Officer  Prepares threat analysis for likely
ingress and egress routes and
target area
7 MEDAD  Checks nearest treatment facility Present in JOC until
 Communicates to supported SOTG mission is completed.
via LO
8 JOC PR Officer  Coordinates support
 Conducts crisis action planning with
SOTGs, MEDAD, intelligence, etc.
 Recommends COAs to JOC director
9 JOC Director  Decides on supported/supporting
relationship
 Informs JTF JOC
10 SOTG LO  Informs SOTGs involved
11 Supported SOTG  Plans, assembles package, prepares
 Delivers CONOPS to JOC

D-5-1
NSHQ 80-003

# Who What Remarks

12 Supporting  Plan, prepare
SOTGs
13 JOC, SOLE  Coordinate fires, escort, fuel,
suppression of enemy air defences,
airspace, etc.
14 JOC Director/CG  Approval of CONOPS MEO.
15 Supported SOTG  Executes mission
 Reports medical status of WIA to
JOC
16 MEDAD  Confirms or changes treatment
facility, depending on report
17 Supported SOTG  Hands over WIAs to treatment
facility

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D-5-3
NSHQ 80-003

ANNEX E TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE TEMPLATE

The TIP can take the form of a paper folder or PowerPoint presentation, depending on the
preferences of the contributors. The entries below are purely examples of the type of data
contained and should be used as a guide for development of a comprehensive product.

Figure E-1. Cover Page

E-1
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-2. Objective/Target Description

E-2
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-3. Target Information for Facility

E-3
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-4. Target Information for High-value Individual

E-4
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-5. Organizational Analysis

E-5
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-6. Individual Link Analysis

E-6
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-7. AOO/AOI

Filled out as many times as needed based on intellience coming in.

E-7
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-8. Intelligence Summary Sheet

E-8
NSHQ 80-003

Figure E-9. Reporting

E-9
NSHQ 80-003

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK.

E-10
NSHQ 80-003

ANNEX F TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. The following pages/slides with notes provide an example of the SOTG CONOPS used
at the NATO Special Operations School (NSOS) for educational and exercise purposes. It has
been developed based on best practices and lessons learned during various NATO SOF
exercises such as Exercise COLD RESPONSE in Norway, NRF SOCC staff training exercises,
and ISAF SOF operations in Afghanistan.

2. It should not be considered the only template used and can be adjusted as the SOF
mission requires. What is important to note is that when a NATO SOCC deploys, there will be a
dictated CONOPS template similar to the one in this annex that is developed by the SOCC J3
staff and must be used by all SOF TCNs with deployed SOTGs. This ensures that there is
commonality between SOTG products and helps the SOCC staff vet, approve, and coordinate
the CONOPS quicker and get the resources and enablers to the SOTG faster.

3. At the SOTG level, the CONOPS provides the who, what, why, where, when (5 Ws), and
how of the proposed SOF mission. It provides the key mission IRs of target information,
mission intent, and SOM, enabling support and consequence management. The CONOPS can
be used for enduring missions that may last for days or weeks, or it can be used for single
missions. If used for enduring missions, the CONOPS may have to be briefed periodically so
that coordinating and approving authorities are satisfied that the information in the CONOPS is
still valid. If a CONOPS is enduring, it may have multiple targets (a threat network, for
example). Each time the SOF unit wants to strike a target under the enduring CONOPS
requirements, it may do so under a one-slide supporting CONOPS that provides the 5 Ws and a
quick SOM, thus saving the SOTG valuable time producing a long CONOPS and missing the
target. Issues such as these will always be laid out by the SOCC J3 before deployment or
during the very early stages of deployment.

F-1
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-1. Cover Slide

4. This is the cover slide for the CONOPS briefing. It highlights the name and type of
operation to be conducted, and provides the first indicator of the target and if it is on a JPTL. It
may be preceded by a sign-off sheet that shows it has been vetted, coordinated, and approved
at the required levels. The LEGAD should always ensure that the HVI is still active on the
JPTL. This is because targets are likely to remain on the JPTL as long as the actioning
agencies are keeping the TIP up to date and are keeping the HVI’s name active each time the
joint targeting working group and joint targeting board sit. If not, the HVI could be removed from
the JPTL and no longer be actionable.

F-2
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-2. Commander's Summary

5. This slide should be written to explain the why of the mission from COM SOTG’s
perspective and outline the potential outcome or gains that conducting the operation should
provide. COM SOTG or his deputy in his absence should draft this slide and convey any
additional details to the LO that may be needed to reinforce the slide when briefed to the SOCC
or JTF HQ for approval.

F-3
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-3. Desired Effects

6. What is the overall effect of the mission? There may be multiple effects at the tactical,
operational, strategic, and political levels. Whatever they are, if they are planned for, they
should be listed here.

7. Effects of the SOF mission should always be coordinated, deconflicted, and

synchronized with those of the BSO. Failure to do so will cause informational fratricide and will
have the potential of minimizing or cancelling out the desired effects of the SOF mission on the
target audiences.

8. The desired effects are typically drafted by the S3 and his current plans staff along with
an information or effects officer. They should always be reviewed by COM SOTG. They will be
vetted by the BSO to ensure they complement current informational effects being waged within
the whole BSO AOO.

F-4
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-4. AOO

9. This slide should provide a macro or big picture overview of the planned AOO for the
SOF mission. It can provide as much detail as required and should include any proposed or
established battlespace control measures. It should not include target details. It would also be
wise to have a scale on the map so that those being briefed can understand the time and space
aspect of the mission, especially when details of aviation movements, FARPs, MEDEVAC, etc.,
start being discussed.

10. It should also highlight any of the major boundaries and established or contested borders
surrounding the mission AOO.

F-5
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-5. Target Intelligence

11. This is the first of several slides that provide detail about the proposed target. It is
typically very similar to the first page of a TIP in that it provides the target’s name, his position in
the insurgency or enemy structure/network, and his family, religious, or tribal affiliations.

12. The slide should also highlight the importance or significance of the target. Why are we
going after the target? What is at stake if we fail the mission?

13. The actionable intelligence should provide a snapshot of the key intelligence pieces that
have led us to the find and now require us to fix and finish the target (which is why the
CONOPS is developed). More intelligence detail can be found on the next few slides.

F-6
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-6. Threat Network Analysis (Link Diagram)

14. In the case of an insurgent threat network, the link diagram representing the whole threat
network should be displayed with the actual target and associated sub-cell for this mission
highlighted. Pictures of key individuals should be included on this slide.

F-7
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-7. Area Threat Summary

15. Area threat is a summary statement of what threat the current target poses to the AOO
and the HN area. It should indicate clearly what the result will be if the mission is not successful
and if the target is allowed to continue to operate unimpeded.

F-8
NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-8. Target Description

16. In this CONOPS example, there is a vessel of interest (VoI) that will have to be watched
and boarded as part of the planned mission. A brief description of the VoI should include type,
tonnage, crew, and registration information. In this example, 10 additional military-aged males
are identified as being on the VoI.

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NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-9. Supporting Intelligence

17. This slide is developed by S2 and provides the key intelligence that has led to the find.
The grade is based on information credibility. Mission approval will typically require at least two
C3-graded intelligence items.

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Figure F-10. Mission Summary

18. Provide a mission summary to include intent, key task(s), end state, brief summary of
SOM, and summary of execution.

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NSHQ 80-003

Figure F-11. Scheme of Manoeuvre

19. This slide should be produced by the GFC in charge of the tactical SOTU or SOF
element conducting the mission. It should cover some of the key TTP being used for the
mission and highlight graphically the sequence of events. The SOTG LO briefing this slide
should understand how a mission like this is planned, resourced, and executed so that he is not
caught off guard and unable to answer a tactically related question posed by the vetting or
approval authority.

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Figure F-12. Task Organization

20. The task organization slide should detail all SOTG assets, all attached assets from the
other CCs used to enable the mission, and any partnered forces from the HN security forces. If
partnered forces are used, it may be a requirement, based on the tactical directives, to provide
some additional detail to show the level of participation the partnered force provided during the
planning, rehearsal, execution, and post-operation phases of the mission.

21. The slide should clearly show to the approval authority what the mission-essential
elements are. The briefer should always be prepared to truthfully answer the question, “What
will you do if you don’t get the mission-essential asset?” If a contingency plan is in place, then
that asset or resource isn’t mission essential. If it can’t be replaced with something else, it is
mission essential.

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Figure F-13. Key Actions on Target

22. This slide represents the major what ifs of the mission. Once identified, develop
appropriate contingencies to mitigate their effects on the mission.

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Figure F-14. GO/NO-GO Criteria

23. If the mission has key GO or NO-GO criteria, they must be clearly articulated on this
slide. As with mission-essential assets, this slide may solicit additional scrutiny from the vetting
and approval authorities. SOTG LOs should be able to provide additional detail if requested.

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Figure F-15. Tactical Directive Compliance

24. Experience has shown that once a NATO operation is in full swing, the JTF HQ will
promulgate a TD. The TD will identify the major restraints and constraints being imposed on the
tactical commanders and the ground forces executing the various missions. The SOTG must
ensure it is familiar with all relevant SOPs and TDs to ensure that key issues are considered,
applied, and mitigated. Key TD issues can include use of ROE, CIVCAS, use of dogs,
operating at night, operating close to a neighbouring border, entering houses or religious
buildings, etc. The SOTU planning the operation may not consider all applicable TDs. It is the
responsibility of the SOTG S3 staff to ensure the tactical plan and SOM comply with the TD.
The SOTG LO must be very familiar with all SOPs and TDs so that when the CONOPS is sent
to the SOCC, it can be vetted by the LO before being taken to the J35 and LEGAD for review
and approval.

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Figure F-16. Tactical Directive Compliance

25. This slide provides additional SOP and TD issues that the approval authority must be
satisfied with before giving the GO to the mission.

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Figure F-17. Tactical Directive Compliance

26. This slide provides additional SOP and TD issues that the approval authority must be
satisfied with before giving the GO to the mission.

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Figure F-18. Information Operations

27. The Info Ops slide is key to the respective BSO. It shows the BSO during the vetting and
concurrence/approval process that the SOTG is aware of the Info Ops objectives and initiatives
being conducted in the BSO’s AOO and is making every effort to support or complement those
Info Ops themes and messages being conveyed to the targeted audiences on a daily basis.
COM SOTG must ensure that he and his staff have taken the time to become familiar with the
BSO Info Ops plan and support the Info Ops campaign appropriately. Before any mission is
executed, the SOTG should be sending an LO to the BSO TOC to brief the CONOPS for
concurrence. Concurrence is not approval; it merely gives the BSO the opportunity to voice any
concerns he may have about the SOF mission conflicting with other kinetic and non-kinetic
activities being conducted by the conventional BSO.

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Figure F-19. Consequence Management

28. The consequence management slide gives a colour-coded assessment on the major
risks being considered. These should be the same for all SOTG missions. Red does not mean
NO-GO; it just means that there is high risk in that area of consideration and that the approval
authority must be aware of the risks and do all they can to ensure that critical issues and
enablers will be coordinated with higher and lateral HQs to mitigate the risks. It also ensures
that when things do go wrong, plans are in place to manage them.

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Figure F-20. Communications Plan

29. This slide is self-explanatory. SOF missions are complex in nature and typically require
assets and resources that do not always come from the SOTG. The C2 plan must show how all
the various CC enablers and, if required, HN forces will coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize
their efforts for the proposed mission.

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Figure F-21. CONOPS Concurrence

30. The final slide of the CONOPS should show that all parties concerned are aware of the
planned mission and that issues are resolved or in the midst of being resolved. The slide
shown may change as required to include other parties or agencies that have a stake in the
mission and whose concurrence must be sought prior to mission execution.

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Figure F-22. Additional Slide Requirements

31. The slides presented up to this point are those that are required as an absolute minimum.
This slide highlights other potential topics that may warrant additional briefing. They can be
included if the mission warrants and issues within are deemed necessary for briefing purposes
due to their coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization issues.

APPENDICES:

1. Example of Mission Execution Checklist

2. Example of Special Operations Task Group Operation Summary Written Report
3. Example of Operations Summary Storyboard

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE OF MISSION EXECUTION CHECKLIST

Figure F-1-1. Mission Execution Checklist

1. The mission execution checklist is developed in conjunction with the CONOPS. Once
the CONOPS has been vetted and approved, the SOCC J35 will then hand over the mission to
the J33 director. The SOTG LO will brief the key aspects of the CONOPS to the JOC staff so
that they are aware of the mission parameters.

2. During the mission briefing, the SOTG LO will walk through the mission execution
checklist and will ensure that as the mission progresses each action is tracked and the key JOC
staff members are aware of the progression. If at any time the SOTG LO indicates that a key
action/part of the mission has been compromised or an incident has occurred that will require
SOTG HQ and SOCC J33 resolution, he will inform the JOC director as soon as possible, who
will then take control of the situation and, in close coordination with the SOTG HQ staff, will
implement the necessary contingency plan or activate one of the battle drills for TIC, CASEVAC,
emergency CAS, QRF, etc.

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3. Once the mission is complete and all SOTG forces have returned to base, the SOTG LO
will inform the JOC staff of the initial results. He will then ensure that the required OPSUM is
developed and submitted by the SOTG within the time required.

4. The example provided here is only one of several ways that a mission execution checklist
can be displayed. The SOTG HQ can develop their own checklist; however, the SOCC JOC
director will likely dictate how he wants the mission execution checklist to be listed and how it is
to be tracked accordingly by each of the respective SOTG LOs.

5. This example shows four columns: the first outlines the main events sequentially, the
second column the code words called in each time an event is reached, the third column the
time it is called in, and the fourth column capturing any key actions taken by staff or
GFC/enablers to support the event. Additional events that could have been listed in this
example include CASEVAC or TIC.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK GROUP OPERATION SUMMARY WRITTEN

REPORT

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DTG: 091300Z SEP 09

FROM: SOTG 94

TO: SOCC

CLASSIFICATION: NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SOTG 94 OPSUM – OPERATION (OP) ORION

1. BACKGROUND

a. SOTG 94 (including partnered unit Pakistan crisis response unit (CRU))/c/s

ROPE/55 personnel deployed.

b. 090100Z SEP 09 to 091300Z SEP 09.

c. The Op ORION CONOPS, a trigger-based MSO/mobile command team (MCT) DA

was planned and executed within a maritime ROZ established 10 NM due west of the
Karachi port complex. While the MCC (commander task group (CTG) 155.1) remains the
lead/supported commander for all MIOs, the SOCC was designated as the supported
commander for this operation.

d. Trigger was based on SIGINT that indicated Shahan Hussein (Obj DIDGERY), a
primary HONTAS narco/IED/weapons facilitator, JPTL CF 2897, was coordinating with
an unknown male in Oman the possible movement of WMDs from Oman to the Afghan
Security Theatre of Operations (ASTO) for use as part of a spectacular event in Kabul.

e. ISR concluded that the VoI, ASL container ship JONNANA, would be used to ferry
the WMDs from Oman to Pakistan.

f. MSO/MCT DA was conducted against the VoI containing terrorist contraband and
possible WMDs at position N24 17.24 E065 52.42.

2. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

a. ISR and Staging for VoI Interception. SOTG 94 and Pakistan CRU jointly planned
and rehearsed for the execution of Op ORION, a trigger-based maritime DA against a
VoI suspected of carrying WMDs en route to Karachi and further on to Kabul,
Afghanistan, for use against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
HUMINT sources in Oman provided credible information leading ASTO and Pakistan
military forces to believe that the WMD had been loaded onto the vessel. ISR/FMV from
CTG 57.3 was able to confirm the loading of sea containers on the VoI. ISR/FMV then

F-2-1
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confirmed that eight fighting-aged males were seen with small arms embarking on the
vessel and taking up observation/defensive positions in various places on the upper deck
and bridge. Based on this fact, it was decided to execute Op ORION. CTG 155.1 set the
maritime ROZ while elements of CTG 155.2 moved into a static forward staging area
position approximately 11 NM from Karachi in preparation for launching of SAF and HAF.
SAF was launched and moved to a holding area to await orders. Once the VoI entered
the ROZ, the on-scene commander (OSC) on ISR/FMV c/s VICTOR gave the order to
execute the DA. The AMC was co-located with the OSC. Ship-to-ship communications
were not initiated in order to maintain principles of security, speed, and surprise.

b. Assault/Boarding of VoI. HAF and SAF moving from north to south were able to
cross phase line yellow without compromise, while c/s STINGER moved in an east-west
direction to set sniper cover for final HAF approach. OSC on c/s VICTOR (accompanied
by Pakistan military LO) gave the order to proceed based on predetermined GO/NO-GO
criteria to phase line green (GO/NO-GO line or point of no return). Assault force
commander (AFC) HAF c/s ROPE 11A assumed TACON of all forces boarding the VoI.
HAF was able to close in on the vessel, and as the first aircraft flared to establish a hover
position, small-arms fire was received from fighting-aged males on the deck. C/s
STINGER was able to neutralize four of the fighting-aged males. The remaining four
fighting-aged males were seen moving into the vessel bridge superstructure. HAF was
able to saturate and clear both the bow and bridge of vessel while SAF was able to
establish hold and clear positions on port and starboard just forward of the
superstructure. HAF was able to secure the bridge and in the process neutralized the
remaining four fighting-aged males. Bow HAF cleared the cargo deck, moving from bow
to stern. SAF entered mid-ship cargo stairwells, moved to below deck holds, and
cleared. No fighting-aged males were encountered below deck. The vessel’s crew were
detained and later moved to a central detention area located at the mid-ship cargo deck
area. All armed fighting-aged males refused to be disarmed and were killed by assault
force.

c. TEO on VoI. Documents from the ship, including cargo manifest, were secured for
inspection. Each assault element was equipped with a combat camera to assist with
TEO and to collect evidence for legal prosecution by Pakistan authorities. Once control
of the vessel was achieved and declared by the AFC, additional QRFs from CTG 155.2
were brought on board to secure areas cleared by SOTG 94/Pakistan CRU. AFC
requested EOD, which assisted with detailed TEO. TEO of the vessel and search of all
five containers revealed no WMDs; however, a large amount of small arms, ammunition,
and possible IED explosive material were found and seized.

d. Turnover/Handover of VoI. The detained vessel was then handed over to prize
crew from CTG 155.1. SOTG 94/Pakistan CRU disembarked via SAF rigid-hull inflatable
boats and returned to c/s TROJAN with injured Pakistan CRU member. VoI was then
escorted by elements from CTG 155.1 to port of Karachi and handed over to Pakistan
police and customs agents. Op ORION was declared over approximately 1 hour and 53
minutes after H-hour.

e. Friendly Personnel Losses. No losses, but one Pakistan CRU member suffered a
severe (non-life threatening) leg injury during fast rope insertion on target vessel.

f. Lessons learned from Op ORION are:

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(1) Lack of credible HUMINT outside the ASTO remains a concern. ISR with
FMV is unable to confirm the actual loading of possible WMD onto any VoI.

(2) The Pakistan CRU is a very capable MCT force. It is recommended that
further interoperability training be conducted between SOTG 94 and the Pakistan
CRU to foster a better relationship for conduct of future MIO or MSO/MCT
operations.

(3) Inability to capture armed fighting-aged males who may have been tied to
HONTAS will hamper TEO and future operations.

(4) The difference between MIO and MSO/MCT is clear; however, MCC C2 at
times had difficulty in accepting their role within MSO/MCT as a supporting
commander. This forced COM SOCC to place the OSC on a CTG 57.3 asset
rather than place him with the assault force (HAF/SAF). The SOCC and its LO to
the MCC must find additional opportunities to conduct staff element training, to
include simple computer-assisted exercises (CAX) to reinforce the required C2 for
successful MSO/MCT when SOCC is the supported commander.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. WMDs from Oman remain a credible ASTO concern. More effort must be made to
develop better intelligence sources (HUMINT) in foreign ports to confirm or deny the
presence of possible WMDs.

b. Additional NATO and non-NATO ISR must be used to support/confirm or refute

possible HUMINT claims.

c. The MCC must conduct more visit, board, search, and seizures to determine the
true character of vessels, cargo, and passengers. This will help develop more credible
targets for possible MSO/MCT operations.

d. MSO/MCT CAX should be performed with the SOCC and MCC on a regular basis
to maintain a high level of C2 understanding and proficiency between the two CCs.

e. TTP must be developed to secure/capture armed fighting-aged males in order to

conduct TEO. Non-lethal weaponry should be investigated and, if possible, used by the
assault force.

4. Technical Exploitation Operation. A full J2 report, including comprehensive TEO

analysis, will be forwarded under separate cover.

J P Julienne
Lt Cdr
Commander SOTG 94

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX F TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE OF OPERATION SUMMARY STORYBOARD

Figure F-3-1 provides an example for an OPSUM storyboard. It will be developed by the SOTG
and submitted to the SOCC through the SOTG’s LO. It may also be sent via additional SOTG
LOs to any of the other higher or lateral HQs that had a stake in the outcome of the mission.
This template may include additional slides, if required, to show additional important shots of
detained personnel or other items that may have been removed from the target for additional
exploitation and analysis. The storyboard should be submitted as soon as possible. Some
SOCCs may demand it be submitted within 1 hour of mission completion. The written report
can follow at a later time as dictated by the SOCC. Like the CONOPS, the storyboard will be
kept in a mission folder on the SOCC’s web portal so that it can be reviewed by other
members/SOTGs of the SOCC.

Figure F-3-1. OPSUM Storyboard

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THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK.

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ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

FORMATS, REPORTS, AND RETURNS

The following appendices provide examples of various formats, reports, and returns.

APPENDICES:

1. Example Order/Plan Format

2. Example Mission Execution Order (MEO)
3. Example Operation Summary (OPSUM)
4. Example Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)
5. Example Situation Report (SITREP)
6. Example Intelligence Report (INTREP)
7. Example Mission Report (MISREP)
8. Example Medical Evacuation Request
9. Example Air Support Request
10. Example Air Control Means Request
11. Example Support Request

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE ORDER/PLAN FORMAT

Required classification at top and bottom of every page

ORIGINATING HQ DATE-TIME GROUP (DTG)

SECTION: Follow internal SOPs for the order’s administrative information. It is recommended
that the origination HQ include its location and that the DTG uses Zulu (Z) time unless the order
states otherwise. When orders apply to units in different time zones, use Zulu time zone. In
operation and service support plans and orders, list the time zone applicable to the operation in
the heading of the order following the references. When an order or plan does not specify the
actual date and hour for beginning an operation, apply the proper reference designations
(H-hour, D-day, etc.).

REFERENCES: The heading of the plan or order includes a list of maps, charts, datum, or
other related documents the unit will need to understand the plan or order. The user does not
need to reference the SOP, but may refer to it in the body of the plan or order. The user
references a map using the map series number (and country or geographic area, if required),
sheet number and name, edition, and scale, if required. Datum is the mathematical model of
the earth used to calculate the coordinate on any map. Different nations use different datum for
printing coordinates on their maps. The datum is usually referenced in the marginal information
of each map. Reference the base order or plan that a FRAGO modifies. Reference any orders
from higher or other guiding, relevant, or reference documents as required.

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE PLAN (ORDER): The time zone used throughout the
order (including annexes and appendices) is the time zone applicable to the operation.
Operations across several time zones use Zulu time.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Describe the allocation of forces to support the commander's

concept. Task organization may be shown in one of two places: preceding paragraph 1, or in
an annex, if the task organization is long and complicated. In a FRAGO or WNGO, only show
the task organization if it has changed. Task organization is internal to the HQ writing the order
and does not include other forces or elements not under the originating HQ’s C2.

1. SITUATION. This paragraph should reflect the executing commander’s appreciation of

the situation, and should provide information to subordinate commanders for their appreciation
of the situation, including the mission and intent of higher commander. If any of the sections
below are not provided or are not applicable, they should be omitted. The degree of detail will
be enhanced when a CONOPS is converted to a contingency OPLAN.

a. General. This is information derived from the higher order or any guidance,
situational changes, or events that led to the development of the plan/order.

(1) Background. Information on the background to the development of the plan.

(2) Strategic Conditions. Describe the strategic conditions that led to the
development of the plan.

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(3) Desired End State. The higher commander’s end state (if given).

(4) Objectives

(5) Planning Limitations (If given from higher headquarters)

(a) Constraints that impose specific obligations that must be met.

(b) Restraints that set limits on what may be done.

b. Opposing Forces. Express this information in terms of two enemy echelons

below friendly forces, if applicable. Describe the enemy’s most likely and most
dangerous COAs. When possible, provide a sketch of the enemy COA in lieu of verbiage
and refer to this in the intelligence annex. Include an assessment of terrorist activities
directed against NATO interests in the AOO. If more sources are necessary, use the
final subparagraph to refer the reader to the documentation. Refer to the intelligence
annex, the current INTSUM.

c. Friendly Forces. Higher commander’s objectives and other forces and

commands whose listed actions will directly affect the issuing commander’s task but are
not a part of his task organization. Subparagraphs state the missions of flank units and
other units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the issuing HQ.

d. Attachments and Detachments. Do not repeat information already listed under

the task organization. Try to put all information in the task organization or in an annex
and state, See Task Organization or See Annex. However, when not in the task
organization, list units that are attached or detached to the HQ that issues the order.
State when attachment or detachment is to be effective if different from when the order or
plan is effective (such as on order, on during phase changes). Use the term remains
attached when units will be or have been attached for some time.

e. Given Assumptions (OPLAN Only)

(1) Political Assumptions. List the political assumptions, including variations

or constraints that may be imposed by agencies outside the Alliance (such as the
UN, etc.) and considerations regarding neutral countries that may be involved in
the operation with NATO forces.

(2) Military Assumptions. List the military assumptions, including those

regarding transfer of operational command/operational control to NATO
commanders.

f. Tasks. List tasks identified from higher HQs.

2. MISSION. State the mission derived during the planning process. Use a clear, concise
statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place,
where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. The order of the elements may vary. There are
no subparagraphs in a mission statement. The mission statement will cover on-order missions.

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3. EXECUTION

a. Commander’s Intent. State the commander's intent derived during the planning
process. This summary should provide the commander’s overall intent and establish the
purpose of the plan. It is an important focusing statement for subordinate commanders.

(1) The Aim of the Operation

(2) Military Objectives

(3) Desired Military End State

b. Commander’s Analysis. (OPLAN Only) Gives briefly the commander’s

evaluation of the situation including:

(1) Centres of Gravity. Identifies the key COGs and decisive points that will
influence mission accomplishment.

(2) Preconditions for Success. Describes other factors that may influence
mission accomplishment.

(3) Risk Assessment. A brief description of the identified risks and an

assessment of their likely influence on successful mission accomplishment.

c. Conduct of Operations. The conduct of operations may be a single paragraph

that summarizes the overall operational concept. It may be divided into two or more
subparagraphs, or if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as a separate annex. The
paragraph should be based on the COA statement from the decision-making process
and, at a minimum, will address close, deep, rear, security, and reserve operations, as
well as describe the type or form of operation and designate the main effort. The
commander uses this subparagraph when he feels he must supply sufficient detail to
ensure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications
or further instructions. The statement should be concise, understandable, and may
address the following:

(1) The employment of major manoeuvre elements in a SOM.

(2) A plan of fire support or scheme of fires supporting the manoeuvre with
fires.

(3) The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation.
These include reconnaissance and security elements, intelligence assets,
engineer assets, and air defence.

(4) Any other aspects of the operation the commander considers appropriate to
clarify the concept and to ensure unity of effort. If the integration and coordination
are too lengthy for this paragraph, that integration and coordination are addressed
in the appropriate annexes.

(5) Any be-prepared missions.

(6) When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate
phases, the overall concept may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each

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NSHQ 80-003

phase. Designate phases as Phase followed by the appropriate Roman numeral,

for example, Phase III.

d. Force Capability Requirements. Include a general summary of the major force

capabilities required to execute the concept. A detailed initial SOR can be attached as
required. NOTE: THIS IS GENERALLY NOT USED IN ROUTINE ORDERS FOR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONOPS.

e. Tasks. Clearly state the missions or tasks for each manoeuvre unit that reports
directly to the HQ issuing the order. List units in the same sequence as in the task
organization, including reserves. Use a separate subparagraph for each manoeuvre unit.
Only state tasks that are necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place
tactical tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3f.

f. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more units

and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in
paragraph 3. Complex instructions should be referred to in an annex. Paragraphs 3f(1)
– 3f(4) are mandatory for base plans and orders. The remaining paragraphs are optional
and are provided as a reference for consideration.

(1) Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.

(2) CCIRs. List once only here. Do not list in intelligence annex.

(a) PIRs.

(b) Essential elements of friendly information.

(c) Friendly force information requirements.

(3) Risk reduction control measures. These are measures unique to this
operation and not included in unit SOPs, and can include mission-oriented
protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria (corps
only), vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention measures.

(4) ROE. (NOTE: ROE can be addressed within its annex.)

(5) Timeline.

(6) FP.

(7) Environmental considerations.

(8) Any additional coordinating instructions.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to
clarify the service support concept. Refer to annexes, if required. Subparagraphs can include:

a. Logistics Concept. State the concept of logistics support to provide manoeuvre

commanders and their staff a visualization of how the operation will be logistically
supported. This could include:

(1) A brief synopsis of the support command mission.

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(2) Support command HQ or support area locations, including locations of the

next higher logistic bases.

(3) The next higher level’s support priorities and where the unit fits into those
priorities.

(4) The commander’s priorities of support.

(5) Units in the next higher organization logistically supporting the unit.

(6) The use of HN support.

(7) Significant or unusual logistics and support issues that might impact the
overall operation.

(8) Any significant sustainment risks.

(9) Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning, arming,

fuelling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the SOF operator and his systems.

(10) The support concept organized into a framework based on operational

phasing, or presented as before, during, and after operations format.

b. Logistics Standards and Requirements. Outline the changes to the expected

logistic storage and requests required to ensure timely support.

c. Movement. Provide movement planning and relevant information. This may be

provided in greater detail in the movement annex.

d. Medical Support. Provide a list of medical support standards expected by

subordinates along with a list of supporting medical facilities and their capabilities.
Greater details may be provided in the medical annex.

e. Personnel Support. Identify any personnel reporting, movement or rotational

procedures, and support capabilities/limitations.

f. Host-nation Support. List the HNS along with capabilities, limitations, and
restrictions that will be utilized for the operation.

g. Funding and Contracting Support. Outline the funds available, including their
purpose and procedures for utilization. Provide details on obtaining and using
contracting support by all units. Include any restrictions or limitations for the use of
funding or contracting for the operation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command and Control. Identify the chain and succession of command (if not
addressed in unit SOPs), applicable locations (as required), and command relationships
critical to the mission.

b. Communications. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs, identify the
specific instructions in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are
submitted.

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NSHQ 80-003

NAME (Commander's last name)

RANK (Commander's rank)

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the

representative signs the original, add the authority line For the Commander. The signed
copy is the historical copy and remains in HQ files.

ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title in the correct order. If a particular annex is not
used, state not used beside that annex letter.

G-1-6
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE MISSION EXECUTION ORDER

The MEO is a SOCC order used to authorize the SOTG to execute a mission. The MEO is
normally drafted by the J35 section and issued by J3 current operations once CONOPS
approval has been granted. CONOPS approval authority is normally promulgated via the
SOCC SUPPLAN or a theatre-specific TD.

PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:

MISSION EXECUTION ORDER XXX/01 – OP (NAME)

References:

A. JTF OPLAN//FRAGO .../01 OP NAME dated

B. SOCC SUPPLAN/FRAGO.../01 OP NAME dated
C. SOTG CONOPS OP NAME dated
D. Maps: Name, Series, Edition, Scale

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE ORDER: (ZULU)

1. SITUATION. Provide an overview of the general situation if the situation has changed
since the mission tasking was issued, using the following headings.

a. Enemy Forces. Provide enemy composition, disposition, capabilities,

vulnerabilities, and intentions. Refer to the approved SOTG CONOPS, intelligence
annexes, INTSUMs, and other reports. If no change from the approved SOTG
CONOPS, indicate by stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.

b. Friendly Forces. Provide information on friendly forces other than those

subordinate to the SOCC HQ that may affect the action of the tasked SOTG. Refer to
the approved SOTG CONOPS for information; if no change, indicate by stating No
change from Reference C in this paragraph.

2. MISSION. Confirm mission statement; refer to approved SOTG CONOPS.

3. EXECUTION. Include any changes to the following:

a. Concept of Operations. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS,

indicate by stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.

b. Subordinate Tasks. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate

by stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.

G-2-1
NSHQ 80-003

c. Coordinating Instructions. Authorize the mission execution. Confirm the

earliest anticipated launch time and state any other instructions for coordination when the
mission involves conventional/HN or interagency forces. Include the allocated RFAs.

d. GO/NO-GO Criteria. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate

by stating No change from Reference C in this paragraph.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. State the applicable administrative and logistic support

arrangements. If no change from the approved SOTG CONOPS, indicate by stating No change
from Reference C in this paragraph.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Indicate any changes to CEOI, HQ locations, code words,
code names, and liaison. If no change from the SOCC SUPPLAN and the approved SOTG
CONOPS, indicate No change from Reference B or C in this paragraph.

G-2-2
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE OPERATIONS SUMMARY

The OPSUM summarizes the conduct of an operation and identifies lessons learned; the OPSUM
forms the basis of post-op reports and ensures that the corporate body of knowledge is not lost
during an operation. The SOTG submits an OPSUM to the SOCC as soon as possible after the
post-mission recovery and initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element. Timescales for OPSUM
submission are normally promulgated via the SOCC SUPPLAN or a theatre-specific TD.

PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:

OPSUM: OP (NAME)

1. Background. Include the following data:

a. Subunit/Call Sign/Strength (including HN involvement).

b. Period. Time over which mission was conducted.

c. Mission. Refer to approved SOTG CONOPS and replicate the mission statement.

d. Target Location.

2. Operations Summary. Include the following data:

a. Evaluation of Results. State whether original plan was followed (if not, outline
deviations and rationale). State whether mission was successful or unsuccessful (if
unsuccessful, outline the reasons).

b. Friendly Losses (including HN if involved).

c. Enemy Losses/Detainees. Indicate count or estimate of enemy losses. Detail

who is responsible for handling detainees and to which organization they will be handed
over for onward processing.

d. Intelligence. Significant intelligence observations and reports. State whether a

separate INTSUM will be submitted for this mission.

e. Lessons Identified. Significant lessons identified, with emphasis on target

development, mission execution, and factors to be considered for further missions of this
sort.

f. Other. Other significant information.

G-3-1
NSHQ 80-003

3. Recommendations. This paragraph should provide options for progressing lessons

identified in paragraph 2e. This affords the SOCC the opportunity to mitigate risk from known
issues and ensures that the lessons identified from previous missions are taken into account
when planning future missions of a similar nature.

4. Sensitive Site Exploitation/Technical Exploitation Operation. State whether SSE or

TEO was undertaken and what, if any, significant material was taken off the target that can be
exploited; detail which organization will be completing the exploitation.

Any additional information from the operation (photographs, images, or data) that may prove
useful to summarize the operation, assist with future targeting efforts, or that have Info Ops
implications may accompany the OPSUM as a PowerPoint presentation or storyboard.

G-3-2
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Intelligence staff members use the INTSUM to communicate a succinct summary of the
intelligence situation for the reporting period, and to provide an assessment and estimation of
the emerging enemy situation. The format is likely to be adjusted to meet the operational
situation.

PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:

INTSUM OP (NAME) (PERIOD OF REPORT)

1. General Summary. Provide an overview of the current situation.

2. Adversary Situation. Summarize the significant activities of the reporting period as they
have affected the subordinate elements/units. The SOTG S2 summarizes the bigger picture.
Include the following information on the land, air, and maritime forces:

a. Summary of activity.

b. Personnel and equipment losses.

c. New identifications (actors or systems).

d. Movements.

e. Assessed capabilities and vulnerabilities.

3. Other Actors. Summarize the significant activities of the reporting period as they have
affected the subordinate elements/units. The SOTG S2 summarizes the bigger picture. Include
the following information:

a. Summary of activity.

b. Personnel losses.

c. New identifications (actors or systems).

d. Movements.

e. Assessed capabilities and vulnerabilities.

4. Assessment. Conclude the INTSUM with an assessment of the relative situation and
predictive analysis of what to expect in the next reporting period.

G-4-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE SITUATION REPORT

1. SITREPs are used by HQs, commanders, and leaders to monitor the daily situation and
operations from a bottom-up perspective. SITREPs are produced daily by each of the
subordinate SOTGs, capturing key information from the past 24 hours of operations and SOTG
intent for the next 24 hours. On receipt of the subordinate SITREPs, the SOCC produces a
SITREP for distribution in line with extant COM JTF guidance. Due to the nature of special
operations and its operational effects, the SOCC’s SITREP is reviewed by a large audience at
the operational and strategic levels. For this reason, the SOTG’s SITREP is not merely a
product created by cutting and pasting information from subordinate elements into a compiled
document to forward to higher HQs. Staff officers and leaders must take the time to compile the
SITREP so that it includes pertinent information relevant to readers and ensure that it includes
critical analysis to provide an accurate picture of the TOO from the SOTG’s perspective.

2. This appendix provides a generic template with instructions and guidance to aid
production of the daily SITREP. During a deployment, guidance from higher HQ and COM
SOCC may require modification of the SITREP format and information required in various
paragraphs of the report.

PRECEDENCE: The precedence for most SITREPs is (Routine). The higher HQ establishes
procedures and provides guidance in the plan, an order, or subsequent procedural documents.

DTG: Written in day, Zulu time, month, year format (051500Z SEP 09). The time SITREPs are
submitted is established by the higher HQs.

FROM: SOTG

TO: SOCC

CLASSIFICATION: The classification guidance is provided in the plan, an order, or subsequent

procedural documents.

SITREP (number) – SOTG OP (period of report) The number is a sequential reference

number that begins with 001 and continues throughout the operation. The period of the report
is for the specified previous 24-hour period as determined by the higher HQ and is written in the
same format as the DTG.

1. LOCSTAT. Provide the location of the SOTG HQ and personnel status – number of
deployed personnel under the command and control of the SOCC.

2. SITUATION

a. Enemy. Units that produce a daily INTSUM (e.g. the SOTG) may refer to the
INTSUM. Subordinate units that do not produce a daily INTSUM should provide an
updated INTSUM of the enemy situation during the 24-hour reporting period.

G-5-1
NSHQ 80-003

b. Friendly. The friendly situation provides a summary of relevant information during

the 24-hour reporting period about HN security forces, partnering forces, key leaders,
and any organizations supporting NATO SOF that are not assigned to the SOTG.

c. Local Population and Atmospherics. Provide a summary of key or significant

events, summaries of any interaction with relevant actors, and any information regarding
media and public opinion (local atmospherics) that may be of value for targeting, Info
Ops, and/or strategic communications.

3. OPERATIONS. Provide a brief synopsis of the events listed in the operations paragraph
(e.g. number of operations by type, highlighted result of a particular mission, projected mission
execution of a significant operation).

a. Last 24 Hours

(1) SOTG/U XX. Each subordinate task group or unit that reports directly to the
SOCC is listed individually by unit designation with a summary of significant
activities during the previous 24-hour reporting period.

(2) SOTG/U XX. …

b. Next 24 Hours

(1) SOTG/U XX. Each subordinate task group or unit that reports directly to the
SOCC is listed individually by unit designation with a projection of significant
activities during the upcoming 24-hour reporting period.

(2) SOTG/U XX. …

4. AIR OPERATIONS. Provide a brief synopsis of the events listed in the operations
paragraph (e.g. number of operations by type, highlighted result of a particular mission,
projected mission execution of a significant operation).

a. Last 24 Hours

(1) SOATG/U XX. Each subordinate air task group or unit that reports directly
to the SOCC, SOAC, or SOATG providing overall C2 (depending on the situation)
is listed individually by unit designation with a summary of significant activities
during the previous 24-hour reporting period.

(2) SOATG/U XX. …

b. Next 24 Hours

(1) SOATG/U XX. Each subordinate air task group or unit that reports directly
to the SOCC, SOAC, or SOATG providing overall C2 (depending on the situation)
is listed individually by unit designation with a projection of significant activities
during the upcoming 24-hour reporting period.

(2) SOATG/U XX. …

5. LOGISTICS STATUS. Information in this paragraph is determined by the commander or

higher HQ policy. Items to consider are listed below and are normally represented in a

G-5-2
NSHQ 80-003

remaining percentage of 30 DOS. Colour codes may be used to highlight the status and are
designated by the commander or higher HQs policy. Paragraphs may also be listed by classes
of supply, tracking information important for monitoring logistics status. The information
provided below is a summary of the entire SOTG, including subordinate SOTU elements.

a. Food. (Green (93% of 30 DOS))

b. Water

c. Fuel

d. Ammunition

e. Sensitive and Major Items

6. COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT. COM SOTG’s assessment is information that the

commander wants to highlight for immediate action to higher COM SOCC. The S3, or other
designated member of the command, will be tasked to provide a daily commander’s
assessment based on their level of situational understanding. Often, this is the first section that
is read by higher HQs or other leaders at the operational and strategic levels; therefore, it must
be well written and provide an assessment or information of the greatest SOCC value.

(commander)
(rank)
COM SOTG

G-5-3
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Intelligence staff members use the INTREP to communicate both routine and significant
intelligence information that might vitally influence current or pending operations.

PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:

INTREP

1. What. Specify the activity identified, including number and type of personnel, number
and type of equipment.

2. When. DTG of observation.

3. Where. Accurate location and any direction of movement if applicable.

4. How. Note method of acquiring intelligence if applicable.

5. Assessment/Comment

a. Reliability

b. Deductions

c. Conclusions

d. Additional Comments. Any additional information needed for clarification of report.

G-6-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE MISSION REPORT

Mission Data Unit Data

Classification Unit (Name and Nation)
Operation Name POC
Mission ATO Unit Phone
Identifier
MISREP Identifier Email Address
A Reporting Unit
1 Aircraft Type and Tail No.
2 Call Sign
3 Aircraft Equipment and Capabilities
4 Type of Mission
5 Location of Mission/Event
6 Time Period of Mission/Event
7 Weather During Time Period of
Mission/Event
8 Supporting Assets
B General Text
1 Amplifying Notes to Support Section
A

C Narrative
1 Supporting Narrative of
Mission/Event

G-7-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST

MEDEVAC 9-LINE REQUEST DTG UNIT

1 Location (Grid of Pickup Zone)
2 Call Sign and Frequency
Number of Patients and Precedence A B C
A – URGENT: To be at hospital facility (R2 or R3) within 2 hours (save LLE) after wounding
3 B – URGENT SURGERY: To be at hospital facility (R2 or R3) within 2 hours (surgical) after
wounding
C – PRIORITY: To be at hospital facility (R2 or R3) within 4 hours after wounding
Special Equipment Required (Select equipment below by checking on the box.)
4
A – None B – Hoist/Winch C – Extraction D – Ventilator
Number of Patients/Type L A E
5
L – Litter (Stretcher) A – Ambulatory (Walking) E – Escorts (e.g. for child patient)
Security at Pickup Zone (Select security below by checking on the box.)
E – Enemy in P – Possible
N – No Enemy X – Hot Pickup
6 Area Enemy
Zone, Armed
I – IED Cleared S – Secured by V – Number of
Escort Required
20M Around FF Vehicles
Pickup Zone Marking Method (Select marking below by checking on the box.)
7 A – Panels B – Pyro C – Smoke D – None
E – Other (explain)
/ / / / / /
Number of Patients/Nationality/Status
/ / / / / /
8 A – Coalition Military B – Civilian with Coalition Forces
C – Non-Coalition Security Forces D – Non-Coalition Civilian
E – Opposing Forces/POW/Detainee F – Child
9 Pickup Zone Terrain/Obstacles
DO NOT DELAY LAUNCH OF MEDEVAC – SUPPLY FURTHER INFORMATION ONCE
AVAILABLE
Mechanism of Injury (and at what time, if
M Time
known)
I Injury or Illness Sustained

Symptoms and Vital Signs A B C

S
D E
A – Airway B – Breathing Rate C – Pulse Rate D – Conscious or Unconscious E – Other Signs
Treatment Given (e.g. tourniquet and time
T
applied, morphine)
Notes:
AVN AUTH’S
NATO APRV’S MSN
LAUNCH
W/U W/D/D W/U W/D

G-8-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE AIR SUPPORT REQUEST

Mission Data Unit Data

DTG of Mission Unit Name
Mission Name POC
Received (ddmmmyyyy) Unit Phone
Approved By (Name) Email Address
A Requesting Unit
1 Unit (Name, Nation)
2 Call Sign
3 Frequency
4 Location Accuracy (low, medium, high)
5 Location/s (might be several)
Lat/Long or MGRS
6 Elevation (feet MSL)
7 Capabilities (weapons, signalling devices,
FAC, comms (LOS/BLOS), downlink, etc.)
8 Notes
B CAS/ISR
1 Action Requested
2 Target Type
3 Target Location Accuracy (low, medium, high)
4 Target location/s (list all) Lat/Long or MGRS
5 Target Size (feet/metres, L x W)
6 Elevation – feet MSL
7 TOT(Z) (time window)
8 Attack Axis (deg mag)
9 Deconfliction (other assets operating in vicinity)
10 Friendly Locations – Lat/Long or MGRS
11 Threats – type, location
12 Notes
C TRANSPORT/RESUPPLY
Pickup Point Deploy Point Cargo
Lat/Long Time(Z) Other Info* Lat/Long Time(Z) Other Info* Pax Cargo Total
or or MGRS Dimension Weight
MGRS (lbs)

Notes
* Other information to list: markers, call signs, frequencies, etc.

G-9-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE AIRSPACE CONTROL MEANS REQUEST

1 Type of ACM
2 DTG POC:
3 Priority A. Low B. Medium C. High
4 ACM Description
A Type/Number
B Shape
C Width/Radius
D Height/Elevation
E Period
F Coordinates
5 Reason for ACM
6 Enemy Information Threat:
Hazards:
Remarks:
7 Air Coordination (SPINS Version/Change)
A Weapon Status
B Control Agency CAOC Frequency
C Type of Control
D Entry/Exit
Procedures
E Remarks
8 Fire Coordination Yes No Reason
9 Offered By Name Position Date/Time

Report No:
Unit/Section Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time

Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time

Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time

J3 Air Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time

AOCC Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time

CAOC Approved Rejected Name Position Date/Time

1 ACO ID
2 POC (Further Coordination if required)
3 Remarks

G-10-1
NSHQ 80-003

APPENDIX 11 TO
ANNEX G TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

EXAMPLE SUPPORT REQUEST

This appendix provides guidance and instructions for SPTREQs for all SOF missions. Ideally,
at least 72 hours before mission execution, the SOTG HQ sends a mission SPTREQ to the
SOCC for the asset support required for an operation. This is to maximize the probability that
assets will be available for the mission. In some instances (e.g. time-sensitive or trigger-based
operations), the request may be submitted inside the 72-hour window requiring the SOCC to
adjudicate the request and leverage the SOCC’s influence to support the operation. In the case
of support from outside of the SOCC, direct liaison between the SOTG HQ and the supporting
or providing component or element may be granted after SOCC staff action of the SPTREQ.
The SPTREQ should list all SOTG HQ support requirements and desired capabilities, not
assets or organizations. The SOTG HQ may submit additional SPTREQs as required. If follow-
on support is necessary, the SOTG HQ submits a SPTREQ to the SOCC, as soon as possible,
requesting follow-on support for a task element conducting an operation.

PRECEDENCE:
DTG:
FROM:
TO:
INFO:
CLASSIFICATION:

SPTREQ (Serial number) OP (NAME)

References:

A. SOCC HQ FRAGO/01 dated (if provided)

B. SOTG HQ FRAGO/01 dated (if utilized)
C. CONOPS name and/or number (at a minimum)

Time zone used throughout SPTREQ: (ZULU)

Repeat paragraphs 1‒6 for each asset requested.

1. Type of Support Requested. Indicate whether the SPTREQ is for:

a. Personnel. Personnel augmentation, including skill requirements, number of

personnel requested, and any pertinent additional information.

b. Operations. Delivery, resupply, recovery, offshore rendezvous, terminal

guidance, etc. Specify the requirement and type of operation (infiltration, resupply,
recovery, etc.), DTG for execution (specify by type of event, such as a time on target for
insertion), method of execution (airdrop, lock-in/lock-out, etc.), indicate number of
personnel and amount of cargo, and specify procedures used and type of parachute (if
applicable) for airdrop requests.

G-11-1
NSHQ 80-003

c. Training. Ranges, materiel, aircraft, vessels, etc. Identify specific training

requirements that are beyond organic capabilities; specify any joint preparation required
(including mission rehearsals), include times and dates.

d. Administration and Logistics. Materiel, services, facilities, etc. Identify specific

administrative or logistic requirements that are beyond organic capabilities (refer to
OPLAN, annexes, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or SORs (if applicable);
include times and dates.

2. Supporting Agency. When applicable or when requesting multiple assets, clearly

indicate what capability is required for an operation. If support from certain elements is
generally acknowledged, provide information related to the element(s), including coordination.

3. Number of Personnel. Indicate number of personnel requiring support.

4. Cargo. Include materiel carried for infiltration and/or resupply. Note: If the cargo is
hazardous, indicate how the materiel and supplies will be delivered (door bundle with
parachute, free fall, pallet airdrop, etc.), and the type of parachute, number of bundles, and total
weight, if applicable and as required for the type of support.

5. Location. Identify or request a point, site, or zone. Refer to a specific reception site or
beach landing site nomination or confirmation message, or specifically request the supporting
agency to nominate primary and alternate sites. Transmit sufficient data to positively identify
locations.

6. Comments. Include any additional information that will assist with coordination or
special requirements not identified in a previous paragraph (e.g. on-load and offload locations;
pilot, aircrew, and team briefing requirements; drop altitude − above ground level; parachute
opening altitude).

G-11-2
NSHQ 80-003

ANNEX H TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

LOGISTICS PREPARATION OF THE THEATRE32

1. Logistics preparation of the theatre (LPT) is a key tool available to the commander and
his planners in building a flexible operational SUPPLAN. It is designed to optimize logistics by
analysing countries or geographic regions and anticipating basing requirements, selecting and
evaluating LOCs, identifying available resources for use by friendly forces and ensuring access
to them, and projecting stock assets. The aim for SOF logistics planners is to reduce the cost of
moving supplies, equipment, and people into an objective or contingency area; provide for the
timely arrival of logistics assets, which is balanced according to the mission; and allow better
use of scarce strategic lift capabilities.

2. Ideally, the process is an ongoing effort during planning Phase 1, Situation Awareness,
and is focused on countries or theatres of interest to SOF. It is impossible to anticipate every
contingency, so the LPT for a given SOF deployment may begin when the country or
geographic region is directed. Logistics planners build a logistics information database that may
be used for developing the concept of support for the SOCC’s OPLAN. Because it is a complex
and time-consuming function, logisticians cannot afford to wait until deployment begins to start
the LPT. Anticipation by logistics planners, at all command levels, can preclude inserting forces
into a completely bare base of operations.

3. The logistics planner must not underestimate the time and resources required to
accomplish this level of detailed analysis and planning. It may be necessary to collaborate with
other components, HQs, or elements, depending on the situation. Once completed, the LPT is
a living document that is in a continual state of review, refinement, and use. It should be used
as the basis for negotiations, and the commander should use it routinely when performing the
planning functions, especially in forces deployment planning and HNS negotiations.

4. The focus of the logistics elements of information development process is on supply and
field services; however, a detailed LPT should collect information on all logistics areas and if
available, coordinate with the SOCC engineer. There is no specific format for an LPT but topics
for consideration include:

a. Geography. Climate and terrain in the AOO to determine types of equipment

needed and when. For example, the use of water information to determine the need for
such things as early deployment of water production, filtration, and distribution units.

b. Supply. Items that are readily available in the AOO and can be used in support of
forces. Subsistence items (Class I: fresh food and (bottled) water), bulk petroleum, and
barrier materials are the most common.

c. Facilities and Services. Availability and limitations of warehousing, cold storage

facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities,
sanitation capabilities, and hotels.

32The genesis for this appendix was derived from ALP-4.2(A), pp. 4-4 – 4-5, and modified for use by SOCC
logistics planners.

H-1
NSHQ 80-003

d. Transportation. Road and rail nets, inland waterways, airfields, truck availability,
bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, and materials handling equipment
(MHE), as well as traffic flow, choke points, and control problems.

e. Maintenance. Maintenance facilities that could support NATO equipment. For

example, does the country have adequate machine works for possible repair parts, or
does the country have dealers for the supply of spare parts for military equipment?

f. Medical Aspects. Information on all health-threatening aspects and necessary

preventive medicine programmes related to the JOA; availability of medical facilities,
especially acceptable Role 3 capacity.

g. General Skills. Skills of the general population of the country. Are interpreters
available? Will a general labour pool be available? What skills are available that can be
used in logistics support operations? For instance, will drivers, clerks, MHE operators,
food service personnel, guards, mechanics, and longshoremen be available?

h. Political Situation. Willingness or resistance of trade unions and/or civil workers

to support armed forces or military operations.

H-2
NSHQ 80-003

ANNEX I TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

LOGISTICS ESTIMATE

1. Background. During the planning phase of an operation, it is essential to produce a

logistics estimate to provide a sound basis for supporting the operation. Relevant information
must be evaluated prior to making planning decisions, taking initial action, or the further conduct
of an operation. The logistics estimate outline below is an ideal format and may be modified to
support the SOTG’s planning requirements. During hasty or accelerated SDMP, the estimate
may be streamlined to meet planning requirements. Logistics data is also required to assist in
CPOE and focuses on the operational environment (e.g. geography, infrastructure, climate,
demography). There is no specific format for the logistics estimate, but the key elements and
broad sequence of the logistics estimate are:

a. COM SOTG’s mission (not dealt with below).

b. The logistic determinants (the four Ds: destination, distance, duration, and
demand).

c. Key factors.

d. Principal logistic deductions (including subordinate commands’ input).

e. Logistic courses open.

f. Logistic recommendations.

2. Logistic Determinants. The key operational parameters are defined in the format
below.

a. Destination

(1) Environment and climate

(2) Infrastructure

(3) Geography

b. Distance

(1) Strategic LOC from strategic base to AOO

(2) In JOA LOCs

(3) Support/mounting/logistic bases and available transport

(4) Strategic lift requirements and allocations (air, land, and sea)

(5) Loop time

I-1
NSHQ 80-003

c. Demand. Establishing the demand requirements (steady, cyclical, surge)

depends to a large extent on the overall strategic and operational planning. A close
liaison with the SOCC J5 is required.

(1) Mission and tasks

(2) CONOPS

(a) Shore-based maritime support facilities

(b) Potential land conflict/intensity/equipment utilization

(c) Air basing plot/sortie rate

(3) C2

(4) HNS

(5) Combat arms and combat support options

(a) Maritime component

(b) Land component

(c) Air component

(6) Deployment options

(7) Classes of supply

d. Duration (Time, Volume, Risk, Endurance)

(1) Deployment

(a) Activation

(b) Transportation

(c) RSOM

(2) Operation

(3) Handover

(4) Termination/redeployment

3. Key Factors. The following key factors have to be included with the determinants.

a. Host-nation Support Intentions/Capabilities. Consider in JOA,

FMB/FOB/staging area.

(1) Infrastructure

(a) Movement (airport of debarkation/seaport of debarkation)

I-2
NSHQ 80-003

(b) Medical

(c) Communications

(d) Utilities

(e) Facilities (ports, warehousing, storage)

(f) Real estate/accommodation

(2) Freedom of movement/transit permission

(3) Medical assistance

(4) Services

(a) Transport/MHE lease/hire

(b) Lifting capabilities

(c) Freight containers

(d) Recovery and maintenance

(e) Civilian labour

(f) Accommodation

(5) Food and agriculture

(6) Civil disaster response

(7) Industrial preparedness

(8) Classes of supply

(a) Food

(b) Water

(c) Spare parts

(d) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants

(e) Ammunition

b. Multinational Intentions, Capabilities

(1) Establishment of an NSE, location and capabilities

(2) Establishment of a JLSG, location, capabilities, and C2

(3) Strategic transport and transport coordination

(4) Transit, storage, and handling

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(5) Supply classes as above

(6) Maintenance

(7) Medical

(8) Infrastructure

(9) Troop welfare

(10) Laundry

(11) Postal service

(12) Procurement and contracting

(13) Legal support

c. United Nations Intentions/Capabilities. As specified for multinational intentions,

capabilities.

d. Third Party Logistic Capabilities. As specified for multinational intentions,

capabilities.

e. Threat

(1) LOC

(2) Potential rear area

f. Humanitarian Demands

g. Dates/Timing

(1) Earliest

(2) Latest

h. Command and Control Options

(1) JLSG

(2) Support command

(3) RSOM

(4) Military logistic units

(5) NSE

i. Required Logistic End State

(1) Residual commitments on handover

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(2) Termination/redeployment

j. Summary of Likely Logistics Tasks

(1) Resources required

(2) Potential shortfalls

4. Principle Logistic Deductions. Subordinate commands are requested to provide

information about logistics and CSS: sustainability options, resupply requirements, relief
options and impacts, and in-theatre localities and LOCs. On receipt of subordinate commands’
comments, the operational HQ consolidates its findings and draws out the following
deductions/tasks:

a. Sustainment

(1) Levels

(2) Shortfalls

(3) Impact

b. Logistic/Combat Service Support Order of Battle

(1) Levels

(2) Shortfalls

(3) Impact

c. Multinational Issues

(1) Coordination

(2) Cooperation

(3) Role specialized nation

(4) Lead nation

(5) Military logistic units

(6) Multinational support agreements

d. Host-nation Support

e. Forward Mounting Base/Forward Operating Base

f. Time and Space

g. Command and Control

(1) JTF logistical combat operations centre

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(2) JLSG at JTF level

(3) Support command

(4) Military logistical units

(5) NSE

h. Logistical Communications and Information Systems. Use of LOGFAS.

i. Showstoppers

j. Tasks

(1) Specific (among others)

(a) Surveillance and intelligence

(b) Military exercising and training

(c) Pre-emptive deployment/show of force

(d) Preparation of deployment of additional forces

(e) Maritime embargo

(f) National evacuations support

(g) Support to humanitarian aid operations

(2) Implied (among others)

(a) Perform reconnaissance tasks/deploy operational liaison and

reconnaissance team.

(b) Perform RSOM tasks and staging areas activation.

(c) Ensure HNS agreements.

(d) Provide supply, medical, and infrastructure for humanitarian

aid/identify IOs/NGOs capabilities and needs.

(e) Ensure lines of supply and logistic support in definite areas.

(f) Set up FOB in specific areas.

(g) Set up safe havens for refugees.

5. Courses Open/Variables. Consider each of the deductions for each option.

6. Recommendations

a. COA

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b. Reconnaissance requirements

c. FMB/FOB

d. Logistic/CSS ORBAT

e. Scope for logistic concept (e.g. logistic main effort, logistic priorities, main logistics)

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ANNEX J TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

LEXICON

PART 1. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC air component command

ACO air coordination order
ACM airspace control means
ACMREQ airspace control means request
ACP airspace control plan
AFC assault force commander
AFS ACO Forces Standards
AIRSUPREQ air support request
AIS automated information system
ALO air liaison officer
AMCC Allied movement coordination centre
AMSL above mean sea level
AOI area of interest
AOO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
ASC all-source centre
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ASTO Afghan Security Theatre of Operations
ATC air traffic control
ATO air tasking order

BDA battle damage assessment

BICES Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems
BSM battlespace management
BSO battlespace owner

C2 command and control

C2IS command and control information system
CAOC combined air operations centre
CARVER criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and
recognizability
CAS close air support
CAT crisis action team
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CAX computer-assisted exercise
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CC component command
CCIR commander's critical information requirement
CCIRM collection coordination and intelligence requirements management
CDE collateral damage estimate
CEOI communications and electronics operating instructions
CET combat enhancement training
CJSOR combined joint statement of requirements

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CI counter-intelligence
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIS communication and information systems
CIVCAS civilian casualty
CND computer network defence
COA course of action
COG centre of gravity
COI community of interest
COM commander
COMINT communications intelligence
COMPUSEC computer security
COMSEC communications security
CONOPS concept of operations
COS chief of staff
CPG commander’s planning guidance
CPOE comprehensive preparation of the operational environment
CRU crisis response unit
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSS combat service support
CT counterterrorism
CTG commander task group
CUIL common user item list

DA direct action
DAR disabled aircraft recovery
DDS dry-deck shelter
DOS days of supply
DTG date-time group

ECAS emergency close air support

ELINT electronic intelligence
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
E&R evasion and recovery
EW electronic warfare

F2UID find, feel, understand, influence, and disrupt

F3EAD find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate
FAC forward air controller
FAC-A forward air controller (airborne)
FARP forward arming and refuelling point
FFA fire-free area
FIT force integration training
FMB forward mounting base
FMV full-motion video
FN framework nation
FOB forward operating base
FP force protection
FRAGO fragmentary order
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FULLCOM full command

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FW fixed-wing

GCCS global command and control system

GEOINT geospatial intelligence
GFC ground force commander
GPS global positioning system

HAF heliborne assault force

HAHO high-altitude, high-opening
HALO high-altitude, low-opening
HF high frequency
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HPT high pay-off target
HQ headquarters
HVI high-value individual
HVT high-value target
HUMINT human intelligence

IED improvised explosive device

IMINT imagery intelligence
Info Ops information operations
INFOSEC information security
INTREP intelligence report
INTSUM intelligence summary
IO international organization
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
IR information requirement
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance

JCCC joint communication and information systems control centre

JCO joint coordination order
JIC joint intelligence centre
JISE joint intelligence support element
JLSG joint logistics support group
JOA joint operations area
JOC joint operations centre
JPTL joint prioritized target list
JSOA joint special operations area
JTAC joint terminal attack controller
JTAR joint tactical air request
JTCB joint targeting coordination board
JTF joint task force
JTL joint target list

km kilometre

LAN local area network

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LCC land component command

LEGAD legal advisor
LN lead nation
LO liaison officer
LOAC law of armed conflict
LOC lines of communication
LOGFAS logistic functional area services
LPT logistics preparation of the theatre

MA military assistance
MCC maritime component command
MCT mobile command team
METOC meteorological and oceanographic
MEDAD medical advisor
MEDCAP medical civic action programme
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEDSEM medical seminar
MEO mission execution order
MHE materials handling equipment
MIO maritime interdiction operation
MISREP mission report
MND multinational division
MSO maritime special operation
MTF medical treatment facility

NA5CRO non-Article 5 crisis response operation

NAC North Atlantic Council
NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO non-commissioned officer
NCS NATO command structure
NFA no-fire area
NGO non-governmental organization
NIC national intelligence centre
NM nautical miles
NRF NATO Response Force
NRT near real-time
NSHQ NATO Special Operations Headquarters
NSE national support element
NSL no-strike list
NTISR non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

op operation
OPSCEN operations centre
OPCOM operational command
OPCON operational control
OPG operations planning group
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OPSUM operations summary

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OSC on-scene commander

OSINT open-source intelligence

PA public affairs
PDSS pre-deployment site survey
PIO public information officer
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PGM precision-guided munitions
POLAD political advisor
POL pattern of life
POW prisoner of war
PR personnel recovery
PsyOps psychological operations
PTL prioritized target list
PTSD post-traumatic stress disorder

QRF quick reaction force

RECCE reconnaissance
RFA restricted fire area
RFI request for information
RIP relief in place
RLS real-life support
ROE rules of engagement
ROVER remotely operated video enhanced receiver
ROZ restricted operating zone
RPV remotely piloted vehicle
RSOM reception, staging, and onward movement
RTL restricted target list
RW rotary wing

SA situational awareness
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAF surface assault force
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SATCOM satellite communications
SCUBA self-contained underwater breathing apparatus
SDV swimmer-delivery vehicle
SFSG special forces support group
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHF super-high frequency
SITREP situation report
SIGINT signal intelligence
SLAR sideways looking aperture radar
SME subject matter expert
SNS sympathetic nervous system
SOAC special operations air command
SOALI special operations air land integration
SOATG special operations air task group
SOATU special operations air task unit
SOBTG special operations boat task group

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SOCC special operations component command

SOCCE special operations command and control elements
SOCC-P2 special operation component command planning process
SOCM special operations combat medic
SOF special operations forces
SOFAD special operations forces advisor
SOIC special operations intelligence centre
SOIDM special operations independent duty medic
SOLE special operations liaison element
SOLTG special operations land task group
SOLTU special operations land task unit
SOM scheme of manoeuvre
SOMTG special operations maritime task group
SOMTU special operation maritime task unit
SOP standard operating procedure
SOPLE special operations planning and liaison element
SOR statement of requirements
SOST special operations surgical team
SOTG special operations task group
SOTU special operations task unit
SPINS special instructions
SPTREQ support request
SR special reconnaissance
SSE sensitive site exploitation
STANAG NATO Standardization Agreement
SUPPLAN support plan

TAC terminal attack control

TACOM tactical command
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TACSATCOM tactical satellite communications
TAI target area of interest
TCDL tactical common datalink
TCN troop-contributing nation
TD tactical directive
TEO technical exploitation operation
TIC troops in contact
TIP target intelligence package
TOA transfer of authority
TOC tactical operations centre
TOO theatre of operations
TPED tasking, processing, exploitation, dissemination
TST time-sensitive target
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF ultra-high frequency

VoI vessel of interest

VoIP voice over Internet protocol

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WAN wide area network

WIA wounded in action
WMD weapon of mass destruction
WNGO warning order

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PART 2. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Key Term Definition

agency In intelligence usage, an organization or individual engaged in
collecting and/or processing information.
all-source intelligence Intelligence products and activities that incorporate all
sources of information, most frequently including human
resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement
and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-
source data in the production of finished intelligence.
analysis In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the
intelligence cycle in which information or intelligence is
subjected to review to identify significant facts for subsequent
interpretation.
area of intelligence interest An area in which a commander requires intelligence on those
factors and developments likely to affect the outcome of his
current or future operations.
area of intelligence An area allocated to a commander in which he is responsible for
responsibility the provision of intelligence within the means at his disposal.
basic intelligence Intelligence, on any subject, which may be used as reference
material for planning and as a basis for processing
subsequent information or intelligence.
collection The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the
delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate
processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.
commander’s critical CCIRs comprise information requirements identified by the
information requirements commander as being critical in facilitating timely information
(CCIR) management and the decision-making process that affect
successful mission accomplishment. The two key
subcomponents are critical friendly force information and
priority intelligence requirements.
common operational picture A single identical display of relevant information shared by
(COP) more than one command. A COP facilitates collaborative
planning and assists all echelons to achieve SA.
communications Intelligence derived from electromagnetic communications
intelligence (COMINT) and communications systems by other than intended
recipients or users. COMINT is typically derived through the
interception of communications and datalinks. Such
information may be collected in verbal form by the reception
of broadcast radio messages, by the interception of point-to-
point communications such as telephones and radio relay
links, or as data through the interception of either broadcast
or point-to-point data down links.
counter-intelligence Those activities that are concerned with identifying and
counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile
intelligence services or organizations or by individuals
engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.

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Key Term Definition

current intelligence Intelligence that reflects the current situation at either
strategic or tactical level.
direction Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the
collection effort, issuing of orders and requests to collection
agencies, and maintenance of a continuous check.
dissemination The timely conveyance of information or intelligence, in an
appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who
need it.
electronic intelligence ELINT is intelligence derived from electromagnetic non-
communication transmissions by other than intended
recipients or users.
evaluation In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the
intelligence cycle constituting appraisal of an item of
information in respect of the reliability of the source and the
credibility of the information.
geospatial intelligence The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial
information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical
features and geographically referenced activities on the
Earth.
high pay-off target A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute
to the success of the friendly COA. Time-sensitive and
component-critical targets are usually special types of HPTs.
high-value targets A target the enemy commander requires for the successful
completion of the mission. The loss of HVTs would be
expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions
throughout the friendly commander’s AOI.
human intelligence A category of intelligence derived from information collected
and provided by human sources.
imagery Collectively, the representations of objects reproduced
electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display
devices, or other media.
imagery intelligence IMINT is intelligence derived from imagery acquired by
sensors which can be ground based, seaborne, or carried by
air or space platforms. The information conveyed by an
image that is clear and concise will often serve to
corroborate intelligence derived from other sources. The
bulk of IMINT is derived from sources such as satellites,
aircraft, and RPVs.
indicator In intelligence, an item of information that reflects the intention
or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a COA.
information Unprocessed data of every description that may be used in
the production of intelligence.
information operations Coordinated actions to influence decision-making of adversaries
(Info Ops) in support of the NATO Alliance’s overall objectives by affecting
their information, information-based processes, and systems
while exploiting and protecting one’s own.

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Key Term Definition

infrared imagery Imagery produced as a result of sensing electromagnetic
radiations emitted or reflected from a given target surface in
the infrared position of the electromagnetic spectrum
(approximately 0.72 to 1,000 microns).
integration A step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle
whereby analysed information and/or intelligence is selected
and combined into a pattern in the course of the production of
further intelligence.
intelligence The product resulting from the processing of information
concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The
term is also applied to the activity that results in the product
and to the organizations engaged in such activity.
intelligence summary A specific report providing a summary of items of intelligence
at frequent intervals.
interoperability The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to
and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and
to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate
effectively together.
interpretation The final step in the processing phase of the intelligence
cycle where the significance of information and/or intelligence
is judged in relation to the current body of knowledge.
ISR massing Two or more ISR assets used to detect or track enemy
actions. When the enemy is massed, detection is made
simpler and ISR can be spread about; conversely, when the
enemy is dispersed, detection potential is reduced and ISR
must be massed to be effective.
near-real time Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information that has
been delayed by the time required for electronic
communication and automatic data processing. This implies
that there are no significant delays.
nodal analysis Spatially connecting relationships between places and people
by tracking their patterns of life. While the enemy moves from
point to point, airborne ISR tracks and notes every location
and person visited. Connections between those sites and
persons to the target are built, and nodes in the enemy’s low-
contrast network emerge.
non-traditional ISR The use of fighter aircraft and their targeting pods to provide
(NTISR) tactical reconnaissance of targets. This ISR mission is useful
for helping to cross-cue targets for additional accuracy.
open source intelligence OSINT is intelligence derived from publicly available information,
as well as other unclassified information that has limited public
distribution or access. OSINT is collected from sources such as
the media, state propaganda, learned journals, technical
papers, the Internet, technical manuals, and books.
operational intelligence Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of
campaigns at the operational level.

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Key Term Definition

priority intelligence Intelligence requirements for which a commander has an
requirements anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and
decision-making.
processing The conversion of information into intelligence through
collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.
protective security The organized system of defensive measures instituted and
maintained at all levels of command with the aim of achieving
and maintaining security.
reach-back The process of obtaining products, services, and applications,
or forces, equipment, or materiel from air force organizations
that are not forward deployed.
reconnaissance A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other
(RECCE) detection methods, information about the activities and
resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area.
security The condition achieved when designated information,
materiel, personnel, activities, and installations are protected
against espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism, as
well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure.
security intelligence Intelligence on the identity, capabilities, and intentions of
hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be
engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.
sensor A piece of equipment that detects and may indicate and/or
record objects and activities by means of energy or particles
emitted, reflected, or modified by objects.
signals intelligence (SIGINT) A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in
combination all communications intelligence, electronic
intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence,
however transmitted.
source In intelligence usage, a person from whom or thing from
which information can be obtained.
strategic intelligence Intelligence required for the formation of policy, military
planning, and the provision of indications and warning, at the
national and/or international levels.
subversion Action designed to weaken the military, economic, or political
strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty, or
reliability of its citizens.
surveillance The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or
subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural,
electronic, photographic, or other means.
tactical intelligence Intelligence required for the planning and execution of
operations at the tactical level.
target acquisition The detection, identification, and location of a target in
sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of
weapons.

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Key Term Definition

targeting The process of selecting targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, taking account of operational
requirements and capabilities.
target intelligence Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a
target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and
relative importance. Target intelligence provides the targeting
data for the targeting process. This process ensures that the
most effective use is made of offensive fire support systems.
terrorism The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence
against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or
intimidate governments or societies to achieve political,
ethnic, religious, or ideological objectives.
vehicle follow Tracking vehicle movements from the air and is important to
defeating the enemy network and generating fix-finish operations.
Also important to building pattern of life and nodal analysis.

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ANNEX K TO
NSHQ SOTG MANUAL
DATED 6 FEB 15

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

The following bibliography lists the Allied publications and other documents related to this
publication. It is provided to supplement the reader’s knowledge of special air warfare and
special operations. Unless otherwise noted, only ratified and promulgated publications are
listed.

Publication Title Date

AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 29 Apr 14
AAP-15 NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents 5 May 14
and Publications
ACIEDP-01(A) Counter-improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Training 18 Apr 13
Requirements
AD 80-70 Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO 27 Apr 10
AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine 21 Dec 10
AJP-2(A) Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security 29 Sep 14
AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 16 Mar 11
AJP-3.5(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 17 Dec 13
AJP-3.9(B)33 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting 2014
AJP-3.10.1(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations 2 Sep 14
ALP-4.2(A) Land Forces Logistic Doctrine 4 Feb 10
ATP-71(A) Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations 20 Sep 13
MC 437/2 Special Operations Policy 21 Apr 11
MC 324/3 The NATO Military Command Structure 30 Jan 13
STANAG Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers and Laser 4 Feb 14
3797 Operators in Support of Forward Air Controllers, Edition 6
STANAG Tactical Data Exchange – Link 16, Edition 4 29 Sep 08
5516
Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations 4 Oct 13
Planning Directive, Interim V2.0
Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements Oct 11
Bi-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines 22 Feb 11
NATO SOF Training and Education Programme Planning Jul 14
Handbook

33In Sep 14, NSHQ J10 made the decision that the NSHQ will use the pre-ratified AJP-3.9(B) as the primary
reference in all NSHQ publications that make reference to the NATO SOF targeting cycles of F2UID and F3EAD.

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SOALI Manual 7 Jul 14

SOCC Manual 20 Oct 14
Special Air Warfare Manual 27 Mar 12

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