MODULE 1: EXECUTIVE PROTECTION MANAGEMENT

Lesson 1- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EXECUTIVE 6

Overview of executive protection management 6
Personal protection barriers 7
Personnel protection 8
Executive protection detail 8
Comprehensive protection 9
Let help mitigation problem and threats. 9
Assessment 11
Lesson 2 - ATTRIBUTES AND QUALITIES OF A GOOD EXECUTIVE 12
PROTECTION MANAGEMENT
10 attributes and qualities of a good executive protection 12
Types of principal for protection 13
Traits of an effective protection agent 14
Assessment 18
Lesson 3 - BASIC TACTICS ON VIP PROTECTION 21
Overview 21
Instructor preparation 22
Training program and basic tactics for VIP executive protection 23
Basic tactics on VIP protection 23
Direct Protection Planning 26
Mobile Protection Planning 27
Static Protection Planning 28
Point Car, Lear Car, Protectee Vehicle 44
Protection Escort Team (PET) Car, Pilot Vehile, Rear Vehicle, 45
Counter Assault Team (CAT) Vehicles
Sweep Car 46
Convoy Internal Communications, Communications with 47
Venues
Communications with other Areas, Radio Call Signs 48
Information Gathering 54
Liaison, Reconnaissance 55
Maps & Plans , Protection Strategy 56
Planning & Tasking Meeting ,Composition ,Planning 57
Development, Site Meetings, Advance Planning, Briefing
Assessment 64
Lesson 4 - DEFENSIVE DRIVING TECHNIQUES FOR EXECUTIVE 65
PROTECTION
Use of Close Protection Vehicle Techniques ( Basic Driving 65
Skills )
Close Protection Drivers, Driver Training 66
General Rule, Choice of Vehicles 67
Risk assessment implications with regards to the use of vehicles 68
The need for alternative transport plans 68
What is Tactical Driving 68
Rules of tactical Driving 69
Vehicle Roadworthy Check 69
VIP Tactical Security Driving 70
Wearing of Seatbelts, One Car Drills 71
Two car drills 72
Vehicle Anti- ambush Drill 73
Summary 81
 LESSON 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EXECUTIVE PROTECTION

MANAGEMENT
Presented below is an overview of personal protection suggestion and
recommendations that should be followed during any period of heightened
threats.

The purposed of this overview is not to:

● Elevate the risk beyond actuality
● Provide anyone with sufficient expertise to repel a direct criminal
or terrorist attack
● Produce and over reaction which may limit your ability to work of
function efficiently
The purposed is to;
● Acquaint you with some of the principles of personal protection ,
including those intended to raise the awareness
● Provide a few hints for emergency situation
Below are some principle of personal protection
● Pay close the attention to the principle of personal protection which
are the needs to be aware and suspicious, to be methodical, to avoid
routine, to utilized good communication and to apply the requisite of
initiative and common sense to all activities which may be the subject.
● All members of your family should exercise the increased level of
awareness and suspicion and should be prepared to summon police
immediately in the event of free text telephone calls, visits, or other
suspicious circumstances, no matter how trivial.
● While maintaining a balance perspective geared to the current level of
threat, all your action and those of your family should be particularly
● You and your family should be particularly alert to the possibility of
surveillance, conducted either as a form of harassment or as a
precursor to further action, in such cases, you should summon police
assistance without hesitation. If driving, you should be prepared to
seek refuge at the nearest safe haven such as police station or other
public area. Under no circumstances should you permit your vehicle
to be followed into an area which may provide and advantage to and
assailant or circumstances conducive to physical assault.
● A precise, evidential log should be maintained dealing alnt should be
included, as well as the identity of those persons available to provide
evidence.
PERSONAL PROTECTION “BARRIERS”

● Used of initiative
● Be consistent
● Disrupt routine
● Used of common sense
● Improve awareness
● Maintain a low profile
● Individual responsibility
● Be aware of surveillance
● Used good communication
Personal Protection Barriers
Personal protection or barriers are procedural barriers used in much the
same ways as physical and technical barriers are employed to protect a house or
company facility. Every time a gate a parameter wall is lift ajar, or windows are
left unsecured, or the door to an inner safe haven is left open. The value and
benefit of that barriers is given away.
Personal protection barriers may not be made or bricks, mortar or solid
hardwood two inches thick, but they are barriers just the same. To carry
analogy further, relinquishing those barriers, so that threats posed to an
individual is increased.
So what are personal protection barriers? As an example consider the
following scenario;
A senior executive is enjoying an excellent meal at fashionable restaurant when
his dining partner looks ups with a strength expression on his or her face and
he feels a hard, metal object placed against the side of his head. He manages to
looks around momentarily and notices that the object is automatic pistol held by
man standing to one side. Conversation in the restaurant is subdued.
What could this incident mean in term of unnecessarily relinquishing barriers?
● The executive came to notice in the first place because he failed to
maintain a low profile.
● He lacked awareness because, although he obviously was the subject of
criminal planning including surveillance, he failed to notice it.
● He may have been aware of one or more threats, but as in the had
decided to ignore them
● He probably operated a fixed and predictable routine and stuck to
inadequate procedure
● He failed to notice the onset of the attack until the gun was place against
his head again lax procedures and lacks of awareness.
● Finally, he probably took no last ditch action when gun was pointing at
him, he failed to recover from surprise and maintain the initiative. When
fast aggressive action was called for, he sat there waiting for the
inevitable.
So personal protection barriers can include:
● Maintaining a low profile
● Utilizing awareness training
● Selecting a dominant and all- seeing position in restaurant
● Avoiding fixed and predictable routine
● Using initiative and common sense
● Recovering from surprise and maintaining the initiative
● Life Saving tactics

Other barriers can be include using good communication, engineering a

positive attitudes toward the threats and security procedures being methodical,
consistent and so on.
Personnel Protection
In Personnel Protection: Security Personnel, the presenters discuss the
critically important task of selecting and training security personnel for
executive protection duties. Criteria for hiring security personnel will vary based
on the responsibilities of the position, and may also vary depending on whether
the position is contract or proprietary. For example, the requirements and
training for a security officer guarding a fixed post differ from that of a security
officer assigned as a driver. The training requirements for security personnel and
the need for proper training documentation are also discussed in detail. The
main messages of this presentation are that the selection criteria for individuals
assigned to executive security duties are justifiably high and must never be
compromised, and training must be ongoing.
Executive protection Detail
High profile clients depend on P4 Security Solutions for comprehensive
executive protection services and solutions. The experience of our management
team and executive protection specialists/bodyguards is unrivaled in providing
executive security to our specialized clientele. Our proven methodology sets us
apart from other executive protection companies, providing security in a broad
spectrum of situations and events. P4 Security Solutions delivers one-source
security solutions in areas affecting both human and other physical resources.
Executive security measures taken to ensure the safety of VIPs who may be
exposed to elevated personal risk because of their employment, celebrity status,
wealth, associations or geographical location is extremely specialized. Our
protective measures are broad: home security systems, executive protection
specialists/bodyguards, armored vehicles and vehicle scramble plans, mail
screening, private jet travel, background checks for other employees, as well as
other additional precautions to keep our clients safe.
Our client’s safety and peace of mind is our main objective. We provide
executive protective services to anyone in the public eye, including family
members,
Partners, assistants and other companions. We perform advance work, detailed
intelligence gathering and deploy the most experienced specialized security
professionals in the industry. Close protection for executives is implemented in
public and private settings, whether stationary or in transit.
A primary focus is on planning routes, advance room sweeps in buildings
where our clients will be visiting, researching the backgrounds of people that will
have contact with the client, searching vehicles, and attentively escorting the
client on their day-to-day activities.
Comprehensive Executive Protection Services
Our core belief is that the best security is based upon advanced planning and
preparedness, working with local law enforcement and getting the most accurate
and up-to-date information available. Our company and staff have years of
experience guarding executives, celebrities, diplomats and VIPs – with a stellar
track record. Our bodyguard’s qualifications and credentials demonstrate both
specialized training in related military applications and law enforcement. We
work seamlessly in the background, we are always present and we blend in with
every event and situation, matching ourselves to the specific styles, needs and
schedules of the person or group that we are protecting.
P4 Security Solutions’ capabilities were developed to exceed our clients'
expectations by securing intellectual property and human assets. Our
experience in any category of asset protection is unparalleled. We maintain a
team of subject matter experts with accessibility to cutting edge tactics and
resources, providing either full-scale security management or seamlessly
working alongside an existing security team.
Our team’s experience covers a multitude of situations and protection for
clients that may be in the spotlight or require exceptional security.
WHY CHOOSE US?
We have successfully implemented security protocols in high-risk
environments maneuvering through all obstacles and complexities. Our staff
has received extensive specialty training for security strategies, threat
assessments, legal authority, defensive tactics and more. The extensive
experience of our management team and our executive protection
specialists/bodyguards is unrivaled by our competitors. We work closely together
to provide a seamless and unobtrusive hedge of protection for our executive
clients. Our customer service exceeds expectations and our costs are extremely
competitive.

LET US HELP MITIGATE PROBLEMS AND THREATS

If you have been thinking about whether you need executive protection
services or have an upcoming situation or event.
We are a state certified security contractor and investigation agency.
Security Solutions clients depend on our consistent delivery of comprehensive
protective services for a broad spectrum of situations, events and investigations
that are needed in today’s corporate, social and political climate.
P4 Security Solutions (P4S) has developed comprehensive Executive
Protection services and solutions which can be implemented globally. The
experience of or management team and protection specialists is unrivaled in
providing world-class personal protective services to executive clientele.
We provide executive protection services to anyone in the public eye,
including family members, partners, assistants and other companions. Our
process includes: route planning, site advances of locations clients will be
visiting, researching the backgrounds of people that will have contact with the
client, vehicle searches, and seamless client escort throughout daily activities.
 Our core belief is that the best security is based upon advanced planning and
preparedness, working with local law enforcement and getting the most accurate
and up-to-date information available. Our company and staff have years of
experience protecting executives, celebrities, diplomats, and VIPs – with a stellar
track record. Our protection specialists come from highly trained and specialized
units from both military and law enforcement communities. They are all vetted
and certified, credentialed, and maintain the highest training and clearance
standards.
 LESSON 2
ATTRIBUTES AND QUALITIES OF A GOOD EXECUTIVE PROTECTION
MANAGEMENT

TEN ATTRIBUTES AND QUALITIES OF A GOOD EXECUTIVE PROTECTION

MANAGEMENT

1. Military Training and Experience – Since you are hired as a body guard
mainly for protection, it is very necessary that your body guard as some military,
Police, or other security guard related experience will quickly adapt to working
with you and well easily perform his duties, which are majorly four -observed,
detect, deter and report.

2. Good Communication Skills- A good protection management professional

must have a very good communication skills-verbal gestural, and otherwise, he
must be able to communicate effectively, accurately, confidently, and eloquently.
Also, and executive protection professional must have a great listening skills
without these, chances are, he would misconstrue assignment and commit may
blunders.

3. Good Writing Skills- An executive protection professional must have a

very good in writing skills .This is because he well regularly deal with reports,
memos email, and other written materials throughout his career .he should be
able to write in simple, easy to understand and grammatically flawless in
English.

4. Good Costumer service experience- Because your bodyguard will most of

the time pick your calls and attends to your guest, he is saddled with the task of
making of excellent first impression about you. So hire someone with courtesy.
Only professional with very good human relation skills well help you to establish
a good reputation. Of course, you don’t want to hire a bodyguard that no one
likes to communicate with due to his lack of courtesy.

5. Good judgment and decision making skills- An ideal protection

professional must know how to deal with a bad behavior, crisis and attack
against your person and assets. To be able to act fast and handle this situation
Professional, the executive protection professional must have as very good sense
of judgment. Hiring of bodyguard with weak sense of judgment could be
dangerous such a person may get confused and be too slow to act during crises.
6. Good driving Skills- An executive professional must be legally authorized
to drive a vehicle. That is, he must hold a valid driver license. He must also have
defensive driving skills. In other words, he must know how to drive
professionally to save lives (for instance, during crises) money property, and
time. The National Safety Councils Defensive Driving Course is aimed at
teaching individual strategic and de3fensive driving skills. So, you may want to
hire someone who undergone this course.
7. Computer Literacy- It is a very importance that an executive protection
professional understands basic computer skills at least. He should be able to
surf the internet for search for any needed information. He should be able to
create and manage relevant files on a computers. And should be able to use
various software packages.
8. Fitness and sound health- although having huge muscle that could
intimidate people is not necessary, and executive protection professional should
be a very sound health. That is, he should rarely have health problem. Also, an
executive protection professional must be physically fit. Though he may not be
very muscular, he should not look flabby and should have a smart appearance.
9. Ability to handled Firearms- Sometime, some situations may warrant the
use of firearms to protect your life. And executive protection management must
understand this and must be skilled with the used of various firearms and other
self- defense device. Most of the time, professional who have undergone adequate
military training are very good at handling guns and other protective weapon.
10. Martial art skills- Sometimes, you may not need guns and other weapon
to save your life. In such cases, some martial arts skills will rescue you perfectly.
So it, is a very important that your bodyguard has these skills. Also in our
country laws may prohibit bodyguard and other civilians from carrying guns and
similar firearms. So it is advisable you check with your state policy before
arming your guard.

TYPES OF PRINCIPAL FOR PROTECTION

1. Political principal- Political principal primarily face danger from fanatic
and activist who differ in philosophical view from their own, the executive
protection job become doubly difficult if the principal himself is fanatical in his
or her view. Nevertheless, once you accept the job, it is your obligation to protect
and care for the safety and comport of you principal. You are often dealing with
emotionally charge issues. It is a much more volatile climate to work in. An
intruder well often be fanatical and irrational and have no regards to for the
consequences of his or her action for himself or herself or the consequences of
other. Often the intruder goals is to make a big scene in order to attack the press
and bring as much attention to his or her views as possible.
The threats in the political area of the executive protection may include
attempt to spit on and /or insult and demean you principal in other way,
throwing paint or bloods, with guns, knives, or clubs and bombs and other
terrorist action. The perpetrator may plan in attack in advance or it may be the
result of emotional outburst. This category usually houses the most
unpredictable intruders. Their desires are fueled by emotion rather than
common sense.
2. Social Principal- The main threats against social principal is kidnapping.
This threats well be most often come from unknown source. Kidnapping is
usually a well -planned and organized attack. It is difficult to predict this type of
attack unless prior threats have been made. As executive protection professional
you must protect your principal from this threats without appearing paranoid to
your principal or causing your principal and his or her family to fearful.
3. Being Prepared- In order to respond effectively to any of the
aforementioned intruders. You must be properly train and properly train you
principal. Of course, it would not very tactful to till your principal that you plan
to train him or her, but the exactly what you must subtly do. Your principal
must know the” Game
Plan” for any given possibility. You might considered approaching your principal
in this way. Say excuse me sir or ma’am at your earliest convenience, could I
speak with you briefly, I would like to get some information from you for my
employer profile. The information well help me to better serve you with the
smallest amount intrusion into you daily routine. Then get your principal to
commit to a specific time.
The following are some question that you might ask when you have you
executive protection professional interview. All knowledge gathered about your
principal well help you better prepare for his or her well being.
1. Ask for the names of all immediate family members, their contact numbers,
addresses and other relevant information.
2.Ask for more information about extended family members living outside the
principals primary residence, parents, grandparent, aunts, uncles, and so on.
3.Assure confidentiality and ask about mistresses’ interest, and so on. This
become even more significant if the principal is married.
4. Find out which car the principal are normally ride in.
5. Ask to what clubs and association the principal are belong.
6. Ask for a list of enemies, possible enemies, business competitors and key
employees
7. Find out any medical problems or medication that the principal take. This
includes foods or drugs allergies.
8. Ask about house -keeping both home and business location, laundry, auto
repair, and other maintenance people. In other words, find out all you can
about peripheral activities.
9. Ask if the principal has or carries of firearms
10. Find out if the principal are used of alcohol or other drugs.
11. Ask about any fetishes the principal they have. Again, assure confidentiality.
12. Find out the principal recreational activities and other interest sports
hobbies and so on.
Note: “LEARN AS MUCH AS U CAN ABOUT YOUR PRINCIPAL:
10 TRAITS OF AN EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE PROTECTION AGENT
A successful Executive Protection Agent should possess a number of
characteristics that can be broadly described as soft skills or personality traits.
We will identify 10 traits that set apart high-performing executive protection
agents from the “less-great”. Many are interrelated; all are important. When an
individual agent displays most or all of these traits strongly, he or she would
make a highly successful executive protection agent – and would also do well in
many other fields.
The first five traits are particularly significant for the special demands of the
protective service industry. Because our overarching goals are to keep our
principals safe, happy and productive no matter where their jobs and other
interests take them, we must consistently come up with solutions to new
challenges, and we spend a lot of time with principals without being their
friends. It requires a certain kind of person to thrive in this context.
The second five traits focus on emotional intelligence, which is also essential
for success in corporate executive protection. We believe these traits apply just
as well to EP agents as they do to CEOs.
1. Resourcefulness
A good executive protection agent needs a special mix of smarts and moxie.
We call it resourcefulness.
 Executive protection teams are often in situations that are completely new.
Changes of venue, tasks, expectations and many other aspects of the job are
commonplace. Even the best Standard Operating Procedure are tested by non-
standard situations. If there is confusion, the executive protection agent is the
one everyone looks to make it all good again.
Resourceful executive protection agents make do with what they’ve got, and
always try to get the best outcome out of any situation. They’re creative problem
solvers, adaptive and quick to think on their feet. They ask for what they need –
and aren’t too shy to ask loudly if that’s what’s required to get the job done.
They always have a Plan B and C. And they never act as if there is anything but
Plan A.
The mental habit of thinking ahead is another characteristic of a resourceful
executive protection agent, for as Seneca pointed out several thousand years
ago, “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity.” Good
executive protection agents make their own luck – and deliver superior results –
through forward thinking. Their approach resembles that of a chess player more
than a checkers fan: They are used to thinking several moves ahead so that they
can shape outcomes proactively rather than deal reactively with adverse
situations. We believe forward thinking is so important to quality executive
protection that we have made it one of our guiding principles – and even part of
our logo.
2. Resilience
Life is full of stress, and bad things happen – also to good executive
protection agents. Resilient executive protection agents aren’t the ones who
never get into tough situations. We all do that. They’re the ones who cope with
adversity and keep the mission on track no matter what. Helplessness is never
an option.
Psychologically, resilient executive protection agents are able to navigate
through emotional turmoil without turning into a shipwreck. They exude a calm
sense of urgency whether everything is business as usual or the situation has
leapt into emergency mode. They have the skills and the mindset to
counterbalance negative emotions with positive ones. Even when others are
succumbing to negativity and pessimism, resilient agents know how and where
to dig deep to find more optimism.
3. Professional commitment
Commitment to the task of serving the principal is an essential part of
executive protection profession.
Good executive protection agents realize that the security, privacy and
productivity of the principal come first, and that the needs of the principal
supersede their own needs. They are able to put their personal preferences aside
and stand by the client no matter what – before, during and after the detail. The
same extends toward the rest of the executive protection team.
Successful executive protection agents also realize that this form of
professional commitment has nothing to do with the interpersonal commitment
that couples promise each other. Professional commitment is a one-way street.
It’s not reciprocal, and it’s not about being the friend of the principal. It’s about
doing the job we are tasked to do in the most professional way possible.
4. Discretion
Executive protection agents doing close protection of a principal are, well,
close to the principal. That closeness extends to all kinds of situations that never
can be taught at an executive protection school. In addition to protecting
principals as they conduct business, agents will often be there when the
principal is traveling, enjoying time with family and friends, and just get on with
his or her life. Complete confidentiality is expected in all matters.
 Through it all, good executive protection professionals must maintain their
integrity and know their place. Sometimes it’s in the foreground and the
principal wants to talk; often it’s in the background, and the principals has no
need to be reminded of their board-mandated 24-7 protection services.
5. Service minded
Executive protection is a service industry. It’s about helping other people
(notably: the paying client who has other options) to meet their needs. It’s not
about you meeting your needs.
If executive protection agents are not comfortable working in a job where the
needs of the client take precedence over their own, then they should start
looking for other work. Because 85% of what we do in corporate executive
protection is directly related to taking care of the client’s requirements for
protection, productivity, comfort and overall well-being. The other 15% of the
time is spent writing up after-action reviews and expense reports.
While executive protection agents might sometimes stay at five-star hotels
and eat at three-star restaurants, they are also the ones who clean up before the
principal arrives and make sure there’s plenty of the principal’s favorite water in
the car. They may have even washed the car between bites of a plastic sandwich.
Some people get the service mentality, others don’t. It’s not so much about
being servile as it is taking ownership of the job and consistently adapting to the
Client’s needs.
Successful executive protection agents do their jobs, and they help others in
the corporate ecosystem to do theirs, too. Because they are service minded, they
know that if they make the principal’s executive assistant, chief of staff, speech
manager or others look good, they too will look good – and the principal will be
more likely to be safe, happy and productive.
6. Self-aware
Executive protection professionals must know their strengths as well as their
weaknesses. In addition to being clear on their own goals and motivation, they
must be able to recognize how their own moods and emotions impact others.
People with a well-developed sense of self-awareness exude self-confidence.
They’re also able to laugh at themselves, and feel no need to over- or
underestimate their own abilities.
7. Self-regulating
Executive protection agents need a high degree of self-regulation in order to
stay open to change and deal with new or ambiguous situations. Good self-
regulation helps them choose their words carefully – and gives them the option
of thinking before reacting.
Great executive protection agents also master another, very particular form of
self-regulation. They are able to remain vigilant for hours on end when
absolutely nothing is happening. Moment by moment situational awareness is
key to protection.
8. Socially skilled
Executive protection agents must be able to work with people and build
relationships in order to make things happen. The best agents are born
networkers who lay the groundwork of solid connections everywhere from the C-
Suite to the hotel kitchen. They find common ground where others find barriers,
and they build good rapport wherever they can.
They’re also excellent communicators who get their message across and have
the persuasiveness to get their way more often than not. They can read a
principal and a situation; they know when it’s time to fade into the background,
when it’s time to engage in conversation; and they understand the difference
between assertiveness and aggression.
9. Empathetic
Empathy starts with being aware of other people’s feelings, then considering
their feelings when we take action. For the executive protection agent, these
“other people” include not only the principal, but everyone else in his or her orbit
– also other folks on the executive protection team.
Empathetic executive protection agents thrive in international corporate
settings. They pick up on verbal and nonverbal cues that express an individual
personality, a corporate culture or an entire nation’s way of relating and doing
business. They recognize the needs of others. And they act accordingly.
But the empathy of good executive protection agents is controlled, not
unrestrained. Controlled empathy enables the successful executive protection
agent to temper warm compassion with cool calculation. We don’t drop protocols
to please the principal. We recognize how people are feeling, and we acknowledge
those feelings through our actions without losing site of the overall program
objectives.
Here, too, good executive protection agents understand that empathy is not
always a two-way street. It’s not about us, or our feelings; it’s about doing the
job in the best way possible.
10. Self-motivated
It is variously called drive, initiative, perseverance and being proactive. Highly
motivated executive protection agents don’t do the job for the money or the
recognition. They achieve for the sake of achievement.
A self-motivated executive protection agent is a good executive protection
agent. He or she maintains an optimistic outlook even when the chips are down. A
high degree of motivation means the performance bar is always on the way up,
and continual improvement is a way of life for the professional executive
protection team.
TRAINING PROGRAM FOR VIP SECURITY EXECUTIVE PROTECTION
MANAGEMENT
Basic tactics on VIP protection
 It is important to understand how Close Protection Operations within the United
Nations should be conducted and how VIPs can support the Protection teams. The
goal is to minimize any exposure to threats through appropriate planning, situation
awareness and reaction.
Planning has to be carried out according to the type of mission. The support of a
VIP to a close protection team can be operated during static, mobile or direct
protection. In any case, VIP members have to be familiar with this vocabulary and
should be able to define clearly the operational principles of each situation and
establish clear coordination mechanisms between the different security actors.
Planning factors are developed.
Planners, and participating units to ensure that:
• Effective coordination can take place
• Resources are allocated and deployed appropriately
• The command structure is defined and understood
• Effective communications are arranged
• All participants are briefed effectively
During the planning phase, it is important to take in consideration the
equipment of the VIP. Operations where risks are confirmed must be carried out
with the appropriate means and vehicles. Firearms and vehicles should also be in
accordance with the Protection team expectations.
Wherever there is a need to support a Close protection team, the assessment,
design and delivery of the operation must be achieved with the maximum efficiency
and to the highest standards. Where threats are manifested, the officers will
focused.
Minimizing the impact on the Protectee by way of extraction from the threat
environment. Where the only option to achieve this is to negate the threat, this
must be done with minimal appropriate use of force and with the purpose of
facilitating the successful extraction of the Protectee from the threat
environment.When the use of firearms is unavoidable, this should be executed with
the highest degree of speed, accuracy and discipline, in accordance with the
Directives of Use of Force of the mission and the VIPs policy.
 Close protection tactics and technics are based on roles, schemas, methodology,
procedures that have to be known by all officers involved in operations. Training
should be delivered to all VIPs before deployment. The role of the drivers has to be
highlighted and should be the focus of the trainers.

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members rests
with the host country. Senior United Nations officials can face an increased risk of
security incidents due to their potentially higher visibility and the fact that they are
often required to issue statements which may make them a focus for hostile
entities. Close protection is a viable tool to mitigate risk to the security and dignity
of United Nations officials.
The deployment of close protection except in the case of the President of the
General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the deputy Secretary-General will be
based upon a specific Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and for travel on official
business only.
 The Protection Officers will therefore not engage in any activity which will
compromise their ability to achieve these aims or which could indeed contribute
towards successful attacks against the Protectee.

The Designated Official in the location to be visited or assigned to remains

accountable for ensuring that the senior DSS personnel in the field, normally the
Chief Security Adviser (CSA) produces the following documents;
• The Security Risk Assessment,
• The Concept of Security
• The Operational Plan
The Concept of Security is a broad overview of the security requirements for the
operation, including arrival and departure protocols, during movement,
Accommodation and office or event location, and medical support. It includes the
division of responsibility between the Host Country and United Nations, the chain
of command for the operation and the intended providers for each requirement. It
also outlines any additional assets not available in country which DSS must source.
The Operational Plan is a detailed schedule of the implementation of the Concept
of Security, with timings and contingencies for each phase of the operation and
emergency actions, communications schedules and contact details and linkage with
host country. The Plan is to be kept strictly confidential and would not normally be
shared beyond the Designated Official, CSA and implementing partners.
Direct Protection Planning
The planning cycle should involve consideration of the following:
• Communication and negotiation with the member state or host nation,
• Ensuring that the threat and risk to a Protectee are correctly identified by the
member state or host nation,
 • Utilizing threat assessments and intelligence to inform the program
undertaken,
• Leveraging the necessary security measures appropriate to the threat and
risks to the Protectee,
• Liaison between the Protectee and the member state or host nation to help in
minimizing the risk, and
• Briefing the Protectee on the threat and risk, and any change in the
intelligence picture.

Mobile Protection Planning

Current threat levels and any relevant intelligence or circumstances that may affect
arrangements for the escort:
• The proposed number and type of vehicles in the convoy
• The standard of the drivers employed
• Departure and arrival times for the venue(s), and whether timings are critical
• Any special requirements, e.g. escort to within 1 mile of venue and then allow
for unescorted covert arrival
• Details of any specific hospital to be used in relation to a Protectee ’s medical
condition (if relevant)
• Suitable hospitals, places of safety and rest areas
The Team Leader will then assess the risk for the escort and consider:
• The number of motorcycles required and experience level of escorting officers
• The deployment of a marked Lead Car and/or Rear Car or four wheel drive
vehicle
• Routes to be used between venues, including alternatives
• Timings
• Traffic conditions anticipated
• Known hazards that may affect the smooth running or security of the escort
• Any tactical considerations at the points of departure or arrival
• Anticipated weather conditions
• Public order issues
• Other environmental factors that may require further control measures
• Relevant reporting lines and codes that will be provided by the convoy to the
Watch Officer or command element.
 Static Protection Planning
•
•The Operational Phase may be further separated into three Phases
described and commented in the following slides.

The Direct Protection phase specifically relates to movement of the Protection

Officers by foot. Protection is provided to the Protectee by the direct intervention of
the Officers rather than by the vehicle or physical security mitigating measures.
Direct Protection highlights individual skills as well as team skills. Moving in
various foot formations will assist in mitigating the various types of threat and
environments encountered. However all formations rely on the individual skills and
professionalism of the Officers to work as a cohesive mitigation measure.
Threats to the Protectee during the Direct Protection phase have an increased
impact. Without the mitigation of armored vehicles, perimeter walls etc., attacks
such as explosive devises or shots fired have fewer defensive mechanisms to
penetrate before causing the Protectee harm.
Direct Protection is also where Protection Officers are most visible to the public.
Their conduct must therefore be beyond reproach to the general public, and
immediate, appropriate and proportionate to an attacker.
Movement by foot will be required in various circumstances including arrival and
departures at airports or train stations, movement within specific venues, and
during all embus and debus drills.

Direct protection is a custom made service which depends upon and is sensitive
to the full spectrum of factors considered in the risk management process.
In its smallest deployment, a Close Protection Unit comprises:
● One PPO assigned to the Protectee (BG).
● At least three Protection Officers acting in the Personal Escort Team (in
most of the formations developed below, the number of Protection
officers is four)
These officers will require two vehicles, one for the Protectee and PPO and one
for the PET. The drivers for these vehicles must be provided in addition to the Close
Protection Unit in this configuration.
From this basic package, the operational command will determine what type and
number of additional assets are required, particularly in the roles to be fulfilled by
the Protection Support Team.
The choice of foot formation will depend on the threat, the number of officers
assigned, and also the visual impact desired. Ea[ch formation has positive and
negative aspects, however all formations should include a ‘layered’ defense of
concentric rings with the PPO forming the most inner ring of security and Officers
of the Personal Escort Team providing at least one additional layer of in depth
security: Box, Diamond and V formations.
 The position of each officer of the close Protection Unit is defined.
The Body Guard (PPO) is assigned directly of the protectee (VIP). In the event of
an attack or other serious incident, the immediate tactical response of the PPO will
be to take control of and extract the Protectee from the area of danger. The PPO has
the specific role of acting as bodyguard and should not be distracted from this duty
by also having the responsibility for delivering orders and coordinating the actions
of the Close Protection Unit. The Personal Protection Officer (PPO) assigned to the
Protectee will remain with the Protectee at all times and acts as the last line of
defence.
In the box formation, the 4 protection officers in the PET are taking position at
the corner of an “imaginary” box and have their own area of responsibility. The
Personal Escort Team (PET) provides a second layer of protection in close proximity
to the Protectee. When operating on foot, these officers will maintain visual and
verbal communication with the PPO at distances dictated by the environment.
When conducting a vehicle move, these officers will travel in an additional vehicle to
the convoy. In the event of incident on foot, the PET will respond to a threat where
necessary and provide cover during the extraction of the Protectee. In vehicle moves
where the Protectee Vehicle is mobilized and cannot self-extract, the PET will
provide all round tactical defense of the Protectee Vehicle, and thereby the
Protectee, whilst the threat and medical status are determined, and the extraction
is planned.
The box formation offers to the protectee a clear view in front of him.
 The position of each officer of the close Protection Unit is defined.
In the diamond formation, the 4 protection officers in the PET are taking
position at the corner of an “imaginary” lozenge and have their own area of
responsibility. The Body Guard (PPO) is assigned directly of the protectee (VIP). The
diamond formation looks more aggressive to the crowd.

The position of each officer of the close Protection Unit is defined.

In the box formation, the 4 protection officers in the PET are taking position
following the lines of an “imaginary” V and have their own area of responsibility.
The Body Guard (PPO) is assigned directly of the protectee (VIP).
The V formation is very often used when the team and the protectee is passing
through a crowd.
 Slide 15
Slide 15 low profile formation with two close protection officers. In some
countries, police officers don’t speak about close protection when the protection
team is composed by less than three members.

Slide 16

Slide 16 low profile formation with three close protection officers. This schema is
the most common system used by the French protection team.
 slide 17
Slide 17 illustrates a low profile formation with four close protection officers. In
this case, one officer is fully dedicated to the Protectee and is in charge of his
extraction and evacuation

slide 18
It is important to note that the host country has jurisdiction in the event of an
attack and therefore assumes responsibility for any response. However, the
protection package must fulfil their responsibility in removing the Protectee from
the threat in accordance with relevant UN policies and procedures.
The primary role of Protection Officers during an incident is to extract the
Protectee to a safe haven. Safe rooms, hardened rooms or exits leading back to the
Protectee Vehicle must be located and reconnaissance made to determine their
suitability. Escape routes must be identified to each safe location.
 For extended movement on foot, rally points must be identified along the route
That in the event of incident and the resulting confusion, the Protection Officers
can extract the Protectee, re-organise at clearly understood locations and
consolidate the team before moving on.
The close protection unit can be supported by a Quick Reaction Force or police
officers in case of visit in a sensitive area or presenting risks of incidents. The
positions of these support elements are described in the following slides from 19 to
22.

slide 19

slide 20
 Slide 21
Slides 19 to 21 show the position of FPU members in case of support to foot
formations.

Slide 22 shows FPU members moving on the sides of a foot formation. This
tactic is principally used while escorting a delegation and when the public is
positioned on both sides of the road.
 The communication in close protection is crucial and present at all steps of
direct protection, starting from the exit of the Protectee ’s office or house till his
return. Particular attention has to be paid during the phases of movement, by
foot, while embarking or disembarking, or in case of aggression.
As during public order operation, all means are used to broadcast information,
namely by radio, verbal, signs or eyes contacts. Communication should be discreet,
except in case of attack, when it is necessary to catch immediately the attention of
the whole protection team.
In this case, the officer who first faces any type of danger is in charge of
announcing it.
The announce aims to inform on :
• The nature of the danger
• The direction where it is coming from
In most of the countries, the direction is defined clockwise.
• 12h = danger coming from the front
• 3h = danger coming from the right
• 6h = danger coming from the back
• 9h = danger coming from the left

When the danger is announced, the protection team splits into two modules.
The first module “Fixation module” is in charge to response to the threat by
neutralizing the aggressor when necessary and possible. The second module called
“Evacuation module” is in charge of the extraction/evacuation of the Principal.
It is obvious that the two modules have to act/react in coordination, and that
one cannot achieve his task without the support/action of the other.
 Slide 26 – 30
Slides 26 to 30 illustrate the role of these two modules.

In case of contact/aggression, a report is immediately made through the “LIAR”

frame.
Essential information need to be broadcasted to the command post in order to
facilitate the decision making. LIAR means that information has to be given on:
• Where the aggression is taking place
• Who are the attackers
• What is the reaction of the protection team
• What the team needs
 Mobile protection refers to an extensive range of available counter-measures,
applied during movement by vehicle of the Protectee between venues, to mitigate a
perceived or actual threat. The threat may be from terrorists, criminals, politically
disruptive groups, fixated persons, self-publicists and lone adventurers.

FPUs are more and more requested to support close protection teams and to
provide with mobile protection. The role of these vehicles is not always well
understood and known by FPUs commanders and members. FPUs should be
trained accordingly prior their deployment within the mission area.
At the same time, FPU coordination should also be familiar with this type of
recurrent tasks. Massive arrival of VIPs occurred several times in the past in
peacekeeping missions. FPUs have to be able to fully integrate and sustain a close
protection operational plan developed by UN security without any problem.

Slide 33
Slide 33 is summarizing the different definitions in order to clarify the
terminology used in connection with the Mobile Protection Phase.
 In addition to any terrorist or criminal threat to which a Protectee or other
protected asset is subject, mobile protection operations are also vulnerable to the
normal hazards of travelling by road.
The drivers of vehicles used in Mobile Protection, whether overt or covert, must
at all times drive according to the type and level of training they have received, and
remain responsible for the driving decisions they make.
Although speed of transit may be desirable in some operations, priority must be
given to ensuring the transit is completed safely for the Protectee, the general public
and for the Protection Officers themselves.
It is an appropriate requirement for all escort drivers to be properly trained in
“Defensive Driving Techniques” and only those properly authorized should be
used for this purpose.
Please refer to the FPU policy and the gradation of use of force to explain that
vehicles may constitute lethal force and that drivers are accountable for their
actions.
Responsibility for the manner in which vehicles are used rests with the drivers
who may have to justify their actions in legal proceedings.
 Officers in charge of UN Mobile Protection should assess the specific
circumstances of each operation and decide upon a relevant protection strategy,
using the risk management process. This will enable other component elements,
including direct and static protection, to support the package in the most
appropriate and cost effective way and thereafter for the appropriate level of
resourcing to be deployed.
The movement by road of Protectee s need not always entail a formal escort. It
may often be more appropriate, subject to the risk management decision, for the
Personal Protection Officer (PPO) accompanying the Protectee to use a low profile,
covert approach with unannounced movements and discreet points of arrival and
departure. For example, for a Protectee at high threat but on private engagements,
it may be appropriate to provide a high security but low profile operation. In such
cases, if an Escort is required, the use of armed motorcyclists to facilitate progress,
without road closures or other high profile activities may be the most effective
measure. Alternatively, an entirely covert mobile operation may be preferable.
For a high security and high profile operation, a carefully managed and
coordinated
Escort including motorcyclists, supported by more heavily armed officers in cars,
together with an overt or covert counter assault capability and other tactics,
including decoys, may be required.
It is important that all officers engaged in the component parts of the protection
package are aware of the protection strategy and the risks giving rise to it. This
enables managers, event planners, and participating units to ensure that:
• Effective coordination can take place
• Resources are allocated and deployed appropriately
• The command structure is defined and understood
• Effective communications are arranged
• All participants are briefed effectively
In principle a convoy (which does not form part of a military convoy) should not
contain more than five vehicles otherwise it becomes unwieldy. Non-essential
vehicles not performing a specific task must be excluded. The practice of forming a
second, separate convoy with its own escort arrangements may be considered if
required.
Most convoys will consist of no more than four vehicles. Four is an ideal number;
fewer vehicles make it easier to identify the Protectee ’s car and thus contribute to
compromising the occupant. All vehicles should conform to the same performance
standard where possible.
All vehicles used should have four doors and depending on the threat should be
ballistically protected, including the windows, door panels and undercarriage. All
convoy vehicles should be fitted with front passenger rear view mirrors. Vehicle
engines should be kept running until a Protectee is secure inside a building and
should be started in plenty of time before the Protectee returns to allow it to reach
its normal working temperature.
Convoy vehicles should always be kept fully fuelled and in any case never be
allowed to fall below half half full exclusive of any reserve tanks.
 Slides 37 and 38
Slides 37 and 38 are listed the different types of vehicles to be used during a
convoy (VIP escort/movement).
The role of each of them is developed in the slides 39 and 40.
 The Point Car driver is for responsible ensuring the route selected remains clear
and travels at a distance in advance of the main convoy so that if a route is no
longer suitable the Protectee Vehicle can take an alternate route without being
forced to slow or stop. Traffic control if required is managed by the local police and
the Pilot Car should maintain communication with these authorities. The driver of
the Point Car alone is responsible for negotiating the selected route.
The Point Car travels well ahead of the convoy, controlling and managing the
traffic in front of it to ensure a non-stop journey or to notify the Convoy Commander
of any obstructions or blockages.
The Point Car officer is responsible for relaying the instructions of the Point Car
driver by radio to the Lead Car and for maintaining an accurate location of the Point
Car to both the Convoy Commander and the Watch Officer. The exact location of the
convoy in transit is of crucial importance, particularly in the event of an incident.

By being remote from the immediate vicinity of an attack on the convoy, the Point
Car will be best able to radio for assistance.

Lead Car
The Lead Car driver is responsible for the speed and position of the convoy on
the road. It is important that the speed of the convoy is such that it enables the
Point Car to manage the traffic safely and efficiently.
The Lead Car driver should follow the instructions of the Point Car and, by
watching the situation ahead and judging speed and distance, maintain a sterile
area around the convoy wherever possible.
The Lead Car officer is responsible for relaying the instructions of the Point Car
to the Lead Car driver. The officer must also remain tactically aware and alert to
any vehicles that may be attempting to interfere with or threaten the integrity of the
convoy.
The Lead Car is responsible for ensuring that there is enough room for the
convoy to move as one.
The Lead Vehicle will also carry national staff used for translation, coordination
with host country escort, vehicles and navigational support.

Protectee Vehicle
The Protectee vehicle is used to transport the Protectee and is driven by the
Protectee Driver. He should follow the instructions of the Lead Car and, by watching
the situation ahead and judging speed and distance, maintain a sterile area around
the convoy as required in accordance with the Operational Plan.
The Protectee Driver is also responsible for ensuring the smoothest ride possible
for the Protectee in normal circumstances, as well as the highest level of defensive
driving skills in the event of incident.
 The Personal Protection Officer will travel in the Protectee Vehicle and is
responsible for providing cover to the Protectee, communication with the convoy
and preparing for the use of firearms and transfer to an alternate vehicle if the
Principal Vehicle is immobilised.

Protection Escort Team (PET) Car

The Protection Escort Team Car is used to transport Protection Officers only. Of
the convoy vehicles, the PET Car may drive the most abruptly, using blocking
tactics to prevent following vehicles from intercepting the convoy.
In the case of low profile convoy operations, the PET vehicle may opt to increase
the distance between the Protectee Vehicle and the PET vehicle in order to reduce
the profile of the convoy however, at no time should the PET vehicle be unable to
observe the Protectee vehicle nor be at a distance that exceeds to effective range of
the firearms carried in the PET vehicle.
In the event of incident the vehicle may be used as a shield for the Protectee
Vehicle and deploy Protection officers to engage with the threat as required. The
PET Car will be used to transport the Protectee in the event of the Principal Vehicle
becoming immobilized.

Pilot Vehicle
Where a convoy travels across unfamiliar boundaries a Pilot Car may be
provided subject to an appropriate threat assessment. The Pilot car provides:
• Enhanced communication within that area, and
• Detailed working knowledge of local routes and conditions.
Rear Vehicle
Rear Vehicles will be utilized only in high profile mobile security operations.
The driver of the Rear Car should maintain a sterile area to the rear of the
convoy in order to prevent encroachment on the convoy from that direction and
alert the PET Car to anyone attempting to do so.

Counter Assault Team (CAT) Vehicles

The inclusion of a CAT should be considered only for particularly high threat
escorts. CAT is deployed to oppose an attack, either to protect the Protectee directly
or to cover the withdrawal of the Protectee.
A CAT may be deployed in uniform or covertly, depending on the decision to
adopt a high or low profile escort.
Where movement of a Protectee is part of a wider operation, a CAT should only
be deployed after consultation between the Protection Coordinator and the other
interested agencies.
Under some circumstances, additional CPOs assigned the role of Counter
Assault Officers may travel in the PET or Rear Vehicle in order to further reduce the
profile of the convoy while maintaining an enhanced support capability.
Sweep Car
The sweep car is normally staffed by three officers, each armed with handguns
and two with enhanced firearms capability. Although part of the overall convoy
deployment, the Sweep Car operates as a detached component, shadowing the
convoy from a discreet distance so that it is not likely to be caught up immediately
in an attack on the convoy.
However, it should be well placed to respond to other vehicles that pose a threat
to the integrity of the convoy or to an ambush. Should an incident occur, officers
would provide contingent tactical support to the main convoy, and the driver will
assume responsibility for communications and coordinate external assistance to
the convoy.

The Sweep Car will also assist the main convoy by:
• Stopping to deal with any incident where immediate action is required such
as another convoy vehicle being involved in a minor traffic accident.
• Where a convoy vehicle is disabled or breaks down, the Sweep Car will
provide immediate replacement, thus preserving the integrity of the convoy
structure and function

Slide 41

FPUs may be involved in the security of several VIPs, provide UN security with
additional armoured vehicles for the escort and play a key role in securing the road
(advanced car, junctions…). The image of FPUs may also be seen more “less”
aggressive than an escort composed of military vehicles. The FPUs are taking part of
the convoy as PC or LC and RC or SC in most of the cases.
 Slide 42
Effective communications within, from and to the convoy and with any Host
Country Escort are vital and need careful consideration as a key operational feature
of the protection plan. An effective solution to the communication structure is
potentially complex.
Standard radio channels may be heavily monitored by enthusiasts and others and
are therefore unsuitable for the transmission of confidential information. Where
communications depend on such systems, the maintenance of radio silence should
be observed, except in emergencies.
For operations where high security is required, the use of robust, reliable
encrypted systems is highly recommended.
In all communications, whether encrypted or not, it is important that venue and
road names are not given in plain language. Coded alternatives are recommended.
Where possible, all vehicles in an escorted convoy should have direct car-to-car
communications. The need is increased during high threat/risk operations where
ancillary vehicles may need to be excluded during the movement if intelligence is
received en route of a raised or imminent threat of attack.
Convoy Internal Communications
The benefit of a dedicated car-to-car radio channel within the convoy has been
clearly identified. It allows for the continuous flow of information required for
convoy cohesion and control as well as the ability to respond immediately to a
dynamic situation.
Communications with Venues
Radio communication with venues or points of arrival should be established
wherever possible. When a convoy stops at, or is in the final approach to, the point
of arrival, its vulnerability is greatly increased.
Real-time information or situation reports from the venue to the convoy will enable
the escort to manage the arrival efficiently and safely, hold off or abort the approach
if circumstances require and re-route to an alternative point of arrival.
Communications with other Areas
Where cross border movement occurs, links should be maintained with the original
communications centre until they are firmly established with the new area. This may
require the newly receiving monitoring station to communicate receipt of convoy
communications back to the original monitoring station after potential periods of
radio
‘dead spots’.

Radio Call Signs

Notwithstanding the global UN radio communications protocols, it is good practice
for radio call signs to be changed regularly, particularly for on-going or repeat
escort operations. The repeated use of the same call signs introduces avoidable
operational vulnerability to hostile.

Slides 43 to 58

FPUs may be tasked to provide a VIP with an escort. In this case, FPU drivers
have to be aware of and familiar with the driving tactics used in order to prevent
any attack and provide the principal with adequate security.
Slides 43 to 58 show the movement of a convoy constituted by the Protectee
vehicle and the Protection Escort Team vehicle (FPU vehicle or not) in case of
overtaking by a third vehicle. In anticipation of an overtaking by an unknown
vehicle, the PET starts moving toward the middle of the road in order to protect the
PV.
At the same time, the driver of the PV moves to his right in order to facilitate the
manoeuvre of the driver of the PET vehicle. The movements have to be coordinated
and initiated upon order of the PET leader. The PET vehicle places itself between the
PV and the unknown vehicle in order to prevent from any attack.
The two vehicles return to their initial position after the overtaking.
After showing several times the movements of the vehicles, practical exercises have
to be proposed and executed.
 Slides 59 to 74

After the case of mobile protection with one vehicle, slides 59 to 74 show the
movement of a convoy constituted by the Protectee vehicle and the Protection Escort
Team vehicle (FPU vehicle or not) in case of overtaking by a third vehicle. In this
situation, the LC and PET car move toward the middle of the road in order to
protect the PV. The driver of the PV initiates his movement to the right side of the
road upon order of the PET leader.
The vehicles in charge of the Protectee protection return to their initial position
after the overtaking.
After showing several times the movements of the vehicles, practical exercises
have to be proposed and executed.

Slide 75
Since it is likely that an attack will focus on the core of the convoy, i.e. Lead Car,
Protectee Vehicle or PET Car, the immediate radio alert will enable those not directly
involved to inform the relevant command centre, provide an exact location, give a
situation report and summon assistance.
This function will usually fall to the Point Car, but in the potentially confused
circumstances of a sudden attack, if not immediately undertaken by the Point Car,
by any officer able to make the broadcast.
Where an attempt is made by an attacker to halt the convoy, e.g. by a vehicle
driven across the route, this should wherever possible be skirted, allowing the
convoy to move on. If this cannot be achieved, ramming to remove the obstruction is
a further option provided:
• The circumstances can be fully justified
• The probability of removing the obstruction outweighs that of disabling the
ramming vehicle
• The Protectee Vehicle should not engage in ramming unless completely
unavoidable
During operations conducted in remote environments or in circumstances where
definitive care is expected to be further than sixty minutes from the convoy position
at any time, medical assets should be assigned to the convoy or staged at
predesignated points along the route. This may include host country or United
Nations medical assets.
 Slide 77 - 85
Slides 77 to 85 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle in case of attack
on the left side of the road.
The main objective is to protect the PV by placing the PET vehicle between the PV
and the place from where shooters are in action.

86 to 94 Slides

Same comments as per slides 77 to 85

 Slides 95 to 117

Slides 95 to117 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle in case of
attack coming from the front of the convoy. The main objective is to protect the PV
by placing the PET vehicle between the PV and the place from where shooters are in
action. In this case, the PET vehicle overtakes the PV and stops its progression. Use
of firearms is done according to the principles of self-defence. Following this
manoeuvre, the two vehicles start moving backward. The PV is always under the
protection of the PET vehicle during the whole process.

Slide 18 -121
Slides 118 to121 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle in case of
attack coming from the back of the convoy. The PET vehicle is already in position to
protect the PV. It keeps moving forward, and using force according to the principles
of self-defense.
 Slide 122-125

Slides 122 to125 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle or the Point
Car in case of roadblocks placed on the road. In this case, when feasible, the convoy
makes a U turn and moves in the opposite direction. Roadblocks may be used to
ambush the convoy. In case of presence of removable objects, the PET vehicle or PC
can be used as a hammer in order to remove the objects. The priority is here to
keep the convoy moving, without any stop that may put the Principal in danger.

Slide 126

Recent world events have demonstrated graphically the capability and intent of
terrorist groups to pursue their ends against static targets. While these horrendous
acts may be foremost in our minds it should also be recognized that other incidents
of criminal activity and events of public disorder can also have a serious impact on
United Nations security.
This reality has lead security professionals to increase awareness and introduce
effective counter-measures, such as personal protection, armed security guards,
restricted access and routine search regimes by properly trained staff at United
Nations premises and many other locations and buildings to which UN staff travel or
access.
What is required for all static protection operations is the proper application of
risk management together with sound, well thought out and effective protection
methods and principles.
Many of the static protection measures currently used by the United Nations
have been established and developed within the system over a long period of time;
in the current security climate however as the threat against its staff has become
more widespread and frequent so the United Nations is increasingly basing its
future security systems on knowledge gained from member states and their
contemporaneous experiences with international terrorism.
Methods to counter new threats from terrorism continue to be developed and the
United Nations must ensure that it always stays ahead of this challenge, or suffer
the inevitable consequences.
Static protection refers to an extensive range of available counter-measures,
applied at, outside or within perimeters to protect a person, activity or place from a
perceived threat. The threat may be from terrorists, criminals, politically disruptive
groups, fixated persons, self-publicists and lone adventurers.

Slide 127

Information Gathering
The foundation of any risk management process is the availability of
information. Information is made available to the United Nations through a
variety of means. It is essential that security practitioners have a complete
understanding of the need to collect or gather information, the recognition that
not all information has value, and that the collection of information within the
UN context is strictly for the safety and security of UN personnel and assets.
Information gathering is the key prerequisite for the risk management process,
effective operational planning and decisions on the command structure and
resourcing.
 It is unlikely that first intimation of an event will provide enough information to
do anything but enable initial scoping for the event and indicate the type of
information which is likely to be required.
Effective information gathering will depend primarily on two main activities:
• Liaison
• Reconnaissance
Liaison
The importance of the role of liaison in planning for static protection
operations cannot be overstated. Virtually all static protection operations are
conducted in partnership with other organisations and groups whose active co-
operation is vital however, not always forthcoming.
The range of issues is potentially vast, but it should include anything which
provides and exchanges essential knowledge, establishes co-operation, promotes
clarity of aims and mutual expectations, such as:
• Identification of all stakeholders, their roles and responsibilities
• Details of organisational structures, and links between respective functional
levels i.e. policy, executive and service delivery levels of an organisation,
• Conditions that any stakeholders may impose,
• The circumstances under which an event will be discontinued and the
method and ownership for such decisions, and means by which this will be
communicated,
• The conditions under which a venue will be evacuated,
• Clarification of the role, powers (including armed response and the use of
force) and capability of security staff, either permanent or temporarily
contracted for the specific event,
• Copy lists of invited and confirmed guests, chronology of events, copies of
invitations, car passes and any other relevant materials, such as plans, maps
and contact lists, etc.
• Specimen copies of all staff passes and badges, etc Liaison with organisers
and partners should be seen as ongoing rather than as a one-time only
process and a suitable officer should be appointed to undertake the role.
Effective liaison ensures that each operation is flexibly tailored to its specific
needs and avoids the dangers which may stem from insensitive application of
an illfitting standard package.
Reconnaissance
The aim of reconnaissance is to gain a thorough tactical appreciation of the area
of operations, its inherent strengths and vulnerabilities. Maps and plans, no matter
how detailed, will not reveal the extent to which a venue is overlooked by
surrounding buildings, or trees that obstruct the view into or from a venue in
different seasons. During periods of conducting reconnaissance, as with all other
operational phases, Officers should carry out hostile surveillance detection
strategies, being aware that reconnaissance in itself may compromise operational
intent and planning strategies.
 Urban street plans give no indication of topography, lines of sight or ambient
lighting, etc. Temporary environmental factors, such as the presence of scaffolding
or road work, can only be ascertained by recent reconnaissance.
Where possible, reconnaissance should be carried out on the same day of the
week and time of day as the proposed event to gauge the volume of normal
pedestrian and vehicular movement and assess the extent to which they are likely
to be affected or interfered with by static protection measures.
The use of a digital or video camera is recommended during reconnaissance to
assist in both planning and later briefing. These should be supplemented by aerial
photographs taken from relevant perspectives particularly in ‘High Risk’ locations.
An officer conducting reconnaissance of premises should, whenever possible, be
accompanied by a person intimately familiar with them, their access and through
routes, normal functions, occupants and contingencies, and the extent of existing
security arrangements.
Knowledge of works recently carried out in a building, or visits by external
contractors, should be sought in relevant cases. Local intelligence units should not
be overlooked as a potentially valuable source of information about factors affecting
a venue’s security.

Maps & Plans

Maps and detailed floor plans of a venue and its surroundings must be of good
quality, an appropriate scale and as up to date as possible. Inaccurate or illegible
plans are a potential liability.
Specialised maps and plans of subterranean structures of sewers, drainage
systems, service conduits, etc. if available, should be obtained where appropriate.
Protection Strategy
The protection strategy meeting will normally be chaired by the UN security and
the Host Country authorities, together with any other specialists who may be
identified. Whether protection is the primary strategic aim, or is embedded in a
larger operation as one of several aims, a separate static protection plan should be
developed. The protection strategy meeting will assist all those involved to
identify the aims of the operation and lay the groundwork for planning and
operational coordination. Although developed separately, the protection plan must
integrate with (or at least take account of) any other strategic intentions to avoid a
conflict of aims.
Protection planning should make full use of the risk management process which
focuses clearly on relevant issues.
Planning & Tasking Meeting
The senior Security Advisor will normally chair the protection planning and
tasking meeting. Where a Protection Coordinator is appointed, it will normally be
for that officer to develop the protection plan and task the contributing units to
meet the tactical plans and strategic aims.
The Protection Coordinator, who is extensively briefed on the Protectees involved,
should also take part where an operation is complex or involves the coordination of
the protection teams for a number of Principals.
Composition
The composition of the protection planning group should reflect the range of
protection and support specialist units involved. Representatives of other strategic
aims should also attend to ensure that protection planning does not develop in
isolation.
Planning Development
Where appointed, Protection Coordinators will normally act as the liaison
between the participating or contributing protection units, develop the protection
plan in consultation with them, and submit it for approval. Protection Coordinators
will usually remain responsible for ongoing review of the plan to ensure its
continued relevance to changing circumstances.
Site Meetings
In addition to any formal planning and tasking meetings, it is good practice to
hold a site meeting with event organisers and representatives of relevant groups.
Each will have perspectives, needs and interests relevant to their own specialization
which need to be rationalised and coordinated towards the common strategic aim.
Mutual expectations should be clarified.
Advance Planning
Many large-scale events require planning to begin well in advance. It is
important that the risk management process is revisited periodically to ensure that
the original planning assumptions, decisions on counter-measures and rationale for
them remain relevant. Risk assessment is a dynamic process requiring constant
revision.

Briefing
Briefing provides the vital link between those who planned the protection
package and those who will deliver it. Whilst general or joint briefings provide
necessary understanding of the context and structure of an operation, a specific
briefing on protection issues for those involved in delivering it must always be
carried out.
 They should include the threat assessment in as much detail as the sensitivity of
the intelligence on which it is based allows. Full understanding of the threat will
enable individual officers to deal more effectively and appropriately with the
circumstances they encounter than information limited to a neutral statement of
the threat level.
Where the threat assessment is credibly supported by intelligence, the
commitment of those providing protection is likely to be enhanced if the intelligence
can be shared with them.
Where circumstances permit, briefing in situ should be considered. This will
improve tactical appreciation of the operating environment and the relevance of the
protection plan for those delivering it. Where this cannot be done, the use of good
quality photographs (including aerial), and clear accurate maps will serve as
acceptable alternatives.
A reminder of relevant legal powers may be appropriate during briefing.
Contingencies, and the circumstances which will initiate them, should be
explained fully.

Slide 129

Planning for defense in depth requires consideration and definition of the

location and function of each of several possible perimeters. It allows for the
possible compromise of an outer perimeter without significant increase in
vulnerability of the protected person, place or activity, i.e. an outer perimeter
providing and early warning indicator and delaying factor to any hostile approach.
Defense in depth relies on presenting an attacker with a series of perimeters,
each of which increases the risk to them of:
• Detection • Delay, or
• Defeat.
Defense in depth buys time during which inner perimeters may be alerted to a
breach or emerging threat, and to institute dynamic counter-measures or the
initiation of contingencies.
The term perimeter obviously includes hard or physical structures such as
fences and walls, but also includes other means such as human perimeters
consisting of uniform security on cordons, fixed posts or foot patrols and
plainclothes officers deployed to-surveillance detection, mobile units on random,
short, or targeted patrols along perimeters or in defined perimeter areas.
There are no hard and fast rules about the siting and function of any particular
perimeter. These issues must be considered and determined in relation to:
• Each specific static protection operation,
• The environment within which it is taking place, and
• The threat or threats to which it is subject.

The range of options is broad, but may include any combination of the following:
• Armed security, vehicle screening, patrols, providing deterrent high visibility
and capable of providing immediate armed intervention or support;
• Surveying, identifying and monitoring potential weapons launch sites for
mortar base plates (MBP) rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and man portable
air defence system missiles (MANPADS), according to the launch site profile
for each weapon type;
• Searches of car and truck parks for VBIEDs on or near an intended approach
route;
• Searches and vehicle checks in streets leading to the protected event;
• Host Country traffic patrol points to regulate, segregate and control
movement of vehicles towards a protected event;
• Discreet identification and research (ownership and occupancy, etc) of
buildings and other structures overlooking approach routes, venues or points
of arrival;
• Overt or covert observation of vehicles and pedestrians moving towards an
event
Intermediate perimeter may include:
• Use of uniform security officers, road signs or concrete anti-ram blocks where
necessary, admission ticket, points of entry and other vulnerable locations
• Establishment of a continuous visible line of demarcation, with tape, barriers
or fencing, to distinguish clearly to those approaching a change of status
between controlled and uncontrolled space. Where instituted, a demarcation
line must be staffed appropriately to maintain its integrity and deal as
necessary with infractions;
• Use of appropriate signs and information boards should be considered where
this will assist individuals to know what is expected of them and to reinforce
a perimeter.
In the inner perimeter, search of an appropriate type or combination of types
before the event should be carried out in order to detect, remove or disable a device,
weapon or harmful substance concealed in advance for use during the event. Once
searched, the area must be kept sterile.
• Take control of the perimeter and place personnel to keep the area secure.
• Escort the Protectee
• Secure and control all escape routes from the venue
• Secure all areas that the Protectee might move to be placing covert personnel
there
• Set up and secure a safe haven or holding room within the venue
 Slide 132

Slide 132 illustrates an example of the different perimeters described above.

The overall security of a protection operation depends largely on how well the
advance team searches the venue during the operational advance phase. The
team must allow enough time for a through unrushed search, with consent from
the owner of the premises or a designated representative.
The advance team must know what they are searching for. They must be able
to locate and recognize anything that may pose a threat to the Protectee, for
example explosives or electronic devices. Once the advance team has searche an
area, the area must be secured.
The three basic rules for searching the venue are as follows:
• Search from outside to the inside
• Search from the bottom to the top
• Investigate all possible hiding places and articles

Slide 135
The officers should be given a summary of the key points of the lesson before
being asked if they have any questions.
 LESSON 4
DEFENSIVE DRIVING TECHNIQUES FOR EXECUTIVE
PROTECTION

USE OF CLOSE PROTECTION VEHICLE TECHNIQUES (Basic Driving

Skills)
Most drivers think they are better drivers than everyone else, but if that was
the case where did all those bad drivers come from? Almost all accidents are
caused by human error and in particular due to unsafe driving practices or
negligence
Almost a third of all accidents are rear end shunts, and you wouldn’t be the
first PES driver to shunt the Principal’s vehicle during a moment’s loss of
concentration. Many accidents are the result of simply driving too close to the
vehicle in front, which is a problem for us because very often while escorting a
Principal a driver will remain quite close so that no other vehicle can jump in
between the convoy.
What makes a good driver?
CONFIDENCE! That’s what... He handles the vehicle efficiently and effectively
with the ride being smooth, with the car and driver operating as one whilst
practicing skilful and effortless use of the controls. The driver will have
excellent observation skills, with the ability to remain alert throughout even the
longest of drives (Condition YELLOW). He will be actively scanning through 360
degrees, matching his vehicle’s speed to the road conditions and the situation
on the ground. He will have a highly developed sense of hazard awareness and
display an excellent attitude to other road users AT ALL TIMES
Contrary to what we all like to believe, we are not all good drivers. Some
people are drawn into this aspect of CP and they excel in it. However, ALL
CPO’s SHOULD BE ABLE TO DRIVE, and CPO’s without a license should
obtain one as soon as possible. All CPO’s need to know the basics of defensive
and evasive driving as you never know when you may be asked to take charge
of a vehicle in an emergency!.
Close Protection Drivers
Very good CP drivers are a rare breed. They need to have all the skills and
attributes of a good CPO, whilst also being highly skilled drivers, capable of
handling their vehicle right to the very limits of its performance and be safe
and reliable, even when under extreme pressure. They need to make instant
decisions under duress, and be cool and calm with ability to escalate into
controlled aggression should it become necessary.
That being the case, there is no place in CP for a reckless or cavalier driver
as the job is just too important to the overall success of the mission in
protecting the Principal. What makes these superb CP drivers so rare is the
fact that a CPO with all those attributes generally does not want to be stuck
behind the wheel of a car as they want to be out there with the Principal on the
ground at the ‘tip of the spear’ so to speak.
Because the driving aspect of CP is often ignored by the more experienced
CPO’s, this job is usually taken up by the ‘new boy’ or less capable individuals.
In fact, it is quite common for some Principals to have drivers who are not CP
trained at all and are employed purely on their navigational of the city in which
they are employed and look quite dashing in a grey peaked cap!
Because of this, many might look at a CP driver and see a glorified taxi
driver; this is especially so when the driver is overweight and always appears to
be eating. Many only remain in place because they have become personal
friends with the Principal or his family which is fine if there is no threat, but
not too useful if the client is being targeted by a determined aggressor or
hostile surveillance team such as the Paparazzi.
Driver Training
Driver training is vitally important as in all aspects of CP training and should
be carried out whenever possible in the regular vehicle, except of course, when
this is impractical such as when ramming practice is taking place using the
Principal beautiful Bentley!
However, it cannot be stressed enough that a slick maneuver that you can do
in an old Ford with manual gearbox and bald tyres will be a harder to do in
your regular car with tire’s designed to half the road and on regular car types
designed to hold road and on regular road widths rather than airfield size
training areas. Good CP driver training instructors are extremely hard to find
as there are not too many specialist instructors with operational experience in
both civilian and hostile environments saying that, courses ran by the institute
of advanced motorists are an excellent grounding for the Close Protection
driver, as this will help you greatly when it comes to the evasive during
manoeuvers, ramming and high speed driving
GENERAL RULES
Before setting off on a journey and whilst en- route, due attendance must be
paid to some standard procedures and the usual list do’s and don’ts. Drivers
must be trained Close Protection officers who enjoy a high standard of driving
skills and should gave attend an offensive and defensive evasive driving course.
Some general rules follow;
1. Know your vehicle
2. Choice of vehicle
3. Brief all passengers
4. Accurate timings
It is essential that you do your best to insist on accurate timings Establish
the time your Principal needs to arrive at a specific location. Work backwards
from your time on route from your Recce and advice as to the time you have to
leave. Be firm leaving to late could put everyone in flat spin, cause tension
resulting in poor convoy drills and endanger the principal if speed becomes
excessive to the point of unsafe if asked how long the journey will take and
what time to leave always give yourself a margin and give them a soonest and
latest . The soonest is when you would like to leave the latest is that time
which could cause being late for an appointment and require and unacceptable
speed on route. Given that information it is then there decision when they
leave knowing consequences.
CHOICE OF VEHICLE
1. Often we as operations cannot influence choice but ideally we would like
to see the following:
2. auto box, power steering
3. Central locking doors
4. Air conditioning
5. Run flat tyres
6. Reliability
7. Not overly ostentatious

Depending on the threat level and available resources, you should also
consider:
1. Engine run on protection
2. Armouring
3. Self – repairing fuel tanks
4. Full air filtering system

Ensure You Have the Correct and Most Appropriate Vehicle for the Journey
Vehicle security
Vehicles use by Close Protection Terms must kept in a secure lock up when
not in use by the driver. If the vehicle is left unattended at any time the driver
must conduct a full search of the vehicle before setting off. When arriving at a
venue the driver must stay with vehicle to ensure that no device can
Attached to the vehicle to ensure that no device can be attached to the vehicle.
If possible an IED Detector should be placed under vehicle.
1. Searching of the vehicle must be one of the teams SOP’s and must be
conducted at the start of every day by two team members following a set
searching routine
2. When parking the vehicle at a venue you must not nosy park. The vehicle
must be ready to move at all times.
3. The driver must remain alert at all times when travelling or parked at a
venue and must always lock the doors when travelling in the vehicle
4. Also consider extreme weather conditions and weather or not a 4 wheel
drive vehicle would be most appropriate?
Risk assessment implications with regards to the use of vehicles
With every form of transport the risks such as speed, unforeseen traffic
jams and breakdown vehicles can become a large target and where possible
driven at speed however all drivers must stay within the law and abide by the
Highway Code. You must remember you are not the police and you cannot run
red lights
The need for alternative transport plans
When considering the use of vehicle you must ensure you have a backup in
case there are problems with travailing by board, it may be safer and quicker to
fly and have vehicle at the destination airport to get your principal to his
meeting. Consider the use of hire vehicles and the use of a chauffeur when
considering the use of hire vehicles book three vehicles and only use two this
gives you some form of security.
WHAT IS TACTICAL DRIVING?
Tactical driving can be described as a:
“Two-car Close Protection Team applying road craft, safe driving and tactical
positioning to safety convey their Principal between locations.”
Principals of Tactical Driving: C.O.A.T.S
Communications
Observation
Awareness
Teamwork
Safe driving practice

Reasons for having a PES: T.R.A.M.E.D

Threat to come between lead car and potential threat Room
to create room in heavy traffic
Anti-Surveillance drills
Manpower to provide additional resources and man power
Protection to give protection to rear of convoy
Emergency transport to become VIP vehicle in the event of
breakdown/collision
Decoy- to act as a decoy vehicle

Rules of tactical Driving

1.Both vehicles should have visual contact at all times. Good procedures and
communications are vital in maintaining this
2.The PPO is in control of the doors which should be locked immediately on
embus
3.Windows closed at all times ( may open windows whist moving but no
more than two inches)
4.There must be efficient communications between vehicles by use of code
words for procedures.
5. Correct spacing between vehicle for reaction procedures to be initiated
6. Both vehicle should be aware of any vehicle overtaking the convoy
7. Surveillance awareness and the principal car park can be used
8.Surveillance awareness and anti- surveillance should be practiced at all
time
9.The VIP vehicle to be guarded at all time unless a secure car park can be
used
10. Maximum distance between VIP vehicles should be more than 30m
but depends upon threats level roads, speed and weather condition.
VEHICLE ROADWORTHY CHECK
1. Ensure you don’t suit when you carry out the checks
2. Visual examination for any damages
3. Check tools, jack , spare type
4. First-Aid/ trauma pack(individual Vehicle)
5. Type preasure, refer to manual, check tread depth and sidewall
damage
6. Check fuel, oil, water, widescreen, wash, brake fluid.
7. Light indicators , hazards, fog light, break light, reverse light
8. Widescreen wipers
9. Horn
10. Fire extinguisher
11. Cleanliness
12. Locate and inspect vehicle jacking point
REMEMBER P, O, W, E, R
P- Petrol
O- Oil
W- Water
E- Electric
s R- Rubber
 VIP TACTICAL SECURITY DRIVING
It is a set of techniques employed by trained personnel using appropriate
vehicle to afford a VIP the best protection and smoothest possible journey
Safe driving essentials
1.Concentrate all the time
2. Take your time
3. Scan by keeping eyes moving
4. Anticipate what if?
5.Always drive at such a speed that you can stop you vehicle in the
distance to can see to be clear
6. Apply the two second rule(following Distance)
2 Car Escort Drills
Principles:
1. Mobile security principle
2. Maximum legal, safe and smooth speed
3. Safety bubble and escape routes

Speeding:
“Police tolerance for Speed- 10%+ 2mph but this can vary, so beware of average
speed cameras.”
Remember that you are not immune from the laws of the road and will be
prosecuted for speeding or reckless driving just like any other road used.

VIP Car Driving

1. Safe secure and smooth ride for principal
2. Actively positioning away from perceived danger
3. Hold off vehicle ahead ( 2Seconds)
4. Space for 2 vehicle whenever emerging
PES Car Driving
1. Fend of threat
2. Anti- Surveillance
3. Vetting of all traffic approaching from the rear
4. Blocking perceived threats
5. Tactical contact/ lane for VIP car
Where should the principal sit in the car?
Some might say that he is at liberty to sit anywhere he likes, and some
principals do, ignoring sensible advice. Some principles may insist on
driving themselves, and this is more common than you might think! While this
is not the best situation you may well have to run with it and compromise,
Ideally when being driven, the principal should sit the rear seat behind the
front passenger seat which will ideally be occupied by his background.
Though sometime the BG is forced to travel in the backup car, all he can do
then is to stay close as is safe to be in a following vehicle,
All doors should be looked immediately after the Principal is in vehicle and
strict observance of the ‘230’ rule should be observed with regard to windows.
Rule 203 states
“No windows will be open more than two inches when the vehicle is
travelling under 30mph”
NB: if you are working with a threat the demands an armored car, then
opening windows IS NOT AN OPTION.

Even if the AC is not working your windows should remain closed at all times
due to the obvious raised threat that requires an armoured car in the first
instance. If you were stopped suddenly in an ambush, even a window open one
inch would render all that armour useless when the muzzle of a weapon is
pushed through it, fires a shot and that bullet then does an impression of a
Pin-Ball machine, bouncing off all the armour inside killing
everyone…..TWICE!.
Wearing of Seatbelts
Dead simple; The principal, his BG and driver should ALL WEAR
SEATBELTS. There are still two schools of thought on this that persist, to
which I answer with one high profile example where failing to wear a seatbelt
resulted in a huge failure in Close Protection;
“PARIS 1997, PRINCESS DIANNA”
The only exceptions to this rule, is if you are;
1. In static or very slow moving traffic with the chance of being ambushed
2. Slowing down for the drop off.

One Car Drills

The CPO will frequently he is on his own, sometimes even driving the
vehicle. Having no backup to rely on means that your route planning,
navigation and timings must be meticulous. It is extremely important that the
driver is extra vigilant at all times, as he can except no assistance should be
have a puncture, traffic accident or drive into an ambush. He should always
observe the speed limit and never violate the local traffic laws. He should use
the rear view mirror extensively and always look for any escape routes when
approaching junctions or traffic lights

CONVOY DRIVING
Some convoys are seemingly ridiculous such as the President of the United
States or POTUS as he is referred to by his protection team of 2000! When he
was President, GW Bush visited the UK and was collected by a twenty five
vehicle convoy…… and that was not counting the outsiders!
I very much doubt many CPO’s will get to ride in protective convoys that
big. The convoy, even if it only consists of two vehicles is the preferred way to
travel on the civilian circuit, with three, four and five vehicle formations
preferred I Iraq and Afghanistan.
Where should the Principal be in the convoy?
If the Principal is employing a PES and they have a backup car they should
always travel behind the Principal’s vehicle, as this is the best position to take
Defensive measures should the convoy come under attack. If attacked from the
rear they are already there. If attacked from flanks they can quickly overtake
or undertake to place themselves between the threat and the Principal’s car
(Blocking).
If the attack comes from the front then they can overtake and take the threat
on from the front. So, in a two vehicle convoy the Principal will always be in
the front vehicle. Some might argue that he should travel in the rear every now
and then to keep the bad guys guessing, but this is wrong. The escort vehicle
is severely hampered in its responses to attacks should they come from
anywhere other than the front.
In a three car convoy, the Principal can be in the middle vehicle which
affords him all round defensive cover and in a 4 vehicle convoy the Principal
can be in either the second or third vehicles
Some may now argue that in a three of four vehicle formation that the
Principal can be in the front vehicle, which would unnecessarily reduce the
protective capabilities of the team by optioning out of all round protection.
Two car drills
The most common protection convoy consists of just two vehicles. For the
reasons stated earlier, the Principal will be in the lead car with the PES behind,
with the Principal driver always being aware of the PES’s position. He will never
pull into a line of traffic if there is not room for both him and the PES car.
Likewise, he will never pass through traffic lights if it is on amber or about
to change cutting him off from the PES. The need for awareness and
concentration is paramount for the lead driver!
When a PES driver trusts the lead driver, he will always follow; i.e. if the
Principal’s vehicle is turning right then the PES will always go with him, often
only looking at the offside traffic, knowing that the other driver wouldn’t have
gone without it being clear on the nearside
The lead vehicle must ensure that he positions himself with regard to giving
the PES good visibility of the road instead ahead. This means that he will be at
a different positions on bends and junctions to if he were a single vehicle with
no PES. At junctions he will position himself so as to make it easier for the
PES to provide cover for them. This cover is both from live traffic or an attack
of some kind.
NB:
Even if the lead vehicle takes different turn to that of the pre-agreed route,
then the PES must still follow and offer protection. There may be a very good
reason for this ‘wrong’ turn, and even if it just an error, the BG can always
pass this off to the Principal as Anti-Surveillance’ manoeuvers !
Obviously, if the driver has turned down a dead end, the use your common
sense and hold the junction for him to turn around.
VEHICLE ANTI AMBUSH DRILLS
Although the most vulnerable part of a journey is the start and finish, many
incidents have occurred when the VIP is travelling between these two points.
These incidents were possible to plan because of weaknesses in drills. This
chances of being ambushed can be greatly reduced by the careful selection,
planning and security of routes and things before the journey
“Remember to present a “HARD TARGET” at all times by maintaining
concentration and professionalism whilst practicing slick well-rehearsed
drills”.
 Whenever you are giving this subject on a team task or advisory, or you’re
receiving it to practice drills as part of an operational team, it is the
culmination of a large amount of time on the training area
It is important to look objectively at the makeup and layout of the convoy,
the threat and the VIP in order to practice realistic and viable drills
Inevitable training area limitations make these drills the hardest to practice
realistically so there must be some preconceived role play to determine the
situation after the ambush is sprung
AIM:
The aim of this lesson is to instil the principles of anti-ambush, discuss the
main options and outline basic vehicle anti ambush drills.
VEHICLE ANTI AMBUSH DRILLS- CASE STUDY
THE MOVING ATTACK
In order to discuss offensive driving techniques associated with protection of
public figures, it is first necessary to become acquainted with the modus
operandi (MO) of the attackers. A cross-section of vehicle assassination attacks,
ranging from the gangland killings to South American terrorist group
assassinations, was studied to determine the pattern of the typical attack and
the specific vehicle tactics employed. A summary of key points identified in
these case studies appears below:
 In most cases studied, the attack was carried out by employing two vehicles.
One vehicle was employed to impede or cut off the target vehicle; the other
vehicle was employed to launch the attack itself. For example, in one instance
an attractive girl in a Volkswagen passed the target vehicle’s progress. As the
second attack car moved into position alongside the target vehicle and the firing
began, the girl accelerated away and turned into a side street. In general, the
attack vehicle held three persons; a driver, a man in front with the driver, and a
man in the right rear seat. Both passengers usually brought weapons to bear
on the target vehicle during the attack. The impeding vehicle frequently held
only the driver.
77