MAIN DEPARTMENT OF MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

RESEARCH CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY OF UKRAINE

DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANISATION OF MORAL

AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR COMBAT
OPERATIONS BY THE ARMED FORCES OF
UKRAINE DURING THE REPULSION OF FULL-
SCALE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
IN THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 24, 2022 TO JULY 8, 2023
(500 days of war)

Under the general editorial supervision of the Chief of the Main

Department of Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, Major General V. KLOCHKOV

Part two

KYIV – 2023
 2

UDK 355/359: 36
О 61

Recommended for publication by the Scientific Council of the Research

Centre for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Protocol
№8, August 28, 2023)

Reviewer:
Stasiuk V.V., Doctor of Psychology, Professor, Professor of the
Department of Moral and Psychological Support of
Military Forces of the National Defence University of
Ukraine

Authored by: Colonel Yatsenyuk V.M., Colonel Chekalov V.V., Colonel

Mamedov R.Ch., Colonel Rudik S.M., Colonel Kalinichenko Y.V., Colonel
Moroz V.M., Colonel Romanishyn A.M.

О 61Description of the organisation of moral and psychological support of

combat operations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the repulsing of
full-scale Russian aggression in the period from 24.02.2022 to
08.07.2023 (500 days of war) / Edited by Major General V. Klochkov - K.:
Research Centre for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, 2023. - 261 p.

The materials of the description will help commanders (chiefs),

specialists of the structures of moral and psychological support of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine to obtain information on the experience of organising and
conducting measures of moral and psychological support of combat
operations in the course of repulsing full-scale Russian aggression.
They will gain knowledge of the experience of practical organisation and
conduct of moral and psychological support of combat operations.
The course is intended for commanders, officers of moral and psychological
support structures, academic staff and cadets of higher military educational
institutions.

УДК 355/359: 36

The description includes photographs from the Internet.

Research Centre for

Humanitarian Problems of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine,
2023
 3

CONTENTS

Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 9
Chapter 1 THE FIRST STRATEGIC DEFENCE OPERATION
(24 February – April 2022)..……………………………………….. 11
1.1. Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine: structure of the
russian armed forces on the border of Ukraine as of
22.02.2022 …………………………………………………………. 15
1.2. The system of military political work in the armed forces of the
russian federation ………………………………………………….. 16
1.2.1. Organisation of military political work in the armed forces of the
russian federation ……………….…………………………………. 24
1.2.2. Problems in organizing military political work during the "special
military operation"…………….……………………..……. 33
1.3. Organisation of moral and psychological support measures
during the operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine…………. 36
1.3.1. The level of moral readiness and psychological stability of the
personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ………………..……. 36
1.3.2. System of command and control of forces and facilities of
moral and psychological support ……………………...…………. 43
1.4. Information and propaganda support for the deployment of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine…………….....………………..……….. 48
1.4.1. Organisation of informational and propaganda support
…………………………………………...……..……………………. 48
1.4.2. Internal communication with personnel …………………............ 51
1.4.3. Organisation of information support for the military personnel
and counter-propaganda measures …………………….……..….. 53
1.4.4. Provision of printed periodicals to troops ………………… 56
1.4.5. National patriotic and cultural work ……………………...……..... 58
1.5. Psychological support…………………………………………...… 65
1.5.1. Psychogenic losses ……………………………………………..….. 65
1.5.2. Provision of psychological aid to personnel................................ 68
1.5.3. The work of combat stress control groups..…………………...… 70
1.6. Social work with military personell and their families ………….. 72
1.6.1. Organising social work with military personnel and their families 72
1.6.2. Social work with family members of captured, wounded, killed
and missing servicepersons…….……………………………….... 74
1.6.3. Evacuation of families of military personnel ……..…….………... 77
Chapter 2 THE SECOND STRATEGIC DEFENCE OPERATION
(May – August 2022)……………………..………………………… 82
2.1. The course of war in May – August 2022…….……………..…… 82
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2.2. Improving the system of moral and psychological support in

the armed forces of Ukraine…………………..…………………… 88
2.2.1. Organising moral and psychological support priorities for the
moral and psychological support of troops (forces)…….…….. 88
2.2.2. Positive and negative influences on moral readiness and
psychological stability of the personell in the Armed Forces of
Ukraine ……………………………………………………….....….. 90
2.3. Information and propaganda support……………..………...…… 93
2.4. Psychological support……………………………………...……… 100
2.4.1. Professional and psychological selection……………………..… 100
2.4.2. Implementation of a psychological training system……..…..….. 103
2.5. Conducting social work with military personnel and their
families ………….………………………………..…………………. 107
Chapter 3 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION
(September-December 2022)……..……………………..……….. 109
3.1. The course of war in September – December 2022 …………… 109
3.2. Improving the moral and psychological support structure in the
Armed Forces of Ukraine ………………..……………………….. 115
3.2.1. Strengthening the practical component of the moral and
psychological support system…..……………………...…………. 115
3.2.2. Measures to improve the moral rediness and psychological
stability of personnel………………………..…………..…………. 117
3.3. Information and propaganda support……………..……………... 120
3.3.1. Internal communication and information support of troops
(forces)……………….…………………………………………...…. 120
3.3.2. Activities for increasing servicepersons’ motivation…...…….…. 124
3.3.3. Sustainment with propaganda technical means…..………..…... 126
3.4. Psychological support…………………………………………...… 128
3.4.1. Enhancing the practicality of psychological support at the
tactical level…………………………..………………..……………. 128
3.4.2. Improving staffing psychology officers’ positions……..………… 129

3.4.3. Improving professional and psychological selection…...………. 130

3.4.4. Activities for psychological recovery and rehabilitation of
military personnel …………………...………………………….…. 131
3.5. Social support for servicepersons and their family
members ……………………………………………………………. 133
3.5.1. New challenges for the social work system with military
personnel and their families………………………….…………… 133
3.5.2. Formation of the social support system for servicepersons
and their families …………………………………………...……… 134
Chapter 4 Third strategic defence operation
(January – May 2023)………..…………………..……..…………. 141
4.1. The course of hostilities in January – May 2023 ……..………… 141
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4.2. Jrganisation of moral and psychological support in the first half

of 2023……………………….………………..……………..……… 146
4.2.1. Psychological support……………………………………...……… 146
4.2.2. Information support of troops (forces)…………....……………… 156
4.2.3. 4.2.3. Social support for servicepersons and their family
members……………………………………………………………. 159
Chapter 5 Reintegration of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
after being held in captivity………………….……...…………….. 166
5.1. Organisation of reintegration process for personel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine after being held in captivity …………………. 166
5.2. The purpose and objectives of reintegration process ……….…. 168
5.2.1. Functions and objectives of the reintegration system ………….. 170
5.2.2. Functions, objectives, and composition of the reintegration
group………...…………………………………………………….… 172
5.2.3. Timing and stages of reintegration activities ………………….... 174
5.2.4. Peculiarities of organising the reintegration process in the
Armed Forces of Ukraine..………………………………………… 176
Chapter 6 Activities of institutions directly subordinated to the Main
Department of Moral and Psychological support of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine…………………………………………………… 179

6.1. Moral and psychological support centre of the Armed Forces of

Ukraine……...…………………………………………...………….. 179
6.1.1. Activities of highly mobile internal communication groups......… 179
6.1.2. Activities of "Alpha" highly mobile internal communication
groups for ideological and moral support for servicepersons of
military units (subunits)…………………………………………...… 181
6.1.3. Activities of "Charlie" highly mobile internal communication
groups for operational psychological aid (support) for
servicepersons…………………………………………………….. 182
6.1.4. Activities of "Bravo" highly mobile internal communication
groups for Armed Forces of Ukraine servicepersons'
culturological needs support ………………...………………… 186
6.1.5. Informational work within troops (forces)…..………………….. 190
6.1.6. Moral and psychological support centres participating in
training of servicepersons ………………………………..………... 196
6.1.7. Work regarding establishing Military Chaplaincy Service within
the Armed Forces of Ukraine………………………………...…... 197
6.1.8. Problems associated with organising highly mobile internal
communication groups' work ………………………………..……. 199
6.2. Research centre of humanitarian problems of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine..…………………………………………..……. 200
Chapter 7 Ukrainian counter-offencive begins
(June 2023 - )…………………..………………………………..…. 225
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Results of the activities of the system of Moral and

Psychological support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and
other components of the Defence Forces over the course of
repulsing the armed aggression of the russian federation
against Ukraine during 2022 – firs half of 2023 …….………… 226
Aftermord....……………………………………………………………..…….. 229
Appendices……………………………………………………………….......... 231
Brief information about the authors …….……………………………..…….. 267
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ABBREVIATIONS

AFU – Armed Forces of Ukraine

APC – Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATO – Anti Terrorist Operation
BTG – Battalion Tactical Group
CCSF – Communications and Cybernetic Security Forces
CSC – combat stress control
CSCU – Combat Stress Control Units
HMICG – highly mobile internal communications groups
IPI – Informational and Psychological Influence
IPS – Informational and Political Support
JPRA – Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
MD – Military District
MIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs
MMCC – Military Medical Clinical Centre
MMPD – Main Military Political Department
MPQ – Multilevel Personal Questionnaire
MPS – Moral and Psychological Support
NGO – nongovernmental organisation
NGU – National Guard of Ukraine
OR – Operational Region
PPS – professional psychological selection
SFC – Support forces command
SMO – Special Military Operation
SOF – Special operations forces
SRC – The Suicide Risk Card
SSU – Security Service of Ukraine
TDC – Territorial Defence Command
TOT – temporarily occupied territory
TRSSC – Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre
 8

The war in Ukraine has highlighted what

the military has known for centuries - that
morale is more important than any expensive
weapon system or military doctrine.
As we know, war is fought by people, not
by weapons. The best technology in the world is
useless without the willpower to use it. The spirit
shapes our will, and the will determines our
actions. All of this together will ensure victory in
the war.
Among the most important problems to be
solved by commanders of all levels is moral and
psychological support. Moral and psychological
support perfectly fits into the overall system of
complex support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
and is included in the combat regulations, guidelines and principles of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine as an independent type. Moral and psychological
support is one of the types of complex support that has proven its ability to
adapt to the conditions of war, achieve positive results in terms of qualitative
and quantitative results, develop and be flexible to changes in the situation.
Its main result is a consistently high moral and psychological state of the
personnel of military units. The events of 500 days of full-scale war clearly
demonstrated the exceptional relevance and importance of a deep
understanding of the problems of moral and psychological support for the
deployment of armed forces.
Only a coordinated system of moral and psychological support, which
allows to influence the individual soldier's mentality and the moral and
psychological state of military units, can form and maximise the moral and
psychological capabilities of the Armed Forces personnel, protect them from
the adverse information and psychological influence of the enemy in a
combat situation, and mobilise personnel to solve combat tasks.
During this period, the structures of the MPS went through a difficult
path of transformation and development, but no matter how difficult the
periods of their functioning were, officers of the MPS structures gave their
best during combat missions, showed creativity, used new approaches in
their work to perform their main task - formation, maintenance and restoration
of the moral and psychological state of the personnel of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, which would allow them to perform their assigned tasks. And they
have done a great job with this task.
Vladyslav KLOCHKOV
Major General, Head of the Main Department of Moral
and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
 9

The foundation of our resilience is people. Ordinary people.

Ordinary Heroes. Among us. With us in the formation.
To all those who serve in the Armed Forces and other parts of the
Defence Forces of Ukraine, I express my respect and deep
gratitude. To all those who help, support and believe in us, I bow
to the ground. Eternal memory and honour to all those who have
fallen for freedom.
Ukraine will stand and win.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi General,

Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine

INTRODUCTION
The experience of combat operations to repel the full-scale aggression
of the Russian Federation against Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the
effectiveness of the use of troops is determined not only by the forms and
methods of combat training of personnel, but also by the psychological
factors of combat activity, prediction of the behaviour of a soldier during their
performance, formation during the training period and maintenance of a
proper moral and psychological state directly in combat, ensuring proper
restoration of the normal functioning of the psyche of soldiers after exposure
to the intense influence of stress.
Combat actions clearly confirm that their course and outcome largely
depend on the moral and psychological factor - a specific manifestation of
public consciousness that expresses the level of moral readiness and
psychological resilience of servicemen and the population of our country to
undergo the challenges of war and achieve victory over the aggressor.
We believe that the awareness of the crucial importance, understanding
and in-depth knowledge of the structure, organisation, management, forms
and methods of providing moral and psychological support in preparing for
and conducting the combat (combat operations), taking into account the
experience of 500 days of repulsing full-scale Russian aggression, is one of
the most important areas of work of commanders and deputy commanders of
the MPS, especially during the war for the authentic existence of the
Ukrainian people.
That is the reason why the necessity arose to describe the experience
of practical activities of the relevant structures, which at all stages of the war
have done and are doing everything possible to develop the qualities
necessary to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of
Ukraine
The aggression unleashed by Russia against Ukraine puts forward new
modern requirements for combat training and deployment of the armed forces,
moral and psychological support, professional training of officers, their
theoretical and methodological skills. Officers at all levels of chain of
command are facing a difficult challenge: to mobilise the efforts of servicemen
of all categories to effectively perform combat missions.
 10

The Russian army intended to occupy Kyiv within three days, but failed
to achieve any of its goals in Ukraine. Blood, sweat, tears, indomitable spirit
and modern Western weapons. In 500 days, a new Ukrainian army was born
- one of the strongest in the world.
In 500 days - from 4am on 24 February 2022 - Ukraine has changed
dramatically, it has withstood and not crumbled, it has ruined Russia's plans,
it has proved to the entire civilised world that we are a truly mature nation,
united and courageous, with a strong will to resist and win, and not some kind
of "failed state", as some people have called and imagined us.
Ukrainian forces have secured and retained the initiative and are
conducting counter-offensive operations along most of the front line, while
Russian forces are almost entirely focused on trying to hold on to the
Ukrainian land they have occupied. With the help of the West, Ukraine has
secured its independence, but faces the critical task of liberating strategically
important territory that is still under Russian control.
Moral and psychological support is one of the main types of complex
support for the training and deployment of troops (forces). It consists of a set
of social, political, international legal, organisational, military-social,
humanitarian, educational and social-psychological measures aimed at
forming the moral and psychological state of military personnel.
The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war has clearly proved the
need for a unified system of moral and psychological influence on the
personnel and population of the country. The MPS in the Defence Forces of
Ukraine, along with other types of support, is an objectively necessary factor
in maintaining combat readiness and combat capability of military units. It
requires constant improvement. The study and implementation of the
experience of organising the MPS of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is carried
out to identify patterns and trends in the development of the MPS system and
to develop recommendations for its improvement.
Over the past 500 days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have conducted a
number of successful operations: they forced Russians to retreat from the
north, liberated Zmiinyi Island, Kharkiv region and the right bank of the
Kherson region. They also sank the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, helped
the "cotton" to bloom* in the occupied Crimea, hit the Kerch Bridge, airfields
and ammunition depots far behind enemy lines... All this came as a shock to
Russia, as a cold shower: the executioner got what he deserved!
500 days of war... This description is the first attempt to analyse the
experience of moral and psychological support of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine in the course of repelling full-scale russian aggression.

* The Ukrainian expression "cotton blossom" in the sense of war originated in russian news, where media representatives
referred to explosions as "'pops" and did not call things by their proper names. Also, in Russian language, cotton and pop are spelled
the same way. That's why the term "cotton blossom" appeared in Ukraine as a sarcastic joke
 11

CHAPTER 1.
THE FIRST STRATEGIC DEFENCE OPERATION
(24 February - April 2022)
1.1. FULL-SCALE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE:
STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES ON THE BORDER OF
UKRAINE AS OF 22.02.2022
Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine began after a prolonged
increase in Russian troops since November 2021 along Ukraine's border with
Russia and Belarus and the recognition by the Russian authorities on 21
February 2022 of the terrorist formations on the territory of Ukraine - the so-
called DPR and LPR - as state entities. Various media sources, Western and
Ukrainian politicians have repeatedly considered the accumulation of Russian
troops near the border with Ukraine since November 2021 as Russia's
preparations for war with Ukraine. Various media sources, Western and
Ukrainian politicians have repeatedly considered the accumulation of Russian
troops near the border with Ukraine since November 2021 as Russia's
preparations for war with Ukraine.

As of 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation completed the

deployment of a military forces and operational and logistical support system
on the Western and Southwestern strategic directions near the borders of
Ukraine. The enemy created five groups forces in certain areas, which were
involved in the offensive operation.
 12

In the direction of the Polissia operational area - a group of forces of the

eastern military district(MD), reinforced by units of the Airborne Forces of up
to 23 battalion tactical groups(BTGs) formed from military units of the 5th,
35th and 36th armies, coastal forces of the russian pacific fleet of the eastern
MD and the airborne forces of the russian armed forces.
16 BTG and 10 TG were located on the territory of the Republic of
Belarus.
7 BTGs situated on the territory of the russian federation: eastern
military district – 4 BTGs formed from the 69th support brigade of 35th army,
114 and 394 motorized infantry regiments, 218 tank regiment, and 127
motorized infantry division of the 5th army, airborne forces – 3 BTGs which
included 11th, 31th and 83rd airborne battalion.
The group consisted of: personnel - up to 14100 people, OTBMS - 12,
tanks - 160; other AFVs - 807, artillery systems - 210, MLRS - 68 systems.
On the western strategic direction, the grouping of forces was created at
the expense of military units of the western, central, eastern MDs, the
aerospace forces and the airborne forces. The grouping included up to 41
BTGs (over 39.5 thousand people, 38 airborne units, 869 tanks, 1764 APCs,
454 artillery systems, 226 MLRS) in the designated areas.
In the direction of the Siverskyi OR - a grouping of forces of the Central
MD, up to 16 BTGs and 15 TGs from military units of the 2nd and 41st armies
and 90th brigade of the Central MD. The group consisted of: 16500 people,
20 OTBMSs, 348 tanks; 959 APCs, 237 artillery systems, 114 MLRS.
Forces of the western MD deployed in the direction of the Slobozhansky
OR: 25 BTGs formed from units of the 6th, 20th and 1st armies of the Western
MD. The group consisted of: up to 23000 people, 18 OTBMSs, 521 tanks;
805 APCs, 217 artillery systems, 112 MLRS.
 13

The grouping of forces on the south-western strategic direction was

created by military units and subunits of the southern and central MD, the
Black Sea fleet MD, the aerospace forces and the airborne forces. The
grouping of forces included up to 43 BTGs (up to 83.7 thousand people, 16
OTBMS, 966 tanks; up to 2970 APCs, up to 1290 artillery systems, 407
MLRS) in the designated areas.
The grouping of russian invading forces of up to 17 BTGs from military
units of the 8th Army of the Southern MD with possible reinforcement from
units of the 2nd Army of the Central MD were deployed in the direction of the
Donetsk OR. In addition, the 1st and 2nd armies with a total of over 35
thousand people were operating in the temporarily occupied territories of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The grouping consisted of up to 58.2 thousand people, 16 OTBMS, 794
tanks, 1654 APCs, 950 artillery systems, and 264 MLRS.
Forces deployed in the direction of the Tavriya OR (Crimean OR) and
the Azov OZ as follows: the Southern MD forces in the Crimean OR and the
Airborne Forces with up to 26 BTGs from units of the 8th Army, 22nd army
corps, 58th army of the southern MD, the Black Sea fleet coast forces and the
7th air assault division of the airborne forces.
The army group consisted of up to 25.5 thousand people, 172 tanks,
1311 APCs, 337 artillery systems, and 143 MLRS.
The total number of forces deployed along the Ukrainian border and on
the temporarily occupied territory of the AR of Crimea included one hundred
and seven BTGs and had more than 138.5 thousand servicemen, 66
OTBMS, up to 2000 tanks; more than 5570 APCs, up to 1950 artillery
systems, MLRS - up to 700 units.
Aircraft from the air force and air defence units of the military districts were on
standby. In total, the following were on standby
 14

the enemy had up to 430 aircrafts and up to 380 helicopters (excluding the Air
Force and Air Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of Belarus).
The Black Sea Fleet's combat strength was as follows:
6 submarines, equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles;
ships - 41, of which 37 were warships (missile cruiser - 1, frigates - 3 /3
with SCLM, medium cruisers – 2, SES – 2, amphibious assault ships – 7 / 2
of them were undergoing repairs; light cruisers – 4 /4 with SCLM)
boats - 152, including 32 combat boats;
support vessels - 127.
Accordingly, a striking force was set up on the border with Ukraine by
the second half of February 2022 to conduct a full-scale invasion of its
territory.

Russian president putin announced a "special military operation" to

allegedly "demilitarise and denazify Ukraine" at around four o'clock Kyiv time
on 24 February 2022. Within minutes, missile attacks began across Ukraine,
including in Kyiv. Russian troops invaded Ukraine near Kharkiv, Kherson,
Chernihiv, and Sumy, entering from Russia, Belarus, and the temporarily
occupied Crimea. Together with Russia, Belarus is actually waging war
against Ukraine: missile strikes are launched from the border areas on the
territory of Ukraine, combat aircraft are flying to launch missile and bomb
strikes on the territory of Ukraine, troops are being redeployed and supplied
in Belarus.
 15

Due to the resistance of the Ukrainian army and self-defence forces, the
Russian army suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment in the
first days of the aggression. In its modern history, according to Ukrainian and
international experts, Russia has never suffered losses even close to this
scale in such a short period of time in any war. Western intelligence
acknowledges that Russia has encountered stronger than expected
resistance, which has led to logistical problems for its forces, a shortage of
fuel, ammunition and food, and undermined morale. The rapid unification of
the countries of the world to help Ukraine, as well as the imposition of
powerful sanctions against Russia, was an unexpected blow to the aggressor
country.
Russia has been violating the rules of war and committing war crimes on

a massive scale since the first day of the invasion. In addition, the Russian
authorities are waging an active information war and using chauvinistic
propaganda. It is widely supported by the military political work of the Russian
army.

1.2 THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY-POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The development of the system of military political work in the AF of the
russian federation was carried out in three stages during 2018-2021:
Stage I (from 01.08.2018 to 01.10.2018) was the establishment of the
Main Military Political Department of the Russian AF (hereinafter - the
MMPD), headed by the deputy minister of defence of the RF - Chief of the
Main Military Political Departmet of the Russian AF
 16

The Main Military-Political Departmet of the AF of the RF is the central

military political command and control unit that carries out military political
work in the armed forces of the RF.

The main military political Departmet was established on July 30, 2018,
by the decree of the president of the RF, vladimir putin. The first reports about
the creation of the Departmet emerged in the media in February of the same
year, citing 'sources in the ministry of defense,' which speculated that it might
be organized based on the Personnel Management Office, the successor to
the main military political Departmet of the AF of the USSR. The latter was
dissolved in 1991 after the coup attempt by the State Committee on the State
of Emergency, as part of the liquidation of political bodies of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in the AF. According to some reports, the idea of
recreating political governance was personally promoted by Minister of
Defence, Sergei Shoigu, and this was the way the centenary of Soviet political
governance was celebrated, because "there are no coincidences".
The press interpreted the emergence of the department as a "return to
the old order", the second coming of political workers and commissioners who
had been engaged in political propaganda and explanations of the
government's policy in the past.
The MMPD consists of 7 departments (military-political work; military-
political propaganda and agitation; psychological work; military social work;
cultural and recreational work; military-patriotic work and interaction with
NGOs; interaction with religious associations), 2 directions (military discipline
and prevention of law violations; military-scientific training and personnel
distribution).
The department of psychological work (psychological service of the
russian AF) was withdrawn from the MMPD and the department of
psychological service of the russian MOD was established on its basis in
June 2020. Additionally, in 2020, within the MMPD a department was
established specifically for working with religious military personnel.
Stage II (until December 1, 2018) – the structure of military-political
work has been established at all levels, from the Main Military-Political
Departmet (ГВПУ) to military units and subunits. The personnel of the military
political work and military political bodies include: the deputy minister of
defense of the RF – Chief of the MMPD of the AF of the RF and subordinate
central bodies of military administration, the department (secretariat of the
deputy minister of defense of the russian federation), other bodies of military
administration, military units and organizations;
 17

deputies of the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the AF,

Commanders of troops in MDs, the Northern Fleet, branches of the Armed,
and military political work groups;
assistants to the heads of central bodies of military administration for
militarypolitical work;
military political Departmets of the Main Command of the Aerospace
Forces, military districts, and the Northern Fleet (structure of the Departmet –
department of organization of military political work; divisions: information and
propaganda, military social support, military personnel support, sociological;
center for psychological work);
military political departments of the main commands of the infantry
forces and the navy, branches of the AF, and military educational institutions;;
military political departments of training centres;
deputy commanders of units, subunits for military political work;
subordinate military units, organizations, and units (psychological,
military-patriotic work, culture, and periodicals).
The positions of deputy commanders for military-political work are
introduced in units with a personnel strength of 50 servicemen or more. In
platoons and companies with a personnel strength of up to 50 individuals,
additional instructors for military political support are appointed from among
the servicemen serving on a contractual basis.
Stage III (until 01.03.2019) - training of personnel for military political
bodies from tactical to strategic levels of command in higher education
institutions in accordance with the new federal state educational standards
 18

Additionally, certain structural units of the MOD, military units, and higher
education institutions have been transferred under the authority of the MMPD
Officers are trained for the bodies of military-political work in the
following educational institutions: The Military University of the Ministry of
Defence of the Russian Federation named after Prince Alexander Nevsky
(the main educational institution), the Military Educational and Scientific
Centre of the Navy The N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Peter the Great

Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces, Novosibirsk Higher Military

Command School, Yaroslavl Higher Military Air Defence School, Ryazan
Higher Airborne Command School named after General of the Army V.
Margelov.
Advanced training courses for psychologists and heads of psychological
support teams are held at the Military University and the Kirov Military
Medical Academy.
The following have been transferred to the MMPD: the Department of
Psychological Work, the Department of Culture, the Department for Citizens'
Appeals of the Ministry of Defence; the Prince A. Nevsky Military University;
the Centre for Psychological Support of the Ministry of Defence Events
(established in September 2020). on the basis of the centre for psychological
work of the Military Police); centre for sociological and psychological
monitoring of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (established
in September 2020 on the basis of the research sociological centre of the
Military Police); military heraldic service of the Russian Federation; centre for
military-patriotic work of the Russian Federation; research centre
(sociological) of the Russian Federation; 49th centre of technical means;
advertising and information agency "Army of Russia" Zvezda Media Group,
newspaper
 19

"Krasnaya Zvezda", "Warrior of Russia" magazine); central military cultural

institutions.
Currently, the total number of personnel of the military-political
institutions of the Russian AF is about 12 thousand people, of which more
than 90% are in tactical units and military units. The staffing of these positions
is in the range of 90%-95%.
During 2020-2021, the legal basis for the activities of military-political
institutions, organisation and conduct of military-political work in the forces
was formed by approving new regulations and making appropriate changes to
existing legislation, military regulations and other governing documents, in
particular, by assigning responsibility for the morale and psychological state
of servicemen to the relevant commanders, approving the functions of deputy
commanders for military political work etc.
The main tasks of the military political institutions of the russian Armed
Forces include:

ensuring a common understanding and support of the state policy,

decisions of the President of Russia and the Minister of Defence of the
russian federation by the personnel;
organisation of military political work during the execution by the troops
(forces) of daily and combat (combat training) activities under any conditions
of the situation;
 20

organisation of sociological support of combat (operational) training

activities, study, assessment and keeping the moral, political and
psychological state of personnel at the proper level;
ensuring a high level of military discipline and order in the troops,
implementing measures to unite military teams, preventing negative social
processes in them, primarily of an interethnic and interreligious nature;
organising and conducting military political training and military political
information for personnel, measures aimed at preventing extremism and
terrorist ideology, including among family members of servicemen;
carrying out the tasks of information counteraction, protection of
personnel from negative informational and psychological influence;
participation in the implementation of state programmes for the patriotic
education of Russian citizens, their preparation for military service and
military-patriotic work with the population;
organisational and methodological assistance in the activities of the all-
Russian children's and youth military-patriotic public movement
"YUNARMIYA" and other military-patriotic associations;
organisation of psychological work in the troops in certain areas;
monitoring of the socio-economic status of servicemen, participation in
the work with citizens' appeals;
organising the work of cultural institutions in the troops (forces), military
museums and libraries;
cooperation with traditional religious associations of the russian
Federation, organising work with religious servicemen;
 21

organising the provision of technical support for military and political

work.
The readiness of the formed military-political institutions of the Russian
Armed Forces was tested both during the conduct of operations in Syria and
during military trainings in 2019-2021 (joint command and staff training
"Resoluteness-2020", strategic command and staff trainings "Caucasus-
2020", "West-2021", special training on military-political work "Cohesion -
2019, 2020, 2021".
During these events, a set of practical actions of military political work in
different conditions was worked out; the system of organising psychological
work was clarified; a draft manual on military political work was tested;
algorithms for the actions of officials of military political institutions and the
integrated use of psychological training techniques for different categories of
personnel were mastered; promising samples of mobile complexes of military
political work "Apostol" and "Rupor" were tested.
Based on the experience gained during the training, certain practical
tasks of military and political bodies were clarified and revised, namely
conducting propaganda activities in the course of gaining information
superiority over the enemy;
mandatory integration of psychological training elements into combat
training;
improving the moral, political and psychological state of servicemen
directly in combat;
 22

the use of integrated mobile teams of military and political work in

battalion tactical groups;
providing psychological assistance to injured servicemen in a
coordinated manner with the medical service;
fighting the falsification of history.
Based on the above information, the following conclusions can be
drawn:
1. The preconditions for the restoration of military-political institutions in
the Russian Armed Forces were the deepening of information and
psychological confrontation between the main geopolitical players;

the growing role of moral and political unity of the army and society; the need
to ensure direct influence on the cognitive, emotional, behavioural and
motivational spheres of the personality, total control over the manifestations
of individual, group and mass consciousness; manipulation with national and
patriotic feelings; formation and strengthening of unified priorities of the
spiritual life of man and society with the obligatory introduction of the ideas of
the "Russian world" into the public consciousness.
2. The creation of a powerful system of military-political work in the
Russian Armed Forces confirmed the Putin regime's policy of increasing
Russia's military potential, where one of the main places is given to work with
personnel and raising a loyal population.
3. The development of the system of military-political work of the
Russian Armed Forces, which was carried out in 2018-2021, was generally
completed by the beginning of 2022.
Shoigu is a rare "talent", even for today's Russia".
"commander" and minister. He, like no one else, knows how to turn any
defeat into a victory, at least on paper. And to present any return to
retrograde order to Putin and the public as a progressive
 23

military reform vital for the development and combat capability of the Russian
armed forces.
This time, Kuzhegetovich delighted the Russian armed forces by
announcing the return of commissars. The Main Military-Political
Administration from Soviet times is back.
It seems like they've once again renamed an existing structure, but
what's the big deal? In reality, the change is substantial. Employees of the
Main Personnel Management Department in the military were primarily seen
as officers-educators, officers-psychologists who primarily assisted
servicemen in resolving personal issues and addressing relationship
problems within army units. Today, the main emphasis in the activities of the
new commissars is placed on propaganda and supervision, and their
significance in the management system of the armed forces will be
significantly increased. By the way, the Chief of the Main Personnel
Management Department manages the department as the deputy minister of
defense, a position that the heads of the Main Personnel Management
Department did not have. This indicates that the employees of the new-old
department have broader powers than before.
In reality, the idea of introducing new commissars is not entirely safe, as
it might seem at first glance.
Indeed, this blurs the
principle of unity of command
in the Russian armed forces.
Even if the officers of the new
structure are not endowed
with the rights of sole
commanders, unlike the
commissars during the period
of the Civil War until 1924, as
well as in May 1937 – August
1940, and from July 1941 to
October 9, 1942,
commanders of platoons,
battalions, regiments, and higher, when making decisions, are involuntarily
compelled to consider their commissars, who are endowed with almost the
same rights as they themselves. The fact that the new commissars oversee
the commanders is a situation that could lead to complications!
As the experience of the war has shown, the pseudo-reform conducted
by Shoigu did not enhance but rather diminished the combat capability of the
Russian forces. Shoigu, with his Soviet background as a party functionary
and former commissar, might have genuinely believed that the new Main
Political Administration (GLAVPUR) would work wonders. However, the
results on the ground suggest otherwise.
 24

1.2.1. Organisation of military political work in the AF of the russian federation

One of the components of military political work in the armed forces of
the Russian Federation is psychological work, the organisation and structure
of which has undergone changes over the past 3-4 years, taking into account
the practical experience of the Russian army in combat, and the use of both
Russian and foreign innovations in the area of psychology.
Psychological support in the Russian Armed Forces is organised and
carried out to develop psychological resilience and readiness to perform
training and combat tasks, and to maintain mental health in accordance with
the requirements of the regulatory legal acts of the MOD of the russian
federation.
The main areas of psychological work are: psychological diagnostics
psychological support;
psychological assistance
(both group and individual);
psychological rehabilitation;
psychological prevention;
psychological education.

In particular, psychological training of military personnel is carried out

during combat training. For this purpose, special psychological lanes and its
elements are set up (more than 75 of them have been created in the Russian
Armed Forces), and fire and assault lanes are used (more than 100 have
been created),
"scout trails", obstacle courses, training complexes for fleets.
 27

Psychological diagnostics of individuals who have arrived from the

combat zone is carried out within 10 to 20 days of arrival.
Psychological assistance and rehabilitation measures are carried out at
the request of subunit and military unit commanders, as well as at the request
of servicemen and their families.
The following facilities are provided for psychological work:
In permanent locations - psychological work rooms;
In the fields - mobile psychological work units of various modifications,
as well as mobile psychological work groups for the prompt resolution of
emerging issues.

During the psychological work, the following equipment is used: an automated

workstation of a military psychologist, an automated workstation of a
professional selection of specialists "Otbor-V" (AWP SPO), psychological
diagnostic complex "Multipsychometer", a psycho-physiological testing device
UPFT-1/30 "Psychophysiologist", a biorhythmic stimulation device "Rhythm-
Polit", a psychology diagnostic complex "BOS-TEST", a set of "Yamaguchi"
massagers, etc.
 28

Psychologists in military units are civilian specialists, up to 90% of whom are

women. Military positions of psychologists start with the head of the
psychological work group of a military unit at the level of regiment, brigade, or
special forces. The military rank is senior lieutenant.
 29

The main goals of the psychological service of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation are:
1) to ensure that persons with signs of deviant behaviour and (or) who are
not fit to perform their assigned tasks are not allowed to serve and study in
military educational institutions;
2) ensuring the psychological readiness of the personnel of the armed
forces to perform assigned tasks;
3) ensuring support for the psychological well-being and mental health of
servicemen, members of their families, civilian staff of the armed forces, as well
as students of general educational organisations;
4) conducting sociological and psychological monitoring activities
armed forces

At the same time, there are a number of negative aspects in the

organisation of the psychological service of the Russian Armed Forces,
caused by both total corruption and the tendency to use outdated practices
and methods of working with personnel, and the inhibition of the introduction
of best practices in psychological work with personnel.
In the Russian Armed Forces, most of the positions of "ordinary"
psychologists, which are staffed by no more than 50%-70%, are civilian.
In December 2020, following the publication of a journalistic
investigation by the Medusa news agency, a scandal erupted over the use of
 30

the "latest" and the "most modern" automated workstation of the military
psychologist ARM VP, which turned out to be a Soviet invention of the 1980s.
At the same time, the cost of purchasing each set of the VP's was
overestimated by more than 3 times and ranged, depending on the
configuration, from 183 thousand to 300 thousand rubles (2.5 thousand to 4
thousand US dollars).

Despite certain progress in the organisation of psychological work

observed in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation since 2019
(formation of a department of psychological work, development and
implementation of promising models of technical equipment, drafting a new
version of the Concept for the Development of the Psychological Service and
new requirements for a psychologist, introduction of a system of advanced
training and additional professional education for psychologists, etc,), in
general, the system of psychological work with military personnel remains
largely underdeveloped and limited, somewhat corrupt, it uses obsolete
Soviet-era developments, most of the latest inventions and new models of
technical equipment are low-budget or purchased in single copies, and are
used exclusively during large-scale and demonstration drills.
 31

In the practical implementation of the requirements of the guidelines for

the organisation and conduct of psychological work in the armed forces of the
Russian Federation, significant attention is paid to psychological diagnostics,
training and support, with a residual focus on psychological rehabilitation and
education.

The majority of psychologists' positions in military units are civilian, with

 32
a staffing shortage of 50 to 70%, which is mainly due to external reasons (low
salaries, unbearable working conditions, excessive demands, encouragement
of "showmanship" at work, etc.) This has a negative impact on both the
effectiveness of psychological work and the perception of the need for it in the
armed forces, both on the part of the leadership (command) and the rest of
the personnel.
Measures to protect the personnel of the armed forces of the Russian
Federation from negative information and psychological influence are also
arranged by military and political institutions, which, in accordance with their
function, participate in the organisation and implementation of information
counteraction measures.
Protection of troops from psychological and information influence of the
enemy (hereinafter referred to as protection from IPI) is a form of military and
political propaganda and agitation conducted during the daily and combat
activities of troops by all military command and control units to prevent,
neutralise (weaken), block and eliminate the consequences of negative
psychological and information influence on military personnel. It is carried out
to reduce the danger of the enemy's information and psychological influence
on command and servicemen

Protection against IPI includes:

counteracting the spread and perception of subversive information by
personnel;
training personnel to be vigilant and immune to hostile ideology;
protection of communication and command and control systems;
 33

blocking the enemy's access to information networks, resources and the

spiritual and psychological sphere of subunits and military units;
exposing and clarifying to the soldiers the enemy's insidious plans,
goals and objectives, methods and techniques of information and
psychological warfare;
suppression of false rumours, panic and prevention of various kinds of
fears among the personnel of units and subunits involved in combat
operations.
In recent years, the problematic issues of protection against IPI and maintaining
an appropriate level of moral and psychological stability of the personnel of the
Russian Armed Forces have remained unresolved:
the difficulty of transferring the mindset of the personnel to a military mode;
underestimation of the scale and duration of operations and enemy forces;
fragmentation of information and reference material on the theatre of
operations,
history and population composition;
underestimation of the importance of protecting personnel from IPI.
This was driven by the prevailing belief among the majority of personnel,
including senior military commanders, that the actions of the Russian Armed
Forces in the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Georgia, and now
Ukraine, would not be met with any significant resistance. It was assumed that
in the face of the power of military machinery and the superior number of troops
involved, the armed formations of these states and state entities would give up
resistance and lay down their arms. The formation of this opinion was
supported by the absence of clear and precise ideas about the number,
weapons, moral and psychological state of the armed forces of the probable
enemy, the content of combat missions, which subsequently affected the quality
of preparation of the Russian troops for combat operations.

1.2.2. Problems of organising military-political work during a "special military

operation"
Given the analogies of the problematic issues of the use of the Russian
Armed Forces during the first Russian-Chechen and Russian-Ukrainian wars,
it could be assumed that the miscalculations made during the first stage of the
Russian-Ukrainian war would be taken into account by the military authorities
of the Russian Federation and, based on their results, adjusted forms and
methods of protection of the personnel of the Russian Armed Forces from IW.
At the same time, the analysis of the experience of organising military-
political work during the preparation and conduct of SMO shows that the
military-political leadership of the Russian Armed Forces did not make proper
conclusions from previous military campaigns, and the military command and
control bodies are once again repeating their own mistakes
 34

There are a number of systemic shortcomings and problems in the work

of officials of the military-political bodies that do not allow for an increase in
the effectiveness of military-political work in the armed forces. These include
Insufficient personal professional and official training of the heads of
military-political bodies of associations and operational staff of the military-
political work control points;
template approaches, formalism in the organisation of military-political
work in the troops in its main areas, ignoring the experience of military-
political work in the group of forces in the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) and in
the "peacekeeping operation" in Karabakh;
the forms and methods of protection against IPI at the level of military
units remain generally outdated and simplified, and there are not enough
trained specialists to implement the relevant measures in practice.
This is confirmed by the interim analysis of the organisation of military-
political work during the preparation and conduct of SMO, which allows us to
identify the most typical shortcomings that significantly affected the level of
moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of troop (force)
groups:
1) in the conditions of a rapid decision to conduct SMO, military-political
propaganda and agitation with personnel to restructure their consciousness
from a peaceful to a military mode was not carried out
 35

the objectives of the operation, their place and role in the fulfilment of its tasks
were not explained to each serviceman;
2) the available data on the assessment of the social and political
situation in Ukraine did not fully correspond to reality: "Instead of flowers and
loaves of bread, as they had expected, local residents of the Russian-
speaking regions met the rear columns of their troops with civilian resistance";

3) information about the moral and psychological state of the personnel

of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was incorrect. The anticipated expectations
of their unpreparedness for armed resistance and mass surrender did not
materialise;
4) the personnel of the Russian Armed Forces groups in Ukraine
participating in the SMO were subjected to large-scale information and
psychological influence deployed by the Ukrainian psychological operations
centres in accordance with NATO standards;
5) the supply of troops with mobile technical equipment for military and
political work was insufficient. The limited number of portable technical
equipment available to the troop groups did not let them effectively carry out
measures to maintain high morale of the troops;
 36

6) The directions of military-political work

with the personnel of the Russian Armed Forces
have been unchanged for many decades, and
so have the approaches to their implementation
As a result, the measures of military-
political work, including protection from IPI, in
the Russian Federation at the tactical and
partially operational levels are rather ineffective,
as evidenced by the spread of desertion among
the military personnel of the Russian
Federation, self-injury to avoid participation in
"special military operation", the introduction of
"boards of shame" in military units, etc.
In addition, as the experience of the
Russian-Ukrainian war has shown, the system
of MPS of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has
proved to be more effective than the military-
political work of Russian troops.
Our system of moral and psychological support has proved to be more
flexible, able to adapt to rapid changes in the combat situation. This is clearly
evidenced by the results of combat operations, during which the Russian
Armed Forces failed to achieve any of the war's objectives.

1.3 ORGANISATION OF MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

FOR THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

1.3.1. State of moral readiness and psychological resilience of

the personnel of the troops
As of 31.01.2022, the level of morale and psychological state of the
personnel of the troops (forces) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was
assessed as satisfactory, which CONTRIBUTES to the performance of
assigned tasks.
There were no resonant centres of social tension or group
manifestations of dissatisfaction, or protest statements in the troops (forces)
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The main factors that had a positive impact on the morale of the
personnel by 24.02.2022 were
appointment to key positions of military leadership of persons with
significant combat experience, as well as a high level of trust and respect
among the personnel;
high level of public trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (74%);
 37

carrying out, within the defence reform, decommunisation measures

with the simultaneous implementation of national military traditions;
creation of the Territorial Defence Forces, their recruitment (manning)
on a territorial basis, as well as comprehensive assistance to their
establishment by local government institutions (regional, district, and city
administrations);
Improving the quality of operational and combat training courses and
directing them towards battle training;

Improving the system of medical, gear and food supply for the Armed
Forces of Ukraine.
At the same time, there were factors that negatively affected the moral
readiness of the personnel:
The salaries of military personnel were lower than the average salary
of the civilian population, and since 2019, the salaries of military personnel
have not been increased;
reduction in the amount of payments to servicemen for solving social
and domestic problems since 2020 (more than 10 times);
the unsatisfactory state of housing provision for servicemen; the
mismatch between the level of payments for housing maintenance and the
real cost of rent of housing in settlements where military units are deployed
(1.5-2 times lower);
psychological and physical exhaustion of the personnel of units that
have been in the areas of assigned tasks for a long time (more than 8
months)
 38

prolonged separation of servicemen who were involved in performing

assigned tasks in the JFO area from their families and the inability to promptly
resolve social and household issues at their place of residence (8-11 months
a year).
With the beginning of the large-scale offensive of the Russian
Federation's armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, the factors that
negatively affected the moral readiness and psychological resilience of the
personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were basically eliminated. The
Armed Forces of Ukraine mobilised promptly to repel the offensive of the
Russian Armed Forces
Since 24.02.2022, all territorial recruitment centres have seen queues
of patriotic citizens (including OR-1 and OR-2 servicemen) ready to join the
Armed Forces of Ukraine. The formation of territorial defence units and the
manning of combat military units was intensified.

On 25-26.02.2022, self-defence units were formed in regional (district)

centres and territorial communities from among persons who did not join the
AFU. Roadblocks and engineering barriers were quickly set up to prevent the
advance of the Russian Armed Forces, and work was actively carried out to
identify (destroy) enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
The massive destruction of manpower, weapons, military equipment,
and aircraft by the enemy's groups of troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
further intensified the people's resistance, and as of 01.03.2022, the level of
public confidence in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and confidence in the
victory of our troops was 95-98%.
 39

An important element of ideological influence on society was the

expression "RUSSIAN WARSHIP - GO FUCK YOURSELF!!!", which was
voiced by Ukrainian servicemen on Zmeinyi Island on 24.02.2022 in response
to the request of the commander of the Moskva missile cruiser to surrender
voluntarily. This statement has practically become the slogan of the Russian-
Ukrainian war and an additional catalyst for uniting the Ukrainian people and
the entire civilised world, as well as for activating the resistance forces

The main factors that positively influenced the moral readiness of the
personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were:
an increase in the level of trust in the military and political leadership of
the state to 95 %;
a high level of motivation and patriotism of the personnel, awareness
of the just nature of the armed struggle for their state, on their territory,
confidence in the inevitable victory of Ukraine; unity of the Ukrainian people
and their active resistance to the Russian troops,
support of the troops (forces) by volunteer ("non-governmental")
organisations; comprehensive support of Ukraine by the EU, the USA, the UK
and the the international community in the liberation of Ukrainian territories;
a 30 % increase in the salaries of military personnel and the
introduction of additional payments for participation in combat operations (30
- 100 thousand UAH);
 40

tactical victories of the military formations of the Ukrainian Armed

Forces and territorial defence in various areas of combat;
displacement of Russian armed forces units from the territory of Kyiv
and Chernihiv regions, partially from Sumy region, successful battles for the
retention of Kharkiv, heroic defence of Mariupol, etc;
systematic and prompt rewarding of the defenders of Ukraine with
state and departmental awards;
formation of a foreign legion and its active participation in the
destruction of the enemy;
spread of panic among the military personnel of the aggressor country
due to significant losses of manpower and equipment, unauthorised
abandonment of military units, desertion, refusal to perform combat missions
and voluntary surrender, including as a result of leaving areas where enemy
forces are concentrated and successful psychological operations.

spread of panic among the military of the aggressor country

At the same time, there were factors that negatively affected the moral
preparedness and psychological stability of the personnel, such as:
manning military units with persons liable for military service who had
no primary military training, were not "shelled" and psychologically
unprepared to participate in intense combat operations, due to the focus of
the recruit centres on the speed of recruitment, given the situation and the
large number of people wishing to join the ranks of the defenders of Ukraine,
with a loss of quality of professional and psychological selection, and
sometimes without any selection at all. At the same time, a significant number
of citizens who had experience in combat operations were left out of their
attention or appointed to positions not in direct military specialities.
 41

sending personnel to military units who were not prepared for actions
in combat (extreme) conditions and were not trained in military affairs, which
was caused by the need to quickly man them up;
a significant increase in the number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in
a short time led to a shortage of personal protective equipment (helmets,
bulletproof vests, first aid kits, etc.) and the inability to organise the resupply
of units with the necessary material assets in a short time;
the supply of foreign-made weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine
required additional training for personnel, which actually did not have enough
time;

ineffective collective training (combat cohesion) led to the emergence

of subordinates' distrust of their immediate commanders, uncertainty about the
correctness and expediency of their decisions (orders).
The above factors influenced the decision-making of personnel to
abandon their positions and to disobey orders of commanders in some units of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In addition, the moral readiness and psychological resilience of
personnel in March-April 2022 was negatively affected by
the absence of an established system for evacuating military family
members at the beginning of the war;
the intensity of the combat operations (constant fire from artillery,
multiple rocket launchers and aviation), mental and physical fatigue, lack of
proper organisation of social -
 42

and welfare services (rest, washing, laundry, etc.) for the personnel of
units in the areas of direct contact with the enemy and those surrounded;
coverage of information about outrages and massacres of civilians
(including women and children) by the occupation forces in the settlements of
Bucha, Irpin, Gostomel, Vorzel, Borodyanka. At the same time, this factor
became a catalyst for the mobilisation of the personnel of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine and the IDF to destroy the occupation forces without regret or
compassion;

partial loss of communication between military personnel and their

families;
forced filtration and transfer of civilians from the occupied territories of
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to the Russian Federation;
the duration of the process of releasing the servicemen of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine who were captured;
the threat of a man-made global catastrophe at the Chornobyl and
Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants, including in connection with a possible
terrorist attack (missile or air strike) by the occupation forces; the threat of
possible use by the Russian Federation of chemical weapons and other
types of weapons prohibited by the Geneva Conventions.
 1.3.2. The system of command and control of troops and
facilities of moral and psychological support
MPS of training and employment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is a
form of comprehensive support, preparation and conduct of combat
operations aimed at formation, maintenance and renewal of MPS of
personnel of troops (forces) necessary for successful performance of
assigned tasks.
The establishment of an effective system of moral and psychological
support in general allowed to fulfil the main task in 2014-2021 - formation,
maintenance and restoration of the moral and psychological state of
personnel necessary for the quality performance of assigned tasks during the
antiterrorist operation, and later - the operation of the joint forces on the
territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (Appendix 1).

During this period, the structures of the MPS (Human Resources

Management) went through a difficult path of transformation and
development. However, no matter how difficult the periods of their functioning
were, the officers of the MPS structures in the MEB and military units
(subdivisions), by their own example, during the performance of combat
missions in the YFO (ATO), gave maximum effort and energy, showed
creativity and used new approaches in their work in order to qualitatively
perform their main task: formation, maintenance and restoration of such
moral and psychological state of the personnel of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine that would allow them to perform the tasks assigned to them. And
they succeeded in this task (Annex 2).
With the beginning of the strategic offensive of the Russian Armed
Forces on 24 February 2022, the management of forces and means of moral
and psychological support of the Armed Forces of of Ukraine and other
components of the defence forces was organised from the deployed units of
the MPS as part of the relevant control points
 44

As of 9:00 a.m. on 24.02.2022, the personnel of the Main Department of

the MPS of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in accordance with the previously
determined distribution, took up their positions at the control point of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and started working (Annex 3).
Given the dramatic changes in the situation, the lack of real-time
information on the status and position of their troops (forces), massive enemy
missile and air strikes on key facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and
the rapid advance of the enemy from different directions, the primary task
was to establish communication with the structural units of the MPS of the
command and control points of the troop groups. Given the unplanned use of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the Defense Forces, the
creation of new groups of troops (forces) in response to the full-scale invasion
of the Russian Federation and the inability to consolidate the control of all
created groups of troops at the command of the Joint Forces Command, most
of the groups of troops were controlled from the control point of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (CP GS AFU).
In addition, the operational groups of troops that were deployed or had
been deployed in areas that were not disclosed were mostly not provided with
departmental and closed communication channels, were just being deployed,
or were still on the march.
Given the above conditions, as well as the non-standard conditions of
command, the transience of events, and the relocation of most control points,
the previously established procedure for organising interaction did not allow
the top leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to fully function and
receive objective information for further decision-making in the first days of
the war.
In fact, in the first three days, only five reports from the MPS were
received from the subordinate structures of the MPS. Information on the state
of affairs and problematic issues was obtained by all possible means and
methods. The requirement to communicate as a matter of priority after taking
up workplaces at the subdivision control points was partially fulfilled,
depending on objective and subjective reasons. The lack of communication
required additional clarification of the procedure for interaction via mobile
communications. When new groups were created, there was usually no
communication with them for various reasons, and the leaders did not try to
establish it with the Control Point of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.
The command and control system for the MPS forces and resources
was established by creating and clarifying a command structure, establishing
communication with 23 troop groups, and coordinating with 5 control points
from other Defense Force components.
Reports from the MPS were sent after a reminder and not in a specified
form.
 45

The best reports, which fully disclosed the status, activities and
effectiveness of the MHLP, were provided by the Air Force Command, the
Joint Forces Command, and the worst by the Navy Command and the
Territorial Defence Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In the course of managing the forces and resources of the MPS during
the first stage of the operation, the Defence Forces sent four directives of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on MPS, twenty-eight
orders of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on MPS, and
received two hundred and sixty-three reports on MPS from subordinate troop
(force) groups.
In the course of the analysis of the MPS reports, their content was
adjusted to include information on the general situation, experience in
organising MPS during hostilities, examples of heroism (description), results
of the work of highly mobile internal communication groups (when, in which
combat orders or units, what measures were taken, moral and psychological
state of the personnel of the units in which they worked, factors of negative
and positive influence, problems and ways of solving them, psychogenic
losses).
Because of the "determination of the degree of urgency" of sending
orders and reports from the MPS, the time for troops to receive orders from
the MPS was up to 3 hours, and for troops to receive reports from the MPS
was 3 to 5 hours.
In view of the rapidly changing situation and the need for an adequate
and rapid response to emerging problems in the field of MPS, a group of
MPS Unit Heads has been created in the SIGNAL messenger to focus
quickly on immediate tasks and to respond to emerging problems and threats
without transmitting information with limited access.
The organisation of the three-shift operation of most of the structural
units of the MPS control points was complicated by the following factors:
insufficient available number of operational personnel due to additional
involvement of MPS officers of military command and control bodies to work
in military units (subdivisions);
redistribution of operational personnel at reserve command posts,
which were constantly moving;
discharging duties in the newly created military units, as there were no
experienced personnel to man them.
The analysis of the system of command and control of the forces and
means of the MPS of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the initial stage of the
war, as well as other components of the Defence Forces, revealed a number
of problematic issues in the organisation of the MPS related to the limited
number of personnel of the structural units of the MPS of the military
command and control bodies, namely:
the structural subdivisions of the MPS of the Air Command Control
Points of the Air Force, Support Forces, Military Communications, and Cyber
Security of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had insufficient operational staff.
 46

This prevented them from being able to work in three shifts during long-term
operations;
the structure of the Main Command Center of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine lacked an MPS unit, which hindered the management of subordinate
military units;
the absence of military management departments or groups responsible
for planning and organisation of the MPS structures in the staff of MPS, has
considerably diminished the quality of planning and management processes
of the MPS operations of operational groups of troops;
appointment of MPS officers of military command and control bodies to
the positions of deputy commanders for MPS of newly formed brigades due
to the lack of combat experience of mobilised officers;
an increase (in some cases almost twofold) in the number of military
units (personnel) subordinated to the groupings of troops, which requires
increased efforts in organising MPS activities.
To address these issues, improve the effectiveness of the organisation
of the MPS activities of the troops (forces) and take into account the
proposals of the relevant commanders of the troops (forces), chiefs of military
administration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the following organisational
and staffing measures were taken in April 2022:
changes were made to the organisational and staffing structure of the
operational commands of the Land Forces, the Naval Infantry Command of
the Ukrainian Navy, and the Logistics Command of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine to introduce MPS departments instead of sections;
introduction of MPS departments instead of MPS section in the Air
Commands of the Air Force, the Command of the Support Forces,
Communications and Cyber Security Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
MPS groups were introduced in the Navy Flotilla and the Main
Command Centre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Subsequently, the Special Operations Forces Command also
introduced a MPS Departmet instead of a section.
Thus, we can see that the existing system of command and control of
the MPS forces and means, in the difficult conditions of the initial period of the
war, acquired new capabilities, functioned almost without significant failures,
proved its effectiveness, showed flexibility and prompt response to emerging
sudden problems and threats to maintain the required level of moral
readiness and psychological stability of the personnel of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine and other components of the Defence Forces to perform assigned
tasks.
 47

In addition, from the first hours of countering the Russian aggression,

officers of the MPS structures demonstrated
examples of courage and inspired their
personnel to perform heroic combat missions
by personal example. For instance, Senior
Lieutenant Maksym Martchenko, an officer of
the military unit A2120, courageously
performed combat tasks assigned by his
superiors in March 2022 as part of a unit in
the village of Izium, Kharkiv region. During
the offensive of the occupation forces across
the pedestrian bridge in the city of Izyum,
leading a reconnaissance group, he engaged
in a battle with the superior enemy forces,
during which he personally killed 9
servicemen of the occupation forces of the
Russian Federation.
On 29.03.2022, the reconnaissance group encountered the enemy and
destroyed unit 1084 of the Interspecies Centre for Training and Combat Use
of Electronic Warfare Troops and a Special Forces unit of the 16th Brigade of
the GRU Special Forces, which acted as a guard, the total number of the
enemy was about 30 occupants.
He was awarded the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, III class, for
courage in combat missions and high professionalism.
Senior Lieutenant Mark Klym, deputy
commander of the self-propelled artillery
battery for moral and psychological support of
military unit A0284, who was awarded the
Order of "Bohdan Khmelnytskyi", III class,
and the "Silver Cross", an honorary badge of
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine, for personal courage and heroism
displayed in the defence of state sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and loyalty
to the oath of allegiance.
From the first day of the full-scale war,
he led the actions of a self-propelled artillery
unit due to the absence of a full-time gun
commander. Performing combat missions in the area of Vesele and Kozatske
settlements of Kherson region, thanks to the skilful actions of the self-
propelled artillery unit under his leadership, the enemy was constantly hit by
fire, which made it impossible for him to move quickly into the depths of the
brigade's area of operations.
There are many more examples of this kind. Officers of the MPS
structures honourably fulfil their military duty to defend the Motherland.
 48

1.4 INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF

THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

1.4.1. Organisation of informational and propaganda support

Information and propaganda support is a purposeful activity of military
command and control bodies, commanders, commanders (chiefs), officials of
structural units of the MPS on information influence on the consciousness of
personnel to strengthen their MPS, formation and dissemination of ideological
beliefs, national values, sustainable motivation and readiness for armed
defence of state sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine, adequate
understanding by servicemen of military-political and JFO, tasks assigned to
the troops

Content and peculiarities of organising information and

advocacy support

Collection, analysis Formation of

and evaluation of personnel feeling of
the military and patriotism, personal
political situation, responsibility for
socio-political Main organisational Main meaningful tasks the protection of the
conditions in the tasks Motherland
areas of
deployment, actions
of troops (forces)
and preparation of
conclusions
Technology and outreach support

Management of Forces Forms Methods Means Formation of a

information flows in conscious attitude
the troops (forces), among the
organisation of personnel towards
cooperation with the fulfilment of
representatives of their public and
local authorities, official duty
mass media, public
organisations, etc
Verbal Visual
(Information, conversations, (Printed materials, visible
lectures, etc.) campaigning, etc.)
Ensuring mutual
Using available understanding and
resources and Practical support among the
propaganda to (personal example, etc.) population, as well
boost the morale as the formation of
of troops and the necessary socio-
political situation in
personnel. Formation and maintenance of a stable and controlled the area of
moral and psychological state among the troops operation of troops
(forces) personnel, creating motivational moods (forces)
among servicemen to perform combat missions.
 49

IPS is carried out in the following areas:

internal communication work;
military-patriotic work;
cultural work;
provision of technical means of propaganda.
Since the beginning of the large-scale aggression of the Russian
Federation, the main tasks of organising information and propaganda support
have became:
forming a conscious understanding of the state policy in the military
sphere among the personnel of the Defence Forces, fostering patriotism,
personal responsibility for the defence of Ukraine, loyalty to the Constitution
of Ukraine, the Military Oath, the Battle Flag, military traditions, courage and
bravery, readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of the Motherland;
protection of servicemen from harmful information and the psychological
influence of the enemy.
This work was organised following the requirements of the Instruction on
the Organisation of Information and Propaganda Support in the Armed Forces
of Ukraine, approved by the Order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine of 04.01.2017
№4.

Taking into account the experience of organising information and

propaganda support for the troops (forces) during the active phase of the
anti-terrorist operation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014-2015, the
main efforts of internal communication work and information support of the
troops (forces) were focused on solving problems related to:
 50
delivering information materials of patriotic, counter-propaganda and
analytical (assessment of the socio-political situation) content to the troops
(forces) located in the areas of assigned tasks;
providing personnel with the necessary number of printed periodicals,
including those of state authorities, and their prompt delivery to the areas of
assigned tasks;
improving the provision of outreach activities with personnel regarding
official, easy-to-understand and legally sound information and analytical
materials for organising patriotic and motivational work with personnel;
conducting long-term large-scale information campaigns to popularise
the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the society, promote the armed defence of
Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity and ensure their
implementation, first of all, in crisis areas with an unstable socio-political
situation;
the need to create image-making video stories and videos for
distribution in social networks, constant broadcasting on leading TV channels,
creation of films, TV and video films about the heroism of the military
personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, increase in the publishing of
literature on military and patriotic topics;
regulatory and legal definition of the procedure for engaging state and
private printing enterprises to perform tasks in the interests of information
support of troops (forces).
To organize purposeful activities of military administration bodies,
commanders, chiefs, and officials of structural divisions of moral and
psychological support, it is important to have effective informational influence
on the consciousness of personnel. This will help strengthen their moral and
psychological state, form and spread ideological beliefs, national sustainable
motives and values, and prepare them for armed defense of state sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is also essential to ensure adequate
understanding among military personnel of the military-political and socio-
political situation, the tasks assigned to the troops, and the conditions and
features of their implementation. To achieve this, a set of measures was
planned and practically implemented in the following areas:
internal communication work;
national and patriotic work;
cultural work;
provision of technical means of propaganda.
 51

1.4.2. Internal Communication with Personnel

The large-scale armed aggression initiated by Russia against Ukraine

on February 24, 2022, has imposed increased demands on the internal
communication system within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Undoubtedly, only a psychologically prepared and adequately motivated
individual can qualitatively perform military duties, especially in the conditions
of real combat actions (combat deployment) and the constant fire impact of
superior enemy forces.
During this challenging period for our country, when the Armed Forces
of Ukraine confront a numerically and quantitatively superior adversary,
economic and social crises occur. Humanistic, ideological, and spiritual
values of Ukrainian citizens take precedence, and society's activities to shape
and enhance readiness for military service and the defence of the Motherland
come to the forefront. One of the leading values is patriotism, the defence of
the Motherland, and the ability to make Ukraine strong, economically
developed, and prosperous. The internal communication work with service
members plays a significant role in realizing this objective.
A system of continuous
communication has been introduced
with the Deputy Minister of Defense
of Ukraine, H. Malyar, regarding the
receipt of instructions for the
formation of narratives and the
conduct of information work within
internal communications involving
representatives of the structural
units of the Ministry of Defense, the
General Staff, and the bodies of
military administration of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine. This has
significantly contributed to the direct
organisation of internal communication work within the military forces.
In line with this, efforts to shape resilient national-ideological convictions
regarding the necessity of armed defence of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine from Russian aggression have been intensified.
Prevention of destructive influences on the personnel from mass media,
political forces, and civic associations, along with targeted informational
support for the forces' activities, especially in combat operations, has
acquired paramount importance.
Collection, analysis and assessment of the socio-political situation in the
country and in the areas (regions, operational zones) of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine
 52

tasks and preparation of conclusions from its analysis were carried out by the
requirements of the Instruction on assessing the socio-political situation in the
areas of deployment and performance of assigned tasks, approved by order
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of 11 September 2017
No. 330, based on the monitoring of official information materials posted on
the Internet and based on reports from military command and control bodies.
At the same time, reports from the troops (forces) did not always
reflect the actual situation and were received with a significant delay.
In addition, as of 31.03.2022, the Central Department of Civil-Military
Cooperation of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had not
prepared any report on assessing the civilian environment in the areas of
assigned tasks.
There was insufficient or no interaction at the level of military regional
administrations and military command and control bodies to exchange
information on assessing the socio-political situation in the areas of
responsibility.
At the same time, analytical materials from official websites were used
to analyse the socio-political situation in Ukraine and the areas of hostilities.
Given the intensity of hostilities, this work was practically not carried out
in the military administration's structural units of moral and psychological
support. Therefore, by the decision of the leadership, the conclusions from
the analysis of the socio-political
situation in Ukraine and in the areas
of combat operations, which were
worked out in the Main Departmet of
Moral and Psychological Support of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine, were
brought to the structural units of
moral and psychological support of
military command and control bodies.
At the end of March 2022, the Main
Departmet of Moral and
Psychological Support of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine launched an
analytical state, the Main Departmet
of Moral and Psychological Support
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
launched an analytical information
digest with elements of analysis of
factors, primarily external ones, that
affect the state
 53

of the socio-political situation in the country. At the same time, the Centre for
Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine continued
to formulate conclusions on assessing the socio-political situation in the areas
where troops (forces) are performing their assigned tasks. Intense combat
operations and restricted access to information on the operational situation in
assigned duties have significantly complicated assessing the socio-political
situation. Therefore, information from official state Internet resources was still
used to form conclusions on assessing the socio-political situation.
As for the analytical information digest covering the socio-political
situation and the impact of foreign policy factors on it, its distribution was
limited to officers of the structural units of the General Staff and military
command and control bodies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who were
involved in operational groups at the control point. The category mentioned
above of military personnel positively perceived the digest.

1.4.3 Organisation of information support for the military

personnel and counter-propaganda measures
The availability and uninterrupted operation of the Internet made it
possible to promptly communicate information messages to the personnel
and ensure command (combat) briefings.
The first information summary in the form of the Information Space
Monitoring Results was processed and communicated to the troops (forces)
at 12:00 on 02/24/2022. During 24.02 - 01.03.2022, an information digest of
the information and narrative situation was prepared daily.
In March 2022, the troops' (forces') information support system was
improved. The result of this work was the preparation and publication of
several periodic information materials (attached) aimed at highlighting the
heroic deeds of the defenders of Ukraine, raising the morale of the personnel
and fostering hatred of the enemy, namely (Annex 4) :
"INFORMATIONAL HERALD" is an analytical digest for commanders
aimed at covering the world's support for Ukraine, the course of the Russian-
Ukrainian war and the current situation in the Russian occupation contingent.
The key purpose of the newsletter is to form and implement narratives among
the personnel, to form an image of the enemy among the military, to debunk the
myth of the invincibility of the Russian army through the realities of participation
in the "special operation", to highlight the large-scale international support for
Ukraine and the sanctions measures of the international community against the
"the Kremlin";
 54

"HEROIC-PATRIOTIC HERALD" is an information digest for

commanders to keep them informed, highlighting the heroic deeds and
actions of Ukrainian soldiers. The key objective of the digest is to glorify the
image of a Ukrainian soldier-defender, to cover events where service
members are awarded with state awards of Ukraine, and to form motivation to
defend the state against the Russian occupation aggressor;
«НОVИНИ ІZ «ZАПОРЄБЄРЬЯ» is a sarcastic news digest
highlighting the realities of life in Russia. The key goal of the digest is to
demonstrate the devastating impact of global sanctions on the Russian
economy, to present opinions and comments of well-known Russian figures
on the Russian-Ukrainian war, and to highlight the negative realities of the
participation of Russian military personnel in the "special military operation"
through the prism of scathing, mocking, contemptuous and ironic comments
and humour;
«ZАГУБЛЕНІ В СТЕПАХ УКРАЇНИ»– is a satirical digest aimed at
humorous coverage of the realities of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The
fundamental goal of the digest is to create an image of the enemy among the
military and debunk the myth of the invincibility of the Russian army through
the prism of humour and satire;

"WE ARE DEFEATING THE ENEMY NOW, WE ARE CONFIDENT IN

THE FUTURE" is a motivational digest aimed at highlighting the positive
aspects of Ukrainian society. The key objective of the digest is to build
confidence among the military in the large-scale global support for Ukraine,
highlight positive transformations in various spheres of public life and the skilful
and professional response of the state leadership to any crisis.
 55

"RUSSIA'S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE THROUGH THE PRISM OF OUR

VICTORIES" is a monthly heroic and patriotic bulletin for commanders'
information aimed at highlighting the victories of the Ukrainian army that took
place in similar months in different historical periods. The main goal of the
bulletin is to build the confidence of servicemen in future victories through the
perception of victorious battles of Ukrainian soldiers.

To organise counter-propaganda work at the initial stage of hostilities, between

24.02 and 30.04.2022, the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine prepared five orders of the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the abandonment of areas of
concentration (accumulation) of enemy troops. The Main Departmet of Moral
and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine developed leaflet
layouts (Annex 5) and organised the interaction of military command and
control bodies to ensure the implementation of these measures. For example,
to reduce the enemy's morale, the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological
Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Strategic Communications
Department of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
developed a propaganda leaflet-pass "5000000 for surrender".
 56

During this work, 44 areas where enemy troops were concentrated were
abandoned. For this purpose, more than a hundred propaganda munitions
were used, and about 400,000 leaflets were printed.
In addition to the use of artillery systems, groups of volunteers were
engaged to abandon settlements in the Kyiv region and the outskirts of Kyiv
using drones.
In addition, volunteers in Kyiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Mykolaiv
produced more than 400,000 leaflets.
Representatives of the resistance movement were also used to
distribute leaflets in the occupied territory (in the area of responsibility of the
Siversk OTU).
The leaflets were promptly produced by one of the printing centres of
the Ukrainian Armed Forces Support Command; however, the delivery of
printed materials and the receipt of propaganda ammunition took some time.
Therefore, the developed leaflet layouts were sent to the structural units
of moral and psychological support of military command and control bodies,
which organised the printing of leaflets in the areas of assigned tasks using
local printing facilities. Because of the above, to ensure the quality of district
postings, it is advisable to consider creating mobile units equipped with
special drones (quadcopters) for posting in the future.

1.4.4. Provision of printed periodicals to troops

The provision of printed periodicals to the troops (forces) has not been
organised since 24.02 and, following the Order of the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine of 27.12.2016 No. 719 "On the Organisation of Subscriptions to
Periodicals in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of
Ukraine" (as amended), subscriptions to periodicals for the second half of
2022 have not been made.
For the first half of 2022, the Information Agency of the Ministry of
Defence of Ukraine, "ArmyInform", concluded agreements with two service
providers to subscribe to periodicals for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the
same time, on 28 February 2022, the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry certified force majeure circumstances that made it impossible for
business entities to fulfil their obligations until the end of martial law.
According to the results of the monitoring of the provision of printed
periodicals to the groups of troops (forces) from 15 to 18 April 2022, the
following was established:
printed publications are supplied to six groups of troops (forces):
 57

the grouping of troops in the eastern direction (15,000 copies of "Army of

Ukraine" per week);

Command of the Airborne Assault Forces (10 copies of "Uriadovyi Kurier"

are delivered once a week);
the grouping of troops in the north-eastern direction (10 copies of
"Uriadovyi Kurier" and "Holos Ukrainy" are received once a week);
the Medical Forces Command (up to 1,500 copies are received once a
week by "Army of Ukraine");
the Support Forces Command (up to 10 copies of 'Uriadovyi Kurier' and
'Holos Ukrainy' are received once a week);
printed periodicals were not delivered to fifteen groups operating in the
northern and southern directions: the Air Force Command, the Navy
Command, the Logistics Forces Command, the Territorial Defence Forces
Command, the SSO Command, and others.
At the same time, the following information publications were prepared
in the troop (force) groups and distributed to the personnel in electronic form:
 58

in the Logistics Forces Command - a newsletter and "Warrior-

Logistician";
in the Airborne Assault Forces - a newsletter "DShV.info";
in the Volyn sector - the newsletter "In defence of the native land";
in the grouping in the northern direction - newsletters "OKP-Inform",
"North", "Chernihiv Tribunal";
in the command of the Territorial Defence Forces - the
"MPS-TRD".
Thus, we can conclude that:
1. The information support of the troops
(forces) was carried out at a level that facilitated
the performance of assigned tasks.
2. Centralised provision of the troops
(forces) with printed periodicals
"Holos Ukrainy" and "Uriadovyi Kurier",
according to the ATO experience, were
ineffective during active hostilities due to the
suspension of Ukrposhta branches and irregular
delivery of mail by the units of the FPS of the
MCCSC (Military Communications and Cyber
Security Command) of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine. For example, the delivery of periodicals
from printing houses in Kyiv to Volnovakha,
Kramatorsk, and Sievierodonetsk by the FPS
was carried out irregularly for 5-7 days, delivery to base camps - up to 5 days,
delivery to personnel - up to 7 days.
3. The printing facilities of local (municipal, private) enterprises in
assigned tasks can be adequate for printing weekly periodicals or targeted
propaganda materials (posters, leaflets, etc.).

1.4.5. National-patriotic and cultural work

The national-patriotic work with the personnel was organised by
establishing a sense of patriotism and personal loyalty to the Ukrainian people
in the minds of the personnel of the troops (forces), forming universal human
values,
 59

national pride, respect for the cultural and historical past of Ukraine in the
servicemen through the awareness of the relationship between individual
freedom, citizen's rights and their readiness to fulfil their civic duty to protect
the Motherland.
At the same time, the primary efforts in
this work were focused on holding
campaigns, information campaigns and
individual events that help increase
personnel motivation.
It is worth noting that at the beginning of
the large-scale aggression of the
Russian Federation on social media as
part of the #stoprussia campaign, a flash
mob on the manufacture and use of
"Molotov cocktails. The Main Departmet
of Moral and Psychological Support of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine joined this
flash mob by producing and distributing
visual materials (leaflets) to motivate the
population to make "Bandera Smoothies"
and use them against the enemy. In
addition, the results of Ukrainian citizens
using Molotov cocktails were
disseminated on social media on
relevant Internet resources.
 60

Under the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of

Ukraine No. 7722/C dated 01.04.2022, a patriotic and artistic event, "Time
Chose Us!" was held between 03.04 and 08.05.2022 under the slogan "Our
unity is our stability and the key to victory!".
To inform the public about the events held within the framework of the
campaign, further, promote the Armed Forces of Ukraine, strengthen the
motivational factors of the personnel of the State Defence Forces and civil
society, the Department of Internal Communications and Information Support
of the Troops (Forces) of the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological
Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, together with the Strategic
Communications Department of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Public Relations Department of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, the Military Music Department of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine and the Morale Centre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, posted on
the official channels and pages of the 41 information messages based on
video materials (creative works, appeals, and statements) of the music bands
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and famous national, world cultural, and
artistic figures were published on official channels/pages in social networks.
The disseminated materials were positively received both in Ukraine and
abroad. The total audience reach was about 642 thousand people.
In addition, during the campaign, the following was done:
an official Facebook page, "Ukraine First", was created to cover the
results of the campaign;
created and distributed on official pages, in existing Ukrainian and
foreign media and social networks:
more than 200 publications on the activities of military bands;
 61

15 original videos for new songs by military bands;

30 video messages from celebrities to the military personnel of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine;
7 video addresses of military band directors to the citizens of Ukraine;
6 videos about the concert activities of military bands;
20 video materials were provided for participation in the "United News"
telethon of Ukrainian TV channels (8 of them were published by TV
channels); participation of the Chief of the Military Music Department of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine - Chief Military Conductor in the "United News"
telethon was organised
News" telethon;
35 pieces of music were recorded: 10 audio and 25 videos (including six
original video clips for songs by military music bands);
an all-Ukrainian flash mob was organised and held to perform the song
"Oh, u luzi Chervona Kalyna" by military and famous performers and
recorded. As a result of the flash mob, video clips were created by the
participants of the action and a consolidated video of all the participants of the
flash mob, which were distributed through existing communication channels;
27 performances of concert brigades of military music institutions and
units were organised and held in public places;
with the assistance of the Command of the Medical Forces of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, 19 performances of concert bands were organised
and held in military (departmental) hospitals and public healthcare facilities;
concert tours of the Brass Band and the vocal and instrumental
ensemble of the Exemplary Demonstration Orchestra of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine were organised and conducted in Chernivtsi region; the Svyatovyd
band and soloists of the Exemplary Demonstration Orchestra of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine were organised and conducted in Khmelnytskyi region;
Sixty-seven performances of concert brigades of military musical
institutions and units were organised and held for the personnel of military
battalions and subunits of the Defence Forces of Ukraine. In addition to the
designated military musical institutions, the following took an active part in the
concert performances: The Military Music Centre of the Land Forces of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, the military orchestra of the Separate Special
Operations Centre "East", the military orchestra of the Joint Task Force
"East", the military orchestra of the Hetman P. Sahaidachnyi National Army
Academy, the military orchestra of the military unit A1108 (Drohobych), and
the military orchestra of the military unit A2641 (Kamianets-Podilskyi);
26 performances by famous artists, performers and bands were
organised and held in military units: Studio "Kvartal 95",
"Dieselstudio, “VIP Ternopil”, Mykhailo Foma, Oleksandr Ponomaryov,
Khrystyna Soloviy, Iryna Fedyshyn, Olya Polyakova, Oleh Skrypka, Zlata
Ognevych,
 62

Natalia Mogilevska, Artem Pivovarov, Max Barskih, Yuriy Horbunov, Yuriy

Tkach, and the Bez Obmezhen band;

30 messages to defenders of the Defence Forces were published on

YouTube. The content was distributed to military units via the following
networks
information hub "MAS Center" - WhatsApp and Telegram using the
hashtags: #milcultprostir, #Unity_of_Victory, #I_do_it_for_victory.
The goal of the campaign - to strengthen the motivational factors of the
personnel of the State Defence Forces and civil society to achieve victory
over the Russian aggressor and restore the state's territorial integrity - was
achieved.
Systematic communication activities in the information space
contributed to countering Russian propaganda, creating a favourable
information environment for the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and
promoting them both in Ukraine and abroad.
The maximum effectiveness of cooperation with state authorities, local
governments, management bodies, other military formations and law
enforcement agencies was achieved during the campaign.
The audience positively received the artistic events of the campaign,
with the participation of concert brigades of military music institutions and
units. An appropriate emotional response accompanied them.
As a result of the campaigns, about 10 music videos for 10 new songs
were created, 6 of which won the ardent favour of listeners and viewers in
 63

Ukraine and the world, namely: "Easter Glory Singing", "Ve Alla",
"Chornobaivka - black hell of enemies", "Ukraine above all!", "Ukraine will win!"
and "Victory!"

The leisure and recreation of servicemen was organised in the areas of

combat cohesion and recovery through cultural and artistic events aimed at
forming and maintaining a stable moral and psychological state, removing
negative emotional effects, restoring moral, mental and physical strength, and
mobilising the personnel of troops (forces) to successfully perform assigned
tasks (Annex 6).
1,788 cultural events were organised and conducted, involving 61,929
servicemen and their families.
Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the
Russian occupiers, given the lack of freedom of movement of performing artists
across the territory of Ukraine, the events have been reformatted and organised
locally.
There were 65 visits by artistic groups, and 1,066 concert performances
by professional bands and performers in the Bravo format were held in military
units, with 6,160 military personnel as spectators.
A common database of amateur groups, individual performers, bands,
and TCs was created, including representatives from 24 regional centres and
179 performers. The following forms of cultural work were organised: 172
performances (2,873 people attended), 34 excursions (632 people attended),
concerts 1,310 concerts (41,120 people), and 37 films (972 people). (
As part of the patriotic and artistic campaign "Time Chose Us!",
Ukrainian pop stars, through the authorised representative of the Office
 64

of the President of Ukraine Anna

Lushchay, for creative meetings
with over 725 events were
organised for creative meetings
with servicemen and women of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine
and the Defence Forces.
Attendance at 18 concerts
featuring Ukrainian show
business stars was organised
under the
#Concert_in_the_Metro
programme, with over 6,300
people attending servicemen
and their family members.
At the same time, 24 video
greetings from Ukrainian showbiz
stars on military and professional
holidays were created, and 47
videos of concert performances
by stars for the Defence Forces
and 92 motivational video publications with a cultural focus were produced.
All the information content was posted on the official media platforms of
the Centre for Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine and distributed by the "MasCenter. The coverage (number of views)
was 762,116.
As part of the #I believe in the Armed Forces of Ukraine communication
campaign, Roksolana held an all-Ukrainian charity art tour, "Hold on", Oksana
Mukha "Songs of an Unconquered Heart", "Cinema for Victory", and others.
As part of joint projects, 103 cultural events were organised.
cultural events were
organised, involving 2,741
servicemen and their
families as spectators.
Two flash mobs
#You_are_not_alone were
held, involving 117 people.
The activities included
Most of the winners of the
of the winners of the all-
Ukrainian festival "Songs
born in ATO" were
involved in cultural activities in the troops (forces): Khrystyna Panasiuk,
Oleksandr Klets, Serhii Kononenko, Yurii Suslo, and Zynovii Mediukh,
 65

Serhiy Boyko, Viacheslav Kuprienko, Volodymyr Semyshkin, Oleksandr

Lamburskyi, Ihor Bilyi, Volodymyr Kiyashko.
At the same time, at the initial stage, some military music units were not
ready to travel and provide support for the events, including participation in
the burial ritual. Given the situation, the Military Music Department of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine was promptly subordinated to the Main Department
of Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
As a result of the measures taken at the first stage, weekly plans for the
concert activities of the Exemplary Demonstration Orchestra of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine in Kyiv were drawn up. Subsequently, full-fledged concert
activities of military bands were organised, pop bands were created on their
basis, and joint performances with professional Ukrainian performers were
held.

1.5. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

1.5.1. Psychogenic losses

Since the beginning of the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine, the
Main Departmet for Moral and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine has been constantly monitoring the psychological readiness of
military personnel to conduct combat operations.
The psychological factors for effective combat performance are the
following: internal (personal) motivation of the serviceperson for an armed
defence of the state, the volitional awareness of the need to perform missions
under the conditions of risk to own life and health, as well as the risk of losing
brothers-in-arms, on whom own security also directly depends.
For example, a psychological analysis of the actions of personnel in
some of the brigades within the Ground Forces that retreated to reserve
positions to regroup and avoid mass enemy IDF showed that some
servicepersons who arrived as part of the battle casualty replacement
procedures and had no combat or emotional experience, and had not
undergone unit cohesion activities, were temporarily unprepared to take well
thought-out and balanced decisions in conditions of high risk to life and
superior enemy forces.
 66

The psychological analysis confirms that the factors (conditions) that

influence psychogenic losses among military personnel can be internal and
external.
Internal factors: the degree of situational awareness within military
personnel and the nature of their missions; the level of unit cohesion, their
staffing; the outcome of previous battles, the presence of combat or sanitary
losses, experience in overcoming negative psycho-emotional states (fear and
panic); the duration of hostilities, the degree of physical and psychological
exhaustion; the state of management and leadership (staffing with officers
with combat experience, a sufficient level of their authority).
External factors: information about the enemy (their combat strength);
unpredictability of hostilities and their duration; actions under enemy fire;
exhaustion, injuries, threat of capture, enemy cruelty; lack of ammunition and
water, isolation, lack of communication with the command element.
These factors are reflected in the scientific justification of the projected
psychogenic losses calculations and confirm the possibility of negative mental
reactions (hysteria, panic, stupor or aggression towards others) in conditions
of high risk to life. Such mental reactions occur primarily in “unexposed”
servicepersons in the first days (hours) of combat, the influence of which
decreases or altogether disappears over time, as they gain combat and
emotional experience.

Thus, the calculations on psychogenic losses of personnel in one of the

mechanised brigades, which were carried out at the beginning of russia’s full-
scale invasion of Ukraine, indicated that the projected losses of combat
capability as a result of combat operations that last 14-21 days, under the
influence of mental combat stressors,
 67
amounted to about 15% of the personnel, of which 10% were short-
term (up to 3 hours), 3% were mid-term (up to 3 days) and 2% were long-
term (sanitary psychogenic losses). Conversely, the calculation on projected
psychogenic losses of one of the territorial defence brigades staffed by
personnel with no combat experience doubles these figures (total projected
psychogenic losses are 28% of all personnel, of which 20% are short-term
(up to 3 hours), 12% are mid-term (up to 3 days) and 6% are long-term
(sanitary psychogenic losses)).
Thus, the psychogenic losses forecast indicates a direct causal
relationship between the level of training and comprehensive support of
servicepersons on the number of psychogenic losses.
In the period from 26 February to 2 March, the change in existing short-
term psychogenic losses shows a tendency for a sharp increase, which is
observed during (a) mass attacks on positions (locations) of personnel with
the lowest level of psychological stability, and (b) mass enemy assaults with a
significant superiority in manpower. Specific examples include:
up to 40 persons per day in units that fought fierce defensive battles in
Donetsk, Slobozhansky and eastern Tavriysky areas of operation, and held
back a superior enemy, who was trying to capture Chernihiv;
up to 20 people per day in military educational institutions the locations
of which were subjected to massive rocket and bomb attacks, which led to
numerous losses in personnel.
After the personnel had adapted to the psycho-traumatic factors of
combat and the enemy’s offensive impulse was reduced, the number of
psychogenic losses in all units decreased to 10 people per day.
The largest number of long-term sanitary psychogenic losses within
servicepersons was observed during the period of staffing military units with
newly arrived recruits who had not yet adapted to combat, 3% of whom
needed specialised psychological assistance for more than three days and
were evacuated (through casualty evacuation stages). The vast majority
(89%) of psychogenic losses were short-term and did not exceed a day of
inability to perform combat duties, while the rest (11%) were long-term and
required treatment in specialised institutions. These results do not exceed the
estimated projected figures.
These indicators will affect the projected shortage of personnel for a
certain period and should be taken into account when planning further
actions.
The scientifically substantiated period of servicepersons’ participation in
active combat is 45 days, after which, in the absence of physical and psycho-
emotional rest, negative mental reactions, stress accumulation, systematic
anxiety and depression are observed, all of which exhaust servicepersons’
psyche. There are no psychogenic losses among servicepersons whose units
have not yet participated in combat. Projected psychogenic losses
calculations also confirm the possibility that the negative psychological states
may occur among the “unexposed” servicepersons in the first days (hours) of
combat. The influence of these states decreases or altogether disappears
over time, as personnel gain combat and emotional experience.
 68

Of all the existing psychogenic losses, 90% are short-term. In these

instances assistance was provided directly in the unit at the psychological aid
point by psychology officers and specialists who are members of combat
stress groups in these units.
Eleven per cent of servicepersons who sustained psychotrauma were
referred to psychiatric and neurological departments for treatment.
Of all the servicepersons who underwent treatment in medical
institutions, 15 per cent were declared unfit for military service by military
medical commissions.

1.5.2. Provision of psychological aid to personnel

In order to provide prompt assistance to personnel, 59 psychological aid
stations were deployed in troop groupings, 6 of which were combined. In
total, up to 2,000 servicepersons used psychological aid stations in February-
April 2022.
The units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are unable to deploy brigade-
level psychological aid stations during active manoeuvre defence. Instead,
the creation of a joint psychological aid unit for a grouping of troops had a
positive result.
When performing missions outside the permanent dislocation area each
unit deployed a psychological aid station at the decision of the unit
commander. The procedure for organising its work is determined by the
Regulation on Psychological Aid Points in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
approved by the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine No. 99 of 28.07.2020.
 69

Psychological aid in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is provided to all

categories of servicepersons at three levels (Annex 7):
first level: first psychological aid. Provided directly at the place where a
psycho-emotional reaction has occurred;
second level: professional. Provided at a psychological aid station
within the unit or another safe place;
third level: specialised. Provided in medical institutions.
At the first stage of the defensive operation, these tasks were performed
with the help of highly mobile internal communications groups (HMICGs) for
operational psychological aid (callsign “Charlie”), which are routinely available
only at the AFU MPS Centre.
As such, in March-April 2022 alone, eighteen Charlie HMICGs, both
regular and from volunteer organisations, were deployed to 38 units. During
this time, they performed tasks in units at the stages of cohesion
coordination, during mission execution, and after the restoration of combat
capability. Altogether 15,000 servicepersons received psychological aid.
 70

The provision of psychological aid by the freelance combat stress

control group specialists has shown that effective assistance can be provided
only if victims are withdrawn from combat and moved to a distance of 5-10
km.
At the same time, experience shows that to perform this work effectively
more of these groups need to be invoved.
The model for psychological recovery of servicepersons in need of
psychological aid was as follows:
in the event of a negative mental reaction during combat, the
serviceperson helps themselves or receives support from their peers nearby;
if within 10-15 minutes the psycho-emotional state of the serviceperson
could not be normalised, they are accompanied to a psychological aid station
or a freelance combat stress control group facility.
It is worth noting that in March-April 2022, no psychological
rehabilitation work was actually carried out with the military personnel of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine.
As of 24.02.2022, there were 36 specialised institutions providing
psychological rehabilitation services in Ukraine. At present, none of the 36
institutions providing psychological rehabilitation services are performing their
primary role, 17 of them are in the temporarily occupied territory or have
ceased operations due to the threat to the lives of staff, and the remaining 19
have been re-profiled for refugees due to active hostilities.
During the first three months of the russo-Ukrainian war, the Armed
Forces of Ukraine managed to establish a system of psychological support
through the creation of freelance combat stress control groups, the
deployment of psychological aid stations, the introduction of the three-stage
psychological assistance system, the early prediction of possible psychogenic
losses, and prompt response to the timely restoration of the psychological
state of servicepersons.

1.5.3. The work of combat stress control groups

On the basis of the Order on Moral and Psychological Support of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, freelance combat stress
control groups were created to ensure the effective employment of
psychology officers and the efficient provision of psychological aid. These
groups include all unit psychology officers, and officers from MPS sections
who specialise in psychology. In their work, freelance combat stress control
groups should be guided by the Protocols for the provision of psychological
assistance to servicepersons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in combat
(extreme) conditions (ВП 1-00(160)03.01), approved by the Chief of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in March 2021.
 71

The creation of freelance combat stress control groups (hereinafter

referred to as the CSC groups) has shown high efficiency in providing
psychological aid to personnel during combat.
The work on the creation of CSC groups was arranged on the basis of
NATO experience, in particular that of the US Armed Forces, where
professional psychological work is carried out by specialised groups (Combat
Stress Control Units – CSCUs), which are primarily formed from clinical
psychologists and psychiatrists from medical units and are not subordinate to
the commander of the unit in which they work, thus allowing themselves go
implement the principles of independence and impartiality of expert opinions,
and remain compliant with the US Armed Forces field manual FM 4-02.51
(FM 8-51) COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL, FM 22-51
LEADERS’ MANUAL FOR COMBAT STRESS CONTROL, US Marine Corps
Training Programme MCTP 3-30E NTTP 1-15M COMBAT AND
OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL.
The main tasks of the CSCUs include: timely diagnosis of the negative
impact of psycho-emotional reactions that arise during combat missions,
providing servicepersons with psychological aid, and recovery (psychological
decompression) of servicepersons after performing assigned missions.
In the course of their work, psychologyl officers of the CSCUs:
were identifying servicepersons in the state of a psycho-emotional
crisis, people with signs of panic and unusual nervous agitation or apathy,
and provided them with the necessary psychological assistance;
carried out individual and group psychological diagnostics (testing) to
identify signs of combat fatigue and stress, and determined the need for
psychological rehabilitation of personnel;
 72
conducted field trainings with non-commissioned officers (NCOs) on the
development of basic self-regulation skills and the ability to provide
psychological first aid (self-help);
provided proposals to unit commanders on the formation, maintenance
and restoration of psychological health in their personnel;
32 CSCUs were set up within units of the Ukrainian Air Force, which
provided psychological assistance to up to 1,000 servicepersons and
prevented them from developing post-traumatic stress disorders. The most
effective were CSCUs from the Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv National Air Force
University.

1.6. SOCIAL WORK WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR

FAMILIES

1.6.1. Organising social work with military personnel and their families
Up until 24 February 2022, social work with military personnel and their
families was carried out in accordance with the conditions of the special
period (de-facto peacetime). The legal framework for social and legal
protection did not provide for additional guarantees related to wartime
restrictions.
The mobilisation of human resources in the country has multiplied the
need for social protection of both military personnel and their families (who
are mostly unprepared for the new challenges of life away from mobilised
family members).
 73

The gradual enemy advance

deep into the Ukrainian territory, the
occupation of some regions of
Ukraine, and the potential danger of
russian troops seizing new areas
predictably caused a decline in the
psychological state of military
personnel, associated with worries
about the future of their families.
The amounts and the way in
which compensations (monetary
payments, benefits and guarantees
primarily to the families of deceased
soldiers) for the specificities of
military service are worked out
remained insufficient for the actual
needs of military personnel.
The law regulating military service during martial law in Ukraine, as well
as the conditions of dismissal of military personnel, remained outdated and
did not fit the present realities.
From the first days of the full-scale invasion all the social needs of
military personnel, as well as certain failures in regulating some related
issues, meant that quick management decisions are needed.
The state of social and legal protection of military personnel and their
families, as well as the state of social stability in military units, required
prompt monitoring, control, and a swift response.
There was no communication between soldiers’ family members and
their units to obtain information about the whereabouts of servicepersons who
had not been in contact for a long time and who might be missing or in
captivity. Families tried to obtain such information through the Territorial
Recruitment and Social Support Centres, hotlines, and other available
sources, which did not have such information. Meanwhile the work of the AFU
call centres, as non-staff bodies, was suspended.
Before the russian invasion, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had 19
military command and control call centres, which could be accessed via a toll-
free multichannel number 0-800-500-410:
UGF 0800500410*1*5 Navy 0800500410*3
ОC West 0800500410*1*1 UAAF 0800500410*4*1
ОC North 0800500410*1*2 SOF 0800500410*5
ОC East 0800500410*1*4 Psychological 0800500410*8
assistance
ОC South 0800500410*1*3 General Staff 0800500410*9
UAF (GC) 0800500410*2*5
 74

AF Western 0800500410*2*1
Command
AF Central 0800500410*2*2
Command
AF Eastern 0800500410*2*4
Command
AF Southern 0800500410*2*3
Command
To remedy the situation, the Main Departmet, through the MAS unit of
the AFU General Staff, organised the following:
the study of daily reports on moral and psychological support;
the cooperation with social support officers in various units to collect
information on social work;
the partial restoration of the AFU call centre on the multichannel number
0 (800) 500-410 for queries to the Ground Forces Command, Air Force, and
the Navy (with the previously designated structural units switched to combat
mode, operators were no longer on duty to work in the call centres);
the cooperation with the NGO
“Public Movement for Empowering
Women of Ukraine” to provide
psychological and social support to
the families of military personnel,
establishing an online platform for
communication between military
families “Wives of Ukrainian
servicemen”, which from the first
weeks of its work has already had
more than 550 regular members.

Numerous requests from servicepersons on the specifics of social and

legal protection of military personnel and their families during martial law
showed that the servicepersons were unaware of these issues and outlined
the need for prompt informational and awareness-raising activities.

1.6.2. Social work with family members of captured, wounded, killed

and missing servicepersons
On the instructions of the AFU Commander-in-Chief, the Main
Department of MPS has been working on the accounting for military
personnel, missing persons, and those in captivity since the beginning of
large-scale hostilities. To this end, an order was issued instructing military
command and control bodies to update the lists of prisoners and missing
persons on a daily basis and send the relevant information to the Main
Department of MPS of Ukraine. Since, in accordance with the decision of the
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of 04.03.2022 No.
5086/C, the same information is received by the AFU Personnel Centre,
communication was established with the relevant structural unit to exchange
and clarify information on captured and missing servicepersons, and to form a
single list of such persons.
 75
The MPS Main Directory also established communication with the Joint
Centre for Coordination of Search and Liberation of Persons Unlawfully
Deprived of Liberty as a Result of Aggression against Ukraine (a body of the
Security Service of Ukraine) on the involvement of their representative in the
coordination group, organisation of reintegration and post-isolation activities
with the liberated servicepersons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
To fulfil this task, additionally, the following were organised:
the collection of information in cooperation with personnel structures on
killed (missing) and wounded servicepersons for further transfer to the AFU
Personnel Centre. These lists are to be updated daily with further report to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
exchange of information with units on the organisation of activities
aimed at providing targeted support to families of servicepersons, especially
those in difficult social situations.
Information and reference materials on the social and legal protection of
military personnel were promptly disseminated through the Main Departmet
information channels in daily reports and Telegram channels.
The primary content of this information campaign concerned the
procedure for payments to servicepersons and their families during martial
law, rewards for destroying enemy equipment and performing other combat
missions, granting leave, and grounds for dismissal from military service
(primarily for servicewomen).
The adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 28 February
2022 of Resolution No. 168 “On Certain Payments to Servicepersons,
Soldiers and Commanders, Police Officers and Their Families During Martial
Law” had a positive impact on the level of social protection of military
personnel and their families, as well as the families of fallen servicepersons.
The explanation of the requirements set out by the Minister of Defence of
Ukraine dated 07.03.2022 No. 248/1217 regarding additional monthly
payments to servicepersons and the Procedure for documenting their
participation in combat was promptly communicated to the troops by the Main
Departmet.
The absence of any communication with the Department of Social and
Humanitarian Support of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine complicated the
exchange of information on the social and legal protection needs of military
personnel during the first month of the war.
At the same time, in accordance with the established procedure, the
Main Departmet sent an appeal to the Ministry of Defence regarding the
need to raise the level of financial support for servicepersons from 1
February, rather than from 1 March, as was previously proposed. This need
was primarily justified by the losses incurred during the first days of the war
in February and the need to make proper payments to the families of the
deceased soldiers. Thanks to these proactive actions of the MPS MD
officials, the military and political leadership of Ukraine amended the
regulations and allocated an additional UAH 20 billion to increase the
salaries of servicepersons in March 2022.
 76

A letter was sent to the Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine Hanna

Malyar from the Head of the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological
Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding certain problematic issues
in social and legal protection of servicepersons during martial law that needed
to be addressed at the level of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Those
issues included:
the financial losses incurred by servicepersons as a result of renting
residential premises due to their relocation to a new place of service
(including newly created military units), and the inability to produce the
required documents in accordance with the established procedure;
the procedure for family members of deceased servicepersons to obtain
the relevant certificate due to the suspension of the work of the medical
examination committee during wartime;
the decreased level of financial support for servicepersons who are
appointed to lower positions in case of necessity (only done by agreement).
Together with the Department of Finance of the Ministry of Defence, the
Main Departmet agreed on proposals for amendments to the Resolution of
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 168 of 28 February 2022 on the
provision of a one-off financial payment to the families of deceased
servicepersons. According to the Resolution, within 6 months from the date of
the death of a serviceperson, family members entitled to the payment could
apply for it, and each of them would be paid up to UAH 3 million. Those who
did not make a claim for valid reasons could do so within 3 years from the
date of the serviceperson’s death. Disputes are to be resolved in court.
 77

1.6.3. Evacuation of families of military personnel

In addition to the implementation of social and legal protection of
servicepersons, one of the pressing issues that directly affected the social
tension among the military personnel in the first days (weeks) of the war was
the issue of evacuating their families from the areas of active hostilities and
areas of enemy missile and bomb attacks.
There were no evacuation plans for the families of military personnel.
No one in the Armed Forces of Ukraine was assigned the task of
implementing primary emergency measures (determining the need for
relocation and the capacity of the accommodation infrastructure). Only the
AFU Statute of the Garrison and Guard Service had specified the head of the
military law enforcement as the one responsible for the evacuation of military
camps.
The current procedure for evacuation in case of emergencies, approved
by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 841 of
30.10.2013, assigned the task of organising the evacuation of the population
(which did not specify the need for priority evacuation of military personnel
family members as the group which is of high priority for the enemy and,
therefore, the most vulnerable one) to local state administrations and local
self-government bodies with the methodological support of the SES.
 78

In addition, paragraph 2.6.1 of the Temporary Guidelines on Civil-

Military Cooperation stipulates that in the course of training and employment
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Order of the General Staff of 02.04.2019 No.
131) the participation in the protection of civilians in the area where military
forces are performing combat missions may include measures to evacuate
the local population from the area of operation (hostilities), ensure their safety
during the evacuation, and assist in the organisation of temporary camps for
internally displaced persons.
Servicepersons ended up having to handle the evacuation of their
family members on their own. At the same time, due to the recall of military
personnel to their units, where they would inevitably be busy performing their
duties, their family members had to go through evacuation by themselves,
within the limits of their capabilities.
The Command Post of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine had to accommodate and take care of the wives and children of
military personnel, altogether rounding up their number to 30.
Considering the importance of the famalies’ safety, the Main Departmet
processed and sent to the troops (forces) a separate order of the Chief of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine No. 5132/C of 05.03.2022 to
promptly study the need for evacuation of military personnel’s family
members and establish cooperation with local authorities on their evacuation
and accommodation. The same instruction was sent out to the AFU Land
Forces Command, through its subordinate TRSSCs, to inform the military
authorities on the capabilities of local authorities to accommodate families of
military personnel using state infrastructure.
On a proactive basis, a draft letter
was prepared from the Minister of
Defence of Ukraine to the heads of
partner countries’ defence ministries.
The letter was considering the possibility
of partner defence ministries funding the
placement of Ukrainian military
personnel family members.
In the area of social support, the
Main Departmet set a task to establish
cooperation between the TRSSCs in the
western regions with local authorities in
order to accommodate evacuated family
members of military personnel in state-
owned and privately owned buildings. In
addition, the AFU Land Forces
Command issued an order on moral and
psychological support No. 658кп of
12.03.22 instructing to, on the daily basis, collect information from the
TRSSCs on social support measures for servicepersons and their families.
 79

The Main Departmet established communication with the administration

of Ukrzaliznytsia to promptly receive and disseminate to the troops
information about family members of military personnel and the schedule of
evacuation trains.
Considering the fact that essentially the entire territory of Ukraine is
dangerous for the families of military personnel, the Main Departmet has
proactively started looking for resources that would assist in temporarily
having these families stay abroad.
In the interest of evacuating the families of military personnel, the Main
Departmet cooperated with military ataches from Poland, Spain, Finland, and
Latvia. It has also issued order No. 900 of the Chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine of 17.03.22, which set out the task for military
authorities to move 38 family members from the eastern regions of Ukraine to
Khmelnytskyi for their further evacuation to Turkey and 24 people to the
Republic of Latvia.
The search for other, non-governmental sources was also underway –
through charitable and volunteer assistance for the evacuation of military
personnel families.
The AFU Special Operations Forces has had positive experience in
working with families of military personnel.

Starting from 24 February 2022, after the beginning of the full-scale

russian invasion, the Special Operations Forces Command planned and
carried out a number of measures to establish strategic communications with
other states:
in 2022, children and families of acting and deceased servicepersons
were provided with trips to Albania, Austria, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey for
recreation and rest;
with the support of international volunteer organisations, on
 80
International Children’s Day (1 June), children of fallen SOF soldiers were
visited and provided with financial assistance of UAH 10,000 per child;
within the framework of medical and psychological rehabilitation of SOF
personnel, there is constant cooperation with the charity organisation “From
Dream to Reality” of the Republic of Lithuania, wherein SOF servicepersons
undergo rehabilitation in Lithuania;
the SOF personnel were involved in the SKS 2022 project
"RaninichVionovNedelia", which took place in the Republic of Lithuania within
the medical and psychological rehabilitation framework;
cooperation was established with the Tallinn Health Centre in Estonia,
with an aim to implement medical-recreational treatment and rehabilitation for
SOF personnel.
As a result of the Main Departmet testing this scheme, by the end of
April 2022, more than 120 people have gone abroad for temporary stays.
With the introdcution of martial law, gender policy implementation was
effectively altogether suspended. The role of gender advisers was negated,
including their involvement in planning missions with a gender perspective
and working in the interests of serviceperson’s spouses.
The Gender Advisor to the AFU Commander-in-Chief has not been in
touch since the first days of the war, has stopped performing her duties, and
has not coordinated or supported gender advisers in the armed forces.
The Department of Humanitarian Policy of the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine did not formulate a relevant policy during the first month of the war.
From the first days of the war, the inability of servicewomen to care for
their minor children posed a serious issue due to the fact that Ukrainian
legislation does not allow them to leave the Armed Forces during martial law
(except for maternity leave and leave to care for a child under the age of
three or six).
There were cases of social tension among servicewomen due to the
spread of information about lengthy fully paid absences of some
servicewomen, as well as the redistribution of workload to those who
remained in the unit. The reasons for such absences were not communicated
to the personnel, which in turn gave rise to rumours about “girlfriends” of
officers, selective attitude of the leadership towards women soldiers, etc.
It was uncovered that some servicewomen, with the help of certain
commanders, were attempting to avoid going to their respective AORs and
instead stayed in their untis’ permanent location areas.
The introduction of martial law in the country and the mobilisation of
persons liable for military service necessitated a review of the existing social
and legal protection framework for military personnel and their families. This
primarily concerned the registry and legal status of mobilised servicepersons,
as well as a prompt informatation campaign on social rights, guarantees, and
restrictions imposed by martial law. The issue of working with the families of
military personnel was an especially important one.
So, in April 2022, it became obvious that russia’s aggressive plans to
wage war against Ukraine had failed. Ukraine continued to successfully repel
the enemy, inflicting more and more losses on it.
 81

April saw significant strategic changes in the war. As a result of the

successful Kyiv defence operation, the russian army lost and retreated from
near Kyiv, whilst riussian command dramatically changed its strategic intent.
Now their main efforts were aimed at encircling and destroying the Joint
Forces grouping in the Eastern Operational Area.
Overall, the frontline remained relatively stable. Since 18 February,
russian troops were attempting to conduct a strategic offensive to defeat the
Joint Forces grouping in the Eastern Operational Area, but the pace of the
offensive was extremely slow and, as of 30 April, the enemy had not achieved
any tangible operational success. This demonstrates the inability of the
russian army to prepare and conduct offensive operations in accordance with
modern conceptual approaches, which are theoretically sound and proven in
military conflicts of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Instead,
Ukrainian troops managed to achieve certain tactical successes on the
Slobozhanskyi and Southern Buh directions.
Thus, despite the complicated military-political and military-strategic
situation, and the preservation of the numerical superiority in terms of
weapons and military equipment by the russian armed forces, the situation as
a whole looked more favourable for Ukraine. The Ukrainian people and the
Armed Forces of Ukraine felt and proved to the world community their ability
to resist and win.
Despite all the difficulties, Ukraine has shown the desire and ability to
win and, with substantial international support, continues to build up its
defence potential and military capabilities that are essential for defeating the
aggressor.
In turn, we could say that the MPS structures have generally overcome all
the significant challenges of the first months of the full-scale russian
aggression. And, since the MPS structures are reliant on the military-political
factors, negative results were often not their fault.
 82

CHAPTER 2.
THE SECOND STRATEGIC DEFENCE OPERATION
(May – August 2022)
2.1. THE COURSE OF WAR IN MAY – AUGUST 2022
In May 2022, the military-strategic situation remained tense and
dynamic. Both sides were focusing their efforts on the Eastern Operational
Area.
In general, the russian command was following a pattern of trying to
take settlements by frontal assault with the support of artillery and aviation, all
the while sustaining significant losses, which the russian command had no
regard for.
Ukrainian troops successfully conducted counter-offensive operations
north of Kharkiv. As a result, the enemy was pushed back from Kharkiv by
several tens of kilometres, a significant number of settlements in Kharkiv
region were liberated, and artillery shelling of the city stopped. In some areas,
units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reached the state border with russia.
The advance of Ukrainian units to the east and northeast posed a threat to
the communications of the enemy’s Izyum offensive grouping.
Thus, in May that year, the main efforts of both sides were transferred
to the Eastern Operational Area. Enemy forces attempted to conduct a
strategic offensive operation to surround and destroy the Joint Forces
grouping. In response, Ukrainian troops conducted a defensive operation to
prevent encirclement, maintain control over certain areas of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, and create favourable conditions for a counter-offensive.
After regrouping, the russian forces launched an offensive in the area of
Izium-Rubizhne-Popasna-Sievierodonetsk to surround and defeat the Joint
Forces grouping. Enemy forces focused their main efforts on capturing the
part of Luhansk region that remained under Ukrainian control. In May, the
enemy managed to advance with heavy losses. Once they reached
Sievierodonetsk by the end of the month, intense fighting broke out in the city
itself. The pace of the offensive demonstrated by russian troops shows that
their approaches to offensive operations are outdated, as they rely on
creating a numerical advantage, primarily in artillery and manpower, and
continuing the attack despite heavy casualties.
In the south of Ukraine, the russian forces went on the defensive. To
the north of Kharkiv, Ukrainian troops were conducting tactical offensives,
which could lead to an operational outcome. In general, both sides were
approaching a situation of a strategic equilibrium in which the russian side
would no longer be able to conduct large-scale offensive actions, while
Ukrainian troops have not yet acquired the capabilities to launch a strategic
counter-offensive.
 83

In June 2022, the russian occupation forces continued to conduct full-

scale armed aggression against our country, fulfil strategic tasks to
operationally encircle and defeat the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donetsk
Operational Area and reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, hold the captured areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
regions, and create favourable conditions for the development of an offensive
in Mykolaiv and Odesa regions.
The enemy focused its main efforts on combat operations in the Eastern
Operational Area. The enemy forces attempted to inflict a decisive defeat on
the grouping of Ukrainian forces in the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk
agglomeration area. Despite marginal gains, which manifested in the capture
of the completely destroyed Sievierodonetsk and a number of surrounding
settlements with heavy losses, the actions of russian troops cannot be
considered successful. The pace of the offensive and the losses suffered by
the enemy were not justified by the territorial gains. Instead, the Joint Forces
Command managed to deplete the enemy, and, after a month of defence,
organised a timely withdrawal of troops to the prepared defensive lines in an
organised manner. Thus, the main goal pursued by the russian command in
its attempts to capture Sievierodonetsk, namely the encirclement and defeat
of the Joint Forces grouping, was not achieved; on the contrary, the enemy
demonstrated its inability to conduct offensive operations within the
framework of modern conceptual approaches that take into account relevant
historical experience.
 84
The enemy also failed to fully realise its numerical superiority in air
power and artillery, because with the balance of forces that prevailed in the
area of the most active hostilities, the results of their offensive could have
been much worse for the Ukrainian side. The reasons for this, we believe, are
not only systemic problems in the organisation of troop management, training
and comprehensive support, as demonstrated by the russian army and its
command, but, above all, the courage and professionalism of Ukrainian
defenders, their high motivation, and readiness to defend their country from
aggressors.
Ukrainian forces continued to inflict significant damage to russian
personnel and equipment, and liberated some of the occupied territories.
In general, in June, the military-strategic situation remained tense and
was characterised by the continuing threat of russia’s use of weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and repeated violations of
international conventions banning certain conventional weapons.

The enemy failed to even come close to achieving its strategic

objectives. It failed to achieve decisive success in most areas. The
occupation of territories in the Luhansk region took place at the cost of
significant losses with very modest territorial gains and demonstrated the lack
of operational and tactical innovations by the russian command. All their
gains were achieved thanks to numerical superiority, primarily in aviation,
artillery and MLRS, and were accompanied by little advancement of troops
and heavy losses in manpower, weapons and military equipment.
 85
Russian troops were no longer able to conduct decisive offensive
operations on several fronts simultaneously as a result of heavy losses, lack
of forces and enablers, as well as increasing socio-economic and production
problems experienced as a result of sanctions imposed for their aggression
against Ukraine. At this time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not yet
acquired the ability to launch offensive operations to decisively defeat the
enemy and liberate the occupied territories. Thus, the situation was
approaching a strategic equilibrium.
The military-strategic situation in July 2022 was consistently difficult.
The enemy forces continued conducting a strategic offensive operation to
“demilitarise and denazify Ukraine”. Russia’s military and political leadership
was also constantly threatening to draw other countries in the region into the
conflict.
In the Eastern Operational Area, the enemy came close to achieving its
strategic objective of reaching the administrative border of Luhansk region.
These marginal territorial gains came a cost of significant losses and, at the
same time, the loss of an advantage on the southern strategic direction. The
near full occupation of the Luhansk region was an important operational
achievement for the russian army – it was russia’s first real major success
since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
The return of Zmeinyi island to Ukraine’s control made it possible to
resume civilian shipping in the western part of the Black Sea. As early as
July, agricultural goods carriers began to operate in this area.
In August 2022, the military-political situation remained dynamic, though
predictable. Generally speaking, it was favourable for the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.
Russian troops continued to conduct a strategic offensive operation, in
the course of which the enemy tried to achieve the following strategic goals:
the encirclement and defeat of the AFU grouping in the Donetsk
Operational Area, leading to an access to the administrative borders of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
retaining control of TOTs in Kharkiv region and ensuring unimpeded
logistics from Belgorod region for the Russian troops in the temporarily
occupied areas of Donetsk region;
retaining control of the TOTs in Zaporizhzhia region and preserving the
land corridor between the temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk region and
the TOT of Crimea;
retaining control of the captured areas in Kherson region and creating
conditions for an offensive in the Mykolaiv-Odesa direction.
 86

In order to repel the enemy’s assault, deprive it of its offensive potential,

and regain control over the TOTs, the Ukrainian forces continued to conduct:
a defensive operation in the Eastern Operational Area by the
“Khortytsia” operational-strategic group;
defensive and counter-offensive operations in the South-Western
Operational Area by the “Oleksandriya” operational-strategic group;
stability operations in the North-Western Operational Area by the
“North” operational-strategic group.
Same as in the month prior, in August the most intense combat took
place in the Eastern Operational Area, where the russian occupiers
conducted active offensive operations and successfully used available to
them firepower. In addition, the enemy continued intensive aerial
reconnaissance using unmanned aerial vehicles.
In order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to effectively participate
in combat, as well as to complicate the redeployment of its reserves, the
Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted missile and artillery strikes on important
logistics centres and places where enemy forces and equipment were
deployed.
In the South-Western Operational Area, thanks to skilful and decisive
actions of the “Oleksandriya” operational-strategic group command, the
Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to stabilise the situation and launch a
counter-offensive. During this counter-offensive a number of key command
and logistics facilities of the russian federation were destroyed, and control
over 8 previously occupied settlements was established.
 87

Overall, in August 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to hold

the contact line through a steadfast defence; continue the defensive
operation, creating favourable conditions for the transition to offensive actions
in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions by destroying the enemy’s
logistics, warehouses and command posts with long-range MLRS and
western-made precision artillery.
 88

2.2. IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

SUPPORT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

2.2.1. Organising moral and psychological support priorities

Based on the assessment of changes in the situation, enemy tactics,
and the second stage of the defensive operation by the Defence Forces, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine set the following priority
of MPS tasks to maintain and restore the moral readiness and psychological
stability of personnel. These tasks are to be executed by the commanders of
AFU branches, commanders of operational-strategic groups, and the Chief of
the Main Departmet of the MPS of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:
to continue implementing measures directed at neutralising negative
influence factors on the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
to ensure the selection of personnel for the formation of the Reserve
Corps and separate rifle battalions is based on professional and psychological
merits;
to organise and conduct measures for professional and psychological
selection, identification and discharge from military service of persons who
are unfit for military service during martial law (mobilisation) or were called up
for military service with violations. These measures are to be implemented by
June 2022 in the units (subunits) of the Reserve Corps and rifle battalions;
in accordance with the order of the AFU General Staff, to continue work
on identifying and returning to service persons with signs (or incitement in
others) of panic, unusual nervous excitement, or unwillingness (refusal) to
perform combat duties in the course of a defensive operation;
to provide proposals for measures of restoing the combat capability in
units (subunits) that have been performing missions as part of military
groupings for a long time;
to organise and ensure the constant internal rotation of personnel
between the 1st and 2nd defence echelons, whilst taking into account the
situation, providing time for rest and to take care of everyday business (5-10
days);
to ensure joint mission execution during rotations that withdraw units to
restore combat capability;
continue work on promptly rewarding personnel with state
(departmental) awards and honours;
to organise constant monitoring of problematic issues of social and
domestic nature within the personnel of subordinate military units, and take
measures to resolve them;
to organise the continuous work of mobile internal communications
groups in troop groupings, during which attention should be paid to training
commanders of all levels in the organisation of internal communications in
subordinate units.
 89

To ensure that the command element responds appropriately to any

personnel from newly formed units abandoning positions without
authorisation, a three-stage system was developed and implemented in May.
The system aims to identify and return to service those with signs of panic,
unusual nervousness and other manifestations of refusal to perform combat
duties. This system made it possible to locate servicepersons who refused to
perform combat duties or incited others to do so. Thus, during May-June
2022 (the period with the highest rate of personnel disobeying orders and
abandoning positions), thousands of cases of disobedience (abandonment of
positions or refusal to obey orders) were recorded, in which 22% of
servicepersons were returned to duty. The remaining servicepersons were
subjected to legal action, including the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Subsequently, the number of cases of refusal to comply with orders has
significantly decreased and is not widespread.
Also in May-July 2022, as part of the development of a new post-war
structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, work was carried out to determine
the role and place of the MPS structures in the future of our country’s army.
In August 2022, the issue of organising MPS support was raised at a
meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine. In his report, Major General Vladyslav Klochkov,
Head of the MPS Main Departmet of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, noted that
since the beginning of the war, the MPS system began working according to
martial law and was adjusted to address the most important problems of
military personnel. The MPS system was subsequently strengthened with
new elements that proved to be most effective and efficient for the troops.
Following his speech, the President of Ukraine – Supreme Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – Volodymyr Zelenskyi set out
objectives to fill vacant positions in the AFU MPS structures, especially at the
tactical level, and to strengthen the practical forces components as MPS
structures need to be able to respond quickly to sudden changes in the moral
and psychological state of personnel within military units operating in direct
contact with the enemy.
Another unresolved problem that arose at that time was the absence of
deputy battalion and company MPS commanders. This was especially acute
in the Territorial Defence brigades and some battalions within the AFU Air
Assault Forces brigades, where there were no positions for deputy battalion
MPS commanders. Instead, there were MPS officer positions, which removed
the people who filled these positions from direct subordination to the deputy
brigade MPS commander, rendered irrelevant the MPS management system
in the brigade-battalion-company vertical chain of command, and complicated
the implementation of measures to maintain the moral readiness and
psychological stability of personnel in a combat situation.
 90

In order to address these issues and improve the effectiveness of the

MPS work, changes were made to the organisational and staffing structure of
the aforementioned battalions of the Territorial Defence brigades and the
battalions of some brigades within the AFU Air Assault Forces with an aim to
introduce the positions of deputy batallion and company MPS commanders,
as well as battalion psychology officers.
Considering the limited number of MPS positions in military units
(subunits) subordinate to the Ukrainian Navy, where the aforementioned
positions are not provided for, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine decided to increase the MPS staff in the Command of the
Ukrainian Navy to five positions.

2.2.2. Positive and negative influences on moral readiness and

psychological stability of the personell in the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The enemy’s use of mass artillery strikes and aviation to push back
units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the consequent absence of small
arms combat, led to “pockets” of panic among military personnel, and an
increase in the number of cases of disobedience and unauthorised battlefield
abandonment.
The main negative factors affecting the moral readiness and
psychological stability of the personnel during this period were:
a decrease in combat readiness due to significant losses of trained
personnel (the core of the units) during the first active phase of hostilities (40
to 60 per cent of military units’ staff consisted of OR-1 and OR-2, and
mobilised personnel), and casualty replacement by mobilised personnel who
did not have any appropriate military training and experience. As such,
mechanised and airborne assault brigades have effectively turned into
untrained infantry units;
an unsatisfactory level of training in the areas where military units are
formed;
an insufficient training and education of platoon, company and battalion
officers, lack of experience in managing units in combat conditions (officers
have not held command positions, most are of retirement age, and do not
understand the general function and organisation of work in positions of their
military occupation (mission planning and management));
lack of training for commanders of all levels in the organisation of
internal communication work in subordinate units;
lack of military print media and the necessary funds to purchase
modern TPE which would help ensure effective work in combat areas in the
absence of internet connection;
constant artillery shelling, MLRS and aviation strikes, mental and
physical fatigue, inability to perform regular domestic routine tasks such as
rest, laundry, etc.;
human casualties as a result of enemy fire;
poor psychological readiness of personnel to act in extreme combat
conditions;
 91

persistent psychological enemy influence on the personnel by means of

indoctrination, suggestion and neuroleptic programming through mass media
and the internet.
Additionally, the involvement of Territorial Defence units and Rifle
battalions in performing missions outside of their territorial affiliation as part of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine has led to the emergence and spread of social
tensions among the TD personnel and their family members at the place of
units’ formation.
In order to mitigate the aforementioned issues, the military command
and troop groupings have organised work aimed at personnel motivation.
This work included:
highly mobile internal communications teams in areas of active combat
to provide psychological assistance to servicepersons, as well as to establish
internal communications in these units;
active work to improve the training system, including the training of
specialists in the use of weapons and military equipment supplied by partner
countries;
continuous cultural work. Professional bands and performers gave 284
concerts, including: Khrystyna Panasiuk, Oleksandr Klets, Serhii Kononenko,
Yurii Suslo, Zinovii Mediukh, Serhii Boiko, Viacheslav Kuprienko, Volodymyr
Semyshkin, Oleksandr Lamburskyi, Ihor Bilyi, Volodymyr Kiiashko, “Kvartal
95”, “Dieselstudio”, “VIP Ternopil”, Mykhailo Foma, Oleksandr Ponomaryov,
Khrystyna Soloviy, Iryna Fedyshyn, Olya Polyakova, Oleh Skrypka, Zlata
Ognevych, Natalia Mohylevska, Artem Pyvovarov, Maks Barskykh, Yuriy
Horbunov, Yuriy Tkach, and “Bez Obmezhen”;
state awards and departmental decorations to servicepersons who
displayed courage and heroism in the defence of Ukraine. The title of “Hero of
Ukraine” was awarded to 146 servicepersons, including 72 posthumously,
and 14,202 servicepersons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were awarded
state decorations, including 1,924 posthumously;
the honorary award “For Courage and Bravery” was established to
commemorate military achievements, courage, bravery and heroism of the
military personnel within certain units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the
National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the
Security Service of Ukraine, the State Service for Special Communications
and Information Protection of Ukraine, and the State Special Transport
Service, displayed in the course of defence of state sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity of Ukraine, conduct of combat, and
performance of (special) combat missions (Order of the President of Ukraine
No. 310/2022 of 05.05.2022);
the evacuation of family members of military personnel for rehabilitation
and recreation in Turkey, the Republic of Latvia, Spain, Montenegro and
Albania;
with the support of the NGO “Women’s Power of Ukraine”, a hotline for
social and psychological support for families of military personnel was set up,
including a support groups pilot project for families of missing persons;
 92
a set of reintegration activities for servicepersons who returned from
captivity;
the system of psychological assistance in troop groupings;
taking measures to restore the combat capability of military units that
have been in combat as part of troop groupings for a long time.
As always, the MPS officers were in the vanguard of Motherland
defenders and led their subordinates.
For example, in June 2022, Captain
Yanush Volodymyr-Bohdan Volodymyrovych,
while serving as deputy company MPS
commander in the A0224 unit, as part of the
3rd Air Assault Company of the 1st Air
Assault Battalion, was performing combat
duties in the town of Lysychansk.
On 30 June 2022, during internal
communication activities with the personnel
of the 3rd Air Assault Company, the enemy
attempted to conduct an assault in the
direction of the stronghold 79131 (callsign
“Berlin”). Because Senior Lieutenant Yanush
happened to be there at the time, he directly
participated in repelling the assault of
superior enemy forces. The enemy was
forced to retreat without even evacuating
their dead. After that, the enemy launched a
UAV to adjust 120mm mortar fire. When
Senior Lieutenant Yanush Volodymyr-
Bohdan was out of cover to check for
casualties, one of the shells hit nearby. As a
result, the Senior Lieutenant was seriously
injured with internal organ damage and gunshot bone fractures. After
reaching the nearest shelter, he provided first aid and waited for casualty
evacuation, which was delayed for 1.5 hours due to instense IDF.
On 20 September 2022, Captain YANUSH, despite being seriously
injured, had returned to the airborne assault company, and since December
2022 continued to work as the deputy battalion MPS commander of the
airmobile battalion.
 93

2.3. INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shown that the hybrid
component of their aggression existed in order to find weaknesses in our
defence, with an outlook on the future conventional armed seizure of
Ukrainian territories. The use of the term “special military operation” blures
the distinction between the state of war and peace, which once again proves
that russia is using hybrid warfare against Ukraine. Therefore, the main tasks
of organising information and propaganda support during the second strategic
defence operation were as follows:
formation among military personnel of a conscious understanding of the
state military policy, patriotism, personal responsibility for the defence of
Ukraine, military traditions, courage and bravery, readiness for self-sacrifice in
the name of the Motherland, and hatred of the enemy;
building up the capabilities of information support to protect
servicepersons from negative hostile information and psychological influence.
Taking into account the experience of organising information and
propaganda support for the troops (forces) during the first strategic defence
operation, the main efforts of internal communication work and information
support for the troops (forces) were focused on:
delivering information materials of patriotic, counter-propaganda and
analytical content, primarily to troops (forces) deployed in their respective
AORs;
conducting informational and explanatory activies with personnel;
conducting information campaigns to popularise the Armed Forces of
Ukraine in the society, promoting the armed defence of Ukraine’s
independence and territorial integrity (Annex 8);
creating reputation-boosting videos for distribution on social networks,
constant TV broadcasting, making films and TV shows about the heroism of
servicepersons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
processing proposals for providing the troops (forces) with printed press
materials.
Long before the war, the enemy began actively using history as a tool by
interpreting it in their own way. Russian propaganda presented it in a way that
would muddle its understanding not only by its own people but also by the
international community. All the information and propaganda support for
russia’s “special military operation” against Ukraine revolved around the
narratives of “the great victory over fascism”, “liberation of Ukrainians from
Nazi rule”, “the fight against fascism”, “the fight against neo-Nazism”,
“continuation of grandfathers’ work”, “Ukrainian terrorism”, etc.
The “Great Patriotic War” myth played an important role in the information
and propaganda support of russian aggression against Ukraine. Today, the
“Great Patriotic War” is interpreted in russia as a majestic feat of liberation
from global evil, when the Red Army saved Europe and all of humanity.
Emphasising the significance of the victory in the war, Putin gave this event a
special humanistic meaning, calling it “the day civilisation triumphed over
fascism” and the soldiers of the “Great Patriotic War” – “soldiers of freedom”.
 94
In order to firmly establish this myth, soviet and later russian propaganda
deliberately downplayed the importance of the Lend-Lease programme provided by the
United States to the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition, which enabled the Red Army to
withstand the Wehrmacht of Nazi Germany.
Therefore, based on the analysis of the narratives used by russian propagandists
during the russo-Ukrainian war and their ideological connotations, the content of
information materials prepared and sent to the troops (forces) was adjusted and
optimised.
Between May and August 2022, these were prepared and distributed:

No. Information material

Type Publication Number
(author)
frequency of
releases
Takeaways from SPS analysis Analytical
1 bulletin daily 122
(MPS MD)
Informational report (MPS Commander's
2 daily 122
MD) bulletin
Informational bulletin Analytical
3 report daily 122
(MPS MD)
Heroic-patriotic bulletin (MPS MD) Informational
4 daily 122
report
Beating the enemy now, confidently Motivational
5 report daily 122
looking into the future (MPS MD)
Novyny iz Zaporeberiia 1 Sarcastic As and
6 84
(MPS MD) report when
necessa
ry
Lost in the Ukrainian steppe Satirical report
7 (MPS MD) daily 122
Russian war against Ukraine Patriotic
двічі на
8 through the lense of our victories bulletin 8
місяць
(MPS MD)
A parable about ruzzian victories Satirical Twice a
9 (MPS MD) publication month 8
Combat
10 Born free (MPSC) daily 122
bulletin
Satirical checkpoint Carricature
11 (Humanitarian Research Centre) report daily 110
Special release “Ukrainians. The 3
Motivational
12 faces of our resistance” Once a month
report
(MPS MD)
Special release Sarcastic As per 11
13 publication availability of
“Analogovniet”2 (MPS MD)
materials

1 Vaguely translated as “News from beyond the kerb”, the sarcastic report in its choice of words and their spelling makes fun of

the russian use of “Z” as a war symbol, and the regional dialect of the russian language
2 In its name “Analogov niet” is poking fun at a common phrase used in russian propaganda which can be roughly translated as

“unrivalled”. This phrase is often used by leading russian propagandists to describe the supposed unrivalled superiority of russian
capabilities and technology
 95

To study the opinion of MPS specialists on the content and quality of

the development of informational support materials for troops (forces), which
are developed and distributed by the Department of Internal Communications
and Information Support of Troops (Forces), a survey was conducted via
messengers in the relevant communication groups. The group of respondents
included 48 officers in the positions of “deputy battalion MPS commander –
head of the MPS department (group)” with the military ranks of “senior
lieutenant – colonel”. The respondents were asked to evaluate the
information materials developed by the department on a 10-point scale
(where 0 points is the lowest and 10 points is the highest) according to the
following criteria: design, legibility, topics, content, relevance
(appropriateness), and frequency.

appropriateness
relevance
design

content
No.

frequency
topics
Publication

legibility

1. Analytical report “Informational

bulletin” 9,2 9,4 8,3 8,8 8,6 9,5 9,8
2. Information report “Heroic-
patriotic bulletin” 9,5 9,4 9,7 9,6 9,8 9,8 9,7
3. Sarcastic report “Novyny iz
Zaporeberiia” 9,4 9,6 9,7 9,5 9,6 9,2 9,3
4. Satirical report “Lost in the
Ukrainian steppe” 9,1 9,3 9,2 9,7 9,9 9,9 9,8
5. Motivational report “Beating the
enemy now, confidently looking 9,3 8,6 9,4 9,8 9,7 9,4 9,5
into the future”
6. Patriotic bulletin “Russian war
against Ukraine through the 8,4 8,3 8,6 9,3 8,9 8,7 9,1
lense of our victories “
The results analysis shows that the criteria indicators by which the
information materials were assessed are “optimal”. Thus, the informational
support materials for the troops (forces) developed and distributed by the
department were highly rated by the respondents.
Notably, during the entire period of material distribution among military
units and authorities, only positive feedback was received from its users.
At the same time, the registration of newly arrived servicepersons,
primarily MPS officers, in the relevant Telegram channels and the WhatsApp
messenger remained problematic.
 96

In view of the
above, in order to
provide prompt
informational support for
troops (forces), to
prevent the spread of
negative information, a
proposal was put
forward to add
personnel to an
appropriate
informational Telegram channel when signining the contract, taking on a new
role, etc.
At the same time, the ban on Wi-Fi access for the distribution of
informational materials at the MAS control post significantly hindered the
autonomy of performing internal communication and information support
tasks for troops (forces) directly from the MPS post.
The AFU MPS Centre
created a rapid information delivery
system which employed
WhatsApp’s technical capacities.
The information was delivered to
WhatsApp through parallel
methods by adding administrators
from among the MPS officers.
This system was built in 3
stages: Stage 1 – bringing in
people from bodies of the military
command structure; Stage 2 –
involving deputy unit commanders,
Stage 3 – creating an internal units
network which connected them all
to a single overarching MAS Center
information hub.
MAS Center information hub extends to 647 andinistrators (Heads of
AFU MPS structures and special forces, all of which relay the content they
receive using the information-sharing network installed by the Centre. In total,
all of this adds up to 122 groups of military units, which allows the reach of 75
per sent of personnel.
 97

In order to converge all the

information channels in one place, the
MAS Center created an AFU MPS
Centre Facebook page. A
crossposting systems was put in
place, which encompassed Instagram,
Twitter, and Youtube, with a further
addition of informational content from
Combat bulletin, Born free,
Psychology and soldier та Military
culturological wok department.

At the same time, the Centre was looking for possibilities of making
modern military-patriotic informational products. The work began by creating
audiovisual materials and posting them on Youtube in respective playlists,
with further dissemination on the capacities of the MAS Center.
In terms of the number
of views and engagements,
the most popular content
among the users is the
content of culturological
nature. In particular, the work
of HMICG Bravo and the
video addresses of Ukrainian
celebrities to the military
personnel congratulating
them on specific military and
professional celebrations they
relate to.
In order to combat negative informational influences on the AFU
personnel, the Centre began working on a blog on the Teletype platform.
As of the time of writing, 480 artiles were released. They have become
the main source of information when conducting informational sessions for
commanders.
Of those: daily briefing – 159 publications; main axes of enemy troop
placement (according to the
data compliled by the MOD
of the UK) – 159
publications; brief
information about current
affairs in Ukraine and
around the world – 159
publications; 10 main
events this month – 3
publications.
In the Doctrine on
public relations and the
 98
Doctrine on strategic communications, which are approved by the AFU
Commander-in-Chief, is a statement which claims that it is internal
communications that form the primary motivational factor, which, in turn,
impacts the degree of success in combat conditions. The availability of timely
and reliable information strengthens the psychological state of military
personnel and their commanders , and fosters a higher level of trust towards
the military command, consequently leading to a better performance in
carrying out combat duties.
In order to raise the motivation levels in personnel, the directory of
internal communications and informational support has (Annex 9):
processed requests and proposals from the AFU Commander-in-Chief
on raising psychological readiness and morale in military personnel to the
levels of conscious and selfless mission execution in the course of the
defence operation;
processed the Order 3 for
awarding sleeve colours and medals of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine for
destroying or capturing enemy
equipment;
took part in processing the Order
of the President of Ukraine No.
310/2022 of 05.05.2022 “on the
honourary award ‘For Courage and
Bravery’”;
took part in processing the Order of the President of Ukraine
on assigning military units honourary titles and presenting them
with honourary awards “For Courage and Bravery”. In May –
August 2022 the honourary titles were given to 6 brigades, 1 regiment, and 1
corvette. In the same period, the honourary awards “For Courage and
Bravery” were presented to 23 brigades, 3 regiments, 2 centres, 2 separate
batallions, and 1 medium landing ship;
took part in organising the ceremony for the Head of state to present
military personnel and families of deceased servicepersons with the “Golden
Star” award;

3 Implemented by the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine No. 130 of 05.05.2022
 99

took part in preparing and conducting ceremonies of presenting military

units with Combat Colours, honourary awards “For Courage and Bravery”,
and honourary titles;
within the initiative by the Office of the President of Ukraine of depicting
heroic feats of AFU servicepersons on advertisement platforms, in May 2022
collected information and visual materials about servicepersons-Heroes of
Ukraine;
with the help of a freelance group of journalists from among the Taras
Shevchenko Kyiv National University Military Institute created and
disseminated 37 motivational patriotic videos on social media;
in order to fulfil the Order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine No. 7919/C of 04.04.2022 organised work on collecting
items and tools of waging war against russian occupiers for further display of
these items in museums belonging to military units;
in order to pay respects to the fallen servicepersons who served in the
Armed Forces of Ukraine and showed an example of heroism and bravery,
the AFU MWR Main Directory created an order on documenting the
information about heroic actions of military personnel in the Combat journal.
 100

2.4. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

2.4.1. Professional and psychological selection

The russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 set in motion the
mobilisation of Ukrainian citizens in order to form new units and fill the
existing ones with additional personnel.
However, the combat experience of the initial few months of the full-
scale russian invasion has shown that not everyone can handle the physical
and psychological pressures expected in the performance of combat duties.
Sometimes due to personal capabilities people are also not able to learn the
new western-provided equipment.
The Main Department of MPS of AFU controlled and provided support
for the psychological training of mobilised personnel. In the period between
17 May and 17 July 2022 work was undertaken in the training centres and
general purpose military training grounds where new units were undergoing
cohesion exercises and their personnel was being trained.
Therefore, very prominent became the necessity for a quality-driven
professional and psychological selection of mobilised personnel, and the
prevention of people with low morale and skill levels getting mobilised, too.
In order to enhance the MPS system psychological education groups in
regional recruit centres had been detached from the supply sectors and
subordinated to the deputy head of the recruit centres. Psychological support
groups with a psychologist staff member were created in the lower-levels
regional recruit centres.
Apart from this, in the beriod between 29 June and 9 July 2022 in the
A2625 unit (located in the village of Starychi) during the staffing of a newly
created AFU Ground Forces brigade, the MPS Main Directory conducted an
experiment on performing PPS whilst receiving mobilised human resource.
As a result of the experiment, which showed the effectiveness of the PPS, a
PPS section was introduced at those personnel reception posts, that did not
have these sections prior.
The implementation of the MPS system at the personnel reception
posts has significantly increased personnel quality and allowed to avoid the
mobilisation of people who, due to their professional and psychological
qualities, are unable to properly perform combat duties.
 101

In order to improve the quality of psychological examination of

candidates for military service and effective management of professional and
psychological selection in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, amendments were
made to the staff of regional TRSSCs on 24 June 2022. These amendments
subordinated the positions of chief specialists (psychologists) to the heads of
MPS departments (groups).
The conduct of professional and psychological selection measures with
all categories of citizens who are called up (accepted) for military service in
the Armed Forces of Ukraine has also been standardised.
In June-August 2022, there was a general downward trend in the
number of suicides among mobilised servicepersons who served for two
months or less. This became possible due to the introduction of a system that
controls professional and psychological selection in the training centres of the
branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
In the context of russian aggression against our state, units (subunits)
that are able to perform missions under conditions of hostile informational and
psychological influence are essential. In view of the above it became
particularly important to implement structural and systemic organisational
changes, reduce time it takes to train military personnel, in particular, in
general military training, and focus on the psychological readiness of
personnel for combat.

2.4.2. Implementation of a psychological training system

 102
In order to take urgent measures aimed at preventing unauthorised
battlefield abandonment, the MPS Department developed the Programme for
Psychological Training (hereinafter – the Programme) of mobilized personnel
(Annex 10).
The programme was piloted with military personnel to test the potential
for developing and implementing effective strategies to increase stress
resistance, combat negative psychological factors that arise during offensive
operations and prevent panic among troops, thus preventing unauthorised
battlefield abandonment, whilst taking into account the combat experience of
military units that have come under heavy enemy fire.

The main problems that had a negative impact on the organisation of

psychological training for servicepersons were:
the absence of a psychological training complex or a special obstacle
course among the facilities of the training ground, which meant that classes
on the topic of “Formation and strengthening of psychological stability in
personnel during the completion of the obstacle course” were not held. For
example, up until 24.02.2022 the following was used for psychological
training of AFU servicepersons: 6 psychological training complexes (GF – 3,
AF – 2, Navy – 1); 36 special obstacle cources (GF – 19, AF – 2, Navy – 6,
AAF – 1, SOF – 4, CCSF – 2, MP – 1, GS (А0139) – 1); 25 psychological
training classrooms (GF – 18, Navy – 1, AAF – 1, SOF – 4, CCSF – 1). In
accordance with the requirements of the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine No. 31 of 14.05.2020 “On Approval of the
Procedure for Organising the Provision of Training of the Troops (Forces) of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine with Military Training Equipment”, the need as
of 24.02.2022 was as follows: 79 special obstacle courses (GF – 38, AF – 31,
AAF – 4, SOF – 4, SFC – 4, LFC – 2); 89 psychological training classrooms
(GF – 39, AF – 33, Navy – 5, AAF – 4, SOF – 4, CCSF – 1, SFC – 5, MP –
2).
 103
In addition, with the russian missile and bomb attacks on the
infrastructure of units’ permanent locations, as well as training centres and
areas, psychological training facilities were destroyed and need to be
restored. Psychological training classrooms in two training centres were
completely destroyed by enemy missile attacks
the absence of general-purpose training areas, training centres for
psychological training, and positions for psychological training instructors,
which reduces the effectiveness of psychological training;
the lack of pyrotechnic imitation equipment that reduces the density of
psychological pressure during conducting practical training to build stress
resistance in military personnel.
Considering the specifities of
the work performed by the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, the following two
Training Military Educational and
Methodological Publication were
developed: СТІ 000Г.22К(И)
“Psychological Training” to the Basic
General Training Programme (ТП7-
00(03).01 approved by the Chief of
the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine); and СТІ
000Г.22Л.02 “Psychological Training
(Training Course)”. These items are
designed as part of the Combined
Training Programme for section
commanders and platoon sergeants
of mechanised, mototrised, airmobile,
airborne, marine, as well as
mountain- and air-assault units (ТП7-
01(40).01). Both publications are
approved by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
for training of mobilised personnel
and can be used during martial law,
when psychological support is
separated into a subject in and of
itself. In such instances combat
training is designed to take 15 hours
(or 10 for sergeants).
Additionally, 163 thousand first
psychological aid cards were
produced to supplement training.
Some of the features of the
Psychological Support Programmes
are:
 104

improving psychological training by increasing the number of repetition

times fore the exercise to control the psychological state in the face of heavy
armoured vehicles (up to 3 times), and including exercises to accustom
servicepersons to the influence of psychotraumatic factors of combat
operations (“Shelling” with live ammunition);
using and implementating modern approaches of forming a high level of
patriotism, determination to win, and readiness to perform comabat duties in
the face of intense hostile informational and psychological influence.
To ensure the effectiveness of psychological training, these classes are
conducted using specialised training facilities, including psychological training
complexes, special obstacle courses and psychological training classrooms.
The psychological training sessions organised under the Programme
with mobilised personnel are effective in building and strengthening their
psychological resilience to perform combat duties, overcoming “tank fear” and
fear of enemy IDF.
In order to organise high-quality psychological training for AFU
personnel, including those called up for military service during mobilisation,
and to increase their psychological stability to the level necessary to perform
combat missions, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine of 08.09.2022 No. 35953/C introduced psychological
training (psychological training instructors) into the staffs of training centres
and military training grounds.
There have also been changes in the additional military training of
Ukrainian citizens under the reserve officer training programme (hereinafter -
military training). The changes take into account the military aggression of the
russian federation and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine.
 105

2.5. CONDUCTING SOCIAL WORK WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL

AND THEIR FAMILIES
In the period of May to August 2022, efforts were concentrated on
effectively securing the social and legal rights of military personnel and their
dependents by ensuring that their rightful entitlements were met.
The main focus of the territorial recruitment and social support centres
was to provide payment to the families of the deceased and arrange
assistance for the burial of Defenders.
With only one social support specialist (chief specialist) out of a staff of
48, the district TRSSCs were unable to effectively implement social work or
provide social services. The idea of establishing TRSSCs as a new body to
provide services to citizens was never realised. As such, these bodies de-
facto remained “military commissariats” 4.
The rise in captured and missing AFU personnel worsened social
distress among their families. The missing servicepersons’ relatives sent out
numerous appeals to state authorities, such as the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine, the General Staff and other military command and control bodies.
In order to better coordinate assistance to the families of captured and
missing personnel in matters within the competence and authority of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Main Department provided a permanent
representative presence to the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, which was established under the chairmanship of the
Defence Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.
The Main Departmet has expanded its capacities for sending the
children of military personnel overseas for rehabilitation. This is due to the
fact that the recreation camp for children of the AFU servicemen (based in
Odesa) was not taking in children, owing to security concerns in the region
and the country.
With support from the First Lady of Ukraine and as part of the
“Childhood without War” initiative, the Main Departmet arranged for military
children accompanied by adults to travel for rehabilitation to the Antalya
region in the Republic of Turkey.
As part of the project, more than 1,000 people were sent for
rehabilitation with a stay of up to 3 months.

4A pre-reform version of the recruit offices body, which Ukraine inherited from the USSR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_commissariat#In_post-Soviet_states
 106

The Main Departmet alone arranged 38 evacuation flights for a total of

1,465 family members of military personnel, which included 873 children.
These flights transported the families to the following destinations:
Turkey – 1 082 (629 children);
Albania – 232 (138 children);
Cyprus – 52 особи (48 children);
Spain – 50 (28 children);
Montenegro – 25 (15 children);
Latvia – 24 (15 children).
Efforts persisted on establishing communications with other
organisations and exploring fresh prospects to send families of AFU
personnel abroad.
The main efforts of social support for military personnel and their
families were in improving the effectiveness of work with servicepersons’
families, especially the families of missing persons and prisoners of war.
The provision of appropriate payments to military personnel has
assisted in maintaining social stability within military units.
CHAPTER 3.
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION
(September – December 2022)
3.1. THE COURSE OF WAR IN SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 2022
The military-strategic situation in September 2022 was difficult.
Russian troops continued to conduct a strategic offensive operation, in
the course of which the enemy tried to achieve the following strategic goals:
the encirclement and defeat of the AFU grouping in the Donetsk
operational area, thus gaining access to the administrative borders of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
retaining TOTs in Kharkiv region and ensuring unimpeded logistics from
Belgorod region for the russian grouping in the TOT of Donetsk region;
retaining TOTs in Zaporizhzhia regions and preserving the land corridor
between the TOTs of Donetsk region and the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea;
holding the seized districts of the Kherson region and creating
conditions for an offensive in the Mykolaiv-Odesa direction.
In order to repel the russian aggression, undermine the enemy’s
offensive potential, and regain control over TOTs, the Ukrainian Defence
Force continued to conduct:
the defensive operation and offensive actions within the Eastern
operational area using Khortytsia OSG;
 110

the defensive operation and offensive actions within the South-Western

operational area using Oleksandriia OSG;
stability operation within the North-Western operational area using
North OSG.
Ukrainian troops conducted successful offensives in the north of the
Eastern and South-Western operational areas, gradually liberating the
territories occupied by russia in Kharkiv, Kherson and Luhansk regions.

The plan for a Ukrainian offensive, praised by international military

experts, succeeded. By feeding the enemy false information about the
intended direction of the principal attack in southern Ukraine, it was possible
to compel the enemy to shift its resources and troops from the Kharkiv to
Mykolaiv direction. This diminished the ability of the russian grouping to
defend the eastern area of the Kharkiv region. This enabled Ukraine to
recapture almost all of the Kharkiv region within one month. As a result, the
military-strategic situation around Ukraine remained manageable and was
marked by successful actions of AFU on the Kharkiv and Kherson axes in
September 2022. Ukrainian troops continued liberating the regions occupied
by russia. Over 400 settlements in Kharkiv, Kherson and Luhansk regions
have been reclaimed since the start of the offensive.
Having established favourable conditions, Ukrainian forces proceeded
with their offensive, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. This outcome
was primarily due to the fact that nearly 80% of the enemy reinforcements,
which had arrived on the right bank of the Dnipro river, were mobilised and
lacked the required level of military preparation and motivation.
Consequently, approximately 50 settlements in the southern direction were
successfully returned to Ukrainian control.
 111

In October, russian troops continued their offensive, in which they

sought to achieve the following goals: secure the administrative border of the

Donetsk region and stop the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
stabilise the front line towards Svatove; avoid losing control over TOTs in the
Luhansk region; establish a defensive line between Svatove and Kreminna,
maintain control over TOTs in the Zaporizhzhia region; safeguard the land
corridor connecting the Donetsk TOTs with the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea; and retain control of a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro
river to avoid isolation of the troops stationed there.
To repel the russian aggression, deprive the enemy of offensive
potential, and regain control over the TOTs, the Ukrainian Defence Forces
conducted strategic offensive operations. The forces of Khortytsia OSG were
deployed in the Eastern operational area and the forces of Kherson OSG in
the Southwestern operational area. Stability operations were also conducted
in the Northwestern operational area by the forces of North OSG and in the
Southwestern operational area by the forces of the Odesa OSG. Ukrainian
forces successfully launched offensives in the north of the Eastern and
Southwestern operational areas, gradually reclaiming territories previously
occupied by russia in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Luhansk regions.
Relevant groups were reinforced to deter enemy advances in the Bakhmut
and Avdiivka axes, while separate operations were conducted to prevent
further enemy advances into Ukrainian territory.
 112

In order to slow down the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the
enemy set up reserve defensive positions closer to the Dnipro river and
created conditions for echeloned defence, particularly in the Kherson area.
Almost all bridges and crossings in Mykolaiv and Kherson regions were
mined and subsequently blown up by the occupiers.

Amidst the failure to maintain the bridgehead on the eastern bank, the
occupation authorities in the Kherson region declared an evacuation of
civilians from Beryslav, Bilozersk, Snihurivka and Oleksandrivka districts to
the opposite bank of the Dnipro river. Using the cover of civilian “evacuation”,
 113
russian military command withdrew its equipped combat units and
heavy machinery, both overland and through numerous river crossings using
boats. At the same time, the enemy forces attempted to retake previously lost
positions by launching targeted counter-attacks in the northern and
northwestern areas of the Kherson region.
In October 2022, Russia escalated its aggressive war against Ukraine to
the next stage, marked by sizeable air strikes on energy infrastructure.
In November 2022, the military-strategic situation around Ukraine
remained under control and was characterised by the successful actions of
the AFU in the Kherson axis. Ukrainian troops continued to liberate the TOTs
and hold a strategic initiative. The enemy’s response to the defeats on the
frontlines was to launch massive missile attacks on Ukraine’s energy
infrastructure.

Russian forces continued their strategic offensive, directing their main

efforts towards the western part of Luhansk (located within the Svatove-
Kreminna frontline) and Donetsk (located within the Bakhmut-Soledar
frontline) regions. Additionally, they launched missile attacks on Ukraine’s
energy infrastructure.
During the strategic offensive, the enemy attempted to achieve the
following goals: to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk
regions; to retain control over the TOTs in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions;
to attack the main facilities of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, thus creating
conditions for the population’s dissatisfaction with the political leadership of
the state, aggravating the socio-economic situation, obstructing the supply of
Western weapons and logistical support to the troops (forces) of the AFU
 114
To counteract the russian aggression, neutralise the enemy’s offensive
capabilities and re-establish control over the TOTs, AFU pursued a multi-
pronged approach: a defensive operation in the Eastern operational area, an
offensive operation in the Southwestern operational area, and stability
operations in the Northwestern operational area. Through successive
offensive operations, the Ukrainian Defence Forces progressively recaptured
TOTs in the Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Luhansk regions. On the
Bakhmut and Avdiivka axes, Ukrainian forces were bolstering their units and
carrying out effective defensive operations.
On 11 November 2022, Ukrainian forces entered Kherson, keeping the
enemy’s retreat routes and new positions under tight fire control. Thanks to
this, Ukrainian MLRS was able to inflict greater damage to the enemy
positions and critical infrastructure, including Armyansk and Chongar logistics
centres, which connect the roads and railway links between the TOT of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and mainland Ukraine.
In December 2022 the military-strategic situation in Ukraine remained
tense but under control. The AFU continued to hold a strategic initiative in
the russo-Ukrainian conflict, effectively constructing defence while preserving
their own forces and depleting the enemy’s resources. This has created
favourable conditions for an offensive.
The russian troops continued their strategic offensive by concentrating
their main efforts on the western part of Luhansk (within the Svatove-
Kreminna frontline) and Donetsk (within the Bakhmut-Soledar frontline)
regions. They also launched missile strikes on the critical infrastructure of
Ukraine. During the strategic offensive, the enemy aimed to accomplish the
following objectives: to approach the administrative boundaries of the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and to retain control of the TOTs in
Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.
As of the beginning of December 2022, the enemy had concentrated
more than 130 BTGs and units of the 1st and 2nd Cores on the Ukrainian
territory. The enemy grouping consisted of more than 200,000 personnel, up
to 930 tanks, about 2,500 armoured personnel carriers, up to 1,350 artillery
systems, up to 660 MLRS, and up to 40 OTR complexes.
The Ukrainian Defence Forces conducted successful offensive
operations, gradually liberating the TOTs in Kharkiv and Luhansk regions,
and in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, reinforced their groupings and
performed defensive operations to prevent the enemy from advancing deeper
into the Ukrainian territory.
Localised fights prevailed, with minimal advances and heavy enemy
losses, as well as massive missile attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.
At the same time, Russia’s strategic goals in Ukraine remained
unchanged, even though they have not seen any strategic or operational
accomplishments.
 115

3.2. IMPROVINGTHE MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

STRUCTURES IN THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

3.2.1. Strengthening the practical component of the moral and

psychological support system
The MPS strctures learned the importance of developing personnel’s
psychological resilience during the full-scale russian invasion. This was
evident in the preparation of combat operations, which included maintaining
psychological resilience during mass aerial and artillery bombardments, as
well as direct contact with superior enemy forces.
During the first stage of the strategic defence operation, these missions
were performed with the help of highly mobile internal communications
groups for operational psychological aid (callsign “Charlie”). These groups
were staffed exclusively by the AFU MPS personnel.
For instance, in just six months of the war, 18 of these groups were
formed in 34 military units. The psychological work involved around 10,000
military personnel.
At the same time, the experience gained from combat highlighted that
this work requires more of these groups.
In order to promptly address the sharp increase in the number of
psychogenic losses, the commanders of military groupings and individual
units independently decided to create freelance combat stress control groups
(hereinafter – CSC groups). These groups have demonstrated great efficacy
in providing psychological support to personnel during combat operations.
Some examples of this include:
 116
in the military unit A4267 a freelance CSC group was formed by
psychology officers from support units and second echelon batallions. This
group provided qualified psychological aid to over 85% of personnel in the
brigade’s units;
in Territorial Defence units, the work of psychology officers and
personnel with psychology education increased the efficacy of providing first
psychological aid and reduced the number of psychotrauma instance in
servicepersons who required evacuation and treatment;
starting from 24.02.2022, freelance CSC groups were created in the
units of the AFU Air Assault Forces. These groups ensured the provision of
professional psychological aid to AAF personnel and taught them effective
self-help methods.
In 2019-2021, the MPS Main Departmet of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
worked to increase the practical component of psychological support to
respond promptly to sudden changes in the morale of personnel at the
operational and tactical levels.
In the course of this work, five experiments were conducted to establish
and test MPS centres for military command and control bodies and CSC
groups of the Ground Force, Air Force and Navy brigades of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine. The specifics these units were considered, both in
performing the assigned missions and restoring combat capability.
By reducing the number of psychology officers in battalions, except for
combat units of up to 50 people and deputy company MPS commanders, the
establishment of these units was intended without increasing the staff of the
MPS structures.
Following the result of these experiments, and with an aim to reinforce
MPS capabilities that are in place to promptly respond to unforeseen changes
in the morale and psychological condition of personnel, deliver efficient
psychological aid to servicepersons throughout execustion of assigned tasks,
and to restore combat capability, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine made a decision to:
bring the organisational structures of MPS centres under the direct
control of the commanders of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Air Assault
Forces, four operational commands, the Ground Forces Reserve Corps, and
the Territorial Defence Units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
to include Combat Stress Control groups in the organisational structures
of: separate mechanised, motorised infantry, jaeger, tank, and artillery
brigades of the Ground Forces; aviation, anti-aircraft, rocketry, and radio
technical brigades of the Air Force; separate marine, and artillery brigades of
the Navy; airborne assault, airmobile, and airborne brigades of the Air Assault
Forces; separate territorial defence brigades of the Territorial Defence Forces
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
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3.2.2. Measures to improve the moral readiness and psychological

stability of personnel
In December 2022, the
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine convened a meeting
to discuss the organisation of
moral and psychological
support for combat operations
in specific areas. During his
presentation, Major General
Vladyslav Klochkov, the Head
of the Main Department of
Moral and Psychological
Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, highlighted that the main efforts of
moral and psychological support are focused on military units operating in the
direction of the enemy’s main attack.
In general, the personnel of military units performing tasks in the most
important areas maintain satisfactory levels of moral readiness and
psychological stability.
However, there are a number of negative factors that directly affect the
moral readiness and psychological stability of personnel, and the resilience of
defence, namely:
intense, concentrated artillery shelling of our positions significantly
increases casualties among our personnel, including experienced
servicepersons and junior commanders;
limited leadership abilities of mobilised NCOs and junior officers hinder
a quick establishment of trust within units and the development of an
authoritative command;
constant waves of enemy assualt on certain areas make the military
personnel live in a state of constant tension;
the rapid pace of battle casualty replacement renders the development
of unit cohesion impossible;
the use of precision tactical weapons by the enemy to gain a tactical
advantage causes a sense of hopelessness and deep depression among
servicepersons;
chronic fatigue and psycho-emotional exhaustion of personnel caused
by prolonged participation in high-intensity combat;
the difficulty in adapting to tense combat situations by relief personnel
leads to abandonment of some positions altogether;
the inability to fully restore combat capabilities by conducting planned
rotations of units that are holding defence on the main axes of enemy
advance;
the length of time that war crime proceedings take does not deter them,
but, in fact, encourages other perpetrators.
 118
The enemy is using the tactics of sending multiple infantry assault
waves (around 3-5 attacks within 5-6 hours) with IDF support. This results in
alterations of the servicepersons’ mental state, the onset of fatigue, and leads
to violent behaviour towards commanding officers and fellow personnel.
To mitigate the adverse effects of the aforementioned negative factors
on the morale and psychological state of the personnel, the President of
Ukraine – Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine –
Volodymyr Zelenskyi tasked the filling of vacant positions within the AFU
MPS structures with personnel from the officer reserve training battalions.
Additionally, the training of non-commissioned officers in combat
brigades has been intensified through the collaborative training program for
section commanders. This includes a compulsory 30-day basic leadership
course.
To reduce the time needed for adjustment and develop psychological
resilience in military personnel, rotations entail introducing new units to the
second echelon of defence before moving them to the front line.
In accordance with the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, reserve officers underwent targeted call-up and
received further training at higher education institutions to assume the roles of
psychology officers. The selected individuals possess the suitable level of
education and specialisations.
During the Ukrainian Defence
Forces’ strategic offensive operation, MPS
specialists exerted every effort to ensure
its success. Efforts such as those of the
Senior Lieutenant ZAIKA Bohdan
Hennadiyovych who serves as a
psychology officer in the unit A4350.
He skillfully organises and carries out
measures to improve the morale and
psychological well-being of personnel
within the unit. Continuously performs
psychological aid in the areas of
responsibility in order to maintain and
restore the morale and psychological state
of the personnel in the airmobile company
of the airmobile battalion. Offers soldiers
psychological assistance and motivation to
effectively carry out their assigned combat
missions.
He exemplifies impeccable conduct
and unwaveringly adheres to laws,
regulations, orders, and instructions. He
conscientiously studies military affairs and
stands ever-ready to fulfil duties related to
safeguarding Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
 119

During combat, he constantly demonstrates courage and

professionalism. For example, on 05.12.2022, he was in a combat mission
near the village of Yakovlivka, Bakhmut district, Donetsk region. He
voluntarily joined and later led an infantry assault group that was executing
batallion commander’s orders.
On 14 April 2023, by Order of the President of Ukraine, Senior
Lieutenant Bohdan Hennadiiovych Zaika received the III class order “For
Courage” for exhibiting personal bravery and selflessness while defending
Ukrainian state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and upholding the military
oath.
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3.3. INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT

3.3.1. Internal communication and information support of troops

(forces)
During the strategic offensive operation, the main efforts of the MPS
structures were focused on improving methods of influencing the
consciousness of soldiers and motivating personnel, which helped them to
perform their assigned tasks confidently.
The main objectives of organising information and propaganda support
during the strategic offensive operation were as follows:
development in personnel
feeling of personal
responsibility for the defence
of Ukraine – courage,
bravery, readiness for self-
sacrifice in the name of the
Motherland, and hatred of
the enemy;
defining clear national
ideological and worldview
reference points intended to
develop personnel
consciousness about their
tasks of protecting the
Ukrainian state;
adoption of national combat traditions, which are the ideological
foundation of the entire training system and usage of the AFU;
building up capabilities to protect servicepersons from the enemy's
negative informational-psychological influence.

Taking into account the experience of organising information and

propaganda support activities for the troops (forces) during the first and
second strategic defence operations, the main efforts of internal
communication and information support of the troops (forces) were focused
on:
distributing information materials of patriotic, counter-propaganda and
analytical content, primarily to the troops (forces) deployed in the areas of
operations;
development of patriotic motivation in the troops (forces);
improvement of national-patriotic training for servicepersons;
ensuring the conduct of informational and explanatory activities with
personnel;
 121

analysing the training of the military specialists in Military Political

Science, Military Culturology, and Information and Propaganda Support
during the russian-Ukrainian war;
development of a scientific and practical methodology for the
development of personnel’s moral readiness to perform assigned tasks;
a generalisation of new combat traditions of the Ukrainian army;
creating image videos and graphic (visual) products
about the courageous defenders of Ukraine;
providing the troops (forces) with printed products and technical means
of propaganda;
ensuring the conduct of the events, with the participation of the Head of
State, dedicated to the anniversaries of the liberation of Ukrainian settlements
from russian occupants;
participation in information campaigns.
During this period, the implementation of the key internal communication
principles was focused on:
building trust in the state military-political leadership and the military
command;
development of awareness and information literacy of personnel;
establishing feedback communication between commanders and their
subordinates;
development of the personnel's readiness to perform assigned tasks in a
quality manner;
maintaining and restoring the morale and psychological state of
personnel.
During this period, information materials continued to be produced and
distributed among the troops (forces). Actions were taken to optimise them.
Information materials were distributed by:
The Department of Internal Communications and Information Support of
Troops (Forces) via:
The telegram group Kameniari5 (654 participants from the number of
officers in charge for moral and psychological support);
The telegram channel Zdokhnyt’Vatniki 6 (35 subscribers from the number
of the Information and Propaganda Support officers of the defence forces,
military command authorities, direct reporting units, and military units);
The Centre of Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU via:
the Telegram channel MPS Information (31 subscribers);
the WhatsApp group MAS-Center (250 members).

5 “The Stone-Hewers” reference to Ivan Franko’s book.

6 Die Vatniks, “vatnik” stands for an unintelligent russian patriot.
 122

The organisation study of activities for operative informing military

units (subunits) in the conditions of
active hostilities showed that
autonomous satellite Internet
stations, such as Starlink, have
proved themselves effective for the
data transmission for informing
personnel. Besides, when TV and
radio networks in the areas of active
hostilities are unavailable, it is
impossible to broadcast military
television and radio Army FM.
Broadcasting is technically possible only with the help of the autonomous
Starlink satellite Internet station via mobile applications (Dzhura, Army FM,
etc.).
At the same time, the Information
Technology Department of the Ministry
of Defence of Ukraine together with
limited liability companies Eleks
and Razom Softwer took actions under
contract No. 2-11/225-2022 dated
19.09.2022
to receive and transfer the
software of the Dzhura application to
the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine
sphere of influence as an element of
the automated information and
telecommunications system
Oberih (Annex 12).
Considering the results of this work, the Main Departmet of Moral and
Psychological Support of the AFU took action to connect the AFU
servicepersons to the mobile application Dzhura.
Since 27 October 2022, the Centre of Moral and Psychological
Support of the AFU has considered the requirements of the AFU leadership
to restrict informational work in the Telegram messenger. Since 2018, the
Centre has been using the technical capabilities of the Telegram messenger
to organise a prompt information dissemination system. The
system consists of 115 closed groups of military units and institutions,
6,600 members of which are group administrators who distribute
 123

content to subordinate units (command authorities, units, battalions, platoons,

squads). Thus, information was shared with 70% of the personnel.
In addition, the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of
the AFU has developed and sent to the troops (forces) various
methodological recommendations, booklets, and guides to build the
servicepersons’ moral readiness to carry out assigned tasks, maintain
morale, and foster hatred of the enemy.

Due to the objectives above, the Humanitarian Institute of the National

Defence University of Ukraine has completed an operational task on the
development of servicepersons’ moral readiness to perform assigned tasks at
the request of the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of the
AFU. Considering the theoretical study of moral readiness and the results of
the studies (surveys, questionnaires) on its development in military personnel,
the research paper highlights the Recommendations for the moral readiness
development in the military personnel of the AFU to perform assigned tasks.
 124

The Commander-in-Chief of the AFU approved a 3-level information

dissemination system developed by the Main Departmet of Moral and
Psychological Support of the AFU to ensure the qualitative organisation of
internal communication, troops (forces) information support, and neutralise of
the enemy's negative informational and psychological influence on the
personnel.

3.3.2. Activities for increasing servicepersons’ motivation

To increase the motivation of the troops (forces) personnel:
The Commander-in-Chief of
the AFU has received instructions
and proposals that aim to enhance
the morale of personnel and prepare
them for conscious and selfless
conduct of combat missions during
the strategic offensive.
The ceremonies will take place in
which the Head of State will present the
Order of the Golden Star to the Heroes of
Ukraine and the family members of those
who have fallen.
Prepared and conducted the rituals of presenting and awarding military
units with battle flags, honorary awards "For Courage and Bravery", and
honorary titles.
Ensured the organisation of solemn events featuring the participation of
the President of Ukraine to commemorate the liberation anniversaries of
Bucha, Irpin, Moshchun, Okhtyrka, Trostianets, Chernihiv and Yahidne.
At the same time, efforts have been made to organise the process of
the branding of military units. It included analysing the state of development
and
introduction of sleeve
chevrons and emblems.
As a result, proposals
outlining the key
elements of military unit
branding were drafted for
the Commander-in-Chief
of the AFU. Additionally,
methodological
recommendations
addressing specific
development issues and
the introduction of military
symbols within the AFU,
approved by the Defence
Minister on 14.01.2020,
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were disseminated to the troops (forces). Simultaneously, the Main

Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU, as the ordering
party, organised activities to implement the pilot project on the creation of an
electronic catalogue (e-catalogue) of the library of the Central House of
Officers of the AFU. It will be implemented in accordance with the Roadmap,
approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU (№11902/С of 03.05.2022),
and the specified activities of the road map of the mentioned pilot project
approved by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the AFU (№14260 / С of
18.05.2022) (hereinafter - the Roadmap).

On 02.12.2022, the library of the

Central House of Officers of the
AFU hosted a presentation of
the special
e-catalogue software in a
test mode. Measures were
organised to connect military
units’ libraries to the e-
catalogue and train military unit
librarians how to use the
software.

At the end of 2022, the

work has been started to
generalise and study new
national military traditions to
further develop an operational
assignment on this topic and
publish a collection of modern
national military traditions of
the AFU. Besides, in the
mentioned context, the Model
Procedure for the Military
Ritual of Initiation into the
Officer Fraternity for Officers-
Graduates of Higher
Military Educational
Institutions of the AFU was
developed in cooperation with
the relevant Military
Institutions.
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In addition, the information base on the servicepersons who were

awarded the title of the Hero of Ukraine continued to be expanded during the
reporting period to disseminate information about the heroic deeds of the
AFU servicepersons.

3.3.3. Sustainment with propaganda technical means

A financial resource of UAH 2,844.0 thousand was allocated to organise
the purchase of modern technical propaganda equipment. (6% of the total
sum needed for the purchase of modern technical propaganda equipment).
The approximate fund demand to support the troops under the budget
subprogramme KPKV 2101020/12 "Moral and psychological support" is UAH
52,910.0 thousand (including the modernisation of 115 units of PAK 65/70
based on GAZ-66 mobile cinema units) (Annex 13).
In addition, 7 GAZ-66-based PAK 65/70 mobile cinema units were re-
equipped with modern equipment (+2%) at the expense of the subordinate
military units (4 – the AFU Air Force Command): A2502 (Starokostiantyniv),
A2502 (Myrhorod), A0704 (Vasylkiv), A1451 (Kharkiv); the AFU Support
Forces Command - 2: A2738 (Kamianets-Podilskyi), A0807 (Sambir); OС
"Zakhid"- 1: A1671 (Rivne).
The most acute issues in providing the troops (forces) with technical
means of propaganda remain:
The need to increase financial resources for the organisation of troop
sustainment under the budget subprogramme KPKV 2101020/12
"Moral and psychological support" up to UAH 6 million annually (a 2x
increase). The existing level of funding has not changed over the past few
years, while the consumer inflation rate became 26.6% in 2022 alone.
Equipping newly created military units with technical propaganda
equipment in accordance with their TOE, as the allocated financial resource
for 2023 of UAH 2,844.0 thousand is not enough to cover the needs.
Allocating additional financial resources for the modernisation of 115
mobile cinema units of PAK 65/70 that are used by military units (on the
condition of centralised procurement of special equipment sets). The cost of a
set of special equipment for re-equipping one mobile cinema unit:
a multimedia projector with a ceiling mount - UAH 15,535.00;
a digital camera - UAH 3,833.46;
a PANASONIC SC-PM250 EE-K type microsystem - UAH 2 600.00;
a Clarity MAX12MH-S type active speaker system (set of two
speakers with 3x15m cable) - UAH 7,377.20;
a satellite TV set (includes: a satellite receiver, 0.45 bracket, 3
converters, antenna, 2 multi feeds, switch, 8
 127

RCI F-connectors, RG690BV-W cable 20 m long, 3 anchor bolts, a mounting) -

UAH 1,560.00;
a Phonic AM220P mixing console - UAH 2,500.00;
a digital terrestrial receiver Romsat TR-9100HD type - UAH 366.00;
a terrestrial antenna FunkeYagiNX type - UAH 874.80;
a KG WMS40 MiniVocal radio system - UAH 3,167.50;
VETA-58A wired microphone - UAH 496.00;
a microphone stand - UAH 434.50;
a coaxial TV cable (50 m) - UAH 106.50;
a Rockcable RCL 10300 D6 microphone cable (50 m) - UAH 995.00;
antenna plugs (12 pcs.) - UAH 60.00;
F connectors (12 pcs) - UAH
10.44; a VGA cable (5 m) -
UAH 90.00;
6,3 mm Jack plug (10 pcs.) - UAH 220,00;
a HDMI (3 m) cable - UAH 170,00.
The total cost of re-equipping one set of PAK 65/70 is UAH
40,396.40.
Additionally, the experience of organising sustainment for the troops
(forces) with technical propaganda means indicates that timely replenishing
the current losses of such means in brigades (separate units) engaged in
active hostilities is not possible because of the need to process a significant
number of corresponding documents.
So, we can draw the following conclusions:
The organisation of information and propaganda support within the
AFU, particularly amidst the active troops’ engagement in combat operations
against the russian aggressor, is steadily improving. It is exhibiting promising
signs of moral support akin to that observed in leading NATO member
countries.
At the same time, the following issues remain problematic:
improvement the troop's (forces) sustainment with printed periodical
publications both at permanent stations and in the areas of operations;
organisation of information support for personnel directly in the combat
areas of operations where there is no Internet coverage;
production and distribution of printed materials (posters, leaflets,
posters, etc.) among the personnel by printing enterprises located in the
areas where the troops (forces) perform their assigned tasks (in accordance
with subparagraph 3 of paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine "On the
Legal Regime of Martial Law" of 12 May 2015 No. 389-VIII (with
amendments) and for the implementation of the legal regime of martial law
measures in the interests of organising moral and psychological support for
the personnel of the defence forces);
 128

museum exhibitions organisation at permanent stations dedicated to

repulsing the full-scale armed aggression of the russian federation;
providing military units with technical propaganda equipment according
to the maximal TOE demand, organising library collections and developing
modern libraries in military units.

3.4. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

3.4.1. Enhancing the practicality of psychological support at the tactical

level
The experience of the russian-Ukrainian war undoubtedly shows that
even in the era of high-precision weapons, modern weaponry and equipment,
widespread use of reconnaissance and strike drones, and elements of
artificial intelligence on the battlefield — the main role in war belongs to a
soldier and their readiness to perform combat tasks. The combat outcome
depends on the psychological readiness of personnel to perform assigned
tasks, their ability to overcome fear in battle and maintain the will to win, and
the development level of psychological resilience towards long duration of
combat-related negative factors.
At the current stage of the AFU combat operations of armed protection
of the Motherland, the analysis and study of the experience of the russian-
Ukrainian war become of particular importance. Foremost, this concerns the
specifics of organising and conducting psychological support activities for
personnel.
The practical experience gained from organising moral and
psychological support for combat operations carried out by the AFU during
the russian federation's armed aggression against Ukraine in 2022
underscored the crucial role of military psychologists in personnel selection,
training, and recovery. Recognising the need to address the significant rise in
psychogenic losses among personnel, the AFU Command made a decision
effective from 16.09.2022, to implement Directives D-194dsk dated
September 17, 2022, and D-193dsk dated 16.09.2022, from the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. These directives apply to the TOE structures
of separate mechanized, motorised infantry, tank, and artillery brigades of the
AFU Land Forces; aviation, anti-aircraft missile, and radio engineering
brigades of the Air Force; separate marine brigades and naval artillery of the
AFU Navy; as well as air assault, airmobile, and airborne brigades of the AFU
Air Assault Forces. These directives focus on the establishment of combat
stress control units (referred to as CSCUs), which have proven to be highly
effective in providing psychological support to personnel during combat
operations (see Annex 14).
The relevant concern emerged regarding staffing psychology officers
and the requisite educational qualifications necessary for effective work with
servicepersons.
 129
It is also worth noting that the experience of using CSCU, which was
created to promptly respond to the increase in the number of personnel
psychogenic losses, has so far shown positive dynamics in improving the
effectiveness of providing operational (crisis) psychological support to
servicepersons and reducing the number of traumatised people who require
medical evacuation and treatment.
However, while analysing the CSCU activities, several issues were
identified in the psychological support organisation at the tactical level,
namely:
Exhaustion of the CSCU officers as the result of long periods of
providing psychological support to many servicepersons. The workload norm
per psychologist providing psychological support to the personnel carrying out
assigned tasks is no more than 400 people in peacetime and no more than
300 people in wartime (special period). Yet, the psychological support to
servicepersons is carried out virtually around the clock and continuously,
although international practice shows that such work is effective only for 14
days, followed by complete exhaustion and the need for supervision.
Continuing the negative tendency of psychology officers of combat
battalions (divisions), whose working positions were left to provide direct
psychological support while CSCUs are being formed, perform unrelated to
their duties tasks. Most of the battalion (division) psychology officers are not
engaged in providing psychological support to servicepersons. Instead, their
tasks are determined by unit commanders and typically involve conducting
internal investigations.
Insufficient number of professional CSCU psychologists for the existing
number of personnel in military units who need psychological support.

3.4.2. Improving staffing psychology officers’ positions

To ensure the effective staffing of psychology officers in battalions and
combat stress control units in the military units of the AFU, a collaborative
effort between the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of the
AFU and the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
was initiated. This initiative, in line with the Commander-in-Chief's Order No.
54670/С of 07.12.2022, addresses the training of specialists for psychology
officer positions in battalions and combat stress control units (BOC 340002
psychology). These specialists will acquire the necessary qualifications to
organize and conduct psychological support for the AFU servicepersons. For
this purpose,
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“The course of professional development for servicepersons for BOC 340002

positions” was included in the catalogue of educational and professional
development courses for the AFU servicepersons in 2023 at the Military
Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The course
provides advanced training for servicepersons with a training period of 4
weeks, in groups of up to 50 people no more than 6 times a year. The state
order for 2023 has also been increased to 100 people at the Military Institute
of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, which does not exceed the
licensed volume of training specialists per year in the speciality 053
"psychology" (Annex 15).

3.4.3. Improving professional and psychological selection

Conducting a high-
quality professional and
psychological selection
significantly improves the
quality of personnel manning
military units and excludes
persons who, by their moral-
professional and
psychological qualities, are
not able to qualitatively carry
out the duties of the military
service.
In 2022, 28623 persons liable for military service were sent to designated
training centres (training grounds) for mobilisation. However, 44% of them did
not meet the requirements for military service and did not pass professional
and psychological selection during the recruitment process.
The main reasons for rejection were: alcohol and drug addiction - 1028
people (8%), low level of neuropsychic stability - 1244 people (10%), low
moral-professional qualities - 2047 people (17%), unspent convictions or
having been convicted of serious crimes - 522 people (4%), suicide attempts -
219 people (2%), poor health - 6726 people (55%), family circumstances (3 or
more minor children, a sole caregiver for a disabled person) - 526 people
(4%). Improvement of the professional and psychological selection has
facilitated an overall decline in the number of suicides among the AFU
servicepersons. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 43%
of suicide cases were recorded in the AFU. (Annex 16).
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The main issues in the professional and psychological selection

organisation lie within the capabilities of Territorial Recruitment and Social
Support Centres (TRSSC) (Appendix 17).

A qualitative study of the individual psychological qualities of persons,

liable for military service, at TRSSC; objective filling in of the reporting
documents of the professional-psychological selection in accordance with the
requirements of the Order of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine No. 272 of
12.09.2022 and their timely submission to the training centre (military unit)
that receives personnel, significantly improved the quality and speed of
manning military units (Annex 18).
It should be noted that to regulate the issues of professional-
psychological selection, in 2022, the "Instruction on Professional and
Psychological Selection in the AF of Ukraine and the State Special Transport
Service" was introduced, approved by the Order of the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine No. 272 dated 12.09.2022, registered with the Ministry of Justice of
Ukraine under No. 088/38424 dated 20.09.2022. Besides, a three-level
system of psychological selection was introduced, as well as methods of
psychological study for each category of persons liable for military service
were defined.

3.4.4. Activities for psychological recovery and rehabilitation of

military personnel
To restore and correct the psychophysiological and psyche functions of
servicepersons who were exposed to psycho-traumatic factors while
performing assigned tasks, to comprehend their experience gained in an
extreme situation and apply it in further activities, from 19 September 2022,
with the support of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
(decision of 14.09.2022 No. 37044 / С)
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The Main Departmet has launched a pilot project to provide psychological

rehabilitation services to servicepersons of the AFU at the state institution
Lisova Poliana Centre for Mental Health and Rehabilitation of Veterans of the
Ministry of Health of Ukraine (Annex 19). In 2022, 212 servicepersons
received psychological rehabilitation services at this facility.
Decompression activities with the AFU servicepersons are carried out
continuously after their withdrawal from the area of operation to restore
combat readiness (combat capability). The psychological rehabilitation
complex is an important element of preserving, restoring, or compensating for
impaired psyche functions, qualities, and personal and social status of
servicepersons. It also facilitates their psychosocial adaptation to a changed
life situation, comprehending the experience gained in an extreme situation
and applying it in life.
The experience of organising moral and psychological support for the
conduct of combat operations by the AFU troops (forces), and other defence
forces during the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine, demonstrated the
need for planned psychological recovery of the servicepersons that have
been in the areas of active combat operations for a long time.
As of now, the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of
the AFU is working to build up the capabilities for psychological recovery of
servicepersons who have suffered combat-related mental trauma and are
temporarily unable to perform their assigned tasks (combat missions).
 133

In particular, psychological support was provided to AFU

servicepersons in cooperation with NGOs with which the relevant cooperation
memoranda were signed, namely: NGO League of Officers, NGO Institute of
Health Psychology, the state institution Centre for Mental Health and
Rehabilitation of Veterans
Lisova Poliana of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, NGO Ukrainian
Association of Specialists in Overcoming the Consequences of
Psychotraumatic Events and the Israeli Trauma Coalition.

3.5. SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR SERVICEPERSONS AND THEIR FAMILY

MEMBERS

3.5.1. New challenges for the social work system with military
personnel and their families
The increase in the number of captured and missing-in-action AFU
servicepersons has highlighted the need to work with the families of such
servicepersons.
Numerous inquiries and appeals from servicepersons’ family members
to the state and the AFU leadership required an immediate response to the
issues that were within the competence and authority of the military command
and control bodies.
The largest number of the appeals came from family members of
military personnel of military units A0998, A0989, and A2802, including
through the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Since the main issues of the families of missing in action and captured
servicepersons were their search and return, which did not fall within the
competence of the moral and psychological support structures, the task of the
Main Departmet was to identify gaps in the work with such families by military
authorities and military units. In particular, during the meeting with the families
of the prisoners from the A0998 military unit in Lviv. The representatives of
the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the General Staff and the Land Forces of
the AFU identified specific tasks on the work with servicepersons’ families.
The management of the state policy implementation on the social and
legal protection of servicepersons and their families required a radical
transformation.
The regulatory framework for social protection, in particular the Law of
Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicepersons and Members of
Their Families, Employees of the Armed Forces of Ukraine", has proven to be
outdated and inadequate to meet the nowadays challenges.
The benefits and guarantees provided by the state to servicepersons
were secured legally, but not entirely realised in practice.
Work with families did not have crucial
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importance, which in turn led to social tension both in society and among the
military.
Development of the system of social support for military service based
on the provision of specific social services to servicepersons and their
families has become an updated task of the moral and psychological support
structures (The Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine No. 35923/C/2 of 21.12.2022).
To fulfil this task, organisational changes have been made in the moral
and psychological support structures: updated tasks were defined, and the
development of a system of social support for military service in the AFU and
the corresponding chain of command was started.

3.5.2. Formation of the social support system for servicepersons

and their families
In the context of
prolonged hostilities, the
social support issues, as one
of the implementation areas
of social protection of
servicepersons and their
families, have underlined the
most urgent need for
appropriate structures and
means. Both the structures
and means must be capable
of a timely and effective
response to social problems
of personnel related to
peculiarities of the military
service under the legal
martial law regime.
Thus, for carrying out
paragraph 2 of the Order of
the Supreme Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine "On the Order
of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the AFU of 06.09.2022
No. 7t/VGK” to improve the quality of moral and psychological support
organisation in the AFU. In particular, the implementation of the social
support system. The AF were given the task of acquiring the relevant
capabilities because as of today, social support for personnel is considered a
combination of proper material and social support.
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It is implemented through the provision of social services, such as: the social
adaptation of servicepersons and their families to military life or a new unit,
representing servicepersons’ interests at public authorities, consultations of
servicepersons and their families on the receiving their benefits and
guarantees, social rehabilitation and adaptation (servicepersons transition to
civilian life after discharge from military service), etc.
Taking into account the partner countries’ experience, in particular of
the NATO member states AF, the Main Departmet prepared proposals to the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFU on the development of the social support
system for military service. It will be based on provision of the social services
to servicepersons and their families, which were approved by the relevant
order of the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU dated 21.12.2022 No.
35923/C/2 (Annex 20).
Thus, the social support system in the army and its chain of command
have been created. Including the first introduction of social workers in military
units, and cooperation with social support representatives to effectively
provide the necessary assistance to servicepersons and their families.
It is worth noting that the history of social support in the AFU began with
the establishment of a new unit on 1 February 2023 - the Social Support
Department within the Main Departmet. The unit’s main tasks are managing
social support in the AFU and ensuring the implementation of social and legal
protection activities for servicepersons and their families (Directive of the
Minister of Defence of Ukraine and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU of
29.12.2022 No. 321/30/dsk "On the Organisational Measures in the AFU in
2023").
In addition, based on a separate order of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine No. 58457/C of 27 December 2022, the troops (forces)
were tasked with amending the staff of military command and control bodies
and military units to introduce the structural subunits and social support
positions.
The structural subdivisions were introduced in the operational level
military administration, namely: social support groups, separate positions
within the structural units of moral and psychological support, and social
support departments of moral and psychological support centres.
For the first time in the Armed Forces, social workers (sociologists)
positions were introduced in the departments of moral and psychological
support of military units, whose main purpose is to provide direct social
services to military personnel and their families.
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Another important element in the formation of the new social support

system was the organisation of training for specialists in the relevant field
(Annex 21).
The launch of such training required amendments to the List of Military
Specialities approved by the Order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine No.
412/DSK dated 20.06.2012 and registered with the Ministry of Justice of
Ukraine on 16.07.2012 under No. 1192/21504. The amendments to the List of
Specialties for determining the need for military specialists training with higher
education and corresponding military specialities of commissioned officers
were approved by the Order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine No. 52 of 31.05.2021 (as amended).
The Main Departmet jointly with the Research Centre for Humanitarian
Problems of the AFU conducted a military sociological study on the topic:
“Relevant issues of social protection of servicepersons of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine and members of their families, their impact on the moral and
psychological state of the personnel of the AFU during the legal regime of
martial law” (Annex 22). The study aimed to learn about the issues of
ensuring the rights, benefits and social guarantees for servicepersons and
members of their families under the legal regime of martial law, as well as to
identify the main social problems in the troops (forces) and their impact on the
moral and psychological state of the personnel of the AFU.
By the Commander-in-Chief’s decision, the study results were
communicated to the troops (forces), so commanders (chiefs) of all levels
could consider them in their work with subordinate personnel.
Within the framework of monitoring social processes in the AFU, the
Social Support Department of the Main Departmet organised a process
 137

to identify and prevent social tension among servicepersons and their families
with the help of a network of call centres, including the AFU call centre at 0
800 500410. The additional task was to organise call centres’ work at the
command centres and AF branches, separate branches of the AFU, and
military units, where servicepersons and their families can find the necessary
information and be guided on where to seek clarification or assistance.
At the same time, the Main Departmet continued to cooperate with
NGOs to meet the needs of servicepersons and their families in social and
psychological support. One of them is the public movement The Women's
Power of Ukraine, which has organised a hotline for psychosocial support for
servicepersons’ families.

The head of this NGO, Natalia Umerenkova, responded to the proposal

and, starting from 16 March 2022, the project Psychosocial Support Service
for Military Servicepersons’ Families has been operating effectively at 0 800
332 720 (calls to the number from mobile phones are free both in Ukraine and
in Poland).
In addition, a pilot project on social and psychological support for
servicepersons’ families was successfully conducted involving the resources
of local territorial communities for the social protection of the brigade's
personnel at the base of the 114th Separate Territorial Defence Brigade.
With the assistance of the NGO Women's Power of Ukraine, memos for
servicepersons’ family members were developed and distributed through
TRSSC to the families of the servicepersons who are performing combat
missions. More than 4 thousand.
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printed copies were sent to regional TRSSCs, and an electronic version was
distributed to each district TRSSC.

The Department of Social Support was represented on an ongoing

basis as part of the Interdepartmental Working Group on combating sexual
violence related to russia's armed aggression against Ukraine and assisting
victims.
In the course of the work, proposals were submitted to the Framework
Program for Cooperation between the Government of Ukraine and the UN on
preventing and combating sexual violence during the armed conflict in terms
of strengthening the capacity of the security and defence sector to prevent
sexual violence.
The Social Support Department has established cooperation with
representatives of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine and the Ministry of
Veterans Affairs of Ukraine to improve the support activities effectiveness for
servicepersons and their families. Within this cooperation during the
mentioned period were carried out the following activities:
With the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in Ukraine 473 social workers of the district and regional territorial
recruitment and social support centres (TRSSCs) were trained in providing
social support to military personnel and their families, families of killed,
missing in action and captured soldiers.
Improvement of the system of transition from military service to civilian
life in terms of social adaptation of servicepersons and their families.
 139

Preparation to launch an experimental project in the AFU on social

patronage of military units and military units’ social services activities.
Along with this, based on the results of monitoring the social issues that
adversely affect the moral and psychological state of personnel, the Main
Departmet has been involved in the development of more than thirty draft
laws regulating the social and legal protection of servicepersons.
In addition, work was carried out on the organisation of social support at
TRSSCs in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr regions.
Despite systematic missile attacks by the russian federation, nursery
schools of the AFU continued to operate. Bomb shelters were set up in
Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi and Zhytomyr regions, which are attended by more
than 100 servicepersons’ children every day.
Organised cooperation with the State Agency of Ukraine in Tourism and
Resorts, Ukraine's military representatives abroad, and national tourism
operators to help organise free holidays for military families abroad and in
Ukraine.
 140

Now, holidays are organised in Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, France, and

Turkey, and picturesque parts of Western Ukraine.
In addition, organised the evacuation of servicepersons’ families (and
other citizens) from the areas of active hostilities to safe places of
accommodation in Poland. The evacuees are provided with further
opportunities for employment and education for children.

As a result, there is a growing need to realise the acquired rights and

guarantees of combatants in working with servicepersons’ families. This has
prompted the necessity to reorganise social support forces at the TRSSC
level, and military unit administrations, and to amend the regulatory acts
governing the organisation of social support in the AFU.
CHAPTER 4.
THIRD STRATEGIC DEFENCE OPERATION
(January - May 2023)
4.1. THE COURSE OF HOSTILITIES IN JANUARY - MAY 2023

The backbone of russian winter invasion forces consisted of “mobiks” (a

Ukrainian word that combines “mobilised” and “vatnik”), LPR/DPR soldiers,
and Wagner group mercenaries, which putin allowed to staff by recruiting
russian convicts. All these brethren have decided to use tactics
of “meat assaults” and intensified the fighting in the Bakhmut area. This army
was backed by the restored relics of the stalin era – barrier troops.
In January 2023, russian troops continued their strategic offensive
focusing their main efforts on the Bakhmut, Lyman, Avdiivka and
Novopavlivka directions (Donetsk region). Defensive actions were conducted
in the Kupiansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions. The main enemy goals
were to hold the temporary occupied territories (TOT); reach the
administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions with the possibility of
further occupation of the Ukrainian territories; destroy critical infrastructure by
launching missile strikes; and form reserves for offensive actions.
To repel the armed aggression of the russian federation, deprive the
enemy of its offensive capabilities and regain control over the TOT, the
Ukrainian defence forces continued to conduct defensive operations within
the Eastern and Southwestern AO and stabilisation operations within the
Northwestern AO with the operational command “North” forces.
In January 2023, to prevent the enemy from advancing deep into the
territory of Ukraine and to respond promptly to the situation escalation
 142

in certain areas of the frontline, forces and assets were regrouped. At the
same time, reserves for future offensive actions were being formed. On the
eastern front, fierce and intense fighting continued, especially in the areas of
Bakhmut and Kreminna, where Ukrainian and russian AF demonstrated
different strategic and tactical approaches to the warfare. The enemy mostly
focused on capturing Bakhmut and Soledar, settlements of limited strategic
importance to the AFU. However, even a minor tactical success of the russian
troops was portrayed by russian propaganda as a “strategic victory".

On 16 January 2023, the enemy overran neighbouring Soledar and

came close to Bakhmut. Even though this town was not of particular strategic
importance, the russians and putin's chef/condottiere Yevgeny Prigozhyn
personally relied on the capture of Bakhmut (Marinka and Avdiivka were
optional targets for the russians, but the enemy did not have much success
there either).
Throughout January 2023, russian troops continued their strategic
offensive, focusing their main efforts on the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.
In other areas, due to significant losses, the enemy was unable to seize the
initiative and was forced to maintain a steady defence.
The main enemy goals were: getting to the administrative borders of
Luhansk and Donetsk regions with the possibility of further occupation of the
Ukrainian territories; holding the TOT; destruction of the critical and civilian
infrastructure of Ukraine through missile and air strikes, artillery and MLRS
fire; formation of the reserves for the offensive.
To repel the armed aggression of the russian federation, deprive the
enemy of its offensive capabilities and regain control over the TOT, the
Ukrainian defence forces continued to conduct defensive operations within
 143

Eastern and Southwestern AO and carry out stabilisation operations within

the Northwestern AO.
The enemy did not achieve any strategic or operational successes. The
hostilities were localised and followed by minimal tactical advances with
significant losses of the russian AF: 21.5 thousand occupants and almost 1.1
thousand pieces of military equipment were destroyed.
The AFU, in turn, made considerable efforts to hold a steady defence,
especially in the areas of Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Vuhledar reducing the
overall offensive potential and causing maximal exhaustion of the enemy
before launching the Ukrainian counter-offensive. As a part of this
preparation, reserves were formed. Niche specialists, detachments (crews)
and individual units were trained abroad.

The military and strategic situation in Ukraine in March 2023 remained

tense but under control. Despite their numerical superiority, the winter-spring
offensive of the russian occupation forces failed. The offensive actions were
exclusively of a local character and had a partial tactical success.
The enemy focused its main efforts on attempts to seize new territories
of Ukraine within the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The absence of significant operational achievements and huge losses in the
background indicated the weakening of the combat capabilities of the russian
AF needed for achieving strategic goals. However, the russian leadership
demonstrated its intention to wage a war of attrition by consistently imposing,
de facto, martial law in the country. Nevertheless, the heroic resistance to the
aggressor country and the preparation of the Ukrainian offensive had a
decisive impact on the development of the situation on the battlefield.
The AFU successfully used manoeuvrable defence, built up reserves
and increased their offensive capabilities. This was facilitated by international
support for Ukraine, whose priorities remained
 144

the scale, quality, and speed of delivery of the necessary military aid.
The overall situation in the combat zone did not change significantly
compared to the previous month. The enemy's actions were characterised by
the slow displacement of the Ukrainian defence force units in the areas of the
main efforts’ concentration in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. None of the
enemy's plans to surround the defending units of the AFU has succeeded.
Despite the superiority in firepower, the advance pace of russain AF was
slow, and after the first decade of March, it slowed down even more.

In April, the russian invaders continued to focus their main efforts on

conducting offensive operations in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and
Maryinka directions.
 145

Fierce battles for Bakhmut continued throughout an entire month with

russians managing to reach the city centre. The Ukrainian defenders fought in
a semi-encirclement, mining and destroying buildings to prevent them from
being taken over by the enemy. The occupiers also tried to attack Avdiivka
and Vuhledar to the west of Kreminna.
The main event of May was the supply of Storm Shadow cruise missiles
to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the UK. The fighting around Bakhmut
continued as the russian occupation forces captured most of the city. At the
end of the month, there were increasing reports of the intention of the Wagner
PMC to withdraw its groupings from the city because of the encirclement
threat already posed by the Ukrainian army. Instead, the rashists planned to
replace the mercenaries with regular units.
At the end of the month, the AFU controlled only the outskirts of the
Bakhmut’s western districts. russian troops occupied the ruins of the city. The
main hostilities took place on the border between Maryinka, Vuhledar and
Bakhmut.

The bloody battles for the city have lasted for over 11 months and
completely wiped out the offensive potential of the muscovites – tens of
thousands of Russians died there, and many of them are still rotting
somewhere in the vicinity of the city. The ambitious "winter offensive" and the
entire "spring campaign" of the russian army was buried there.
It was only in early June 2023 that russia announced that it had
captured the city and called it a great victory of the russian soldiery. It was not
true.
The enemy has failed to capture the last foothold of the AFU in the “aeroplane”
area that covers the strategically important road from Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar.
The AFU also retained control of the dominant heights around Bakhmut,
which allowed effective fire control over the destroyed city. The fighting for
Bakhmut continued in June as well. The Ukrainian defence forces were
actively advancing on the flanks through the surrounding villages and
 146

turning the city into a trap that has every chance of becoming a mass grave
for the occupiers.
The Ukrainian defence forces contained the enemy in the Kupiansk,
Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Novopavlivka directions by conducting
defensive operations. The defensive battles for Bakhmut, Vuhledar,
Bilohorivka, and Pavlivka are ongoing. By inflicting significant losses to the
enemy’s manpower and materiel, the AFU depleted their reserves and
undermined offensive potential.
In these difficult times, as always, the officers of the MPS structures
inspired their subordinate personnel to perform combat missions without
hesitations by leading by example.
Just like Lieutenant MUZYKA
Volodymyr Fedorovych has done. An MPS
officer of the military unit A4030, who
always has defended the rights of
servicepersons in his unit, for which he
gained authority and trust. He proved
himself both in training activities and in
combat missions, during which he did not
leave his peers and showed courage,
risking his own life.And so it happened on
21 March 2023 in the Avdiivka direction.
During the storming of the enemy
positions, the personnel of the combined
group of the 2nd Special Forces
detachment were cut off from the unit and
surrounded, but the unit’s soldiers did not
surrender and took the fight.

Thanks to the decisive actions of Lieutenant Volodymyr MUZYKA, the

soldiers managed to break out of the encirclement and rescue the wounded.
Lieutenant Muzyka, who showed an unbreakable character and resilience,
was seriously wounded.
By the order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine on 03 May 2023 he
was awarded the insignia of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine - the badge
"For Exemplary Service".

4.2 ORGANISATION OF MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT IN

THE FIRST HALF OF 2023

4.2.1. Psychological Support

Pursuant to the relevant decision of the Chief of the General Staff of the
AFU of 05.01.2023, the Main Departmet of Moral and
 147

Psychological Support of the AFU together with the Military Institute of the
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv formed a training battalion of
reserve officers of the MPS structures. The aim is to train servicepersons and
newly mobilised soldiers, with the corresponding higher education, to be
company officers in charge of MPS and psychology officers of combat stress
control units.
In the course of this work, programmes were developed to train
company officers in charge of moral and psychological support and
psychology officers.
To improve the quality of candidates for training in the reserve training
battalion of commissioned staff of moral and psychological support structures,
an additional group for professional and psychological selection has been
formed. As of 24.06.2023, the preparation process was streamlined and
improved. Based on the graduates' performance of the MPS tasks in the
army, it can be seen that they have acquired the needed capabilities for this
work. This operational decision allowed us to significantly improve the staffing
of the MPS structures at the tactical level.
The most urgent issue became the staffing of psychology officer
positions and their educational qualifications which are needed for qualitative
psychological work with personnel. For example, as of 24.06.2023, the AFU
had 72% of psychology officers positions staffed. 32% of them do not have a
degree in the relevant field, which significantly reduces the effectiveness of
psychological support and undermines the trust of servicepersons in military
psychologists.
Despite staffing difficulties, consistent and goal-oriented work is being
done to provide professional training and development for psychologists in
the AFU including the training within the framework of international
cooperation with foreign partners.
Thus, at the invitation of the Office of Defence Cooperation of the US
European Command, a coordinating training on the prevention and avoiding
mental disorders in military personnel was held in Rzeszów (Poland) on 15-
19 May 2023.
The event aimed at processing, outlined by the American side, the
training programme for the professional development of Ukrainian military
psychologists trained by foreign partners, taking into account the experience
of combat operations in Ukraine and the national peculiarities of the
Ukrainians.
 148

Representatives of the Main Departmet, the Medical Forces

Command of the AFU and the Humanitarian Research Centre of the AFU
were involved in the coordinating training.
Also, representatives of the Office of Defence Cooperation of the U.S.
European Command, behavioural health specialists from the California
National Guard, the U.S. Air Force Defence Institute for Medical Operations
and U.S. Special Operations Command Europe took part in the coordinating
training.
 149

The American colleagues were requested to incorporate cognitive-

behavioural therapy in the training programme for Ukrainian military
psychologists. This request stemmed from the collaborative review of the
training programme and guidance derived from the experience of organising
psychological support during the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), Joint Forces
Operation (JFO) and combat operations during the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine by russian troops,
Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is one of the leading,
contemporary, scientifically based methods of psychotherapy. Its foundation
lies in the recognition that distorted perceptions of reality (whether about
oneself, others, or the future), alongside inappropriate responses to existing
problems, constitute primary factors that contribute to the development and
perpetuation of various psychiatric disorders and psychological issues.
Unfortunately, most Ukrainian psychologists do not know this method of
psychotherapy.
In addition, the American colleagues were proposed expanding
cooperation on the exchange of the tools to measure the servicepersons’
psychological resilience to traumatic combat factors, as well as the
digitalisation of psychological support activities.
The experience of organising moral and psychological support for the
conduct of combat operations by the AFU troops (forces), and other defence
forces in the course of he full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine, demonstrated
the need for planned psychological recovery of the servicepersons (units) that
have been in the areas of active combat operations for a long time
 150

As of now, the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of

the AFU is working to build up the capabilities for psychological recovery of
servicepersons who have suffered combat-related mental trauma and are
temporarily unable to perform their assigned tasks (combat missions).
For this purpose, the Main Departmet has developed the System of
Mental Health Restoration of Servicepersons in Combat Areas, which
consists of four stages (these proposals were supported by the Commander-
in-Chief of the AFU Ukraine by the Order No. 26321/C of 22.04.2023) (Annex
23):
Stage I – servicepersons recovery for 1-3 days at the brigade (regiment)
psychological aid point;
Stage II - servicepersons recovery for a period of 5-7 days in
specialised institutions located in the area of combat operations;
Stage III - servicepersons recovery for a period of 7-10 days in
sanatorium and resort facilities of the Medical Forces Command of the AFU
and specialised institutions of other departments (upon agreement). During
this period, servicepersons have the option to recover with their families upon
request, provided that the facility conditions are suitable.
Stage IV - servicepersons recovery for a period of 14 to 21 days in
medical and sanatorium facilities of the Medical Forces Command of the
AFU, specialised institutions of other departments (by agreement) and
specialised institutions of partner countries (by invitation). During this period,
servicepersons have the option to recover with their families upon request,
provided that the facility extends an invitation and conditions are suitable.
A typical example of the second stage is the rehabilitation of
servicepersons at the Centre for psychological support to servicepersons
exposed to psycho-traumatic factors during their service (hereinafter referred
to as the Centre). It was established in June 2022 at the clinical sanatorium of
the private joint stock company of healthcare facilities of Ukrainian trade
unions Ukrprofozdorovnytsia Roshcha (Pisoychyn village, Kharkiv region).
The sanatorium specialises in the treatment of the cardiovascular and
musculoskeletal systems, rehabilitation after heart attacks and strokes. Its
medical and diagnostic facilities contribute to the psychological recovery of
the servicepersons.
The Centre provides psychological support in accordance with the
psychological support programme to the AFU servicepersons, developed by
the Main Departmet’s psychology officers, psychologists of military command
authorities, military units, institutions and volunteer psychologists of the NGO
Institute of
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Health Psychology. The duration of stay in the Centre is from 5 to 7 days.

Between June 2022 and Jun 2023 1,867 servicepersons of the AFU
were involved in psychological recovery activities.
The Centre's psychological
support activities help maintain the
required level of psychological
readiness of personnel and preserve
and restore their mental health.
As for the third stage, effective
measures for the servicepersons’
psychological recovery are carried
out with the funds of the state
institution Centre for Mental Health
and Rehabilitation of Veterans
Lisova Poliana of the Ministry of
Health of Ukraine.
In addition, in order to gain
experience for military unit
commanders (subdivisions) in
organising psychological support for
subordinate servicepersons the
Department of Psychological
Support of the Main Departmet for
Moral and Psychological Support of
the AFU developed and approved a
corresponding standard procedure.
A draft order of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine "On Approval of the
Procedure for Providing Psychological Support to Servicepersons of the AFU
and the State Special Transport Service" has been prepared to streamline the
procedure for providing psychological support to servicepersons of the AFU
and the State Special Transport Service. The draft order provides the
approval of the Procedure for Providing Psychological Support to
Servicepersons of the AFU and the State Special Transport Service.
In total, in 2023, 47,486 servicepersons of all military units of the AFU
who were withdrawn to restore their combat capabilities had participated in
decompression sessions. As a result of which 1,344 underwent psychological
rehabilitation, including 41 abroad.
Today, one of the main tasks of psychological support is to select a
motivated and psychologically stable candidate for the military
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service in the AFU. In order to improve the quality of professional

psychological selection (PPS) in the AFU, from 16.02 to 20.03.2023, officers
of the PPS group of the military unit A2615, under the general supervision of
the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU, tested
the Military Program Complex of Psychological Diagnostics (MPC-psyD)
(hereinafter - the Program Complex).
The Program Complex was developed with the direct participation of the
Main Departmet. It aims to automate the psychological assessment of military
personnel or candidates for military service. The complex consists of three
interconnected electronic programs.
The Program Complex must be installed on a computer prior to
conducting psychological diagnostics of personnel. AcerSwift 3 laptop was
used to process database results and prepare questionnaires (MPC-psyD (B)
during the testing. 8 Lenovo TAB M10+ tablets were used to run the MPC-
psyD (Q) questionnaire client. Files were exchanged between the programs
(questionnaires and database) using a SanDiskUltraDual flash drive (USB
3.1+Type-C). The Program Complex functioned without any malfunctions or
software errors on the mentioned equipment.
During the testing of the Program Complex at the military unit A2615,
501 servicepersons of military units A2615, A4138, A3618 and A3211 were
examined for their psychological qualities.
The testing of the Program Complex involved military personnel of
various categories, which include: 64% of privates, 28% NCOs, and 8% of
officer staff, 12% of whom are female respondents.
In addition, during this period and with the help of the Program Complex
118 NCOs were selected for the Junior Leadership Course in the UK.
During the testing of the Program Complex, psychological research
methods relevant to martial law were mainly used, namely:
Multilevel Personal Questionnaire (MPQ) Adaptability - 200, which is
used in the study of military personnel called up for military service during
mobilisation and enlisted under a contract, who have military service
experience;
Methodology for studying the thinking peculiarities (MDOM - 2), which
allows you to determine the thinking flexibility for quick mastery of the military-
occupational speciality;
The Suicide Risk Card (SRC), which allows timely identification of a
potential suicide;
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Leadership Aptitude (LA) and leadership qualities study, which reveal

the potential of serviceperson’s leadership skills. As of 27.03.2023, the
database of the Program Complex includes 19 methods, including 15
methods provided by the Collection of Psychodiagnostics methods for
conducting PPC in the AFU and the State Special Transport Service and 4
methods provided by the Collection of Methods for assessing leadership
qualities of NCOs and commissioned officers.
Based on the recommendations of the Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi
National Army Academy, the Command of the Land Forces of Ukraine has
sent positive feedback on the work of the Program Complex to the Main
Departmet and proposed its implementation in the AFU.
The MPC-PsyD program complex is designed to automate the
psychological assessment of military personnel and candidates for military
service to quickly obtain an interpretation of the assessment results and print
them on paper.

The programs of the complex can be installed on desktop computers,

laptops and tablets with Windows OS, as well as on Android tablets (to
ensure the mobility of devices at a relatively low cost).
The program complex includes three electronic applications:
1. The MPC-psyD (Q) questionnaire client (for Android and Windows
operating systems) allows you to conduct a survey of respondents using
certain methods (a group of chosen methods) and review the interpretation of
the results right after the survey.
 154

2. The results database and survey preparation - MPC-psyD (B)

(Windows) contains all information on psychological surveys conducted,
allows high-quality preparation for the psychological study of personnel, and
monitors changes in the mental states of each serviceperson throughout their
military service.
3. The MPC-psyD (C) (Windows) survey methodology designer allows
you to convert methods of personnel psychological study into an electronic
form.

Thanks to the implementation of the program complex for PPC, more

than 50,000 servicepersons were assessed in January-May 2023.
Based on the experience of organising moral and psychological support
during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by russian troops and the experience
of NATO partner states in providing psychological support to personnel, the
Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU has
developed the Programme of Psychological Support for Servicepersons
called rivnyi-rivnomu (Eng., equal-to-equal, Annex 24). The expected result of
the Programme implementation is the growth of the psychological culture of
the military personnel of the AFU, timely changes detection in their behaviour,
recognition of stress disorders symptoms and ensuring the broadest possible
reach of personnel through psychological recovery activities.
In addition, the Main Departmet prepared an Algorithm for the
implementation of the Psychological Support Programme for servicepersons
rivnyi-rivnomu, which was approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU
(as of 16.05.2023 №34075/С).
 155

ALGORITHM
of the implementation of the rivnyi-rivnomu psychological support
programme for servicepersons

Preparation of the regulatory framework:

 development of the Instruction on the procedure for the work of
Step 1 freelance psychological support instructors;
 development and approval of the training programme for
psychological support instructors;
 development and approval of the programme.
Training of psychological support coaches:
 creation of professional development courses for trainers for
training freelance psychological support instructors at the
Step 2 Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of
Kyiv;
 selection and training of psychology trainers from psychologists
from the Centres for Moral and Psychological Support of
different armed forces branches (separate branches).

During the restoration of servicepersons’ combat capability

Training of freelance psychological support instructors:
 selection of candidates for training as psychological support
Step 3
instructors;
 conducting instructional and methodological lessons with
company/platoon commanders and officers of the CSSU and
PPS on the cooperation procedure with freelance psychological
support instructors;
 conducting a three-day training for instructors.

Feedback.
Step 4  effectiveness analysis of freelance psychological support
instructors;
 adjustment of training programmes;
 conducting intervision and supervision sessions for freelance
psychological support instructors.
 156

Within the framework of the

Cooperation Memorandum between the
Main Departmet and the Israeli Trauma
Coalition, which was approved by the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFU on 28
April 2023, the Main Departmet of MPS
of the AFU with the involvement of
Israeli partners, conducted four two-day
trainings for psychological support
instructors under the rivnyi-rivnomu
programme.
These trainings were held in May-
June 2023 at the Hetman Petro
Sahaidachnyi National Army Academy
(2 lessons: one in Lviv, the other in
Starychi, Lviv region) and the Military
Academy (Odesa)
(2 lessons in Odesa). The training
involved 82 people, and all servicepersons received relevant certificates after
the completion.

4.2.2. Information support of troops (forces)

In order to increase the motivation of the troops (forces), 9 brigades, 3
regiments and 1 corvette were awarded honorary titles in a period between
September 2022 and June 2023.
From May 2022 to June 2023 the Ukrainian Marine Corps, 14 brigades,
2 regiments, 1 centre, and 10 separate battalions (divisions) were awarded
the honorary insignia "For Courage and Bravery".
DYNAMICS
awarding honorary titles to military educational institutions, military units
(subunits) and military equipment (objects)
in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the period of 2015 - 2023 (as of
08.07.2023)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 SUMM
ARY
battalions 1 - - - 2 2 1 - 6
centres - - - - 1 2 1 - 4
regiments - - 1 1 - 1 5 3 11
brigades 1 - 5 6 12 11 4 8 1 48
HMEIs - - - 1 1 - - - 2
aircrafts 2 2 - - - - - - 4
ships - 1 - - - - 1 1 3
SUMMARY 4 3 6 8 16 16 12 12 1 78
 157

DYNAMICS
awarding military units (subunits), military educational institutions and
military equipment (objects) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (as of
08.07.2023)
2022 2023 SUMM
ARY
Commands 1 1
battalions, divisions 9 3 12
centres 6 6
regiments 6 6
brigades 32 5 37
ships 1 1
SUMMARY 54 9 63

On 7 April 2023 the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological

Support together with the Office of the President of Ukraine organised Iftar -
the dinner held during the holy month of Ramadan - on the territory of the
Birlik Crimean Tatar Cultural Centre in Kyiv region. The tradition of holding
the iftar dinner at the official level was established for the first time in Ukraine.

The event was attended by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr

Zelenskyy, representatives of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and
Muslim clergy. Ukrainian Muslim servicepersons who are currently fighting in
the AFU ranks: Crimean Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Volga Tatars, and Ukrainians
who have converted to
 158

Islam shared the food together with the Head of the State. These include
chaplains, paramedics, volunteers, and representatives of public and
diplomatic establishments.
The President presented state awards to Ukrainian servicepersons. In
return, the servicepersons presented the Head of State patches and a book.

As part of the event, a photo exhibition about the events in Crimea was
organised. It covers human rights violations on the peninsula, political
persecution of Crimean Tatars and their families, and tells about Muslim
soldiers who are currently fighting at the frontline.
In April 2023, the condition and availability of Battle Flags in military
units were analysed. According to the analysis results, the need for the
production of combat flags amounted to 512 units, and 20 combat flags
needed to be replaced.
In 2023, work on decentralising the management system of military
cultural institutions was continued. In accordance with the order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFU No. 176 dated 21.06.2023, the transfer and
receipt of command under the 14th garrison officers' house (Horodok,
Zhytomyr region) was organised to the Logistics Forces Command of the
AFU. The 8th garrison officers' house (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, Odesa region)
to the Support Forces Command of the AFU.
The financial resource of UAH 2,844.0 thousand was allocated to
organise the purchase of modern technical propaganda equipment in 2023.
(6%
 159

of the total needed for procurements of modern technical propaganda

equipment).
As of 01.07.2023 (in 2023) 226 units were purchased (in 2022 - 720
units) of modern technical propaganda equipment, which slightly increases
the overall percentage of needed equipment for staffing with equipment,
namely: printing complexes up to 3.7% (+ 2%), TVs up to 84% (+ 1%),
multimedia projectors up to 44%
(+1%); and up to 32% (+1%) for loudspeakers.
In general, in the first half of 2023, the AFU managed to increase the
equipment completeness of the main propaganda equipment by 1% (up to
57% of the total requirement).

4.2.3. Social support for servicepersons and their family members

An important element in the development of the new social support
system was the organisation of training for specialists in the relevant field.
 160

For example, for the first time in the Armed Forces, by the Order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFU of 11.03.2023 No. 13580/C, the tactical level
training of officers in the military occupational speciality 340005 (social work
in troops (forces)), has been launched at the Military Institute of Taras
Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The order was processed for the
training of specialists at the bachelor level for 20 people, as well as retraining
courses for social support specialists for 80 people annually.
On 1 June 2023, a new department of Social Work in the Troops
(Forces) of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of
Kyiv was established to provide direct training for social support specialists,
and the first intake of cadets was already planned for 2023.

As mentioned above, the Main Departmet continued to cooperate with

NGOs to meet the needs of servicepersons’ family members for social and
psychological support, in particular with the public movement Women's Power
of Ukraine, which
 161

has organised the hotline for psychosocial support of the family members.
During the first half of 2023, a representative of the Social Support
Department continued to work at the Coordination Headquarters for the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
As part of this work, the Main Departmet's office was involved in:
387 consultations at the public reception office of the Coordination
Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War to address the problems
of the families of war prisoners, missing and deceased defenders;
186 meetings with relatives and friends of the AFU servicepersons of
certain types (branches) of the AFU, namely: military units A7014, A2802,
A1736, A0989, A0998, A0281, A0224, A1126, NGOs Polygon 56, All-
Ukrainian Public Movement of Mothers and Families of ATO Participants
Berehynia, United by the Sea, 501st Battalion and others.
One of the most topical areas of social support that required additional
attention was and still is the segment of

work with families of servicepersons.

During the first half of the year, the Main Departmet's main efforts under
the updated task were aimed at establishing and maintaining continuous and
effective communication between military units,
 162

TRSSC and family members of killed, captured and missing servicepersons.

The main issues of servicepersons’ families were with obtaining the
necessary documents, and getting information on how to receive benefits and
guarantees eligible for them:
one-off financial payment;
the documents from military units for obtaining beneficiary status;
information on confirmation of servicepersons’ legal status;
receipt of captured servicepersons’ salary.
Thus, with the support of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for
Human Rights, the Main Departmet organised meetings with the families of
servicepersons of the military units A1965 and A0536.
Involving medical and financial service personnel from military units, along with
representatives of civil-military cooperation, proved to be a positive experience in
working with families.

In June 2023, the Social Support Department worked on analysing

experience on improving the functioning of the TRSSC in the reception of
citizens and information support offered by the regional civil-military
administration together with the TRSSC of Zakarpattia region.
Work continues to form lists for further organisation of social
rehabilitation, reintegration, and recovery activities.
In April, rehabilitation activities were organised and carried out at the
Morshyn sanatorium for the recovery of female servicepersons of the AFU
who had been held captive by russian troops.
 163

So, we see that during the first half of 2023, social support as an
updated area of efforts in the general system of moral and psychological
support of the AFU has demonstrated its relevance and the need for further
development and building up capacities. The radical transformation of the
management of social work in the AFU, and the creation of the management
vertical of monitoring processes and responding to the needs of personnel,
has revealed new directions for improvement of personnel support and
several gaps. One of the gaps is not assigning responsibility to commanders
(chiefs) for the social and legal protection of servicepersons and their
families.
The growing demand for the use of the acquired benefits and
guarantees provided to combatants and their families has outlined the need
to reorganise social support elements at the TRSSC and military unit
administration levels. As well as to amend the legal acts regulating the
organisation of social support in the AFU.
At the same time, along with the positive developments in the
organisation and conduct of the MPS training and use of troops (forces),
there are still many problematic issues and certain shortcomings. For
example, the study of the MPS
state of the Command of
Territorial Defence Forces of the
AFU and subordinate military
units conducted in April - May
2023 by the Main Departmet of
MPS of the AFU defined that
MPS organisation state during
engagement of the territorial
defence units in combat (special)
missions (especially on their own
in the main directions of the enemy's activity, as well as in the areas of active
hostilities for the first time) barely ensures the qualitative conduct of such
missions. The MPS structures need to be staffed, and MPS officers need to
improve their qualifications and acquire practical skills to implement MPS
tasks while performing combat (special) missions in the areas of active
hostilities.
The main causes of such a state were:
Leaving the position of the Head of MPS of the Territorial Defence
Command (TDC) vacant for more than six months, which has significantly
affected the MPS organisation quality both in the TDC and in subordinate
military units;
Due to the changes in the TOE structure of MPS units of TDC and the
transfer of relevant MPS officials to other
 164

positions, implementation of the requirements of the regulatory documents on

MPS submitted to the TDC were not carried out in full, and the
implementation of those requirements was not monitored;
The psychological support department of the TDC was staffed on 80%.
Combat stress control units were staffed on 70%, and only half of them
had a professional psychological education;
Systems of work of the military officials in certain fields were not
specified, which led to the uncontrolled conduct of the functional duties;
The account of technical propaganda means was superficial and did
not reflect the real state;
The planning documents for the MPS training and application in TD
Forces (TDF) did not fully comply with the requirements of the governing
documents;
The administrative documents received by the TDC were not analysed,
they were communicated to subordinate military units without taking into
account the specifics of the TD;
Specific tasks were not assigned to brigade commanders for
implementation;
After action review, as one of the main tools in the system of internal
communication work aimed at uniting personnel and improving the conduct
efficiency of combat (special) tasks, has not been practically implemented in
the TDF;
Actions by the MPS centre of TDF and TD brigades’ CSCU were not
controlled by the TDC, which resulted in the absence of a unified approach
for the use of MPS and CSCUs. Nevertheless, unit A7383 has organised
effective work of the CSCU to provide psychological support and prompt
response to changes in the psychological state of servicepersons. Support is
available both directly on the contact line (operational-tactical group Soledar,
Bakhmut) and in the rear, providing them with time for rest and meeting their
social and domestic needs, considering the operational situation. As of
27.04.23, 3 officers in charge of MPS were performing tasks of leading in
assault groups. While doing that, 1 battalion-level officer and 2 company MPS
officers got wounded;
The algorithm for applying the three-stage work system on
servicepersons' recovery and bringing them back into the ranks was violated.
For example, servicepersons of one of the military units - who because of an
unsuccessful combat mission in early April 2023 were withdrawn to restore
combat capability – were neither provided with primary medical and
psychological help nor proper living conditions. Instead, administrative
measures were primarily applied to the personnel, which subsequently did
not ensure the expected results from the work of psychologists and officers of
the MPS structures;
 165

Ineffective cooperation between TDC and subordinate brigades with

servicepersons’ family members, TRSSC, and local authorities at the place of
stationing (deployment) of the TD brigades, which, in case the TD brigades’
(units) had been engaged in combat (special) missions in the areas of active
hostilities and loss of personnel, it would have led to social tension cells
among family members of servicepersons (including wounded, killed and
missing).
However, it should be noted that during the group’s work, the TDC
promptly responded to the identified problems and took measures to
eliminate them:
the system of providing psychological support to the TDF was
improved;
together with the Main Departmet and the Medical Forces Command of
the AFU actions were taken to provide prompt medical assistance to
servicepersons;
the system for monitoring social processes was established to
summarise problematic issues and promptly respond to them.
Thus, on 26.04.2023, the Main Departmet together with the TDC, the
command of military units, local authorities’ representatives, military
counterintelligence, police and the Kryvyi Rih Territorial Recruitment and
Social Support Centre (TRSSC), organised meetings with servicepersons’
family members, during which they established effective cooperation,
answered questions and created joint groups in messengers to respond
promptly to requests from the families.
The analysis of family members’ requests via messengers during the
first four days of the chats functioning (from 27 April to 01 May 2023) showed
that 70% of appeals were related to the provision of medical care to
servicepersons, 20% were due to complex bureaucracy in providing
information at the headquarters of individual units, receiving reports, etc., and
10% were due to the unwillingness of individual battalion officials to
communicate with servicepersons and respond to their appeals.
In such circumstances, a notable instance of effective internal
communication occurred in late April 2023, involving the efforts of Moral and
Psychological Support (MPS) officers from the Main Departmet. This took
place at the Forward Command Post (FPC) of the A7383 military unit in
Bakhmut, where they identified a critical shortage of artillery ammunition
crucial for the city's defence. Then, the leadership of the Main Departmet of
MPS promptly organised cooperation with the Main Logistics Departmet of
the General Staff of the AFU and the Logistics Forces Command of the AFU
within two days, which significantly enhanced the capabilities of the units to
engage the enemy in the Bakhmut direction as a result.
CHAPTER 5.
REINTEGRATION OF PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF UKRAINE AFTER BEING HELD IN CAPTIVITY.
5.1. ORGANISATION OF REINTEGRATION PROCESS FOR PERSONNEL
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE AFTER BEING HELD IN
CAPTIVITY.
The large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the russian federation on 24
February 2022 became the largest act of armed aggression against a
sovereign state in Europe since the Second World War.
The rapid enemy advance into the depths of the AFU defence lines and
occupation of its territories became one of the main factors in the capture of
Ukrainian servicepersons and citizens by the rf in the first period of the war.
The prolonged high-intensity warfare carried out by AFU units in direct fire
contact with the enemy resulted in a rise in the number of prisoners of war
from the AFU.
Given that military captivity is one of the main occupational risks for
servicepersons, along with their injury and death, the AFU leadership has
been faced with the task of making this process more controlled and reducing
the negative consequences of being held in captivity.
For this purpose, a freelance reintegration group of the General Staff of
the AFU (hereinafter referred to as the reintegration group) has been created.
The reintegration group was formed within one day and already on 26
March 2022, it carried out reintegration activities with servicepersons who had
been released from captivity and accommodated at the National Military
Medical Clinical Centre MMCH (the Main Military Clinical Hospital) and Kyiv
City Clinical Hospital No. 4.
The reintegration group gained full capacity after moving to the base of
the Novi Sanzhary Medical Centre of the National Guard of Ukraine
(hereinafter referred to as the NGU) in early April.
During the deployment, the reintegration group carried out the following
activities:
identification, reconnaissance and preparation of sites for reintegration
activities;
recruitment of specialists and staffing the reintegration group;
organising cooperation and establishing communication with the
responsible persons from the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, the Joint Centre for the Coordination of Search and
Release of Illegally Deprived Persons in the Area of National Security and
Defence, Repulsion and Deterrence of the Armed Aggression of the russian
federation in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions of the Security Service of
Ukraine (hereinafter - the Joint Centre of the SSU), the Office of the
Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the International Committee of the Red Cross
 167

(ICRC), the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (MIA), other state and
military authorities, and military units;
defining internal procedures and protocols for reintegration activities.
The main factors that contributed to the reintegration group's rapid
acquisition of initial capabilities (within one day) and its full deployment (within
12 days) were the following:
previous experience in conducting reintegration activities in the AFU
during 2016-2020;
availability of an appropriate legal framework that regulates the
procedure and process of reintegration with servicepersons of the AFU who
have been in captivity.
availability of the scientific research results and methodological
developments carried out in the research institutions of the AFU on the
reintegration issues of the personnel who have been in captivity;
availability of specialists in the areas of organisation and conduct of
debriefs in the AFU, psychologists with specialisation and experience in
working with personnel who have been in captivity and/or isolation (SERE
psychologist), specialists in survival tactics and evasion of contact with the
enemy (SERE) (search and rescue specialists), etc., who have undergone
appropriate training in accordance with NATO standards (under the guidance
of instructors from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), Defence
SERE Training Organisation (DSTO), USA, UK, etc.
In addition, the work was facilitated by the establishment of the
Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter
- the Coordination Headquarters) as a temporary auxiliary body of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, headed first by the Vice Prime Minister, Head
of the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories Iryna
Vereshchuk, and later by the Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine
Kyrylo Budanov.
Subsequently, under the leadership of Deputy Minister of the Ministry of
Defence of Ukraine Hanna Malyar, a working group on reintegration and post-
isolation support was established within the Coordination Headquarters,
which included representatives of central authorities in the field.
Currently, the national legal framework for the reintegration of personnel
released from captivity includes the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal
Protection of Persons Deprived of Personal Liberty as a Result of Armed
Aggression against Ukraine and Members of Their Families" of 26.01.2022.
As well as related CMU resolutions No. 1210 and No. 1281. Obligatory
recovery (post-isolation, reintegration) and adaptation activities, support
(accompaniment) for servicepersons who have been released
 168

from captivity, as defined by the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal
Protection of Servicepersons and Members of Their Families".
The above-mentioned law of Ukraine establishes the obligation of the
state (executive authorities) to carry out recovery (reintegration) and
adaptation activities, support (accompaniment) after the release from captivity
of persons who have been members of the Security Forces and the Defence
Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, this law does not regulate the procedure
for the reintegration process.
CMU Resolutions No. 1210 and No. 1281 supplement the Law of
Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Persons Deprived of Personal
Liberty as a Result of Armed Aggression against Ukraine and Members of
Their Families" regarding social and legal protection of persons deprived of
personal liberty because of armed aggression against Ukraine.
Besides, the reintegration subjects in their work use other national and
international normative documents that define the principles of international
humanitarian law, regulate the conduct of hostilities during armed conflicts
and seek to limit the consequences. International normative documents
establish the procedure of holding prisoners of war, and their rights and
provide guidance on documenting torture or degrading treatment and
punishment towards the prisoners.

5.2. THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REINTEGRATION PROCESS

The purpose of the reintegration process is to restore the physical and
psychological health of the released servicepersons, provide social support to
them, as well as to obtain intelligence, study and summarise their experience.
According to the purpose, the reintegration process involves four main
objectives:
medical examination and treatment;
psychological screening and post-isolation decompression;
obtaining intelligence, studying the experience of survival and being
held in captivity (SERE, CAC);
providing social and legal support.
The object of the reintegration process into the AFU is servicepersons
who have been in captivity and/or isolation, including in the territory controlled
by the enemy.
The main subjects of the reintegration process into the AFU are:
the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War;
the reintegration group;
military command and control bodies and military units (subdivisions).
The reintegration process has an internal structure, which is divided into
three stages, as follows (Figure 5.1):
 169

Stage I begins when a serviceperson who has been held in captivity

and/or isolation is handed over to the reintegration specialists. Usually, stage
I of reintegration is carried out in the prisoner exchange area or evacuation
place of the personnel who have been in isolation;
Stage II begins when a released serviceperson arrives at a designated
facility;
Stage III begins when a released serviceperson arrives at a military unit
or a medical facility for further treatment and rehabilitation (Annex 25).

Figure 5.1. Content and structure of the reintegration process (option)

The reintegration process may be limited to the implementation of Stage
I and/or Stage II activities only if further reintegration actions are not required.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the structure of the reintegration process
is linked with the main objectives through the implementation of specific
activities, a list of which is provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1
Content and General Characteristics of the Reintegration Process Stages
Stage
Duration Focus on Activities
No
І. up to Obtaining intelligence first aid, medical triage;
48 (counterintelligence) psychological screening,
hours information prompt debriefing.
 170

Stage
Duration Focus on Activities
No
II. up to 30 Physical and medical examination and treatment;
days psychological tactical (formal, clarifying)
recovery; debriefing, psychological
experience study support;
studying and summarising the
experience of being held in isolation
and/or captivity; restoring personal
documents, phone numbers and bank
cards, legal advice.

III up to 1 year Adaptation and treatment,

social support medical, medical-psychological,
psychological rehabilitation; post-
isolation support (psychological,
social, legal support);
restoring personal documents.

5.2 1. Functions and objectives of the reintegration system

As of now, the reintegration system in the AFU is not regulated by the
law, yet the need to conduct reintegration activities with personnel who have
been in isolation and/or captivity stimulated the creation of the system to fulfil
this function.
The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War
– is an interagency body established to perform the function of coordinating
the activities of central and local executive authorities, other bodies, local
authorities, military formations established in accordance with the law, law
enforcement bodies and public associations on the treatment of prisoners of
war. The head of the Coordination Headquarters is the Chief of the Defence
Intelligence of Ukraine, and it also includes representatives of the Ministry of
TOT Reintegration, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Security Service of
Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, etc. As part of the reintegration
process, the Coordination Headquarters provides administrative support to
the reintegration process at the interagency level, plans and organises the
implementation of reintegration activities of the first stage.
Reintegration group - is an interbranch subdivision established in
accordance with a separate order of the Chief of the General Staff of the AFU
to organise and conduct reintegration activities with the AFU servicepersons
who have been in isolation and/or captivity.
Military command and control bodies, military units and subunits to
which servicepersons belonged at the moment of getting captured, perform
their reintegration functions at the third stage. Their competence usually
includes the following issues: restoration of personal documents (officer's
certificate, military ID card, etc.), resumption of cash payments and other
types of benefits, psychological support, referrals for military medical
commission examination, treatment, rehabilitation, etc.
 171

Reintegration is a complex process that requires extensive cooperation

at both the interagency and interbranch levels. As part of this cooperation,
certain reintegration activities can usually involve representatives of the
following institutions: The Ministry of TOT Reintegration of Ukraine, the
Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the
Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament
Commissioner for Human Rights, the ICRC, the United Nations Monitoring
Mission, etc.
The Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of
Ukraine is the main body in the system of central executive authorities that
ensures the creation and implementation of the state policy on the temporarily
occupied territories. One of the main tasks of the Ministry is to support
citizens affected by the armed aggression of the russian federation. The
National Information Bureau (NIB) is a structural subdivision of the Ministry
responsible for collecting and summarising data on Ukrainian prisoners of
war, killed in action, missing, and illegally detained by the occupiers (including
civilians). An additional objective of the NIB is to provide the released
prisoners of war with basic necessities at the first stage of reintegration.
The SSU representatives are involved in the reintegration process
mainly to obtain intelligence (counterintelligence) information, clarify data, and
identify other persons held in captivity, reported missing or dead, etc.
Representatives of the Ukrainian MIA ensure that servicepersons
released from captivity are removed from the Unified Register of Missing
Persons under special circumstances, and that documents of Ukrainian
citizens, such as driver's licences, are restored.
Representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine
participate in the reintegration process to document violations of international
humanitarian law, and cases of torture (abuse, murder) used against
servicepersons or other citizens of Ukraine released from captivity.
Representatives of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human
Rights perform a supervisory function to monitor compliance with the
constitutional rights and freedoms of servicepersons released from captivity.
Representatives of the ICRC and the UN Monitoring Mission may, upon
request, be allowed to attend reintegration activities to document cases of
human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed against
the released servicepersons; clarify data and identify persons currently in
captivity.
 172

5.2.2. Functions, objectives, and composition of the reintegration group

It is obvious that the personnel who have been isolated in enemy
territory and/or captured have unique experience in survival, evasion of
contact with the enemy, resisting enemy pressure in captivity and
evacuation/release (SERE). Besides, they may also have important
intelligence information. Therefore, the priority task right after their release
from captivity is to interview them and provide them with medical and
psychological support.
Return of the servicepersons directly to military units after their release
from captivity without prior reintegration activities usually carries both direct
and hidden risks to their mental and physical health, loss of important
intelligence information, and the experience of surviving in isolation and/or
captivity.
Considering all of that, the reintegration group has been established by
the Order of the Chief of the General Staff of the AFU to carry out
reintegration tasks in the AFU at the interbranch level.
In its work, the reintegration group is guided by the laws of Ukraine and
other national and international regulatory documents, including NATO
international military documents.
Administratively, the reintegration group is subordinated to the Chief of
the General Staff of the AFU but managed by the Chief of the Main
Department of Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU.
The group is designed to perform all four reintegration objectives and, in
fact, ensures their implementation during the second stage of reintegration in
cooperation with other military authorities, ministries, agencies and
international organisations.
During its existence, in addition to fulfilling the tasks outlined by the
leadership, the group's specialists have actively engaged in information work
to enhance internal communication, education, and prevention of
manipulation regarding sensitive topics related to release from captivity. They
have also undertaken scientific sociological and psychological research for
the Research Centre for Humanitarian Problems of the AFU and the National
University of Defence of Ukraine, focusing on survival in conditions of forced
isolation. The findings from this research are intended for use in the
psychological training system and post-isolation recovery.
To prevent the media from disseminating distorted information about
people released from forced isolation (captivity), the National Psychological
Association of Ukraine, Lviv Media Forum and Media Development
Foundation held an online class for journalists as part of the mini-course
“Psychology of War. How journalists can work with sensitive topics". A total of
150 people were engaged.
A basic online course on "Survival and Resistance in Hostile
Environments, Forced Isolation (Captivity)" was conducted with two groups of
mobilised moral and psychological support officers who were trained
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at the Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Army Academy. A total of 60

participants.
Continued online seminars on issues faced by persons released from
forced isolation (captivity) and psychological support specialists.
Preparations have begun on a working project with the families of
prisoners: organised support and self-help groups, organised a session to
prevent professional burnout of operators of the hotlines created for
communication with the families of prisoners.
The reintegration group held working meetings and established
cooperation with existing helplines and hotlines used by relatives of missing
persons and those in captivity (National Information Bureau, 1648, 044
2878165; National Police of Ukraine, 089 4201866, 080 0212151;
Psychosocial Support Service for the Families of Servicepersons, 0800
332720; All-Ukrainian Human Rights Organisation Legal Hundred, 080
0308100; National Psychological Association, 080 0100102).

Manning of the reintegration group occurs on a rotational basis. Usual

group composition:
group leader (1 serviceperson);
group administrator (1 serviceperson, if any);
liaison officer (1 serviceperson); a legal advisor;
debriefers (2-6 servicepersons and/or employees of the AFU);
debriefer’s assistants (if any);
SERE psychologists (2-4 servicepersons and/or employees of the AFU);
SERE tactical specialists (2 servicepersons, rescue and search
specialists);
military medical commission (MMC) (according to a separate TOE,
usually 11 people).
Depending on the reintegration activities conditions and the number of
released servicepersons, the size of the group can vary from 5 to 12 people
(without considering the MMC).
Such group composition ensures its round-the-clock operation and
constant readiness to receive servicepersons released from captivity. In
addition, if the necessary resources are available, the group can be divided in
half to conduct reintegration activities simultaneously at two separately
located sites.
Thus, during this period, the reintegration group of the General Staff of
the AFU have been performing tasks at four sites: National Military Medical
Clinical Centre MMCH (the Main Military Clinical Hospital), Kyiv City Clinical
Hospital No 4, the Novi Sanzhary Medical Centre of the NGU of Ukraine, and
the Military Medical Clinical Centre (hereinafter referred to as the MMCC) of
the Eastern Region.
Today, the reintegration group of the General Staff of the AFU is carrying
out
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reintegration activities of the second stage at the Novi Sanzhary Medical

Centre of the NGU of Ukraine and, starting from October 2022, at the Eastern
Region MMCC due to the increased scale of prisoner exchanges.
During the nine months since its formation (from 26.03.2022 to
25.12.2022), the reintegration group of the General Staff of the AFU ensured
continuous completion of the tasks on:
conducting a full medical examination and treatment of personnel
released from captivity;
conducting a psychological screening and post-isolation decompression
activities, providing psychological counselling to the AFU servicepersons
released from captivity and their families (next of kin);
collection, analysis, accumulation, and dissemination of intelligence
about the enemy;
information on Ukrainian citizens held in captivity, their condition and
detention places in the territory of the russian federation, the republic of
belarus and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;
information on violations of international humanitarian law by the
enemy;
information on cases of collaboration;
experience of operating in isolation in enemy-controlled territory and/or
in captivity (SERE, CAC);
information on the death and burial places of Ukrainian citizens and
enemy personnel in the temporarily occupied territories.
Coordination and provision of social and legal support in the following
areas: personal belongings and basic necessities; provision of
comfortable living conditions and food (in the second stage of the
reintegration process);
restoration of basic personal documents (passport, individual tax
number certificate, etc.), access to financial (payment bank cards restoration)
and communication services (phone number restoration);
issuance of proof certificates on being held in
captivity; restoration of official and social contacts;
legal advice on restoring legal status.

5.2.3. Timing and stages of reintegration activities

The average duration of reintegration activities with the mentioned
categories of servicepersons was up to 1 day for the first stage, 18 days for
the second stage, and 120 days for the third stage (Fig. 5.2.).
–
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Fig. 5.2. Minimum and maximum duration of the reintegration stages

In practice, the duration of the reintegration stages depended on

several factors, the main ones were:
a distance of a prisoner exchange place from a reintegration site, type
and number of vehicles for their transportation, etc;
availability of the necessary number of specialists (debriefers,
psychologists and SERE tactics specialists) to carry out the reintegration
activities;
preparation level of the reintegration sites (availability of the necessary
number of rooms for debriefings, office equipment, etc.);
the number of AFU servicepersons in the exchange, their state of health
(presence of serious injuries, traumas and diseases) and moral and
psychological condition;
availability of personal documents (passport, individual tax number
certificate, officer's certificate/military ID, etc.) of the released servicepersons;
the possibility of the reintegration group representatives to start working
with servicepersons released from captivity immediately after their exchange;
the level of cooperation organisation with representatives of the military
unit in which a serviceperson served before being captured and/or isolated.
Representatives of the following bodies were engaged in the work as a
part of the reintegration group of the General Staff of the AFU throughout
2022:
General Staff of the AFU;
The Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU;
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The Land Force of the AFU;

the Air Force of the AFU;
the Navy of the AFU;
Territorial Defence Forces of the AFU;
Special Operations Forces of the AFU;
Military Law Enforcement Service of the AFU;
Communications and Cyber Security Troops of the
AFU; National Defence University of Ukraine.
4th-year cadets of the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National
University of Kyiv were involved as a part of the working group to solve
operational tasks related to reintegration.
The quantitative indicators of the reintegration group performance are
provided according to the information from the group's internal database and
may differ from other assessments due to the complexity of the reintegration
process and the inability of the reintegration group to obtain complete
information on the exchange processes.

5.2.4. Peculiarities of organising the reintegration process in the AFU

The operational situation and the impact of the factors above created a
number of peculiarities in the organisation of the reintegration process in the
AFU.
Considering limited resources, primarily human resources (highly
qualified specialists), and anticipating a lot of personnel to be released from
captivity in the short term, the reintegration process was implemented at the
interbranch level.
Due to the lack of a regulatory definition of the status and corresponding
restrictions on the powers of the reintegration group, they effectively gain
control over the reintegration process only at the second stage.
Thus, in contrast to the existing international practice, the AFU have
implemented a one-stage structure of the reintegration process rather than a
three-stage structure.
The heavy workload of SERE debriefers and psychologists (up to 4-5
debriefings per day for exchanges of 30 people or more) made it necessary to
revise the format of debriefings.
The shortage of SERE debriefers and psychologists in the reintegration
group made it impossible to conduct debriefings in the conventional format:
a released person – a debriefer – a SERE psychologist. Given that most of
the debriefers had a psychological background, the decision was made to
expand the debriefer’s duties, requalify SERE psychologists and unify the
duties under the position of a SERE debriefer-psychologist.
For the first time since 2016, the reintegration group included specialists
in search and rescue support (hereinafter referred to as SAR) from the Air
Force of Ukraine. They were engaged as SERE specialists and performed
the tasks of collecting, studying and summarising experience in survival,
enemy evasion, behaviour in captivity and evacuation.
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Specialists with psychological education serving in the AFU were

additionally involved in the work on a rotational basis to solve the problems
with staffing the reintegration group.
Based on the results of the analysis, it should be noted that as of now
the AFU has established an effective process of reintegration of personnel
who have been in captivity. This process is implemented at the interbranch
level and is based on the principles of broad interagency cooperation. It has a
clear practical focus on achieving the main objective of reintegration –
recovery and return of servicepersons who have been in captivity to the full
performance of their service duties and social life.
In terms of its content, the reintegration process in the AFU is based on
principles that are in line with the main global trends and are widely used by
NATO member states. At the same time, the form of this process in the AFU
has significant differences such as the composition of the reintegration group,
conduct methods of reintegration activities, internal structure of the
reintegration process, etc. As a rule, these differences are due to the fact that
the reintegration process in the AFU has not received sufficient regulatory
and administrative support since 2016, as well as the special conditions of its
implementation. For example, a large number of prisoners of war compared
to other military conflicts of recent decades.
The practical significance of the reintegration process was that its
implementation in the AFU allowed to:
ensure collecting intelligence (counterintelligence) information from
persons released from captivity within 48 hours;
centralise the process of collecting, accumulating and processing
operational information on detention places of prisoners of war in the territory
of the russian federation and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine,
the condition and location of persons held in captivity by the enemy, etc.
Thus, reducing the time for collecting, processing and disseminating this
information to an average of 72 hours;
unify and centralise the process of collecting, studying and summarising
combat experience on survival, enemy evasion, resisting enemy pressure in
captivity and evacuation/release (SERE);
ensure the provision of qualified medical care in the first hours after
release and a thorough medical examination within a period of up to
10 days. Prescribe and carry out necessary treatment, plan rehabilitation
activities;
conduct psychological screening and psychoeducation of
servicepersons in the first 48 hours after their release from captivity, post-
isolation decompression during the first 7 days and further individual
psychological counselling of the released persons and their families;
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comprehensively address social security issues (basic necessities,

clothing, footwear, mobile communications, etc.) in the first
24 hours after release from captivity, restore basic personal documents and
bank payment cards within 14 days.
Taking into account the experience gained during this period and the
results of reintegration activities with servicepersons released from captivity, it
is possible to draw conclusions about the expediency of further development
of this area in the AFU.
Besides, it was decided to establish the Centre for Recovery of the
Personnel of the AFU in order to coordinate actions on the return and conduct
recovery (reintegration, post-isolation) activities with the personnel of the AFU
who have been isolated in the enemy's territory, as well as to reduce the risk
of getting there (Annex 26).
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CHAPTER 6.
ACTIVITIES OF INSTITUTIONS DIRECTLY
SUBORDINATED TO THE MAIN DEPARTMENT OF
MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE
6.1. MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT СENTRE OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

6.1.1 Activities of highly mobile internal communication groups

Since the beginning of the enemy's full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
due to a significant increase in requests, the Moral and Psychological Support
Сentre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has intensified its work on the
formation of highly mobile internal communication groups, organisation and
support of their work in military units of the Defence Forces.
The main efforts of HMICGs (High Mobility Internal Communication
Groups – D.O.) were aimed at fulfilling requests from military units regarding
the following:
formation of ideological attitudes and conviction in the justice of the
war from the Ukrainian warriors’ side, the indomitability of their spirit and
belief in the inevitability of victory over the enemy on battlefields, as well as
restoration of the inviolability and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
training commanders and sergeants of military subunits in methods
behind working with servicepersons of their subunits, namely communicative
interaction with subordinates and commanders of different levels in combat
conditions;
providing psychological first aid and developing skills of recognising
servicepersons’ negative behavioural reactions before, during and after
combat, regulation and self-regulation methods when overcoming difficult
combat situations;
providing warriors with informational content regarding situational
awareness about what's going on at the frontlines and around the country, as
well as taking informational and psychological measures to counter enemy
disinformation;
facilitating the satisfaction of servicepersons' culturological needs;
The main factors that influenced the content and format of the
groups' work were:
a significant increase in the number of troops (forces), primarily
through reservists and mobilised servicepersons. That significantly
increased the need for the groups' work and, consequently, increased the
load on the HMICGs' personnel;
lack of confidence among mobilised servicepersons in their ability to
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execute a combat mission they have been given due to the absence of
combat experience and appropriate level of military training, as well as their
prior psychological training being very weak;
unpreparedness of and lack of confidence among servicepersons
during combat when there is no sufficient artillery support;
low level of professionalism of the vast majority of commanders on a
platoon-company level, unformedness of their leadership qualities and
communicational abilities. That in turn results in distrust from their
(subordinate -D.O.) servicepersons and uncertainty in the appropriateness of
commanding decisions made by them;
spontaneous (haphazard) nature of internal communications within
subunits, widespread facts of formation and dissemination of negative
narratives by destructive (toxic) leaders, significant influence on the minds of
servicepersons by family members, civilian friends, etc;
unstable psychoemotional state of those servicepersons whose units
suffered heavy losses during combat;
the work of enemy PSYOP forces;
a large number of mobilised servicepersons who are unfit for service for
health-related reasons or because of their family status, which leads to an
increase in tension within military subunits;
dissatisfaction with the necessity to execute combat missions outside of
brigades' deployment area (common for territorial defence units, especially at
the initial stage of their deployment).

A total of 71 highly mobile internal communications groups have been

set up since the beginning of 2022:
29 “Alpha” highly mobile internal communication groups for ideological
and moral support for servicepersons of military units within 48 military units;
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35 “Charlie” highly mobile internal communication groups for

operational psychological aid (support) for servicepersons within 73
military units;
3 “Bravo” highly mobile internal communication groups for
servicepersons' culturological needs support in 10 military units;
4 “Omega” highly mobile internal communication groups for
administrative and coordination work in 15 military units;
In total, the work has been carried out within 146 military units
(taking into account repeat work within some military units).

6.1.2. Activities of "Alpha" highly mobile internal communication

groups for ideological and moral support for servicepersons of
military units (subunits)

Training for unit commanders (primarily for operational reserve and

mobilised servicepersons) in modern technologies behind working with
servicepersons as well as effective internal and external communication
methods depending on the combat environment is conducted by "Alpha"
highly mobile internal communication groups for ideological and morale
support for servicepersons of military units (subunits). The following
numbers of lessons have been conducted with commanders (chiefs) of
all levels:
brigade level – 28 lessons;
battalion level – 145 lessons;
company level – 410 lessons;
platoon level – 970 lessons;
There have been around 460 group and 950 individual discussions
conducted with servicepersons.
In addition, the groups provide commanders with assistance when
it comes to studying and analysing factors affecting servicepersons’
moral and psychological state as well as recommendations on how to
neutralise negative social and psychological phenomena.
There are many examples that confirm the effectiveness of "Alpha"
highly mobile internal communications groups' work, including the
following one. There have been individual discussions with
servicepersons and conversations with the command element of a
battalion in one of the subunits of a motorised infantry brigade that was
executing combat missions along the Kherson direction in October 2022.
When conducting those discussions and conversations it was
discovered that the infantry fighting vehicles’ crews were not ready for
combat due to them fearing their vehicles getting hit by enemy anti-tank
weapon systems as well as their lack of knowledge on sequences of
actions in such situations. One of the key negative factors that affected
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the crews' level of psychological combat readiness was the combat

vehicle crews of that subunit getting killed.
The group conducted studies of psychological conditions various
members of a combat vehicle crew find themselves in when executing
missions. The group subsequently developed recommendations
regarding how servicepersons should be reacting to the impacts of
stress factors in combat. The group also conducted practical lessons
with servicepersons regarding corresponding actions in various combat
conditions.
The battalion commander was provided with recommendations on
the implementation of key psychological training elements into crew
combat training to regulate each crew member’s behaviour in various
combat situations. Subsequently, the unit successfully executed combat
missions, including those during the liberation of the Kherson region’s
right bank.

6.1.3 Activities of "Charlie" highly mobile internal communication

groups for operational psychological aid (support) for
servicepersons.

The main missions of "Charlie" highly mobile internal

communication groups were forming and maintaining psychological
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readiness (resilience), as well as providing psychological aid to

servicepersons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's subunits, that were
executing missions in a combat zone. The groups' specialists were
conducting methodological instructor lessons with subunits' officers-
psychologists and combat stress control groups. That was significantly
increasing the knowledge and skill level.
The group's psychological work was organised taking into account
the main psychological aspects existing within subunits at this stage of
the war, namely:
insufficient level of servicepersons’ psychological readiness and
resilience;
panic fear of occupying and holding positions under heavy enemy
artillery fire;
servicepersons' crisis psychoemotional state, a large number of
them having acute stress reactions and mental disorder symptoms;
Servicepersons' psychoemotional state stabilisation was
complicated by the fact that a large percentage of servicepersons
sustained mild and moderate forms of acubarotrauma (contusion/ shell
shock - D.O.) and did not receive medical care. In addition, in conditions
of intense combat and negative factors affecting servicepersons' mental
state (losses among servicepersons, absence of possibility to make a
full psychophysiological recovery, remaining at positions under
concentrated enemy fire for a lengthy (more than 40 days) period), the
number of psychogenic losses was increasing.
When conducting psychological work in military units (subunits) of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine that were executing missions in a combat
zone, the main lines of the group's work were the following:
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conducting psychological training measures to develop

psychological readiness and stress resistance in servicepersons;
conducting group and individual psychological work in the format
of psychoeducational sessions to train servicepersons in methods
behind providing psychological first aid (self-help) when emotionally
experiencing combat stress, during debriefing, response groups,
psychological consultations (crisis intervention) to reduce psychological
strain;
identifying those servicepersons who are in a crisis
psychoemotional state (acute stress reaction, anxiety disorder
symptoms, PTSD, depression, risk of suicide etc.), providing
psychological aid to stabilise their state so they return to their subunits to
subsequently continue executing missions or referring them to medical
specialists;
training servicepersons in self-regulation methods when subunits'
servicepersons are recovering.
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the
Russian Federation, psychological work has been conducted in a
combat zone by 35 "Charlie" HMIC operational psychological support
groups within 73 military units . In addition to that, psychological training
and recovery measures have been conducted at training grounds and in
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subunits' withdrawal areas.

“Charlie” has conducted:
2339 individual psychological consultations;
3645 psychoeducational lessons in providing psychological first aid
and maintaining mental health;
92 training lessons with the officers of morale and psychological
support agencies (officers-psychologists) of military units (subunits) in
nuances of psychological work with servicepersons during active
combat, borderline mental (behavioural) reaction sign identification,
suicidal behaviour prevention;
989 groups of response to negative emotions after executing a
combat mission;
There were 249 servicepersons identified to have mental disorder
symptoms (psychogenic losses). They were being evacuated to the
nearest hospitals (clinics) to undergo further treatment, which helped
maintain their mental health. 89% of them returned to continue their
service further and execute missions according to their purpose;
1067 servicepersons received psychological aid;
Crisis work was being conducted within 11 subunits of the AF of
Ukraine regarding servicepersons’ emotional and volitional state
psychocorrection when they organised riots and refused to communicate
with the subunit's command.
In addition to that, psychological aid (crisis intervention) was
conducted in 2 subunits of military units where suicide cases occurred.
A positive example of "Charlie" highly mobile internal
communication group's work when executing a mission in accordance
with its purpose within the AF of Ukraine’s subunits was psychological
work with servicepersons, which resulted in identifying servicepersons
who had acute stress reaction symptoms, mental disorders
(psychogenic losses), and their evacuation to the nearest hospitals
(clinics) to undergo further treatment. This helped maintain their mental
health. 89% of them returned to continue their service further and
execute their assigned missions.
At the same time, elements of psychological training were
conducted with servicepersons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
regarding developing psychological readiness for a combat mission. One
of the examples: a detachmentwas undergoing combat cohesion. There
was a tendency to refuse to execute a combat mission in a combat zone
observed among the servicepersons. After psychological work was
conducted (conducting a debrief, team building training) there was a
significant increase in the servicepersons' trust in their commanders, as
well as their psychological readiness and motivation In addition, group,
company and detachment (загін) commanders were given
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recommendations regarding creating a healthy environment in (their -

D.O.) subunits and maintaining servicepersons' mental health.
Subsequently, the subunit has been successfully executing combat
missions in the area of holding the enemy in the Avdiivka region.
Psychocorrectional work was also being conducted with subunits'
servicepersons who refused to execute combat missions in 11 subunits.
After that 67% of them continued executing combat missions.

A Facebook page called “Психологія та солдат" (Psychology and

Soldier – D.O.) was created to facilitate psychological education on
current problems of psychological nature that occur when combat stress
is emotionally experienced.
The page's effectiveness is achieved through the dissemination of
educational information and experience exchange among military
psychologists, as well as the possibility of online feedback for
servicepersons of military units (subunits) of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.

6.1.4 Activities of "Bravo" highly mobile internal communication

groups for servicepersons' culturological needs support
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Since the beginning of the enemy's large-scale offensive against

Ukraine, the formation of "Bravo" highly mobile internal communication
groups for servicepersons' cultorological needs support has been carried
out on a territorial basis.
Those artists that live (stay temporarily) in the areas where military
units execute missions in accordance with their purposes are involved in
the groups' work. Most of them have experience of participating in the
Joint Forces Operation (ATO – Anti-Terrorism Operation – the official
name from the Ukrainian side of the military conflict in Donbass from
2014 to2018. Then it became “Joint Forces Operation” from 2018 to
2022 – D.O.) as part of a "Bravo" HMICG
Five "Bravo" HMICGs have been founded and are operating based
on this principle in the interests of the "Khortytsia" (Хортиця – an island
on the Dnipro River in the Zaporizhzhya region – D.O.) and "North"
(Північ – Pivnich – Ukrainian for “North” – D.O,) OSGFs (operational-
strategic groups of forces – D.O.). The Centre has organised 128
deployments of artistic groups in the format of a "Bravo" HMICG. There
have been 1,066 concerts held, with 6,160 servicepersons involved as
spectators.
City of Kharkiv – 37 deployments, 72 concerts;
City of Dnipro – 54 deployments, 851 concerts;
City of Zaporizhzhia – 25 deployments, 97 concerts;
City of Rivne – 3 deployments, 15 concerts;
City of Chernihiv – 9 deployments, 31 concerts.
Interaction with the following bands and volunteer community
organisations (NGOs) with a culturological focus has been resumed:
ГO (“gromads’ka organizatsiia” ukrainian for community
organisation(NGO) – D.O.) “Хелп Армі” (“Help Army” transliterated in
Ukrainian – D.O.) city of Kharkiv;
ГO “Культурний десант” ( CO “Kul’turnyi Desant” – “Cultural
landing force” – D.O.);
ГO “Музичний батальон” ( CO “Muzychnyi Batal’yon” – “Musical
battalion” – D.O.);
ГO “АРТ Десант” ( CO “ART Desant” – “ART Landing force” –
D.O.) city of Vinnytsia;
ГO “Творча сотня “Рух до перемоги” (CO “Tvorcha sotnya “Rukh
do peremogy” – “Artistic hundred “Movement towards victory” – D.O.)
“Пісні, народжені в АТО” ( “Pisni, narodzheni v ATO” - “Songs
born during ATO – D.O.) city of Dnipro;
“Пісні війни” (“Pisni viyny” – “Songs of war” – D.O.) city of Lviv;
There has been contact established with the following individual
artists, bands and art collectives around the regions:
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk;
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Zlata Ognevich;
Iuriy Horbunov;
Serhii Vasyliuk;
Viktor Pavlik;
Natalya Mohylevs’ka;
Svitlana Tarabarova;
“Скай” band (SKAI – D.O.) сity of Rivne;
“От вінта” band (“Ot vinta” – Ukrainian for “clear prop” – D.O.);
“Cкольмо” band (“Skol’mo” – D.O.) city of Rivne;
“Нічлава” band (“Nichlava” – D.O.) city of Ternopil;

Interaction has been established with the radio broadcasting

administration of the "BAYRAKTAR” radio regarding streaming songs by
authors-performers of the "Пісні, народжені в АТО" (Songs born during
ATO - D.O.) All-Ukrainian Festival.
2 events have been conducted, that are aimed at supporting
A0998 military unit’s servicepersons in the city of Lviv as well as
servicepersons’ family members in the city of Kyiv.
In total, 1,854 culturological events have been organised and
conducted, with more than 63,532 servicepersons and their family
members involved.
Interaction and cooperation with Ukrainian pop scene stars have
been organised and established. 78 artistic meetings with the AF of
Ukraine servicepersons and workers have been held.
Cooperation has been established with the Main Departmet of
Information Policy of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of
Ukraine and the Military Music Departmet of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine. There was a patriotic artistic event "The time
has chosen us!" conducted (online addresses from artists and pop stars
with further dissemination within the general information system of the
"MAS CENTER" HUB #Єдність_Перемоги (Unity of Victory – D.O.),
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#Я_роблю_це_для_перемоги (I am doing this for the victory – D.O.) ,

#Концерт_у_метро (Concert in the underground (metro) – D.O.)
As part of the #Вірю_в_ЗСУ (I believe in the AFU - D.O.)
communication campaign, a Roxolana's (Ukrainian singer - D.O.)
nationwide charity "Hold on" tour was conducted.
As part of conducting joint projects, 103 culturological events have
been organised, with 2,741 servicepersons and their family members
involved as spectators. Two #Ти_не_один (You are not alone - D.O.)
flash mobs have been held, with 117 people involved.

In the information space, the information content is promptly

disseminated through content coverage by the "Mas Center" information
hub network.
At the same time, when it comes to covering the content’s practical
activities by fields it is done in parallel through the information system
using the capabilities of the Facebook and Instagram social media
messengers. 114 AFU military units (subunits) and institutions of are
connected to those.
24 video congratulations from Ukrainian showbiz stars regarding
military and professional celebration dates have been created. 47 video
сlips of celebrities performing have been edited for the Defence Forces.
92 motivational video publications with a culturological focus have been
produced.
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Musical and social video clips are being filmed, edited and
disseminated, as well as musical addresses from famous artists and
cultural figures, performers, children, etc.

Effective cooperation with artists and artistic collectives has been

established regarding the systematic creation and publication of
addresses in support of servicepersons of the AF of Ukraine.

6.1.5 Informational work within troops (forces)

Over the course of Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine, the
informational space has gained particular attention as a separate object
of the enemy's negative informational and psychological influence and
conducting disinformation campaigns among servicepersons of our
troops and population including (the population – D.O.) of the
temporarily occupied territories.
The enemy has either directly or indirectly been attempting to exert
influence to reduce our warriors’ morale and destroy internal unity
among the state and military leadership, servicepersons and Ukrainian
people.
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Providing information promptly in conditions of unstable connection

and Internet coverage has become the main objective of all the news in
the media (both civilian and military). High-quality informational content
would have to be reaching every serviceperson and meeting the
following standards: official information sources only; promptness of
information; accuracy of information; reliability of information; dosing of
information; separating facts from comments and assessments; balance
of opinions and points of view; completeness of presented facts and
information about the reality of events at the frontline; the main factors
influencing the socio-political environment in Ukraine and
servicepersons’ moral and psychological state within troops (forces).

Taking into account the aforementioned circumstances as well as

the sharp change in the situation and the growing need for informing
troops (forces) promptly after 24 February 2022, the Moral and
Psychological Support Centre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has
implemented and improved the system of providing information promptly
to servicepersons of the Defence Forces, using the capabilities of the
WhatsApp messenger - the "MAS Center" hub and the Telegram
messenger.
For the sake of promptness and the number of servicepersons
involved, the corresponding work has been carried out in parallel using
the Telegram ↔"WhatsApp" method.
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Information and propaganda support in the "MAS Center" group

created in the WhatsApp mobile application has been carried out by 629
administrators, which satisfied up to 88% of the servicepersons'
information needs.
Delivering information content via the "Telegram" messenger
covered 115 closed groups of military units and institutions while the
“WhatsApp" messenger covered 24 closed groups.

At the same time, the Centre has been searching for opportunities
to produce modern information products with a military and patriotic
focus. The work was launched with the help of audiovisual content
created and uploaded to the YouTube video hosting service in relevant
playlists with further dissemination via the "WhatsApp" and "MAS
Center" information hubs.
The number of views of one (single?) publication within one hour
of it being published in early 2022 was between 2000 and 2800. Taking
further dissemination of information into account, the number of views
ranged from 4.5 thousand to 1 million 590 thousand 490 people
(15.08.2022 - 16.08.2022) per publication. Such dissemination of
information content was indicating compliance with the standards for the
creation of information content.
 193

Studying how theactivities directed at providing information

promptly to military units (subunits) in active combat conditions are
organised has demonstrated that "Starlink" autonomous satellite Internet
stations " have proven to be an effective tool for conducting prompt data
transmission when providing information to servicepersons. In addition
to that, the absence of a television and radio network in the active
combat areas has made it impossible to broadcast military television and
the "Армія FM" (Army FM - D.O.) radio. Terrestrial broadcasts were
technically possible only via the "Starlink" autonomous satellite Internet
station through mobile applications.
From 27 October 2022, the Centre has taken into account the
Armed Forces of Ukraine command’s demands regarding prohibitions
and restrictions on the use of the "Telegram" messenger for operational
information work.
On 01 November 2022, the Centre's sole page was created on the
Facebook social network to unify information channels and content.
Crossposting was set up on the "Instagram", "Twitter", and YouTube
social applications with the subsequent inclusion of information content
from the "Бойовий бюлетень" (Combat Bulletin - D.O.), "Народжені
вільними" (Born Free - D.O.), "Психологія та солдат" (Psychology and
Soldier - D.O.), and "Відділ культурологічної роботи у військах"
(Department for Culturological Work within Troops - D.O.) pages.
Transitioning to a single information resource (The "Центр МПЗ ЗСУ"
(TheMPS centre - Moral and Psychological Support of the AFU - D. O.)
Facebook page).
 194

At the same time, meeting servicepersons' information needs

today also requires searching for new ways to improve and enhance
internal communication work as one of the fields of information and
propaganda support, monitoring information space, creating and
disseminating information content regarding the military and political,
economic, infrastructural, socio-demographic, cultural and religious as
well as security and information situation in Ukraine.

In order to improve the quality of conducting operational informing

among servicepersons over the course of organising internal
communication work within troops (forces), the Centre provided
methodological and practical support to commanders of all levels in
mastering the latest methods behind internal communication work, in
particular, analysis of actions taken (AfterActionReview), command
informing (defined by the Order No.4 of the General Staff of the AF of
Ukraine from 04.01.2017 4 "On Approval of the Instruction regarding
Organising Information and Propaganda Support in the Armed Forces of
Ukraine"), appraisal priority methodology and situational leadership.
Building servicepersons' trust in the military and political leadership
of the state as well as military command, establishing feedback to
subordinate servicepersons, their readiness for mission execution,
maintaining and restoring servicepersons' moral and psychological state
 195

highlights the internal communication line of work as one of the main

and highest priority factors affecting servicepersons' moral and
psychological state.

To neutralise the impact of negative information on servicepersons

of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and provide information promptly while
adhering to the principles of dosed and selective presentation of
information content, the Centre has organised a comprehensive work on
creating a blog on the Teletype platform to more actively promote its
own products and disseminate them during the morning information
delivery block (06.00-12.00), the afternoon block (12.00-17.00) and the
evening block (17.00-20.00) using its own resources.
During 2022, more than 10,000 publications were shared using the
corresponding hashtags ( #Захищаємо_своє (Protecting what's ours -
D.O.); #Народжені_вільними (Born free - D.O.);
#Били_б'ємо_і_будемо_бити (We were beating them, are beating them
and will be beating them - D.O.); #Гуманний_Воїн (Humane Warrior -
D.O.); #Герої_серед_нас (Heroes among us - D.O.)
#Звірства_окупантів (Occupiers' atrocities - D.O.);
#Я_роблю_це_для_Перемоги (I am doing it for the Victory - D.O.);
#10_знакових_подій_місяця (10 important Events of the Month - D.O.);
#Оперативна_інформація_про_події_в_Україні_та_світі (Operational
information about the events happening in Ukraine and all over the world
-D.O.); #ВЕКТОР_дня (Vector of the day);
#Напрямки_нападу_та_розташування_російських_військ (Attack
 196

directions and positions of Russian Troops (according to the data

summarised by the UK Ministry of Defence and the Institute for the
Study of War (ISW) - D.O.); #milcultprostir; #Психологія_та_солдат
(Psychology and soldier - D.O.); #Правова_допомога (Legal aid - D.O.)
; #Центр_МПЗ (MPS(Morale and Psychological support) Centre - D.O.);
#Вірю_в_ЗСУ (I_believe_in_AFU - D.O.).
To improve the system of providing information to servicepersons
further, taking into account security and protection of information that will
be disseminated by servicepersons for service-related as well as
personal purposes, the Сentre? has participated in implementing the
"Джура" (Dzhura - D.O.) mobile application’s capabilities after obtaining
the administering and function distribution rights.
The urgent need for being provided with "Starlink" mobile satellite
internet systems and power generators in conditions of absent Internet
coverage and power outages remains a typical problem when it comes
to organising operational informing of troops (forces). In the areas where
military units (subunits) execute combat missions, there is a need for
more widespread distribution of periodicals (periodically printed
materials) (the "Армія України" (Army of Ukraine - D.O.), "Бойовий
бюлетень" (Combat Bulletin - D.O.) "Народжені вільними" (Born Free -
D.O.) newspapers, other information publications, newsletters, digests)
among servicepersons due to the existing ban on the use of cellular
communication.

6.1.6 Moral and psychological support centres participating in

training of servicepersons.
There has been a methodological training camp conducted by the
training group consisting of the Centre's instructors involving
servicepersons of moral and psychological support centres of the Air
Force, Navy, and the "West", "North", and "South" operational
commands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's Ground Forces to prepare
them for executing combat missions in accordance with their purpose.
The camp has been conducted in accordance with the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's Directive №Д-194/ДСК (No. D-
194/DSK - D.O.) from 17.09.2022 and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine's telegram №56085/С (No. 56085/C - D.O.)
from 15.12.2022.
 197

The missions set out by the Training Programme for

servicepersons of moral and psychological support centres were
completed in full by the training group of methodologists. At the same
time, it is being noted that a significant part of the centres'
servicepersons does not have the corresponding level of basic
knowledge and experience necessary to execute missions in
accordance with their purpose.
Such a state of affairs is going to have a negative impact on the
quality of execution of the specified missions if no measures regarding
conducting further specialist training and providing methodological
support to the centres’ servicepersons are taken.

6.1.7 Work regarding establishing Military Chaplaincy Service

within the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The Centre's specialists' participation in the implementation of
provisions of the Law of Ukraine №1915-ІХ (No. 1915-IX - D.O.) from 30
November 2021 "Про Службу військового капеланства" (On the
Military Chaplaincy Service - D.O.) has become one of the Department
of Culturological Work and Interaction with Military Priests (Chaplains)'s
priority lines of work with the Department being the formative part of the
Military Chaplaincy Service in the AF of Ukraine.
The following work has been carried out by the Department in
order to implement the Minister of Defence of Ukraine's decision
№1143/у/2 (No. 1143/U/2) from 01.04.2022:
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An nanalysis of the activity structure of the Royal Canadian

Chaplain Service, the US Chaplain Service and the Military Religious
Service of the Russian Armed Forces has been conducted;
a roadmap for establishing the Military Chaplaincy Service in the
Armed Forces of Ukraine has been developed;
the results of the survey among servicepersons of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine regarding their religious affiliations have been
processed;
the structure of the Military Chaplaincy Service of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine has been developed and approved by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
a draft management plan for the Military Chaplaincy Service of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine has been prepared;
provisions on the Military Chaplaincy Service in the Armed Forces
of Ukraine have been prepared;
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's
"On the Military Chaplaincy Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine"
order has been developed and approved;
In cooperation with the Main Departmet of Personnel of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine, amendments have been made to the orders of the
MOD of Ukraine;
preparation and signing of the Directive, introduction of positions;
preparation and submission for examination of the Draft scheme of
tariff categories for new positions of the Military Chaplaincy Service of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s officers to the Department of Social
Support of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine;
in cooperation with the Department of Human Resources of the
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, amendments have been made to the
Provision on the Military Service of Ukrainian Citizens in the Armed
Forces of Ukraine;
Together with the Department of Social and Humanitarian Support
of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, work has been carried out to
distribute quotas for the religion-based representation of military
chaplains, taking into account the religious affiliations the Armed Forces
of Ukraine’s servicepersons;
curricula for the professional military education course for military
chaplains have been developed and submitted for approval to the
Department of Military Education and Science of the Ministry of Defence
of Ukraine;
proposals have been submitted to the State Ethnic Policy and
Freedom of Conscience Service regarding the draft Provision on the
issuance of a mandate for the right to carry out military chaplaincy
activities;
 199

approval of the structure of the Military Chaplaincy Service of the

Armed Forces of Ukraine and the structure of the Departmet of the
Military Chaplaincy Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with (them?)
becoming included as part of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The result of the department's work was the Commander-in-Chief
of the AF of Ukraine's issuing the “Про проведення додаткових
організаційних заходів у Збройних Силах України в 2022 році” (On
Additional Organisational Measures in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in
2022 – D.O.) Directive №Д/4Т (No. D/4T - D.O.) from 29 July 2022022
and the establishment of the Military Chaplaincy Service of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine of the Apparatus of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine.

6.1.8 Problems associated with organising highly mobile internal

communication groups' work
Limited possibility to meet the existing demand for the work of
highly mobile internal communication groups due to the insufficient
number of specialists of the corresponding level available to work as part
of HMICGs, which, in turn, leads to an exhaustion of the personnel
involved. That remains a typical problem associated with organising
highly mobile internal communication groups' work. Highly mobile
internal communication groups' performance is also adversely affected
by inadequate reactions of the command of some brigades to proposals
made by HMICGs.

At the same time, the deployment of a motor unit as part of the

Moral and Psychological Support Centre of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
in July-August 2022 significantly increased the promptness of
responding to changes in the MPS (Moral and Psychological State -
D.O.) of servicepersons in troops (forces), that are directly executing
 200

missions associated with protecting Ukraine’s state sovereignty and

defending Ukraine.

6.2 RESEARCH CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF THE

ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE
Since the beginning of 2022, the activity of the Research Centre
for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter
referred to as the RC for HP of the AF of Ukraine) has been focused on
conducting research aimed at developing and improving the system of
moral and psychological support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s
activities, increasing its effectiveness in forming, maintaining and
restoring the Armed Forces of Ukraine servicepersons’ moral and
psychological (Annex 27).
From the very first days of the full-scale aggression, the Centre's
missions were clarified and adjusted in accordance with the needs of the
military command and control agencies as well as servicepersons of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine’s military units and subunits. Scientific
research gained a practical nature in the context of improving the forms
and methods of work.
In conditions of the full-scale armed aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine, the main lines of work of the RC for HP of
the AF of Ukraine have become as follows:
preparation of practical
recommendations for
commanders of military units and
subunits as well as specialists of
the MPS (moral and psychological
support - D.O.) agencies
regarding psychological support
and internal communication work
withthe Armed Forces of
Ukraine’s servicepersons;
conducting applied military
psychological research on
effective forms, methods and
ways of influencing
servicepersons of the Defence
Forces of Ukraine’s subunits
regarding the formation of the
necessary moral and
psychological state, high
psychological resilience, as well
as the ability to overcome panic
 201

and fear in combat conditions;

development of information and

propaganda materials aimed at
improving servicepersons’ moral and
psychological (infographics for
conducting commander and targeted
informing, materials for conducting
operational forms of national and
patriotic training with mobilised
servicepersons, newsletters,
brochures, booklets, etc.);
To ensure the quality of
execution of these and other scientific
missions during martial law, the Centre
has reformatted the principle behind
serviceperson selection. Officers who
possess extensive practical
experience of service in the armed
forces as MPS specialists have been appointed to the positions.
The Research Centre for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine’s activity as part of the information and propaganda
support system has been aimed at scientific, methodological and
practical support for the AF of Ukraine’s internal communication
measures, as well as counteracting enemy’s negative
 202

information and psychological influence on the AF of Ukraine’s

servicepersons.
Since the beginning of the full-scale armed aggression of the
Russian Federation against Ukraine, properly establishing internal
communication between chief commanders, commanders (chiefs) and
servicepersons, command and control agencies, military units
(subunits), as well as providing them with scientific and methodological
as well as practical support has been an important mission. To this end,
the Centre's representatives have participated in highly mobile internal
communication groups' work. The groups’ mission was establishing
internal communication processes between (subordinate - D.O.)
servicepersons and (their – D.O.) commanders, as well as training
commanders in methods behind "After Action Review" and "Command
informing". In addition, there was a need to assess servicepersons’
moral and psychological state and determine the extent to which the
activity of a particular commander affects this state.

Based on the work's results subunit commanders and their moral

and psychological support 2ICs have been provided with
recommendations regarding organising internal communication work
with subordinate servicepersons. They have also been provided with
information and propaganda materials regarding counteracting enemy's
negative information and psychological influence.
Since the beginning of the full-scale aggression, the main efforts of
the Centre's researchers have been focused on executing operational
missions and publishing
 203

scientific materials. That is why in

February-May, the following has been
prepared within the Armed Forces of
Ukraine to support internal
communication measures:
learning and
methodological materials regarding
organising internal communications
within a military unit;
propaganda narratives
and messages intended for
dissemination in messengers, that are
aimed at raising the morale the AF of
Ukraine’s servicepersons and
lowering the morale of the enemy
troops;
propaganda narratives
and messages aimed at forming the
"enemy image" of the Russian troops
for the AF of Ukraine’s
servicepersons during an active combat phase;
a range of informationaand analytical materials for military
command and control agencies regarding enemy leaflets that have been
disseminated in the temporarily occupied cities of Ukraine during
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Based on the analysis
conducted, practical recommendations have been provided to the
military command and control agencies regarding ways of counteracting
enemy propaganda;
information and analytical
materials based on studying the
content of enemy propaganda
leaflets and video clips aimed at
Ukrainian servicepersons so they
leave their positions and whole
units leave a combat zone.
Practical recommendations have
been provided to military
command and control bodies
regarding building and
maintaining resilience among
Ukrainian servicepersons and
rejecting such enemy propaganda
and campaigns;
 204

The "Основи медіаграмотності для військовослужбовців ЗС

України" (Media Literacy fundamentals for the AF of Ukraine
servicepersons - D.O.) learning materials intended for further use in the
"Джура" (Dzhura - D.O.) app.
The learning materials that are aimed at developing critical
thinking, conscious consumption of media products and resistance to the
enemy's information and propaganda influence.
Over the course of 2022, the Centre's researchers created a
series of new visual informational and propaganda projects aimed at
shaping the patriotic outlook among the AF of Ukraine’s servicepersons,
boosting morale, informing, and countering the enemy's negative
informational and propaganda influence. In March-December

materials for targeted informing dedicated to important events from the

history of Ukraine and its armed forces were being systematically
prepared.
In addition to the above, in June-
December 2022 within the system of
national and patriotic training, the
Centre's researchers prepared 20 video
lectures for mobilised servicepersons
The themes of those lectures are
dedicated to victorious battles of the
Ukrainian forces, as well as refuting
Russian propaganda myths and fakes
and exposing the war crimes of the
Russian occupiers.
 205

The video lectures were narrated

by Vladlen Maraiev, who holds a degree
of a Candidate of Sciences in History,
and is also the host of the “Історія без
міфів” (History without myths – D.O.)
YouTube channel, where he
disseminates military and historical
knowledge and debunks Russian
historical myths.
There was a new project launched
as early as March 2022, called
"Восьмирічна війна, що триває
століттями" (Eight-Year War that has
been lasting for centuries - D. O.), which
continues in 2023. It reflects on a
monthly basis the most significant
victories over the Muscovites (Russians), the most successful
campaigns of the Ukrainian troops, and joint actions with the allies
regarding destroying the Moscow (Russian) occupiers. Famous
Ukrainian military leaders are also mentioned.

Another project called "Спростування

російських історичних міфів" (Refuting Russian
Historical Myths - D.O.) was launched in July
2023. It was briefly refuting the enemy's history-
related myths that are currently used by the
Russian propaganda.
Since June 2022, the Centre has been
developing materials regarding military units that
are carrying honorary names - "Почесні
найменування війскових частин Збройних Сил
України" (Honorary names of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine's military units - D.O.).
 206

To support internal communication

measures in the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, the following scientific materials
have been prepared by the Centre:
The "Комунікативно-
пропагандистська складова
інформаційно-психологічної протидії у
ЗС України" (Communicational and
Propagandistic Component of
Informational and Psychological
Counteraction within the Armed Forces
of Ukraine - D.O.) learning and
methodological manual, that explores the
current trends within an information and
psychological confrontation. The
publication analyses the experience of
information and psychological confrontation in wars and military
conflicts, as well as the communicational and propagandistic component
of the informational and psychological counteraction system within the
Armed Forces of Ukraine;
The "Руйнування історичних міфів
російської пропаганди" (Destroying the
Historical Myths of Russian Propaganda -
D.O.) counter-propagandistic material
compilation, which refutes 30 of the most
widespread historical myths of the
Russian propaganda. They are related to
the origin of Ukraine and Russia, our
country's territory and the Ukrainian
people’s settlement boundaries, the
Soviet historical period, as well as
important topics of the Second World War
of 1939-1945 and the Russo-Ukrainian
war that has been going on since 2014;
The "Загарбники і кати народів:
справжні обличчя російських
полководців" (Invaders and Torturers of
Nations: The True Faces of Russian
Military Leaders - D.O.) compilation of
historical essays which contains historical essays about the most
famous Russian military leaders of the imperial period. Russia's
aggressive policy towards other states and peoples during the 17th and
 207

18th centuries is demonstrated through the prism of their life activity.

The "Справжнє обличчя
російської армії: минуле та
сьогодення" (The True Face of the
Russian Army: Past and Present -
D.O.) compilation of information and
analytical materials. Through
historical parallels, it shows the true
face of the Russian army that invaded
independent Ukraine and is
threatening the existing world order in
the XXI century. Various aspects
intrinsic to the Russian people's
mentality are highlighted in order to
fully demonstrate the inner world of
the agressor country's AF.
The above-mentioned
publications have been introduced
into the information and propaganda
support system for troops (forces)
and are used during commander
(combat) informing and national and patriotic training to form the
necessary national and ideological beliefs in servicepersons, as well as
maintain and restore their moral and psychological state; to form the
corresponding
worldview as well as the moral and
combat qualities necessary for the
effective execution of set missions in
conditions of the full-scale armed
aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine.
24 February 2022 became a
terrible day for millions of
Ukrainians. The occupier has
brazenly invaded our land but has
been receiving a worthy rebuff for
days on end. And that is, on all
fronts. For, even during such trying
times, the Ukrainian people are
boldly and openly laughing at the
enemy.
Satire is an important genre,
as it always has been during war. It
 208

ridicules the occupier and supports our military and Ukrainian opinion
leaders. Humour and satire can comfort us during combat. With Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine
there was a revival of the "Сатиричний блок-пост" (Satirical Checkpoint
- D.O.), a daily bulletin that was launched back in the distant year of
2014.
The compilation of 260 issues includes a variety of jokes and
anecdotes, songs and humour stories, as well as poems and sayings
aimed at supporting Ukrainians and ridiculing the occupiers.

At the end of 2022, the

Centre's researchers took part in
the preparation of the tactical
publication called "Правила
поведінки та виживання під час
війни" (Rules of Behaviour and
Survival during War - D.O), which
contains information and
propaganda materials as well as
psychological advice for the
Ukrainian defenders during combat.
The centre's researchers also
conducted a scientific examination of
the publication.
To summarise, the scientific
and methodological as well as
practical support of internal
communication measures within the
Armed Forces of Ukraine since the
beginning of the full-scale Russian
armed aggression against Ukraine has generally been aimed at the
following: transforming servicepersons' outlook from peaceful life
attitudes to wartime requirements;
 209

instilling the belief that the participation of

the Armed Forces of Ukraine in repelling
Russian armed aggression is right and just
in servicepersons; forming and maintaining
the feelings of patriotism, responsibility for
the fate of the Motherland in servicepersons,
increasing morale and readinessto destroy
the enemy and keep fighting until Ukraine's
victory; as well as informing, preventing and
neutralising the adversary's negative
information and psychological influence on
the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s
servicepersons.
Right from the first days of the full-
scale aggression, the Centre's missions
were clarified and adjusted to meet the
needs of servicepersons of the AF of
Ukraine's military units and subunits. The
scientific research gained a practical nature
in the context of improving the forms and methods of psychological work
with

servicepersons, including those

that have been mobilised, as well
as reservists, their training, support
and recovery after executing
combat missions, psychological
aid, and support for their families.
The following has been
conducted first and foremost:
analysis of factors affecting
psychogenic losses among
servicepersons and nuances of
motivating servicepersons to
execute combat missions as well
as ways of stimulating them;
review of domestic scientific
sources on diagnosing
servicepersons' stress resistance in
combat conditions;
summarising information
regarding psychology of combat
and servicepersons' psychological resilience.
 210

Based on studying and

summarisation of requests from military
units' psychologists, there have been
suggestions and recommendations
provided regarding the following:
Improving practical work of
psychologists in combat conditions;
assessing and forecasting the
dynamics the AF of Ukraine’s moral and
psychological state dynamics in combat
conditions;
ways of increasing
servicepersons' psychological resilience
during combat by overcoming the fear
of death;
Providing psychological support
and a protocol (sequence of actions) for
psychological assistance to
servicepersons whose families
remained in the temporarily occupied
territories and those territories that are close to a combat zone.
During 2022, the Centre's activities regarding scientific support of
psychological support measures were aimed at implementing current
operational missions regarding solving
urgent problems related to moral
and psychological support for the combat
use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine aimed at
repelling the full-scale armed aggression of
the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
The main efforts of the research
psychologists were concentrated on
conducting theoretical scientific research. As
a result of that, three following
methodological manuals were processed:
"Забезпечення психологічної
стійкості військовослужбовців в умовах
бойових дій" (Ensuring Servicepersons'
Psychological Resilience in Combat
Conditions - D.O.), which outlines the
modern theoretical foundations developing
psychological resilience of servicepersons,
 211

taking into account the stressors

associated with their professional
activity as well as factors and
gender nuances of psychological
resilience. Practical experience of
building servicepersons'
psychological resilience within the
AFof the world's leading countries is
also presented;
"Теорія і практика
управління страхом в умовах
бойових дій" (Theory and Practice
of Fear Management in Combat
Conditions - D.O.), which provides
modern theoretical concepts
regarding the psychology of fear, as
well as practical recommendations
for managing fear and panic,
assessing servicepersons' fear-
related emotional states and
providing psychological aid in controlling such states.
"Діагностика схильності військовослужбовців до ігрової
залежності" (Diagnosing servicepersons' proclivity towards gambling
addiction - D.O.) containing materials on gambling addiction
manifestations, such as problematic and pathological gambling, as well
as computer gaming addiction. The manual also contains a modern
diagnostic toolkit for various forms of gambling addiction.

A methodological manual, called "Збірник

психодіагностичних методик для проведення
професійно-психологічного відбору в ЗС України
та Державній спеціальній службі транспорту"
(Compilation of psychodiagnostic methods for
conducting the AF of Ukraine and the State
Transport Special Service professional
psychological selection - D.O.) has been processed
to provide scientific and methodological ground for
psychological support of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine’s combat (service) activities for military
command and control agencies’ officials, territorial
recruitment and social support centres, military
units, pre-higher specialist education institutions
(colleges?), higher military education institutions
 212

and military training subunits within higher education institutions that

become involved in organising and conducting the AF of Ukraine and the
State Transport Special Service professional psychological selection.
The manual includes the
psychodiagnostic methods defined by
the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine's
"Про затвердження Інструкції з
організації професійно-
психологічного відбору в ЗС
України та Державній спеціальній
службі транспорту" (On Approval of
the Instruction regarding organising
the AF of Ukraine and State
Transport Special Service
Professional Psychological Selection
- D.O) Order №272 from 12.09.2022.
A 10-hour programme, a
thematic plan, and methodological
materials regarding the psychological
training of section commanders and
platoon sergeants have been
processed within the shortest
timeframe possible. The programme
has been included in a military
learning publication called "Програма
суміщеної підготовки командирів
відділень та головних сержантів
взводів для механізованих,
мотопіхотних, десантно-штурмових, аеромобільних, повітряно-
десантних, гірсько-штурмових підрозділів та підрозділів
морської піхоти" (Joint Training Programme for Section Commanders
and Platoon Sergeants for Mechanized, Motorized Infantry, Air Assault,
Airmobile, Airborne, Mountain Assault subunits And Marine subnits -
D.O.) (ТП 7-01(40).01) (TP 7-01(40). 01 - D.O.), approved by the Chief
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on 12.07.2022.
Practical exercises, as well as psychological first aid and self-help
techniques for servicepersons have been selected. Relevant leaflets,
memos, and messages have been prepared.
During 500 days of the war, in accordance with the requests from
psychologists, servicepersons' needs, and instructions from the Main
Departmet of Morale and Psychological Support of the AF of Ukraine,
more than 40 information materials have been processed, in particular,
regarding the following:
 213

experience of moral and psychological support of the Armed

Forces of Ukraine's activities («Морально-психологічний стан
особового складу в умовах бойових дій (нові наукові підходи щодо
змісту, оцінювання та забезпечення)», ("(Servicepersons' Morale and
Psychological state in combat conditions (new scientific approaches to
content, assessment and provision) - D.O.), "Адміністративно-правові
засади дисциплінарної відповідальності військовослужбовців ЗС
України" (Administrative and legal principles behind the AFU
servicepersons' disciplinary responsibility - D.O.) "Досвід провідних
країн світу щодо переходу військовослужбовця від військової
кар’єри до цивільного життя" (World Leading countries' experience
when it comes to a serviceperson's transitioning from military career to
civilian life - D.O.);
Safeguarding of mental health and providing psychological aid to
the servicepersons and individuals affected by the armed aggression of
the Russian Federation against Ukraine ( "Корекція
психофізіологічного стану військовослужбовців")(Correction of
servicepersons' psychophysiological state - D.O.);
servicepersons' psychological and stress resilience («Психологічні
основи зміцнення віри військовослужбовців у Перемогу України»)
(Psychological foundations for strengthening servicepersons' faith in
Ukraine's victory - D.O.);
how military political work is organised within the armed forces of
the Russian Federation - based on materials from open information
sources ("Система військово-політичної роботи зс рф", (System of
military-political work of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation -
D.O.) "Структура і керівний склад військово-політичних органів зс
рф" , (Structure and leadership of the military-political bodies within the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - D.O.), "Психологічна робота
у зс рф" (Psychological work within the AF of the RF - D.O.),
"Ідеологічна складова військово-політичної підготовки особового
складу зс рф" (Ideological component of military-political training of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’s servicepersons - D.O.),
"Організація захисту особового складу зс рф від негативного
інформаційно-психологічного впливу" (Organisation of protection of
the Russian Armed Forces’ servicerepsons from negative information
and psychological influence - D.O.);
Comparing the moral and psychological agencies (educational and
socio-psychological work) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the
educational bodies (work with servicepersons), as well as military-
political agencies of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, etc.
Psychological education (psychoeducation) and psychological
training for various categories of servicepersons have been conducted
 214

both online and offline. In particular, there have been lessons held with
territorial recruitment and social support centres representatives as well
as civil-military cooperation agencies regarding sequences of actions for
notifying about servicepersons' death (getting killed). In addition, the
plan-prospectus of a textbook called "Психологічне забезпечення ЗС
України" (Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - D.O.)
as well as the materials of the "Професійно-психологічний відбір"
(Professional and Psychological Selection - D.O.) and "Наукове
супроводження заходів психологічного забезпечення» ( Scientific
Support (Ground?) for Psychological Support Measures - D.O.) sections
have been processed. It has also been generally arranged in order and
proofread.
The Centre's researchers have participated in work groups on
psychological support components and prepared a series of projects to
be implemented within the troops (forces) in the future: Programmes to
build servicepersons' psychological resilience to execute missions in
extreme environment conditions, a system for training mental health
instructors based on the NATO member states' experience; a roadmap
for implementing a system for servicepersons' transitioning from military
career to civilian life, etc.
Work on the following manuals was completed in 2022:
"Особливості надання психологічної допомоги
військовослужбовцям, ветеранам та членам їхніх сімей цивільними
психологами" (Nuances of Providing Psychological Aid to
Servicepersons, Veterans and Their Family Members by Civilian
Psychologists - D.O.), "Практикум з індивідуального психологічного
консультування військовослужбовців, ветеранів та членів їхніх
сімей" (Workshop on Individual Psychological Counselling for
Servicepersons, Veterans and Their Family Members - D.O.), "Окремі
аспекти реінтеграційних заходів із особами, звільненими з умов
примусової ізоляції (полону)" (Certain Aspects of Reintegration
Measures for Persons Released from Forced Isolation (Captivity) - D.O.)
(Part 1).
An extremely important component of the Centre's activities was
the continuous and systematic participation of its representatives in
reintegration and post-isolation measures with Ukrainian servicepersons
liberated from Russian captivity, which were conducted at medical and
rehabilitation facilities in an urban-type settlement of Novi Sanzhary in
Poltava Oblast as well as the cities of Dnipro and Kyiv.
Studying servicepersons' psychological recovery problems during
the post-experiential (post-traumatic, post-stress) period and their return
to peaceful life has become a promising line of the Centre researchers'
work. To this end, a psychological toolkit of tests and questionnaires has
 215

been processed regarding surveying

various categories of servicepersons on
the specified issue.
Continuous education and increasing
servicepersons' proficiency has been
ensured through (their - D.O.) participation
in more than 30 scientific and practical
events (conferences, seminars, forums,
webinars, etc.).
The aspects of military and patriotic
education of servicepersons of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine on the basis of heroic
examples from the military history of our
country have not been left aside either. In
order to form a comprehensive
understanding regarding the role of the
military elite in defending the Ukrainian
state’s sovereignty, and popularise the
prominent military figures and leaders who
created and led the Ukrainian army (armed
forces?) during the Ukrainian peoples' struggle for freedom and
independence during 1917-1921, a compilation of information and
analytical materials called "Видатні військові діячі Української
революції 1917-1921 років" (Prominent Military Figures of the Ukrainian
Revolution of 1917-1921 - D.O.) has been developed.
The publication is intended for use by commanders (chiefs) and
moral and psychological support officers when conducting

when conducting national-

patriotic training, informing
servicepersons and other
information and propaganda
measures.
The logical
continuation of the above-
mentioned compilation is the
presentational album called
 216

"Видатні постаті воєнної історії України" (Prominent Figures in

Ukraine's military history - D.O). This album is essentially Ukraine's
military history concentrated.
It tells in an easy-to-
understand way the story of the
individuals who were determining
the course of Ukraine's military
history. It does so while recreating
the stages of the struggle for
Ukrainian statehood from the
ancient Russian (Rus'/Kievan Rus'?
The word Russian actually comes
from the word "Rus" which was a
state consisting of various regions
that later became parts of modern
Ukraine and Russia from IX to XII
century - D.O.) state to the mid-
twentieth century. The album will be
facilitating better mastering of the
"Історія України та українського
війська" (History of Ukraine and its
military - D.O.) academic discipline
by officer cadets in military higher
education institutions.
By the Сommander-in-Chief of the AF of Ukraine's warrant
№6820/с (No. 6820/s - D.O.) from 26.03.2022, there was a military
history commission established within the AF of Ukraine with the
purpose of writing up a military history description(outline? - опис) of the
Russo-Ukrainian war (from the beginning of the full-scale invasion on
24.02.2023).

The main missions of this

commission's work are collecting
historical materials, summarising them,
analysing the most significant historical
facts and events, and creating a military
history of the Russo-Ukrainian war after
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine's
territory by the Russian occupation
forces.
The Centre's specialist historians
were invited as co-executors during the
 217

preparation of the Military Historical Descriptions of the Russo-Ukrainian

War. In particular, the materials for the first chapter called "Воєнно-
політична обстановка" (Military and Political Situation - D.O.) and
"Міжнародна підтримка України" (International support for Ukraine -
D.O.) were being processed.
In accordance with the subject matter of national and patriotic
training of all the servicepersons' categories, the AFU servicepersons'
national and patriotic training manual was developed in 2023. The
publication's purpose is to provide assistance in conducting national-
patriotic training to those in charge of groups.
To cover each party’s roles and places in
the military and political confrontation during the
Russo-Ukrainian full-scale war, a compilation of
information and analytical materials called "
“Воєнно-політична обстановка в ході
російсько-української війни (лютий- червень
2022 року)" (Military and Political Situation
during the course of the Russo-Ukrainian War
(February-June 2022) – D.O.) has been
developed. The compilation is dedicated to the
history of the military and political confrontation
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
from the first day of the full-scale war on 24
February to 30 June 2022.
During the 500 days of the full-scale war,
the Centre executed more than 60 operational
missions, the results of which were aimed at
improving the military command and control agencies’ work in the field of
state defence and solving the AF of Ukraine’s moral and psychological
problems. The main ones among those were the following:
collection and
analysis of informational
materials regarding the conduct
of combat operations by units
and subunits of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine's branches
(arms, forces) as well as other
components of Ukraine's
Defence forces since the
beginning of the invasion by the
Russian occupying forces;
Preparation of generalised materials regarding the servicepersons
who have participated in the Russo-Ukrainian war and received the Hero
 218

of Ukraine award.
preparation of visual materials for the "Зброя Перемоги"
(Weapons of Victory - D.O.) and "Трофейна зброя Перемога"
(Trophy Weapons of Victory - D.O.) projects and producing presentation
albums;
developing the following help booklets for commanders, moral and
psychological support agencies' specialists, and servicepersons:

"Стра
х
бою:
підко
ритис
я,
борот
ися
чи
управляти" (Fear of Combat: Succumb to It,
Fight It or Manage It - D.O.), (Fear of Combat:
Teaching Your Subordinates to Manage It -
D.O.), "Командиру взводу про
індивідуальну роботу з підлеглими" (To a
platoon commander on individual work with
their subordinates - D.O.), "Командиру
взводу про профілактику суїцидів у
підлеглих" (To a platoon commander on
suicide prevention among their subordinates -
D.O.), “Алгоритм роботи командира взводу
щодо профілактики суіцидів у підлеглих (Platoon сommander's
sequence of actions when working on suicide prevention among their
subordinates -D.O.), "справедливість: помста ворогу, як засіб
досягнення справедливості"(Justice: Revenge on Enemy as Means of
Achieving Justice - D.O.), "Заступнику командира роти з МПЗ щодо
профілактики суїцидів підлеглих на ґрунті сімейних конфліктів
(проблем)" (To company commander's MPS (Morale and Psychological
Support - D.O.) Deputy regarding family conflict (problems)-caused
suicide prevention among their subordinates - D.O.);
studying the experience of the National Guard of Ukraine's "Azov"
Special Forces detachment in motivating soldiers to actively participate
in combat and proposal rehearsing.
 219

Taking into account the relevance of this issue in the armed forces
and in order to help commanders (chiefs) and MPS specialists, primarily
those who have been mobilised, to
gain in-depth knowledge of organising
and conducting individual work with
different categories of servicepersons,
in particular of the following: main
lines of work, principles behind it, as
well as forms and methods of
conducting it with servicepersons a
methodological manual called
"Методика індивідуальної роботи з
особовим складом підрозділу"
(Methodology Behind Individual Work
with subunit's servicepersons - D.O.)
has been developed. The publication
may be used by officer cadets, officers
and scientific and academic personnel
of military higher education
institutions.
Studying and summarising
foreign countries' experience (Finland,
Georgia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) in immortalisation of heroic
deeds and resistance against an
aggressor during a struggle for
independence and sovereignty of their
state have resulted in developing a
compilation of information and analytical
materials called "Увічнення подвигів
воїнів (зарубіжний досвід)"
(Immortalising warriors' heroic deeds
(foreign experience) - D.O.)
The publication is intended for
command and control (administrative?)
decision-making by the Armed Forces of
Ukraine's command regarding
immortalising servicepersons' heroic
deeds in the struggle for independence
and sovereignty of their country during
the full-scale invasion of the Russian
Federation.
Taking into account their extensive
professional experience, the Centre's
 220

servicepersons have been actively involved in practical work within

troops. When conducting this work, the officers have been sharing the
latest developments when it comes to methods and ways of working with
servicepersons to maintain a sufficient level of moral and psychological
state, as well as finding and receiving information for relevant
sociological research for its further generalisation and transforming it into
scientific and methodological materials to be subsequently delivered to
the troops. Over the course of the work, the methods behind studying
leadership qualities for command position candidate selection were
approved.
Due to the situation along our country's borders escalating, even
before the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there was a
decision made by the Main Departmet of Moral and Psychological
Support of the AF of Ukraine's command regarding НДЦ ГП ЗС України
(Research Centre for Humanitarian Problems withing the AF of Ukraine
– D.O.) conducting a series of
sociological studies. The
following ones are among
them:
surveying servicepersons
of composite subunits from
higher military educational
institutions to assess their
readiness to execute missions
aimed at protecting the
independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine in case the situation were to escalate
further;
"Стійкість військовослужбовців ЗС України як складова
національної стійкості" (Resilience of the AF of Ukraine's
servicepersons as a Component of National Resilience - D.O.)
sociological research.
 221

The purpose of the research was to assess servicepersons' ability

to counter threats of any nature, adapt to changes in security of the
environment, maintain the capabilities to execute missions according to
their purpose in different conditions and recover quickly after crisis
situations. Based on the analysis of the answers of the respondents who
took part in the surveys, relevant reports were prepared and proposals
submitted to the AF of Ukraine's command for their administrative -
decision-making.
With the enactment of the "Про службу військового капеланства"

(On the Military Chaplaincy Service-D.O.) Law of Ukraine to determine

the religious affiliation representation quotas for military chaplains. The
Centre was tasked with conducting a survey among the Armed Forces of
Ukraine's servicepersons regarding their religious affiliation.
The analysis of the results obtained showed that the most common
religious affiliations the AF of Ukraine's servicepersons identify
themselves with are the following ones:
Ukrainian Orthodox Church - 78.80%;
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church - 14.50%;
Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalic Church (renewed) - 2.34 %
Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine - 1.77%
The servicepersons belonging to other affiliations accounted for
less than one percent.
The need to train (re-train) reserve officers emerged over the
course of the mobilisation. There were corresponding courses organised
at military higher education institutions for officers in the fields in which
 222

they will be deployed in combat in the future. In accordance with the

Сhief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's instructions,
the Centre conducted a survey among graduates of the training courses
for those officers who were called up to the Armed Forces of Ukraine
under general mobilisation to determine the level of their leadership
qualities. Over the course of conducting this mission, graduates of officer
training courses at the following military higher education institutions
were surveyed:
Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Ground Forces Academy;
Military Institute of Telecommunication and Information
Technologies named after the Heroes of Kruty;
Zhytomyr Military Institute named after S.P. Koroliov;
National Air Force University named after Ivan Kozhedub;
Military Academy (city of Odesa);
The report on the survey results was sent to the AF of Ukraine's
command for their administrative decision-making.

In the interests of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, several

sociological surveys have been conducted at the Social and
Humanitarian Support Department of the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine's initiative. For example,the civil servants of the Ministry of
Defence of Ukraine's apparatus: "Задоволеність умовами державної
служби в частині врахування у кадровій політиці принципу
забезпечення рівних прав та можливостей жінок і чоловіків" (Level of
satisfaction with the state service conditions in terms of the gender
equality principle being adhered to when it comes to the HR policy -
D.O.) and a sociological survey of servicepersons who were held in
 223

captivity called "З’ясування окремих соціально-психологічних аспектів

перебування військовослужбовців ЗС України у полоні" (Identification
of certain social and psychological aspects of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine's servicepersons being held in captivity - D.O.). Based on the
analysis of the respondents' answers to the surveys, relevant reports
were drawn up and proposals submitted to the Ministry of Defence of
Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine's command for their
administrative decision-making.
The following analytical materials have been prepared to
determine the general features and nuances of how the system of
transition from military service to civilian life functions in the world's
leading countries and provide proposals regarding its implementation in
Ukraine while taking into account foreign experience:
"Досвід провідних країн світу щодо функціонування системи
переходу від військової служби до цивільного життя" (The World's
Leading Countries Experience Regarding the Functioning of the System
of Transition from Military Service to Civilian Life - D.O.).

Over the specified period, the Research Centre for Humanitarian

Problems' specialists conducted a series of important studies directly
among troops regarding the issues of servicepersons' moral and
psychological resilience, manifestation of leadership qualities, and
development of servicepersons' moral and psychological state
necessary to execute combat missions.
Research Centre for Humanitarian Problem's specialists provide
practical aid to servicepersons directly in combat subunits when working
as part of highly mobile groups. The practical recommendations
 224

regarding overcoming fear of combat, conducting individual work with

servicepersons, and suicide prevention that have been developed and
implemented in troops' (forces) combat activities to overcome the fear of
combat, conduct individual work with servicepersons, and suicide
prevention among servicepersons have already proven their
effectiveness.
Based on that, the lines of work of the Research Centre for
Humanitarian Problems' research and scientific departments fully
correspond to the main lines of work of the Main Departmet of the
Ministry of Defence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's structural subunits.
The Research Centre for Humanitarian Problems' scientific
subunits are being constantly involved in the execution of the most
important missions from the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the General
Staff of the AF of Ukraine, and the Main Departmet of the AF of Ukraine.
 225

Chapter 7.
UKRAINE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE BEGINS
(June 2023 –)

While the Russians were banging their foreheads against Bakhmut

and grinding their teeth away over there, Ukraine was preparing forces
for an offensive in the rear (within its own territory and abroad) - twenty
new formations were trained. They received new Western equipment
and weapon systems. The units and formations withdrawn from the
frontline were also renewed. Together, they were preparing for a major
Ukrainian counter-offensive. It began in June 2023 with a
reconnaissance battle.
Ukraine initially deployed several new brigades to probe for
weaknesses in Russian defences across a wide section of the frontline -
in Luhansk, Donetsk and the South (towards Berdians’k and Melitopol).
The SOF forces intensified their operations in the Dnipro floodplains
near Kherson.
The Russians' ploys did not stop the Ukrainians. As the
unprecedented assault on the supply line continues, Russia is forced to
throw more and more new reserves into the battle, the reserves it is not
capable of replacing. The Russians are also panicking and throwing all
the shells available at the defence forces, including Soviet-era tanks.
On 6 July, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced
that the Ukrainian Defence Forces had managed to liberate about 1,900
settlements since the beginning of the Russian invasion.
The Head of the State stressed that this was all due to the
powerful Western partners' support.

Despite the fact that the Armed Forces still have a very difficult
road ahead of them to deoccupy Ukraine completely, victory will
definitely be ours.
Thanks to quality training, during offensive battles and assaults on
 226

well-fortified Russian strongholds Ukraine ends up losing less equipment

and men than Russia, who are actually on the defensive. Yes, Ukraine
pays a high price for possessing the strategic initiative in this war and
loses its best men, but it does everything to avoid losses. The enemy,
instead, seeks to overwhelm the Ukrainian counteroffensive with
"cannon fodder" (or just fodder? – м’ясо).
This demonstrates the difference in the military art of the two sides
and is a harbinger of new "difficult decisions" for the occupiers.
They are currently throwing their last resources into the battle, the
resources that are not even from different lines of defence, but from
other parts of the frontline. At the same time, Ukraine has not yet
deployed 80% of its forces but is succeeding even in conditions of the
absence of air superiority (Air superiority is still enjoyed and being
actively used by russia.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine have a clear strategy that will
certainly translate into success. And it will be done in accordance with
the Ukrainian plan.
Victory will be ours! We don't know how many more days it will
take... War is not about round and symbolic dates... The main thing is
that the nation remains united, and its heroic defenders’ morale and
motivation are at their highest! And much credit for this belongs to the
officers of the moral and psychological support agencies.
Glory to Ukraine! We will win!

RESULTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SYSTEM OF

MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE AND OTHER
COMPONENTS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES OVER
THE COURSE OF REPULSING THE ARMED
AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AGAINST UKRAINE during 2022 - FIRST HALF OF
2023

Based on the experience of the MPS executing missions during

this period, the MPS system’s capabilities were optimised, focusing the
efforts on the areas that proved to be most effective and efficient for the
troops, namely:
developing an optimal MPS structure
the command and control system of MPS's forces and capabilities
was brought in line with the three-shift round-the-clock cycle of executing
the entire scope of MPS's missions over the course of planning and use
of troops (forces) by introducing TOEs (Tables of Organisation and
Equipment -D.O.) of MPS Departmets of the Ground Forces’ operational
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commands, the Navy's Marines command, the Special Operations

Forces command, the AF of Ukraine’s Logistics Forces, the Air Forces
air commands’ MPS departments, the Support Forces commands, the
Communications and Cyber Security Forces, and the Main Departmet of
the Military Law Enforcement Service of the AF of Ukraine;
the practical component of the MPS's forces and capabilities was
strengthened through the creation of moral and psychological support
centres for branches, air-assault troops, territorial defence forces,
operational commands, the Armed Forces of Ukraine's Ground Forces
Reserve Corps, combat stress control groups of the Ground Forces’
combat brigades, Air Force, Navy, air-assault troops, and the AF of
Ukraine’s territorial defence forces;
work is ongoing to form a vertical of social support for
servicepersons by introducing TOEs for the Social Support Departmet in
the Main Departmet and relevant groups and positions within the MPS's
structural subunits of the MPS military command and control agencies,
military units, territorial recruitment and social support centres;
regarding improving psychological support
the system of effective professional and psychological selection for
military service, including during mobilisation, was restored through the
development and enactment of the corresponding order of the Ministry
of Defence of Ukraine, which prevented the conscription of 8286
persons liable for military service who were not fit for military service in
terms of their levels of mental and nervous resilience and moral and
professional qualities;
the practice of servicepersons' psychological training was brought
to a new level by introducing two psychological training programmes,
introducing psychological training departments in training centres and
military training grounds, using psychological training lessons, special
obstacle courses, and psychological stress imitation means;
psychological support was put into practice through deploying
psychological aid stations (centres?), which provided psychological aid
to about 20,000 servicepersons, as well as psychological
decompression measures for 45,000 servicepersons in combat
readiness restoration locations. Systematic reintegration measures for
servicepersons after their captivity has also been organised;
a pilot project was launched to provide psychological rehabilitation
services to servicepersons, including tactical aviation pilots, at a state
institution of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine;
the work of 65 highly mobile internal communication groups of the
AF of Ukraine's MPS Centre, consisting of the Centre's personnel as
well as coming from volunteer organisations, has been organised within
troops' combat formations, which allowed for prompt reaction to sharp
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negative changes in servicepersons’ moral and psychological state

within 127 military units and subunits, and prompt first aid provision to
about 16,000 servicepersons;
regarding organising morale support
a linear communication network was created to promptly
communicate and deliver unified information content to servicepersons
to explain the military and political leaders' actions, as well as the socio-
political situation in Ukraine and combat zones using the "Telegram"
and "WhatsApp" messengers' capabilities. 120 military units are
connected to those applications. The "Джура" (Dzhura - D.O.) mobile
application has also been developed;
In cooperation with the Office of the President of Ukraine,
systematic awarding of state and departmental awards to
servicepersons who displayed courage and heroism when defending
Ukraine has been introduced, and the work on awarding honorary titles
and the honorary "For Courage and Bravery" award to military units has
been continued;
more than 500 concerts featuring Ukrainian pop stars, as well as
professional and amateur artistic collectives have been organised for
servicepersons, including those held directly where troops were
stationed;
more than 500 concerts featuring Ukrainian pop stars, as well as
professional and amateur artistic collectives have been organised for
servicepersons, including those held directly where troops were
stationed;
The process of removing outdated models and providing troops
(forces) with modern technical means of propaganda has been
established;
regarding providing social support for servicepersons and their
family members
There have been 27 evacuation flights organised for more than
960 servicepersons' family members for a temporary stay abroad -
flights to Turkey, the Republic of Latvia, Spain. 152 servicepersons'
family members have been sent to Montenegro and Albania for
recuperation (health improvement?) and 52 people (including 48
children) have been sent to a children's camp in Cyprus;
psychological aid and social counselling has been provided to
3,200 servicepersons' family members through a social and
psychological support hotline organised in cooperation with the "Жіноча
сила України" (Women's Power of Ukraine - D.O.) NGO Women's
Power of Ukraine. A pilot project regarding 67 groups that provide
support for families of missing in action defenders.
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Thus, it can be acknowledged that the MPS system has been

functioning smoothly during the specified period. It has shown its
effectiveness and demonstrated flexibility as well as its ability to
react promptly to sudden problems and threats emerging. It is
ensuring the moral readiness and psychological resilience of the
AF of Ukraine's servicepersons as well as other components of the
defence forces to execute missions according to their purpose.

AFTERWORD

Over 500 days of the Great War, it is no exaggeration to say that

the Ukrainian army as of 24 February 2022 vs 08 July 2023 are two
different armies. This is the army that did the unthinkable and stopped
the aggressor, but it did so at the cost of huge bloodshed and losses.
And today, we see the army that truly demonstrates the highest possible
quality of this very complex work of the military, which shows that it is
operating according to the standards of the modern Western armies. It
has shown that it is capable of learning quickly, and that it can and will
win.
These 500 days gave birth to a new Ukrainian army, which, in
addition to its indomitable spirit, now possesses the fantastic ability to
fight against a superior enemy using smaller forces. Today, it is one of
the strongest armies, and not only in Europe.
In the 500 days since the start of the large-scale invasion, the
Ukrainian Defence Forces have thwarted all the plans of the Russian
aggressors, forcing them to abandon their attempts to seize Kyiv,
conduct an amphibious landing in Odesa Oblast and reach Transnistria.
Since the autumn of 2022, the efforts of the armed forces of the
Russian Federation have been focused on trying to seize the territory of
Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and hold on to the temporarily occupied
parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Courageous and effective
resistance over 500 days of the great war broke the spine of the Russian
aggression.
The moral and psychological support agencies' specialists have
also made a great contribution to defending our Motherland from the vile
invader. Sparing no effort and health, and often their own lives, the MPS
specialists did everything possible and impossible to create, a proper
moral and psychological state of the AF of Ukraine's servicepersons,
which ensured combat mission execution. They have been doing so with
the help of a well-established moral and psychological support system.
We thank all the MPS agencies' servicepersons! Eternal memory
and glory to all our fellow servicepersons who have heroically given their
 230

lives defending our dear Ukraine!

We believe that the awareness of the extreme importance, as well
as understanding and comprehensive knowledge of the forms and
methods of carrying out MPS training and combat (conducting combat
operations) during the repulsion of the full-scale Russian aggression is
one of the most important areas of commanders' and their MPS
deputies, especially during the war for the Ukrainian people’s existence.
That is why the necessity has arisen to describe the experience of
practical activities of the relevant agencies that have been and are doing
everything possible to develop the qualities in servicepersons necessary
to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine.
We will continue describing the experience of organising morale
and psychological support for repelling russia's full-scale aggression in
the future.

GLORY TO UKRAINE! GLORY TO THE HEROES!

231

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1
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Appendix 2
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Appendix 3
234

Appendix 4
235

Appendix 4 continued
236

Appendix 4 continued
237

Appendix 4 continued
238

Appendix 4 continued
239

Appendix 4 continued
240

Appendix 5
241

Appendix 5 continued
242

Appendix 5 continued
243

Appendix 6
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Appendix 7
245

Appendix 8
246

Appendix 9
247

Appendix 10
248

Appendix 10
249

Appendix 11
250

Appendix 12
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Appendix 13
252

Appendix 14
253

Appendix 15
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Appendix 15
255

Appendix 16
256

Appendix 17
257

Appendix 18
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Appendix 19
259

Appendix 20
260

Appendix 21
261

Appendix 22
262

Appendix 23
263

Appendix 24
264

Appendix 25
265

Appendix 26
266

Appendix 27
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BRIEF INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS Appendix 28

Vladyslav KLOCHKOV – Major General, Chief of the Main Departmet of Morale and
Psychological Support of the AF of Ukraine

Volodymyr IATSENTIUK – Colonel, Deputy Chief of the Main Departmet of

Morale and Psychological Support of the AF of Ukraine

Valeriy CHEKALOV – Colonel, Chief of the Morale and Psychological

Support’s Planning Department – Deputy Chief of the Morale and
Psychological Support Organisation Departmet of the Main Departmet of
Morale and Psychological Support of the AF of Ukraine

Rustam MAMEDOV – Colonel, Chief of the Psychological Support

Departmet of the Main Departmet of Morale and Psychological Support of the
AF of Ukraine

Serhiy RUDIK – Colonel, Chief of the Internal Communication and

Informational Support of troops (forces) Departmet of the Main Departmet of
Morale and Psychological Support of the AF of Ukraine

Iaroslav KALINICHENKO – Colonel, Chief of the Social Support Departmet

of the Main Departmet of Morale and Psychological Support of the AF of
Ukraine

Volodymyr MOROZ – Colonel, Chief of the Research Centre for

Humanitarian Problems of the AF of Ukraine.

Andriy ROMANYSHYN – Colonel, Deputy Chief of the Research Department

for Humanitarian Policy Problems of the Research Centre for Humanitarian
Problems of the AF of Ukraine, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Docent
 268

DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANISATION OF MORALE AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR CONDUCTING COMBAT
OPERATIONS BY THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE OVER THE
COURSE OF REPULSING FULL-SCALE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
OVER THE PERIOD FROM 24.02.2022 TO 08.07.2023
(500 DAYS OF WAR)

Under the general editorship of the Chief of the Main Departmet of

Morale and Psychological Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Major General V. KLOCHKOV

PART TWO
Editors: Colonel V.M. Iatsentiuk,
Colonel V.V. Chekalov,
Colonel R.C. Mamedov,
Colonel S.M. Rudik,
Colonel I.V. Kalinichenko,
Colonel V.M. Moroz,
Colonel A.M. Romanyshyn,
Сorrector (proofreader): AFU Employee A.I. Zaryts’ka,
Сomputer formatting: Liutenant-Colonel S.I. Tsipov’iaz.

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