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Perspectives on Development in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) Region
Hussein Solomon
Arno Tausch
Islamism,
Crisis and
Democratization
Implications of the World Values Survey
for the Muslim World
Perspectives on Development in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) Region
Series Editor
Almas Heshmati, Sogang University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)
This book series publishes monographs and edited volumes devoted to studies on the
political, economic and social developments of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA). Volumes cover in-depth analyses of individual countries, regions, cases
and comparative studies, and they include both a specific and a general focus on the
latest advances of the various aspects of development. It provides a platform for
researchers globally to carry out rigorous economic, social and political analyses, to
promote, share, and discuss current quantitative and analytical work on issues,
findings and perspectives in various areas of economics and development of the
MENA region. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) Region allows for a deeper appreciation of the various past, present, and
future issues around MENA’s development with high quality, peer reviewed contri-
butions. The topics may include, but not limited to: economics and business, natural
resources, governance, politics, security and international relations, gender, culture,
religion and society, economics and social development, reconstruction, and Jewish,
Islamic, Arab, Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish and Turkish studies. Volumes published in
the series will be important reading offering an original approach along theoretical
lines supported empirically for researchers and students, as well as consultants and
policy makers, interested in the development of the MENA region.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Islam Is Religion and State? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Understanding Political Islam/Islamism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Concluding Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 “The Age of Ignorance” and the Civic Culture of Democracy:
A Multivariate Analysis Based on World Values Survey Data . . . . 23
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.1 The Perspectives of Economic Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.2 Measuring the Substance of the Islamist Analysis . . . . . . 28
3.2.3 Liberal Islam and the Civic Culture of Democracy . . . . . . 31
3.3 Methodology and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.1 The Variables for the Factor Analytical Investigation . . . . 32
3.3.2 The Statistical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4.1 The Overall Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4.2 The Promax Factor Analytical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4.3 The Civic Culture of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Statistical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4 Islamism in Practice: Politicos in Power in Egypt,
Sudan and Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
v
vi Contents
4.2 Egypt: Between the Ideal of Political Islam and the Reality of
Political Desolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3 Islamist Sudan: Growing Authoritarianism and Incompetence . . . 91
4.4 Turkey’s AKP’s Path from Moderation to Authoritarianism . . . . . 95
4.5 Concluding Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5 Political Islam: Between Luther and Locke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1 Drawing the Wrong Lessons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2 Reflecting on the Thesis of Islamic Exceptionalism . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3 A Muslim Martin Luther and an Islamic Reformation? . . . . . . . . 109
5.4 John Locke and an Islamic Restoration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5 Concluding Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6 The Return of Religious Anti-Semitism? The Evidence from World
Values Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.3 Materials and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4 Results from the Global Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.5 Results from the Promax Factor Analysis of World Values
Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.6 Results from the Multiple Regression Analysis of World
Values Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.7 Discussion on Other Drivers of Anti-Semitism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.8 Religion and Anti-Semitism: The Cross-National Evidence from
the ADL Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.9 Conclusions and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7 Towards an Islamic Restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.2 Exploring Shari’a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.3 Examining the Hadith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.4 The Status of Non-Muslims Within an Islamic Polity . . . . . . . . . 172
7.5 Country Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.5.1 Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.5.2 Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.5.3 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.5.4 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.6 Concluding Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Contents vii
8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.2 Political Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.3 The Role of Intellectual Dissidents and the Adoption of New
Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
8.4 Prioritizing Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.5 What the Empirics from Global Opinion Surveys Tell Us . . . . . . 193
8.6 Concluding Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Table 3.1 The Muslim samples and the general samples in the WVS . . . . . 33
Table 3.2 Muslim trust in the police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 3.3 Muslim trust in the courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 3.4 Muslims confronted by violent crime in their neighbourhoods . . . 44
Table 3.5 Global Muslim respondents answering the question of what is
justifiable in a society (scale ranging from 1, never, to 10,
always) ................................................................. 45
Table 3.6 The global factor analytical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 3.7 Constructing an overcoming of Jahiliyyah Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 3.8 Overcoming of Jahiliyyah Index—global Muslim population . . . 49
Table 3.9 Overcoming of Jahiliyyah Index—global population . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Table 3.10 Comparisons of Muslims and non-Muslims in different
countries: overcoming of Jahiliyyah Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 3.11 Constructing a Civic Culture of Democracy Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 3.12 Muslim population—Civic Culture of Democracy Index . . . . . . . 53
Table 3.13 Global population—Civic Culture of Democracy Index . . . . . . . . 54
Table 3.14 The performance of Muslim communities compared to the total
country population—Civic Culture of Democracy Index . . . . . . . 56
Table 3.15 Factor structure matrix after promax rotation . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . 63
Table 3.16 Factor correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Table 3.17 Factor scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 3.18 The value development indices of the overall population . . . . . . . 74
Table 3.19 The value development indices of the Muslim population . . . . . . 78
Table 3.20 Margins of error at 95% confidence level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Table 6.1 Percent of people saying that they reject to have a Jewish
neighbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Table 6.2 Anti-Semitism by global denomination according to the World
Values Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
ix
x List of Tables
Graph 6.1 The correlation between the WVS data on rejecting Jewish
neighbours and the ADL (2014) rates of Anti-Semitism. Note:
WVS scale ranging from 0.0 (¼0%) to 1.0 (¼100%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Graph 6.2 The different phobias in the world system according to the left-
right political spectrum: rejecting to have different types of
neighbours according to respondents’ self-positioning on the left-
right political scale. Data from the World Values Survey . . . . . . . . 133
Graph 6.3 Factor loadings of Anti-Semitism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Graph 6.4 How the social conditions, defined by secularism, life satisfaction
and feminism, prevent Anti-Semitism. X-axis: Index of social
conditions preventing Anti-Semitism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Graph 6.5 The drivers of Anti-Semitism (t-test) . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . 146
xiii
List of Maps
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract The most recent terrifying month of global history, with the Christchurch
Mosque shootings of March 15, 2019, followed by the Sri Lanka Easter Sunday
Islamist bombings of April 21, 2019, and the Passover San Diego Synagogue
shooting of April 27, 2019 are a part of the never-ending spiral of terrorism which
brought a harvest of death also in the year 2019, and are a stark reminder to the
scholarly community, governments, security agencies, NGOs and the global public
at large to focus on the dynamics of these processes. The introduction to the present
book elaborates the background to the study and lists briefly the content of the seven
chapters.
The Islamist rejection of democracy, their intolerance and rejection of the pro-
verbial other, however, hardly suggests that the Islamist path would lead the Muslim
world out of the current morass they find themselves in.
The authors argue for a separation between religion and politics where political
elites do not seek legitimacy on religious grounds. Political democratization is not
possible unless intellectual dissidents are not only protected but also celebrated.
Liberalism and political openness, however, will not occur without economic
growth. As such business interests need to be accommodated at the political
bargaining table and the Muslim world will need to adopt new technologies and
invest in human capital and human development whilst creating the conditions for
the private sector to thrive.
The most recent terrifying month of global history, with the Christchurch Mosque
shootings of March 15, 2019,1 followed by the Sri Lanka Easter Sunday Islamist
bombings of April 21, 2019,2 and the Passover San Diego Synagogue shooting3 of
April 27, 2019 are a part of the never-ending spiral of terrorism which brought a
harvest of death also in 20194 and are a stark reminder to the scholarly community,
governments, security agencies, NGOs and the global public at large to focus on the
dynamics of these processes.5
There were 18,814 deaths from global terrorism in 2017. Despite its reduced
capacity, ISIL remained the deadliest terrorist group globally in 2017.6 In the MENA
region alone, there were 91,311 deaths from terrorism from 2002 to the end of 2017,
followed by 59,229 deaths in South Asia and 40,601 deaths in sub-Saharan Africa.7
During the same period, in the Asia-Pacific region, there were 6465 deaths from
terrorism, in Russia and Eurasia 3852, in Europe 2436, in South America 1658, in
North America 280 and in Central America and the Caribbean 184.8 After 2012, the
murderous share of the four most deadly Jihadist terrorist groups—Al-Shabaab,
Boko Haram, ISIL/Daesh and the Taliban—in global terrorist deaths rose dramati-
cally, reaching their peak in 2014.9
According to the study by Grinin et al. (2018) and Tausch (2017), there are at
least 5,042 monthly deaths from Islamist political violence on a global level, and
Islamist terrorism enjoys a considerable support among the general populations in
several key Muslim and especially MENA countries:
• In Egypt, Malaysia and Tunisia, more than 10% of the adult population support
suicide bombing and the following four terrorist organizations: Hamas;
Hezbollah; Al Qaeda; and the Taliban.
• In Indonesia and Jordan, there are 10% or more supporters of Hamas, Hezbollah
and Al Qaeda, and 10% or more of the resident population in addition support
either suicide bombing or the Taliban.
1
https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/christchurch-attack-new-zealand (accessed April 29, 2019).
2
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/sri-lanka-bombings-latest-updates-190421092621543.
html (accessed April 29, 2019).
3
https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/04/28/san-diego-synagogue-shooting-attack-
based-religion/3608726002/ (accessed April 29, 2019).
4
https://www.apnews.com/Terroristattacks (accessed April 29, 2019).
5
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/ (accessed on April 29, 2019) and https://www.timesofisrael.
com/topic/anti-semitic-attacks/ (accessed April 29, 2019).
6
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf (accessed
April 29, 2019).
7
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf (accessed
April 29, 2019).
8
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf (accessed
April 29, 2019).
9
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf (accessed
April 29, 2019).
1 Introduction 3
• In Senegal and the Lebanon, 10% or more of the resident population support
Hamas and suicide bombing and in addition are in favour of either the Taliban or
Hezbollah.
• More than 10% of the resident population in Pakistan and Nigeria support Hamas
and Hezbollah. Of particular concern is also the radicalization of segments of the
Israeli Arab population, which supports to a rate of more than 10% Hamas and
Hezbollah. In the NATO member country Turkey, there are more than 10% of the
resident population which support suicide bombing and the Taliban.
• What’s more, a third or more of the resident population in key Western allies
think that Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a threat to the
country: such rates were observed in Canada; Turkey; Czech Republic;
Australia; Poland; Greece; Germany; Japan; Britain; South Korea; Spain; and
the United States.
• Not only in many Muslim countries but also in NATO member states such as
Turkey, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, 50% or more of the
resident population hold an unfavourable opinion of the State of Israel.
• Iran’s nuclear programme is seen as constituting only a minor threat or not a
threat at all to the country by more than 1/3 of the resident population in key
Western allies: Canada; Turkey; Britain, the Czech Republic; Spain; Australia;
Germany; Japan; France; the United States; and Poland.
50% or more of the total resident population are in favour or strong favour of the
following measures:
• Shar’ia: Afghanistan; Iraq; West Bank and Gaza; Malaysia; Niger; Iran;
Pakistan; Morocco; Bangladesh; Egypt; Indonesia; Jordan; Algeria; Tunisia
• Death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion: Egypt; Jordan;
Afghanistan; Pakistan; West Bank and Gaza; Algeria; Malaysia
• Punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and
robbery: Pakistan; Afghanistan; Algeria; Niger; West Bank and Gaza; Egypt;
Malaysia; Iraq; Jordan
• Stoning people who commit adultery: Afghanistan; Pakistan; West Bank and
Gaza; Egypt; Algeria; Niger; Jordan; Iraq; Bangladesh; Malaysia
33% or more of the total resident population are also in favour or strong favour
of the following measure:
• Honour killings (female offender): Lebanon; Egypt; Jordan; West Bank and
Gaza; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Niger
More than 20% of the respective Muslim population hold racist and xenophobic
attitudes:
Rejecting neighbour of a different race: Libya; Thailand; Bangladesh; West
Bank and Gaza; India; Lebanon; Saudi Arabia; Philippines; Turkey; Egypt;
Yemen; Jordan; Indonesia; Malaysia; Azerbaijan; Iran; Iraq; France; Kyrgyzstan;
Cyprus; Bosnia; Nigeria; Algeria; Uganda; Mali; Ghana
4 1 Introduction
analyses, including a factor analysis of 45 key items from the WVS data, Tausch
concludes that the disrespect of property rights and traditional family values,
analysed by Hayek, emerge as the major drivers of social decay. The combination
of the “Egyptian plagues” of the erosion of religion and the decay of the disrespect of
property rights and family values is especially strong in the countries of the MENA
region.
In Chap. 4, Islamism in Practice: Politicos in Power in Egypt, Sudan and Turkey,
Hussein Solomon asks the question: How do Islamists govern when capturing
political power? Do their Islamist nirvana meet the basic needs of their citizens? Is
the cause of political freedom advanced with the assumption of the reins of political
power? In each case the answer is decidedly negative. Examining three country case
studies—Egypt, Sudan and Turkey—the chapter examines how Islamists in these
countries managed to destroy any prospects of democratization in each country
through their centralization of power. In the case of Egypt, this power was central-
ized in the office of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide. In the case of Sudan,
power was centralized in the hands of the military as Islamists joined forces with the
men in uniform in 1969 and 1989 as they staged coups. In the case of Turkey, power
was centralized in the hands of first Prime Minister and then President Erdogan.
Moreover, in each case the socio-economic circumstances of citizens deteriorated
under Islamist rule. Patronage networks, nepotism, corruption and general incom-
petence came to characterize their rule. All this served to undermine economic
growth and service delivery. Their attempt to Islamize society more only served to
alienate the local population. Both Egypt’s President Morsi and Sudan’s Al-Bashir
were ousted as a result of popular protests, and Erdogan’s era is rapidly coming to an
end in Turkey.
In Chap. 5, Political Islam: Between Luther and Locke, Hussein Solomon starts
from the diagnosis of the poor performance of Islamists once in power together with
the failed Arab Spring protests which resulted in some scholars positing the Islamic
exceptionalism thesis. According to this, Muslim societies are unique in their
inherent rejection of modernity, democracy and secularism. Flowing from the
Islamic exceptionalism thesis is the argument that Islam itself needs to be reformed.
Rejecting such a position, this chapter argues that one needs to make a distinction
between the political aspects of Islam and the distorted view of the faith as promoted
by Islamists. What is needed is not an Islamic Reformation, but reformation of
Muslim interpretations of Islamic teachings. Surveys have also demonstrated that
Muslims desire to be both religiously observant and politically free. Drawing from
the works of John Locke, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, the chapter argues that a
polity is possible which is both Islamic and democratic. What is key to realize this
happy outcome is what Alfred Stepan refers to as the “twin tolerations”. Recognizing
that secularism has little appeal in the Muslim world and that it hardly exists in the
West, what is needed is significant institutional differentiation between religious
establishment and the political sphere.
In Chap. 6, The Return of Religious Anti-Semitism? The Evidence from World
Values Survey Data, Arno Tausch addresses the return of religious Anti-Semitism by
a multivariate analysis of global opinion data from 28 countries. For the lack of any
6 1 Introduction
available alternative, the author used the World Values Survey (WVS) Anti-
Semitism study item: rejection of Jewish neighbours. It is closely correlated with
the recent ADL-100 Index of Anti-Semitism for more than 100 countries. To test the
combined effects of religion and background variables like gender, age, education,
income and life satisfaction on Anti-Semitism, Tausch applied the full range of
multivariate analysis including promax factor analysis and multiple OLS regression.
Although religion as such still seems to be connected with the phenomenon of Anti-
Semitism, intervening variables such as restrictive attitudes on gender and the
religion-state relationship play an important role. Western Evangelical and Oriental
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are performing badly on this account,
and there is also a clear global North-South divide for these phenomena. Challenging
patriarchic gender ideologies and fundamentalist conceptions of the relationship
between religion and state, which are important drivers of Anti-Semitism, will be
an important task in the future. Multiculturalism must be aware of prejudice,
patriarchy and religious fundamentalism in the global South.
Chapter 7, Towards an Islamic Restoration, written by Hussein Solomon, exam-
ines the underlying theological justification for it as well as how it might be
practically manifested in specific Muslim-majority countries. Utilizing insights of
ijtihad, the chapter notes that shari’a is far more nuanced than Islamists would have
us believe and creates the conditions for legal pluralism. This legal pluralism is seen
in the contending schools of jurisprudence in Islam as well as the fact that shari’a
exists on two levels—siyasa and fiqh. Whilst fiqh constitutes the interpretation of
legal scholars, siyasa belongs in the realm of the state. The primary purpose of such
state law is the public good of all the country’s citizens. Such law is pragmatic and is
not necessarily sourced from the Qur’an or hadith. As such, it is infinitely possible
for a country to be Islamic without even being inhabited by a majority of Muslims.
The chapter then goes on to examine four country case studies. Three of these—
Tunisia, Malaysia and Indonesia—are attempting to promote an Islam which is both
emancipatory and forward-looking. The fourth country case study, Saudi Arabia,
however, seems to be undertaking superficial reforms for the purpose of public
relations in an effort to endear it with the West and for the Crown Prince to
consolidate his diminishing political power.
Given the challenges confronting the Muslim world, how is it expected to be true
to its Islamic faith whilst embracing modernity, liberalism and economic growth
whilst halting the spread of Islamism? The Conclusion, written by Hussein Solomon
and Arno Tausch, argues for a separation between religion and politics where
political elites do not seek legitimacy on religious grounds. The chapter also argues
that where Islamist parties seek to enter the political sphere, state authorities and the
general public need to ensure that these do not only engage in behavioural moder-
ation but also ideological moderation. Moreover, political democratization is not
possible unless intellectual dissidents are not only protected but also celebrated.
Liberalism and political openness, however, will not occur without economic
growth. As such business interests need to be accommodated at the political
bargaining table, and the Muslim world will need to adopt new technologies and
Literature 7
invest in human capital and human development whilst creating the conditions for
the private sector to thrive.
The final Appendix (The Islamist Constraints Against Democracy in the MENA
Region: A Collection of Data) presents the most important World Values Survey and
other opinion data on the issues dealt with in this volume.
Work on this volume ended on May 8, 2019. If not specified otherwise, all
electronic links were rechecked by the end of April 2019.
Literature
Grinin, L., Korotayev, A., & Tausch, A. (2018). Islamism, Arab spring, and the future of democ-
racy: World system and world values perspectives (perspectives on development in the Middle
East and North Africa (Mena) region). Cham: Springer.
Hentz, J., & Solomon, H. (Eds.). (2018). Understanding Boko haram: Terrorism and insurgency in
Africa (contemporary terrorism studies). London: Routledge.
Popper, K. S. (2012). The open society and its enemies. London: Routledge.
Solomon, H. (2008). Challenges to global security: Geopolitics and power in an age of transition
(Toda institute book series on global peace and policy, 2). London: I.B. Tauris.
Solomon, H. (2013). Jihad: A South African perspective. Bloemfontein: Sun Media Bloemfontein.
Solomon, H. (2015). Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa: Fighting insurgency from al
Shabaab, Ansar dine and Boko haram (new security challenges). Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Solomon, H. (2016). Islamic state and the coming global confrontation. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Tausch A. (2017, January 12). Occidentalism, terrorism, and the Shari’a state: New multivariate
perspectives on Islamism based on international survey data. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract¼2731640 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731640.
Tausch, A. (2009). What 1.3 billion Muslims really think: An answer to a recent Gallup study,
based on the World Values Survey. New York: Nova Science.
Tausch, A., & Karoui, H. (2011). Les musulmans un cauchemar ou une force pour l’europe?
(Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes). Paris: L’Harmattan.
Tausch, A., Heshmati, A., & Karoui, H. (Eds.). (2017). The political algebra of global value
change: General models and implications for the Muslim world (economic issues, problems and
perspectives). New York: Nova Science.
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Chapter 2
Islam Is Religion and State?
Abstract The Muslim world is currently undergoing a political, social and eco-
nomic crisis. This is a truism which is acknowledged by Muslim scholars and policy-
makers. Islamists, those seeking to capture political power to legislate the perfect
Muslim, believe that this Muslim decline can only be reversed by creating a polity
which resembles that of the first Islamic state—that of seventh-century Medina
during the rule of the Prophet Muhammad. Despite sharing this common goal,
Islamists are divided into three groups on the basis of which tactics to employ to
achieve their common objective. Purists focus on non-violent methods of propaga-
tion and education, whilst politicos enter the political space in an effort to legislate
“good” behaviour and sanction “bad” behaviour. Jihadists constitute the final group-
ing, and they seek to topple the existing order through revolutionary violence. The
Islamist rejection of democracy, their intolerance and rejection of the proverbial
other, however, hardly suggests that the Islamist path would lead the Muslim world
out of the current morass they find themselves in.
2.1 Introduction
The sorry state that the Muslim world finds itself has increasingly attracted the
attention of Muslim scholars, the political class and the ordinary man and woman.
Muqtedar Khan and Tahir Shad begin their article with this truism, “The political
reality of many countries in the Muslim world is untenable and reforms and change
is absolutely necessary” (Khan and Shad, 2017). The untenable nature of the
political reality afflicting Muslim state and society is evident in any Freedom
House, Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch Report. Political freedom
has been jettisoned in favour of some form of authoritarian regime. Indeed, recent
research undertaken by John Walker highlights this truism. Muslims make up 80%
or more of the populace in 36 countries worldwide. Of these Walker notes only two
are ranked as free according to Freedom House’s definition which includes respect
for political rights and civil liberties (Walker, 2015). Human rights abuses are the
norm as opposed to the exception in the Muslim world. The brutal killing and
dismemberment of renowned Saudi journalist and critic of the Saudi govern-
ment—Jamal Khashoggi—on 2 October 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul
emphasize the point (BBC, 2018).
This decay in the Muslim world will be explored more in depth in the next
chapter, but it is a phenomenon which Muslim politicians were also compelled to
confront. Already in 1994, Anwar Ibrahim, then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia,
presented a lecture at Georgetown University where he admitted that “. . . ignorance,
injustice, corruption, hypocrisy and the erosion of moral rectitude are quite prevalent
in contemporary Muslim societies” (Manji, 2013). A decade later, then Pakistani
President, Pervez Musharraf decried the state of the ummah (global community of
Muslims) when he asserted that Muslims today, “. . . are the poorest, the most
illiterate, the most backward, the most unhealthy, the most unenlightened, the
most deprived, and the weakest of all the human race” (ibid, 2013). There are
unfortunately copious amounts of evidence to support such a bleak assessment.
Hillel Ofek notes that whilst there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, only two
scientists from Muslim countries won Nobel Prizes for science. This was in 1979 and
1999 for physics and chemistry, respectively. Perhaps even more to the point,
46 Muslim countries combined contribute a mere 1% of the planet’s scientific
literature (Ofek, 2011).
The burden of this miserable state of affairs is felt most acutely by the man and
woman on the street in the Muslim world. As she demonstrated in Tahrir Square,
Caro, in 2011, 24-year-old Noha Hamed, a worker in an advertising agency, made
clear her views about the corrupt ancien regime of Hosni Mubarak: “We are
suffering from corruption, oppression and bad education. We are living amid a
corrupt system which has to change” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). Her
comrade-in-arms on that sweltering day was 20-year-old pharmacy student, Mosaab
El Shami who expressed the hope that, “. . .by the end of the year we will have an
elected government and that universal freedoms are applied and that we put an end to
the corruption that has taken over this country” (ibid, 2013). Noha Hamed and
Mosaab El Shami got their wish when Egypt’s latter-day pharaoh was forced to
resign in February 2011. However, their nightmare of oppression and corruption
continues. The Muslim Brotherhood’s incompetent and authoritarian rule was
quickly followed by the recapture of the Egyptian state by the men in uniform.
The dearth of democracy in much of the Muslim world raises serious questions as
to whether Islam is indeed compatible with tenets of liberal democracy like toler-
ance, pluralism, rule of law and most importantly secularism. The common refrain
by Islamists that Islam is religion and state (Islam din wa-dawla) certainly seems to
undermine any attempt at a rapprochement between Islam as faith and democratic
governance (Hirsckind, 1997; The Economist, 2017).
There has certainly been a resurgence of Islamism since the twentieth century
with the establishment of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the Iranian
revolution of 1979, the establishment of the Shia militant Hezbollah in Lebanon in
2.2 Understanding Political Islam/Islamism 11
1985, Hamas in the Palestinian territories in 1987, the Taliban in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Al Qaeda, Islamic State and various regional groupings like Boko Haram
in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia. Despite their tactics and ideological differ-
ences—Shia or Sunni—all these groups have two issues in common. First, they all
share a certain telos or end-state—one which resembles the first Islamic state that of
seventh-century Medina during the rule of the Prophet Muhammad (Wickham,
2004). As a concomitant of this, all Islamist groups seek to capture political power
in an effort to legislate the perfect Muslim. This emphasis on the organs of state
power is problematic in an age where one has witnessed the steady erosion of the
state because of processes of globalization and technological advances (Van
Creveld, 2002). Perhaps, this was the reason for the Qur’an to lay greater emphasis
on the concept of the ummah (the global body of Muslims) as opposed to focusing on
governance within the territorial boundaries of a supposed nation-state.
Second, these Islamists share a rejection that any separation can exist between
religion and faith and a rejection of democracy. For Islamists, Islam transcends the
confines of a religion and also constitutes a political, economic and social system
(Osman, 2017). This God-given system of governance takes precedence over any
man-made creation, such as democracy. Democracy, with its inherent popular
sovereignty, in their estimation is a sin since God is supposed to the source of all
authority (hakimiyya)—not the people (Kazmi, 2017). The government exists to
fulfil God’s edicts and not to govern on the basis of any social contract. This book
rejects such a position and argues that traditional Islam is perfectly compatible with
the tenets of liberal democracy. It justifies such a position not only theologically but
also providing practical case studies demonstrating this truism. Indeed, it holds that
the Islamist position itself is untenable in the light of the Qur’an and Islamic practice.
In doing so, it argues that the Islamist position itself is un-Islamic and impractical to
realize. What follows next is a critical exploration of the Islamist position.
Political Islam or Islamism has been described by Zeynep Kuru and Ahmet Kuru
(2008) as “. . . an ideology that emerged in the twentieth century in reaction to
colonialism and modernization. Political Islamism aims to create an ‘Islamic state’
ruled according to the Shari’a. Although political Islamist movements can be
characterized as part of the Islamic religious resurgence, these movements are
primarily political. Political Islamists regard the foundation of the Islamic state as
the sine qua non for the attainment of a complete Muslim life. The key ideological
components of the political Islamists programme are: taking the Quran as the source
of political, legal and social systems; and claiming to return to the example of the
Prophet Muhammad”.
Whilst agreeing on these core aspects, Islamists are divided into three major
factions, according to Quintan Wiktorowicz (2006), on account of their differences
on tactics to be adopted. Purists focus on non-violent methods of daw’ah
12 2 Islam Is Religion and State?
(propagation) and education to connect more people to the Islamist ideal. At the
same time, they shun political participation, viewing it as deviant. The second group,
or politicos, seek to participate in the political arena, believe this route to bring about
social justice and to legislate good behaviour and sanction bad behaviour. Purists
and politicos view the process of Islamizing society as evolutionary. The final group
consists of the jihadists who adopt a more revolutionary approach, believing that the
current status quo can be toppled through violence (Wiktorowicz, 2006). In practice,
these demarcations between the groups tend to be fluid. Egypt’s Muslim Brother-
hood, ostensibly a politico organization, had an armed wing in the 1930s and 1940s.
Following a harsh government crackdown, they chose a political path (Simcox,
2017). In 2014, however, the Egyptian government reported that the Muslim Broth-
erhood had reactivated its armed wing, killing five policemen in one attack (Reuters,
2014). In the same vein, the line with purists and jihadists are also porous. Consider
Tableegh Jamaat which is active in 150 countries and has 80 million active fol-
lowers, making it the largest Muslim proselytizing organization in the world (Burton
and Stewart, 2008). Despite its proselytizing focus, however, various scholars have
commented on the organization’s proximity to jihadist groups. Alex Alexiev (2005)
writes:
After joining Tableegh Jamaat groups at a local mosque or Islamic centre and doing a few
local dawa (proselytism) missions, Tablighi officials invite star recruits to the Tablighi centre
in Raiwind, Pakistan, for four months additional training. Representatives of terrorist
organizations approach the students at the Raiwind centre and invite them to undertake
military training. Most agree to do so.
Given the porous nature of the borders between these three groups of Islamists,
this chapter will provide an understanding of the overall Islamist ideology as
opposed to focusing on individual groups of Islamists. Given the central thrust of
Islam and democratization pertinent to this volume, however, a subsequent chapter
will focus exclusively on the politicos within the Islamist current.
The Islamic tradition of tolerance has been increasingly displaced by what Abdul
Hadi Palazzi (2001) terms “Islamism” or political Islam with its obsession regarding
the capture of political power. Islamism is a twentieth-century totalitarian ideology
that seeks to mould Islamic religious tradition to serve narrow political ends of
domination. Khaled Abou El Fadl (2005) also refers to this as a “puritanical”
tradition within Islam noted for its “fanatical reductionism and narrow-minded
literalism”. Whilst having been moulded and coming together as a somewhat
coherent ideology in the twentieth century, its theological roots ostensibly go all
the way back to the thirteenth century to the time of Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah
(1263–1328 CE) (Laqueur, 2004). As with other totalitarian ideologies of that
blighted century, Islamism shares more characteristics with Nazism and Fascism
than it does with the Qur’anic teachings alluded to earlier. Islamism capitalizes on
feelings of humiliation and powerlessness that Muslims started feeling in the early
twentieth century with Western encroachment and colonialism, the dismantlement of
the Ottoman caliphate and the economic backwardness of their societies in relation
2.2 Understanding Political Islam/Islamism 13
VI
«Chère Marquise,
«Beauzonet a relié ce livre et l'a rendu moins indigne d'être ouvert
par vos belles mains. Permettez-vous à l'auteur d'aller vous revoir
avec René? il fait un temps de printemps glacial et je me dis qu'on
serait très-bien au coin de votre feu!
»Recevez, chère marquise, mes affectueux hommages.»
«Dis-moi donc si ce vers est juste, je crois que j'ai fait un hiatus; je
ne serai jamais qu'un mauvais versificateur!»