NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our Ref: SH/SDP/J5/PLS/GD/21-007676 Tel: +32-(0)65-44-7111(Operator)

Tel: +32-(0)65-44-6858
NCN: 254-6858
Date: Z?6 January 2021 Fax: +32-(0)65-44-3545(Registry)

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVEOPERATIONSPLANNING DIRECTIVEVERSION3.0

1. Introduction. The Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) Version

(Ver) 3.0 was approved on 15 January 2021 and supercedes COPD Ver 2.0.
Please give it the widest distribution within your commands.

2. Revision. COPD Ver 3.0 has been revised in light of changed procedures,
processes and thinking at the strategic and operational level. It has also benefited
from significant feedback received from across the NCS and NFS. This directive
covers the planning processes in detail. An 'aide memoire' to the COPD is also
under production and will contain further comment and explanation on the
techniques and methodologies used during the planning process. It will
be developed with the NATO School Oberammergau, and designed to be used
to complement the delivery of operations planning, training, and education.

3. Considerations. COPD Ver 3.0 remains a guide to help planners work through
the Operations Planning Process and as such will include specific functional area
details and processes unless they directly affect the overall planning process.
Details relevant to specific functional area should be contained in local Functional
Planning Guides or Standard Operating Procedures / Instructions (SOP/SOl)
as appropriate.

4. SHAPE Primary poe. The primary SHAPE J5 PLS POC for the COPD is Lt Col
George Deakin on NCN: 254-6858.

Major General, POL A

Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Developmentand PreparationDirectorate

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ENCLOSURES:

1. Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Version 3.0, 15 January 2021.

DISTRIBUTION:

External:

Action:

Ha SACT
SACT SEE
Ha JFCBS
Ha JFCNF
Ha JFCNP
NATO School Oberammergau
JWC
AIRCOM
LANDCOM
MARCOM
NSHO
SJLSG
STRIKEFORNATO
HQARRC
Ha NRDC-IT
Ha NRDC-ESP
Ha NRDC-GRE
Ha NRDC-FRA
Ha NRDC-TUR
Ha 1 GNC
Ha EUROCORPS
Ha MNC NE
Ha MN JHO (ULM)
C2COE

Information:

IMS
ACCI
SACEUREP •
NCIA
NSPA
NCISG
All NMR to SHAPE

Internal:

Action:

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SHAPE COM SAC

SHAPE COM OSA
SHAPE COM COS
SHAPE COM VCS
SHAPE COM COS OAC
SHAPE COM COS HIS
SHAPE COM SIA
SHAPE OSO
SHAPE OlA
SHAPE COMOV
SHAPE SEM
SHAPE SOP
SHAPE SOP J5
SHAPE STREN
SHAPE CYBER
SHAPE PD
SHAPE FINAC

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 ENCLOSURE 1 TO
NATO UNCLASSIFIED SH/SDP/J5/PLS/GD/21-007676
DATED 28 JANUARY 21

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED

POWERS EUROPE
BELGIUM

ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS

COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS
PLANNING DIRECTIVE

VERSION 3.0
15 January 2021

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PREFACE
1. Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning
Directive (COPD) Version 3.0 (v3.0) is the result of a complete review and revision of
ACO COPD Interim Version 2.0 (v2.0) issued on 04 October 2013. It articulates, in
separate chapters, the Operations Planning Process (OPP) for the NATO strategic
and operational levels, in support of the NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP), to
facilitate a collaborative approach to planning.

2. Each situation for which the OPP is used is different. The process and
templates presented in the COPD v3.0 are a capture of best practice; they suit well a
timely and systematic movement through the process from one phase to another.
With appropriate training, they can be used effectively as a guide to develop
appropriate operations planning products for the requisite level to support each
situation. The COPD is principally focussed at the NATO strategic and operational
levels of command and the headquarters within the NATO Command Structure
(NCS), NATO Force Structure (NFS) and supporting organisations. It is not designed
for the tactical level where national policies, doctrine and procedures will be the
primary direction for planning but its content should be understood and applied
where appropriate. Collaborative planning at all levels, including the tactical, is
greatly facilitated through the use of Functional Services (FS) and the use of tools
such as TOPFAS and LOGFAS is strongly advised.

3. The development of COPD v3.0 has considered lessons identified through

use of the COPD Interim v2.0, during operations, exercises and training, changes
within NATO HQ, NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure
(NFS) and updated policy and doctrine. It remains consistent with the NATO Crisis
Response System Manual (NCRSM), MC 0133 ‘Operations Planning Process’ and
AJP-5 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations’. The COPD v3.0 is
issued cognisant of the fact that there is still much on-going work that could have an
influence on the planning process, such as: adjusting to the roles and responsibilities
of the adapted NCS and tools available to support operations planning and as such
must be used as guide to the staff.

4. The COPD is classified as NATO UNCLASSIFIED so that it can be used

across the NATO international military community to provide common
understanding, principles and approach to operations planning and training. The
COPD may also be useful to other actors, subject to approval, within NATO’s
contribution to a comprehensive approach for the promotion of a common set of
procedures for operations planning. Allied and Partner Nations are encouraged to
use the COPD for education, training and exercises including advanced leadership
courses at national military institutions and training centres.

5. The COPD v3.0 is to be used during operations, exercises and training, such
as the Comprehensive Operational Planning Course (COPC) and the Strategic
Operations Planning Course (SOPC). This approach will further validate processes
and allow improvements to be identified. Observations and validated lessons
identified as a result of its use can be forwarded to the COPD Custodian, through
SHAPE J5 for consideration in subsequent reviews and revisions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para Subject Page

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Security Environment 1-1
1.2 Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive 1-1
1.3 Guide versus Directive 1-3
1.4 NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach 1-4
1.5 NATO Crisis Response Process 1-5
1.6 Operations Planning Process 1-7
1.7 Operations Planning Principles 1-10
1.8 Operational Art 1-11
1.9 Risk and Opportunity 1-12
1.10 Mission Command 1-12
1.11 Levels of Command 1-12
1.12 Campaign Synchronisation 1-12
1.13 Engagement Space 1-13
1.14 Instruments of Power 1-14
1.15 NATO End State, Objectives and Effects 1-16
1.16 Design of Operations 1-18
1.17 Planning Tools 1-24

TABLE OF FIGURES
Fig 1.1 NATO Crisis Response Process – Six Phase Generic Process 1-6
Fig 1.2 NCRP - Baseline Model 1-8
Fig 1.3 NCRP Schematic - Political Military, Strategic and Operational 1-9
Level Planning Flow Chart
Fig 1.4 Theoretical International / Inter-Agency Design 1-20
Fig 1.5 NAC Determination of NATO Role and Ends 1-21
Fig 1.6 Illustrative Overall NATO Strategic Design 1-22
Fig 1.7 Illustrative Strategic Vertical Design 1-23
Fig 1.8 Operational Design Relationships 1-26
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Fig 1.9 TOPFAS Interoperability 1-27

CHAPTER 2 - SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

2.1 Introduction 2-1
2.2 Knowledge Development 2-3
2.3 Information Management for Crises and Operations 2-3
2.4 Horizon Scanning 2-4
2.5 Situational Awareness 2-6
2.6 Knowledge Development Process 2-12

TABLE OF FIGURES
Fig 2.1 Situational Awareness main Activities 2-6
Fig 2.2 Illustrative Perception Diagram 2-7
Fig 2.3 Illustrative Comprehension Diagram 2-7
Fig 2.4 Illustrative Projection Diagram 2-8
Fig 2.5 The Knowledge Development Process 2-13

CHAPTER 3 - STRATEGIC LEVEL

CONTEXT
3.1 Introduction 3-1
3.2 Process and Products 3-1
3.3 Command and Staff Interaction 3-4
3.4 Organisation 3-4
3.5 External Coordination 3-8
PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (POTENTIAL / ACTUAL
CRISIS)
Section 1 - General
3.6 Introduction 3-10
Section 2 - Process
3.7 Appreciation Indication of a Potential / Actual Emerging Crisis 3-14
3.8 Direction and Guidance 3-14
3.9 Develop and Monitor an Initial Understanding of an Emerging 3-15
Crisis

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3.10 Initial Crisis Estimation 3-16

PHASE 2 - STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Section 1 - General
3.11 Introduction 3-18
Section 2 - Process
3.12 Overview 3-23
3.13 Initiate SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment 3-23
3.14 Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis 3-27
3.15 Identify and Analyse the Principal Actors and their Role in the 3-29
Crisis.
3.16 Determine and Analyse Strategic Centre of Gravity 3-31
3.173-14. Appreciate International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis 3-33
3.18 Appreciate Security Implications for NATO, Including Potential 3-35
Strategic Risks / Threats and Opportunities
3.19 Appreciate Potential Strategic Ends, Ways and Means 3-36
3.20 Strategic Ends - Appreciate the Desired NATO End State, 3-37
NATO Strategic Objectives and Strategic Effects
3.21 Strategic Ways - Appreciate Potential Use of Instruments of 3-38
Power
3.22 Strategic Means - Appreciate Potential Options Available to the 3-39
Alliance
3.23 Develop Military Considerations 3-39
3.24 Coordinate and Submit SSA 3-41
PHASE 3 - MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT
Section 1 - General
3.25 Introduction 3-43
Section 2 - Process
3.26 General 3-47
3.27 Review and Analyse Political Direction and Guidance 3-47
3.28 Appreciate Lessons Learned from Similar Previous Operations 3-47
3.29 Select and Develop MROs 3-47
3.30 Test, Evaluate and Compare MROs 3-55
3.31 Coordinate and Submit MROs 3-58

PHASE 4 - STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Phase 4a - Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development

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Section 1 - General
3.32 Introduction 3-61
Section 2 - Process
3.33 Initiate Strategic CONOPS Development 3-64
3.343-28. Update the Selected Military Response Option 3-66
3.353-29. Establish SACEUR’s Strategic Intent and Guidance 3-68
3.36 Develop and Issue the Strategic Planning Directive 3-69
3.37 Development of the Strategic CONOPS 3-75
3.38 Coordinate Strategic Military Requirements in NATO’s 3-76
Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach
3.39 Coordinate Operational Requirements 3-77
3.40 Contribute to the Achievement of NATO’s StratCom Objectives 3-80
3.41 Consider Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level 3-80
3.42 Develop the Strategic Service Support Concept 3-81
3.43 Develop the Concept for Cyberspace and Command and 3-82
Control
3.44 Review of Draft Operational CONOPS 3-83
3.45 Coordinate and Submit Strategic CONOPS 3-84
Phase 4b - Strategic Operations Plan (OPLAN) Development
Section 1 - General
3.46 Introduction 3-85
Section 2 - Process
Strategic OPLAN Development
3.47 Initiate Strategic OPLAN Development 3-90
3.48 Develop International Legal Arrangements 3-97
3.49 Synchronise Military and non-Military Activities within a 3-98
Comprehensive Approach
3.50 Plan for the Employment of Strategic Resources 3-99
3.51 Plan StratCom 3-101
3.52 Plan for Command and Control 3-104
3.53 Plan for Strategic Operations Assessment 3-105
3.54 Plan Force Preparation and Sustainment 3-105
3.55 Plan for Force Deployment 3-108
3.56 Plan Force Protection 3-111
3.57 Review of Draft Operational OPLAN 3-113

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3.58 Coordinate and Submit Strategic OPLAN 3-113

3.59 Promulgate Approved Strategic OPLAN and Seek Operational 3-114
OPLAN Approval
FORCE GENERATION
3.60 Review Force Requirements, Force Availability and Possible 3-115
Contributions
3.61 Review NATO CRMs 3-115
3.62 Initiate Force Activation 3-116
3.63 Coordinate National Offers and Request Forces 3-117
3.64 Activate Enabling Forces for Pre-Deployment 3-119
3.65 Appreciate Force Contributions and Balance the Force 3-120
Package
3.66 Coordinate Integration of Non-NATO Forces 3-121
3.67 Integrate Forces with OPLAN Development 3-122
3.68 Activate Forces for Deployment 3-123
PHASE 5 - EXECUTION
3.69 Introduction 3-125
3.70 Considerations for Execution 3-127
PHASE 6 - TRANSITION
3.71 Introduction 3-130
3.72 Considerations for Transition and Termination 3-132

TABLE OF FIGURES
Fig 3.1 NCRP Schematic – Political Military, Strategic and Operational 3-3
Planning Flow Chart
Fig 3.2 Command and Staff Interaction at the Strategic Level 3-5
Fig 3.3 Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential / Actual 3-11
Crisis
Fig 3.4 Phase 2 Strategic Assessment Development 3-20
Fig 3.5 Factor Analysis (Factor – Deduction – Conclusion) 3-29
Fig 3.6 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix 3-32
Fig 3.7 Phase 3 Development of Military Response Options 3-46
Fig 3.8 Illustrative Strategic Risk Evaluation Matrix 3-59
Fig 3.9 Phase 4a Strategic CONOPS Development Main Activities 3-63
Fig 3.10 Phase 4b Strategic OPLAN Development Main Activities 3-92

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Fig 3.11 Force Generation Main Activities 3-118

CHAPTER 4 - OPERATIONAL LEVEL

CONTEXT
4.1 Introduction 4-1
4.2 Operational Level Process and Products 4-1
4.3 Commander and Staff Interaction 4-4
4.4 Organisation for Operational Planning and Execution 4-4
PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF A POTENTIAL / ACTUAL
CRISIS
Section 1 – General
4.5 Introduction 4-7
Section 2 – Process
4.6 Appreciation Indication of a Potential / Actual Crisis 4-12
4.7 Initiate Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating 4-13
Environment
4.8 Develop Initial Understanding of, and Monitor, the Emerging 4-13
Crisis
4.9 Support Development of Initial Strategic Military Advice 4-15
PHASE 2 - OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT
Section 1 – General
4.10 Introduction 4-16
Section 2 – Process
Step 1 - Appreciation of SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment
4.11 Initiate an Operational Level Appreciation of the Crisis 4-20
4.12 Appreciation of the Strategic Context of the Crisis 4-22
4.13 Appreciate the Level and Scope of International Engagement 4-25
4.14 Appreciate Implications for NATO 4-26
4.15 Appreciate Strategic Military Considerations 4-27
4.16 Brief Commander on SSA Appreciation 4-27
Step 2 - Operational Advice on Military Response Options
4.17 Assist SHAPE during MRO Development 4-29
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4.18 Commander’s Guidance for MRO Analysis 4-29

4.19 Analyse Draft Military Response Options 4-30
4.20 Evaluation of the MROs 4-35
4.21 Develop Considerations 4-36
4.22 Provide Operational Advice 4-37
PHASE 3 - OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE
Section 1 – General
4.23 Introduction 4-38
Section 2 – Process
Phase 3A - Mission Analysis
4.24 Initiate Mission Analysis 4-43
4.25 Framing the Operational Level Problem 4-45
4.26 Analyse the Mission 4-52
4.27 The Operational Design 4-60
4.28 Estimate Initial Force / Capability and C2 Requirements 4-66
4.29 Review Critical Operational Requirements 4-68
4.30 Plan and Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing 4-68
4.31 Issue Operational Planning Guidance 4-70
4.32 Develop and Submit Requests to SHAPE 4-70
4.33 Plan and Conduct the Commander’s Theatre Reconnaissance 4-70
Phase 3B - Course of Action Development
4.34 Prepare for Courses of Action Development 4-71
4.35 Develop Own Courses of Action 4-73
4.36 Analyse Courses of Action 4-80
4.37 Compare Courses of Action 4-83
4.38 Plan and Conduct CoA Decision Briefing 4-85
4.39 Refine Selected Course of Action 4-85
4.40 Issue Operational Planning Directive 4-86
PHASE 4 - OPERATIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Phase 4A – Operational Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development
Section 1 - General

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4.41 Introduction 4-87

Section 2 – Process
4.42 Initiate Operational CONOPS Development 4-92
4.43 Development of the Operational CONOPS 4-93
4.44 Develop Coordinating Instructions 4-94
4.45 Describe the Concept for Service Support 4-95
4.46 Describe Concept for Command and Control and 4-95
Communications Information Systems
4.47 Development of Operational CONOPS Annexes 4-96
4.48 Develop Operational Requirements 4-98
4.49 Review of Draft Component CONOPS 4-101
4.50 Coordinate and Submit Draft Operational CONOPS 4-101
4.51 Assist SHAPE in Finalising the Strategic CONOPS 4-102
PHASE 4B - Operational Operations Plan (OPLAN) Development
Section 1 – General
4.52 Introduction 4-103
Section 2 – Process
4.53 Initiate Operational OPLAN Development 4-107
4.54 SACEUR Approval of Operational CONOPS 4-110
4.55 Plan for the Employment of Operational Forces 4-111
4.56 Plan for Command and Control 4-113
4.57 Force Preparation and Sustainment 4-115
4.58 Plan for Force Deployment 4-117
4.59 Plan Force Protection 4-120
4.60 Rehearsal of Concept and Operational OPLAN Coordination 4-122
for Approval and Handover
PHASE 5 – EXECUTION
4.61 Introduction 4-125
4.62 Considerations for Execution 4-127
4.63 Execution and the Operational Estimate 4-129
PHASE 6 – TRANSITION
4.64 Introduction 4-131

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4.65 Considerations for Transition and Termination 4-133

TABLE OF FIGURES
Fig 4.1 NCRP Schematic – Political Military, Strategic and Operational 4-3
Planning Flow Chart
Fig 4.2 Command and Staff Interaction at the Operational Level 4-6
Fig 4.3 Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential / Actual 4-9
Crisis Main Activities
Fig 4.4 Phase 2 Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment 4-17
Main Activities
Fig 4.5 Phase 3 Operational Estimate Main Activities 4-40
Fig 4.6 Phase 3a Mission Analysis 4-46
Fig 4.7 Operating Environment Characteristics and Potential Impact 4-51
Fig 4.8 Factor Analysis – Factor / Deduction / Conclusion 4-53
Fig 4.9 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix 4-56
Fig 4.10 Illustrative Risk Evaluation Matrix 4-58
Fig 4.11 Basic Concepts of an Operational Framework 4-62
Fig 4.12 Phase 3b Courses of Action Development Main Activities 4-72
Fig 4.13 CoA Advantages and Disadvantage Comparison Table 4-83
Fig 4.14 Friendly and Opposing CoA Comparison Table 4-84
Fig 4.15 Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria Comparison Table 4-84
Fig 4.16 Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria (Weighted) Comparison 4-84
Table
Fig 4.17 Operational CONOPS Development Main Activities 4-89
Fig 4.18 Operational OPLAN Development Main Activities 4-105
Fig 4.19 Illustrative Tailored Operational Estimate 4-130

CHAPTER 5 - OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

5.1 Introduction 5-1
5.2 Overview of Operations Assessment 5-1
5.3 Operations Assessment Process 5-4
5.4 Strategic Level Operations Assessment 5-4
5.5 Operational Level Operations Assessment 5-7
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5.6 Operations Assessment at the Component Level 5-8

5.7 Inter-Relations between Levels of Command 5-9

TABLE OF FIGURES
Fig 5.1 Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level 5-6
Fig 5.2 Operations Assessment at the Operational Level 5-9

CHAPTER 6 – FORMATS AND ADMINISTRATION

6.1 Introduction 6-1
6.2 Physical Elements 6-1
6.3 Document Cover 6-1
6.4 Letter of Promulgation 6-1
6.5 Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages 6-3
6.6 Record of Changes 6-3
6.7 Operations Planning Documents 6-3
6.8 Functional Planning Guides 6-4
6.9 Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation 6-4
Procedures
6.10 Review, Revision and Cancelation Procedures 6-4
6.11 Plans Identifications and Nicknames 6-4

Annex Title Page

ANNEXES
A Strategic Planning Templates A-1
 App 1: Strategic Warning Order A-1-1
 App 2: SACEURs Strategic Assessment A-2-1
 App 3: Military Response Options A-3-1
 App 4: Strategic Planning Directive A-4-1
 App 5: Strategic CONOPS / OPLAN Main Body A-5-1
B Operational Planning Templates B-1
 App 1: Operational Advice on Military Response Options B-1-1
 App 2: Operational Warning Order B-2-1

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 App 3: Mission Analysis Briefing Outline Format B-3-1

 App 4: Operational Planning Guidance B-4-1
 App 5: Course of Action Decision Briefing Outline Format B-5-1
 App 6: Operational Planning Directive B-6-1
 App 7: Operational CONOPS / OPLAN Main Body B-7-1
C Strategic / Operational CONOPS / OPLAN Annexes C-1
D Format for Document Covers D-1
E Format for Letter of Promulgation E-1
F Format for Record of Changes F-1
G Format for Functional Planning Guides G-1
H Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation H-1
Procedures
I Review, Revision and Cancellation Procedures I-1
J Plans Identification and Nicknames J-1
 App 1: Plan Numbering System J-1-1
K Glossary of Definitions K-1
L Glossary of Abbreviations L-1

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RECORD OF CHANGES

1. After a change has been incorporated it is to be recorded below and the

pages that have been replaced are to be destroyed in accordance with security
orders.

CHANGE SERIAL AND DATE SIGNATURE RANK /

NUMBER DATE ENTERED ORGANISATION

2. Superseded letters promulgating changes to be recorded below.

REFERENCE DATE TITLE

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para Title Page

1.1 Security Environment 1-1
1.2 Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive 1-1
1.3 Guide versus Directive 1-3
1.4 NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach 1-4
1.5 NATO Crisis Response Process 1-5
1.6 Operations Planning Process 1-7
1.7 Operations Planning Principles 1-10
1.8 Operational Art 1-11
1.9 Risk and Opportunity 1-12
1.10 Mission Command 1-12
1.11 Levels of Command 1-12
1.12 Campaign Synchronisation 1-12
1.13 Engagement Space 1-13
1.14 Instruments of Power 1-14
1.15 NATO End State, Objectives and Effects 1-16
1.16 Design of Operations 1-18
1.17 Planning Tools 1-24

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure Title Page

Fig 1.1 NATO Crisis Response Process – Six Phase Generic Process 1-6
Fig 1.2 NCRP - Baseline Model 1-8
Fig 1.3 NCRP Schematic - Political Military, Strategic and Operational 1-9
Level Planning Flow Chart
Fig 1.4 Theoretical International / Inter-Agency Design 1-20
Fig 1.5 NAC Determination of NATO Role and Ends 1-21
Fig 1.6 Illustrative Overall NATO Strategic Design 1-22
Fig 1.7 Illustrative Strategic Vertical Design 1-23
Fig 1.8 Operational Design Relationships 1-26
Fig 1.9 TOPFAS Interoperability 1-27
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Security Environment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

security environment, and by default NATO’s security interests, are influenced by a
broad and constantly evolving set of challenges; it is and will be complex, global,
subject to unforeseeable developments and increasingly ambiguous. In a
progressively more complex world, peace, security and development are ever more
interconnected. This highlights the need for greater and closer cooperation and
coordination among Nations, International Organisations (IOs), Governmental
Organisations (GOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the requirement
that they play their respective, complementary and interconnected roles in crisis
prevention, response, management and resolution. In this environment, global and
regional organisations are of particular importance, including the United Nations
(UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). The UN Security Council (UNSC) will continue to have the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. With, and in
support of, such structures, the Alliance remains ready, on a case-by-case basis and
by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention, to engage actively in
crisis response and management including Non-Article 5 crisis response operations
(NA5CRO), and to stabilise post-conflict situations. But what is equally clear is the
key role of the UN and relevant organisations, IOs, as well as appropriate NGOs, in
ongoing operations and future crises. It is this requirement that puts a premium on
the need for close collaboration among all actors involved in an international
response and on the need to recognise the interdependence of all the elements of
the international community’s (IC) efforts.

1.2. Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive. Set within the context of a

NATO contribution to a comprehensive approach, (CA) the purpose of this Allied
Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)
is to outline the military procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation,
approval, implementation and review of operation plans1 to enable a common
approach to operations planning. This includes the associated documents which are
required in order to execute the mission allocated to the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) and subordinate operational level and theatre component
commanders. The central role of the Commander (COM) and the inherent need for
collaboration at all levels and at all stages are key aspects in the application of the
COPD as well as the processes it applies;

a. Application. The COPD is focussed at the strategic and operational

level as it represents the application of the processes and procedures laid out
in MC 0133 NATO Operations Planning Process (OPP) and the NATO Crisis
Response System Manual (NCRSM). It is therefore primarily applicable to
operations planning activities at the NATO strategic and operational levels of
command. As the OPP affects and requires input from the tactical level, the

1
The planning process described in the COPD is applicable for both advance planning and crisis response planning.

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COPD must be understood by all and can be adapted for use at the tactical
component level in order to enhance collaborative planning activity2.

b. Commander / Staff Relationship. The relationship between the COM

and his principal staff officers is fundamental to the OPP. The design,
planning and execution are human matters where the COM should lead and
the staff support. The OPP is command led because it supports the
commander’s decision-making. Although much of the actual process can be
delegated, the COM alone remains ultimately responsible for determining how
his formation is to operate. COM guidance at every level and at every stage
provides the staff with the vision of how a challenge is to be tackled and
provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the broader context
of the mission. The COM will remain in charge of their planning process in
their own headquarters (HQ). They may adjust the process outlined in the
COPD in order to adapt it to the situation, while noting the common benefit of
similar procedures to enhance collaboration vertically and laterally. The staff
enables the COM to make the right decisions at the right time. It implements
the COM’s Intent, which must be intuitively understood. The staff must
produce plans that are clear, understandable and robust. The staff also
serves the force by supporting subordinate commands at all times, thereby
ensuring unity of effort. All HQ staff must strive to build and maintain excellent
relations with neighbouring and higher HQs.

c. Collaboration. The planning process sees SACEUR informing the

decision-making process at NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) and establishing
the right conditions for the operational level COMs to achieve the operational
objectives successfully. No formal SACEUR product will be developed
without guidance from NATO HQ or, where appropriate, significant input from
the designated operational level COMs. For collaborative planning to work
effectively, it is vital that planners, at each level, not only have a common
understanding of the crisis situation and a common approach to developing
the necessary plans to support NATO involvement, but also for them to
understand how the COM and staff operate at the next higher level so they
are able to contribute to, and influence, the process. In that respect, each
level should structure its planning organisation in a way that is compatible and
allows for easy interface and collaborative planning.

d. Process. Planning for operations is oriented towards a NATO end

state and strategic objectives (military and non-military) established by
Nations at NATO HQ and carried out within the political limitations and
resource constraints. To achieve this certain processes need to be followed to
account for changing conditions, guidance and analysis;

(1) Changing conditions from an unacceptable to an acceptable

state will require the creation of effects that are necessary to achieve
planned objectives and contribute to the achievement of the NATO end
state. This central idea of planning determines the combination and

2
Whilst the processes and methodologies outlined in the COPD can often be applied at the tactical level, tactical level
commands will in general follow their national planning procedures and processes.

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sequencing of actions in time and space using available resources with

the greatest potential to create the required effects.

(2) The military strategic level, Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe (SHAPE), seeks to translate political-strategic
guidance into military strategic direction for the operational level COM,
and to establish at the strategic level the conditions necessary for the
operational level HQ to plan and execute the mission. At the
operational level, planning seeks to transform strategic direction into a
scheduled series of integrated military actions, carried out by joint
forces, to achieve operational objectives efficiently and with acceptable
risks. The aggregation of operational objectives contributes to the
achievement of strategic objectives.

(3) Strategic planning begins with an in-depth study and analysis of

the crisis and its root causes, taking into account all the constraints.
An analysis of the various actors and systems at play within the
engagement space3 and the operating environments4, including their
perceived objectives, modus operandi, strengths and weaknesses,
interactions and inter-dependencies, will contribute to the identification
of the best possible strategic approach for NATO, including where
appropriate a range of options for NATO’s military contribution within
the context of a CA to crisis resolution. Once approved by the NAC,
the selected option will serve as the basis for the development of
strategic planning direction and then, through a collaborative planning
process, the development of a strategic concept of operations
(CONOPS) and operations plan (OPLAN).

1.3. Guide versus Directive. As a common framework for collaborative

operations planning, the COPD is deliberately detailed, so that it supports training,
while giving experienced planners, at the strategic and operational levels5, the
necessary processes and tools to fully appreciate all elements of the most complex
crisis and to produce high quality operations plans and products. A number of key
aspects will govern the use of the COPD;

a. The COPD’s processes can be applied to cover all expected scenarios;

however, as planners become more familiar with the concepts of the COPD, it
should be used to guide the development of necessary output rather than
followed paragraph by paragraph without consideration to the actual need of
each specific situation.

3
Engagement Space - That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or
has decided, to engage. Note: the engagement space can be initially viewed through several conceptual models. The most
common in NATO recognises the six PMESII domains (Note this list is not exhaustive and can be expanded): political, military,
economic, social, infrastructure, information. The engagement space is different from the operating environment that is defined
as, ‘a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the
decisions of the COM’.
4
Operating Environment - A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. NATO Term.
5
The operational level component commands, theatre component commands and tactical component commands, where
appropriate, will be integrated in the collaborative planning and therefore need to understand the OPP and the methodologies
suggested.

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b. The detail provided in the COPD must also not be mistaken as

generating a requirement for a complex and detailed plan; rather, it is
designed to help the planners develop products of clarity and simplicity
capable of providing the necessary guidance to execute a COM’s vision.

c. The COPD represents ‘a way’, not ‘the way’ of completing operations

planning. It is designed to guide the planner through the process with
suggested methods and means to consider the different aspects of the
process.

d. The COPD complements a number of publications, most notably the

NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), MC 0133 NATO’s
Operations Planning, the Bilateral Strategic Commands (Bi-SC) Knowledge
Development Handbook and the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook
(NOAH). In addition, the COPD draws on Allied Joint Publications and
Doctrine (AJP / AJD) and aims to follow agreed doctrine and practice where
ever possible and appropriate.

e. The COPD is not a compendium for functional or subject matter area

details and specific processes, this detail will be contained in Functional
Planning Guides (FPG) or doctrine; the COPD is a guide on how to plan, not
what to plan.

1.4. NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. NATO recognises

that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. The Alliance’s Strategic
Concept states, ‘[t]he lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in
Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make clear that a comprehensive political,
civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.’ An
understanding of lessons identified and lessons learned must be complimented by
the recognition of new and emerging threats, challenges and opportunities seen in
other conflicts or crisis such as cyber, space, social media, hybrid warfare etc.

a. Deliberate and Inclusive Planning. There is therefore a need for

more deliberate and inclusive planning and action through established crisis
response procedures that allow for both military and non-military resources
and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose. Adopting such a
CA to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active collaboration and
transparency among those involved in crisis response.

b. Integrated Civilian-Military Planning. For the Alliance, this includes:

enhancing integrated civilian-military planning such as NATO cross-cutting
topics6; and the development of process and structures for effective co-
ordination and co-operation with other actors, to allow each to complement
and mutually reinforce the others’ efforts, ideally within an overall strategy
agreed by the international community and legitimate local authorities.

6
Cross Cutting Topics within NATO currently include Women Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC),
Protection of Civilians (PoC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP) and Building Integrity (BI).

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c. Planning Challenges. Planning in a multi-domain environment

generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors.
Experience shows that not only may there be no formally appointed lead
agency to provide overall coordination, but that those organisations capable of
reacting quickly are very often military in nature. In addition, some institutions
may not wish to have formalised relationships with others. Thus, a CA
emerges through the determination of various actors to play their part to
resolve a crisis. Pragmatism is often the way forward, as imperfect as this
may be in an otherwise rules-based society. All levels of NATO should look
for opportunities for interaction and / or collaboration under principles of
mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding, and a duty to share.
Moreover it is incumbent on NATO, especially in the planning and early
execution stages of an operation, to understand and to attempt to anticipate
the needs and objectives of other potential contributors thus enabling
subsequent coordination and cooperation.

d. Legal Considerations. NATO and its COMs cannot operate in

isolation; they have legal and moral responsibilities under the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), United Nations
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), any Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) or Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) with the Host Nation (HN) or
Coalition Partners, and national domestic law. National policy direction, such
as Rules of Engagement (ROE), Targeting Directives (TD), as well as
National Caveats and Red Cards may also constrain planning. The Legal
Advisor (LEGAD) will be one of the COM’s principal advisors and is
responsible for providing timely, accurate, relevant, succinct and robust legal
advice. LEGADs must be engaged in all aspects of the planning process to
identify not only constraints but potential freedoms and to ensure that any
action can legitimately be carried through.

1.5. NATO Crisis Response Process. The six phase generic NATO Crisis
Response Process (NCRP) facilitates grand strategic political decision making, by
capitals, through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in an emerging Article 5 or Non
Article 5 crisis, as well as throughout its life cycle, see Figure 1.1. In circumstances
that will be difficult to predict the NAC will decide for each relevant crisis if NATO
should act and, if so, in what manner. While every crisis is unique, the NCRP
ensures the Alliance is prepared to perform the whole range of possible Article 5 and
Non-Article 5 missions encompassing all of the NATO core tasks.

a. Circumstances. Clearly each circumstance will dictate the exact

steps, but the NCRP provides a default template from which deviations may
be made by informed decisions. It is primarily designed to allow the relevant
staffs and NATO Committees to co-ordinate their work and to submit
comprehensive advice to the NAC in a timely and compelling way. In so
doing, it facilitates grand strategic political decision-making by capitals,
through the NAC, early in an emerging crisis, as well as throughout its life
cycle.

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b. Procedures. The NCRP also provides a procedural structure that

allows the SACEUR, under the political control of the NAC, to undertake
some prudent preparatory planning activities in light of a developing or actual
crisis, in a reasonable time frame and, subsequently, to provide strategic
assessments and advice, including on operations planning and throughout
the execution of a mission.

Political Military Estimate (PME)

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Indications & Assessment Response Planning Execution Transition
Warning Options
Development

NAC Decision

Figure 1.1 NATO Crisis Response Process – Six Phase Generic Process

c. Baseline NCRP Model. The NCRP consists of six phases which

provide a baseline model for use through the full lifecycle of a generic crisis.
The interactions between the NAC, the Military Committee (MC), and
SACEUR is shown on Figure 1.2, and the detailed interactions and the
associated products from the NAC through the strategic and operational level
are shown in Figure 1.3. The generic phases are summarised as follows;

(1) Phase 1 – Indications and Warnings (I&W). Timely and

effective warning of a potential or emerging crisis will initiate movement
through the NCRP. Phase 1 is permanently active. It is SACEUR’s
prerogative to direct his staff to focus on the potential or emerging crisis
as well as to change focus on that particular area. This supports a NAC
decision on the same situation to move to Phase 2.

(2) Phase 2 – Assessment. Once a potential or emerging crisis

has been identified an assessment of the implications to NATO’s
security interests will be initiated. Unfettered military advice will be
submitted to the NAC that includes an assessment whether there is a
role for the military instrument of power (IoP) in response to the crisis.

(3) Phase 3 – Response Options Development. Once it is

accepted that the military has a role in managing the crisis, options for
the use of the military IoP as part of a CA needs to be determined and
assessed.

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(4) Phase 4 – Planning. The formal planning for the use of the
military IoP. The strategic level plan will be approved by the NAC and
the operational level plans, nested within the strategic plan, by
SACEUR.

(5) Phase 5 – Execution. On direction from the NAC the plan(s)

will be executed as part of a CA to achieving the NATO End State.

(6) Phase 6 – Transition. Once there are indications that the

NATO End State is being reached and the possibility to draw down and
/ or handover the mission, direction will be given to transition or
terminate. These phases may overlap and depending upon the extant
OPLAN these phases may require revisiting phases 2 to 4 again to plan
specific transition or termination activities.

1.6. Operations Planning Process. In order to prepare for and conduct complex
and multi-domain operations, it is necessary to conduct operations planning7 to
develop appropriately detailed operations plans, which address all relevant factors
for the efficient and successful conduct of an operation. The operations planning
process (OPP), sets out how the military supports the NCRP; it describes how the
Alliance initiates, develops, coordinates, approves, executes, reviews, revises and
cancels operations plans.

a. Planning Categories. There are two categories of operations plans,

both applicable for Article 5 or Non-Article 5 situations:

(1) Advance Planning. Designed to prepare the Alliance to deal

with identified possible security risks. There are various types of
advance planning operations plans: Standing Defence Plan (SDP),
Contingency Operations Plan (COP), Generic COP (GCOP),
Graduated Response Plan (GRP) and Sequenced Response Plan8
(SERP).

(2) Crisis Response Planning (CRP). Developed in response to

an actual or developing crisis, crisis response planning calls for the
development of an OPLAN. For each operation, a strategic OPLAN
(approved by the NAC) and operational OPLAN(s) (approved by
SACEUR) are produced.

b. Linkages. Operations planning requires specific practices and

procedures for each level and the establishment of clear links between
actions, effects, objectives and the end state and, where possible, the
harmonisation of military, political, civil and economic planning.

7
Operations planning is defined in AAP-06 as, ‘[t]he planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tactical
levels. Note: The preferred English term to designate the planning of military operations at all levels is ‘operations planning’.
The term ‘operational planning’ is not to be used so as to prevent confusion with operational-level planning.’
8
SERP has been approved as a new type of advance plan in accordance with PO (2020)0048 (INV).

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 Political-Military Estimate (PME) Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP) Development Comprehensive Strategic Political/Military Plan Review

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Indications Assessment Response Planning Execution Transition
& Warning Options

Approval Approval Approval

NAC
Task for Task for CONOPS OPLAN Task for NID DS
NID NED Transition NED
SMA MROs & FAD ROEREQ PMR Transition Termination
OPLAN
TCSOR

CONOPS
SMA w/ SMA w/ Illustrative OPLAN PMR Transition
SSA MROs CJSOR ROEREQ
OPLAN
TCSOR TCSOR
Endorsement Endorsement Endorsement Endorsement

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Indications Assessment Response Planning Execution Transition

1-8
MC
& Warning Options

Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance Guidance

Tasker Tasker Tasker

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SSA MROs PMR

CONOPS
Illustrative OPLAN
SSA MROs PMR Transition
CJSOR ROEREQ

Figure 1.2 NCRP Baseline Model

TCSOR OPLAN
TCSOR

PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4a PHASE 4b PHASE 5 PHASE 6

Potential/ Strategic Military Strategic CONOPS Strategic OPLAN Execution Transition

SACEUR
Actual Crisis Assessment Response & Force Gen
Identification Options
 Generic NATO Operations Planning Process

Political-Military Estimate (PME) Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP) development Strategic Political-Military Plan review
Phase 1
Phase 2 Phase 3
Indications and
Assessment Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Phase 4 Planning

NAC
of the of Response Execution Transition
Potential/Actual
Crisis Options
Crisis
Approved Endorsed NID for
Task NMAs Transition NAC
Endorsed Strategic Strategic Approved
Request or for PMR planning Decision Sheet
Request or Strategic CONOPS OPLAN, Strategic Approved
Information Task the NMA’s OPLAN, to Terminate
Task the NMA’s CONOPS SORs Transition NED
Sharing for SMA with ROEREQ ROEREQ, NED
SMA and for MRO OPLAN
FAD TCSOR Endorsed Endorsed
SSA SMA and NID Illustrative CJSOR
MPR Transition
MROs and TCSOR
OPLAN
Phase 1
Phase 2 Phase 3
Indications and
Assessment Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Phase 4 Planning

MC
of the of Response Execution Transition
Potential/Actual
Crisis Options
Crisis
NAC NAC Approved NID for Approved NAC
Tasker NID with MC Approved Strategic Tasker for Transition Transition Decision Sheet
Strategic OPLAN, NED with
for MRO Guidance Strategic PMR planning with OPLAN to Terminate
Tasker for Strategic MC
Information FAD
OPLAN, ROEREQ, NED MC Guidance with MC With MC
SSA SSA MROs CONOPS CONOPS SORs Guidance
Sharing TCSOR with MC Guidance Guidance
with With MC With MC 1 ROEREQ with
Guidance Strategic

1-9
Illustrative CJSOR Guidance Guidance
MC Guidance SACEUR’s
Transition
and TCSOR MPR
OPLAN
Phase 1
Initial Phase 3 Phase 4 Strategic Plan Development
Phase 2
Situational Military Phase 4b
Phase 5 Phase 6
Strategic Phase 4a
Awareness of Response Strategic OPLAN Development Execution Transition

Planning Flow Chart

SHAPE
Assessment Strategic CONOPS Development
Potential/Actual Options (Force Generation)

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Crisis
Strategic Strategic SPD
Strategic Draft MROs OPLAN ACTORD ACTORD
SPD CONOPS Draft Op on
Information Warning Op ROEIMP ROEIMP
SSA Draft Op OPLAN Op Transition
Order CONOPS SCO
Sharing CONOPS, SORs OPLAN Operations
Operational Approval Disengagement
Illustrative ROE REQ Approval
Advice Assessment Planning
SORs
Phase 1
Initial Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Operational Plan Development
Situational Operational Appreciation Operational Estimate Phase 5 Phase 6
Phase 3a Phase 3b Phase 4a
Awareness of of the Phase 4b Execution Transition
Mission CoA Operational CONOPS
Operational OPLAN Development
Potential/Actual Strategic Environment Analysis Development Development
Crisis

Op Level Commands
Note:
Note: 1. Following
1. Following FADFAD
receipt,
receipt,SACEUR
SACEURwill
willrelease
releaseprovisional
provisional CJSOR with
with ACTWARN
ACTWARNtotocommence
commenceformal Force
formal Generation
Force Process
Generation Process

NAC – North Atlantic Council MRO – Military Response Option CONOPS – Concept of Operations FAD – Force Activation Directive ROEREQ – ROE Request (message)
SCO – Strategic Coordination Order NID – NAC Initiating Directive CJSOR – Combined Joint Statement of Requirement NED – NAC Execution Directive ROEIMP – ROE Implementation (message)

Figure 1.3 NCRP Schematic – Political Military, Strategic and Operational Level
SMA – Strategic Military Advice SPD – Strategic Planning Directive TCSOR – Theatre Capabilities Statement of Requirement ACTORD – Activation Order (message) PMR – Periodic Mission Review
SSA – SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment CoA – Course of Action SOR – Statement of Requirement ROE – Rules of Engagement MPR – Mission Progress Report
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

c. Type of Response. Regardless of the situation, the underlying

premise for operations planning is that military operations are required to
counter threats from opposing forces or other sources, or to contain violence
and hostilities. This pertains to both Article 5 Collective Defence (CD) and
NA5CRO and encompasses conventional, unconventional and asymmetric
threats. Our opponents, including political leaders, the population and the
military, possess their own ‘will’, influenced by their own culture, perspectives
and vital interests, to pursue goals in opposition to our own. It is therefore
imperative during all operations planning to attribute to our opponents and
opposing factions the potential to willingly oppose our operations with their full
potential when their aims conflict with our own.

d. Appreciation. During the conduct of operations planning, it is

important for commanders at all levels to properly appreciate the relevant
information environment and its potential impact on the planning for, and
conduct of, military operations. Commanders need to be fully cognisant of
how military activities, especially those involving the use of force, may
communicate strategically and influence perceptions of a wide variety of
audiences. In the design of operations, commanders and their staff need to
consider various ways to create the desired effects, including both lethal and
non-lethal measures as appropriate, to ensure those selected support the
overall strategic intent and understand the implications of their actions.

1.7. Operations Planning Principles. The following general principles for

operations planning, paraphrased below for brevity, are promulgated in MC 0133;
they are applicable when considering the design of NATO operations in today’s
modern strategic environment:

a. Strategic Coherence. It is essential that the planning process be

coherent internally, as well as externally with other actors, as appropriate. The
military strategic plan must be fully integrated within the over-arching NATO
strategic plan and the military strategic activity must complement and support
where appropriate the non-military activity. Likewise the activity planned and
executed at the operational level and below must be linked to the
achievement of the strategic objectives and goals in order to ensure unity of
purpose and consistency in approach and action.

b. Comprehensive Understanding / Preparation of the Environment

(CUOE / CPOE)9. Coherence in the planning and conduct of operations
requires building / fostering a shared comprehensive preparation or
understanding of the situation from the very beginning of planning and
maintaining this understanding throughout the process. In order to support
the commander’s decision making process, we need to understand, but only
to the best extent in the time available, the complexity of the operating
environment and the linkages, strengths, interdependencies and
vulnerabilities therein. The process undertaken to understand the

9
The terms CUOE and CPOE are often used synonymously, CPOE has traditionally been used to describe the appreciation of
an environment however CUOE with the use of the word ‘understanding’ better implies the need to acquire the knowledge and
then interpret or comprehend its significance with regard to the crisis or OPP.

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environment is continuous from commencement of planning through to

operation termination and as such the operations planning must be regularly
reviewed in order to ensure it remains appropriate and relevant.

c. Mutual Respect, Trust, Transparency and Understanding.

Operations planning in support of NATO's Contribution to the CA must be
underpinned by a culture of mutual respect, trust, transparency and
understanding. This is built through information sharing and practical
cooperation and must be encouraged to allow collaboration and cooperation
across NATO bodies, among civil and military actors, and with relevant non-
NATO actors and national and local authorities.

d. Consultation and Compatible Planning. Mutually supportive,

compatible, and wherever possible, concerted and harmonised planning is
fundamental for success of a CA. Therefore, operations plans must meet the
politically agreed level of interaction with external civil and military actors and
at a minimum allow consistency between our actions and desired effects, and
those of external actors. Accordingly, NATO's operations planning, and the
associated information exchange and classification procedures, must
encourage and enable concerted effort, collaboration and cooperation
wherever possible.

e. Efficient Use of Resources. During planning, decision makers must

be made aware of the risk of not adequately resourcing an operation. In
addition, to maximise effectiveness, planners must take into account the core
competencies of both military and non-military contributing actors to the fullest
extent possible within the international response to the crisis.

f. Flexibility and Adaptability. The operating environment of a

particular modern crisis is both complex and continually changing.
Adversaries possess a ‘will’ and are thus potentially unpredictable, complex
and adaptive. Thus, no planning process can guarantee assured success.
Plans must allow flexibility and adaptability within the mission and agreed
political and resources framework. Regular operations assessment is
required to guide execution of military operations towards achievement of their
objectives and their contribution to the achievement of the desired NATO end
state.

1.8. Operational Art. Operational art connects the details of tactics with the goals
of strategy and may be regarded as the cognitive approach by commanders and
staffs, supported by their intuition, skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and
judgment, to produce strategies, campaigns, and operations to organise and employ
military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. At the highest level it
correlates political needs and military power and is not defined by force size, scale of
operations or degree of effort alone. The application of operational art is most often
associated with commanders and senior staff but its success relies with the
operational science or process and understanding, provided by the staff. The two are
not mutually exclusive and must be complimentary. Operational art, guided by the
COM, remains an essential aspect of operations planning.

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1.9. Risk and Opportunity. The identification, analysis, management and

monitoring of both, risks and opportunities, must be completed throughout the OPP,
at all levels. Risk must be owned by the COM, supported by the staff. The level of
risk taken will be determined by the COM in conjunction with the Chain of Command
(CoC), with risk considered through a risk management process (RMP) that will look
to categorise each according to the ability to treat, tolerate, terminate or transfer
each risk. The RMP will be dynamic and will often be directly linked to opportunities
that develop or occur during operations.

1.10. Mission Command. Through mission command, commanders generate the

freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully both when planned and
unforeseen developments arise, and exploit favourable opportunities. Mission
command encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making.
Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state
clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be
achieved and provide sufficient forces, resources and authority required to
accomplish their assigned tasks.

1.11. Levels of Command10. The NCRP and the OPP are primarily applicable
across the strategic and operational levels of command but directly affect and
require input from the tactical level, and as such needs to be understood by all. The
NATO agreed definitions of the levels of command are below.

a. Strategic Level. The level at which a nation or group of nations

determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys
national, including military, resources to achieve them.

b. Operational Level. The level at which campaigns and major

operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish
strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.

c. Tactical Level. The level at which activities, battles and engagements

are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to
tactical formations and units.

1.12. Campaign Synchronisation. Due to the inter-related, inter-dependant and

potentially simultaneous multi-domain nature of modern operations, and the
increasingly complex nature and scope of the operating environment, there is an
increasing requirement at the strategic level for greater coordination, deconfliction,
prioritisation and synchronisation of activity being conducted across the area of
operations (AOO). The orchestration or campaign synchronisation, of multiple HQs
and commands, distinct geographical areas, resources and assets towards a
unifying purpose (end state / objectives) requires SACEUR and SHAPE to adopt and
implement a broad and holistic approach to the planning and execution of
operations. COMs and staffs at all levels have to therefore recognise, understand
and constantly monitor the complex inter-relationships and dependencies that
increasingly typify operations. Campaign synchronisation is led at the strategic level
through the six phase planning process and executed by the Comprehensive Crisis

10
Definitions taken from NATO Term Approved 15 Jan 2008.

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and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) through the Strategic Coordination

Order (SCO). Joint synchronisation is led at the operational level through the JFC /
JHQ planning process and executed though the Joint Coordination Order (JCO).

1.13. Engagement Space. Modern crises are characterised by complex

interdependencies and conflicts are underpinned by a combination of historical,
political, military, social, cultural and economic issues.

a. The underpinning issues are generally interdependent and,

consequently, the solutions required to address these issues are of a varied
nature. NATO currently recognises six standard domains11 under the political,
military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII) construct
within an engagement space, though others12 may be included according to
the situation. They are:

(1) Political. Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations

and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or
rule within a specific geographic boundary or organisation through the
application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes
the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative
of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors
that form the identity of a society.

(2) Military. The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure,

acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect
national or organisational security objectives. This also covers the
internal security aspects of a country.

(3) Economic. Composed of the sum total of production,

distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or
organisation. It includes not only economic development of a country,
but also the distribution of wealth.

(4) Social. The interdependent network of social institutions that

support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory
opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within
hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable
environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society’s
structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting
infrastructure, humanitarian, etc.

(5) Infrastructure. The basic facilities, services, and installations

needed for the functioning of a community, organisation, or society.
Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures,
schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation,
11
A gender perspective will become an integrated part of all six domains through the completion of a gender analysis (including
social, cultural, economic, health etc. aspects).
12
AD 065-11 talks about PMESII plus, which is described as: Political (including governance), Military (including security),
Economic, Sociocultural, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII), plus technological and environmental elements. The use of the
PMESII domains is not prescriptive and its use is akin to using a DIMEFL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic,
Financial, Intelligence and Legal) approach.

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geography, judicial, security etc. and, if known, defined critical national

infrastructure (CNI) and identified mission vital infrastructure (MVI).

(6) Information. The entire infrastructure, organisation, personnel,

and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display,
disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information
and communication media.

b. Through an analysis of the goals, strength, weaknesses and

interdependencies of the main actors within the PMESII domains, knowledge
is developed about the behaviour of the main actors within the engagement
space. That knowledge is then used by decision makers and staffs at all
levels to determine how these actors might be influenced in ways that achieve
the Alliance’s strategic objectives and end state, thereby contributing to the
international community aims.

1.14. Instruments of Power. Conditions in each of the PMESII domains of the

engagement space can be influenced by the application of one, or a combination of,
the four IoPs under the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)
construct13. In order to achieve a lasting solution, modern operations require the
complementary and coherent application of the various IoP.

a. DIME Construct. As a security Alliance, NATO exercises control over

only the diplomatic / political (partially) and the military (primarily) instruments.
While commanders have primarily the military instrument at their disposal to
contribute to resolving a crisis, the NAC can also use the diplomatic / political
instrument through the office of the Secretary General (SECGEN). The other
instruments are controlled by IOs and states or NGOs and, consequently, the
Alliance must often coordinate or deconflict its own actions and plans with the
relevant non-NATO actors involved. In most cases, the Alliance will be
involved in a supporting role in order to provide a degree of security and
stability that allows the other instruments to work and operate in the
engagement space in order to establish acceptable conditions in the other
domains.

(1) Diplomatic. The diplomatic instrument refers to the use of

political power, in particular in the diplomatic arena cooperating with
various actors, to influence an adversary or to establish advantageous
conditions14. NATO member nations employ NATO and other IO’s to
combine their political power and influence on the international scene,
speaking and acting with the same purpose, to create greater effect.
The degree to which diplomatic engagement succeeds is governed by
the ability to: negotiate; broker agreements; and manage relationships
between allies and potential partners. Diplomatic failure, partial or total,
is generally signalled by the switch to economic or military activities.
Effective diplomacy relies on persuasive negotiation supported by
13
IoP could be considered using the Political, Military, Economic and Civil (PMEC) construct. Either construct will help the staff
consider the issues in a more comprehensive manner.
14
The NCRSM refers to ‘diplomatic’ options for dealing with a crisis as part of Preventative Options / Measures.

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

credible economic and military power. The diplomatic instrument is

constantly in use, including during conflict. The public face of the
Alliance's collective diplomatic instrument is the NATO SECGEN.

(2) Information. Information underpins understanding and decision

making. Every Alliance action, word and image communicates the
intent of the Alliance with the resulting potential for strategic
effects. The Alliance makes every effort to synchronise and coordinate
communication activities. Strategic communications (StratCom) aims to
advance Alliance interests and to achieve the Alliance's political and
military objectives. StratCom, delivered through the instruments of
power via policy, words and actions is an important element of
operations planning and execution.

(3) Military. The military instrument refers to the application of

military power, including the threat or use of lethal and non-lethal force,
to coerce, deter, contain or defeat an adversary, including the
disruption and destruction of its critical military and non-military
capabilities. It can also refer to the constructive use of military forces
to secure and / or support stabilisation and reconstruction or as a tool
in helping solve complex humanitarian disasters and emergencies.
The military is NATO’s main instrument. Integrating the military
instrument early into a collective strategy is critical and is enabled at a
high level by continuous effective civil-military interaction (CMI).The
Alliance will use military force, which is a component part of the military
instrument, only as a last resort.

(4) Economic. The economic instrument generally refers to

initiatives, incentives and sanctions designed to affect the flow of goods
and services, as well as financial support to state and non-state actors
involved in a crisis. The aggregation of the economic instruments of
NATO nations could act as a significant lever, provided that nations
would use their economic instruments in a way that supports the
achievement of the NATO end state and also other stated IC goals. In
extreme circumstances, the economic instrument may require the
military instrument to apply force in support, for example, through
blockade operations to enforce an embargo. The economic instrument
does not only have utility to coerce or compel; it may also encourage
desirable behaviour through beneficial concessions or investment.

b. In accordance with direction and guidance from the political strategic

level, the use of these instruments must be planned and, where feasible, de-
conflicted and harmonised with the non-NATO instruments that are being
levered by relevant non-NATO actors inside the engagement space. This will
facilitate the harmonisation of NATO’s military and non-military, and possibly
political, planning with non-NATO diplomatic, information, military and
economic planning, whenever possible. Such coordination will take place at a
number of levels within the international, governmental and non-governmental
actors concerned, for example at the institutional and regional HQs and field

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

office levels.

1.15. NATO End State, Objectives and Effects. The definition of the NATO end
state, objectives and effects is the result of a collaborative approach to crisis
identification, analysis, and assessment between NATO HQ and the strategic /
operational HQ within the NCRP.

a. NATO End State. The NATO end state15 is defined as, [t]he NAC
statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for
NATO’s involvement.’

(1) The NATO end state of an operation, and associated NATO

strategic objectives (military and non-military), are identified and
defined politically by the NAC, informed by military advice from
SACEUR and the advice of the Military and other Committees in NATO
HQ.

(2) At the conclusion of NCRP Phase 3 (Development of Response

Options), if the NAC decides that NATO is to be involved in efforts to
resolve a crisis, as NATO’s contribution to a CA to its resolution, it will
release a NAC Initiating Directive (NID), which includes the NATO end
state.

(3) During the execution of an operation, the NAC will determine

when the NATO end state has been achieved. SACEUR, supported by
his subordinate commanders, will assist this process through the
submission of periodic operations assessments and / or Periodic
Mission Reviews (PMR) on the progress of each operation / mission,
including when military objectives are considered to be achieved.

b. Objectives. An objective is defined as ‘[a] clearly defined and

attainable goal or aim to be achieved’. In NATO, in the spirit of mission
command, objectives are assigned to a commander by the next higher level
(i.e. operational objectives assigned to the operational commander by
SACEUR).

(1) In the NID, the NAC promulgates strategic objectives16, military

strategic objectives (MSOs) and non-military strategic objectives
(NMSOs)) to prescribe the ‘ends’ to be achieved by NATO military and
non-military efforts in support of the achievement of the NATO end
state. SACEUR informs the development of MSOs with military advice,
including the submission of Military Response Options (MROs) if

15
This NATO end state is not to be confused as a ‘military end state’, as used in some national doctrine. A separate ‘military
end state’ is not articulated in NATO military plans. Military ‘ends’ to be achieved are expressed through the use of objectives.
16
The NCRSM illustrative NID template includes ‘supporting objectives’. While labelled as military and / or non-military
objectives (to be achieved within means and capabilities), the examples listed are ‘provision of support to IO, NGO, etc.’ These
activities are intended to assist to pursue, progress and sustain the main strategic objectives. As such, these ‘supporting
objectives’ are not considered ‘objectives’ in a purest sense. If promulgated by the NAC, their intent will most likely be captured
by strategic planners in ‘limitations’ as something to be done while achieving the main strategic objectives, with the resources
provided for that purpose. If they are expressed as something to be ‘achieved’, ‘supporting objectives will be analysed and
treated like military and / or non-military strategic objectives accordingly (noting that they are to be achieved with no additional
resources).

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

requested by the NAC, supported by the designated operational

COM(s).

(2) The focus of military planning, following receipt of the NID, is on

the achievement of the MSOs and their contribution to the achievement
of the NATO end state, while considering necessary military support for
the achievement of NATO NMSOs. SACEUR assigns operational
objectives to designated operational commanders as part of their
assigned mission. Initially these operational objectives are issued as
‘provisional’ until the operational commander has conducted his
mission analysis, following which requests for amendments can be
discussed with SACEUR.

(3) During the conduct of the operation, regular assessments and

reviews are conducted to inform on mission progress. As military
objectives are considered achieved commanders inform their next
superior commander. SACEUR will inform the NAC when he considers
the MSOs achieved. The termination of a NATO military operation will
be decided by the NAC when the NATO end state is considered
achieved or, following achievement of NATO strategic military ‘ends’,
when the military is no longer needed in support of remaining strategic
non-military ‘ends’ necessary for achievement of the NATO end state.

c. Effects. Planning attempts to identify and develop a plan to create

desired effects, while mitigating undesired effects. An effect is defined as, ‘[a]
change in the state of a system17 (or system element), that results from one or
more actions18, or other causes.’ NATO uses effects in the planning for, and
conduct of, operations at the military-strategic and operational levels19.

(1) Derived from objectives, effects bridge the gap between

objectives and actions by describing what changes in a system are
required, including changes in the capabilities, behaviour or opinions
(perceptions) of actors within the operations environment and to the
strategic environment. Effects play a crucial role because they provide
a focus for actions and contribute to the achievement of objectives and
the end state. Effects must be measurable and should be limited in
number.

(2) Effects can be grouped into two categories physical and non-
physical. Although all physical effects will lead to some form of non-
physical effect, their primary purpose will be to influence the capabilities
of actors, while non-physical effects are principally directed towards an
actor’s behaviour (also referred to as the cognitive domain). This
change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system
elements), which results from one or more actions, or other causes,

17
For definition of system, system element etc. See Chapter 5.
18
Actions are defined generically as ‘[t]he process of doing something to achieve an aim.’ For the purposes of the COPD, an
action can also be thought of as the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in
order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective.
19
MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the Use of Effects in Operations, dated 20 July 2010.

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

may be further categorised:

(a) Desired Effects. Those effects that have a positive

impact on the achievement of objectives.

(b) Undesired Effects. Those effects that disrupt or

jeopardise the achievement of objectives.

(3) The use of effects in operations planning helps in prioritising

efforts to achieve NATO’s objectives and in the efficient allocation of
resources. However, planners should remember that a proper effects
determination is only possible through a sound understanding of the
crisis situation, the main actors to be influenced and the cultural
aspects of the environment within which an operation will be taking
place.

1.16. Design of Operations. As planning progresses it is useful to be able to

graphically depict the linkages between end state, objectives, effects, lines of effort
or operation, centres of gravity etc. This depiction allows for a simple visualisation of
a plan as it evolves; it will initially be developed as a design framework from which
options can be developed but once an initial operations framework has been agreed
it will become the operations design. The operations design should reflect the CA
and the use of all of the IoP at the highest level becoming increasingly more
focussed towards the military IoP at the military strategic and operational levels.

a. International Design. International crises are by nature complex and

evolve over time. At their outset it is likely that all will not share the same
understanding of the problem nor will they universally have the same view on
how to react to it.

(1) Actors in the international arena (e.g. IOs, GOs, NGOs, regional
organisations or nations will engage (or not) in line with their interests
and / or responsibilities in their own time and a manner of their
choosing. These actions may be coordinated or not, and may be
complementary or competing. As mentioned previously, this serves
only to highlight the need for close cooperation and coordination
among IOs and the requirement that they play their respective,
complementary and interconnected roles in crisis prevention and
management.

(2) Therefore at no time, especially as a crisis emerges, will there

be a universally agreed international end state, expressing desired final
conditions, or objectives, except in a more general sense. Neither
would there be a formal ‘international design’, similar to the NATO
operational design as explained below, where actions of the four IoPs
are organised along lines of engagement (LoE) towards international
objectives to the international end state.

(3) In a theoretical sense, if there were a universally accepted

expression of an international end state to a particular crisis by an

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

organisation that had control of all four IoPs, a theoretical international

operations design could be expressed as shown in Figure 1.420 and
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 then show where and how the military IoP is
nested.

b. NATO Design. The NCRP is designed to assist the NAC determine if a

NATO response to a particular crisis is warranted and, if so, what would be
the desired outcome of such a response.

(1) Strategic Design. The need for NATO involvement and the
possible role NATO could play would be the subject of dialogue
between NATO, at the political level, and relevant players and
international actors.

(a) If the NAC determines that a NATO response is

necessary, they describe the NATO ‘ends’ to be achieved as a
NATO end state and strategic objectives (MSOs and NMSOs).

(b) The NAC would then promulgate the desired NATO ‘ends’
(NATO end state and strategic objectives), with other direction
and guidance in a NID, which directs crisis response planning by
the NATO military authorities and political and non-military staffs
and bodies.

(c) SACEUR would focus ACO military planning on realising

the military ‘ends’ to contribute to the achievement of the NATO
end state and supporting, as required, the realisation of strategic
non-military ‘ends’. ACO planning would be conducted in a
collaborative manner, in cooperation with relevant international,
regional, national and local actors, which would require timely
devolution of authorities for interaction with these actors by each
level, commensurate with the assigned objectives. This would
ensure NATO military plans are complementary to other NATO
strategic non-military activities and coordinated with relevant
non-military and non-NATO actors at each level. The product of
this planning would be a strategic OPLAN, to be approved by
the NAC, and an operational OPLAN to be approved by
SACEUR.

c. A diagrammatic overall NATO strategic design is not used in the same

manner as at the operational level. As the strategic plan is developed an
‘illustrative’ vertically aligned strategic framework is developed, which in turn
becomes the strategic design, see Figure 1.7. The scope of SACEUR’s
strategic OPLAN would address the elements shown in green, as a
contribution towards achievement of the NATO end state.

20
Figure 1.4 is an overly simplistic diagram, only shown here to aid understanding of this section and how the sections that
follow relate – there should be no expectation that such a diagram for the resolution of a crisis will ever exist during the
planning process.

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 Potential Phases

Phase Phase Phase

Military Military Military

Effect Effect Objective

Systems Military Military Military

Analysis Effect Effect Objective
MILITARY
POLITICAL Military
Effect

MILITARY Military Military

Current
Effect Objective “INTERNATIONAL
Situation Strategic
Friendly Centre(s) of END STATE”
ECONOMIC Set of (acceptable
Strategic Gravity

1-20
Unacceptable Centre(s) of Opposing conditions)
Conditions Gravity Diplomatic Actor(s) Diplomatic
SOCIAL Effect Objective

DIPLOMATIC
Diplomatic Diplomatic

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

INFRA- Effect Objective

STRUCTURE

Economic Economic Economic

ECONOMIC Objective
INFORMATION Effect Effect

Info Information
Effect Objective
INFORMATION Info

Figure 1.4 Theoretical International / Inter-Agency Design

Effect
Info Information
Effect Objective

PMESII Instruments International

Lines
Lines of
of Engagement
Engagement
Domains of Power (DIME) Objectives
 Potential Phases

Phase Phase Phase

Military Military Military

Effect Effect Objective

Systems Military Military Military

Analysis Effect Effect Objective
MILITARY
POLITICAL Military
Effect

MILITARY NATO Military Military

Current
Contribution to a Effect Objective “INTERNATIONAL
Situation Strategic
Friendly Centre(s) of END STATE”
ECONOMIC Set of (acceptable
Strategic Comprehensive Gravity
Unacceptable Centre(s) of Opposing conditions)
Conditions Gravity Diplomatic
Approach Actor(s) Diplomatic
SOCIAL Effect Objective

DIPLOMATIC
Diplomatic Diplomatic
INFRA- Effect Objective
STRUCTURE

Economic Economic Economic

ECONOMIC Objective
INFORMATION Effect Effect

Info Information
Effect Objective
INFORMATION Info
Effect
Info Information
Effect Objective
Potential Phases

PMESII Phase Phase Phase

Instruments International

1-21
Lines
Lines of
of Engagement
Engagement
Domains of Power (DIME) Objectives

Action
Military Military Military Military
Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic
Theoretical International Design Effect Effect Effect Objective
Action

Action Action Action

M ILITARY Military Military

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Strategic Strategic
(SACEUR) Effect Objective
Action

Action Action
NATO Strategic “NATO”
Current Unacceptable Strategic Centre(s ) of End State
Military Military Military
Situation Condition Centre of Gravity ( acceptable
Strategic Strategic Strategic
Gravity Effect Effect
Opposing Objective conditions)
Actor(s)
Action

Action
Action Non-
NATO Role
Non- Military
Military
Strategic
Strategic
Action Effect
Objective
and ‘Ends’
Non- Military
(Mainly Nations – DI-E) Action Action
Non-
Non- Military
Military
Strategic
Strategic
Effect
Action Objective

Figure 1.5 NAC Determination of NATO Role and Ends

NATO NATO
Instruments of Power Lines
Lines of
of Engagement
Engagement Strategic Objectives

NATO Role and ‘Ends’

 Potential Phases

Phase Phase Phase

Action
Military Military Military Military
Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic
Effect Effect Effect Objective
Action

Action Action Action

MILITARY Military Military

Strategic Strategic
(SACEUR) Effect Objective
Action

Action Action
NATO Strategic “NATO”
Current Unacceptable Strategic Centre(s) of End State
Military Military Military

1-22
Situation Condition Centre of Gravity (acceptable
Strategic Strategic Strategic
Gravity Effect Effect
Opposing Objective conditions)
Actor(s)
Action

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Action
Action Non-
Non-Military
Military
Strategic
Strategic
Action Effect
Objective
Non-Military
(Mainly Nations – DI-E) Action Action
Non-
Non-Military
Military
Strategic
Strategic
Effect
Objective

Figure 1.6 Illustrative Overall NATO Strategic Design

Action

NATO NATO
Instruments of Power Lines
Lines of
of Engagement
Engagement Strategic Objectives
 “NATO” NATO End State and
End State Strategic Objectives
(acceptable conditions) as given by the NAC

Non- Non-
Military Military Military
Military Military
Strategic Strategic Strategic
Strategic Strategic
Objective Objective Objective
Objective Objective

Complementary Complementary Complementary

Military Military Military Military Military
Non Military Non Military Non Military
Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic

1-23
Activity Activity Activity
Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military

Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic
Action Action Action Action Action Action Action Action Action

Figure 1.7 Illustrative Strategic Vertical Design

Unacceptable Conditions

Current Situation
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Operational Design. SACEUR assigns the designated

operational commander(s) a mission, including operational objectives
to be accomplished.

(a) Through the operational estimate, a commander develops

a final operational design, which is an expression of the COM
vision for the transformation of the unacceptable operational
situation at the start of an operation into a series of acceptable
operational conditions at its end. This is done through
establishing decisive conditions (DCs) along different lines of
operation (LoOs), leading to the achievement of operational
objectives, while contributing to the achievement of strategic
objectives and NATO end state.

(b) Figure 1.8 depicts the relationships of the operational

design to the illustrative overall NATO strategic design and the
theoretical international design.

1.17. Planning Tools. In order to facilitate collaborative, parallel, although

somewhat consecutively, and convergent planning and execution a number of
planning tools21 built around web based applications / Functional Services (FS), have
been developed by NATO. These have been designed to assist the staff at all levels
of operations planning and support, from political, strategic and operational22 down to
the tactical. These applications conform to the appropriate NATO policies and
directives and whilst they have been developed to support the full planning and
execution process they are flexible enough to support rapid planning that may
selectively omit stages and elements in line with the intent of the COPD. Three
primary applications are currently used to support the OPP and users have to be
aware that these FS continue to be developed further to provide greater utility and
there are inherent constraints associated with their use.

a. Intelligence Functional Support (INTEL FS). Intel FS represents in

many respects the first of the Functional Services that serves or feeds the
OPP as one of the primary tools available to the J2 / Intelligence community.
The Intel FS suite of applications is designed to allow information sharing in
order to support the management of intelligence processes, provide search
and analytical capabilities, generate and manage intelligence information,
provide specialised functionalities in support of specific domains (imagery,
signals intelligence, and counter-intelligence) and allow intelligence
collaboration and synchronisation. INTEL FS will support interoperability with
external systems and manage multiple users and permissions in order to
allow the sharing of information across all NATO static HQ’s and deployed / in
theatre HQs.

21
The use of planning tools is to be maximised whenever possible; they facilitate timely and effective collaborative planning and
significantly enhance the planning process as a whole. The OPP and the methodologies associated with it must however be
fully understood and able to be applied when the FS are not available.
22
Planning Tools / FS can be used down to the tactical level depending on the role the tactical level organisation may be
fulfilling, if it is utilising the COPD. The COPD is not prescriptive in the use of planning tools.

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

b. Tool for Operations Planning Functional Area Services (TOPFAS).

TOPFAS is a suite of tools that supports Knowledge Development (KD),
Planning and Assessment for operations in an integrated way at all levels of
operations. It allows planners, analysts and assessors to work collaboratively
and in parallel, although somewhat consecutively, through the OPP. Relevant
planning information is instantly available for informing decision-makers and
commanders in order to facilitate integrated and synchronised planning.
TOPFAS is already interoperable with several existing Functional Services
support tools (LOGFAS, INTEL FS,) and itself comprises of three main
components; the System Analysis Tool (SAT), the Operations Planning Tool
(OPT) and the Campaign Assessment Tool (CAT), see figure 1.9, and these
are supplemented by additional tools and applications for specific aspects of
planning support such as Force Generation Management, Readiness
Reporting, Request for Information (RFI) Management and the Order of Battle
Management Tool (OMT).

(1) System Analysis Tool (SAT). SAT is used from the outset of
the planning process by the staff, normally led by J2, analysts and the
Knowledge Developers, to gain and provide awareness and
understanding of the area of interest (AOI). It helps to identify (key)
factors, conditions to be changed, vulnerabilities, strengths etc. and can
identify and compare different sets of the cascading effects that a
change of one or several conditions might have on the rest of the
conditions. This dynamic analysis constitutes an essential piece of
support that SAT offers to the planners. The different options or
permutations of potential changes can serve to help identify Response
Options and / or Courses of Actions (CoA) in due course and as
options are identified assessors can help identify the measurements of
the acceptability status of the different conditions to be changed.

(2) Operations Planning Tool (OPT). Based on the analysis

conducted in SAT, planners using OPT can frame the problem and the
mission they have received. OPT functionalities support all the phases
and steps used and described in the COPD, however, should time
require or, should the process be altered by decision, OPT can also be
employed in support of rapid planning. The OPT can also support the
production of planning outputs such as frameworks, documents or
maps and support presentations and briefings. All levels involved in the
planning process may be given access to relevant information and
planning outputs of a level may (if and when required) be developed in
full view of other levels; this speeds up substantially the dissemination
of essential information. Statement of Requirements (SOR) that collect
resources or capabilities requirements can also be built instantly,
following the troops-to actions analysis.

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 Potential Phases

Action Action
Phase Phase Phase Operational Operational Operational
Effect
Effect Objective

Military Military Military

DC DC
Effect Effect Objective
Operational
Effect Operational
Decision Objective
Point
Opposing
Action
Systems Military Military Military Operational Actor’s
Analysis Effect Effect Objective Effect Operational
MILITARY
POLITICAL Military
Effect DC Operational
DC Centres Objective
MILITARY NATO Military Military Operational Operational of
Current Effect
Effect Objective “INTERNATIONAL Effect
Situation Strategic Gravity
Friendly Contribution to a Centre(s) of END STATE”
ECONOMIC Set of (acceptable
Strategic Gravity
Unacceptable Centre(s) of Opposing conditions)
Conditions Gravity
Comprehensive
Diplomatic Actor(s) Diplomatic
DC DC
SOCIAL Effect Objective Action
Approach Operational Operational
DIPLOMATIC Effect Objective
Decision Action
Diplomatic Diplomatic Point
INFRA- Effect Objective
STRUCTURE
DC
Economic Economic Economic Operational
ECONOMIC Objective
INFORMATION Effect Effect Action Effect
Operational
Info Information Action Action Effect Illustrative Operational Design
Effect Objective
INFORMATION Info
Effect
Info Information
Effect Objective

Illustrative Operational
PMESII Instruments International
Lines
Lines of
of Engagement
Engagement
Domains of Power (DIME) Objectives
Design

Theoretical International
Potential Phases

1-26
Design Phase Phase Phase

Action
Military Military Military Military
Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic
Effect Effect Effect Objective
Action

Action Action Action

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO Military – Operational Level Military Military

M ILITARY Strategic Strategic
( SACEUR) Contribution Effect Objective
Action

Action Action
Friendly Strategic “NATO”
Note – This diagram assumes Current Unacceptable Strategic Centre(s ) of End State
Military Military Military
Situation Condition Centre(s ) of Gravity ( acceptable
Strategic Strategic Strategic
Gravity Effect Effect
Opposing Objective conditions)
Actor(s)
Action
only one Operational
Action

Figure 1.8 Operational Design Relationships

Commander Action Non-
Non- Military
Military
Strategic
Strategic
Action Effect
Objective
Non- Military
( Mainly Nations– DI-E) Action Action
Non-
Non- Military
Military
Strategic
Strategic
Effect
Action Objective

NATO NATO
Instruments of Power Lines
Lines of
of Engagement
Engagement Strategic Objectives

Illustrative Overall NATO

Strategic Design
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

(3) Campaign Assessment Tool (CAT). CAT has been designed in

compliance with NATO Operations Assessment Hand Book (NOAH)
and allows the assessors to prepare the assessment plan and Data
Collection Plan (DCP) in close coordination with Knowledge
Developers and planners. This key feature provides consistence to the
planning process and helps validate the plan. During execution phase,
CAT processes the assessment data and helps assessors advise
COM(s) about current progress along LoOs, establishment of DCs and
achievement of objectives. It also calculates potential trends as
described in NOAH.

Figure 1.9 TOPFAS Interoperability

c. Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS). LOGFAS is NATO’s

suite of software that supports logistical planning, execution and reporting for
operations in an integrated way at all levels of operations. The programs use
a common LOGFAS database (LogBase) so data can be easily shared and
used for various functions, including stockpile planning and logistical
reporting. Logistic Movement and Transportation (M&T) applications allow
staffs to carry out deployment planning, monitoring and exchange of
movement related data in a clear, well understood and common format. The
key M&T LOGFAS applications are:

(1) Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS). ADAMS

provides the tools to plan deployments at the strategic and operational

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

level. For NATO operations and exercises, national movement plans

will be communicated and coordinated between Nations and NATO
using ADAMS. Standing Joint Logistics Support Group (SJLSG) / Allied
Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC) conducts movement planning
with ADAMS, in coordination with the appropriate operational level HQ
and the Host Nations (HNs) and the production of national and NATO
organisations detailed deployment plans (DDPs), to be amalgamated
into a multinational DDP (MNDDP) that represents all of the planned
NATO-led forces movements in a single view.

(2) Effective Visible Execution (EVE). EVE is the M&T execution

tool for managing the MN / national strategic and theatre movements.
This includes all movements, (re)deployments, movements for
sustainment and rotation of forces. In addition to its primary mobility
management functions, it provides visibility for ongoing and planned
transport missions to all participating nations and NATO.

(3) Coalition Reception Staging and Onward Movement

(CORSOM). In addition to ADAMS, the CORSOM software tool
enables detailed planning for reception, staging and onward
movements (RSOM) to be performed, and provides visualisation and
oversight of theatre movements during both deployment execution and
sustainment operations. It is important to note that all three systems
share the same data and are made to interact with each other, allowing
a seamless transition from one phase of a movement operation to
another, as well as their concurrent use.

c. Constraints. The use of FS tools requires discipline. Existing HQ

standard operating procedures / instructions (SOP / SOI) for KD, planning,
and assessment procedures should be adapted to include the use of the
tool(s) at each phase and step of the processes. TOPFAS presentation
capabilities are not comparable to what commercial applications may do but
they can represent the live reality of the planning process at a given time.
Fundamentally INTEL FS / TOPFAS / LOGFAS are only suites of tools and
they cannot replace, or think in lieu of, the planners, analysts, assessors or
the staff in general: they are designed to support the staff in the preparation of
operations staff work and act as an aid to support the decision making
process and the COM. It is only through the diligent use and proper control, of
FS at all levels that the full potential of what they offer can be realised and
exploited.

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CHAPTER 2

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para Title Page

2.1 Introduction 2-1

2.2 Knowledge Development 2-3

2.3 Information Management for Crises and Operations 2-3

2.4 Horizon Scanning 2-4

2.5 Situational Awareness 2-6

2.6 Knowledge Development Process 2-12

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure Title Page

Fig 2.1 Situational Awareness Main Activities 2-6

Fig 2.2 Illustrative Perception Diagram 2-7

Fig 2.3 Illustrative Comprehension Diagram 2-7

Fig 2.4 Illustrative Projection Diagram 2-8

Fig 2.5 The Knowledge Development Process 2-13

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2 CHAPTER 2
3 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

2.1. Introduction. The Alliance seeks to continually monitor and analyse the
international environment to anticipate crises that could impact on NATO’s security
interests and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming
larger conflicts, including through diplomatic, political and military measures. The
NATO Strategic Concept also guides engagement with other international actors,
including encouraging collaborative analysis.

a. NATO Policy. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s)

Terms of Reference1 (TOR) details responsibilities for his Area of
Responsibility and Areas of Interest (AOR / AOI), including those beyond
NATO’s territory, and the need to monitor and analyse regional instabilities,
military capabilities, and transnational issues that may directly or indirectly
impact NATO's security interests. Further, the NATO Crisis Response
System Manual (NCRSM) and MC 0166 series (NATO Intelligence Warning
System (NIWS)) provide more detail on SACEUR’s role in Indications and
Warning (I&W) of potential or actual crises, and AD 0652 provides the
complementary direction and guidance for the management of intelligence
production within Allied Command Operations (ACO).

b. Strategic Environment. The strategic environment has evolved into a

highly complex, hybrid, dynamic and adaptive system with many new, state
and non-state, actors (both local and international). Understanding their
relationships and their interdependencies within an agreed AOI is key to
identifying likely or emerging crises with potential impact to NATO’s security
interests. This understanding allows for timely preparation for the conduct of
possible NATO operations or preventative measures. NATO requires
capabilities and procedures that can monitor, assess and warn of impending
crises in the vicinity of NATO territory or beyond, to provide strategic warning
to decision-makers in a timely and effective manner. SACEUR, in carrying out
the responsibilities of monitoring, assessing and warning of impending crisis
within the AOR and beyond, conducts horizon scanning, information /
knowledge management (IM / KM) and knowledge development (KD) to
facilitate detection of potential crises further in advance and the development
of situational awareness (SA) and understanding of emerging crises for the
conduct of prudent preparatory and formal planning activities as and when
directed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and NATO Headquarters (NATO
HQ).

c. Understanding. Within a military context, understanding is the

1
MC 0053.
2
ACO Directive (AD) 065 (NC) – ACO Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence Production Management.

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perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the

context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making3. This
includes answering the main questions of; who, what, where, when, why and
how, in order to provide the context and narrative of events. In turn, this
informs when the application of military power may be appropriate or
necessary to achieve strategic objectives, or when its use should be avoided,
such as when political or diplomatic means, in consultation with others, may
achieve the same ends.

(1) Understanding flows from developing a detailed perspective of

an audience, actor, group, environment or situation. Building an
‘enhanced’ understanding, necessary for operations planning, takes
time and, therefore, it may not be immediately available at the moment
of emergence of a potential crisis. This highlights the importance of
horizon scanning activities, and the necessity for prompt direction to
focus on emerging crises of relevance to the Alliance.

(2) As a crisis situation continues to evolve, development of an

understanding of it is an on-going process, with the need for continuous
holistic re-evaluation of developments of potential challenges to NATO
and its security interests.

(3) Developing a holistic understanding of a crisis is by its very

nature, a multi-agency and multisource process, which requires
drawing on all available NATO and non-NATO expertise (both military
and non-military). A sufficiently broad, inclusive, flexible and adaptive
comprehensive approach needs to be taken to accommodate a wide
range of experts, both within and external to the formal NATO structure.
Such experts may provide the necessary subject matter expertise to
understand the possible operating environment.

(4) Understanding of an emerging crisis is built over time including

horizon scanning, development of initial SA and throughout the
operations planning process (OPP). The development and sharing of
understanding is further enhanced through IM and KM, KD and
stakeholder engagement capabilities.

d. Stakeholder Engagement. Due to the nature of modern crises, crisis

prevention and crisis management, efforts demand a comprehensive
approach by many stakeholders. Through established mechanisms
(especially in the early stages of a crisis) or devolved authorities, appropriate
engagement with relevant stakeholders, for the horizon scanning or OPP
activities being conducted, will facilitate development and maintenance of a
holistic understanding of an emerging crisis of interest to NATO. As there is a

3
AJP-02 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security.

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risk of inadvertent, damaging impact from ad hoc or casual communication

with other actors and audiences, there is a need for a structured and
considered approach to stakeholder engagement by the staff.

2.2. Knowledge Development. Knowledge is the meaning rendered from data

and information, using the skills acquired through experience or education, that
contributes to the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. Iteratively
applied, the KD process converts basic data to more usable information, information
to awareness (what is happening) and awareness to understanding (why it is
happening). This contributes to the preparation for, and execution of, NATO’s
missions by providing higher levels of awareness and understanding that can
support NATO senior military leaders and political officials in their political-military,
strategic and operational level decision-making processes.

a. Characteristics. In general, KD is a proactive, collaborative and

iterative process, carried out at all levels of ACO, and contributed to by all
functional and specialist staffs. While some functional areas (e.g. intelligence)
have their own internal processes, their output contributes to the overall
knowledge requirements of their HQ and ACO.

b. Expertise. While the structure and processes of each HQ may be

unique, ideally all those involved in NATO planning and operations would
have some resident civil expertise and additional mechanisms to obtain
further specialist advice when required. Drawing on NATO and non-NATO
entities, these subject matter experts (SMEs) would apply regional and
thematic (political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure)
expertise towards the development of contextual understanding of external
actors in crisis or current operation situations especially as they impact
Alliance interests.

2.3. Information Management for Crises and Operations. Information

Management (IM) is a discipline that directs and supports the handling of information
throughout its life-cycle ensuring it is the right information in the right form and of
adequate quality to satisfy the demands of an organisation.

a. Policy. The NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP) 4

establishes a framework to ensure that information is handled effectively,
efficiently and securely in order to serve the interests of NATO. This includes
managing all aspects of information throughout its life-cycle. Within this
policy, the term ‘information’ is used to embrace all information, including
related data, required in support of NATO’s missions, whether such
information originates in NATO civil or military bodies or is received from
member nations or non-NATO sources. Such information, and the media and
resources used to record and process it, shall be managed in accordance with
the NIMP and other relevant NATO agreements and legal obligations.

4
C-M (2007)0118, The NATO Information Management Policy, 28 Jan 08.

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b. Applicability. The efficient and effective management of

information and knowledge is a critical success factor for achieving NATO’s
goals and objectives. The principles and objectives of the NIMP, as directed
in the Primary Directive on Information Management (PDIM), are to be applied
in all ACO endeavours in the planning and conduct of tasks and activities
under NCRS and OPP, as well as in the conduct of operations.

2.4. Horizon Scanning. Horizon scanning5 is a collaborative effort drawing on all

NATO political and military capabilities at all levels to assess potential risks and
threats to NATO’s members’ security interests.

a. Within ACO, horizon scanning should provide SACEUR with timely,

accurate, relevant, predictive and wide-ranging contextualised information and
intelligence, to help prevent strategic surprise and deliver a decision
advantage to NATO political-military authorities at NATO Headquarters
(NATO HQ). Throughout, SACEUR will draw on advice from his military
commanders, including those who may be given specific responsibilities for
monitoring an AOI.

b. Specifically, a horizon scanning capability should:

(1) Enable crisis identification within designated AOI by

continuously monitoring the security environment. SACEUR has
responsibility for AOI beyond NATO's territory in which NATO
commanders monitor and analyse regional instabilities, military
capabilities, and transnational issues6 that include military aspects, in
order to identify their potential military consequences, which may
directly or indirectly, influence NATO's security interests.

(2) Establish, maintain and, as appropriate, share an initial

perception of emerging crisis situations relevant to NATO’s security
interests.

(3) Understand transnational issues of interest to the Alliance. In

reviewing the global geo-political situation and transnational issues, in
terms of possible threats and risks to NATO security interests, the
following should be considered as potential, but not exclusive themes:

(a) Threats or acts of armed attack or aggression.

(b) Proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD).

5
Strategic Concept, Lisbon.2010, ‘NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises
and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.’
6
Transnational issues, which include military aspects, encompass activities such as: terrorism/extremism; proliferation and
delivery of weapons of mass destruction; malicious cyber activities; military technological developments; and the military use of
space.

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(c) International terrorism / extremism.

(d) Instability from failed and failing states.

(e) Environmental and humanitarian disaster.

(f) Security of vital resources.

(g) Organised / Transnational crime7, for example human

trafficking and narcotics.

(h) Hostile communications and information activities

targeted at NATO.

(i) Cyber and hybrid threats.

(4) Maintain a matrix of potential crisis regions / countries (and

related relevant actors) not addressed in the NIWS or Potential Crisis
Warning List (PCWL). This matrix should be based on factors derived
from NATO policy and command guidance; it should also provide a
methodology to reduce the range of possibilities and ensure their
relevance to NATO.

(5) Take maximum advantage of non-NATO expertise, including

assessments, analysis and networks of experts, as authorised.

(6) Contribute to identifying and defining SACEUR’s AOI. Taking

into account the geo-political situation, SACEUR can define AOIs
which are subject to Military Committee (MC) endorsement and NAC
approval.

(7) Identify indications and warnings. I&Ws may be identified and

reported by NATO operations centres monitoring an AOI, as well as by
nations. They are shared and assessed using the NIWS, which is
designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO
HQ and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or
concern that could impact on NATO security interests.

(8) Continuously review SACEUR’s AOR / AOI for changing trends.

(9) Continuously review warning problems (WPs) and indicators

and identify new WPs for inclusion in the NIWS or raise as ‘problems’
in the PCWL8.

7
Crime should be considered as an instability factor that could develop into threats to NATO interests, including undermining
governance, extensive corruption, the crime-war overlap (such as criminal entities used as irregular proxy forces), and criminal
endeavors within hybrid threats.
8
ACO directive (AD) 065 (NC) – ACO Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence Production Management.

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2.5. Situational Awareness (SA). SA is the human perception of all available

elements of information in relation to a specific situation that allows for more holistic
and informed interpretation of reality. SA contributes to all phases of the process by
providing a holistic understanding of the operating environment, see Figure 2.1.

Strategic and / or Operational Level Operations Planning Process (OPP)

NCRP
NCRP
Phase 1
Phases 2-6
Situational Awareness of Potential / Actual Crisis

Horizon Scanning
Develop Initial Situational
Awareness of the Area of Interest
(AOI)
· Appreciate Nature of Threats, Challenges and Trends
· Identify Main Actors
· Develop Encyclopaedic Information about Actors and
Systems in the AOI

Develop Information / Knowledge Continued Situational Awareness Development

Requirements across all phases through contribution of
Information and Knowledge

Acquire Information and Develop

Develop the Knowledge about the AOI
Knowledge
Base

Establish and Maintain Common

Situational Awareness

Figure 2.1 Situational Awareness Main Activities

a. Levels of Situational Awareness. Different levels of SA9, perception,

comprehension and projection, reflect the range of contextual understanding
to support decision making. Illustrative examples of diagrams that help with
the visualisation of SA are shown below in Figures 2.2 – 2.4 below.

(1) Perception. This involves the processes of monitoring, indicator

detection, and simple recognition leading to an awareness of multiple
situational elements (objects, events, people, systems, environmental
factors) and their current states (locations, conditions, modes, actions)
to provide an initial awareness of the environment.

9
Collaborative Tools, such as TOPFAS can be used to capture, analyse, interpret and display information and data in support
of situational awareness.

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Nation YYY

YYY Mil System

The YYY Air Force has about

3,300 troops and 43 combat
YYY Air Force aircraft as well as one helicopter
squadron. Air Defence forces
include a mix of ...

YYY 1 Ftr Rgt YYY 2 Attack Ftr Rgt YYY AD Sector 1 YYY AD Sector 2

YYY ground based Air Defence

The numbers and types of aircraft
systems include the following
flown by the YYY Air Force are:
systems:
15x MiG A
SA-A
20x MiG B
SA-B
8x MiG C
SA-C

Figure 2.2 Illustrative Perception Diagram

(2) Comprehension. This requires integrating the information to

understand how it will impact upon goals and objectives. This includes
developing an initial understanding of the AOI as it pertains to NATO.
Nation
EAST YYY
CERASIA

President of XXX Central

President of KAMON Central Government
Government ZZZ
STELLARIA

Level
Level of Stability
Stability
in YYY
in East Cerasia

B
Negative
Kamon Levelof
XXX Level of Influence: If “A” Level of Ambition
Level Ambition
Aggressive Policy
Aggressive Policy increases, “B” Negative Influence:
If “A” increases,
ofin
Stellaria
ZZZ
decreases
“B” decreases
A Positive A
Influence: If “A”
increases, “B”
Level of Security increases
Level of Security and State Positive Influence
and Stability in
Stability in VVV
Tytan
State Negative Influence

A System Element

System Attribute

Figure 2.3 Illustrative Comprehension Diagram

(3) Projection. This involves the ability to make assessments as to

the range of possible outcomes that potential actions may have within
the operating environment leading to a more enhanced understanding.
This is achieved through building knowledge on the status, dynamics
and interrelations of the elements and more detailed comprehension of
the situation and then extrapolating this information forward in time to
provide estimates of how it could affect future states of a potential AOI

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YYY Level of stability ZZZ level of regional dominance

QQQ Level of (ethnic) violence ZZZ support to QQQ
YYY Level of security Regional Stability

Figure 2.4 Illustrative Projection Diagram

b. Develop Initial SA of the AOI. Information and intelligence related to

the operating environment / AOI should be drawn from across all sources and
represent the differing levels of SA understanding. This will be reviewed,
analysed and assessed to provide an initial view of the potential scale and
scope of threats and challenges to NATO’s stated security interests from the
emerging crisis.

(1) Appreciate the Nature of Threats, Challenges and Trends.

Attention should be given to the analysis of the Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII10) domains.
This should include a comprehensive identification of indicators to be
monitored over time to establish trends.

(2) Identify the Main Actors in the Area. Typically, there will be a
variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries,
partners and others, whose actions and influences contribute to or
mitigate potential risks or threats to NATO’s interests in the area. Each
actor has its own interests and acts in pursuit of those interests in
accordance with their capabilities and motivation. These actors can be
viewed as systems, comprised of different elements that interact in
accordance with their attributes with other systems to influence their
behaviour in pursuit of their interests. Their actions will also create
effects that may have other consequences. Once the main actors in an
area are identified, contact should be initiated, if possible and

10
PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (e.g. Systems within the Operating Environment).
The PMESII model is a way to explain the inter-related elements or domains of a complex operations environment. All analysis
should integrate a gender perspective in line with the Bi-SC Directive 40-1, dated 08 Aug 12. Note that AD65-11 uses ‘PMESII
plus’ which is described as PMESII, plus technological (consideration of how technology is used or available and what impact
this could have) and environmental (consideration of the natural world and potential impacts it could have) elements.

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authorised, with appropriate and relevant actors and trusted experts

who can contribute to building understanding. Actors may be:

(a) Nation states and non-state entities.

(b) Organisations including Governmental Organisations

(GOs), security forces, International Organisations (IOs), Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Private Volunteer
Organisations (PVOs), as well as criminal enterprises,
organisations, terrorist groups and organisations as well as
affiliates or inspired groups or networks, commercial enterprises
and multinational corporations.

(c) Groups including political interest groups, criminal, social

power and influence groups, social media including influencers,
as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan groups.

(d) Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders, opinion

leaders, opinion formers and power brokers.

(3) Develop Encyclopaedic Information about Actors and

Systems. Drawing on information and intelligence provided by J2 / KD,
the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) and other staff, planners
ensure that their information and knowledge are at the appropriate level
of granularity to support operations planning.

c. Develop Information / Knowledge Requirements. As part of

establishing a Knowledge Base (KB)11, the staff determines specific
requirements for information / knowledge to support the analysis and decision
making during the different phases of the OPP. The start point for the KB will
be based on the initial awareness of the situation and its potential for
development and will be built upon by a series of other staff actions.

(1) Determine the Commanders Information / Knowledge

Requirements12. Information and knowledge requirements may be
generated through the identification of any Commander’s (COM)
Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) required at this point to
support timely decision-making and their supporting Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIRs)13. These requirements, managed through the
request for information process, may include further knowledge about
the capabilities and behaviour of different actors, their relationships and
influences, as well as key factors within the strategic environment.

11
The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, knowledge, expertise and established contacts that is distributed,
inter-linked and standardised.
12
Knowledge Requirement - A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system in order
to make a decision.
13
To satisfy PIRs, J2 staff initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the NIFC as well as to nations in accordance with
the NATO intelligence Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) process.

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(2) Information Sources. KD elements must collect information

and knowledge from all sources. In addition, it is highly likely that
governmental organisations (GOs), IOs and NGOs are already
engaged in the AOI. They represent a potentially vast source of
information and knowledge about different aspects of the area related
to humanitarian assistance, development and reconstruction, including
logistics, transportation and communications infrastructure.

(3) Coordinate Requirements between Levels. It is important that

KM elements at each level (i.e. strategic, operational and component)
coordinate their knowledge requirements across all levels through
liaison elements to make the best use of all available means in NATO.

d. Acquire Information about the Designated Area of Interest. Once

AOI has been designated the staff must seek and acquire as much
information, knowledge and understanding as early as possible.

(1) General. A product plan is developed to acquire and analyse

the information necessary to generate the required knowledge to better
understand the situation. Different actors have their own internal
dynamics and external linkages within one PMESII domain, or even
crossing several domains. It is possible to understand actors and
resources that are linked as a system or a system of systems with each
having numerous distinct system elements. Creating effects in one
domain often influences conditions in another domain, system or
system element. Analysing the systems in an AOI can contribute to a
more detailed understanding about the environment and the roles
played by the different actors including any actions that have
established the conditions that characterise the current situation and /
or may influence its likely development.

(2) Analyse AOI Systems. Each of the different systems present

in the designated AOI must be examined and analysed in order to
determine the relationships and influences between them.

(3) Complex Adaptive Systems. The complexity of a given

situation depends on the number, composition and structure of the
different systems and the ways they interact. The structural complexity
of a system is directly proportional to the number of related systems
and system elements, while the system’s interactive complexity is
related to the freedom of action of each individual part and the number
of linkages among the components. Complex systems that are able to
learn and adapt in response to their interaction with other systems and
changes in the operational environment can be considered complex
adaptive systems. A system analysis will enhance the understanding
of complex adaptive systems, as well as the nature of the problem, and
supports the development of possible response options.

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(4) System Analysis. A system analysis examines potential

adversaries, friendly and neutral actors and the physical environment
holistically as complex adaptive systems to understand their behaviour,
capabilities and interaction within the operational environment. This
analysis will reveal strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other
critical factors, including an actor’s capacity for adaptation, which
provides insight into how they can be influenced. The following are
basic steps in the system analysis:

(a) Analyse / update the composition of the system and

identify essential subsystems and system elements in its PMESII
aspects.

(b) Identify system strengths and weaknesses. This process

will identify key system elements, which will assist centre of
gravity (CoG) determination, as well as its ability for adaptation
during interaction with other systems.

(c) Identify relations between system elements. Next it is

important to determine how key actors (individuals, groups and
organisations) interact with each other and which
interrelationships are particularly important. Relationships
between a system’s elements will influence its strengths and
weaknesses as it interacts with other systems. This will reveal
potential vulnerabilities. It is important to identify those
vulnerabilities that have potential for exploitation. Identify which
system elements are associated with each system’s
vulnerabilities. Examining the key personalities, organisations,
facilities, features and materiel associated with the vulnerable
system elements should begin to reveal whether they might be
influenced by an action that could in turn create a desired effect
on the system.

(d) Visualisation. System analysis diagrams can be used to

help visualise a systems relationships, including critical
requirements, capabilities or vulnerabilities and can help
appreciate where the behaviour of system elements can be
influenced or affected in either a positive or negative way. Such
a visual representation helps in understanding situations that
may be complex in terms of structure, interactivity and
adaptation. These diagrams can also help determine objectives,
desired effects, criteria for success and decisive conditions, as
appropriate.

e. Establish and Share Common Situational Awareness.

(1) Share Information, Knowledge and Common

Understanding. Establishing common SA may be achieved by

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drawing information from any number of sources and displaying it using

a number of collaborative planning tools such as the System Analysis
Tool (SAT) within the Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area
Service (TOPFAS) as a medium for KD, sharing information and
collaborating on an agreed AOI.

(2) Expand the Knowledge Base. KM elements will orchestrate

the further acquisition of information about assigned AOIs. These
acquisition efforts require functional expertise from across the HQ as
well as collaboration with external organisations to build up a repository
of information, expertise and contacts about any given area and its
main actors. This repository of information must be accessible through
shared workspaces to support further analysis and planning.
Therefore, it is imperative that information about the area is collected,
organised and stored in a manner that ensures that it can be managed
and shared efficiently and effectively within the HQs, with other HQs
and with relevant external actors, using common schemes.

(3) Monitor the AOI. The current operations centres will

continuously monitor designated areas, paying close attention to
CCIRs established by the operational commander and SACEUR. They
will be aware of the current activities of each actor in the area and will
look for any changes that might impact the overall situation. They may
submit requests for information to fill gaps or gain a better
understanding of the scope, scale and impact of changes on the overall
situation.

2.6. Knowledge Development Process. The KD process14 covers the

acquisition, integration, analysis, and sharing of information and knowledge from
relevant military and non-military sources, see Figure 2.5. It includes analysis of the
relationships and interactions between systems and actors taking account of
different PMESII and environmental factors to enable a COM and staff to better
understand the situation as well as the possible effects of Diplomatic, Information,
Military and Economic (DIME) Instruments of Power15 (IoP) actions on different
systems and actors. The KD process supports horizon scanning activities and the
entire OPP, including the planning and execution of operations, as well as periodic
operations assessment. An effective ACO-wide KD process will contribute
proactively to shared SA and an understanding of potential crises and conflict
situations. This supports timely and informed political and military authority decision-
making, at all levels, and interaction with cooperating national and international
actors by improving understanding and ability to influence issues, which integrate

14
To support the KD process, HQs at the Strategic level and below require capabilities to coordinate and prioritise
requirements, draw together information / Intel from internal NATO and external sources, analyse it and make it available to
decision makers and other relevant entities. Within the NATO Command Structure (NCS) the manner in which this will be
accomplished is under review.
15
IoP could be considered using the Political, Military, Economic and Civil (PMEC) construct. Either construct will help the staff
consider the issues in a more comprehensive manner.

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into wider actions, events and third-party activities that impact upon Alliance
interests, avoiding the consequences of inappropriate engagement by ensuring
relationships with non-NATO entities are within the bounds of NAC / MC direction,
SACEUR’s Terms of Reference (TOR) and command intent and allowing external
organisations to develop effective relations with ACO.

Determine
Knowledge
Requirements (KR)

Knowledge
Transfer Knowledge Develop Product
Plan
Manage
Knowledge
Base (KB)

Development (KD)

Acquire Required
Generate Knowledge Data and
Information

Figure 2.5 The Knowledge Development Process

a. KD Process Steps: The KD process follows five steps:

(1) Determine Knowledge Requirements. Based on a review of

the AOI and coordinated end user requirements, knowledge
requirements can be determined. This also involves the gathering and
cataloguing of gaps in knowledge that derive from strategic,
operational, and component ACO decision-making processes. KM
responsibilities in this step include coordinating who will satisfy specific
knowledge requirements.

(2) Develop Product Plan. Involves the generation of a plan for

developing a knowledge product and determining the sources or
information and knowledge that will be required. This will involve
drawing on existing or developing new networks of SMEs internal and
external to NATO, including a requirement to establish information

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sharing agreements.

(3) Acquire Required Data and Information. Based on the

product plan, the designated lead acquires data and information from
internal and external networks of SMEs to support generating the
required knowledge product.

(4) Generate Knowledge. Involves collaborative activities,

systems of system analysis, modelling or simulation to integrate and
analyse information and intelligence, resulting in a knowledge product
that satisfies one or more knowledge gaps.

(5) Transfer Knowledge. Involves activities to manage

accessibility and establish permissions, such as Release and
Disclosure Rules, for sharing knowledge products with the original
requesting organisation and other organisations, internal to NATO and
external Non-NATO entities in accordance with NATO policies,
procedures and agreements.

b. Feedback. All of the above activities include an essential mechanism

for receiving and acting on feedback. This involves activities to collect and
evaluate feedback received from knowledge product consumers and to take
necessary actions to improve all aspects of the process.

c. Information and Knowledge Management. As an essential

supporting element of the KD process, KM is a multi-disciplined approach to
make the best use of information, insights and best practices, to facilitate the
achievement of organisational goals. KM, and its intrinsic component IM, is
the means by which NATO organisations determine what knowledge is
required, manage existing knowledge and identify knowledge gaps to be filled,
including who will fill them (e.g. Analysis section / intelligence etc.) KB
management involves activities to maintain the KB (governance, storage,
assurance), enhance its capabilities, and purge out-dated or no longer
required knowledge products.

d. KD Coordination. KD requires close coordination with the Information

Knowledge Management (IKM) staff to ensure effective and efficient
acquisition and management of information within a HQ. This requires clearly
established procedures for:

(1) Assigning information owners, authorities and responsibilities to

all staff elements involved in the OPP.

(2) Creating and managing shared information space where all

relevant information, knowledge products and automated information
displays can be pulled from NATO Secret and / or mission secret wide-
area networks.

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(3) Sharing geo-spatial information using available core and

functional services as well as establishing gateways to access national
databases.

(4) Archiving and sharing key authoritative documents including

relevant NAC and other strategic level documents as well as other
international actors’ documents.

(5) Developing information capabilities and procedures to share

relevant information / knowledge with non-NATO entities.

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC LEVEL

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ii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para Title Page
CONTEXT
3.1 Introduction 3-1
3.2 Process and Products 3-1
3.3 Command and Staff Interaction 3-4
3.4 Organisation 3-4
3.5 External Coordination 3-8

PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (POTENTIAL / ACTUAL

CRISIS)
Section 1 - General
3.6 Introduction 3-10
Section 2 - Process
3.7 Appreciation Indication of a Potential / Actual Emerging Crisis 3-14
3.8 Direction and Guidance 3-14
3.9 Develop and Monitor an Initial Understanding of an Emerging 3-15
Crisis
3.10 Initial Crisis Estimation 3-16

PHASE 2 - STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Section 1 - General
3.11 Introduction 3-18
Section 2 - Process
3.12 Overview 3-23
3.13 Initiate SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment 3-23
3.14 Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis 3-27
3.15 Identify and Analyse the Principal Actors and their Role in the 3-29
Crisis.
3.16 Determine and Analyse Strategic Centre of Gravity 3-31
3.173-14. Appreciate International Interests and Engagement in the 3-33
Crisis
3.18 Appreciate Security Implications for NATO, Including Potential 3-35
Strategic Risks / Opportunities and Threats

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3.19 Appreciate Potential Strategic Ends, Ways and Means 3-36

3.20 Strategic Ends - Appreciate the Desired NATO End State, 3-37
NATO Strategic Objectives and Strategic Effects
3.21 Strategic Ways - Appreciate Potential Use of Instruments of 3-38
Power
3.22 Strategic Means - Appreciate Potential Options Available to 3-39
the Alliance
3.23 Develop Military Considerations 3-39
3.24 Coordinate and Submit SSA 3-41

PHASE 3 - MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT

Section 1 - General
3.25 Introduction 3-43
Section 2 - Process
3.26 General 3-47
3.27 Review and Analyse Political Direction and Guidance 3-47
3.28 Appreciate Lessons Learned from Similar Previous Operations 3-47
3.29 Select and Develop MROs 3-47
3.30 Test, Evaluate and Compare MROs 3-55
3.31 Coordinate and Submit MROs 3-58

PHASE 4 - STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Phase 4a - Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development
Section 1 - General
3.32 Introduction 3-61
Section 2 - Process
3.33 Initiate Strategic CONOPS Development 3-64
3.343-28. Update the Selected Military Response Option 3-66
3.353-29. Establish SACEUR’s Strategic Intent and Guidance 3-68
3.36 Develop and Issue the Strategic Planning Directive 3-69
3.37 Development of the Strategic CONOPS 3-75
3.38 Coordinate Strategic Military Requirements in NATO’s 3-76
Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach
3.39 Coordinate Operational Requirements 3-77

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3.40 Contribute to the Achievement of NATO’s StratCom Objectives 3-80

3.41 Consider Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level 3-80
3.42 Develop the Strategic Service Support Concept 3-81
3.43 Develop the Concept for Cyberspace and Command and 3-82
Control
3.44 Review of Draft Operational CONOPS 3-83
3.45 Coordinate and Submit Strategic CONOPS 3-84

Phase 4b - Strategic Operations Plan (OPLAN) Development

Section 1 - General
3.46 Introduction 3-85
Section 2 - Process
Strategic OPLAN Development
3.47 Initiate Strategic OPLAN Development 3-90
3.48 Develop International Legal Arrangements 3-97
3.49 Synchronise Military and non-Military Activities within a 3-98
Comprehensive Approach
3.50 Plan for the Employment of Strategic Resources 3-99
3.51 Plan StratCom 3-101
3.52 Plan for Command and Control 3-104
3.53 Plan for Strategic Operations Assessment 3-105
3.54 Plan Force Preparation and Sustainment 3-105
3.55 Plan for Force Deployment 3-108
3.56 Plan Force Protection 3-111
3.57 Review of Draft Operational OPLAN 3-113
3.58 Coordinate and Submit Strategic OPLAN 3-113
3.59 Promulgate Approved Strategic OPLAN and Seek Operational 3-114
OPLAN Approval

FORCE GENERATION
3.60 Review Force Requirements, Force Availability and Possible 3-115
Contributions
3.61 Review NATO CRMs 3-115

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3.62 Initiate Force Activation 3-116

3.63 Coordinate National Offers and Request Forces 3-117
3.64 Activate Enabling Forces for Pre-Deployment 3-119
3.65 Appreciate Force Contributions and Balance the Force 3-120
Package
3.66 Coordinate Integration of Non-NATO Forces 3-121
3.67 Integrate Forces with OPLAN Development 3-122
3.68 Activate Forces for Deployment 3-123

PHASE 5 - EXECUTION
3.69 Introduction 3-125
3.70 Considerations for Execution 3-127

PHASE 6 - TRANSITION
3.71 Introduction 3-130
3.72 Considerations for Transition and Termination 3-132

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TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure Title Page

Fig 3.1 NCRP Schematic – Political Military, Strategic and 3-3

Operational Planning Flow Chart

Fig 3.2 Command and Staff Interaction at the Strategic Level 3-5

Fig 3.3 Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential / Actual 3-11

Crisis

Fig 3.4 Phase 2 Strategic Assessment Development 3-20

Fig 3.5 Factor Analysis (Factor – Deduction – Conclusion) 3-29

Fig 3.6 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix 3-32

Fig 3.7 Phase 3 Development of Military Response Options 3-46

Fig 3.8 Illustrative Strategic Risk Evaluation Matrix 3-59

Fig 3.9 Phase 4a Strategic CONOPS Development Main Activities 3-63

Fig 3.10 Phase 4b Strategic OPLAN Development Main Activities 3-92

Fig 3.11 Force Generation Main Activities 3-118

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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC LEVEL

CONTEXT
3.1. Introduction. This chapter describes the strategic level of the Operations
Planning Process (OPP) carried out by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE), as directed and guided by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR). It is designed to develop strategic products for consideration by NATO
military and political authorities in order to support their decision-making on the
strategic direction for NATO in response to a crisis within the framework of a
Comprehensive Approach (CA)1 and then develop the military strategic products for
approval.

a. The Operations Planning Process (OPP) at the military-strategic level

comprises six phases that are aligned with the NATO Crisis Response
Process (NCRP), to harmonise the interface between SHAPE and NATO
Headquarters (NATO HQ), as depicted in Figure 3.1.

b. The process outlines the necessary interaction with the political-military

level (i.e. NATO HQ) and collaboration with the operational level (e.g.
Headquarters Joint Force Command (HQ JFC), Joint Task Force
Headquarters (JTF HQ), Single Service Commands2 (SSC), Theatre
Component Commands3 (TCC) and other necessary Commands, Agencies
and organisations for its efficient conduct.

c. SACEUR might be tasked to take over an ongoing operation from

another non-NATO actor be it coalition, nation or international organisation. In
this case, the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Handover / Takeover4
(HOTO) process is aligned with and supports the strategic OPP. A HOTO
could be an alternative for Transition in NCRP Phase 6 Transition.

3.2. Process and Products. Within the NATO OPP, there is a clear division of
responsibilities for initiation, development, endorsement, approval, execution,
revision and cancellation of operations plans. These responsibilities are divided
between the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Military Committee (MC), SACEUR
and subordinate NATO Commanders. The NAC is the highest political authority
within the Alliance and as such is responsible for the initiation and approval of all
strategic operations plans developed in response to an actual or developing crisis,
either from scratch or utilising existing advance plans. The MC is the senior military

1
CA can be described as a means to enhance a complementary, compatible response to crisis by all relevant actors.
2
SSC as described in MC 0324, are HQ Allied Land Command (HQ LANDCOM), HQ Allied Maritime Command (HQ
MARCOM) and HQ Allied Air Command (HQ AIRCOM).
3
TCC are newly defined entities under NCS Adaptation and execute specific and dedicated functions according to domain; HQ
MARCOM for the maritime domain, HQ AIRCOM for the air and space domains, HQ LANDCOM for the land domain, Standing
Joint Logistic Support Group (SJLSG) for the logistics domain, Cyber Operations Centre (CyOC) for the cyber domain and the
SHAPE Office of Special Operations (OSO), in conjunction with NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), for the
Special Forces domain.
4
ACO Directive 080-109: Handover / Takeover Process.

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authority in NATO and is responsible to the Council for the overall conduct of the
military affairs of the Alliance. It is the primary source of military advice to the
Council and the Secretary General (SECGEN).

a. In accordance with the NCRP, the following NAC decisions drive the
activities at the strategic level:
(1) To initiate a comprehensive Political-Military Estimate5 (PME),
including: a formal analysis of a potential crisis, including the tasking of
the development of a SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA) and the
development of strategic response options, including the tasking of the
development of Military Response Options (MROs).

(2) To initiate operations planning by issuing a NAC Initiating

Directive (NID).

(3) To approve the strategic concept of operations (CONOPS) and

to initiate activation of forces in preparation for deployment by issuing a
NAC Force Activation Directive (FAD).

(4) To approve the strategic operations plan (OPLAN).

(5) To execute an operation by issuing a NAC Execution Directive

(NED).

(6) To revise strategic aspects of an ongoing operation by tasking

SACEUR to provide a strategic assessment and possible military
options for the adaptation of operations (including the NATO end state
and strategic-level objectives) according to strategic and operational
conditions.

(7) To plan for transition of military operations by following normal

procedures.

(8) To plan for termination of military operations by following normal

procedures.

(9) To conduct Assessments including Periodic Mission Reviews

(PMRs) to provide strategic Operations Assessments (OPSA) of
progress towards achieving the NATO strategic objectives and the
desired NATO end state.

b. The phases of the strategic OPP, as shown in Figure 3.1, are

specifically designed to develop strategic assessments, planning products,
directives and orders, in support of the NCRP, required by the political-military
and operational levels. The processes and products for each phase are
described in the following sections of this chapter.

5
The PME spans Phase 2 (Assessment) and Phase 3 (Response Options) of the NCRP.

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 Generic NATO Operations Planning Process

Political-Military Estimate (PME) Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP) development Strategic Political-Military Plan review
Phase 1
Phase 2 Phase 3
Indications and
Assessment Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Phase 4 Planning

NAC
of the of Response Execution Transition
Potential/Actual
Crisis Options
Crisis
Approved Endorsed NID for
Task NMAs Transition NAC
Endorsed Strategic Strategic Approved
Request or for PMR planning Decision Sheet
Request or Strategic CONOPS OPLAN, Strategic Approved
Information Task the NMA’s OPLAN, to Terminate
Task the NMA’s CONOPS SORs Transition NED
Sharing for SMA with ROEREQ ROEREQ, NED
SMA and for MRO OPLAN
FAD TCSOR Endorsed Endorsed
SSA SMA and NID Illustrative CJSOR
MPR Transition
MROs and TCSOR
OPLAN
Phase 1
Phase 2 Phase 3
Indications and
Assessment Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Phase 4 Planning

MC
of the of Response Execution Transition
Potential/Actual
Crisis Options
Crisis
NAC NAC Approved NID for Approved NAC
Tasker NID with MC Approved Strategic Tasker for Transition Transition Decision Sheet
Guidance
Strategic OPLAN,
planning with OPLAN NED with to Terminate
Tasker for for MRO Strategic Strategic PMR
Information OPLAN, ROEREQ, NED MC Guidance with MC MC With MC
SSA SSA MROs CONOPS CONOPS FAD SORs
Sharing TCSOR with MC Guidance Guidance Guidance
with With MC With MC 1 ROEREQ with Strategic

3-3
Guidance Guidance
Illustrative CJSOR Guidance MC Guidance SACEUR’s
Transition
and TCSOR MPR
OPLAN
Phase 1
Initial Phase 3 Phase 4 Strategic Plan Development
Phase 2
Situational Military Phase 4b
Phase 5 Phase 6
Strategic Phase 4a
Awareness of Response Strategic OPLAN Development Execution Transition

Planning Flow Chart

SHAPE
Assessment Strategic CONOPS Development
Potential/Actual Options (Force Generation)

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Crisis
Strategic Strategic SPD
Strategic Draft MROs ACTORD ACTORD
SPD CONOPS Draft Op OPLAN on
Information Warning Op ROEIMP ROEIMP
SSA Draft Op OPLAN Op Transition
Order CONOPS SCO
Sharing CONOPS, SORs OPLAN Operations
Operational Approval Disengagement
Illustrative ROE REQ Approval
Advice Assessment Planning
SORs
Phase 1
Initial Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Operational Plan Development
Situational Operational Appreciation Operational Estimate Phase 5 Phase 6
Phase 3a Phase 3b Phase 4a
Awareness of of the Phase 4b Execution Transition
Mission CoA Operational CONOPS
Operational OPLAN Development
Potential/Actual Strategic Environment Analysis Development Development
Crisis

Op Level Commands
Note:
Note: 1. Following
1. Following FADFAD
receipt,
receipt,SACEUR
SACEURwill
willrelease
releaseprovisional
provisional CJSOR with
with ACTWARN
ACTWARNtotocommence
commenceformal Force
formal Generation
Force Process
Generation Process

NAC – North Atlantic Council MRO – Military Response Option CONOPS – Concept of Operations FAD – Force Activation Directive ROEREQ – ROE Request (message)
SCO – Strategic Coordination Order NID – NAC Initiating Directive CJSOR – Combined Joint Statement of Requirement NED – NAC Execution Directive ROEIMP – ROE Implementation (message)

Figure 3.1 NCRP Schematic - Political Military, Strategic and Operational Level
SMA – Strategic Military Advice SPD – Strategic Planning Directive TCSOR – Theatre Capabilities Statement of Requirement ACTORD – Activation Order (message) PMR – Periodic Mission Review
SSA – SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment CoA – Course of Action SOR – Statement of Requirement ROE – Rules of Engagement MPR – Mission Progress Report
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

c. Each situation or crisis for which the OPP is used is unique and
different. The process, mechanisms and templates presented in this chapter
are a capture of best practice; they suit well a timely and systematic
movement through the process from one phase to another. With appropriate
training, they can be used effectively as a guide6 to develop appropriate
strategic level operations planning products to support each situation.

3.3. Command and Staff Interaction. SACEUR, with the Command Group (CG),
will direct and guide the staff as they move through the planning process. Regular
formal and informal staff interactions will occur throughout in accordance with
SHAPE procedures. Figure 3.2 shows the command staff interaction at the strategic
level and highlights those points where there is a requirement for formal direction,
guidance and approval by SACEUR. Depending upon the phase either ACOS J5 or
Director Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (DCCOMC), in
conjunction with the Team Leaders / Head Planners will be the lead in briefing
SACEUR and the CG.

3.4. Organisation. Appropriate cross-functional bodies within SHAPE provide the

basis for collaboration and synchronisation of activities with the political-military and
operational levels as well as with Nations, supporting organisations, agencies, and
non-NATO organisations in accordance with NATO policies, procedures and
agreements. These cross-functional bodies also facilitate the seamless transition
between planning and execution to ensure continuity in situational awareness and
knowledge development (KD) over time. The principal elements and bodies involved
in the internal and external coordination in response to a crisis are as follows:

a. Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre

(CCOMC). The CCOMC is the focal point for crisis and operations
management at SHAPE. It facilitates comprehensive planning in response to
a crisis or situation, monitors ongoing NATO operations, provides direction
and guidance to the operational and subordinate commands solutions and
maintains situational awareness across NATO Area of Interest (AOI) and
SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). The CCOMC is staffed and
operates through the flexible and scalable cross-functional ‘whole of SHAPE’
approach.

b. Cross-Functional Action Team (CAT). The CAT is a cross-functional

staff organisation activated in SHAPE in response to a crisis (potential or
actual), and configured in line with the NCRP phasing. The CAT is likely to
have Plans, Ops and Supporting elements within it, each with specific
responsibilities throughout the OPP.

6
Other documents can assist functional experts with their contribution to the development of strategic operations planning
products, such as Functional Planning Guides (FPG) as described in MC 0133 NATO Operations Planning.

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 Staff Brief to Commander’s Strategic
NAC Direction Commander’s Lead Staff Activity
the Commander Decision Output

Phase 1 Horizon Indications of Inform /

NAC / NATO HQ
Scanning / Initial Crisis Emerging Advice the
Horizon scanning
Initial Awareness Develop Initial Estimation Crisis NAC
of a Potential / Actual Understanding
Crisis

Strategic
NAC Tasker for Develop Warning Order
Phase 2 Initial Intent &
Strategic SACEUR’s Strategic
Guidance for SSA Decision
Assessment Strategic Assessment
Assessment
Strategic Assessment SACEUR
Appreciation Strategic
Assessment

NAC Tasker for Initial Intent & Military

Phase 3 Response Guidance for Develop and Comparison Response
Options MRO Decision
MRO Analyse MROs of MROs Options
Development Operational

Political-Military Estimate (PME)

Military Response
Advice
Options

Strategic
Planning
Phase 4a NAC Initial Intent & Directive
Develop
Initiating Guidance for Draft CONOPS
Strategic

3-5
Directive (NID) CONOPS CONOPS Approval
Strategic CONOPS Operational
Development Strategic
CONOPS CONOPS Illustrative
SORs CONOPS
Development

Development
Phase 4b Approved Strategic
Guidance for Develop

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Strategic OPLAN Operations ROE Request

OPLAN Strategic Draft OPLAN
Strategic OPLAN CONOPS Approval Plan (ROEREQ)
Development OPLAN Operational
Development OPLAN

Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP)

(Force Generation)

Activation ROE
Order Implementation
NAC Develop Draft Strategic (ACTORD)
Guidance for (ROEIMP)
Execution Strategic Strategic Coordination
Directive (NED) Strategic
Coordination Coordination Order
Coordination
Order Order Approval
Strategic
Phase 5 Coordination

Figure 3.2 Command Staff Interaction at the Strategic Level

Order
Execution
NAC Tasker for Develop
Guidance for SACEUR Mission
Periodic Mission Campaign Campaign Assessment
Campaign Progress Report
Review Assessment Assessment Decision
Assessment Operations
Plan
Assessment
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(1) Plans. Under Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J5 lead, a Plans

led element or planning team will form for all aspects of the initial Crisis
Response Planning (CRP) or Advance Planning deliverables and
subsequently remain for any additional planning activities as required. It
will normally lead on all aspects of the OPP under Phases 2, 3 and 4
and a strategic planning element will remain during NCRP Phases 5
and 6 in order to develop further supporting plans. The CAT will
operate in close coordination with the CCOMC and depending on the
type / nature of the team it will share resources and personnel.

(2) Ops. An Ops led element, under the lead of DCCOMC, will
constantly be monitoring the situation / crisis and normally lead during
Phase 1 activities before handing over to the Plans led element. It will
assume responsibility for the execution of the operation during the
transition from NCRP Phase 4 to 5 and 6.

(3) Support. The Plans and Ops led elements of a CAT will be
supported by a central support core staff element that will facilitate the
coordination between all elements when they are working
simultaneously.

c. Staff Elements / Subject Matter Experts. All SHAPE Directorates

and Divisions support the CCOMC and, when assembled, the CAT. The
following are examples of some of SHAPE staff elements that would be
represented initially in the CCOMC with subject matter experts (SME) and
their roles during the conduct of the OPP:

(1) J2. J2 is responsible for directing and managing the intelligence

production to satisfy SACEUR’s Prioritised Intelligence Requirements
(PIR). J2 coordinates and directs intelligence production across the
ACO Intelligence Organisations (e.g. HQ JFCs, JTF HQs, SSC, TCC
and the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre7 (NIFC), and coordinates
intelligence with the NATO HQ Joint Intelligence and Security Division
(JISD) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as necessary.

(2) J9. J9 ensures coordination of strategic engagement and

outreach capability, primarily composed of experts in specific domains
including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International
Organisations (IOs), Development, Stabilisation & Reconstruction,
Humanitarian, Rule of Law (RoL) and Governance. It is responsible for
coordinating with cooperating civilian organisations and for developing
awareness and contextualised understanding of non-military aspects of
the situation including the activities of international, non-governmental
and governmental organisations in the AOI. J9 will also ensure that
7
The NIFC is a multi-national intelligence organisation with intelligence analysts from participating member nations. It provides
SACEUR with timely, actionable, intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations. The NIFC produces
baseline intelligence, including encyclopedic information, analysis products, target products, orders of battle, and assessments,
as tasked by SHAPE J2.

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cross cutting topics although a whole HQ responsibility, are duly

considered during this phase.

(3) Political Social Analysis (PSA). The PSA branch applies

regional and thematic (primarily Political, Economic and Social)
expertise, including researching and analysing activities in support of
the development of the contextual understanding of emerging crises
and ongoing operations, especially with regard to how they may impact
Alliance security interests.

(4) Knowledge Management / Knowledge Development. An

essential element of the OPP is the development and management of
information. This requires a multi-disciplined approach to making best
use of information, insights and best practice. At the strategic level KD
and Knowledge Management (KM) SMEs will be responsible for
managing both SACEUR’s and ACO’s overall knowledge priorities and
requirements, and ACO’s knowledge base. They will direct information
gathering and knowledge development across ACO and establish
formats, procedures and standards to maintain accessibility, currency
and accuracy.

(5) Strategic Communications (StratCom) Staff. SHAPE

StratCom are responsible for maintaining awareness of conditions in
the strategic information environment; co-ordinating timely engagement
with NATO HQ and ensuring that communications and information
activities and effects are considered and ultimately coordinated in all
aspects of the planning and execution of an operation. SC staff are
guided by the political-military discussions, direction, and guidance of
NATO HQ staffs. They will routinely consult and collaborate with SMEs
from across the functional and advisory staffs to ensure comprehensive
guidance, assessment and analysis is formulated.

(6) Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC). Unlike air, land,

maritime and special operations forces, which normally execute their
missions and tasks at the operational and tactical level within a theatre,
cyberspace effects, including Communication Information Services
(CIS), are often planned and executed at a strategic level through a
centralised command and control (C2) function. The CyOC is the
command element responsible for this, and provides to SACEUR a
standing defence plan for cyberspace / CIS operations, a mechanism
for establishing pre-approved responses to cyberspace incidents,
events and attacks, all of which can, and are, expected to occur
throughout the full spectrum of modern operations.

(7) SHAPE Historical Office. The SHAPE Office of the Historical

Advisor provides historical advice and expertise, including researching
and analysing the historical perspectives in support of the development
of the contextual understanding of emerging crises and ongoing

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operations, especially with regard to how they may impact Alliance

security interests.

3.5. External Coordination. To facilitate the conduct of the OPP, SHAPE will
liaise and / or coordinate, as appropriate and approved, with external organisations
and bodies, subordinate commands including any nominated HQ(s), domain
advisors, NATO agencies and other relevant international actors. The principal
external agency that SHAPE will be in close coordination with is NATO HQ and the
following are examples of some of its internal bodies with whom SHAPE, at an
appropriate level, may interact during the OPP, due to their political-military crisis
management responsibilities:

a. Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC). The SAC will help provide the
SECGEN and the Chairman of the MC (CMC) with timely and comprehensive
analysis of potential and emerging crises that may affect NATO, to support
their possible consideration and / or discussion by Allies. In addition, the SAC
will provide an ‘interface’ role between the intellectual, policy, and practical
aspects of possible emerging challenges and NATO's crisis management
structures and processes.

b. Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF). The CMTF composed of

designated representatives from the International Staff (IS) and the
International Military Staff (IMS) may be activated by the SECGEN. It
provides an executive level forum for cross-functional staff coordination at the
political-military level within NATO.

c. Political Affairs and Security Policy (PASP) Division of the

International Staff (IS). PASP provides a source of information and contacts
related to regional, economic and security affairs and relations with other IOs
and Partner countries including: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
and Enlargement Policy; Multilateral Policy, especially with the United Nations
(UN), European Union (EU) and the World Bank; Partnership for Peace (PfP);
Regional Affairs, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the Mediterranean
Dialogue (MD); Conventional Arms Control Policy; Defence and Security
Economics; and political aspects of non-proliferation and arms control.

d. Enablement and Resilience Section (ERS). The ERS maintains a

Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) database of
national civil experts in the political, stabilisation and reconstruction and media
fields and a roster of other civil experts from business/industry and
governments / administrations of Member and / or Partner countries with
expertise in areas such as: Movement and Transportation (air / land / sea);
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD); Public Health; Critical Infrastructure; Energy Security;
Civil Communications; Food and Agriculture, Missile Defence; and Industry8.

8
See ACO Directive 80-90 ‘Allied Command Operations – Access to Civil (Civil Emergency Planning) Expertise’.

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e. Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

In the event of a natural or technological disaster, including a CBRN incident,
the EADRCC will be responsible for coordinating, in close consultation with
UNOCHA and the affected nation(s), the response of EAPC Countries to a
disaster occurring within the EAPC geographical area. This coordination work
includes MD and ICI countries and partners across the globe, as appropriate.
The EADRCC can also respond to requests from nations where NATO is
engaged militarily.

f. NATO HQ Strategic Communications (StratCom). StratCom falls

under the direct authority of SECGEN and the NAC. There are several
elements within NATO HQ that enable, and support the development of
StratCom, through the provision of information, contacts, analysis, trends and
guidance related to the international, regional and local information
environments, including those of NATO members, partners and external
organisations. The key elements are:

(1) Private Office (PO) of the SECGEN.

(2) Public Diplomacy Division (PDD).

(3) IMS Office of the Public Affairs and Strategic Communications

Advisor (PASCAD).

Supported by:

(4) PDD StratCom Cell. Responsible for developing StratCom

Guidance on behalf of Assistant Secretary General (ASG) Public
Diplomacy Division (PDD).

(5) NATO Press and Media. Responsible for supporting the NATO
Spokesperson and providing Public Affairs advice to SHAPE
Public Affairs Office (PAO).

(6) NATO StratCom Policy Board (SCPB). A standing SCPB has

been established to act on behalf of SECGEN and the NAC in
accordance with the NATO StratCom policy, under the direction
of ASG PDD.

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PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (POTENTIAL / ACTUAL

CRISIS)
SECTION 1 - GENERAL
3.6. Introduction. The NCRP is initiated once there are indications that suggest
that there is an emerging crisis that may affect NATO’s security interests. These
indications could come from the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS),
Allies, SACEUR or other sources. At the strategic level, the purpose of Phase 1 -
Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential9 / Actual Crisis, is to assist with the
identification of relevant emerging crises and to support the NAC and / or NATO HQ
staff in their NCRP Phase 1 activities. The main elements of Phase 1 at the strategic
level are as follows:

a. Overview. Within SHAPE, Phase 1 activities are coordinated and

managed by the CCOMC. They normally begin when horizon-scanning
activities identify an emerging potential / actual crisis that may have
implications to NATO’s security interests and concludes when the NAC
requests a formal assessment under NCRP Phase 2. There may be multiple
emerging crises under analysis at any one time. SACEUR and the CG will
continue to be updated on any Phase 1 activities for a given emerging crisis
and provide direction as required, including when continued Phase 1 activities
are no longer required.

b. Main Activities Once an emerging potential / actual crisis has been

identified several options now exist; the issue may continue to be monitored
as part of CCOMC scanning activity, direction may be given to build an initial
understanding of and monitor the crisis and / or conduct an initial estimation of
the crisis and its possible implications to NATO, and / or it can elevated to
NATO HQ. In addition, SHAPE may also support NATO HQ staff, as
appropriate and directed, with the development of any initial advice. The main
activities of Phase 1 are depicted in Figure 3.3.

c. Desired Outcome of this Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 1

are:

(1) Appropriate indications and warnings and initial appreciation of

relevant emerging crises are provided to SACEUR and, if SACEUR
decides, the NAC, in a timely fashion.

9
The OPP as laid out in the COPD will also be used for the development of advance plans where there is potentially no
existing indications of an imminent crisis.

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 4
Political Military Strategic Level Operational Level
Level SACEUR COM
NATO HQ.
Horizon Scanning Collaboration on Horizon
Collaboration with
(CCOMC) Scanning Activities.
Horizon Scanning
Initial Indication of a Provision of indications of
Activities, including
Potential / Actual Crisis Potential / Actual Crisis.
NIWS

Indications of
emerging crisis

Appreciate Indication of a Potential /

Actual Crisis
Support for IS / IMS
initial analysis

NATO HQ and /

3-11
or NAC D&G Develop Initial
Understanding

Phase 1
As authorised,

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

collaboration in
NATO HQ.
developing
(IMS / IS)
understanding of
Staff Level Monitor Emerging Crisis crisis
Coordination. (and Further Develop
Initial Understanding)

Initial Crisis Estimation Initial Situational

(Further Enhance
Understanding) Awareness of
Potential / Actual
Crisis

Figure 3.3 Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential / Actual Crisis

 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

(2) An initial understanding of an emerging crisis is developed,

which can be shared for collaborative situational awareness10 when
authorised.

(3) An initial estimation of the emerging crisis is developed, to

include an appreciation of the nature of the problem and the possible
implications for NATO.

(4) When requested, appropriate SHAPE support, as directed, is

provided to NATO HQ IS / IMS.

(5) Appropriate analysis is performed, as directed, to inform the

development of SACEUR’s strategic military advice (SMA).

(6) Prompt return to horizon scanning activities for emerging crises

not deemed relevant.

d. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The CCOMC is

responsible for leading the cross-functional effort for the conduct of Phase 1
activities and raising to SACEUR / CG those emerging crises with potential
impact to NATO’s security interests. The CCOMC is ‘supported’ by all
SHAPE directorates and CG Advisors, including through the provision of
information, intelligence and knowledge (e.g. J2 Ops (including NIFC as
tasked), PSA, J9, CyOC etc.).

e. External Coordination. Phase 1 activities at the strategic level are

facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities,
authorised and appropriate for the emerging crisis under investigation. These
may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) NATO HQ. On behalf of IMS Director Intelligence, the Warning

Secretariat is the manager and focal point for the NIWS, which is the
Alliances’ strategic indicator-based system to provide warning to
decision makers of any developing threat, potential threat, risk or
concern that could impact on NATO’s security interests. As indications
and warnings begin to indicate a potential emerging crisis of interest to
NATO, the IS and IMS will develop an initial analysis of the situation for
the SECGEN. Liaison and coordination with some or all or the
following NATO HQ entities may be required during Phase 1: SAC,
CMTF, IS (PASP), ERS, EADRCC, and PDD.

(2) Operational Level Headquarters11 (JFC12 / SCC / TCC).

Intelligence and knowledge for specific areas of interest will be

10
Tools for Operations Planning Functional Areas Services (TOPFAS) Systems Analysis Tool (SAT) allows to better capture,
collect and understand all the information available and share the analysis of the crisis; in Phase 1, consideration should be
given to establishing a SAT database to assist collaboration and use of TOPFAS throughout the strategic OPP.
11
Within the COPD reference to operational level HQs will include, where appropriate, the NCS JFCs, NFS HQs, SSCs and
TCCs accepting that the latter two will primarily be providing advice at the strategic level as the principal domain advisors to

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developed in collaboration with JFC(s) and the TCCs as domain

advisors, using common procedures for developing and sharing
information13. As authorised, the CCOMC will collaborate with
respective HQ(s) and SSC and TCC staffs in their analysis of the
emerging crisis.

(3) Other Relevant International Actors. Within a comprehensive

approach, SHAPE and other HQs may require specific authorisation to
coordinate directly with other IOs, such as the UN, EU, or International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). With guidance from the CG, and
using existing authorities or mechanisms (e.g. civilian advisors
(CIVAD), NATO HQ IS (PASP), open source information), the CCOMC
will increase their understanding of the emerging crisis, and its potential
implications for NATO through information available through other
relevant international actors, if appropriate.

SACEUR but could in theory, for specific operations be conducting their own planning in support of the strategic and
operational level command.
12
Normally, unless a NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters (NFS JHQ) has been generated following deployment of a HQ
JFC (as a JTF HQ) and assigned specific responsibilities, the HQ interacting with SHAPE during Phase 1 activities would be a
HQ JFC, MARCOM, AIRCOM, LANDCOM and potentially NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ).
13
Such as AD-065-11 - ACO Standing Policy And Procedures For Intelligence Production Management.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

3.7. Appreciate Indication of a Potential / Actual Crisis. Indications of an

emerging crisis, which may affect NATO’s security interests, are identified by the
CCOMC; they can come as result of horizon scanning, as an appreciation of an on-
going operation, as Indications and Warnings (I&W) from the NIWS14, or directly from
Allies or other sources. Whatever the origin each indication should be considered
when determining what Phase 1 activities are appropriate:

a. The source of the initial indications of the emerging crisis, the urgency
of the situation and the magnitude of the possible impact to NATO’s interests.

b. Political sensitivity of emerging crises that may have an impact on

NATO interests; staff need to continually balance the need to develop an
understanding of an issue and be prepared for possible subsequent phases
against the possible ramifications of exposing NATO concern before Allies
have agreed.

c. As appropriate, early discussion with the relevant NATO HQ staff at an

appropriate level, including early coordination with the NATO HQ Situation
Centre (SITCEN), SAC and relevant staff in the operations divisions of the IS
and IMS.

3.8. Direction and Guidance. SACEUR and / or the CG will provide direction and
guidance to the CCOMC for the conduct of Phase 1 activities for the possible
emerging crisis. As Phase 1 for a particular relevant emerging crisis may continue for
a significant period of time, SACEUR and / or the CG will need to remain informed of
any change in the situation or the result of any NAC discussion of the issue and
therefore amend their direction and guidance as necessary. Phase 1 direction and
guidance could include:

a. The submission of indications and warning of an emerging crisis to

NATO HQ, with potential impact to NATO’s security interests, including initial
military considerations, as appropriate. If at this point the IS / IMS develops
an initial analysis for the SECGEN of the emerging crisis, the CCOMC would
coordinate any SHAPE efforts to support as required.

b. The necessity to conduct additional Phase 1 activities, including the

development of an initial understanding of, and monitoring of the emerging
crisis and / or to conduct more detailed analysis to deepen the understanding
of the emerging crisis and consider possible implications to NATO.

c. The requirement for any additional action. If no further action is

required then CCOMC could be directed to return to horizon scanning.
14
The NIWS is specifically designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO HQ and ACO to provide early
warning of any developing threat, risk or concern that could impact on NATO’s security interests.

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d. Guidance may also be provided on authority for, or restrictions on,

interaction with external actors.

3.9. Develop and Monitor an Initial Understanding of the Emerging Crisis.

The CCOMC will monitor and develop an initial understanding of the emerging crisis
and if time allows, deepen its appreciation of the emerging crisis. As appropriate, it
will continue to task or ask for the collection/acquisition of data / information /
intelligence to fill the identified gaps. To assist this activity, it will also continue,
within delegated authority, to cultivate appropriate expertise to broaden the
understanding of the crisis. As new data / information / intelligence becomes
available, it will update the understanding of the emerging crisis, and its relevance to
NATO’s interests.

a. Develop Initial Understanding. The CCOMC will develop an initial

understanding of the emerging crisis, including the development of an initial
system15 perspective of the area of interest (e.g. across the Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information domains (PMESII16),
focusing on potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors as well as other
aspects of the engagement space relevant to the potential security risks and
threats. To assist the development of an initial understanding of the emerging
crisis, the CCOMC will:

(1) Widen Stakeholder Co-ordination. As authorised and when

appropriate, the CCOMC will:

(a) Consult with external crisis identification community.

(b) Deepen the involvement of the SHAPE staff (functional

area specific staff, CyOC, CG Advisors, and CCOMC enablers).
The input from Strategic International Affairs advisor (SIA),
StratCom Advisor, Legal Advisor (LEGAD), CIVAD, Gender
Advisor (GENAD), Historical Advisor (HISAD) and appropriate
specialist staff is especially important early in any analysis.

(2) Appreciate Existing Information and Intelligence. The

CCOMC, supporting directorates / divisions and specialist staff, will
gather, collate, organise and analyse existing information and
intelligence on the emerging crisis.

(3) Identify Information, Intelligence and Knowledge

Requirements. Following their initial appreciation of the existing
information and intelligence, and whenever required throughout their
analysis, the CCOMC will identify information, intelligence and

15
System - A functionally, physically, and / or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements
forming a unified whole.
16
The PMESII domains may be tailored to reflect exact circumstances in relation to the crisis and additional aspects included
such as Physical Environment / Terrain or Time.

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knowledge requirements needed to improve their understanding of the

emerging crisis.

(a) Establish SACEUR’s Commander’s Critical

Information Requirements (CCIRs). In conjunction with
SACEUR / CG the CCOMC will determine and propose
SACEUR’s initial CCIRs which focus on understanding the
scale, scope and timeframe of the risk or threat to NATO’s
interests and how such a situation might be influenced by
military and non-military means.

(b) Establish SACEUR’s Priority Intelligence

Requirements (PIRs). Based on its analysis of SACEUR’s
CCIRs, SHAPE J2 is responsible for the development of
SACEUR’s PIRs. PIRs for the area of interest provide the basis
for tasking intelligence production17 and also support collection
and coordination of intelligence requirements management with
NATO HQs and nations.

(c) Identify Information and Knowledge Requirements.

In many cases NATO intelligence may not be the most
appropriate source or means for collecting information and
developing knowledge. Therefore, the CCOMC must identify
those other priority information and knowledge requirements
about the area of interest as a basis for collection / acquisition
and management and engage with the appropriate staff or
agencies (e.g. NATO HQ IS / IMS, non-NATO entities, etc.).

b. Monitor Emerging Crisis. The CCOMC will continue to monitor and

evaluate if a threat to NATO’s security interests exists or remains.
Periodically it will update SACEUR / CG on the potential crisis under analysis,
especially if the situation deteriorates and threatens NATO’s interests further.

3.10. Initial Crisis Estimation. SACEUR / CG may direct that the analysis of the
crisis be deepened, especially regarding potential security implications for NATO.
The CCOMC would then conduct an initial estimation of the crisis, including
analysing the nature of the problem, possible implications for NATO security, and, as
appropriate, develop recommendations, including initial domain advice, for
submission to SACEUR / CG. Throughout this work information, intelligence and
knowledge shortfalls will be identified and requests / tasks to fill the information
requirements issued, particularly those that contribute to the following areas:

a. Characterise the Nature of the Problem. The CCOMC will analyse

the nature, scale, scope and pace of the problem; the principle actors, their
roles and their inter-relationships; the international interests and engagement
including legal aspects and the information environment.
17
Intelligence production is completed within ACO as per ACO Directive 65-11.

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b. Determine Extent of Impact and Implications for NATO security.

The CCOMC will analyse the possible extent of the impact and implications
for NATO by considering:

(1) The urgency of any possible required response.

(2) The assessments, goals and actions of relevant Partners and

actors, using delegated approvals or through NATO HQ.

(3) Any known international community or other actor response.

(4) The potential risks and threats to the NATO.

(5) Possible future military roles for NATO.

(6) The impact of the crisis / issue on other ongoing NATO

operations.

c. Develop Recommendations. Based on the understanding developed, the

CCOMC makes recommendations to SACEUR / CG on the need to advise NATO
HQ of the emerging crisis, including military considerations for precautionary or
preparatory activities. These considerations for example could include a request to
the NAC for authority to declare certain Crisis Response Measures (CRMs), while
they consider the indications and warnings and decide if a move to NCRP Phase 2 is
warranted.

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PHASE 2 - STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

SECTION 1 – GENERAL

3.11. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment, is to develop

and coordinate SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA) of an emerging or potential
crisis in support of the Political Military Estimate (PME). A strategic assessment may
also be conducted for an on-going NATO operation as part of work leading to
development of a revised OPLAN. Phase 2 will start on SACEUR’s direction to
develop a military assessment, following tasking from the NAC and ends with
SACEUR’s submission of the SSA, which will form the basis of the NATO Military
Authorities (NMA) advice for NAC consideration.

a. Overview. Phase 2 begins with a tasker18 for SACEUR to conduct a

strategic assessment after the NAC formally decides to move into Phase 2 of
the NCRP. This phase includes formal activation of a CAT and potentially the
nomination of a JFC(s) or operational level HQ(s) as required (through a
Strategic Warning Order (WNGO)19); development of the SSA of the crisis;
coordination with NATO HQ, subordinate HQs; and as appropriate and
authorised, external organisations. In addition, the NAC decision to move into
Phase 2 of the NCRP, which initiates the PME, may include guidance on and
the authorisation of CRMs20 for declaration by SACEUR. SACEUR may
recommend / request to the NAC, due to time constraints, to invoke the Fast
Track Decision Making (FTDM) or Accelerated Decision Making (ADM)
process21.

(1) Ideally, the CCOMC would have developed an initial

understanding of the situation / emerging crisis and can transfer it to
the CAT; this would aid the CAT’s work on the early portion of the
Strategic Assessment process (e.g. developing a strategic appreciation
of the crisis). However, with a rapidly emerging crisis it is possible that
there will have been little time for Phase 1 activities and in this
instance, the CAT will have to rapidly develop an initial understanding
of the crisis, within the time available, to facilitate completion of the
SSA to meet MC and NAC timelines.

(2) Following the submission of the SSA, the appreciation of the

emerging crisis22 will need to be continually validated and developed to
support subsequent OPP phases.

18
The tasking would cover the NAC decision sheet that requests NMA advice; the tasking may provide additional guidance and
other details such as timings for submission of the SSA.
19
For illustrative format of a Strategic Warning Order see Annex A Appendix 1.
20
Pre-authorised CRM measures are described in general and listed in the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM).
The NCRSM ‘recommends’ the NCRP Phases in which a pre-authorised CRM should be declared; however, unless the NAC
provides restrictions on the declaration of certain pre-authorised CRMs, once they move the NCRP into Phase 2 SACEUR can
declare any pre-authorised CRMs when deemed necessary. The NAC can also direct SACEUR to declare certain CRMs.
21
For explanation of Fast Track / Accelerated Decision Making refer to MC 0133 – NATO Operations Planning.
22
The appreciation of the emerging crisis draws from the work contributing to the comprehensive understanding of the
environment. The understanding should be continually reviewed and updated throughout the OPP and where changes that
could impact on the planning process are identified they need to be immediately raised to the CAT.

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b. Prerequisites. Phase 2 will start on SACEUR’s direction to develop a

military assessment, following tasking from the NAC.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 2 are depicted in Figure

3.4.

d. Desired Outcome of this Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 2

are:

(1) Strategic WNGO. A strategic WNGO is issued to the selected

JFC(s) / op level HQ(s) and other ACO subordinate HQs as
appropriate, to alert them to be prepared to support strategic operations
planning.

(2) SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment. The SSA, as a part of

SMA, is submitted and provides the NAC with:

(a) A fundamental understanding of the nature of the crisis,

including its key PMESII aspects.

(b) An appreciation of the potential implications for NATO,

including potential strategic risks and threats.

(c) An appreciation of potential strategic ends, ways and

means.

(d) Military considerations relevant to the situation to inform

the NAC on the applicability of the use of the NATO military
instrument to assist with the situation resolution, including any
recommendation for the use of the FTDM process, to assist
them to develop the necessary direction for SACEUR to develop
MROs, if they so decide.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The CCOMC will

transition relevant information, intelligence and knowledge to support the
planning element of the CAT as it assumes responsibility for Phase 2, along
with selected members who participated in the initial analysis of the emerging
crisis. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide
information and intelligence to the planning group. If a Strategic Assessment
Team (SAT) is authorised to deploy, the CCOMC would establish reporting
mechanisms and ensure coordinated interaction, especially with the planning
group.

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Political Military Strategic Level Operational Level

Level SACEUR COM

Tasker for SACEUR Initiate Strategic Strategic

SACEUR’s Assessment Warning
Strategic Order
Assessment
Receive formal Initial
Crisis Estimate briefing

Review NAC Political

direction / guidance

Develop a strategic
Contributex TCCs
appreciation of the crisis

Analyse the principal Appreciate International

Phase 2

actors and their roles in interests and engagement

the crisis in the crisis
SACEUR’s
Strategic Appreciate potential
strategic ends (including Determine implications for
Assessment NATO end state, strategic NATO, including potential
objectives and effects), strategic risks and threats
ways and means

Develop military
considerations

SACEUR’s
Strategic Coordinate and Submit
SACEUR’s Strategic Share Collaborative
Assessment
Assessment planning.
Operational
Appreciation of
Strategic
Tasker for Review political guidance Environment.
MROs and direction. Appreciate Advice during
Lessons Learned development of
MROs
May be combined Select and Develop
and submitted MROs (including Strategic
as one document Framework, potential C2 Military
Phase 3

if directed and Capabilities /

by the NAC Requirements) Response
Options
Analyse, evaluate, Development
compare MROs

Military Coordinate and include COM review draft

Response SACEUR’s MROs.
Options recommendation. Provide Operational
Submit MROs Advice

Note:
Note:Phases
Phases2 2and
and33may
maybe
becombined
combined under Fast
Fast Track
TrackDecision
DecisionMaking
Makingprocedures
procedures

Figure 3.4 Phase 2 Strategic Assessment Development

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f. External Coordination. Subject to direction, the requirements for

liaison and coordination by and with SHAPE during Phase 2, at an appropriate
level, should be considered and may include interaction with:

(1) NATO HQ. Liaison and coordination with some or all of the
following NATO HQ entities may be required:

(a) IS / IMS. A liaison element from NATO HQ (IS / IMS) may

be requested to support the planning team to facilitate their
appreciation of the current NATO HQ staff perspectives of the
evolving situation. It could include an ERS liaison officer to
advise on Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) aspects and, as
required, representation from among IS Operations (IS (Ops)),
IMS Plans and Policy (IMS (P&P)), and / or IMS Operations (IMS
(Ops)).

(b) Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF). The CMTF

complements the lead committee’s role and, as directed by the
NAC, facilitates coordination with the UN and other IOs
regarding NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach,
including to facilitate and / or conduct pre-operations planning
consultations with international actor’s staffs. As appropriate
and if requested, SHAPE staff at an appropriate level may be
approved to participate in the CMTF and in pre-operations
planning consultations.

(c) Operations Policy Committee (OPC). The OPC or other

committee assigned as ‘lead’ by the NAC would coordinate
political-military crisis management advice. As early as the
PME, NCRP Phases 2 and 3, a Strategic Political Military Plan23
(SPMP) may begin to take shape if deemed necessary.

(d) Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC). The

CEPC advises the NAC on the availability and effective
utilisation of civil resources in an emerging crisis and facilitates
the integration of civil support and advice on civil issues. It
ensures co-ordination in matters related to the co-operation
between NATO military and civil authorities and civil emergency
preparedness. It also advises on the need to consider specific
measures of NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS).

(e) Euro Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Committee

(EADRCC). The EADRCC is mandated to respond to civil
emergency situations in the Euro-Atlantic area, and to function
as a clearing-house mechanism for the coordination of requests
and offers of assistance.

23
Note – there is currently no standard format for a SPMP. Each case is tailored to the specific requirement.

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(2) Single Service Commands / Theatre Component

Commands. Dependent upon the nature of the potential crisis, SSCs /
TCCs may be tasked to deploy domain specific planning and liaison
elements to SHAPE to assist the planning team with coordinated
domain advice and input.

(3) Joint Force Commands / Operational Level HQ(s). The

designated JFC or op level HQs will typically be tasked to deploy an
Operational Planning and Liaison Element (OPLE)24 to SHAPE to assist
the planning team with communication with the HQ(s) joint operational
planning groups (JOPG) and the provision of coordinated operational
input. If there is a requirement for Operational Liaison and
Reconnaissance Team(s) (OLRT) to deploy during Phase 2, the
strategic planning team may receive their reports and have the
possibility of interaction with them through the JOPG.

(4) Relevant NATO Agencies. NATO Communication and

Information Agency (NCIA), NATO Support and Procurement Agency
(NSPA), etc. will provide advice and support through entities such as
Planning and Liaison teams embedded within ACO commands.

(5) NATO Partners. NATO Partners represent important external

actors that are increasingly involved with both the planning and
execution of operations from the outset. With guidance and authority
from the NAC / NATO HQ, NATO Partners could be granted access as
part of the framework for Consultation, Coordination and Deconfliction
(CCD).

(6) Other Relevant International Actors. With guidance from the

NAC, SACEUR and / or the CG, and using existing authorities or
mechanisms (e.g. CIVAD, NATO HQ, open source information), the
CCOMC will increase their understanding of the emerging crisis, and its
potential implications for NATO through information available through
other relevant international actors, if appropriate (e.g. UN, EU,
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ICRC,
African Union (AU), and relevant international, governmental (including
gendarmerie / police organisations) and NGOs).

24
The OPLE must include experienced operational level planning staff, familiar with the JOPG and planning processes of the
HQ(s) they represent as well as the strategic planning process. The composition of the OPLE will be determined by the sending
HQ. Depending on when the OPLE is deployed they will support SHAPE in the development of products according to the
NCRP Phase.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS
3.12 Overview. The processes followed through the development of the SSA
draws upon the work initiated during Phase 1, the collection, collation and
interpretation of data, information and intelligence as part of the comprehensive
understand of the environment. From this specific aspects, factors, actors, directions
etc. are considered in order to provide an initial comprehensive overview of the
crisis. The results and conclusions drawn from the different processes completed
during the development of the SSA have utility and applicability throughout the
development of the strategic products during Phases 2, 3 and 425.

3.13. Initiate SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment. On direction from SACEUR or

the CG, the CAT planning team will assume responsibility for Phase 2 from the
CCOMC and begin to draw together all of the available information. The planning
team will work through the following tasks and actions as laid out in Fig 3.4:

a. Formal Handover Brief. The planning team will receive a formal

briefing from the CCOMC and specialist staff involved in the initial crisis
estimate. The briefing should highlight and cover all of the detail behind the
information supplied to NATO HQ.

b. Review NAC Decision Sheet and Relevant Tasking. The planning

team will review the tasking to determine any requirements for additional
guidance and / or clarification. It should be recognised from the outset
whether this is an urgent situation requiring an immediate response or a
developing situation requiring a more deliberate approach within the context of
an overall strategy. The review should focus on understanding:

(1) The nature of the task26 and any guidance and direction27.

(2) The time available.

(3) The political aim, possible NATO role, desired NATO end state,
or end state conditions, and strategic objectives28, if stated.

(4) Potential military and non-military roles.

(5) Requirements for clarification.

(6) Requirements for external coordination.

25
The use of applications such as TOPFAS facilitates the collection, collation and subsequent use of the analysis products
completed during Phase 2 and the subsequent production of the SSA.
26
It is possible that the NAC may request MROs to be submitted along with the SSA as part of the FTDM process. If this is the
case, the guidance provided in Phase 3 ‘Military Response Option Development’ should also be consulted.
27
At this point there may be an initial NATO HQ IS / IMS analysis available, which can add some context to the NAC direction
and guidance, or it can be used to assist development of the understanding of the crisis from a NATO HQ point of view.
28
MC 0133 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level,
where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At
this stage however, any strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.

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c. Determine Potential Requirements for Fast Track or Accelerated

Decision Making. If not already directed, the planning team must
immediately determine whether the situation requires an urgent response and
if so whether a FTDM / ADM process may be necessary and advise SACEUR
accordingly. When the NAC decides that NATO should respond to the crisis,
and that the FTDM / ADM process is required, it will issue political guidance
and task SACEUR accordingly to urgently provide a strategic OPLAN and
conduct specific enabling activities as appropriate.

d. SACEUR's Initial Guidance. SACEUR’s initial guidance will direct the

planning effort. ACOS J5, supported by specialist staff as necessary, will
through the CG, inform SACEUR of any essential elements of the NAC
Decision Sheet and any MC direction and guidance, the nature of the problem
and the time available as necessary and should be prepared to advise on
the following:

a. Any immediate StratCom considerations.

b. Preparation and / or deployment of a SAT29 and the need to

request requisite authorities through CRMs.

c. The recommended JFC(s)30 or HQs and subordinate HQs to be

involved in the strategic assessment process, including the
requirement to prepare and / or deploy an OLRT, as required.

d. Requirements for external coordination.

e. Timings for review of the draft SSA.

f. Issues to be clarified.

e. Review NATO Political Guidance and Policy Statements. Given

that most crises develop over time, it is likely that the NAC has developed a
view and may have issued policy statements regarding a NATO position. The
planning team must quickly analyse NATO policies and declarations and other
official statements by the NAC and the SECGEN, including the latest press
releases, to review and understand NATO’s current position regarding the

29
The concept for deploying a SAT is to facilitate the completion of a strategic estimate for the crisis. A Civil-Military
Assessment and Liaison Team (CMALT) has also been used in the past, with co-leads (one representing the political-military
level and one representing the strategic military level). Limited in size, a SAT will be tailored to the particular crisis and may
include operational level representation; the deployment of OLRT would have to be coordinated with any deployed or deploying
SAT. The deployment of a SAT may also require coordination with National Military Representatives (NMRs). It would always
require arrangements with sponsors in the area, including the HN and/or a national embassy. The conduit from the CAT to the
SAT would normally be through the CCOMC to ensure they retain full awareness.
30
Where a JFC(s) has associated NRF responsibilities it may have been identified early in the OPP and designated; however,
there are many options for C2 of NATO operations at the operational level. It will not be until a MRO is selected by the NAC,
and a NID promulgated, that it will be clear who is best positioned to command the entire operation or those HQs that will be
required to coordinate their operations under SHAPE. This command(s) would normally develop the CONOPS and OPLAN(s)
but may not have been the designated JFC or involved directly in the planning to that point. Throughout the planning process,
staff will have to be sensitive to this issue in order to mitigate as early as possible any issues to maximise planning efficiency
and effectiveness.

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crisis and specific strategic issues. If not provided, the StratCom staff must be
prepared to draft a Strategic Narrative for consideration by NATO HQ.

f. HQ Selection. A JFC or multiple operational level HQs / Commands31

could be selected to support the strategic planning effort and then develop the
operational level planning, on the basis of geographic location of the crisis,
domain responsibilities, NATO Response Force (NRF) responsibilities, current
commitments or other relevant factors.

g. Draft Warning Order. The planning team will draft a strategic WNGO
to the selected JFC(s) / HQs, other appropriate ACO subordinate commands
and other supporting entities. It should cover issues such as key NAC and
MC documents, a request for operational or domain input during the planning
process, provision of liaison elements to SHAPE, possible contribution to a
SAT, preparation and / or deployment of OLRT(s) and proposals for CRM
implementation. The WNGO will include the timeline for any products to be
provided to SACEUR. Standing up of the operational level Joint Operations
Planning Groups (JOPGs) will be under the direction of the nominated
COM(s).

h. Crisis Response Measures (CRMs). CRMs, as pre-defined and

agreed measures, cover a wide range of military capabilities and provide
various measures for planning, preparing and activating national capabilities
to meet NATO operational requirements. CRMs should be identified and
justified early by the staff in order to allow the request to be submitted.
Depending upon the situation the NAC may have already delegated authority
to SACEUR for certain CRMs.

(1) Guided by the NCRS subject matter expert (SME), functional

SMEs must review the requirements for CRMs based on the situation
and any existing authorised CRMs and recommend selected measures
for SACEUR approval. CRMs for the preparation and deployment of a
SAT and / or OLRTs32 in particular need to be considered at an early
stage. In particular, the CAT should review CRMs including in the
following subject areas:

A Manpower

B Intelligence

D Force Protection

31
JFC / JHQ is used as a general term for any HQ that can be assigned as the operational command for an operation,
reporting directly to SACEUR (SHAPE), and would thus lead the planning effort at the operational level (e.g. in garrison – HQ
JFC; AIRCOM; MARCOM; NFS JHQ; or deployed – a JTF HQ). The operational HQ selected will have to be joint, or
augmented to be, ‘sufficiently’ joint for the mission assigned as necessary
32
Depending on the situation, SHAPE may have already alerted any designated HQ to prepare a OLRT for deployment or may
have received a request for this authorisation from the HQ. Any guidance for tailoring the OLRT as well as its preparation and
deployment should be developed by the CAT, especially the use of deployable CIS, arrangements for initial entry, coordination
with HN and MilPA / PsyOps.

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E General Operations

I Psychological Operations

J Electronic Warfare

K Meteorology / Oceanography

L CBRN Defence

M Logistics

O Forces Readiness

P Communications and Information Systems

Q Critical Infrastructure and Services

S Military Public Affairs

(2) SACEUR is authorised to declare a CRM once the declaration

authority has been devolved. When the NAC decides to initiate Phase
2 of the NCRP, the NAC Decision Sheet authorises SACEUR to
declare any of the pre-authorised CRMs subject to any limitations
imposed by the NAC, without further consultation with, or requests
being sent to, NATO HQ. To declare other CRMs, SACEUR must
request that the NAC devolve the declaration authority for each CRM.
The NAC can also direct SACEUR to declare a certain CRM.

(3) Functional SMEs will provide justification and rationale to

support each recommendation they make for declaration of a CRM, or
devolution of CRM declaration authority. The op level HQ(s) may also
submit requests for CRM declaration, which would be validated by the
appropriate functional SME. Considerations for declaration of a CRM
will be situation dependent, including whether a crisis is in its early or
advanced stage. The justification would normally include the following
type of information:

(a) The aim that the originator intends to achieve by the CRM
declaration.

(b) The implications of declaring the CRM(s).

(c) The implications if the request or recommendation is not

authorised.

(d) An estimate, if possible, of the lead-time needed to

implement a declaration.

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(e) Considerations for the desired area of applicability, like

NATO territory, or parts thereof, or to the area of the crisis that is
beyond NATO territory.

(f) Any other factors.

(4) Requests for devolution of declaration authority can be made to

the NAC by SACEUR at any time. Depending on the situation, the
planning team can prepare recommendations on CRMs with the
submission of the SSA or separately as the situation dictates. The staff
need to be proactive in recommending requests for the devolution of
declaration authority to ensure that SACEUR has the requisite
authorities, with additional NAC guidance as required, prior to the time
they are needed.

(5) Once SACEUR has the appropriate declaration authority and

decides to declare a certain CRM, a Declaration Message is issued;
Nations and designated HQs, respond with an NCRS Implementation
Report reflecting their implementation decisions. Once implemented,
SHAPE functional SMEs are responsible for monitoring33 and assessing
the effectiveness and results of the implementation of declared CRMs;
they also are responsible to recommend the cancellation of the
implementation of a CRM when it is no longer required.

(6) Throughout this process, the NCRS SME provides advice on the
use of CRMs, including for SACEUR, as required. The NCRS SME also
assists with: forwarding requests to the NAC for devolution of CRM
declaration authority; the administration of CRM messages; and the
use of the NATO Crisis Response Tracking Application34 (NCRTA).

i. Lessons Learned. The J7 SME should be tasked to begin to collate

and analyse relevant lessons learned from previous operations in similar
circumstances. Initial analysis will be factored into the analysis of strategic
ends, ways and means, which is later in the SSA development process. The
SHAPE / ACO Office of the Historical Advisor and JALLC can be consulted
and asked to assist with historical analysis.

3.14. Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis. The CAT will begin the
strategic appreciation of the crisis with a review, and updating where appropriate, of
the systems perspective of the crisis developed during Phase 1. This review will
consist of three basic steps:

33
While a CAT needs to monitor the state of the implementation of CRMs, and the related implications, it is a non-permanent
body. The CCOMC is therefore the focal point for the monitoring of CRM implementation. The CCOMC and CAT SMEs
(NCRS and functional SMEs) should use the automated NCRTA to track the progress of CRMs and Counter-Aggression /
Counter-Surprise through the Request – Authorisation – Declaration – Implementation processes.
34
The NCRTA is a web-based application that can be reached by all NATO SECRET network users via the SHAPE NCRS
Portal.

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a. Determine the Nature, Scale and Scope of the Problem. The aim is
to identify the main conditions in the current situation that the NAC has
deemed or might deem to be unacceptable and the principal actors and
factors contributing to the problem and its resolution (including the main
international actors and their role in the crisis). This analysis of the problem
will continue to be refined, as necessary, as the strategic appreciation of the
crisis matures; the description of the problem should eventually include any
major threats or risks posed by the problem, such as the potential
consequences of not taking action (e.g. ethnic violence, regional instability,
interruption to lines of communication (LoC) or energy supplies) or of taking
action (e.g. potential for collateral damage to civilians, infrastructure and
cultural sites). It should also include a description of the most urgent aspects
of the crisis.

b. Analyse the Strategic Environment. The CAT reviews and updates

the analysis of the strategic environment (PMESII, meteorological and
oceanographic (METOC) and geospatial) developed during Phase 1, while
identifying any critical gaps in information and knowledge. This
comprehensive analysis will include, where appropriate, an integrated gender
perspective35 and consideration of any cross cutting topics36 while also
applying a population-centric perspective in order to recognise the existing
and potential threats to the civilian population. The aim is to identify those key
issues, factors and actors influencing the crisis, and its possible causes and
possible resolution.

c. Analyse Key Factors37. Throughout the strategic assessment

process, the CAT identifies the key factors that define the problem and which
must ultimately be addressed when resolving it. They analyse these factors
making deductions about strategic implications, noting any assumptions, and
drawing conclusions relevant for further analysis and planning, see Figure 3.5.
This is a continuing process that provides the foundation for developing and
maintaining a current strategic appreciation of the situation. The CAT will
inevitably identify gaps in information, intelligence and knowledge that will
generate collection / acquisition requests as well as identify potential
preconditions for success (PCS)38 that will need to be satisfied. Where PCS
may be dependent upon the actions of other non-military entities they may be
35
As per Bi-SC Directive 40-1, ‘Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure’ (Dated
16 May 2017), ‘integration of a gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men
reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources’.
36
Cross Cutting Topics within NATO currently include Women Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC),
Protection of Civilians (PoC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP) and Building Integrity (BI).
37
Factor Analysis is normally conducted using the 3-column model, (Factor, Deduction and Conclusion). See COPD Aide
Memoire for detailed explanation and examples.
38
Definition: Preconditions for Success (PCS) represents those prerequisites or requirements that must be in place or achieved
before something else may happen or be completed. With regard to planning at the strategic level, PCS will consist of those
aspects, conditions, parameters that are outside of the immediate control of the COM or those aspects and conditions that
need to be in place or achieved by the higher command or external actors in order for the operation or campaign to succeed.
PCS do not necessarily need to be achieved, in place or even in progress before an operation starts: the operation or parts
thereof, may in themselves contribute to achieving the PCS. PCS do have associated assumptions and risks that planners
must consider and account for in their planning and as such could also need to be reconciled as part of operations assessment.

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represented as Complementary Non-Military Actions (CNMA) and as such

could require either direct or indirect military support as part of a
Comprehensive Approach (CA).

Factor Deduction Conclusion

A significant factual The implications, issues or The outcome or result
statement of information considerations, derived reached that requires
known to be true that from fact(s) that have action in planning or
has operational operational significance. further analysis.
implication.
What is the current state So what is the significance So, what can or should
of affairs or trends? of the factor? be done?

Figure 3.5 Factor Analysis (Factor – Deduction - Conclusion)

3.15. Identify and Analyse the Principal Actors and their Role in the Crisis.
Typically, there will be a variety of state and non-state actors39, including potential
adversaries, Intel, Partners and Military Partnership and others, whose actions, in
varying degrees have contributed to the conditions that characterise the crisis. Once
identified these actors can be viewed as systems, each comprised of different
elements, which interact with other systems to create effects intended to support
their goals. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences
in the crisis. Appreciating these actors goals, capabilities and motivation will be key
to understanding how to influence them. When considering each of the identified
actors against the following criteria, it is important to challenge and validate all
analysis and assumptions and to ensure that the expected actions / reactions and
capabilities of all actors are realistic:

a. Analyse the Capabilities and Behaviour of Each Actor. Based on

the analysis of the strategic environment, including any analysis of the actors,
the CAT must identify those actors who will have the greatest influence in the
current crisis. The CAT must then understand the effects40 caused by the
actions of each actor to gain insight into how best to influence them.

b. Review Essential Subsystems and / or Elements of Each Actor

System. By leveraging the analysis of external entities, the CAT should be
able to describe the network of interrelated systems and systems elements in

39
Actors may be divided, grouped and referred to by colour; potential adversaries or opposing forces + red; friendly or allied =
blue; partners or indigenous security forces = green; national and supranational political organisations and diplomats,
humanitarians, IOs and NGOs = white; organised and transnational criminals and organisations = black. These colour grouping
may subsequently be used in wargaming.
40
Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (COPD
definition).

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the different PMESII domains that determine the capabilities and capacity of
each main actor to act and to influence other systems and system elements in
different domains. Actor systems may be comprised of:

(1) Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders, opinion leaders

and opinion formers.

(2) Groups including political interest groups, social power and

influence groups, as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan
groups usually linked to the above individuals.

(3) Organisations including Governmental Organisations (GOs),

security forces, IOs, NGOs, Private Volunteer Organisations (PVOs),
criminal organisations and transnational organisations as well as
commercial enterprises and multinational corporations.

(4) Nation States.

c. Appreciate the Main Characteristics of Each Actor. The CAT

considers the motivation of each actor including the influences of history,
culture, values, beliefs and prevailing attitudes of their members, and the
personality traits, psychological profiles, motives and interests of key
individuals. At this point it is also useful to begin to appreciate the receptivity,
susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of military influences,
as well as their ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

d. Appreciate the Main Actions of Each Actor and their Potential

Effects. Actions41 are typically directed at some other actor, system or
system element to create specific effects with the intent that the cumulative
effect will establish conditions required to achieve the actor’s objective.
However, actions may create other undesired effects with different
consequences. It is critical at this point that the CAT appreciates the
relationship between each actor’s capabilities, actions, effects and objectives
as a basis for gaining insight into their behaviour.

e. Appreciate Possible Response to NATO Involvement. Based on

their understanding of the different actors, the CAT should appreciate the
likely response of each actor to a possible NATO response. This will provide
an initial indication of potential adversaries, partners and neutrals. It may also
highlight relationships that are conditional.

f. Identify and Address Knowledge Gaps. The analysis of actors will

highlight gaps in knowledge. The CAT should capture any additional
requirements for information, intelligence and knowledge and issue collection /
acquisition and analysis tasks.

41
Action - The process of doing something to achieve an aim and in the sense of this paragraph, an action can be considered
the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect (s)
in support of an objective.

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3.16. Determine and Analyse Strategic Centre of Gravity (CoG)42. The CAT
must determine the CoGs of friendly and opposing actors and determine what
vulnerabilities can be exploited in opposing actors and what Alliance and friendly
actors’ vulnerabilities must be protected. If required, the CAT may find it necessary
to determine the CoG of certain neutral actors43. At the conclusion of the CoG
analysis, the main building blocks towards acceptable conditions in the engagement
space will emerge. See Figure 3.6 for a CoG analysis template. The basic stages of
CoG analysis are as follows:

a. Appreciate the Goals and Objectives of Each Actor. The CAT

reviews the statements and actions of each actor to appreciate what they
seek to achieve as well as the conditions they may desire as an end state to
the crisis.

b. Appreciate the Critical Capabilities (CC) of Each Actor. Once the

CAT has determined what are the aims and objectives of the actor it must
identify ‘what’ the actor must be able to do in order to achieve the identified
aims. This will point to actors CoG as well as any deficiencies.

c. Appreciate the Critical Requirements (CR) of Each Actor. From the

CCs the CAT must determine those key system elements and essential
conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences required to
generate and sustain the critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical
resources, and relationships with other actors, what are the primary means
that enables the CoG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an
opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control
a population, wealth distribution, or a political system

d. Appreciate Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) of Each Actor. The CAT

must determine what are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the CRs
through which the CoG may be exploited or protected.

e. Determine the CoG. When the CCs are identified, the CAT must
determine what represents the primary strength necessary for an actor to
achieve its strategic objective; this should be its CoG. Care must be taken to
ensure that the CAT focuses at the strategic level in their CoG analysis. At the
political / military strategic level a CoG may represent a moral strength of an
actor rather than a physical entity which exists in principle at each level of
command.

42
Centre of Gravity - A CoG is the primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action, or will to fight.
AJP 05. Note: At the political strategic level, moral-strength as well as physical-strength CoGs exist. At lower levels of
command, only physical-strength CoGs normally exist and are therefore normally represented by a physical entity.
43
Based on the system (PMESII) analysis of potential adversaries, partners and others, the CAT will examine the foundations
of each actors / system that gives it strength and determine possible strategic CoGs. Having completed the process the CAT
must deduce what can be exploited and what should be protected and draw these findings together in a conclusion. System
network diagrams help in determining positive and negative influences as well as critical dependencies.

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CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX

ACTOR:
DEDUCED AIM AND DESIRED OUTCOME
What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions does the actor seek to establish
by their actions?
CENTRE OF GRAVITY CRITICAL CAPABILITIES
…is a principal source of strength of …is the primary ability (or abilities) that
power for achieving one’s aim. gives the COG its strength.
What is the primary element of power What are the primary means that enables
upon which an actor depends to achieve the COG to gain and maintain dominant
operational objectives? influence over an opponent or situation,
such as to threaten or coerce an
opponent, or to control a population,
wealth distribution, or a political system?

To be targeted in an opponent and

To be influenced/denied to an opponent
protected in a friend.
and exploited in a friend).
A noun; an entity; a complex system; a
The key word is the verb - the ability
thing.
to….
CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS
…exists when a critical requirement is …are specific conditions, components or
deficient, degraded or missing and resources that are essential to sustaining
exposes a critical capability to damage or those capabilities.
loss. What are those key system elements and
What are the weaknesses, gaps or essential conditions, characteristics,
deficiencies in the key system elements capabilities, relationship and influences
and essential conditions, characteristics, required to generate and sustain the
capabilities, relationship and influences COG’s critical capabilities, such as
through which the COG may be specific assets, physical resources, and
influenced or neutralised? relationships with other actors?

To be exploited in an opponent and To be denied to an opponent and

protected in a friend. provided to a friend.
A noun with modifiers. Nouns, things.

CONCLUSIONS
Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential
conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences could be exploited in an
opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities, relationship and
behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space?

Figure 3.6 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

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f. Conclusions. The CAT must now draw conclusions against all of the
identified CVs. This is the main step of the CoG analysis, where potential
objectives and effects can be determined which exploit weaknesses, gaps or
deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, CCs, CRs
and CVs in an opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities,
relationship and behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in the
engagement space.

3.17. Appreciate International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis. No

crisis will develop in isolation and there will be many varied and diverse interests and
factors associated with it. Not all will necessarily be immediately apparent but certain
aspects will always need to be considered:

a. Determine International Legal Aspects. Throughout the process the

legal aspects of the crisis based on international law, treaties and
agreements, as well as relevant UN resolutions, will be reviewed for
understanding and applicability.

b. Appreciate International Interests and Objectives. The CAT will

analyse policy statements made by international community actors regarding
the crisis to determine their specific interests and the level of consensus. As a
minimum, this review should consider statements by the UN, IOs such as the
G8 and EU, as well as other regional organisations. Direct coordination and
liaison with any of these organisations should be considered in accordance
with NAC guidance, and coordinated as applicable through HQ NATO.

c. Appreciate International Commitments. The CAT will identify the

main non-NATO entities in the crisis area, including those engaged in
humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, displaced persons
and refugees (DPREs), legal assistance, medical care, women’s rights and
empowerment, reconstruction, agriculture, education and general project
funding. It is critical that the CAT understands the mandate, role, structure,
methods and principles of these organisations as a basis for determining
possible areas for interaction and / or cooperation. Therefore, the CAT should
review interaction of the main organisations to include:

(1) The lead agencies coordinating efforts in different sectors (e.g.

governance, development, security, humanitarian).

(2) The nature, level and scope of commitments.

(3) Goals and objectives, as well as major obstacles to achieving

them.

(4) Potential future contributions.

(5) Potential roles for NATO to enable international efforts, gain

synergies and limit interferences, including security and theatre logistic

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(including medical) support as well as Public Information / Affairs

aspects.

(6) The likely relationship between any deployed military force and
the agencies on the coordination spectrum (cooperation through to co-
existence) and from this possible areas for cooperation and interaction.

(7) Priorities for coordination and liaison.

(8) Required degree of interaction with each significant non-NATO

actor.

d. Appreciate the Information Environment. The SSA will include an

analysis of the information environment from the strategic perspective which
will serve as a basis for developing and evaluating possible activities and
effects in the strategic information environment. This analysis includes
consideration of; potential audiences, main actors in the information
environment and their networks, aspects of opinion building including key
leaders, perception management and information flow, specific information
systems and media. Additionally, it will provide the status of own and
adversary communication and information activities using contributions from
both J2 and StratCom.

(1) Audiences. Potential audiences will be identified in broad terms

and can be divided into three main categories, each of which can be
interrelated and overlapping in some instances:

(a) Alliance Audiences. Alliance internal and domestic

audiences, as well as troop contributing partner nations, may be
addressed by appropriate Alliance communication and
information activities.

(b) International Community Audiences. Includes other

countries and individual actors, in particular from neighbouring
countries, local influential countries and non-NATO entities
involved in the region, with whom the Alliance’s messages
should be coordinated. International audiences will be approved
based on a sound analysis of their roles and stance (audience,
public or stakeholder) related to the situation and mission (e.g.
‘favourable’, ‘neutral’, ‘opponent’ or ‘sources of instability’).

(c) Host Nation Audiences. This covers the wider

population of the host nation(s), formal and informal authorities,
including the local government(s), affiliated opinion leaders and
opinion formers, media (both traditional and digital) and other
actors at the local level. As above, the identification of
audiences needs to be based on a sound analysis of their roles
and stance related to the situation.

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(2) Strategic Communications (StratCom) Considerations. This

appreciation may highlight considerations to be factored by NATO HQ
into the future development of the mission-specific StratCom
Framework. These considerations will be included in the SSA.

e. Appreciate the Media and Public Affairs Environment. Media

attitudes and perceptions may reflect, or influence, public opinion and
ultimately can influence political will in support of an operation. PA (including
Military PA), InfoOps, and PsyOps (facilitated by StratCom) should collaborate
in developing an understanding of the level of media interest amongst different
audiences as well as any prevailing or underlying attitudes or influences that
affect such audiences. Working within the StratCom guidance and objectives
issued by NATO HQ, this appreciation will underpin future PA plans and
activities to engage with selected audiences via the media in order to gain and
retain strategic initiative. It includes a requirement to:

(1) Media Infrastructure and Assets for Production. This

appreciation examines the availability, affiliation and reach of assets as
well as the stance and credibility of content. Understanding the various
media outlets is essential to inform any analysis of their potential
impact and to assist the efficient dissemination of information.

(2) Prevailing Attitudes and Issues in the Region. The analysis

of media content helps to understand prevailing attitudes and key
issues, which provides further insight into the different aspects of the
crisis as well as potential support and opposition to a possible NATO
response. This appreciation provides the basis for determining
requirements for InfoOps and, separately PA, as well as the best use of
resources to deliver relevant information to selected populations.

f. Appreciate International Common Aims, Objectives and Desired

End State Conditions. Based on their appreciation of the international
situation regarding the crisis, including its legal aspects, and drawing on
engagement with the international community, the CAT can then provide a
summary of the most likely common aims and objectives of the international
community at large as well as essential conditions that must be established.
They should highlight any significant areas of disagreement.

3.18. Appreciate Security Implications for NATO, including Potential Strategic

Risks / Threats and Opportunities. It will be essential for the CAT to determine at
an early stage what are the over-arching security implications that the crisis presents
for NATO including identifying the potential risks and threats and any opportunities
that may be apparent or could potentially arise from taking risk:

a. Determine Security Implications for NATO. The CAT determines the

possible implications that the situation will have on NATO’s security interests,
including potential strategic risks and threats.

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b. Strategic Risks and Opportunities44. Potential risks from a broader

range of issues across PMESII should be identified based on the previous
system of systems analysis that should have identified the most relevant
PMESII issues that have strategic implications. Potential opportunities at the
strategic level may be identified at an early stage in the OPP or may result
from the analysis of identified risks. Potential risks and opportunities should be
highlighted early as ultimately it will be a COM decision as to where the risk is
held.

c. SHAPE Threat Assessment. Those strategic issues that pose a

potential risk or threat to NATO’s security interests are further developed by
SHAPE J2 into a SHAPE Threat Assessment, which is based on a fused
intelligence picture that addresses the combination of threat capability and
intent. The Threat Assessment provides a general narrative, a specific threat
statement and an assessed threat level.

3.19. Appreciate Potential Strategic Ends, Ways and Means45. At this point the
CAT should consider potential strategic ends (the essential conditions that need to
be established to secure NATO’s interests), ways (how can military, political,
economic and civil instruments be used to create coherent effects that will establish
the essential conditions) and means (What military, political, economic, and civil
instruments of power are available to NATO and cooperating partners to create
desired effects?). During this analysis the following considerations need to included:

a. Possible different levels of NATO’s ambition in contributing to the

international effort to establish the essential conditions, in terms of urgency
and burden sharing with other international and regional organisations.

b. The use of direct or indirect engagement in support of IOs to establish

essential conditions.

c. Different risks to be accepted in terms of achieving NATO strategic

objectives.

d. Preventive options46, a component of the NCRS47 which are, by design,

broad in nature. They are the starting point for defining an appropriate initial
Alliance response to the crisis, when these options by themselves are not
enough to solve the crisis at its very early stages. A coherent approach to
crisis management will require NATO to consider appropriate responses from
a range of diplomatic, economic and military Preventive Options in the light of

44
It must be recognised that strategic risks are broader than military or enemy related risks. Political, Economical, Social, etc.
factors could constitute strategic risks. Once identified the risks should start to be analysed in accordance with the Risk
Analysis and Management processes outlined in the COPD Aide Memoire.
45
While this work will not be articulated directly in the SSA, it is a necessary intellectual step leading to the development of
military considerations, which concludes the SSA.
46
Details on NCRS Preventive Options can be found in the NCRSM Chapter 5, arranged in ascending order of gravity.
47
When appropriate, and depending on the circumstances of an emerging crisis, the use of the components of the NCRS may
be guided by the applicable illustrative crisis situations described in the NCRSM. These illustrative crisis situations cover a
wide spectrum of hypothetical Article 5 and non-Article 5 crises.

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the prevailing circumstances, while exercising close political control at all

stages.

3.20. Strategic Ends - Appreciate the Desired NATO End State48, NATO
Strategic Objectives and Strategic Effects. The desired NATO end state and the
corresponding strategic objectives and effects will establish the ends for potential
response options; the achievement of these ends would use the different means and
ways available to the Alliance in cooperation with other national and international
actors within a comprehensive approach to create the necessary strategic effects.

a. Review Appreciation of the NATO Political Context. The CAT

should review their appreciation of the political context of the situation,
including any NATO statements, policy documents and the Strategic Narrative
that provide an understanding of NATO’s position on the crisis or its impact on
NATO’s strategic interests. The political context is often directly linked to the
provisions of an international mandate or agreement providing legal authority
for resolving the crisis. The NAC Decision Sheet requesting SMA should
summarise this context and may provide additional direction and guidance on
NATO’s strategic interests, or the possible NATO role, from which to
understand or develop the desired NATO end state and strategic objectives.

b. Political Limitations. The CAT reviews any limitations (restraints49 or

constraints50). These will factor into the analysis of NATO end state and
strategic objectives.

c. Develop Necessary Assumptions51. There will be some gaps in

information and knowledge at the time of the analysis of the situation or
planning, for example how the main actors will react to the involvement of
NATO. In these cases the CAT may find it necessary to make certain
assumptions as a basis for further analysis or planning. To be valid, an
assumption must be logical, realistic, and necessary for the planning to
continue. The CAT must never assume away problems for which planning
should cater such as dealing with adversary capabilities or assuming
unrealistic friendly capabilities and successes. Assumptions should be
rigorously reviewed and kept to a minimum. While an assumption allows
planning to continue, it is also a weakness in the structure of the plan and
should be treated as a risk and recorded and analyised as such. The CAT will
control assumptions and ensure that they are regularly reviewed. If
assumptions are changed, added or deleted, the CAT will have to determine if
this change has a consequence in terms of the planning or analysis done to
that point. In order to turn assumptions into facts the CAT may consider
tasking the SAT, or an OLRT if deployed, to investigate.

48
End state - The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement. (COPD
definition).
49
Restraint - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action.
50
Constraint - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action.
51
Assumption - In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and / or the future course of events to complete an
estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action. (AAP-06). Note: An assumption can equate to a potential risk and
as such needs to be planned against.

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d. Desired NATO End State and Strategic Objectives52.

(1) Appreciate Possible Essential Strategic End State

Conditions. With consideration to conditions which are considered
necessary to be established to end the crisis or conflict on acceptable
terms, the CAT must appreciate which essential strategic end state
conditions need to be established to secure NATO’s interests. The
NAC request for a SSA may already include a possible desired NATO
end. If so, compare the CAT list of essential strategic end state
conditions (developed above) against the NAC provided desired NATO
end state.

(2) Desired NATO End State and Strategic Objectives. The CAT
considers any NAC provided desired NATO end state and strategic
objectives in the context of its analysis of the main actor systems and
influencing factors, which define the problem and describe the strategic
conditions required to establish an acceptable solution to NATO’s
interests. If necessary, the CAT will propose alternative wording for the
desired NATO end state, strategic objectives and strategic narrative.
In addition, if a possible NAC desired NATO end state, strategic
objectives or strategic narrative are not provided, the CAT will propose
a possible desired NATO end state, strategic objectives and strategic
narrative based on the analysis of the system and problem definition.

(3) Determine Desired NATO Strategic Effects. The CAT will

consider any NAC provided desire NATO strategic effects and the
desired changes they seek to achieve the strategic objectives. Where
appropriate the CAT will determine where military activity could support
the achievement of non-military strategic objectives.

3.21. Strategic Ways - Appreciate Potential Use of Instruments of Power53.

The CAT will primarily develop military lines of engagement54; however, it will
recognise logically that the achievement of some NATO strategic objectives will
require that desired effects are created in addition to those that can be created using
military, by using also political, economic or civil means, or some combination of
these. In addition, in modern conflict or crisis, the military instrument is often not
decisive; therefore, there is a need to consider how to coordinate and synchronise
the application of different sources of power toward a common purpose, leading
through desired strategic effects to a strategic objective(s) and the NATO end state.
Based on their appreciation of the strategic ends, the CAT should identify possible
applications of instruments of power and when considering possibilities for

52
MC 0133 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level,
where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At
this stage however, any strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.
53
The CAT may use the Instrument of Power matrix in the COPD Aide Memoire to assist in their analysis of how the different
instruments of power may be used.
54
Strategic line of Engagement - A logical line that connects military, political, economic and / or civil actions in time and
purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end state. (Proposed definition).

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leveraging different instruments of power to create strategic effects, the CAT should
consider:

a. Countering critical capabilities of potential adversaries by exploiting

critical vulnerabilities in the critical requirements of opposing actors CoGs, as
well as critical system elements and influences such as vital infrastructure.

b. Enhancing critical capabilities of potential friends by covering critical

vulnerabilities in friendly actors CoGs, as well as critical system elements and
influences such as vital infrastructure.

c. The implications that may result from the use of force to establish
essential conditions or create strategic effects.

d. If actors, other than NATO, could be used to establish essential

conditions or create strategic effects (e.g. when considering the use of the
military instrument).

e. Different risks to be accepted in terms of achieving NATO strategic

objectives.

f. Any relevant lessons learned from previous military operations.

3.22. Strategic Means - Appreciate Potential Options Available to the Alliance.

The CAT, with input from the NATO ERS, JFC(s), SSC(s), TCC(s) and supporting
commands and entities and any cooperating external organisations as appropriate,
should develop a coherent appreciation of the different instruments of power
available to the Alliance, as well as other possibly cooperating non-NATO entities,
which might be able to create strategic effects required to achieve one or more
strategic objectives. As a minimum, this should include appreciations of:

a. Political / diplomatic, information, civil and economic efforts.

b. Readiness and availability of deployable forces, including the NRF and

other Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF) as well as deployable
communications and information systems (DCIS), and the potential impact to
other on-going NATO operations.

c. Partner forces operational capabilities.

d. Availability of strategic lift and transportation assets.

e. Support by potential HNs in the crisis area.

f. Availability of UN / IO logistics resources in the area.

3.23. Develop Military Considerations. The SSA concludes with an articulation of

military considerations deduced during the CAT analysis of the situation. If the NAC
decides that the Alliance could become involved in the crisis, the SSA and its military

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considerations should assist the NAC in providing the necessary direction (through a
NAC Decision Sheet requesting options) for SACEUR to develop Military Response
Options (MROs). The military considerations for each situation will vary and may
include some of the following: applicability of the military instrument; use of the
NATO military instrument; and non-NATO interaction requirements.

a. Applicability of the Military Instrument. The general applicability of

the military instrument to the resolution of the situation can be presented,
including any implications that may result from the use of force. Particular
attention should be given to the potential harm caused to the civilian
population, including second and third order effects. This may describe if the
military instrument would be decisive, instrumental in establishing the security
conditions necessary for other instruments / actors to be decisive, or just
supporting.

b. Use of NATO Military Instrument. The CAT should consider their

appreciation of the implications for NATO’s security interests, including
potential strategic risks and threats; including from non-military aspects;
strategic ends, ways and means; the applicability of the military instrument to
the situation, and other actors available to assist within the security
environment. The SSA should outline considerations on the application of the
NATO military instrument of power to assist in resolution of the situation,
including its necessity, suitability, availability and any existing constraints.
With care to remain at the strategic level, it may further describe how the
military instrument may be used to achieve strategic objectives and effects.
Further considerations that could be discussed are:

(1) Availability of NATO forces. The NRF, or elements of it, may be

suitable for use (suitability, availability, implications of its use for this
purpose).

(2) Accelerated Decision Making. The SSA should outline if the use
of ADM procedure is warranted, when a relevant, current advance plan
is available.

(3) Possible Impact on Other NATO Operations. The SSA should

outline if this situation has implications for other on-going NATO
operations (e.g. geographical proximity, involves actors involved with
NATO in another on-going operation, or possible competition for limited
resources).

(4) Proposed Military Strategic Objectives (MSOs). To this point,

the desired NATO end state (or end state conditions), strategic
objectives and strategic effects have been developed with
consideration to the use of any of the instruments of power; they are
thus not tailored for any one specific instrument of power (e.g. military).
If deemed useful to highlight how the NATO military instrument may be
used to assist in the resolution of the situation, the CAT may propose

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potential MSOs55, that describe the strategic aims to be achieved with

military power; these may assist the NAC to provide guidance and
direction for MRO development, if they direct their development. It is
critical that the CAT recognises that the development of MSOs is an
iterative process, and any objectives developed at this stage are likely
to change or be refined later.

(5) Relevant Lessons from Previous NATO Operations. The

development of military considerations should consider any relevant
lessons from similar NATO operations.

(6) Recommendations on additional CRMs, including the need to

deploy an OLRT(s), and Alert States56.

c. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements. The CAT may develop an

initial list of significant non-NATO actors with whom SHAPE and the
designated HQ(s) will be required to interact at the early stages of planning.
The SSA would request authorities for this interaction, if not previously
authorised, or a confirmation of the modalities for this interaction for this
purpose.

3.24. Coordinate and Submit SSA. In accordance with CG guidance, CAT SMEs
should identify and coordinate as required any key issues with their counterparts in
NATO HQ. Particular attention should be paid to international legal issues,
requirements for StratCom objectives and guidance, requirements for additional
interaction at the strategic level with significant non-NATO actors and issues
requiring further political guidance. Once coordination is completed two final steps
are required:

a. Seek SACEUR’s Approval and Further Guidance. ACOS J5 in

coordination with DCCOMC will oversee the final preparation and staffing of
the SSA, for approval by SACEUR. This includes any required internal
coordination, the completion of the draft SSA, the provision of any required
briefings (e.g. to the CG), and gaining SACEUR’s approval of the key
appreciations, military considerations, and any key issues for further
coordination.

b. Submit SSA. SACEUR will submit the SSA to the MC, with a copy to
the National Military Representatives (NMRs) at SHAPE. The MC will in turn
include the SSA with their SMA for further NAC considerations. When
submitted to the MC, the SSA will be shared with any designated HQ(s) and
the operational level commands for information and awareness. If due to the
55
The definition of an objective is, ‘A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain
feature, neutralising an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a
commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed’. NATO Term. In analysing or developing MSOs, the CAT
should consider what they can do in response to a crisis, such as: separate warring parties; enforce compliance with
truce/peace agreements and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of illegally armed groups; train, mentor
and assist local security forces, police or law enforcement agencies; contribute to stability and reconstruction, assist in disaster
relief and development assistance; and to contain, deter, influence coerce or destroy potential adversaries.
56
NCRSM defines NATO Alert States and provides guidance for their declaration and the declaration of related CRMs.

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urgency of the crisis, the NAC has invoked a FTDM process and tasked
SACEUR to submit a combined SSA and MRO package SACEUR would
then submit, in one document, the SSA and MROs.

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PHASE 3 - MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT

SECTION 1 - GENERAL
3.25. Introduction. The purpose of NCRP Phase 3 – Military Response Options
Development is to finalise the desired NATO end state and further develop the
potential strategic, political and military response strategy for the Alliance to deal with
the crisis at hand. At the military strategic level, Phase 3 articulates military options
for NAC consideration in support of their PME process.
a. Overview. Phase 3 begins with a tasking for SACEUR to develop
MROs after the NAC formally decides to move into Phase 3 of the NCRP.
The CAT will be tasked to identify possible MROs, develop a strategic
framework for each and consider requirements needed to support it. Next,
they analyse, evaluate and compare the MROs, including identifying strategic
risks and opportunities, and develop recommendations. Following
coordination and input from the designated HQ(s) / domain advisors, they
present the MROs to SACEUR for consideration. Phase 3 ends with SACEUR
approving and then submitting the MROs, through MC, to the NAC.

(1) Given the complex interdependent nature of modern conflicts,

MROs must be developed with an in-depth understanding of the
comprehensive nature of the crisis, keeping in mind that actions in the
military domain will also have direct or indirect effects in the non-
military domains, and vice versa. As such, this phase should be
preceded by the completion of a SSA in order to commence this phase
with an understanding of the crisis and the military considerations
related to how the military instrument may be used to assist its
resolution.

(2) If a formal SSA has not been conducted, the CAT should
conduct the intellectual thinking outlined in the previous phase as a
basis for the development of MROs.

b. Prerequisites. Phase 3 will normally begin with the NAC tasking

SACEUR to develop MROs. However, it is important to note that the NAC
may also request the development of MROs when requesting the SSA, if time
constraints dictate as part of the FTDM process.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 3 are depicted in Figure

3.7.

d. Desired Outcome of this Phase. The desired outcome of Phase 3 is

a series of feasible, acceptable, exclusive and distinguishable MROs for
achieving Military Strategic Objectives (MSOs) that will contribute to the
establishment of the desired NATO end state conditions, within the context of
a comprehensive approach. These MROs should inform the MC and the NAC
on possible uses of the NATO military instrument to assist with crisis
resolution; from these military options and other advice, if the NAC decides to

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move into NCRP Phase 4 - Planning, they should have sufficient detail from
which to develop a NID.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.

(1) CAT. The planning team element of the CAT develops the
MROs under ACOS J5 lead, supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE
directorates and CG Advisors, as required and approved.

(2) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis

situation and provide information and intelligence to the CAT. If not yet
deployed, a SAT may be authorised to deploy during Phase 3; its
deployment should be coordinated with the deployment of any OLRT.
The CCOMC would establish SAT reporting mechanisms and ensure
coordinated interaction, especially with the CAT.

f. External Coordination. Subject to direction, the requirements for

external coordination should be re-evaluated for Phase 3, including:

(1) NATO HQ. Continued SHAPE liaison and coordination with

NATO HQ bodies, at an appropriate level, will facilitate Phase 3
activities (e.g. NATO HQ (IS / IMS), CMTF, OPC, etc.). The NATO HQ
(IS / IMS) liaison element could be requested to remain to support
SHAPE during Phase 3.

(2) JFC / JTF / SSC / TCC . The designated op level planning

groups and the deployed OPLE(s) at SHAPE will assist the planning
team in the development of viable MROs, including the identification of
capabilities needed for each MRO and through provision of formal
advice on the draft MROs. If the OLRT(s) is deployed, the CAT may
receive their reports and have the possibility of interaction with them
through the JOPG.

(3) Relevant NATO Agencies. If not already in place, an

embedded planning and liaison officer from NCIA and NSPA should be
provided to SHAPE.

(4) Other Relevant International Actors. Contact is required with

appropriate organisations as authorised to ensure the ongoing and
planned actions of others are considered in the development of MROs
and to explore areas for mutual cooperation. Normally, especially in
the context of pre-operations consultations, this interaction is
conducted through either the CMTF or PASP (e.g. UN, EU, OSCE,
ICRC, AU, and relevant international, governmental and NGOs), with
SHAPE participation.

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(5) Potential Host Nations. Contact and coordination with potential

HNs as authorised and required to facilitate and support the
appreciation of options.

(6) Specialist Units. Specialist units such as the Joint Electronic

Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS), CBRN or PsyOps Task Forces, if
requested, can provide specialist input to the CAT for the development
of MROs.

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Political Military Strategic Level Operational Level

Level SACEUR COM
Tasker for SACEUR Initiate Strategic Strategic
SACEUR’s Assessment Warning
Strategic Order
Assessment
Receive formal Initial
Crisis Estimate briefing

Review NAC Political

direction/guidance

Develop a strategic Contributex TCCs

appreciation of the crisis
Phase 2

Analyse the principal Appreciate International

actors and their roles in interests and engagement
SACEUR’s the crisis in the crisis

Strategic Appreciate potential

Assessment strategic ends (including
NATO end state, strategic
Determine implications for
NATO, including potential
objectives and effects), strategic risks and threats
ways and means

Develop military
considerations

SACEUR’s
Strategic Coordinate and Submit
Assessment SACEUR’s Strategic Collaborative
Assessment planning.
Operational
Appreciation of
Strategic
Tasker for Review political guidance Environment.
MROs and direction. Appreciate Advice during
Lessons Learned development of
MROs
Select and Develop
May be combined
MROs (including Strategic
and submitted
as one document
Framework, potential C2 Military
and Capabilities /
Response
Phase 3

if directed
Requirements)
by the NAC
Options
Analyse, evaluate, Development
compare MROs

Military COM review draft

Response Coordinate and include MROs.
Options SACEUR’s Provide Operational
recommendation. Share Advice
Submit MROs

Figure 3.7 Phase 3 Development of Military Response Options

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

3.26. General. The CAT will review any guidance received and, accounting for any
changes since the submission of the SSA, should develop a series of MROs, each
outlining a military mission, MSOs, Military Strategic Effects (MSEs), Military
Strategic Actions (MSAs) and capability requirements, as well as possible CNMAs.
MROs should be clearly distinguishable from one another; they must be
unambiguous and sufficiently detailed to provide decision makers with clear and
realistic options in response to a crisis. They need to be developed with
consideration to a comprehensive approach by the wider international community for
resolution of the crisis, keeping in mind that actions in the military domain will also
have direct or indirect effects in the non-military domains, and vice versa. After
MROs have been selected and developed, they will be analysed, evaluated and
compared in terms of feasibility, acceptability, completeness and compliance,
exclusivity and suitability (FACES) in order to assist SACEUR to select a preferred
MRO to recommend to the NAC.

3.27. Review and Analyse Political Direction and Guidance. The CAT initiates
the development of the MROs by reviewing the guidance and direction from the
NAC, MC, SACEUR and / or the CG regarding the overall NATO political aim,
possible impact to NATO’s interests, possible NATO role(s), desired end state 57,
strategic objectives, potentially including specific military58 and non-military strategic
objectives, limitations59 and assumptions. If a desired NATO end state has been
provided, the CAT will determine what end state conditions are to be established and
then analyse any provided strategic objectives. If these objectives have not yet been
articulated as military and non-military strategic objectives, the CAT analyses the
possible strategic aims to be achieved with military power, which will form the basis
for the MSOs.

3.28. Appreciate Lessons Learned from Previous Operations. Every effort

should be made to consider lessons learned from previous operations during the
development of MROs. The J7 SME, tasked during the development of the SSA,
can update the CAT on relevant lessons.

3.29. Select and Develop MROs. With consideration to their analysis of the
political guidance, and with a view to their work for the SSA, including military
considerations and possible strategic ends, ways and means, the CAT will identify
possible MROs. Normally, MROs would be designed to achieve strategic military
ends to support one desired NATO end state; however, depending on the situation
and guidance received, MROs leading to different NATO end states may be
developed.

57
The illustrative NID format in MC 0133 indicates that an overall NATO mission statement (vice a military mission statement)
may be included as can ‘supporting objectives’ (which are to be achieved within means and capabilities). If either of these are
provided at this point, they should be analysed as part of the political guidance received for the development of MROs.
58
MC 0133 outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives
may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any
strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.
59
These limitations may include a ‘task’(s) to support certain non-NATO organisations during the possible operation.

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a. Select MROs for Development. MROs should consider a

comprehensive approach by the wider international community to the
resolution of the crisis; they should not duplicate effort of other actors and
should consider any stated NATO non-military objectives, potential NATO role
(including lead, support or participation), and the need to complement other
on-going activities. MROs may be a series of independent, non-related
options, from which one or more could be chosen by the NAC, or they may be
a series60 of related options which are graduated to reflect NATO’s possible
levels of ambition (LoA) with respect to its participation in an emerging crisis.
Initially, the CAT should attempt to identify as many potential MROs as
possible. From those MROs identified, the CAT should then select the most
viable MROs for further development. While the number of options to be
developed is not limited, three unambiguous and sufficiently detailed options
is a good starting point to provide the NAC with clear and realistic options in
response to a crisis.

b. Organise Planning Team for MRO Development. Once the MROs

for development have been selected, the planning team leadership (Team
Leader / Head Planner / Deputy Head Planner) normally identifies a small
sub-syndicate61 for each selected MRO. A sub-syndicate lead is chosen
based either on strategic planning expertise or subject matter expertise
related to the aim of the MRO (e.g. air operations SME for an air centric
MRO). Some SMEs (e.g. LEGAD) may have to support the development of
multiple MROs.

c. Develop MRO Strategic Framework. The planning team develops

the strategic framework of each MRO. The MRO strategic framework is a tool
to provide clarity on what each MRO describes; it helps to focus thinking and
the development of detail needed to develop a full MRO. It includes the MRO
mission (including MSOs), MSEs, MSAs and CNMAs62.

(1) Analyse the Strategic Military Mission (SACEUR’s Mission).

Each sub-syndicate discusses the MRO to gain a common
appreciation of its aim and purpose. They develop an initial description
of the MRO mission; at this stage this may be a descriptive paragraph
that will be used to guide development of the MRO strategic
framework. Following the development of the MRO strategic
framework, each sub-syndicate will refine the MRO description into a
strategic military mission statement (which includes the MSOs). In

60
One possible intellectual approach to developing MROs is a series of related MROs that describe: ‘what NATO MUST do’,
‘what NATO SHOULD do’ and ‘what NATO COULD do’. In this approach, each MRO builds on the previous, therefore
reflecting greater levels of ambition; however, they are normally based on a single NATO end state.
61
If the ‘must / should / could’ construct is chosen for the approach for developing MROs, the strategic framework for all MROs
may be developed by a small core, and then as each is developed it is passed to the applicable sub-syndicate for development
of details and refinement.
62
As planning progresses the elements of the MRO will be captured in the documents developed or refined into other elements
of those documents (e.g. CNMAs, may appear in a CONOPS or OPLAN as non-military objectives (promulgated in the NID by
NAC; not assigned to SACEUR), assumptions or preconditions for success (PCS), etc. The MRO strategic framework will not
appear as such in a strategic CONOPS or OPLAN as once an MRO has been selected and a NID issued, the Strategic
Framework becomes the Strategic Design when coupled with the SACEUR’s Mission and Intent.

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most cases, each MRO will have a separate mission statement;

however, it is possible that multiple MROs may have the same mission
statement, with only the manner in which the objectives will be
achieved to differentiate the MROs (e.g. two MROs with the same
MSOs, one being conducted with ‘boots on the ground’ and one
through a combination of air and / or naval actions, in cooperation with
other organisations on the ground).

(2) Analyse and Determine Military and Non Military Strategic

Objectives. Strategic Objectives or Non-Military Strategic Objectives
(NMSO) and MSOs to describe the strategic aims to be achieved by
NATO military power may have been provided by the NAC in the
request to develop Response Options; however at this stage it is still
possible to develop and consider alternatives. The planning team
analyses the strategic objectives (SO) and MSOs provided by the NAC
or develops MSOs, with reference to the NAC guidance received
(including the NATO end state or end state conditions), any current
systems analysis of the crisis and also the previous analysis from
Phase 2, including the essential conditions deemed necessary to
secure NATO’s interests and any previous draft MSOs. In analysing or
developing MSOs, the planning team should consider what they can do
in response to a crisis, such as: separate warring parties; enforce
compliance with truce / peace agreements and Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of illegally armed groups;
train, mentor and assist local security forces, law enforcement
agencies or police; temporarily replace local security services;
contribute to stability and reconstruction, assist in disaster relief and
development assistance; and / or to contain, deter, influence coerce or
destroy potential adversaries.

(3) Determine the Military Strategic Effects. The CAT then

analyses the desired NATO end state (or end state conditions), the
MSOs, the strategic environment and the ‘problem’ to determine
precisely the MSEs that must be created, using principally military
means, to achieve each MSO. This may include MSEs in support of a
NATO non-military strategic objective63 (NMSO) or other essential
support to envisioned non-NATO military or non-military efforts. By
closely examining the CCs and CVs identified during the analysis of the
CoG, as well as the identified critical infrastructure, system elements
and critical influences, the CAT should be able to clearly state the
strategic changes in the capabilities of actors and systems that could
be achieved using military means for each MRO.

(4) Determine Military Strategic Actions. The CAT states the

MSAs that would likely create the desired strategic effect given the
analysis and understanding of the actor / system. The CAT must
63
Strategic Objective (SO) and Non-Military Strategic Objective (NMSO) are interchangeable terms.

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provide arguments to conclude that a certain military action directed at

a specific actor / system or system element would have the potential to
create the desired effect in terms of changes in its actions, capabilities
or condition. Analogous to the relationship of operational actions to
operational objectives and effects, MSAs are an intellectual tool to
assist the planning team to develop and communicate sufficient detail
of an MRO for it to be clearly appreciated by the NAC / MC and the
operational level. MSAs may be ‘activities’ to be done by strategic
forces or assigned to one or more operational commanders. They
assist further in the identification of force capability requirements.
Following SACEUR’s submission of the MROs and subsequent
approval by the NAC of a selected response option, and its military
contribution, MSAs assist in the development the provisional mission
statements, including objectives, for the operational COM(s), which will
be included in the Strategic Planning Directive64 (SPD).

(5) Determine Required Complementary Military and Non-

Military Strategic Effects / Actions / Activity (NMSE / CNMA). In
many cases the desired MSE cannot be created by military action
alone or could be created more effectively by a combination of
complementary military, political, economic and civil actions. The CAT
needs to recognise the ideal mix of non-military effects or actions
needed to support creation of the effect as well as those actions that
would contribute to the overall synergistic effect of military action.

d. Determine Strategic Assumptions. The planning team should also

consider any assumptions associated with the MROs and determine the
associated risks that these could present if the assumption is wrong. An
emphasis should be put on the assumptions related to the requirements for
other instruments of power (political, economic and civil) for the achievement
of SOs as well as MSOs and strategic effects and should properly determine
the strategic risks associated to them. These assumptions related to non-
military instruments of power are closely related to the identified force
requirements for CNMAs. Strategic assumptions together with political
assumptions given by the NAC represent the foundation on which the MROs
and subsequent CONOPS and OPLAN are developed. Together with the
strategic risks associated, assumptions must be assessed and validated
during the execution phase. Once identified the strategic risks and
opportunities need to be consolidated into a risk and opportunity management
register, from where they can be analysed, assessed and managed in
accordance with the risk management process.

64
At the issue of the SPD the MSAs cease to have utility; they are not to be construed to have the intent of constraining op
level COMs in the conduct of the operational estimate, including the development and selection of an operational level course
of action.

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e. Determine Strategic Risks and Opportunities65. The planning team

should then determine if there are any additional strategic risks or
opportunities associated with each MRO, which relate either to the possibility
and consequences of failure in achieving a MSO at an acceptable cost or to
the opportunities presented by taking risks to achieve a MSO or its impact on
achieving other non-military objectives and effects as part of the
comprehensive approach. The planning team should carefully examine the
degree to which military ends, ways and means are balanced with objectives
and the potential consequences resulting from potential deficiencies or
potential opportunities. Risks and opportunities should be considered in terms
of their nature and likelihood of happening, determination of how to mitigate or
facilitate and then recommending a conclusion with regard to the risk or
opportunity.

f. Determine Force Capability Requirements. With the input of liaison

elements from the designated operational command(s), including the TCCs,
the planning team estimates, in broad order, the primary military capabilities 66
that would be required to perform the mission, create the desired effects and
achieve the desired objectives. These capabilities should where possible,
describe these requirements in terms of the Bi-SC agreed capability codes
used by NATO and Nations in defence planning to facilitate force generation
(FGen) by Nations. Any enabling capabilities that may be required to pre-
deploy should also be identified using the FGen SME67 to advise of desired
military capability areas which may be challenging to force generate. In
addition, the FGen SME should identify those primary military capabilities,
under OPCON of the operational level commanders, intended to provide
theatre level support.

g. Determine the Main Support Requirements. The resources and

enablement SMEs within the CAT will coordinate68 and provide advice on the
main implications of the logistics, military engineering (MILENG) and medical
support requirements for each option to verify feasibility and to facilitate a
rough resource69 estimate. Resource estimates will be based on a rough
order of magnitude (ROM) appreciation of the resource implications of these
support requirements based on experiences from other missions and
database / models to identify, as is possible, military budget (MB), NATO

65
See COPD Aide Memoire for the strategic risk and opportunity evaluation matrix as a tool for conducting an analysis of
strategic risk / opportunity.
66
The NCRSM states that MROs would contain an ‘estimation of the volume and nature of forces and resources needed’ for
each MRO. MROs will identify the capabilities required, and, if possible, some qualification with respect to size can be given
(e.g. for land forces - Division or Corps+). While this may be a way to illustrate possible force size and thus differential between
MROs, reasonably accurate figures will not be available until COM(s) conducts an operational estimate for a specific mission
(after receipt of the SPD), and conducts a troops-to-actions analysis.
67
Force Generation Branch (FGR) may at this point elect to conduct informal force sensing with nations to get a sense of the
viability of certain MROs, or desired military capabilities.
68
The SMEs will seek and coordinate the support input needed for each MRO, either within those SMEs that have been
nominated to support the CAT or through ‘reach back’ to the requisite SHAPE office of responsibility (e.g. JMED, MILENG,
M&T, J8, etc.).
69
Within NATO, ‘resources’ comprise three distinct aspects - budget, investment and manpower. All three areas need to be
assessed.

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Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and military manpower aspects.

Estimates will identify those requirements, which are eligible for common
funding in accordance with NATO regulations in advance of mission approval,
as part of a package of enabling funding (Initial Enabling Resources). Support
input will include appreciations of:

(1) Force deployment, including Strategic lift70 requirements and

costs for NATO.

(2) Theatre logistics requirements for establishing and operating

staging bases, air, rail and sea ports of debarkation (APOD / RPOD /
SPOD), storage and distribution of all classes of supply, maintaining
LoC, and developing infrastructure.

(3) Logistic Support to non-NATO entities.

(4) MILENG support. MILENG as champion for infrastructure will

provide initial expertise in support of infrastructure assessment71.

(5) Medical support.

(6) Host Nation Support (HNS).

(7) Multinational (MN) solutions.

(8) Commercial support solutions

(9) Communications capabilities.

h. Determine Preliminary Command and Control (C2) Arrangements.

The planning teams will determine the principal C2 arrangements required for
each option. These will address in the broadest terms the following:

(1) Proposed Theatre of Operations (TOO)72, required for the

conduct or support of the military option.

(2) Proposed Joint Area of Operations (JOA)73, required for the

conduct of operations.

(3) Proposed Cyberspace74 required for the conduct of operations.

70
Strategic movement is a collective responsibility where NATO and Nations have specific and shared responsibilities (MC
336).
71
AD 084-002 Infrastructure Assessment in Support of Planning should be referred to for all stakeholders in order to identify
strategic mission vital infrastructure, key infrastructure for red, blue and green parties and in addition, if not available, critical
national infrastructure.
72
TOO - An operational area, defined by SACEUR, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint
operations areas. TOOs are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. For
simplicity TOO is generally associated with the strategic level, JOA with the operational level and Area of Operations (AOO)
with the tactical level.
73
JOA - A temporary area defined by SACEUR, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission
at the operational level of war. A JOA and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area,
are contingency or mission-specific, and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-06).

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(4) Essential C2 structure, in terms of required operational and

component levels of command as well as requirements for forward
deployment versus reach back. The possibilities for command75 at the
operational level may be quite different for each MRO; however, the
chosen HQ will need to be sufficiently ‘joint’ for the C2 of anticipated
assigned forces. The implications of each option need to be
considered in the evaluation and comparison of MROs (what residual
responsibilities remain if a HQ deploys, with early considerations of
possible manpower reinforcement and the mechanism76 best suited to
manage this reinforcement (either a Crisis Establishment (CE) or a
reinforced Peacetime Establishment (PE))). In addition, especially for
the deployment of any NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQ as a JTF HQ,
supporting arrangements from the NATO Command Structure (NCS)
need to be considered. When several HQs are deployed within the
same TOO, C2 must describe the Supported / Supporting Inter-
relationship (SSI) among them and the SSC / TCCs.

(5) The feasibility of the C2 structure in terms of deployment and

sustainment of deployable communications and information systems
(DCIS) should be considered. Where a MRO envisions a sequenced,
significant deployment then consideration should be given for
developing a graduated series of C2 structures, which will need to feed
into the force capability requirements and FGen process.

(6) Potential coordination and liaison requirements, with

international, governmental and / or non-governmental entities.

i. Determine Legal Requirements. The LEGAD must review each MRO

to determine critical legal requirements, which in turn may require timely
action by the NATO Office of Legal Affairs. Specific consideration should be
given to requirements for:

(1) Ensuring an appropriate legal basis for the option.

(2) Negotiating Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA),

Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) and technical agreements /
arrangements (TA), in order to get country clearance for transit, over
flight, staging, basing and support with HN and transit countries etc. as
required.

(3) Negotiating any necessary additional agreements for mission

support with international bodies (e.g. International Criminal Court

74
Cyberspace domain is not linked to geographical boundaries as the other operational domains (Air, Land, Sea, Space). The
CyOC is tasked to identify and monitor the TOO / JOAs, which will change throughout the operation.
75
The planning team when considering these options, should identify if there is a requirement to apprise, through a Strategic
Warning Order, additional operational commands of the need to begin to follow the operations planning activity, in case they
are chosen to command the ensuing operation.
76
Standard Manpower Procedure (SMAP) 15 - NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy (change 19 to MC 0216 / 4-AAP–16
(D)).

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(ICC), Hybrid Court etc.), host and third nations (e.g. prosecution of
criminals, handover of suspects, handling and prosecution of
suspected pirates, etc.).

j. Determine Rules of Engagement (ROE) Requirements. At this

stage, it is not possible to develop a detailed ROE Request (ROEREQ), but
rather to develop an understanding of the key aspects of ROE that will be
required to support each MRO, especially for the use of force or actions that
could be seen as provocative, articulated as a short textual statement. This
effort would be led by the operations SMEs and supported by POLAD and
LEGAD.

k. Determine StratCom Requirements. The StratCom SME will advise

on any critical StratCom factors including:

(1) Audiences, publics and potential stakeholders and any need for
prioritisation.

(2) Desired information effects.

(3) Possible 2nd and 3rd order information effects resulting from the
activities and actions of the force.

(4) Any requirements for approvals to enable and promote

relationships with other actors (civil, military, governmental, and non-
governmental), including:

(a) Any NATO-wide engagement strategy or guidance.

(b) Approval of interagency information activities.

(c) Harmonisation of communication and information

activities amongst Alliance members and with partners.

(d) Determination of related information sharing

requirements.

(5) Required capabilities and resources in support of Public

Diplomacy (PD), PA, Military Public Affairs (MilPA) and PsyOps
activities, including but not limited to:

(a) Staffing and funding of the NATO Media Information

Centre (NMIC).

(b) Requirements for media operations teams.

(c) Requirements for psychological operations support.

(6) Requirements and provisions for linguistic and cultural expertise.

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(7) Politically imposed StratCom related constraints and / or

restraints.

(8) Themes to stress and themes to avoid from the political

perspective.

l. Determine non NATO Interaction Requirements. NATO may

already have, within a comprehensive approach framework, standing
agreements and frequent interactions with some of the IOs involved in the
crisis engagement space. In addition, as part of the SSA, the CAT would
have already provided an early indication of potential interaction
requirements. The CAT will update the list of significant non-NATO actors
and the degree of interaction required with each at the strategic level (mutual
awareness / exchange of information, de-confliction, synchronisation of
effects, coordination or mutual support, etc.). It is essential that NATO HQ be
appraised of both the list of IOs with which planners at the strategic and
operational levels will be required to interact and the degree of interaction
they estimate will be needed with each. This information should be included
as part of the MROs. Where necessary, a request should also be included for
authorisation to interact with organisations not already on an NATO HQ
approved list77, or to interact to a degree not previously authorised by the
NAC.

3.30. Test, Evaluate and Compare MROs. Each of the developed MROs should
be tested and evaluated before being compared in order to ensure that they meet
the basic criteria required of them. The CAT can opt to conduct a wargame of the
complete MROs, or selected parts, in order to critically scrutinise, develop and refine
the options before comparison. The process of analysis and comparison should be
both objective and empirical; the MROs must be judged against defined standards,
i.e. via the FACES criteria, and by theoretical suppositions, i.e. challenged through
the use of ‘red teaming’. The planning team will refine, develop and incorporate any
captured or identified inconsistencies, gaps or weaknesses the final comparison and
development of recommendations.

a. Strategic Wargaming78. The CAT can chose to wargame the

developed MROs utilising a structured, intellectually driven, process that will
help to explore what works (winning / succeeding) and what does not (losing /
failing) in achieving the desired objectives and end state. The techniques
employed can help to further develop and refine the MROs and typically
involve the use of red teaming to challenge the MROs and ensure that they
are all viable and realistic when judged against various opposing approaches.
The ‘red team’ should not have been involved in the development of the

77
Based on standing agreements, MOU, etc. with non-NATO organisations.
78
NATO defines a war game as: a simulation of a military operation, by whatever means, using specific rules, data, methods
and procedures. NATO Term. Red Teaming and wargaming has not routinely been conducted at the military strategic level but
represents an approach that allows the MRO, or aspects or it, to be analysed and tested against different scenarios in order to
help refine and develop the MRO. Wargaming and red teaming is explained in the COPD Aide Memoire.

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MROs but the scenarios or options that they portray must be realistic and
within the means of any opponent.

b. Analyse MROs. The CAT should first perform an analysis of each

MRO in terms of the basic FACES criteria:

(1) Feasibility. The feasibility of nations providing strategic means

can only be assessed if the MSOs and NMSOs are considered
together as they must be viewed as inter-dependent. The implications
of any shortfalls or missing strategic means will need to be assessed
against the ability to, deliver the MSAs, MSEs and CNMAs to achieve
MSOs and NMSOs.

(2) Acceptability. The potential use of military force will be

acceptable / permissible to Nations and the MRO worth the expected
costs in terms of forces / resources needed and potential costs in terms
of:

(1) International law.

(2) Moral constraints.

(3) Likely costs and potential risks compared with the

expected strategic outcome.

(4) Implications79 of the chosen C2 arrangement.

(3) Complimentary and Compliant. Does the MRO conform to or

implement Allied Joint doctrine and is the MRO complete; does it
answer the questions of when, who, what, where, why and how.

(4) Exclusive. Are the MROs sufficiently varied and different from
each other to clearly differentiate the comparative advantages and
disadvantages? Do they apply the means in different ways to achieve
the same ends?

(5) Suitability. The MRO should seek to:

(1) Create the effects required to achieve NATO MSOs and

contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state.

(2) Avoid creating effects that would undermine the

achievement of NATO strategic objectives80.

79
C2 options can also have implications to operational level planning as well as execution; if the chosen MRO identifies a C2
construct other than the current JFC(s), this new commander will want to be involved in the development of the operational
CONOPS / OPLAN. Mitigations for this possibility should be discussed when the possible issue is first apparent.
80
NATO Strategic Objectives will be wider than purely military and as such consideration needs to be given to the effects or
impact on the civilian environment, intended or unintended that could impact on the achievement of the mission.

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(3) Avoid creating effects that would negate the effects

sought by significant non-NATO actors who are working toward
goals that support or help our own objectives; or establish
conditions that support the aims or goals of the IC.

(4) Cater for foreseeable reactions by the main actors, the

main systems and system elements, and changes in the
strategic environment.

c. Compare MROs. The planning team, with support from assigned

systems analysts and SMEs, should then evaluate each MRO and then
compare them against each other. With consideration to the crisis situation
and the guidance received, this is a subjective appreciation of the likely
outcomes resulting from the application of the different means and ways
within the strategic environment and the interaction with, and between, the
different actors. In evaluating and comparing the different military options, the
following areas should be considered:

(1) Inherent Advantages and Disadvantages. The planning team

can draw on their analysis of the MRO’s FACES criteria and strategic
risks. The likely costs compared with expected strategic benefits of the
various MROs; the time required to begin to impact the situation; and, if
possible, a rough order magnitude sense of the time required to
achieve the MSOs or the anticipated length of NATO commitment
should also be considered.

(2) Potential Impact on NATO operations. The implications of the

MRO on existing or planned NATO operations with particular emphasis
on those specific limited capabilities essential for the enablement of
operations, strategic lift, ISTAR etc. must be determined.

(3) Strategic Risks and Opportunities. A comparison of the

strategic risks and opportunities associated with each MROs that
includes any impact they may have on other NMSOs may indicate
significant pros and cons. See Figure 3.8 for an illustrative risk analysis
matrix.

d. Develop Recommendations. Based on their analysis, the planning

team should develop their recommendations to assist SACEUR to select
which MRO to recommend to the NAC / MC, based on the best balance
between probability for success, effectiveness and acceptable risks.
Recommendations should also address:

(1) Preconditions for Success. PCS represent those strategic

conditions that must be created at the political level to posture for
operational success. These may include arranging transit, over-flight,
preparedness of deployment infrastructure as well as legal agreements
of the status of forces and HNS. They will also include the changes

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needed in the non-military domains to support military efforts and to

address the current crisis in a sustainable manner. These PCS related
to the non-military domains are closely linked to the CNMAs as well as
political and strategic assumptions and risks related to these non-
military domains.

(2) Pre-deployment of Enabling Forces. What force elements or

capabilities must be deployed early and what additional actions need to
be taken to allow this to happen. An indication as to the timeframe that
the pre-deployment will need to occur will also help inform discussions
at NATO HQ.

(3) CRM Requirements. The functional SMEs would develop

recommendations on which pre-authorised CRMs SACEUR could
declare to ensure preparation if the emerging crisis continues to
develop and leads to NATO involvement. If the OLRT(s) has not been
deployed, the planning team should discuss with the HQ(s) the need
for it to be deployed to support the operational level planning effort.
The planning team can also identify CRMs that should be considered
for declaration for each MRO, if chosen by the NAC, as a basis for
planning. This would include specifying which of the identified CRMs
that are not pre-authorised for which the devolution of declaration
authority should be requested.

(4) Partner and Non NATO Nation involvement. Whilst Partner

and Non NATO nation involvement is a political issue handled by the
NAC, recommendations where this impacts on specific capability
requirements or pre-operations training should be provided.

3.31. Coordinate and Submit MROs. Before the MRO package is submitted, it
must be thoroughly coordinated with all relevant external commands, including the
submission of operational level advice before final internal coordination before final
SACEUR approval and submission to NATO HQ.

a. Coordinate with the nominated Op Level HQ(s). The draft MROs

must be coordinated with the nominated HQ(s), SSCs and TCC to ensure
broad concurrence with the proposed MROs and seek formal operational
advice. This coordination will be facilitated by the OPLE(s) throughout the
development and analysis of the MROs.

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STRATEGIC RISK EVALUATION

SOURCES CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY PROBABILITY

FOR
Actions of the Desired NATO end Extremely high - could result in High.
opponent(s). state. failure to accomplish mission.
Moderate.
Actions of NATO Strategic High - could result in failure to
friendly actors. Objective, including achieve one or more objectives.
Low.
Military Strategic
Objective.
Changes in Moderate - could result in difficulty
strategic to achieve one or more objectives
conditions. Military Strategic or create military strategic effects.
Effect.
Low - minimal impact on mission
accomplishment.

RISK MITIGATION
Can we neutralise the source?
Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the strategic risk?
Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence?
Can we reduce the probability of occurrence?

CONCLUSION
Unacceptable - risk mitigation cannot reduce the strategic risk to an acceptable level.
Conditionally acceptable - strategic risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by
taking actions to:
Modify the desired NATO end state and/or strategic objective.
Increase the availability of strategic means.
Adjust the ways that military and non-military instruments are applied.
Acceptable - no risk mitigation actions required.

Figure 3.8 Illustrative Strategic Risk Evaluation Matrix

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b. Operational Level Advice81. At the initiation of the MRO development,

the timing for the submission of formal operational level input from the
designated HQ(s) will have been determined. This input represents the last
opportunity for the operational level to formally influence the strategic product
that will be submitted to NATO HQ.

c. Final Coordination with NATO HQ. The NATO HQ liaison officers

supporting the CAT should provide input on any potential outstanding issues.
Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the MROs to SACEUR,
at the CAT leadership level or through the CG or SACEUR as appropriate.

d. Seek SACEUR’s Approval. ACOS J5, in coordination with DCCOMC,

will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the MROs, for SACEUR’s
approval. Final internal coordination will normally be facilitated through a
briefing to the CG on the main elements of the MROs and proposed
recommendations.

e. Submit MROs. Once SACEUR has approved the MROs, they will be
forwarded through the MC to the NAC, with a copy to the NMRs at SHAPE.

f. Other CAT Activity. If requested, and with CG guidance, the CAT will
be available to assist the CMTF and / or the OPC in drafting the NID, the
release of which concludes the PME process that spans Phase 2 and 3 of the
NCRP at the political-military level. In parallel at this point, especially when
time is a critical factor, the CAT may wish to begin drafting a SPD in
anticipation of a possible NAC decision to move the NCRP into Phase 4 –
Planning.

81
The exact format of the operational advice will be determined by the COM(s). The respective strategic and operational level
staffs will be in regular contact during the development of the MRO package and staff level issues should have been worked
through at that stage, leaving the formal operational advice to focus on issues that directly concern the COM in regard to the
MROs being presented.

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PHASE 4 - STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPMENT

PHASE 4A - STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)

DEVELOPMENT

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

3.32. Introduction. Phase 4 - Strategic Plan Development is split into two distinct
parts: Phase 4a - the development of a Strategic Planning Directive (SPD) and
CONOPS; and Phase 4b - the development of a strategic OPLAN. The purpose of
Phase 4a is to detail SACEUR’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military
operation, in concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, to achieve the
NATO MSOs and establish conditions required to assist in the achievement of the
desired NATO end state.

a. Overview. Phase 4a begins with the receipt of the NID with MC

guidance following the submission of MROs to the NAC. Phase 4a covers the
development of the strategic CONOPS, based on the selected MRO,
including coordination of operational requirements with designated operational
commands and political-military coordination with NATO HQ. Early in the
process, a SPD is issued to the designated operational level commands.
Phase 4a ends with submission of the strategic CONOPS to the NAC
(through the MC).

b. Prerequisites. Phase 4a requires a NID with MC guidance. It is

supported by the previous development of an SSA and / or MROs, and
requires an up-to-date systems understanding of the environment.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 4a are depicted in Figure

3.9.

d. Desired outcome of this phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 4a

are:

(1) The SPD is issued to provide authoritative direction to the

designated HQ(s) and ACO subordinate commands, enabling the
operational level to conduct an Operational Estimate(s) and issue
timely guidance to subordinates.

(2) SHAPE and the designated HQ(s) collaborate effectively in the

development of strategic and operational level CONOPS based on
clear strategic direction and operational requirements.

(3) The strategic CONOPS is submitted to the MC / NAC, describing

SACEUR’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military operation,
including essential operational requirements, support and C2. The

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illustrative statement of requirements (SORs)82 provided with the

CONOPS adequately describe the requirements for the type and scale
of forces and capabilities required to implement the military strategic
concept, including the required force capabilities and flow into the
theatre (including preliminary deployment information), as well as
requirements for theatre capabilities and manpower for deploying HQs.

(4) The resulting strategic direction and guidance are sufficient to

allow the designated HQ(s) to proceed, in close cooperation with
SHAPE, with the development of the operational OPLANS.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.

(1) CAT. The planning team will develop the SPD and strategic
CONOPS under ACOS J5 lead, supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE
directorates and CG Advisors, as required and approved.

(2) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis

situation and provide information and intelligence to the CAT. A SAT, if
deployed, would normally be used for Phase 2 and 3 activities, with the
OLRT taking more prominence in Phase 4; however, it could remain
deployed to support Phase 4 activities, especially if it was a combined
political-military / strategic military team.

f. External Coordination. The SHAPE requirements for external

coordination for Phase 4a are typically the same as for Phase 2 and 3. It is
essential at this point, that arrangement for liaison and coordination is
established, as authorised by the NAC, with relevant non-NATO actors. If a
SPMP is to be developed by NATO HQ, SHAPE liaison should be established
with the NATO HQ body drafting such a document. Finally, NCIA and NSPA,
if not already engaged, should be tasked to provide a liaison to the CAT.

g. Op Level HQ(s). The weight of effort switches from the strategic level to
the operational level in this phase. The development of the strategic
CONOPS relies heavily on the work of the operational level, especially their
development of the operational requirements to support the Op level COM(s)
concept for the operation. Regular interaction between the JOPG(s) and the
planning team throughout the phase is essential. If the chosen MRO
articulated a command other than the one who conducted Phase 2 and 3 with
SHAPE, then the way forward for the development of the operational
CONOPS and OPLAN will have to be decided, which may need SACEUR to
discuss with the commanders involved.

82
Statement of requirements is used here as a general term to capture any requirements needed to implement the military
strategic concept, including an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR and / or ROEREQ.

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Political Military Strategic Level Operational Level

Level SACEUR COM

NAC Initiating Initiate Strategic Planning,

Directive with review guidance, develop
MC Guidance work plan

Update Selected MRO,

consider service support
and C2
Continued JOPG
collaboration
Establish SACEUR’s
Strategic Intent, guidance
and vision

Strategic Develop and Issue

SACEUR’s Strategic
Contributex Strategic
Planning
Directive
CONOPS Planning Directive

Development Develop Strategic

CONOPS, including
annexes

Coordinate Strategic
Military requirements in
NATO contribution to CA
Phase 4a

Coordinate Operational Collaborative

Requirements planning.
Operational
Coordinate with Estimate and
IMS / IS CONOPS
Contribute to NATO
StratCom Strategy

Consider Operations
Assessment at the
Strategic Level

Develop Strategic Logistic

Support, C2 and CIS
concepts

Draft Operational
CONOPS
Review Draft Operational (supports Strategic
CONOPS CONOPS)

Illustrative SORs
Strategic Coordinate and submit
CONOPS SACEUR Strategic
CONOPS
Illustrative
SORs

Figure 3.9 Phase 4a Strategic CONOPS Development Main Activities

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

3.33. Initiate Strategic CONOPS Development. The strategic CONOPS

development will be initiated with a thorough review of all of the information,
intelligence and understanding regarding the crisis; has anything changed that could
alter or impact the planning process since the MROs were developed. On receipt of
the direction and guidance from NATO HQ the following steps will be taken:

a. Review NID, and MC, SACEUR and / or CG Guidance. With receipt

of the NID (and MC guidance), the planning team reviews the NAC’s political
direction and any MC, SACEUR or CG guidance regarding the selected
response option to confirm and evaluate the impact of any changes regarding:

(1) The NATO end state, mission, role, and strategic objectives,
including any specific MSOs.

(2) Political limitations and assumptions (including arms control

instruments).

(3) Political restraints and constraints

(4) The legal basis and mandate for the operation.

(5) The overall comprehensive strategic approach.

(6) The designated op level HQ(s) selected to conduct planning for

the operation.

(7) Guidance on resources.

(8) Participation of partners and other non-NATO Nations.

(9) The list of significant non-NATO actors with which SACEUR is

authorised to interact during the planning for the operation, including
the degree of interaction authorised for each, if described.

(10) The mission specific StratCom framework and guidance83.

(11) Authorisation or direction to declare additional specific CRMs.

(12) Any other guidance, including timing for CONOPS / OPLANS

delivery to NAC and / or MC.

b. Selection of Op Level HQ(s). If the C2 of the chosen MRO articulates

a commander other than the currently identified COM, the original selection of
the JFC / op level HQ(s) may have to be revisited. Ideally, during MRO
development this issue would be discussed and mitigated when first apparent.
83
The NATO HQ StratCom objectives and guidance will be provided through a NATO StratCom Framework developed in
collaboration with SHAPE StratCom.

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The solution84 chosen may require SACEUR to discuss with the COMs but the
option chosen must facilitate efficient and effective planning, while facilitating
the role of the chosen commander in the operation operational design. As
required, the planning team will draft, for SACEUR release, a document to
formalise the chosen approach.

c. Update Planning Milestones and Work Plan. The NID and MC

guidance will typically establish deadlines for the submission of planning
products and may also establish other critical timings related to crisis
management. Therefore, the planning team must update its planning
milestones and adjust its work plan within SHAPE as well as with subordinate
commands and other organisations to make the best use of available time.
Through the ACOS J5 (and in coordination with DCCOMC), the planning team
should discuss their initial thoughts and work plan with the CG but it should
include as a minimum:

(1) The release of SPD.

(2) The submission of the draft operational CONOPS, including

an ’illustrative’ Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR),
Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR) and / or a
manpower SOR.

(3) The submission of the draft strategic CONOPS to SACEUR,

with an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR, TCSOR and / or manpower SOR (in the
form of a request for CE or a PE reinforcement as appropriate).

(4) Further requests for authorisation to implement specific CRMs

as required to prepare and activate specific capabilities.

d. Establish Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning.

The planning team should re-evaluate its requirements for liaison and
coordination. The primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase
4a are the same as described for Phase 2 and 3 but any other expertise
required, such as from NCIA and the NATO HQ ERS must be made now. It is
essential at this point, that arrangement for liaison and coordination is
established, as authorised by the NAC, with relevant non-NATO actors. The
NID should establish the strategic military and non-military roles and
objectives, and articulate NAC authorisation for interaction with non-NATO
actors. During MRO development, an initial list of non-NATO interaction
requirements will have been developed and this should be reviewed with the
additional guidance received in the NID, and the planning team should specify
precisely those GOs and NGOs with which collaboration and coordination is
determined to be crucial. The planning team must confirm that they have the

84
Options may include: leaving the original HQ to plan the operation; having the one new COM plan the operation using key
staff members but using the original JFC staff; and moving the planning to the new COM, with support from the original HQ(s).
Discussion on this issue should start during the finalisation of the MROs in Phase 3. SACEUR would have to formally document
the chosen relationship to replace that articulated in the original Strategic WNGO.

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authorities or the mechanisms to engage all of these organisations (e.g.

through CIVAD, CMI or NATO HQ IS (PASP)). Liaison may be required with
the following:

(1) Designated IOs, GOs and NGOs.

(2) HN governments and governments of transit countries.

(3) EADRCC.

e. Information Sharing. Given the nature of NATO information security

policy, it is essential that a suitable means for sharing information with
relevant international actors be developed.

f. Prepare and / or Deploy the OLRT85. Depending on the situation,

SHAPE may have already authorised the designated HQ(s), through CRMs,
to prepare and or deploy OLRT(s). If not then the requirement to prepare and
/ or deploy an OLRT at this point should be considered by the planning team
in concert with the HQ(s); if deemed necessary, the CAT would recommend to
SACEUR to declare the applicable CRM for preparation or deployment of the
OLRT. Any guidance for tailoring, preparing or deploying the OLRT should be
developed by the CAT, especially the use of DCIS, arrangements for initial
entry, coordination with HN Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations
(InfoOps) and PsyOps.

3.34. Update the Selected Military Response Option. Based on their review of
the NID and any additional MC guidance, SACEUR and / or CG guidance, the
planning team should update the selected MRO as a basis for the development of
the CONOPS and, especially, the SPD. The planning team should assign a core
group to review the selected MRO strategic framework, followed by a quick review
and update of the other elements of the MRO by the functional SMEs that developed
them. Any issues that require clarification or further guidance are coordinated with
NATO HQ or presented to the CG, with recommendations.

a. Review MRO Strategic Framework. The strategic framework of the

selected MRO provides the overall context for engaging military forces to
achieve NATO MSOs within a comprehensive approach.

(1) Strategic Framework. The planning team should update the

strategic framework of the closest MRO to suit the guidance received in
the NID. This includes analysing the impact of any changes in the NID
to the wording of MSOs and ensuring the MSEs support them.

(2) Criteria for Success. If the NATO end state and / or the MSOs
received in the NID are vague, then the criteria for success to aid
85
Authorisation to prepare and deploy an OLRT is devolved to SACEUR by the NAC through CRMs and this authority may
already have been provided, perhaps in a NAC Decision Sheet such as the NID. If not already devolved, the authorisation for
SACEUR to declare the OLRT related CRMs should be requested.

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clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent must be
developed. This will also assist the conduct of strategic OPSA.

(3) Review / Develop Strategic Assumptions and Preconditions

for Success. The planning team should capture any additional
strategic planning assumptions and PCS that are identified during the
review of the MRO strategic framework, e.g. the need to analyse if the
strategic non-military objectives in the NID encapsulate the identified
CNMA in the MRO strategic framework, or if not, the planning team will
need to develop additional strategic planning assumptions or PCS to
ensure these areas of necessary supporting or complementary activity
are captured.

(4) Strategic Phasing and Sequencing. If needed, the planning

team will develop a description of the strategic phases of the operation
or the intended sequencing of strategic military effects. Each phase
should have a clear purpose; however, this does not preclude the
possibility for a phase to overlap with another. This phasing and
sequencing will facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and
non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as
well as Alliance political control. Elements of the MRO strategic
framework will be further developed by the planning team
collaboratively with the designated HQ(s) during Phase 4 to ensure that
all essential strategic conditions are addressed in the strategic
CONOPS when it is subsequently forwarded through the MC to the
NAC for approval. The following political-military decisions may
influence the main phases of the strategic framework:

(a) Activation of forces in preparation for deployment as

initiated by the issue of a FAD by the NAC.

(b) Authorisation for pre-deployment of enabling forces as

defined by the issue of an Activation Pre-Deployment
(ACTPRED) instruction.

(c) Execution of an operation including the deployment and

employment of forces through a NAC Execution Directive
(NED).

(d) Transition and eventual termination of military operations.

b. Consider Required Service Support. For the updated selected MRO,

with consideration to NAC and SACEUR / CG guidance, and supported by
any infrastructure assessment, consider the possible theatre logistics
architecture required to support the MRO, such as strategic LoCs; access to
the theatre and entry points, including APODs, SPODs and RPODs;
Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB), if required; etc. In conjunction with the Log
SME, the planning team must develop initial thoughts, guidance or requests

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for operational input for inclusion in the SPD. The various aspects of Service
Support that should be considered includes the following:

(1) Logistic Support Concept.

(2) Logistic Standards and Requirements.

(3) Movement concept.

(4) HNS concept.

(5) Supply and Maintenance concept.

(6) MILENG Support concept.

(7) Medical Support concept.

(8) Commercial Support concept.

(9) Finance.

(10) Manpower.

c. Consider Required Command and Signal. With consideration to

NAC and SACEUR / CG guidance, consider the possible C2 arrangements
and communication concept required to support the updated selected MRO,
within the constraints of the theatre logistic architecture and the
communications means available. Develop provisional C2 arrangements and
initial thoughts, guidance, or requests for operational input on the
communication concept for inclusion in the SPD.

3.35. Establish SACEUR’s Strategic Intent and Guidance. It is of critical

importance for SACEUR to clearly, and early, articulate the strategic military intent,
including the effect(s) that military forces are to create, or the military support to non-
military efforts, in collaboration with other cooperating IOs, GOs and NGOs to
contribute to the achievement of the desired NATO end state. It is important for the
planning team to confirm the strategic intent, including SACEUR’s vision and aim for
the conduct of the operation, to ensure a correct focus.

a. SACEUR’s Strategic Intent. SACEUR’s strategic intent may include:

(1) An appreciation of the intentions of adversaries.

(2) Strategic criteria for success (related to the NATO end state or
MSOs or any conditions that military forces must establish).

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(3) The strategic main effort86.

(4) Limitations (any additional constraints or restraints).

(5) Cooperation with non-military and non-NATO efforts (e.g. other

instruments of national or international power).

(6) Acceptance of risks.

(7) Critical desired effects and any effects to be avoided.

(8) Phasing and / or sequencing of strategic military effects.

b. SACEUR’s Strategic Guidance. The planning team should also seek

initial SACEUR guidance on other issues to guide the further development of
the military strategic concept. This guidance could include, among others, the
following:

(1) Refinement of SACEUR’s CCIR and PIRs.

(2) Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

(3) Use of the NRF.

(4) CRMs to be requested.

(5) ROE and the Use of Force.

(6) Targeting guidance.

(7) StratCom Guidance.

(8) CMI and inter-agency coordination.

(9) Involvement of Partners.

(10) Critical Infrastructure87.

(11) Critical Timings.

3.36. Develop and Issue the Strategic Planning Directive. The SPD is
developed and issued to provide authoritative direction to SHAPE, the designated
HQ(s), ACO subordinate commands and other supporting NATO agencies. The
SPD provides the top down guidance needed to generate bottom up requirements
which can then be incorporated into the strategic CONOPS. It provides essential
direction and guidance to allow the operational level commands to commence an
86
The main effort is ‘[a] concentration of forces or means in a particular area and at a particular time to enable a commander to
bring about a decision. (AAP-06).
87
Critical Infrastructure may be broken down into Mission Vital Infrastructure (MVI), Key Infrastructure (KI) and Critical National
Infrastructure (CNI)

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Operational Estimate. As such, its release should not be overly delayed to refine the
content; rather it should provide a succinct capture of the direction, detail and
guidance to date to act as a start point for the collaborative planning between
SHAPE and JFC(s) / HQ(s) / SSCs / TCCs functional staffs, with a request for
operational input. It is critical to direct the HQ(s) to determine operational
requirements that must be reflected in the military strategic concept.

a. Format. The SPD format is based on that of the strategic CONOPS,

but can be adjusted as required to suit the requirement. The content of the
SPD (see the SPD format and guidance at Annex A Appendix 4) is a
synthesis of the planning work to date and is derived from NAC guidance
including the NID, SACEUR intent, guidance, input from the SSCs / TCCs /
OPLEs and the updated selected MRO, etc. Where appropriate specific
perspectives, such as cross cutting topics, should be included in the
development of the areas addressed in the SPD. Some of the specific areas
of the SPD are:

(1) Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders.

Based on the MSOs assigned by the NAC, SACEUR’s mission and the
strategic framework of the selected MRO, and in the spirit of mission
command, SACEUR will assign provisional missions88 (including
operational objectives) to subordinate commanders as a basis for their
planning. The missions / operational objectives contained in the SPD
will ideally be discussed between the planning team and JOPG(s) prior
to the issue of the SPD. At this stage the operational commanders will
not have yet conducted their mission analysis and may seek from
SACEUR amendments to the assigned mission / objectives, if required,
following its completion.

(2) Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Areas. The SPD

provides guidance on the proposed TOO and JOA and any specific AOI
such as cyber, and requests operational input on whether they meet
requirements.

(3) Force and Theatre Capability Requirements. The planning

team will provide provisional force capability requirements, derived from
the revised selected MRO, which should be used as a start-point basis
for planning.

(4) Coordination of Requirements. Direction and guidance on a

range of issues, necessary for the conduct of operational estimate and
planning and determination of operational requirements, is developed
and promulgated in the SPD, including:

88
A mission is a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it will take
place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. It includes, by its nature, the authority and freedom of action required
to achieve the assigned objectives while clearly articulating the role of the subordinate command in contributing to the higher
command’s mission accomplishment as envisioned in the higher Commander’s Intent. For every command there is only one
mission.

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(a) SACEUR’s Critical Information Requirements.

Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate
decisions at the military strategic level. SACEUR’s CIR should
guide subordinate commands in developing their own CCIRs,
PIR and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(b) CRMs. The planning team should initially direct

subordinate commands to develop and justify requirements for
the implementation of additional CRMs. As these are generated,
the functional SMEs and planning team will validate their
requirement and include them in the strategic CONOPS.
Throughout the planning process, the planning team / CCOMC89
must keep account of the requests for the devolution of CRM
declaration authority, CRMs declared and their state of
implementation. Where CRMs have only been partially
implemented, or delayed, the planning team must appreciate the
associated risks to the mission.

(c) ROE and the Use of Force. In parallel to their

development of targeting guidance, the planning team,
supported by POLAD and LEGAD, must provide initial guidance
in the SPD on the use of military force, including lethal and non-
lethal measures. This will include articulation of a Political Policy
Statement (PPS) and expression of Political Policy Indicators
(PPI). In absence of PPS and PPI, the subordinate commands
will have difficulties in developing their ROE requirements with
proper justifications and risk assessments.

(d) Targeting. Based on the NID and any specific national

guidance available as well as SACEUR’s initial intent and
guidance, the planning team, with input from Ops / Intel staff (to
include InfoOps) LEGAD and SMEs, should provide initial
targeting guidance and direct subordinate commands to further
determine: the target sets that may be illustrated by example
target categories; and, as far as possible, categories of time
sensitive targets (TSTs), which could need to be engaged due to
the threat that they pose to, or the opportunity that they would
present for, the success of the NATO mission.

(e) MILENG. Guidance and direction for MILENG,

focusing on strategic threats, risks and force requirements that
require actions by NATO and nations during the deployment and
conduct of operations that must be developed by the planning
team / MILENG SME.

89
While the planning team needs to monitor the state of the implementation of CRMs, and the related implications, a CAT is a
non-permanent body. The CCOMC is therefore the focal point for the monitoring of CRM implementation.

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1/ C-IED. Guidance for the development of threat,

mission and resource specific C-IED capabilities.

2/ Barrier Planning. Guidance for the development of

barrier planning and requirements for specific barrier
capabilities.

3/ Critical Infrastructure. Initial guidance on cross-

functional Infrastructure Assessment at all levels to
identify Mission Vital Infrastructure (MVI), Key
Infrastructure (KI) and Critical National Infrastructure
(CNI).

(f) Force Protection. Guidance and direction for force

protection (FP), focusing on strategic threats and risks that
require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and
entry into the TOO must be developed by the planning team / FP
SME.

(g) Military Policing / Stability Policing90. The planning

team develops guidance and direction for Military or Stability
Policing Operations, focusing on security, detention and stability
policing functions, and strategic threats and risks that require
actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into
the TOO and JOA.

(h) StratCom. The StratCom SME leads the development of

StratCom Implementation Guidance for subordinate commands
to generate requirements or focus their operational level
planning. This provides a general StratCom overview and may
form an Annex to the SPD or be issued under separate cover.
Direction and guidance will cover military contribution to
communication and information activities including:

1/ General Advice. Advice on the potential impact of

military activities to communicate strategically or
influence audience perceptions.

2/ MilPA. Specific direction on the MilPA mission and

specific MilPA objectives.

3/ PsyOps. Specific direction on the PsyOps mission

and specific PsyOps objectives of NATO’s engagement in
the region.

90
Stability Policing. Guidance and any specific direction to the operational commander for the Stability Policing aspects
(replacement and / or reinforcement) to contribute to establishing a safe and secure environment (SASE), restoring public
order and security, and reinforcing the Rule of Law, as well as police capacity building (PCB) may form a distinct aspect of an
operation and as such will be reflected in the SSA, SPD and subsequent OSW.

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(i) Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) / Co-operation. Specific

guidance to subordinate commands on requirements, focus or
constraints on their operational level planning regarding CMI.

(j) Inter-agency Coordination. Guidance on how inter-

agency coordination will be managed.

(k) Partner Involvement. In accordance with the NID and

SACEUR’s direction and guidance, the SPD should provide
initial guidance on the preparation, certification and integration of
partner forces, including arrangements for information sharing.

(l) Environmental Protection. The SPD should provide

initial guidance on environmental protection requirements,
measures and considerations, consistent with operational
imperatives.

(m) Operations Assessment. The SPD should provide initial

guidance to direct the development of OPSA planning including
any specific strategic level criteria and reporting requirements.

(n) Lessons Identified / Learned. The SPD should provide

guidance for capturing operational and strategic lessons and
best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness
and strategic success.

(o) Exit Criteria.

1/ In NATO the military only contributes to setting the

overall conditions required for termination of ‘all’ Alliance
activities – or those conditions described by the NATO end
state. Exit criteria are those conditions that must be
established prior to the conclusion of the NATO military
activity called for in the operation described by the
strategic plan, and the transition of residual authorities to a
proper authority. These exit criteria may be: solely those
conditions set by the achievement of the MSOs; they may
be those that define the conclusion of NATO military
support to any non-military or non-NATO activity, as
prescribed by the NAC, beyond that specifically required
for achievement of the MSOs; or other conditions set by
the NAC, such as the arrival of a replacement international
security force in theatre.

2/ Ideally these ‘exit criteria’ would be clear from the

outset of planning’ however, it is likely that they will
continue to evolve throughout planning and even
execution. In the end, it will be the NAC that will

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determine when the NATO end state has been reached,

or, prior to reaching the end state, when military
operations can be concluded. If no exit criteria are
provided in the NID by the NAC for the termination of
military operations, some initial exit criteria should be
developed, for the JOPG(s) to factor into their operational
estimate and which will be further developed for NAC
consideration with the submission of the strategic
CONOPS.

(p) Critical Timings. Planning deadlines and key planning

events, such as FGen and deployment conferences, as well as
critical timings related to the activation of forces, the pre-
deployment of enabling forces, initial entry, transfer of authority
(TOA), transition (if known), etc. should be provided.

(5) Service Support. The SPD should provide an initial outline of,
or guidance on, the overall Service Support concept (e.g. logistic,
movement, MILENG, medical, HNS concepts, etc.), that will serve as
the planning basis for the operational level support planners and direct
any requirements for operational input including on any broad order
costs.

(6) Command and Signal.

(a) Command and Control. The SPD should give broad

order guidance on Command authority in terms of transfer and
delegation of authority. Guidance should also be provided on
external liaison and the conduct of combined operations. Finally,
further detail may be required on the identification and the
responsibilities of any supporting commands. It is important to
provide clear guidance and direction on these issues in the SPD,
and allow the HQ(s) to develop C2 requirements based on the
operational concept.

(b) Cyberspace Concept. Broad guidance to the HQ(s) on

NATO CIS, networks, support and interaction with external
agencies.

b. Forward Strategic Planning Directive to the Op Level HQ(s). The

SPD, based on SACEUR’s intent, provides direction for the designated HQ(s),
and other supporting commands, to guide the development of the operational
CONOPS. Once SHAPE issues the SPD and the op level HQ(s) has
completed its mission analysis, consideration may be given to sending a
strategic liaison element, if not already deployed, to the HQ(s) to collaborate
during operational concept development to ensure harmonisation between the
operational and strategic CONOPS; however, the liaison elements / JOPGs
provided to SHAPE may serve this purpose.

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3.37. Development of the Strategic CONOPS. The strategic CONOPS

establishes SACEUR’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military operation, in
concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, to achieve the NATO MSOs
and conditions required to assist in the attainment of the desired NATO end state.

a. Following release of the SPD to the HQ(s), the drafting of the strategic
CONOPS begins (see the CONOPS format at Annex B Appendix 5),
incorporating the detail and guidance contained in the SPD as a start point.
While the work on the strategic CONOPS remains the responsibility of the
planning team, it will be supported by the directorate and divisional staff as
necessary; this may at times mean that they work in parallel on certain
supporting tasks, while keeping the planning team appraised, with the end
result being fed into the development of the strategic CONOPS (e.g. logistic
planning conferences, FGen activities, etc.).

b. To be submitted to the NAC for approval, the strategic CONOPS draws

on NAC guidance, SACEUR’s strategic intent and guidance, and the updated
selected MRO; it also incorporates the HQ(s) main operational requirements
for the successful conduct of operations, including the deployment,
employment, and sustainment of forces. As such, it cannot be finalised
without input from the operational level following the HQ(s) operational
estimate; this input is normally provided, in addition to regular collaborative
activity between the planning team and the JOPG, through submission of a
draft operational CONOPS91.

c. It is important during the development of the strategic CONOPS that

external liaison and collaboration be continued, to maintain situational
awareness and to ensure it meets the requirement and supports the
operational commander’s concept for the operation. SHAPE leadership should
remain appraised of the political environment, which will be accomplished
through various conduits, such as the CCOMC, SHAPE liaison to the CMTF
and the liaison officers from NATO HQ. Functional SMEs at the various levels
should discuss functional issues, as required, to ensure clarity (e.g. the legal
mandate - LEGAD at SHAPE, Op level HQ(s) and NATO HQ).

(1) Maintain Coordination with NATO HQ. ACOS J5, in concert

with the DCCOMC, must ensure that the planning team maintains
close coordination and cooperation with NATO HQ IS / IMS. Normally,
a SPMP would not be expected to be developed / refined in parallel to
the development of the strategic CONOPS, as this could drive major
change to political guidance in the NID (e.g. end state, military

91
What is submitted to SACEUR / SHAPE by the operational level before submission of the strategic CONOPS to the MC and
the NAC should be discussed as the SPG is developed, and, if necessary, agreed between SACEUR and op level COM(s).
Normally this will be in the form of a ‘draft’ operational CONOPS, but in the past this requirement has been satisfied by the
submission of a rough draft operational OPLAN, with the essential elements of a CONOPS completed. If an operational
CONOPS is submitted, it will not be formally approved by SACEUR until approval of the strategic CONOPS by the NAC; once
the strategic CONOPS is approved, this may drive adjustments to the draft operational CONOPS prior to its final approval.
After submitting a draft operational CONOPS, designated COM(s) continues with operational OPLAN development; following
the approval by the NAC of the strategic CONOPS, approval of the operational CONOPS by SACEUR will be actioned.

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objectives); however, the planning team must remain abreast of any

developments in this area, especially the development of non-military
aspects to ensure the military concept remains complementary.

(2) Maintain Collaboration with the nominated HQ(s) and

Domain Advisors. Throughout the CONOPS development, the
planning team will collaborate with the JOPG(s) / domain advisors to
ensure that: the nominated HQ(s) has as much flexibility as possible in
its operational design and concept development within the selected
MRO strategic design; and the operational requirements are
understood and properly reflected in the strategic CONOPS. Normally,
the strategic CONOPS should not be submitted to SACEUR before
elements of the operational concept are developed enough to be
included.

d. Development of Strategic CONOPS Annexes. In addition to

commencing the main body of the strategic CONOPS, the planning team
selects, and assigned functional SMEs begin to develop, the annexes that
support the strategic CONOPS. A list of possible annexes for inclusion, and
some additional considerations for annex / appendix development, can be
found at Annex C. Throughout the development of the strategic CONOPS the
content of the selected annexes will continue to be identified, developed and
refined and as required, re-evaluate the annexes and appendixes selected for
development.

(1) Mandated Annexes. Those annexes highlighted in Annex C

are mandated by the NAC for inclusion with a strategic CONOPS;
however, while the appendices listed provide an indication of what is
covered in a particular annex, they are not mandated for inclusion (as
at the time of the CONOPS development there may be insufficient
detail to do so). At the time that the CONOPS is developed, the main
annex itself may be enough to provide and understanding to the NAC
and to provide guidance and direction to the operational level.

(2) Additional Annexes. Annexes in addition to those mandated

for inclusion with a strategic CONOPS can be selected for
development if it is felt that strategic direction and guidance on these
issues is required; all annexes selected for development, even if not
mandated for inclusion, should be submitted with the strategic
CONOPS to the NAC for approval.

3.38. Coordinate Strategic Military Requirements in NATO’s Contribution to a

Comprehensive Approach. The information and economic IoPs reside with
Nations, including Alliance members, and coordination of these efforts will most likely
be carried out under the auspices of the UN or other IOs such as the EU.
Coordination must be made at the political level of NATO to ensure that the efforts of
the Alliance are harmonised with non-military efforts. It is also essential that the
development of the strategic CONOPS is synchronised with those plans of

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significant cooperating non-NATO actors and that this interaction has the support of
the NAC.

a. Key areas for Confirmation. Certain key areas that are directly linked
to the military IoP must be confirmed at the earliest opportunity:

(1) Non-military support to military operations.

(2) Military support to non-military efforts.

(3) Logistics support.

b. External Liaison Mechanisms. By this point the mechanisms for

liaison and coordination with relevant non-NATO entities should be
established (e.g. authorities for direct engagement or mechanisms for this
interaction (e.g. perhaps through NATO HQ)). The CIVAD and the J9 staff will
normally be the conduit for this interaction for the planning team.

c. These issues may also be discussed during CMTF sessions or in direct

pre-operations planning consultation sessions. The planning team must
continue to remain aware of these discussions and factor implications derived
from their analysis into their work on the strategic CONOPS.

3.39. Coordinate Operational Requirements. One of the most important aspects

in the development of strategic CONOPS is the determination of the operational
requirements needed to realise the strategic concept. While a collaborative effort
between the strategic and operational levels, this work originates at the operational
level as they devise their estimates of the requirements needed to support
designated COM(s) operational concept. Requirements are articulated using four
main products: the CJSOR92, the TCSOR, a manpower SOR and a ROEREQ; at the
time of the submission of the strategic CONOPS to the NAC these are termed as
‘illustrative’. In addition, the annexes of the draft operational CONOPS will articulate
various requirements that need to be validated and, if required, captured in the
strategic CONOPS and annexes, such as the need for implementing additional
CRMs, and target sets and, where appropriate, illustrative target categories of TST
for each phase of the operation93.

a. Coordinate the development of the CJSOR. The development of the

CJSOR during operations planning is perhaps the most critical step in the
development of an executable OPLAN. It is developed in parallel with the
CONOPS under the lead of the FGen SME. The HQ(s), in consultation with
their Component Commanders, normally prepares an initial ‘illustrative’
CJSOR; within the CAT, the FGen SME leads the validation and the
coordination of the CJSOR with the HQ(s). The version of the CJSOR that
exists at the time of the submission of the strategic CONOPS is normally

92
Where Graduated Response Plans are being developed Graduated Force Lists (GFL) are used in lieu of the CJSOR.
93
MC-471, NATO Targeting Policy.

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submitted with it for illustrative purposes, as an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR 94,95 to

provide nations with an early indication of the type and scale of forces
required to implement the strategic concept. It then is continued to be refined
until the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC and a NAC FAD is
issued; the CJSOR is then formally released to Nations as the ‘provisional
CJSOR’, as a precursor to the commencement of the formal FGen process.
The provisional CJSOR represents SACEUR’s minimum military requirement
for forces to conduct the operation within acceptable risks; it ultimately
determines the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to achieve
agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks and the feasibility of
deployment, employment and sustainment. The minimum essential
information that must be confirmed in the provisional CJSOR is:

(1) Force / Capability requirement, including strategic and theatre

reserve and any detailed capability requirements.

(2) Echelon that indicates size.

(3) Commander’s Required Date96.

(4) Required destination.

(5) Priority of arrival.

(6) Command authority to be transferred to the gaining NATO

Commander.

b. Coordinate TCSOR. The TCSOR identifies critical theatre-level

capabilities, normally considered as national responsibilities, which may
exceptionally be considered as eligible for NATO common funding by the
Resource, Planning and Policy Board (RPPB). At this point in the planning
process, the Force Generation and Readiness (FGR) Branch will seek to
identify which theatre capabilities meet the criteria established in existing
eligibility guidelines will need to be identified, and which ones may require an
exceptional agreement for common funding by the MC and the RPPB.
Whenever possible, TCSOR enabling requirements are provisionally identified
94
In the FGen process (as described in MC 0133), use of ‘provisional’ and ‘draft’ to qualify the CJSOR have specific
connotations. The ‘provisional’ CJSOR is provided to nations with the Activation Warning message (ACTWARN) to commence
formal force generation, following the NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS and issue of a FAD. The ‘provisional’ CJSOR
evolves into the ‘draft’ CJSOR as the result of the FGen conference, which reflects Nations’ force offers. Accordingly
throughout this chapter, the term ‘illustrative’ will be used to describe the version of the CJSOR provided to SHAPE with a draft
operational CONOPS by the op level COM(s), and to describe the CJSOR provided by SACEUR to the NAC / MC with the
strategic CONOPS, for ‘illustrative’ purposes. This approach to terminology will also be used to describe the other SORs (e.g.
TCSOR and manpower SOR) at the various stages (e.g. illustrative TCSOR (with strategic CONOPS), provisional TCSOR (up-
to-date version provided to nations at the time of a FGen conference), draft TCSOR (following the FGen conference), and
TCSOR (with the OPLAN)).
95
While the ‘illustrative’ CJSOR provides an early indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required to
implement the military strategic concept, it will not necessarily provide sufficient detail for nations to prepare their force offers;
this detail will be provided in the ‘Provisional’ CJSOR.
96
Commander’s required date - The latest date, calculated from G-day, established by the theatre commander, on which forces
are required to be completed in their final destination and organised to meet the commander’s operational requirement. (AAP-
06). G-day - The day on which an order is or is due to be given to deploy a unit. Note: Such an order is normally a national
one (AAP-06).

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at the operational level by the designated HQ(s), with a rough estimate of the
required resources, during the development of the strategic CONOPS; they
will be fully coordinated at the conclusion of the FGen process. This
coordination requires:

(1) Identifying which TCSOR capabilities are expected to be

provided by Nations as well as those that will have to be outsourced,
subject to the specific approval by the RPPB.

(2) Estimating the cost for establishment and sustainment of all

TCSOR capabilities eligible for common funding in accordance with
NATO regulations.

The TCSOR that exists at the time of the strategic CONOPS submission is
normally submitted for illustrative purposes, as an ‘illustrative’ TCSOR.

c. Coordinate Manpower Requirements. Resource / Manpower SMEs

in the CAT, in collaboration with the JOPG, with contributions from other
directorates will identify personnel to fulfil the force C2 requirements by NCS
HQs, NFS HQs, Multi-National HQs, NATO Nations and Non-NATO Troop
Contributing Nations (NNTCN) including Partner Nations. The product of the
manpower planning is either a request for PE reinforcement or a CE 97. If
possible, the HQ(s) will provide an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR with the
submission of the draft operational CONOPS. If detailed manpower
requirements are not available at that time, the HQ(s) should comment on the
perceived manpower needs. The planning team will validate the operational
requirements and submit an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR with the strategic
CONOPS (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE) or some
considerations on manpower requirements for submission under Service
Support in the main body of the strategic CONOPS.

d. Coordinate Illustrative ROEREQ. An illustrative ROEREQ is

normally submitted with the strategic CONOPS to help illustrate the ROE that
are considered necessary for the authorisation for, or limits on, the use of
force during military operations. The operations staff, supported by the
LEGAD, lead this activity within the CAT; in dialogue with their operational
level counterparts they may develop the initial draft ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ or
wait for an initial HQ(s) draft. It is validated and developed for submission
with the strategic CONOPS. While the ROEREQ is not ‘approved’ by the
NAC at this point, they may give direction for ROE refinement prior to the
submission of the ROEREQ for approval with the strategic OPLAN.
Depending on the NAC direction, this may impact other areas of the strategic
CONOPS, and necessitate its amendment; as such, as the ‘illustrative’

97
SACEUR will determine the need for reinforcements in coordination with the respective Commanders and will coordinate the
provision of the appropriate personnel from the pool of identified reinforcement personnel from within the NCS and by asking
nations for personnel from outside NCS. Subject to MC endorsement and NAC approval, SACEUR will decide if the conduct of
an operation requires reinforcing a PE or a transition to a CE. (SMAP 15 – NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy - change 19
to MC 0216/4 - AAP–16 (D).

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ROEREQ is developed it should be discussed with the NATO liaison officers,

IMS staff and NATO HQ LEGAD, as appropriate.

3.40. Contribute to the Achievement of NATO’s StratCom Objectives. The

NAC will provide mission-specific strategic political guidance on StratCom activities
(including StratCom objectives) as part of the NID or under separate cover. These
must be reviewed by the planning team and StratCom SMEs in order to develop the
initial StratCom implementation concept.

a. Develop the Initial Concept for Achieving the NATO StratCom

Objectives. ACO’s initial StratCom concept will detail how ACO intends to
achieve the military aspects of NATO HQ’s StratCom objectives. It will be
developed by the StratCom staff (in support of its SME). The concept will
match the StratCom aims, themes and focus topics set out in the StratCom
Framework to identified audiences and stakeholders. StratCom staff will also
assist in the determination of limitations and assessment criteria, and provide
advice regarding the planning and execution of communication and
information activities at, and below, the strategic level; including appropriate
interagency interfaces.

b. StratCom Annex. This initial ACO StratCom concept may have been
sent as an annex to the SPD (or under separate cover) in order to solicit
operational level feedback, as well as to allow the operational level to begin
planning on agreed aspects of the concept immediately.

3.41. Consider Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level. OPSA planning

must remain an integral part of the OPP at strategic and operational levels from the
outset. Initial strategic guidance will have been provided in the SPD to direct the
development of assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements.
This guidance and direction should be built upon during the development of the
strategic CONOPS, in concert with the JOPG(s).

a. In general, OPSA at the strategic level focuses on appreciating the

progress towards achieving the MSOs and NMSOs, and their contribution to
the achievement of the NATO strategic objectives and end state. The planning
team should determine which other relevant non-NATO actors have OPSA
capabilities or sources of data that may be of use to the NATO OPSA effort;
this may lead to recommendation for additional interaction authorities or
mechanisms, or lead to discussion of these issues during any pre-operations
planning consultations.

b. While the strategic CONOPS would normally only include general

description of strategic OPSA requirements, with necessary direction and
guidance for the operational level, design of the strategic OPSA should ideally
commence during the initial phases of planning. The process of specifying
unacceptable and acceptable conditions by the planning team will help
increase understanding of effects and objectives and the determination of
necessary metrics by the OPSA staff.

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3.42. Develop the Strategic Service Support Concept. The initial outline strategic
service support concept described during the MRO development now need to be
developed by the CAT and functional SMEs.

a. Determine the Theatre Logistics Architecture. Within the planning

team, the support staff will further develop the theatre logistics architecture,
supported by any infrastructure assessment from the MILENG staff, in
collaboration with the JOPG(s), based on the NID and SACEUR’s initial intent
and guidance as promulgated in the SPD. The principal aspects that must be
established include:

(1) Strategic LoC.

(2) Access to the theatre and entry points, including APODs,

SPODs and where applicable RPODs.

(3) ISBs, if required.

(4) Possibilities for HNS.

(5) Theatre LoCs.

b. Develop Logistic Roles and Responsibilities. Support staff continue

to lead in the development of the logistics support concept in coordination with
nations during an Initial Logistics Planning Conference which is conducted as
early as possible to:

(1) Inform Nations about the strategic service support, including

movements, the provision of supplies and medical support.

(2) Evaluate key factors influencing service support (e.g. choke

points).

(3) Review the proposed logistic C2 structure.

(4) Determine optimal methods of logistic support arrangements

including:

(a) MN joint theatre logistics.

(b) HNS.

(c) Lead Nation and role specialised Nation.

(d) MN integrated logistic units.

(e) MN logistics units.

(f) MN integrated medical units.

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(g) MN medical units or medical framework / lead nation

requirements.

(h) Commercial support.

c. Coordinate HNS Arrangements. Based on the results of the Initial

Logistics Planning Conference, the support staff and LEGAD ensure that
essential legal arrangements are in place to allow the support staff to initiate
requests for HNS, to summarise requirements and outline the scope of the
desired arrangements.

d. Coordinate the Deployment and Sustainment Concept. Within the

CAT and working closely with the designated commands, support staff
continue to lead in the development of the strategic Service Support concept
as part of the strategic CONOPS, including the following:

(1) Movement concept.

(2) HNS concept.

(3) Logistic Support concept.

(4) Logistic Standards and requirements.

(5) Supply and Maintenance concept.

(6) MILENG Support concept.

(7) Medical Support concept.

(8) Commercial Support concept.

(9) Funding.

(10) Manpower.

3.43. Develop the Concept for Cyberspace and Command and Control98. Once
the requirement for operational level commands, subordinate commands and
supporting commands / agencies have been identified and confirmed, the concept
for how C2 will be implemented will need to be determined by the planning team.
The C2 concept should wherever possible reflect the basic principle of simplicity
accepting that it will need to be flexible and able to change in line with FGen and
TOA of assigned forces and capabilities.

a. Develop the Concept for Command and Control Arrangements.

The planning team must review the NID, MC guidance and SACEUR’s initial
intent/guidance to determine the C2 structure required to conduct the mission
98
NATO CIS will be planned against minimum military requirements. CIS support will confirm to eligibility and connection rules
and extant guidance.

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within the constraints of the theatre logistic architecture and the

communications means available. This work is done in dialogue with the
operational level, through the JOPG(s), to capture the COM(s) C2
requirements to support the operational concept.

b. Develop the Cyberspace Concept. The communications and

information concept developed by the cyberspace SMEs describes in principle
the provision of CIS for the operation, based on SACEUR’s strategic concept
and the operational requirements developed by the designated HQ(s). Since
the C2 structure and the size of the HQs will vary according to the mission,
the DCIS architecture will be adapted to support C2 arrangements based on
operational information exchange requirements (IERs) - who needs the
information, what the information is, where it comes from and how the
information exchange occurs. Cyberspace support for the operation will use
the existing NATO General Communications System (NGCS) and DCIS, as
well as nationally provided systems. Cyberspace effects99 will normally be
planned and executed at a strategic level in order to enable SACEUR to
maintain mission assurance over NATO networks and information systems
essential to command and control Alliance operations. Communications will
be grouped into three levels:

(1) Level 1 - Theatre / Strategic Level Communications. Theatre

communications will link SHAPE, op level HQ(s), Component
Commands (CCs) and other HQs when required. Theatre
communications link forward deployed HQs and subordinate
commands that are in direct support of the operation. These links are
characterised by high volume information flow, security and timelines in
support of command, control, intelligence and support of the forces.

(2) Level 2 - Component Communications. Force-level

communications between CCs and their subordinate formations are a
CC responsibility. However, they can have access to secure and non-
secure common-user NATO SECRET (NS), MISSION SECRET (MS)
and NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) services, recognised air, maritime
and common pictures, and intelligence imagery / data systems.

(3) Level 3 - Deployed Unit / National Unit Communications.

Communications within national units are the responsibility of, and
organic to, the units themselves. Level 3 CIS will consist primarily of
terrestrial links, UHF / VHF or HF radio, as conditions permit and the
Nations can provide.

3.44. Review of Draft Operational CONOPS. Normally, the strategic CONOPS

will not be submitted prior to receipt of the draft operational CONOPS, including their
‘illustrative’ statements of requirements (e.g. illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR and / or
manpower SOR). This serves two purposes: first, a final check that the operational
99
Cyber effects will be managed through the Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies (SCEPVA) process.

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level has correctly interpreted all elements of strategic direction and guidance; and
second, a final check that all elements needed in the strategic CONOPS, which need
NAC approval, have been identified and included. Appropriate functional SMEs
should review all elements of the operational CONOPS, including annexes. Any
issues identified should be resolved by functional SMEs through discussion with their
operational counterparts or through amendment of their portion of the strategic
CONOPS. Any major issues needing direction or resolution prior to staffing the
strategic CONOPS should be identified and briefed to the planning team ‘lead’, the
CG or SACEUR, as appropriate. The planning team should ensure that the JOPG(s)
receives appropriate feedback on any issues that may need to be addressed in the
operational CONOPS prior to SACEUR approval (following approval of strategic
CONOPS by the NAC).

3.45. Coordinate and Submit Strategic CONOPS. Ideally, prior to submission, the
operational level and supporting commands are afforded the opportunity to comment
on the draft strategic CONOPS and the illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR
and ROEREQ that will normally accompany it.

a. Final Coordination with the nominated HQ(s). The OPLE(s) should

also review the draft strategic CONOPS as it develops and raise any potential
issues. Depending on the HQ(s) JOPG capacity (as they will be dealing with
the component level CONOPS development at the same time), a complete
review of the draft strategic CONOPS may not be possible; if this is the case
the planning team should ensure that any major issues or possible areas for
differences of opinion are discussed between the planning team and the
JOPG. Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the strategic
CONOPS for approval, at the ACOS J5 leadership level or through the CG or
SACEUR as appropriate.

b. Final Coordination with NATO HQ. The NATO HQ liaison officers

supporting SHAPE should provide input on any potential outstanding issues.
Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the strategic CONOPS
for approval, at the ACOS J5 leadership level or through the CG or SACEUR
as appropriate.

c. Seek SACEUR’s Approval. ACOS J5, in coordination with DCCOMC,

will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the strategic CONOPS, and
illustrative SORs, for approval by SACEUR. Final internal coordination will
normally be facilitated through a briefing to the CG on the main elements of
the strategic CONOPS and proposed recommendations. SACEUR may
require an operational CONOPS review with subordinate commanders to
further ensure strategic synchronisation, or this understanding of the
operational CONOPS, and any related issues, can be addressed by the
planning team in the briefing.

d. Submit Strategic CONOPS for NAC approval. Once the CONOPS

has been approved by SACEUR, it will be forwarded through the MC to the
NAC for their approval, with a copy to the NMRs at SHAPE.

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PHASE 4B - STRATEGIC OPLAN DEVELOPMENT AND FORCE GENERATION

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

3.46. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 4b – Strategic OPLAN Development and

Force Generation is first to identify and activate the forces and capabilities required
to implement the strategic CONOPS and accomplish the mission within acceptable
risks. Second, it specifies, for MC endorsement and NAC approval, the sequence of
the strategic activities and operations, including the deployment, employment,
sustainment and C2 of NATO-led forces, for the accomplishment of the agreed
NATO military mission, as well as the possible necessary interaction required with
cooperating non-NATO entities.

a. Overview. Phase 4b involves two interrelated processes (Strategic

OPLAN Development and Force Generation) that must be harmonised to
ensure that the plan being developed is adequately resourced in terms of the
capabilities being generated. They are conducted in parallel at the strategic
and operational levels to: identify and confirm national commitments; to
balance the force package against mission requirement; and to appreciate
risks from any critical shortfalls. The activation and pre-deployment of
enabling forces may also be included.

(1) Strategic OPLAN Development. Immediately following

SACEUR’s submission of the strategic CONOPS, pending NAC
approval, the development of the strategic OPLAN begins to further
coordinate the arrangements required to implement the CONOPS. It
includes further development and coordination of the arrangements
required to implement the strategic concept, including legal
agreements, deployment, force protection, information strategy,
sustainment, C2, training support and certification, and OPSA.
Strategic OPLAN development ends with a viable strategic OPLAN
endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC.

(2) Force Generation. Following NAC approval of the CONOPS

and the issue of a NAC FAD, FGen can be formally initiated by
SACEUR to coordinate force activation with member Nations, partner
and other non-NATO nations designated by the NAC, as required, in
coordination with the HQ(s). FGen continues throughout Phase 4b in
parallel to the strategic OPLAN development.

b. Prerequisites. Certain prerequisites and actions are required to take

place to allow Phase 4b to be completed:

(1) Strategic OPLAN Development. The following are required to

initiate Strategic OPLAN Development:

(a) Strategic CONOPS, including illustrative SORs (e.g.

illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR (either a request

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for PE reinforcement or a CE), and / or ROEREQ, pending NAC

approval.

(b) NAC and / or SACEUR’s direction and guidance.

(c) Arrangements for collaboration with contributing and

HNs, NATO HQ and operational commands

(2) Force Generation. Although informal coordination with nations

will begin during Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment and Phase 3 - MROs
Development, the formal initiation of FGen requires the following:

(a) NAC approval of strategic CONOPS, or NAC FTDM /

ADM direction to develop an OPLAN.

(b) NAC FAD and MC guidance.

(c) A provisional CJSOR based on the force / capability

requirements established by the designated operational
COM(s).

(d) NAC guidance on the participation of Partners and other

non-NATO nations100.

(e) Updated status of forces available to NATO.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Strategic OPLAN and FGen

development are depicted in Figures 3.10 and 3.11 respectively.

d. Desired Outcome of Phase 4b.

(1) Strategic OPLAN Development. The strategic OPLAN, with

an associated TCSOR and ROEREQ, is submitted to the MC / NAC
and approved, while meeting the criteria for timeliness and adequacy
as follows:

(a) Timeliness.

1/ Planning products are produced in time to allow

subordinates to initiate and complete required planning
and preparation.

2/ Essential strategic planning aspects are covered in

the plan.

3/ Planning and execution are integrated

incrementally as required.
100
The NAC may indicate the desirability for participation by Partners and other non-NATO nations in the NID, a subsequent
decision sheet, or in the FAD.

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(b) Adequacy.

1/ The legal framework, including an international

mandate and SOFAs, as well as arrangements with HNs
and Nations allowing transit, are established and satisfy
mission requirements.

2/ ROEs allow for appropriate protection and

employment of Forces.

3/ Force capabilities and resources satisfy minimum

military requirements for mission accomplishment within
acceptable risk.

4/ The flow of forces into the theatre supports the

operational Commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.

5/ C2 arrangements, including liaison and

coordination with NATO and non-NATO actors, as well as
CIS, allow effective integration and employment of forces
to achieve MSOs. This includes the establishment of
mechanisms to share information with relevant non-
NATO actors while preserving operations security.

6/ Theatre support and sustainment meet operational

requirements.

7/ Contingency planning requirements have been

identified and prioritised to cover identified risks and
opportunities.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.

(1) CAT. The planning team will develop the strategic OPLAN
under an ACOS J5 lead, supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE
directorates and CG Advisors, as required and approved. At times
SHAPE staff elements may work in parallel on a certain supporting
task, while keeping the planning team appraised, with the end result
being fed into the development of the strategic OPLAN (e.g. logistic
planning conferences, FGen activities, etc.). In addition, the planning
team will typically be supported by the following:

(a) SJLSG Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC),

for deployment planning.

(b) SHAPE Partnership Directorate (PD), for coordination

with partners and other non-NATO nations as authorised by the
NAC.

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(2) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis

situation and provide information and intelligence to the CAT. It will
finalise preparations, supported by SHAPE directorates, as required
and approved, for management of operation execution.

(3) Force Generation and Readiness Branch. During Phase 4b,

the FGR staff play a central role, in close cooperation with the CAT, in
coordinating force / capability requirements with Nations as well as the
designated commands. Close coordination with the AMCC is required
to ensure that deployment information for each force is coordinated
with the JFC(s) / JTF(s) / SSC / TCCs and provided to Nations. The
SHAPE PD, collocated with SHAPE, provides a means for coordinating
potential force contributions with partners and other non-NATO nations,
as authorised by the NAC. FGen needs to ensure provision of an
adequate force package to provide the right forces, at the right place,
at the right time and in the right sequence in accordance with the
operational concept. While this depends on nations’ decisions, which
will be influenced by political considerations, activities by SHAPE
should focus on the following additional criteria:

(a) Force / Capability requirements are balanced with the

mission, can be supported from forces available to NATO and
reflect the level of political will.

(b) Nations receive force / capability requirements, including

planned employment, command relations and preliminary
deployment information, to allow timely decisions.

(c) Information related to national contributions clearly

establishes the forces capabilities and command authority to be
provided as well as any caveats on force employment.

(d) Critical shortfalls in force / capabilities required for

mission success are identified and filled through force balancing
or reported through the MC to the NAC with an appreciation of
the risks and suggested mitigation possibilities.

f. External Coordination. The SHAPE requirements for external

coordination for Phase 4b are typically the same as for Phase 4a, including:

(1) NATO IS and IMS planners, including CMTF. This includes

liaison with any NATO HQ body developing a SPMP, if one was
deemed necessary.

(2) The supported HQ(s), SCC(s), TCC(s) and supporting

commands.

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(3) Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), including members, partners

and other non-NATO nations, in accordance with NAC guidance. This
may be accomplished through the EAPC and or the PD.

(4) NATO Agencies.

(5) Cooperating non-NATO entities, as designated or authorised by

the NAC, including GOs, IOs and NGOs.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

STRATEGIC OPLAN DEVELOPMENT

3.47. Initiate Strategic OPLAN Development101. Following the submission of the

strategic CONOPS for NAC approval, the planning team will normally be directed to
begin development of the strategic OPLAN102. This phase may however begin once
the NAC approves the strategic CONOPS and directs the development of the
strategic OPLAN as per Figure 3.10.

a. Review Guidance and Direction. The planning team leadership

should review and seek command guidance as required on the following; any
changes to the strategic CONOPS necessary to gain NAC approval; any
issues raised in SACEUR’s review of the strategic CONOPS and the
Operational CONOPS; and / or any additional NAC, MC, SACEUR or CG
guidance.

b. Update Planning Milestones and Work Plan. The NID and MC

guidance will typically establish deadlines for the submission of the OPLAN.
Therefore, the planning team must establish planning milestones and adjust
its work plan within SHAPE as well as with subordinate commands and other
organisations to make the best use of available time, for as a minimum:

(1) The review of the approved strategic CONOPS.

(2) The submission of the operational CONOPS for SACEUR final

approval.

(3) The submission of draft operational OPLAN(s).

(4) The submission of the draft strategic OPLAN(s) to the CG,

including:

(a) Submission, review and coordination, and revision of

initial drafts, including all annexes and appendices.

(b) External review and coordination.

(5) Further requests for authorisation to implement specific CRMs

as required to prepare and activate specific capabilities.

Much of the work in this phase will be done in parallel; therefore, it is

important for the planning team to ensure sufficient plenary sessions, or other
mechanisms, to ensure that all CAT staff retain the same situational
awareness.
101
This section is written for the development of a strategic OPLAN; it can be used as a basis for the production of other
strategic operations plans (e.g. CONPLAN, generic CONPLAN or Standing Defence Plan (SDP)).
102
MC 0133 states that CONOPS approval (by the initiating authority) is not a pre-requisite for further plan development,
although it is required for the plan’s full development and submission.

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c. CAT. The planning team will transition from Phase 4a to accomplish

the following:

(1) Review the status of political-military developments at the MC

and NAC.

(2) Review requests from the supported and supporting commands.

(3) Address issues raised by SACEUR.

(4) Review coordination required with relevant non-NATO actors,

including security issues linked to information, knowledge and
intelligence sharing.

(5) Develop the strategic OPLAN. The strategic CONOPS is used

as the start point for the strategic OPLAN (see the OPLAN format at
Annex A Appendix 5).

(a) Specific sections of the OPLAN main body will be

assigned to specific functional experts.

(b) The planning team will re-evaluate the annexes

necessary to support the strategic OPLAN to determine if any
new annexes / appendices are required. Throughout strategic
OPLAN development the content of the selected annexes /
appendices will continue to be identified, developed and refined
and the planning team should, as required, re-evaluate those
needed for inclusion. Each annex / appendix will be assigned to
a specific functional expert for development.

(6) Establish arrangements for transitioning the OPLAN to the

CCOMC for its execution.

d. Review Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning. The

planning team should re-evaluate its requirements for liaison and
coordination. The primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase
4b are the same as those described for Phase 4a. The planning team should
confirm that they have the authorities or the mechanisms to engage all
relevant GOs and NGOs (e.g. through CIVAD, CMI or NATO HQ). CAT
leadership should remain appraised of current issues and developments
associated with the crisis through the CCOMC, and the liaison officers from
NATO HQ. If deemed necessary by the NAC, a SPMP will be developed at
NATO HQ; SHAPE liaison at an appropriate level should be established with
any NATO HQ body drafting such a document.

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Political Military Strategic Level Operational Level

Level SACEUR COM

Submitted
Strategic
CONOPS
Illustrative
Initiate Strategic OPLAN
Strategic
SORs
Development
OPLAN
Host Nation Development
Support
Agreements
Status of
Forces
Agreements

Approved Develop International Legal

Strategic Arrangements
CONOPS

Collaborative
Synchronise Military and planning.
Provisional Non-Military Activity Operational
CJSOR OPLAN

Plan for Employment of

Force Generation

Draft CJSOR Strategic Resources

Process

(with national
commitments)

Plan Strategic
Communications
CJSOR, with
Allied Forces
List
Plan
Phase 4b

for Command and Control

Non-NATO
Planning
Inputs Plan
For Strategic Operations
Assessment
Framework /
Lead / Role
Specialisation Plan
Agreements Force Preparation and
Allied Sustainment
Disposition
List
Nations
Detailed Plan
Deployment Force Deployment
Plans Multi-national
Detailed
Deployment
Plan
Plan
Force Protection

(Draft)
Review Draft Operational Operational
Strategic OPLAN OPLAN
OPLAN

TCSOR
Coordinate and submit
ROEREQ Strategic OPLAN
NAC approved
for NAC Approval
Strategic
OPLAN
NAC approved Approved
Promulgate strategic
Strategic Operational
OPLAN and approve
OPLAN OPLAN
Operational OPLAN

Figure 3.10 Phase 4b Strategic OPLAN Development Main Activities

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e. Appreciate Approved Strategic CONOPS and Seek Operational

CONOPS Approval. The planning team must factor any changes in the
strategic CONOPS, which resulted during its staffing for NAC approval, into
the strategic OPLAN development. Once the strategic CONOPS is approved,
the planning team must inform the JOPG(s) of any changes, especially if they
impact the operational CONOPS. The operational CONOPS is staffed to
SACEUR for approval103 or, if needed, returned to the designated op level
COM(s) for amendment prior to staffing to SACEUR.

f. Review Strategic Planning Requirements. The focus of the planning

team during strategic OPLAN development should be on integrating and
synchronising military actions, including those of the supported commands
and other supporting NATO commands and agencies, with non-military
actions by NATO and non-NATO actors within a comprehensive approach.
The aim must be twofold:

(1) First, to ensure that required strategic resources, capabilities

and supporting activities are coordinated and arranged to facilitate
operational success during execution by the designated HQ(s) within
the JOA.

(2) Second, to ensure that these activities are synchronised with

supporting and / or supported activities by other relevant actors within
the framework of a comprehensive approach.

Responsibilities must be clearly established for operations in the TOO that are
external to the JOA, including rear areas, the communications zone and
strategic LoCs, as required. Therefore, the planning team, in close
coordination with the TCCs, should focus on strategic and theatre-level
planning requirements associated with, but not limited to, the following:

(1) Coordination of military activities in theatre with supporting /

supported activities by non-NATO actors within the framework of a
comprehensive approach.

(2) Employment of strategic resources – intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance (ISR), deterrence, StratCom, targeting, logistics,
theatre and strategic reserves etc.

(3) Command and Control – delegation and TOA, areas of

responsibility, coordination with relevant non-NATO actors, ROE,
OPSA at the strategic level, etc.

103
Depending on the necessary pace of the planning for a particular crisis, the draft operational CONOPS may remain a ‘draft’
to allow the op level HQ(s) to concentrate on the development of the operational OPLAN; if this is the case any points that
result from the planning team review of the draft operational CONOPS or due to the changes in the strategic CONOPS,
necessary to gain NAC approval, must be passed to the HQ(s) so they can be factored into operational OPLAN development.

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(4) Force preparation and sustainment – training, evaluation and

certification, theatre logistic support, capability development, force
rotation, etc.

(5) Strategic deployment – movements architecture, coordination

and de-confliction of transportation resources, operation of strategic
LoC and ports of debarkation, etc.

(6) Force Protection - strategic LoCs, staging areas, theatre entry

points and the communications zone, etc.

g. Review the Status of Planning. OPLAN development at the strategic

level depends on critical planning actions by NATO HQ and participating
nations, as well as input from the designated commands, the TCCs and
relevant non-NATO actors. It requires that close coordination and liaison be
maintained with these different HQs and nations, especially during the FGen
process in order for the planning team to remain abreast of developments and
raise issues requiring further attention. Critical areas that directly impact on
OPLAN development, particularly during crisis response planning, include:

(1) Legal Arrangements. Legal requirements for the operation

should have been identified with the strategic MROs and further
specified in the strategic CONOPS. The Legal SME must be proactive
in working with the NATO LEGAD to ensure that these previously
identified essential legal arrangements are being put in place, while
ensuring that the CAT is updated on their status.

(2) StratCom. Any changes in the StratCom direction and

guidance104 from NATO HQ must be immediately noted and
incorporated in the strategic OPLAN. Any considerations resulting
from the op level HQ(s) review of the StratCom concept equally must
be immediately noted, evaluated, and incorporated into the strategic
OPLAN as appropriate. Additionally, NATO PDD agreement with
StratCom guidance in the main body of the strategic CONOPS and the
StratCom annex is critical to moving forward with pre-deployment
tasks.

(3) Targeting. The planning team should update the status of NAC
targeting guidance (and caveats) and approval of the target sets and
illustrative target categories identified by SACEUR in the strategic
CONOPS to allow detailed planning to proceed in line with political
guidance.

104
The StratCom objectives and guidance are provided through a NATO StratCom framework, developed in collaboration with
SHAPE StratCom.

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(4) Barrier Planning. Planning requirements and HN limitations

should have been identified. HN agreement on planned barrier(s) are a
pre-requisite for the release of barrier related CRMs.

(5) ROE. An illustrative ROEREQ should have accompanied the

strategic CONOPS to support the HQ(s) requirements for the potential
use of force in the accomplishment of the mission. The planning team
should review the status of any NAC guidance on the illustrative
ROEREQ and discuss the implications with the JOPG(s).

(6) Planning by Op Level HQ(s), SSC, TCC and Supporting

Commands / Agencies. The planning team should be updated on the
status of planning by the designated HQ(s) commands, SSCs, TCCs
and supporting commands and agencies with particular attention to:

(a) The status of operational CONOPS / OPLANS

development.

(b) Coordination of supporting / supported requirements.

(c) Issues and concerns.

(d) Requirements for additional assistance, expertise and / or

liaison for their planning.

(e) Coordination with designated relevant non-NATO actors.

h. Planning with Relevant non-NATO Actors. OPLAN development will

likely require detailed coordination with relevant non-NATO actors, as
authorised by the NAC. It is important to review planning requirements, the
current status of planning and the arrangements that will be made to facilitate
coordination, including the delineation of responsibilities between SHAPE and
the designated HQ(s).

i. Review the Status of Force Generation. FGen activities will be

ongoing in parallel with other planning activities. As required the CAT will
support FGR during the FGen process. The FGR SME should regularly
update the CAT on progress in filling the provisional CJSOR and identify force
balancing issues and associated risks so that they may be factored into
planning. As they become available, FGen products should be shared within
the planning team and other planning groups to track the status of national
commitments and the resolution or mitigation of force shortfalls.

j. Coordinate NATO CRMs. The planning team should continuously

review requirements for CRM to enhance NATO’s preparation and readiness.

(1) Review Requirements for CRM. The following CRM subject

areas in particular should be reviewed:

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A Manpower.

B Intelligence.

D Force Protection.

E General Operations.

I PsyOps.

J Electronic Warfare.

K Meteorology / Oceanography.

L CBRN Defence.

M Logistics.

O Forces Readiness.

P Communications and Information Systems.

Q Critical Infrastructure and Services.

S Public Affairs.

It is especially important that the planning team remain appraised of

developments in the FGen process; they should discuss with FGR staff
how CRMs could assist in ensuring that capabilities are ready and
available to meet potential operational requirements.

(2) Process CRM Requests and Track Implementation. Based

on their appreciation of requirements identified during planning, as well
as any requests from the designated commands, functional area SMEs
should develop requests within their areas of responsibility for further
CRM declaration, with the necessary operational justification. As
required, SACEUR issues a Declaration Message and Nations respond
with an NCRS Implementation Report reflecting national
implementation decisions. If declaration authority for these addition
CRMs has not yet been devolved, SACEUR will seek NAC approval.
The automated NCRS Tracking Application (NCRSTA) is used by the
CCOMC and the CAT to assist with tracking the status of
implementation by Nations.

k. Consider Transition to CCOMC for Execution. The planning for the

future transition from the Plans element of the CAT to the Ops element within
the CCOMC for execution should be considered early in OPLAN
development. The planning team should be reinforced by additional CCOMC
staff, who will assume staff responsibility during execution. Arrangements

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should be made to ensure continuity between planning and execution across

all functional areas. This must balance the requirements for those who
developed the plan to oversee its execution with the need to continue
planning during the conduct of operations.

3.48. Develop International Legal Arrangements. The further development of the

plan and its eventual execution require that international legal provisions are in
place.

a. Confirm Legal Requirements for the Operation. These must be

reviewed by the planning team and typically include the following:

(1) The international mandate.

(2) Status of Forces with HNs in the theatre.

(3) Legal agreements on transit, basing and support of forces and

the use of infrastructure and facilities.

(4) Additional legal agreements / arrangements for mission support

with international bodies (e.g. ICC, Hybrid Court etc.), host and third
nations (e.g. prosecution of criminal, handover of suspects, handling
and prosecution of suspected pirates, etc.).

b. Establish or Review Status of Forces Agreement(s). SOFAs are

required with individual countries to establish the legal status of forces as they
enter and operate within the theatre. Where there is no recognised legal
government, a UN mandate105 must establish the legal status. On behalf of
NATO, SOFAs are negotiated by the NATO HQ LEGAD based on operational
requirements developed by the SHAPE LEGAD in coordination with the
designated commands. They should be in place prior to entry into the theatre
of NATO-led forces. In lieu of a SOFA concluded in a treaty-like form, an
‘exchange of letters’ with respective political authorities must as a minimum
provide for the following:

(1) Transport of arms and ammunition.

(2) Carrying of individual weapons.

(3) Use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum.

(4) Control of airspace.

(5) Use of lethal and non-lethal force.

(6) Legal responsibility of the TCNs.

105
A UN mandate may be considered to have come from a specific UN resolution, or a decision taken or approved by the UN.

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(7) Status and / or authority of medical personnel and assets.

(8) Status and authority of military police / stability policing

personnel and assets.

c. Conclude HNS Agreement(s). Following the establishment of the

SOFA, a HNS agreement must be negotiated by SHAPE with the respective
HN(s) on behalf of the op level HQ(s) and TCNs. It represents the formal
establishment of overarching principles for the provision of HNS between
SHAPE, the TCN(s) and the HN and establishes the basis on which the HNS
planning process can be built. It should support the operational needs of the
HQ(s) and therefore requires CAT input. The process is led by SHAPE in
coordination with LEGAD, J8 and the Provost Marshal (PM). According to
NATO HNS doctrine, and pending HN approval, this agreement is normally
concluded as a MOU.

d. Develop follow-on HNS Arrangements. These follow-on HNS

arrangements, according to NATO HNS doctrine and pending HN approval,
could take the following form:

(1) Technical Arrangement (TA). TAs will be developed at the HQ

level to amplify the concept and procedures for the provision of HNS
common to all participants.

(2) Joint Implementation Arrangement (JIA). JIAs will be

developed at the component level and they will include financial
obligations, serving as the fundamental ‘contracts’ between the HN and
TCNs for provision of specific HNS.

3.49. Synchronise Military and non-Military Activities within a Comprehensive

Approach. The synchronisation, and by default, de-confliction between NATO and
non-NATO actors with require the CAT and functional SMEs to remain fully engaged
with any external actors or agencies throughout the OPLAN development. Non-
military planning is unlikely to be performed at the same tempo and will be driven by
other considerations not immediately apparent to the planning team.

a. Coordinate Supported / Supporting Inter-relationships (SSI) with

other NATO and Relevant International Actors. The planning team must
establish in principle the complementary supported and supporting inter-
relationships and agree the nature of the support to be provided as well as
any mechanisms for coordination. It may be necessary to develop
memoranda of understanding or letters of agreement to establish a more
formal basis for cooperation in the theatre.

b. Confirm Interaction with other NATO and Relevant non-NATO

Actors. Depending on the degree of coordination authorised and achieved
with other NATO and relevant international actors, it is critical that the
planning team confirms more precisely the specific areas for interaction and

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activities that, based on a common agreement of the purpose, require

synchronisation.

3.50. Plan for the Employment of Strategic Resources. Recognising that the
designated HQ(s) and supporting commands are responsible for the employment of
forces within the JOA(s), strategic level planning should focus on integrating and
synchronising the employment of strategic resources external to the JOA(s) and in
support of the HQ(s) to facilitate operational success. The TCCs play a significant
role in the C2 of strategic assets and / or in the coordination and integration of
nationally delivered effects to NATO operations, as well as provision of domain
advice for the allocation of forces in their domain. The planning team needs to
maintain close relation to those of the TCCs.

a. Review Planning Requirements for Employment of Strategic

Resources. Planning must be closely coordinated with the supported HQ(s),
under integration of the TCCs, as well as contributing Nations, supporting
commands and non-NATO entities as required. Planning should address, but
should not be limited to, the following:

(1) Strategic and theatre level ISR.

(2) Strategic containment, deterrence, coercion or attack.

(3) Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), including Ballistic

Missile Defence (BMD).

(4) StratCom effects from the employment of strategic resources.

(5) Targeting.

(6) Cyber Defence (CD).

(7) Protection of NATO Critical Infrastructure.

(8) Integration of non-military instruments.

(9) Theatre and strategic reserves.

(10) Special Operations Forces (SOF).

b. Plan Strategic and Theatre Level ISR. In any operation, especially

an expeditionary operation, there will be a requirement to improve situational
awareness within the theatre. This leads to requirements for the advance
deployment of ISR capabilities such as SOF or sensors, such as NATO
Airborne Early Warning and Control System (NAEW&CS), NATO Ground
Surveillance System (NAGS) or SOF, to the theatre, as well as requesting the
deployment or positioning of national capabilities required for the development
of theatre intelligence. The planning team should review and update
SACEUR’s CIRs and refine PIRs with the supported HQ(s) to plan and, if

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need be, request activation and pre-deployment of ISR assets. Planning must
provide for C2, support and protection of ISR once deployed.

c. Plan Strategic Enabling, Containment, Deterrence, Coercion,

Deception or Attack. The planning team is responsible for planning the
integration and synchronisation of NATO military activities with non-military
actions by NATO and cooperating relevant international actors to implement
SACEUR’s strategic concept. These activities in principle will be external and
complementary to operations by the supported commands within the JOA and
therefore require close coordination with the op level planners, particularly
with regards to C2 and support within the theatre. They are typically
developed to isolate the JOA(s) from adverse influences and to establish
favourable conditions for the theatre among nations adjacent to the JOA(s) as
well as others engaged in the theatre.

d. Strategic integration and synchronisation of military and non-military

actions may be required to:

(1) Enable – provide assistance and support to:

(a) Nations adjacent to the JOA(s) to provide operational

support to NATO operations and to prevent attacks by illegally
armed groups and the flow of arms from their territory.

(b) IOs and Nations external to the theatre for post-conflict

security sector reforms, stabilisation and reconstruction.

(2) Contain – prevent threats or acts of aggression or armed

violence in adjacent areas from spreading within the theatre and into
the TOO and JOA(s).

(3) Deter – to convince potential opposing forces that the

consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the
potential gains.

(4) Coerce – threaten or actually employ force to enforce sanctions

required to compel adversaries to comply with the international
mandate as a condition for subsequent operations in the JOA(s).

(5) Deception106 - mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion,

or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner
prejudicial to his interests.

(6) Destroy / Neutralise – employ lethal and non-lethal force to

eliminate the military capacity of an adversary to carry out the
international mandate.

106
Deception definition: Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence
to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. NATO Term.

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e. Develop Strategic Targeting. The planning team, supported by the

StratCom and Joint Effects SMEs, develops strategic targeting107 requirements
and identifies priority targets as an integral part of planning strategic activities.
Targets are selected from available databases108 based on an understanding
of key elements and nodes in specific systems that must be influenced to
further influence or exploit critical vulnerabilities in the CoG of an adversary or
protect vulnerabilities in own CoG. It requires the staff to identify high-value109
targets (HVT) and select those that offer the greatest payoff in terms of
creating the required strategic effects. Coordination with Nations is required
to develop a single integrated database for the theatre that supports the
development and maintenance of the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) and
the Joint Prioritised Defended Asset List (JPDAL) by the supported HQ(s) and
prioritised strategic targets by SHAPE.

f. Plan Strategic / Theatre Reserves. The strategic concept should

have identified the requirement for strategic or theatre reserves that typically
remain on call out of the theatre. Further planning will be necessary with the
supported HQ(s) to determine more precisely the level of readiness required
for deployment based on possible contingencies. These requirements and
arrangements for activation as well as in theatre reconnaissance and
rehearsals should be addressed with TCNs.

g. Integrate Military and Non-Military Instruments. The planning team

must confirm the actions of other cooperating entities that should be
integrated and synchronised with NATO military actions within the theatre.
On this basis the planning team, supported by the TCCs, should establish
suitable mechanisms on behalf of the supported HQ(s) for coordination and
the exchange of information in theatre.

3.51. Plan StratCom. StratCom considerations are an essential element of

planning based on the agreed mission specific StratCom objectives and guidance
from NATO HQ. Therefore, it is critically important that the planning team be
proactive in ensuring their proposals are in line with the strategic concept and
coordinated with the supported HQ(s).

a. Review Requirements for StratCom. Planning for StratCom,

supported by the StratCom staff, should include the following:

107
Strategic targeting processes must include proper consideration of targeting consequences to NATO environmental
protection, cultural property protection and protection of civilians’ responsibilities. Failure to do so risks adverse legal, financial
and StratCom consequences and might result in diverting scarce operational resources from intended tasks to meet
environmental, cultural property and protection of civilian’s response requirements. Targeting planners and decision-makers
must be cognisant that environmental consequences of a targeting action may only manifest as a second- or third-order effects.
108
Available information sources and databases that provide the level of detail required to support targeting, including national
databases such as the U.S. Modernised Integrated Database (MIDB), may be combined to produce a single Integrated
Database (IDB) for the theatre.
109
As described in AD 80-70, a HVT, ‘can be considered as a target the adversary commander requires for the successful
completion of the mission. The loss of HVTs would be expected to seriously degrade important adversary functions throughout
the commander’s area of interest’; a High-Payoff Target (HPT), ‘is a target of significance and value to an adversary, the
destruction, damage or neutralisation of which may lead to a disproportionate advantage to friendly forces.’ HPTs are derived
from the list of HVTs.

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(1) Review the NATO desired end state, strategic objectives,

military strategic objectives and effects and the strategic narrative.

(2) Consider requirements for Information Environment Activities

(IEA) to support communication and information activity planning.

(3) Consider and provide input regarding the impact of military

activities and actions on the information environment.

(4) Develop supporting narratives, themes and messages for

different audiences.

(5) Match StratCom objectives to audiences and desired outcomes.

(6) Establish responsibilities and arrangements for coordination of

MilPA and PsyOps activities.

(7) Develop criteria for the assessment of information effects.

(8) Coordinate communication and information activities with non-

military and non-NATO entities.

(9) Ensure limitations are taken into account.

(10) Appreciate StratCom risks and develop mitigation actions.

(11) Identify and establish required mechanisms to address

emerging issues of strategic and / or political importance,

b. Review NATO Strategic Objectives, including Military Strategic

Objectives, and desired effects. NATO strategic objectives, including
MSOs, and desired effects are developed to ensure that NATO achieves its
end state. NATO’s actions must be clearly understood to gain support from
governments, populations and other groups in the theatre as well as to
influence the actions of adversaries. The planning team, with the support of
StratCom SMEs, must continually analyse the objectives and desired effects
in light of current strategic conditions to ensure that military activities,
including those of the communication capabilities, are coherent, aligned and
contribute to desired effects for each phase of the operation.

c. Consider requirements for IEA to support communication and

information activity planning. StratCom staff will develop IEA requirements
to support the planning and execution of communications and information
activities. Levels of granularity needed will differ dependent on the audience
and use for which the IEA products will be used.

d. Develop supporting narratives, themes and messages for different

audiences. Based on the direction and guidance provided in the StratCom
Framework, and their understanding of the different perspectives, heuristics

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and biases of the different audiences, StratCom will develop a supporting

narrative, themes and messages for each key stakeholder. These will be
regularly revisited to refine as necessary depending on the progress and
strategic conditions. Reviews should take account of levels of audience
receptiveness, susceptibility, and vulnerability to different historical, social,
cultural, and religious references. This may include the necessity to establish
agreed terminology to be used by all actors when communicating to and
about adversaries and audiences.

e. Match StratCom objectives to audiences and desired outcomes.

The Alliance (and its partners if applicable) must act in close concert to
communicate agreed themes and messages using an appropriate mix of
activities, words and images. Where possible, other international actors,
opinion formers and elites should be integrated into this approach through a
coordinated engagement strategy at all levels within the wider local, regional
and international public to promote support for NATO actions.

f. Develop criteria for the assessment of Information Effects. To

evaluate the effect of all NATO activities on the Information Environment,
StratCom will develop of IEA assessment criteria; including measure of
performance (MoP) and measures of effectiveness (MoE) as part of a wider
larger cadre of operational assessment activity.

g. Establish responsibilities and arrangements for coordination of

MilPA and PsyOps activities. StratCom staffs will define responsibilities and
coordination mechanisms for the planning and conduct of communication and
information activities within the theatre.

h. Coordinate communication and information activities with non-

military and non-NATO entities. To promote StratCom coherence among
the non-military and relevant cooperating non-NATO actors, StratCom, in
coordination with NATO PDD, should establish a forum to coordinate and
harmonise the communication and information activities in the theatre and
within the wider international community. In particular, arrangements and
mechanisms must be agreed that will allow regular coordination of
communication and information activities during the subsequent phases of the
operation and in response to urgent information requirements as a result of
events on the ground.

i. Further Develop Narratives, Themes and Master Messages for

Different Audiences. Based on their understanding of the different
perspectives and biases of the different audiences, StratCom should develop
an over-arching, resonating narrative, upon which themes and master
messages can be based. StratCom must then refine the themes and master
messages depending on the strategic conditions, taking into account
audience receptiveness, susceptibility and vulnerability to different historical,
social, cultural, and religious references. This may include the necessity to

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establish agreed terminology to be used by all actors in the information

environment when referring to adversaries and local populations.

j. Appreciate Limitations. StratCom staffs must understand the

restraints and constraints imposed by political-level guidance and conditions
in the TOO / JOA(s). This understanding must then be used to inform and
guide planning and execution of all military activities.

k. Appreciate Risks to StratCom and Develop Mitigation Actions.

Risks to StratCom can take many forms, including but not limited to message
incoherence, information fratricide and rising expectations. These risks must
be evaluated and mitigation actions planned against them.

l. Identify and establish required mechanisms to address emerging

issues of strategic and / or political importance. There is a need to
identify and establish required mechanisms to address issues of strategic and
/ or political importance, including, but not limited to, CIVCAS and counter-
propaganda. Mechanisms are required to address issues of political and / or
strategic sensitivity to prevent an erosion or loss of NATO’s credibility and
prevent the development of a gap between what NATO says and does and
the perception of NATO at all levels. These mechanisms can take many
forms, but two important issues are CIVCAS and propaganda. Responsive,
thorough mechanisms for identifying, investigating and releasing information
on all credible CIVCAS claims caused by NATO forces must be implemented
and coordinated at all levels. Equally, implementation of a proactive counter
propaganda mechanism coordinated at all levels is a must. Failure to do
either of these mechanisms will result in a rapid loss of NATO’s credibility in
the theatre and perhaps even within the wider international community.

3.52. Plan for Command and Control. NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS
will confirm command responsibilities, the main components of the command
structure, and the definition of the TOO and the JOA(s). FGen will have identified
the HQs and C2 assets provided by Nations to meet C2 requirements. Further
planning within the CAT, the supported HQ(s) and other supporting commands will
typically identify additional requirements and refinements in C2 arrangements for the
operation. The planning team will have to ensure that the C2 is adequate for the
multinational nature of the forces from all contributing nations and articulates
arrangements for coordination with non-NATO entities.

a. Refine Responsibilities for Theatre Level Activities and Functions.

OPLAN development requires further coordination between strategic and
operational levels and the TCCs to establish planning responsibility for theatre
activities and functions external to the JOA(s). On this basis, the planning
team should coordinate and further develop the command responsibilities and
arrangements, including liaison and coordination requirements, with the
supported HQ(s).

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b. Establish Arrangements for Coordination with Cooperating non-

NATO Entities. Coordination with cooperating non-NATO entities should
include arrangements and mechanisms to be established for coordination and
the exchange of information to synchronise actions in theatre. Typically the
key issues to be developed within the planning team will be related to the
following:

(1) Physical arrangements and facilities in theatre required to host a

coordination centre, including the possibilities to collocate with a
leading, relevant, non-NATO entity.

(2) Developing the required information sharing agreements for the

release and sharing of mission specific information, knowledge and / or
intelligence with non-NATO entities in accordance with NATO
information security policy.

c. ROE. The CAT (led by operations SMEs, assisted by the LEGAD) will
refine the ROEREQ, in collaboration with JOPG SMEs and coordination with
NATO HQ staff as required (e.g. NATO HQ LEGAD). Any issues that cannot
be resolved at the functional SME level are to be raised to the CAT
leadership, CG or SACEUR as appropriate, including major differences
between what the supported HQ(s) is requesting and what the CAT
recommends.

d. Plan for CIS and Cyber Defence (CCD). The strategic CONOPS
included a CIS concept based on known C2 requirements and CIS
constraints. CIS planning, led by the CCD SME and reporting by subordinate
commands and the TCCs, and in close coordination with NCIA, will refine and
implement the CIS concept based on: the actual CIS capabilities available,
including bandwidth and CIS and CD capabilities in the force package and the
further definition of C2 requirements across different functional areas.

3.53. Plan for Strategic Operations Assessment. The strategic OPLAN

development should also include planning for the conduct of strategic level OPSA
and contributions to PMRs. Initial planning for OPSA is coordinated within the CAT;
the CCOMC is leading the cross functional operations assessment during execution.
OPSA at the strategic level will require the integration of one or more operational
level assessments and assessments of non-military actors. The assessment of non-
military actors will bring a different perspective as they will be working towards
different objectives. OPSA of the engagement space will involve the monitoring and
evaluation of actions taken across the whole engagement space and all associated
effects.

3.54. Plan Force Preparation and Sustainment110. The purpose of planning for
force preparation and sustainment is to ensure the forces required to mount and
conduct operations are fully capable of meeting mission requirements. It includes
110
Under NCS-A a Joint Support Enabling Command (JSEC) was created, which on activation will be closely integrated with
force preparation, sustainment and integration.

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resource management and capability development, mission training and certification

of HQs, personnel and forces, logistic support to the force in theatre and the Rotation
of HQs, personnel, forces and reinforcements111.

a. Resource Management and Capability Development. The

preparation and sustainment of a NATO-led operation requires the provision
and management of NATO resources as well as the development of
capabilities to meet theatre requirements.

(1) FGen focuses on identifying National contributions to fill

requirements for forces, HQs, personnel and certain theatre
capabilities.

(2) The acquisition of new common funded capabilities, identified in

the Resource Assessment, is managed by the SHAPE Resource
Management (REM) Branch in close coordination with the CAT and J8.
Resource planning priority should be given to enabling and initial entry
operations, establishment of the theatre C2 network and operating
ports and facilities. Requirements are coordinated throughout the
operation through the Crisis Management Requirements Board
(CMRB) while project development and programming is managed
through the implementing HNs.

(3) Budget requests are developed and coordinated by J8 as part of

the planning process. Particular attention should be given to theatre
level HQs and critical theatre level enabling capabilities112, sustainment
of CEs and contracting of local services such as interpreters and
security. Details are articulated in Annex FF - Financial Support.

b. Plan for Mission Training and Certification of HQs, Personnel and

Forces. The planning, supported by the J7 SME, should ensure that mission
training, validation and / or certification requirements for HQs, personnel and
forces deploying to the theatre have been developed by subordinate
commands. The planning team should ensure that essential information
related to pre-deployment training and certification is included in Annex BB -
Training and Mission Rehearsals. In addition, the CAT should coordinate the
following on behalf of the supported HQ(s) and other supporting commands:

(1) Mission Rehearsal Training and Exercises. Completed in

conjunction with ACT and its training centres to plan and conduct
mission-specific collective training and exercises for deploying HQs
and forces as required.

(2) Evaluation and Certification (EVAL). Responsibility for the

evaluation and certification of HQs and forces sits with the J7 EVAL
Branch and Nations according to existing readiness evaluation
111
See paragraph 21 SMAP 15 – NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy (change 19 to MC 0216/4 - AAP–16).
112
As per PO(2013)0056, dated 06 Feb 13.

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programmes for NATO forces, as well as with PD and partner nations

in accordance with the Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation
and Feedback (OCC E&F) Programme.

(3) Pre-deployment Training. Completed in conjunction with ACT

and the various schools and centres under its control as well as
Nations to ensure that augmentation and rotating personnel receive
mission-specific individual training.

(4) Support for In-Theatre Training. Completed in conjunction with

ACT and Nations, including the HN(s) as required, to establish the
capabilities to conduct training in-theatre.

c. Plan Logistical Support to the Force in Theatre. The concept for

logistics, included in the strategic CONOPS, described how joint MN logistic
support to the force would be accomplished in theatre. During strategic
OPLAN development, support staff coordinates detailed planning required
with TCN and HNs on behalf of the supported HQ(s) and other supporting
commands to ensure that supplies and services will be delivered to the force
to meet operational requirements for each phase. The following areas must
be closely coordinated with other planning activity to mitigate any potential
operational impact:

(1) Logistical Standards. Logistical standards must reflect the

expected operational tempo and demands for each phase based on
estimates from the supported HQ(s) and supporting commands.

(2) HNS. The level and scope of HN support must be confirmed

based on close contacts with the HN(s) including access to specific
facilities, infrastructure and logistic operating units, especially ground
transportation. Provisions must be made for TCN to coordinate with
HN(s) within guidelines established by SACEUR113.

(3) National Responsibilities. National responsibilities for specific

logistic functions under framework, lead or role specialisation nation
arrangements must be confirmed in particular for critical logistic
activities such as petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) distribution.

(4) Theatre Infrastructure. Critical theatre infrastructure

requirements such as the improvement of the APOD / SPOD / RPODs,
LoCs, and facilities must be identified and prioritised against
operational requirements.

(5) Multinational Solutions. The roles and responsibilities of units

supporting the mission with MN solutions have to be specified and
delineated.

113
Refer to AJP-4.5 (B) Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine & Procedures.

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(6) Contractor Support to Operations (CSO). Support

requirements that can be effectively met by either collective, MN or
national contracting with a commercial provider, and can mitigate risk,
must be determined.

d. Plan for the Rotation of HQs, Personnel and Forces. The planning
team should anticipate the requirement to sustain the operation through to its
termination or transition to a follow on force and develop initial plans 114 for the
following:

(1) Rotation of HQs and forces through FGen considering the likely
tempo of operations and the possibility to adjust force levels over time
as well as national rotation requirements.

(2) Rotation of personnel reinforcement in deployed HQs based

either on an approved reinforced PE or CE in accordance with NATO
personnel management policy115. The reinforcement process will be
maintained electronically and include the structure, job descriptions
and sources identified for each PE or CE post.

3.55. Plan for Force Deployment. The strategic deployment of forces into a TOO
and their onward movement into and within the JOA(s) constitutes a strategic
manoeuvre and must be planned as an operation requiring the expertise of
operations, movements and logistic planners.

a. Review the Requirements for Planning the Deployment of Forces.

Planning should cover the entire sequence of activities required for mounting,
embarkation, debarkation, reception, staging and onward movement to the
final destination in the JOA(s). It requires close coordination with:

(1) AMCC.

(2) Designated commands.

(3) TCNs.

(4) HNs116.

(5) Port operating authorities / organisations.

(6) Gaining commands (e.g. Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG)

HQ).

Legal arrangements must be in place or assumed regarding the status of

forces, transit authorisations and over-flight clearances. Details of the

114
Long-term responsibility for planning rotation of forces will fall to FGR.
115
See AAP 16 D.
116
If a NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) is present in the HN then they will need to be fully integrated into the coordination
matrix.

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deployment of forces are articulated in Annex S – Movements to the strategic

OPLAN.

b. Design and Develop the Theatre Movements Architecture. The

design, development, implementation and control of the strategic movements
architecture from ports of embarkation (POEs) to the ports of debarkation
(PODs) in the theatre is a SHAPE responsibility, coordinated closely with the
supported HQ(s) and supported by the TCCs. Responsibilities for onward
movement into the JOA(s) must be delineated. The planning team must
confirm as early as possible the strategic LoC and confirm with the HN(s) the
availability and capabilities of the following:

(1) APOD / SPODs and other key transportation nodes such as

railheads.

(2) Staging Areas (SA) and reception facilities.

(3) LoCs into the JOA(s).

c. Finalise the Force Flow. Based on detailed planning for the

employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force based on the AFL
force package, the planning team must confirm the final force flow with the
supported HQ(s) and supporting commands and release the ADL. Specific
deployment requirements must be established for each force in the AFL
according to the final force flow including the following:

(1) Strategic LoCs and entry points into the theatre.

(2) Final destination in the JOA(s).

(3) COM’s required date for the full operational capability of the
force for employment at final destination in the JOA(s).

(4) Priority for sequence of movement.117

(5) Command authority to be transferred.

d. Establish Command Authority and Responsibilities for

Deployment Operations. The planning team must confirm specific
requirements and responsibilities for the conduct of specific aspects of
deployment operations, including Reception Staging and Onward Movement
(RSOM) with the supported and supporting commands as well as with the
HN(s) for the following critical activities:

(1) Mounting operations to prepare assigned HQs and forces for

deployment.

117
Priority is set to allow de-confliction at PODs.

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(2) Security of entry points, staging / reception areas, and LoCs

within the theatre.

(3) Operation of port facilities and reception areas.

(4) Operation of SAs.

(5) Control of onward movements into the JOA(s).

e. Coordinate Detailed Deployment Plans (DDP) with Nations. The

ADL is released by SACEUR and establishes the required flow of forces into
the theatre on behalf of the supported HQ(s). It provides the authority for the
AMCC, supported by the TCCs, to coordinate with Nations on behalf of
SACEUR for the strategic deployment of HQs and forces to their required
destination, including the coordination of strategic LoCs, modes of
transportation and strategic lift. On this basis, each TCN develops DDPs for
its forces for coordination and de-confliction by the AMCC, who will create a
multinational DDP (MN DDP) that will best achieve the required flow of forces
into the theatre once an ACTORD is issued. Deployment planning is
coordinated with Nations at the strategic level but requires close involvement
of the supported HQ(s) and other supporting commands in a series of
movement planning conferences, as follows:

(1) Initial Movement Planning Conference (IMovPC). The

IMovPC is hosted by the AMCC as soon as possible after ACTWARN
and will provide the first step on the deployment planning cycle. The
JOPG(s) representative will attend to ensure that the movement plan
reflects the operational COM’s intent. IMovPC should review and
confirm the following:

(a) Overall concept of operations.

(b) HN resources to include APODs, SPODs and railheads.

(c) Requirement for sharing logistic and infrastructure

resources with relevant non-NATO actors operating in the
JOA(s).

(d) Required force flow based on the ADL.

(e) Movement control organisation network and point of

contact register.

(2) Main Movement Planning Conference (MMovPC). The

purpose of the MMovPC is to coordinate the details of the actual
deployment of forces based on national deployment planning. The
main activities of the MMovPC are:

(a) Review the DDPs.

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(b) Start the initial de-confliction process, including de-

confliction with cooperating relevant non-NATO actors operating
in the JOA(s), as required.

(c) Start the strategic air and sea appreciation and identify
national shortfalls.

(d) Confirm HN support agreements as well as resources

and throughput capabilities.

(3) Final Movement Planning Conference (FMovPC). The aim of

the FMovPC is to provide a fully co-ordinated and de-conflicted
MNDDP agreed by all HQs, TCNs and the HN(s). The MNDDP will
form the basis of all further movement planning in support of the plan.

3.56. Plan Force Protection. Force protection118 planning at the strategic level
should focus on requirements and measures to be taken to protect the NATO forces
from identified risks and threats to strategic LoC and the TOO, especially with
respect to the possible use of WMD, CBRN incidents, including theatre ballistic
missiles (TBM), from within or beyond the theatre.

a. Review Strategic Requirements for Force Protection Planning.

Close coordination is required with the supported HQ(s) and supporting
commands as well as TCNs and HN(s). Details are articulated in Annex J -
Force Protection. Particular attention should be given to protection of forces
in transit, choke points, air and sea ports as well as reception and staging
areas where concentration of personnel and equipment may be vulnerable to
attack. Force protection planning should consider the following four areas:

(1) Protective Security.

(2) Active Defence.

(3) Passive Defence.

(4) Recuperation.

b. Protective Security. The planning team should establish

requirements for protective security of strategic activities, facilities and
deployment operations. Coordination is required with the supported HQ(s)
and supporting JLSG HQs, supporting commands, as well as TCNs and
HN(s), for the specific protective measures to be taken to address the specific
risks and threats, especially from WMD, CBRN incidents and Cyber.

118
Force protection is defined as, ‘(all) measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and
operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force’.
(AAP-06). It consists of the following diverse notional capabilities: Security, Military Engineering Support to Force Protection,
Air Defence, Force Health Protection, Consequence Management and CBRN Defence.

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c. Active Defence. Based on the appreciation of the threat of attack from

beyond the JOA(s) and or the theatre, the planning team should provide
guidance regarding defensive measures to deter, prevent, neutralise, or
reduce the effectiveness of potential attacks, including defence against
surface, sub-surface, air, rocket and missile attack. The planning team should
coordinate any requirements to establish supporting command relations for
the provision of active defence measures including:

(1) Counter-air operations.

(2) Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).

(3) Port and harbour defences.

(4) Defence of strategic LoCs.

(5) Defence of staging, lodgement and rear areas as well as other

vital areas.

(6) CBRN defence.

(7) Defence of CNI and other vital services.

(8) Counter Terrorism (CT).

(9) CD.

d. Passive Defence. Force protection planning should also develop

passive defence measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of
conventional and CBRN incidents on forces and facilities during deployment
and entry into the theatre and to limit the potential consequences. Passive
defence guidance should specify measures to limit the exposure of HQs,
personnel, forces and facilities and deal with such attacks to ensure their
survival and ability to continue operations with minimal loss of effectiveness.
Passive defence guidance should also identify NATO requirements, including
NATO Education and Training (E&T) requirements, to prepare HQs,
personnel and forces deploying into a potential CBRN environment to sustain
operations under CBRN conditions.

e. Recuperation. Planning for recuperation is primarily the responsibility

of the supported HQ(s) but may require the coordination of strategic
resources to deal with risks and threats with more serious potential
consequences. Close coordination with the supported HQ(s), supporting
JLSG HQs, and supporting commands, as well as possibly with the HN(s), will
be required to identify contingency recuperation measures that may be
required to assist with the recovery from the effects of a major attack,
especially from CBRN incidents. In particular, the planning team should
confirm organisational responsibilities and command authorities at strategic

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and operational levels to ensure timely and effective recuperation action.

Strategic planning for recuperation should consider requirements to generate
additional capabilities for:

(1) Damage Control (DAMCON).

(2) Rescue operations, including search and rescue / combat

search and rescue (SAR / CSAR).

(3) Mass casualty handling.

(4) Decontamination.

3.57. Review of Draft Operational OPLAN. Normally, the strategic OPLAN will
not be submitted prior to receipt of the draft operational OPLAN. This serves two
purposes: first, a final check that the operational level has correctly interpreted all
elements of strategic direction and guidance; and second, a final check that all
elements needed in the strategic OPLAN, which need NAC approval, have been
identified and included. The planning team review should include a review by
appropriate functional SMEs of all elements of the operational OPLAN, including
annexes (such as the CJSOR), the TCSOR and the ROEREQ. Any issues identified
should be resolved by functional SMEs through discussion with their operational
counterparts or through amendment of their portion of the strategic OPLAN, in
discussion with the planning team leadership. Any major issues needing direction or
resolution prior to staffing the strategic OPLAN should be identified and briefed by
ACOS J5, in collaboration with DCCOMC, to the CG or SACEUR, as appropriate.
The planning team should ensure that the JOPG(s) receives appropriate feedback
on any issues that may need to be addressed in the operational OPLAN prior to
SACEUR approval (following approval of strategic OPLAN by the NAC); this will also
facilitate any final preparations and planning being done by the op level COM(s) in
the interim, especially any finalisation of component level plans.

3.58. Coordinate and Submit Strategic OPLAN. Final coordination of the

strategic OPLAN, and associated TCSOR and ROEREQ, ensures that
responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements and actions are in place for all
essential strategic activities called for in the plan. The planning team will conduct the
following steps:

a. Coordinate Draft Strategic OPLAN. This typically requires a

deliberate review by the planning team with the liaison officers supporting the
CAT, supporting commands and representatives from cooperating relevant
non-NATO actors if feasible119, as well as HN(s) and TCNs as required.

b. Conduct Final Evaluation of Strategic Risk. Based on the outcomes

from coordination of the strategic OPLAN, the planning team should conduct a
final evaluation of strategic risks, including in particular any risks resulting

119
In accordance with agreed security requirements and arrangements.

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from shortfalls in critical capabilities or gaps in coordination with relevant non-

NATO actors that might put the operation at risk. Recommendations are
developed for presentation to SACEUR regarding any risks considered
unacceptable at this point or the possible need for any further contingency
planning to mitigate identified risks.

c. Seek SACEUR’s Approval. ACOS J5, in coordination with DCCOMC,

will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the strategic OPLAN, TCSOR
and ROEREQ for approval by SACEUR. Final internal coordination will
normally be facilitated through a briefing to the CG on the main elements of
the strategic OPLAN and final risk evaluation, with any significant issues and
risks that might jeopardise the mission highlighted. SACEUR may require an
OPLAN review with subordinate commanders and the senior representative
from cooperating relevant non-NATO actors to further ensure strategic
synchronisation.

d. Submit Strategic OPLAN for NAC Approval. Following SACEUR

approval of the strategic OPLAN, including the main body and all required
annexes, the TCSOR and ROEREQ, it is forwarded to the MC (with a copy to
the NMRs at SHAPE) for MC endorsement and NAC approval.

3.59. Promulgate Approved Strategic OPLAN and Seek Operational OPLAN

Approval. Following submission of the strategic OPLAN to the NAC, in advance of
their approval, the planning team should prepare for promulgation of the strategic
OPLAN (e.g. develop promulgation letter, etc.). Once the strategic OPLAN is
approved, the planning team will submit it for promulgation. They must also inform
the JOPG(s) of any changes, especially if they impact the operational OPLAN. The
operational OPLAN is staffed to SACEUR for approval or, if needed, returned to the
op level COM(s) for amendment.

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FORCE GENERATION

3.60. Review Force Requirements, Force Availability and Possible

Contributions. Once the NAC directs SACEUR to develop MROs, it will also issue a
request to Nations to update the status of their available forces within a given time
period (dependent upon the urgency of the situation).

a. Update the Status of Forces Available to NATO 120. Once the NAC
directs SACEUR to develop MROs, it will also issue a request to Nations to
update the status of their available forces within a given time period
(dependent upon the urgency of the situation). The SHAPE FGR staff should
follow-up on the progress of the Nation’s activities to update the status of
forces available to NATO. Force data should be validated and saved in the
NATO common database of forces available to SACEUR and designated
HQ(s). This request for an update should where appropriate include:

(1) A reminder to Nations that updates on the status of land, air,

maritime, logistics, special forces and cyber forces / capabilities
available to NATO be submitted in the form of domain Order of Battle
messages to SACEUR121.

(2) Advise commanders of the NRF on stand-by and the NRF to

prepare to update their NRF readiness reporting122.

(3) Request the SHAPE PD to update Partner Operational

Capabilities.

(4) Request SHAPE support staff to update core logistics database

as required.

b. Review and Refine Force / Capability Requirements. The

development of force/capability requirements is an iterative process that
commences with the development of MROs. Requirements, initially stated as
force capabilities, are refined during subsequent phases of planning by the op
level HQ(s) and designated component / subordinate commands in terms of
specific force types. FGR, in cooperation with the planning team, reviews the
development of these requirements against the current situation and mission
to ensure that they remain within realistic limits for the anticipated duration of
the operation.

3.61. Review NATO CRMs. To ensure that capabilities are ready and available to
meet potential operational requirements, FGR confirms with the planning team the
120
As part of the TOPFAS suite of applications that can be used to help planning staffs throughout the OOP, a Readiness
Reporting Tool (RRT) application has been developed to help provide SACEUR with a constantly updated picture of the
readiness status of forces.
121
MC 053/3, Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, authorises SACEUR to request periodic national
order of battle reports in peacetime and accelerated order of battle reporting by national authorities during periods of crisis or
conflict. Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3 Volume III establishes the operational information requirements, reporting templates
and procedures.
122
Details of the NRF Readiness Reporting Procedures are laid down in AD 080-96.

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CRMs for which devolution of declaration authority has been requested by SACEUR
from the NAC, or that have been declared by SACEUR, noting their state of
implementation. If necessary, FGR discusses with the planning team how additional
CRMs could be declared to ensure national capabilities are prepared and activating
to meet NATO operational requirements.

3.62. Initiate Force Activation. As part of the FGen process the following tasks
will be completed:

a. Contribute to the Preparation of the NAC FAD. The planning team

(assisted by the FGen SME) may provide input during the drafting of the FAD
to ensure that the following requirements are adequately addressed:

(1) Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

(2) Authorisation for SACEUR to negotiate with Partners and other

non-NATO Nations for force contributions.

(3) Authorisation for SACEUR to negotiate HNS arrangements.

(4) Specific guidance on the deployment of forces and TOA123.

b. Finalise the ‘Provisional’ CJSOR. As the MC and then the NAC

digest the strategic CONOPS, the CJSOR is refined by the planning team (led
by the FGen SME). It will be released to Nations as ‘the’ provisional CJSOR
with the Activation Warning124 (ACTWARN) message, following approval of
the strategic CONOPS and release of the NAC FAD, for the generation of the
forces described. To ensure an effective and accurate FGen process, it is
important that the provisional CJSOR contains enough detail of the
requirements for Nations to prepare their force offers.

c. Issue the ACTWARN and the Provisional CJSOR. The FGen SME
drafts the ACTWARN message, with planning team assistance as required, to
provide the essential information required by Nations to determine national
force contributions.125 The ACTWARN should also establish arrangements for
coordinating national contributions including the scheduling of an FGen
conference, if required, and the submission of national force preparation
(FORCEPREP) messages. The provisional CJSOR is approved and formally
released by DSACEUR. The ACTWARN, provisional CJSOR, provisional
manpower SOR (either a request for PE reinforcement or a CE) and
provisional TCSOR are transmitted using the Allied Information Flow System
(AIFS) and the AIFS Integrated Message System (AIMS) to establish the
release authority by SACEUR and confirm receipt by Nations.

123
Transfer of Authority. Within NATO, an action by which operational command or operational control of designated forces
and / or resources, if applicable, is passed between National and NATO commands or between commanders in the NATO
chain of command. AAP-06.
124
In lieu of an ACTWARN, DSACEUR may send nations a formal ‘calling’ letter to initiate force generation.
125
Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3, Volume III, Section 14 (ACTWARN).

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3.63. Coordinate National Offers and Request Forces. FGR staff, in close
coordination with the planning team should review Force Offers from Nations.
Nations should acknowledge receipt of the ACTWARN and, depending on the
circumstances, respond with either informal force offers or a formal FORCEPREP
identifying force commitments to fill specific serials on the provisional CJSOR.
National offers and commitments are consolidated and reviewed against the overall
requirements, as a basis for developing and coordinating proposals with nations to
eliminate redundancies and fill shortfalls.

a. Conduct Formal Coordination with Nations. Formal bilateral

coordination with Nations will be required to clarify and confirm offers and
commitments as well as to discuss proposed adjustments. FGR staff must
determine the requirements and scheduling of conferences for multilateral
coordination of forces, manpower and theatre capabilities required for the
operation.

b. Prepare and Conduct a Force Generation Conference. The

purpose of the FGen conference is to establish national commitments to
provide the forces, capabilities and manpower called for in the provisional
CJSOR, provisional TCSOR and provisional manpower SOR.

(1) The conference is prepared by FGR and chaired by DSACEUR.

It requires participation from potential TCNs, as well as the designated
COMs, SSC, TCCs and the subordinate / CCs. FGR, coordinated with
the CAT, must decide whether it is appropriate to include members,
partners and other non-NATO nations in a single conference or to
conduct separate conferences.

(2) The FGen conference typically begins with a review of the

strategic CONOPS, as approved by the NAC, and then addresses the
force capability requirement described in each serial of the provisional
CJSOR to confirm which Nation(s) will commit to providing the required
force capabilities. The opportunity for negotiation, both in and out of
session, requires that FGR (assisted by the CAT as required) prepare
any issues with DSACEUR in advance. The conference result is a
‘draft’ CJSOR with national commitments for each serial, which sets the
stage for the Initial Logistics and Movements Conferences that are
typically convened immediately following the FGen conference.
Coordination of required manpower and theatre capabilities can be
accomplished during the conference or separately.

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Political Military Strategic Level Operational Level

Level SACEUR COM

Nations’
ORBAT
Mesages
Review force requirements, Illustrative CJSOR
Nations’ force availability & possible (Input)
Readiness contributions
Reports

SACEUR Recommend CRMs

Declare or
Review CRMs
Nations Request CRMs
Implement
CRMs Implement CRMs

NAC approval
strategic SACEUR
CONOPS ACTWARN /
Initiate force activation
Force Calling Letter
Activation Provisional
Directive with CJSOR
MC Guidance Provisional
Theatre
Capability
SOR
Strategic OPLAN
Initial National Provisional Development
Manpower
Offers /
Commitments SOR (Force Generation)
SACEUR Coordinate national offers
ACTREQ and request forces
Message (Force Generation
Conference)
Draft CJSOR
Phase 4b

Draft TCSOR

Draft
Manpower
SOR
Nations’
Force
Preparation
Message
SACEUR
Activate enabling forces for
ACTPRED
pre-deployment

CJSOR, with
Appreciate force Op level Risk
Allied Forces
contributions and balance Assessment
List
the force package
Assess capability gaps
and conduct relevant
strategic risk Coordinate integration of
assessment non-NATO forces

Allied
Disposition Allied Disposition
Integrate forces with
List List (Input)
OPLAN development

NAC Execution
Directive with
MC Guidance
SACEUR Activate forces for
ACTORD deployment
Phase 5

Message
Nations’ Execution
ORBATTOA
Message
Force Generation for
Operation Sustainment

Figure 3.11 Force Generation Main Activities

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c. Issue the Activation Request (ACTREQ) Message. Based on

national commitments established in the draft CJSOR, FGR prepares the
ACTREQ requesting Nations to formally confirm their force contributions to
the force package in the draft CJSOR, and to identify the forces that they
intend to provide by sending a FORCEPREP message initially, followed by
the required order of battle (ORBAT) force data to SACEUR by a specified
date. The ACTREQ should also provide instructions for confirmation of
manpower and theatre capabilities. The planning team should provide input,
as required, for the ACTREQ development, including the following:

(1) Deployment requirements.

(2) Command Relationships (related to TOA).

(3) ROE (in effect for the deployment phase).

(4) Preparations.

(5) PA Guidance.

3.64. Activate Enabling Forces for Pre-Deployment. When there is an urgent

requirement to establish an early NATO presence in the theatre, the NAC may
authorise the pre-deployment of enabling forces126 as soon as they are available and
prior to the NAC approval of the OPLAN and NED.

a. Review Requirements for the pre-Deployment of Enabling Forces.

The requirement for the pre-deployment of Enabling Forces should have been
identified during the development of strategic response options, including
MROs, and addressed in the NID or during the operational estimate by the
designated commands. In any case it should be ensured that these
requirements are reflected in the FAD, addressed in the ACTWARN,
coordinated with Nations during the FGen conference and, finally, included in
the ACTREQ. Requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling forces
typically include:

(1) Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

(2) Forward Command and Liaison Element (FCLE) / Forward

Command Element (FCE).

(3) Special Operations.

(4) Cyberspace including CIS.

(5) Security of LoC, entry points and lodgement areas.

126
Enabling Forces – A force tailored to the requirements sent in advance to prepare for the full deployment of a main force in
theatre. NATO Term.

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(6) SJLSG / JLSG HQ.

(7) RSOM of forces.

(8) MilPA, PsyOps and StratCom LOs.

(9) Civil-Military Cooperation.

(10) Logistics and Commercial support.

b. Request Enabling Forces for pre-Deployment. Based on

commitments coordinated with nations and specific requirements established
in the ACTREQ, contributing nations should respond by identifying in their
FORCEPREP messages those enabling forces they are prepared to deploy
into the theatre in advance of an ACTORD.

c. Direct Activation Pre-deployment. Once the NAC has authorised

SACEUR to deploy enabling forces to the theatre, the planning team prepares
the Activation Pre-deployment (ACTPRED) message for approval and release
by SACEUR. The ACTPRED authorises the pre-deployment of enabling
forces and their TOA to SACEUR, as well as the release of initial NATO
common funding.

3.65. Appreciate Force Contributions and Balance the Force Package. Nations
respond to the ACTREQ with FORCEPREP messages which provide detailed
information regarding the forces they will contribute to the force package, including
the readiness status, planned command relationships and any caveats on
employment. They should also provide updated ORBAT force data. All of this
information must be assessed and analysed in order to appreciate and balance the
Force package as necessary.

a. Prepare and Issue the draft Allied Force List (AFL). The FGen SME
will consolidate the Nations’ force contributions as reported in their
FORCEPREP messages, update the CJSOR and produce the AFL for the
entire force package. It should be reviewed by the planning team to identify
shortfalls and sent to the designated commands for comment. The force
package data will be used during plan development and therefore must
adhere to NATO information standards so that it can be shared among
different HQs and used with automated operations and logistics functional
services.

b. Balance the Force Package. Based on their appreciation of the

impact of any capability shortfalls, FGR staff (supported by the CAT) may
initiate further bilateral coordination or recommend a further force balancing
conference to address shortfalls with nations. The aim of force balancing is:

(1) To balance the force package against the mission requirements

within acceptable risks.

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(2) To balance the operational, support and C2 elements to allow

efficient and effective employment.

Therefore, a deliberate cross-functional review of the entire force package

with the designated HQ(s) and subordinate / CCs may be required to identify
any issues and develop recommendations for DSACEUR’s consideration and
presentation to the TCNs. The resulting force balancing decisions may
require additional ACTREQ and FORCEPREP messages, as well as changes
to the CJSOR and the corresponding AFL.

c. Appreciate Strategic and Operational Risks from Shortfalls in

Critical Capabilities. Supported op level COM(s), should provide an
appreciation of the operational risks resulting from any critical shortfalls
following force balancing. The planning team must also analyse the strategic
risks related to capability shortfalls and the strategic risks associated with
potential lack of progress in the non-military domains. FGR staff, in
collaboration with the planning team, will then provide recommendations to
DSACEUR as to whether these risks are acceptable along with the
possibilities for mitigation. If risks are not acceptable with mitigation, then
those considered unmanageable should be identified with the strategic
OPLAN when submitted, for consideration and acceptance prior to its
approval.

3.66. Coordinate Integration of Non-NATO Forces. The coordination of the

integration Non-NATO Forces will need to be balanced against the requirements,
offers and certificate of forces.

a. Review Requirements for Integrating Forces from Partners and

non-NATO Nations127. The NID should provide an initial indication of the
NAC’s128 desire to allow participation by partners and other non-NATO nations
and may authorise SACEUR to coordinate directly with designated Nations.
The subsequent NAC FAD should clearly state those partners and other non-
NATO nations to be included in the force activation process and the degree of
Information and Intelligence Sharing. These Nations are kept informed
through the EAPC and the SHAPE PD. They are notified of requirements by
the ACTWARN and ACTREQ messages and may be invited to attend FGen
and force balancing conferences.

b. Review and Advise on Initial Force Offers from non-NATO Nations.

The FGen SME informs the planning team and the HQ(s) of initial offers
received from non-NATO nations. The planning team (led by the FGen and
PD SMEs) should consider these offers and develop input for DSACEUR
including in the following areas:

127
Refer to MC 0567.
128
Offers by partners and other non-NATO nations must be certified initially by SACEUR and determined by the NAC to be
politically acceptable as preconditions for a formal invitation by the NATO SECGEN to contribute to the operation.

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(1) MC initial certification of forces and inclusion of nations in the

FGen process, or

(2) Force evaluation and certification, as a prerequisite for further

consideration, or

(3) If force offers are not to be further considered at this point.

c. Arrange for Certification of non-NATO Force Contributions. The

planning team (led by the PD SME) must determine the specific requirements
for the evaluation and certification of non-NATO force offers and develop
arrangements for the conduct of evaluations by ACO or member nations.
These evaluations should determine the suitability and acceptability of these
force offers and provide the basis for SACEUR’s recommendation to the MC
to finally certify these forces as part of a NATO-led force. To the extent
possible, the existing OCC E&F Programme should be used as the basis for
certifying partner forces. Arrangements will be documented in Annex GG of
the strategic OPLAN. Certification should take account of the following:

(1) Suitability of the force to meet specific CJSOR capability

requirements.

(2) Interoperability with NATO forces, including communications

security.

(3) Readiness for deployment to the theatre and employment in the

JOA.

(4) Sustainability by the contributing nation.

d. Establish Coordination and Liaison with ACO HQs. Once non-

NATO force offers have been certified, formal letters of agreement will be
signed between NATO and the respective nations. The planning team should
be prepared to assist in specifying any particular requirements regarding the
participation of these non-NATO nations in the operation, including any C2,
legal, financial and information security arrangements. In addition, the
planning team should coordinate the provision of liaison officers to SHAPE
and ACO subordinate HQs, as required.

3.67. Integrate Forces with OPLAN Development. FGen planning will typically be
conducted in parallel with OPLAN development at both the strategic and operational
levels and will be based on the requirements and the force flow.

a. Review Requirements for Integrating Force. The CJSOR, with the

corresponding AFL, provides information regarding force capabilities and
limitations, including any caveats on employment, as well as their support
requirements. Operational level planning by the designated commands will
focus on the deployment and logistic support of forces within the theatre and

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their operational employment within the JOA. Strategic planning will focus on
the strategic aspects of deployment, C2, intelligence, cooperation with other
non-military means, sustainment and communications.

b. Coordinate the Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL establishes

the time-phased flow of the force package’s force components into the theatre
and to the final destination in their designated areas of operations, including
APODs and SPODs as well as the transfer of command authority to the
gaining NATO Force Commander. It provides the basis for all deployment,
sustainment and C2 planning for the operation and is included in Annex A of
the strategic OPLAN. The ADL requires multi-level cross-staff coordination
including the following functional areas:

(1) Operations.

(2) Movements.

(3) Logistics.

(4) MILENG.

(5) CIS.

(6) StratCom.

(7) Legal.

(8) TCCs.

c. Issue the Coordinated ADL. The coordinated ADL should be

approved by DSACEUR and released to Nations as well as ACO subordinate
commands as a common basis for strategic and operational level plan
development. Ideally, the ADL should be issued as an electronic data file
based on common information standards to allow rapid processing using
automated functional services for operations and logistics planning.

d. Maintain Configuration Control of the ADL. The FGR SME must

establish and maintain configuration control of the ADL by coordinating and
validating proposed changes that may result from further force balancing
actions as well as planning with nations, ACO subordinate commands and the
TCCs. Changes must be published in revised versions of the ADL and
transmitted using the AIFS / AIMS to confirm receipt.

3.68. Activate Forces for Deployment. The process of managing the transfer of
authority of forces offered for the mission is managed through the use of ACTORD
and ORBATTOA messages.

b. Issue the Activation Order (ACTORD) Message. Once the strategic

OPLAN is endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the NAC will issue

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a NED if and when they decide to initiate the execution of the operation. The
NED provides the authority for SACEUR to issue an ACTORD message to all
participating Nations and commands, which initiates the process for Transfer
of Authority (TOA) of national forces to SACEUR, the deployment of NATO
forces and the release of NATO common funding. The planning team assists
the CCOMC in the preparation of the ACTORD to ensure that any critical
information is included, such as:

(1) Deployment of forces will be coordinated by the AMCC and

conducted in accordance with SACEUR’s MN DDP.

(2) Specifying conditions for TOA of forces to SACEUR on arrival in

theatre.

(3) Release of common funding.

(4) ROE within the theatre.

(5) Confirmation of Approved Audiences.

(6) Authority to commence communication and information

activities.

c. Process Order of Battle TOA (ORBATTOA) Messages from TCNs.

Upon receipt of the ACTORD, Nations should respond by sending an
ORBATTOA message to SHAPE to transfer the requested command authority
to SACEUR and delegate authority to the gaining command. The CCOMC
will pass ORBATTOA messages to the gaining HQ(s) and track TOA to
ensure that all forces are brought under NATO command authority.

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PHASE 5 - EXECUTION

3.69. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 5 - Execution is to facilitate, with

strategic advice, direction and guidance, the commencement and conduct of a
NATO military operation for the achievement of MSOs to contribute to the
achievement of the NATO end state.
a. Overview. Coordinated by CAT Operations team / CCOMC, Phase 5
includes all strategic level activities to ‘execute’ the strategic OPLAN. These
activities include supporting the initiation and conduct of the operation,
including periodic review of strategic progress (e.g. strategic OPSA), the
coordination, de-confliction and synchronisation of the subordinate commands
and the TCCs via a Strategic Coordination Order (SCO) and, as required,
conducting a plan review.

b. Prerequisites. The commencement of Phase 5 requires a decision by

the NAC to execute the operation, and the promulgation of a NED, and the
FGen of the forces described in the strategic OPLAN.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 5 are:

(1) Coordinating the actions necessary to initiate an operation.

(2) Implementing the strategic OPLAN.

(3) Monitoring and facilitating the operation, including identifying and

managing strategic risks and issues, and the continued generation of
resources necessary for operational success.

(4) Coordination, de-confliction and synchronisation of the

subordinate commands via a SCO.

(5) Assessing the relevance of current plans and directives with

stakeholders, and, when required, conducting a plan review (using
Phase 2-4 process as appropriate).

(6) FGen for operation sustainment.

(7) Reviewing the strategic-level progress of operations (e.g.

strategic OPSA).

d. Desired outcome of this phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 5

are:

(1) Smooth commencement of the operation, with the op level

HQ(s) supported by SHAPE and the TCCs as required, including
through the issue of an ACTORD, TOA messages to devolve authority,
and a ROE implementation message (ROEIMP).

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(2) Provision of accurate and timely SMA, including PMRs, to inform

NAC and assist their decision-making for the conduct of the operation
towards achievement of the NATO end state.

(3) Provision of strategic direction and guidance, via SCOs, to

COM(s) for the execution of the operation and support to ensure
operational success.

(4) Revised / new strategic operations plans, as directed by the

NAC.

(5) The establishment of the conditions in the engagement space,

and the achievement of the MSOs, by military-led NATO forces as
directed by the NAC, including successful military support of any NATO
non-military activities, to contribute to the achievement of the NATO
end state.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The following staff

organisations have a specific role during Phase 5:

(1) CCOMC. During execution, the CAT Ops team is the focus of
SHAPE cross-functional effort to enable SACEUR to execute strategic
C2 of the operation. It maintains routine engagement (at the
appropriate level) with subordinate and NATO HQ staff. It is
responsible for coordinating actions necessary to initiate, facilitate and
monitor the execution of the operation, including by identifying strategic
risks, assessing the relevance of current plans and directives (in
concert with J5), the review of strategic level progress (e.g. OPSA),
and supervision of contracts with strategic implication (e.g. fuel). The
CCOMC remains responsible, with support from across SHAPE
(including J2, PSA, J9, etc.), to ensure the maintenance and
improvement of situational awareness and understanding of the
operation, including that it is shared as appropriate.

(2) CAT. Once the NED is issued by the NAC, the OPLAN will
transition from the Plans led CAT to an Ops led CAT for execution,
Further Plans led activity may be subsequently convened to undertake
additional or supporting planning activities as directed and will be
supported by CCOMC, SHAPE Divisions and CG Advisors as
appropriate. Depending on the urgency of NATO’s response to the
crisis, a SPMP, if deemed necessary, may not have finished (or even
been commenced) prior to the execution of the NATO military
operation. The planning team, albeit reduced in size, may be retained
to assist the development of any subsequent planning efforts and to
consider, as it develops, the need for review of the strategic OPLAN.

(3) Staff Elements. With the Ops team as a focal point, all SHAPE
directorates and CG Advisors will support Phase 5 activities as

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required. They will provide information, intelligence and knowledge, in

accordance to SACEUR / CG priorities (e.g. J2, StratCom, CCD, PSA,
J9, etc.). In addition, the resolution of some issues raised during
execution will be assigned to an appropriate staff element, which must
coordinate with the CAT / CCOMC to ensure common situational
awareness.

f. External Coordination. Phase 5 activities at the strategic level are

facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities,
authorised and appropriate for the ongoing NATO military operation. These
may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) NATO HQ. Close coordination with any NATO HQ body

involved in political-military execution activities is paramount. The
CMTF, formed to assist staff activities during appreciation of the crisis
and planning, will transition into a Steering Group or directly into the
standing Operations Task Force (OTF) under IS (Ops), in which
SHAPE will normally participate. If a SPMP is still in development, or is
developed in this phase, liaison and coordination is required with any
NATO HQ body involved in this work.

(2) JFC(s) / JTF(s) / SCC(s) / TCC(s). Close coordination between

SHAPE, the designated op level HQ(s) and supporting HQs will remain
a necessity, but the main conduit will shift from those bodies involved in
planning (e.g. planning team and JOPG(s)) to those associated with
execution (e.g. CCOMC and the Joint Operations Centres (JOC)). To
facilitate the needed communication, especially in the transition from
planning to execution, an op level HQ liaison element may initially
remain and support the CAT / CCOMC.

(3) Other Relevant Actors. Within established authorities and

mechanisms, and guided by NAC and / or CG guidance, the ops team
will coordinate strategic execution activities with relevant actors. This
may be facilitated through the provision of liaison officers to the
CCOMC.

3.70. Considerations for Execution. The seamless commencement of a NATO

military operation is facilitated by appropriate and informed strategic level support.

a. Preparation for Execution. In the period leading to the finalisation of

the strategic OPLAN and the generation of the necessary forces, the ops
team should have been (if not already) reinforced by CCOMC staff, who will
assume responsibility for execution, to ensure the development of a sound
understanding of the situation and the planning conducted. The ops team
should begin to draft an ACTORD and a ROEIMP, in preparation for a NAC
decision to initiation the execution of the operation.

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b. Initiation of Operation Execution. Once the NAC decides to initiate

the execution of the operation, they will issue a NED. The ops team will
finalise the ACTORD and ROEIMP and staff them to SACEUR for release.
The ops team, supported by FGR, will manage the TOA of the forces. They
will also begin the integration of the new operation with the CCOMC battle
rhythm. Part of this effort is to refine and validate information exchange and
reporting requirements, procedures and mechanisms. This is a very dynamic
period and may see the associated support to the CCOMC at its largest until
operation execution stabilises.

c. Execution. The main strategic functions during execution are the

provision of situational awareness and understanding and military advice to
the NAC, and strategic C2 of the operation. At NATO HQ, the CMTF will
transition to an OTF under an IS (Ops) lead; SHAPE will provide
representation at an appropriate level to this important coordination forum.
The CCOMC provides continuous monitoring and analysis of operational
events and developments in order to facilitate operations, identify strategic
issues and risks, and deliver strategic level situational awareness and
understanding in addition to providing strategic direction and guidance in the
form of SCOs as necessary. The CCOMC will coordinate and, as appropriate
and authorised, share information with NATO stakeholders, external relevant
actors and partners. Issues that require strategic resolution would be
assigned to an appropriate lead directorate, division or CG Advisors.
Periodically, or as required, the CCOMC will review the strategic level
progress of the operation (strategic OPSA) and appreciate the relevance of
current plans.

d. Strategic Coordination Order. Following the production and issuing

of a strategic operations plan (OPLAN) and the approval of operational level
OPLANs, the requirement exists to be able to adjust, coordinate and direct
activities at the strategic and operational level over time and space as
changes occur to the overall situation. The SCO is the mechanism and
product to allow this to occur and in a single document provides direction and
guidance to the subordinate commands for the synchronisation of operational
level plans and operations as part of the overall strategic military campaign. It
will reflect the total interaction of all forces and capabilities, lethal and non-
lethal, the prioritisation of resources and capabilities and the SSI necessary to
complete the mission. It is anticipated that the SCO will be a relatively short
and concise document focussed only on the changes that have, or will need to
occur in the future and as such will have a relatively short production and
approval cycle. The format of a SCO is not set but should be expected to
following the standard format of an OPORD.

e. StratCom Framework. The NATO HQ StratCom D&G will be provided

through the mission-specific NATO StratCom Framework. SHAPE SC staff
will ensure that development of the strategic CONOPS and OPLAN is in line
with the direction and guidance and will liaise with NATO HQ regarding the

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need to revise the Framework as the operation progresses129. Examples of

events that may require a review of the framework include moving to new
phase, or the occurrence of a strategic shock.

f. Force Generation. The FGen process continues during the execution

phase with active dialogue with the operational command and the TCNs. It
focuses on filling any remaining shortfalls in the original CJSOR, validating
and filling any new operational requirements, and ensuring that contributions
are sustained over time either by another or the same nations.

g. Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level. OPSA of the

engagement space involves monitoring and evaluating the whole engagement
space and all associated effects. Strategic OPSA will be informed by
operational level assessments and will be adjusted according to inputs from
the following before being presented to SACEUR and the CG via an
Assessment Board (AB):

(1) Informed Adjustments. From a military standpoint, OPLANs

require periodic operations assessment in order for informed
adjustments to be made. Progress of actions, creation of effects and
achievement of objectives towards the achievement of the NATO end
state are all evaluated via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures
current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and
decision process. This OPSA process applies to all levels: at the
strategic level a PMR is the normal ‘operations assessment’ product
provided to the NAC.

(2) Data Collection. Data collectors who support the OPSA

process may be non-NATO assets, further highlighting the requirement
for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments
and relevant actors. OPSA and the KD process are closely related
through system analysis, which provides the backdrop for OPSA to
understand how to measure effects and actions.

129
Should a NATO StratCom Framework not be deemed necessary, ACO will develop its own to ensure evolving StratCom
considerations are articulated to the Alliance, its partners or TCNs.

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PHASE 6 - TRANSITION

3.71. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 6 - Transition is to coordinate the

transition and termination of a NATO military operation; this involves the handover of
responsibility to proper authority (e.g. UN, other IOs (e.g. EU or indigenous actor)) in
the crisis area and the withdrawal of forces under NATO military command, in a
controlled manner so as to avoid this action being a destabilising influence in the
region.

a. Overview. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, periodic

operations assessments will be conducted to evaluate the progress made
towards the desired objectives and the NATO end state; eventually SACEUR
will conclude that the MSOs have been achieved and, with consideration to
the overall conditions of the NATO end state to which military efforts
contribute, will recommend to the NAC that planning for transition and
termination of the NATO military operation should commence. This phase
covers all the activities for the transition and termination of a NATO military
operation to facilitate the transition of NATO military responsibilities to proper
authority and the withdrawal of forces under NATO military command.
Depending on the situation, transition and termination may be able to be
managed within the construct of the existing strategic and operational
OPLANs; alternatively, appropriate operations planning activities may be
needed, leading to NAC approval for a specific transition strategic CONOPS
or OPLAN. As the exact moment for transition may be difficult to define and
Phase 5 and 6 may overlap.

b. Prerequisites. The commencement of Phase 6 requires a NAC

decision sheet to begin preparation for transition and withdrawal of NATO
forces under military command, with SACEUR and / or CG direction and
guidance; or SACEUR and / or CG direction and guidance to commence
considering the issues associated with a future transition and withdrawal.
Each situation will be different; the NAC guidance and direction may
necessitate commencing with a strategic assessment (including military
considerations), proposal of military options, and a transition CONOPS or a
revised/new OPLAN. This activity will be supported by the most recent
assessment of the operation (e.g. PMR) leading to the decision to commence
transition planning.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 6 are:

(1) Provision of SMA to assist NATO HQ and NAC decision-making

for the transition and termination.

(2) Activities to appreciate and / or conduct transition planning,

including as required strategic assessment, MROs, and strategic
transition CONOPS and / or OPLAN, and coordination / approval of the
operational transition CONOPS and / or OPLAN.

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(3) Coordination and / or collaboration between SHAPE, NATO HQ,

JFC(s), JTF(s), SSC(s), TCC(s), NATO Agencies and relevant actors.

(4) Provision of strategic guidance, direction and support to op level

COM(s) and supporting commands to facilitate the transition and
termination of NATO military operations.

d. Desired outcome of this phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 6

are:

(1) SMA to assist NATO HQ and NAC decision-making for the

transition and termination of NATO’s role in the crisis, including the
associated military operation(s).

(2) Either / Or:

(a) Strategic military direction and guidance to operational

commands to assist in managing the transition and termination
of the NATO military operation within the current strategic and
operational OPLANs.

(b) Strategic and operational transition OPLANs.

Development of appropriate products for the NAC, as requested,
leading to their approval of a revised or new strategic OPLAN
(e.g. strategic assessment, military options, transition CONOPS
and / or transition OPLAN). Following NAC approval of the
strategic OPLAN, SACEUR approval of the operational
transition OPLAN.

(3) The transition and termination of the NATO military operation

has been completed, in a controlled manner so as to avoid being a
destabilising influence in the region.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The following staff

organisations have a specific role during Phase 5:

(1) CCOMC. The CCOMC is responsible for the conduct of cross

functional operations assessment and identifying to the CG when
operations assessments begin to indicate that the need for transition
activities is emerging. The CCOMC leads initial transition thinking (e.g.
to consider future base closure, or termination of contracts with
strategic implication (e.g. fuel)). It will support the CAT if one is
established to conduct transition and termination planning activities.
Once the manner of transition / termination is agreed, the CCOMC will
coordinate / facilitate the strategic-level transition and termination of the
NATO military operation. As an operation nears completion, the
CCOMC will manage all the post operation termination activities, such

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as end of mission reports, archiving operation information, completing

post operation analysis (e.g. lessons learned process), etc.

(2) CAT. If required, the CG will establish a CAT, under an ACOS

J5 lead, (in coordination with DCCOMC) for the conduct of transition
and termination planning activities (i.e. strategic transition CONOPS or
OPLAN). It will be supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE directorates
and CG Advisors, as required and approved.

f. External Coordination. Phase 6 activities at the strategic level are

facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities,
authorised and appropriate for the ongoing NATO military operation. These
may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) NATO HQ. Close coordination with any NATO HQ body

involved in political-military transition and termination activities is
paramount. Initially, a standing Operations Task Force will exist, but as
required it may be supplemented with the re-establishment of a CMTF
to focus on operation transition. SHAPE may be requested to assist
with formulation of any initial IS / IMS advice on transition and
termination, including the evolution of an existing StratCom Framework.

(2) JFC(s) / JTF(s) / SSC(s) / TCC(s). Close coordination will exist

already with the op level HQ(s) for Phase 5. They will collaborate /
coordinate with strategic transition / termination activities, including
through the provision of liaison elements to assist collaboration, as
required, between the planning team and the JOPG(s) (as per Phases
2-4). The operational commands will manage the op level execution of
transition and termination of the NATO military operation.

(3) Other Relevant Actors. By this point in an operation,

relationships between strategic and operational levels and relevant
actors would have been established; however, there may be additional
actors, not yet involved in the crisis resolution, who will be relevant for
the transition and termination of NATO’s military operation. The
planning team will have to ensure they have the requisite authorities /
mechanisms to engage all actors, guided by NAC and / or CG
guidance, relevant to transition and termination activities.

3.72. Considerations for Transition and Termination. Modern conflicts are

complex in nature involving interdependent actors with both convergent and
divergent interests and objectives. The deployment of NATO forces introduces them
into an already complex system and over time, creates inter-dependencies with other
actors and systems (e.g. economic, civil, and political) present in the engagement
space. NATO should reduce adverse effects from the presence of NATO forces
operating in the same area as the local population and other aid providers. Such
adverse effects could subsequently undermine the feasibility of the transition phase

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and as such, a number of considerations need to factored into transition and

termination planning.

a. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, commanders and

their staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring
the effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects, establishing
desired conditions and achieving objectives, to contribute to the achievement
of the desired NATO end state.

b. Eventually SACEUR will consider that the MSOs have been achieved;
having established the conditions required by forces under NATO military
command, and recommend that consideration can now be given to the
withdrawal of those forces. The desired NATO end state may require military
and non-military activities to establish all the conditions necessary to achieve
it; thus, following the achievement of the MSOs, the continued presence of
forces under military command may be required to support non-military
efforts. Eventually, through operations assessment, indications will begin to
highlight that military forces could be withdrawn, the timing for which will be
approved by the NAC. As the exact moment for transition may be difficult to
define, Phase 5 and 6 could to overlap or effectively merge.

(1) Planning for the disengagement of NATO forces must be

initiated well in advance and may eventually involve a large number of
non-NATO actors in order to minimise the negative effects that the
departure of NATO troops may have on the overall stability of the
theatre. Planning for transition may involve activities to facilitate the
coordination and management of the transition and withdrawal within
the construct of the current strategic and / or operational OPLANs; it
also may require conduct of some or all of the activities described in
Phases 2-4, culminating in a new or revised NAC approved strategic
OPLAN. The approach to transition and termination will be guided by
appropriate NAC guidance and direction. As guided by the CG,
SHAPE may assist NATO HQ bodies (e.g. CMTF, IS / IMS) in the
preparation of advice on transition and termination of NATO military
operations. The following may help guide the conduct of Phase 2-4
activities for transition planning by a CAT.

(2) Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment. Assessments of the

operation(s), including PMRs, lead to the determination that transition
and termination of the NATO military operations is warranted.
Depending on the timing and focus of the last strategic operations
product (e.g. PMR) prior to the decision to begin transition and
termination planning, there may be no need for a separate strategic
assessment to support transition and termination planning. Ideally,
with the PMR advising that a transition be warranted, the status of
relevant actors and the impact of such a transition should have been
assessed. If not this updated systems understanding of the operational
environment should be established as a basis for further work, even if

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not formally tasked by the NAC. Not conducting this appreciation can
be mitigated, for the consideration of options, if the requisite authorities
for interaction have been received.

(3) Phase 3 - Options. Once OPSAs indicate the conditions

required of military forces have been established and that these are
sustainable without the current level of NATO forces in theatre,
SACEUR may recommend to the NAC to be authorised to develop
options for NATO disengagement (total or partial). Options may or
may not necessitate revised / new strategic planning products;
transition and withdrawal within the construct of the current strategic
and / or operational OPLAN may be achievable with appropriate
strategic guidance and direction130. Alternatively, the option chosen by
the NAC may see the issue of a NID to direct the production of a
transition strategic CONOPS and / or OPLAN. It should be noted that
the options tabled should clearly state the level of interaction with non-
NATO actors required during strategic and operational planning.

(4) Phase 4a - CONOPS Development. A strategic transition

CONOPS would articulate how to disengage NATO forces from the
mission most effectively and efficiently. It would be developed with
consideration to the different interdependencies that were created over
the duration of the mission between the deployed NATO forces and
possible ways to mitigate the negative effects caused by the withdrawal
of forces.

(a) Mitigation measures will in most cases involve

international or national actors developing transition plans and
for the NATO forces to adjust their handover of responsibilities
to these actors in a way that allows them as much as possible to
minimise the negative impacts during this critical phase of the
operation.

(b) The selected MRO will provide the basis for the
development of the strategic concept and a supporting
statement of the required comprehensive activities (including
supporting NATO non-military efforts) required to establish the
PCS. The development of the CONOPS will require close
collaboration with the op level HQ(s) and supporting commands
especially in coordinating with non-NATO actors for local risk
mitigation measures and for a theatre-level handover concept.
Following receipt of the NID, the planning team may develop a
succinct SPD to guide the op level COM(s) operational estimate.

130
Once this decision is made, the CCOMC would be the focus point at the strategic level to facilitate the operational level
transition and termination of the operation within the construct of the current OPLANs.

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(c) SACEUR will obtain NAC approval for the strategic

CONOPS for the transition. It should be noted that the
overriding factor in the decision to repatriate troops should be
the need to maintain stability in the theatre and to give sufficient
time for a proper handover to take place. In cases where the
handover will take place over a long period of time, it may be
necessary to re-tool or re-role elements of the NATO forces in
theatre.

(5) Phase 4b - OPLAN Development. OPLAN development will

further amplify the schedule of strategic effects required, the supporting
PCS, and the general flow of forces out of theatre. It will also identify
critical logistic and movement nodes for the withdrawal of NATO
forces. Upon approval of the strategic transition OPLAN, NAC will
issue a NED.

(6) Phase 5 - Execution and Operations Assessment.

Throughout the transition phase, it will be necessary to monitor
execution closely and to appreciate the developing impacts of the
departure of NATO forces. An OPSA process, similar to the process
used throughout the execution phase of the operation will be used, with
particular emphasis on measuring negative effects. These operations
assessments will allow changes, within the construct of the approved
OPLAN, or identify the need for changes to the OPLAN where
necessary.

c. Process Controls. Transition planning is designed to identify and

mitigate, to the maximum extent possible, the negative risks and effects
resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops. It also allows
commanders to coordinate, in detail, the TOA to non-NATO actors, by
allowing the Commander and staff enough freedom to develop ideas and
concepts while ensuring necessary political and military control over the entire
process.

d. In enabling a coordinated and deliberate transition, the detailed

systemic analysis of the engagement space is necessary. This systemic
analysis should place a particular emphasis on the interdependencies that
involve the presence of NATO forces in-theatre. It will be essential that all
relevant non-NATO actors be identified early and that proper liaison and
coordination be implemented to allow these actors to be able to inform and
contribute where appropriate to the strategic and operational planning for the
withdrawal of NATO forces under military command.

e. The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, as well as to execute

OPLANs, is retained by the NAC and delegated incrementally to SACEUR.

f. Political Controls. The NAC maintains political control of transition

planning by:

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(1) Issuing direction and guidance to guide the transition and

planning for it, including NAC decision sheets like a NID.

(2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

(3) Approving a strategic transition CONOPS, including approving

strategic effects and endorsing the PCS.

(4) Authorising force deactivation.

(5) Approving a strategic transition OPLAN.

(6) Authorising force redeployment.

(7) Authorising execution.

g. Military Controls. NATO military commanders maintain control of the

OPP by:

(1) Issuing transition direction and guidance, such as planning

directives.

(2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

(3) Approving subordinate CONOPS.

(4) Approving subordinate OPLANs.

(5) Issuing deactivation messages and execution orders (when

authorised).

h. Collaborative / Parallel Planning. The development of strategic and

operational transition CONOPS / OPLANs requires collaboration and
continuous coordination at the Political/Military (NAC / MC and Nations) and
at strategic, operational, and component levels with relevant non-NATO
actors.

i. Coordination with Participating Nations. Coordination with

participating nations should take place as soon as authorised. This should
include the early exchange of information with HNs to facilitate
comprehensive planning by the HN as well as with TCNs. Once authorised
by the NAC, SACEUR will negotiate with NATO and non-NATO Nations in
order to ensure a coordinated and deliberate disengagement of forces.

j. Coordination with the Civil Environment. Early liaison and

coordination between Allied Headquarters and civil authorities and agencies is
essential to the success of the NATO disengagement. This includes
establishing, during the initiation of planning, effective means for coordination
and liaison, initially at the strategic level, with national governments, IOs and

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NGOs. Planning by the HQ(s), SCC(s) and TCC(s) must provide for effective
cooperation with these same civil organisations within the TOO / JOA(s).

k. StratCom Framework. A phase-specific StratCom Framework will be

critical to the successful disengagement of NATO forces from a crisis area.
The framework should address StratCom aims with specific respect to:
audiences in the host country to re-assure them about the stability of the
situation; the international community to underline NATO’s accomplishments;
potential de-stabilising actors to demonstrate NATO’s resolve; and the
populations of NATO member and non-NATO partner nations to inform them
about the success of the mission.

l. Operation Termination. Once the manner of transition and

termination is decided, and transition plans are created, approved and
execution initiated as appropriate, the CCOMC will conduct their normal
functions as per execution and will also manage all the post operation
termination activities, such as end of mission reports, archiving operation
information, completing post operation analysis (e.g. lessons learned
process), etc.

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para Title Page
CONTEXT
4.1 Introduction 4-1
4.2 Operational Level Process and Products 4-1
4.3 Commander and Staff Interaction 4-4
4.4 Organisation for Operational Planning and Execution 4-4

PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF A POTENTIAL / ACTUAL

CRISIS
Section 1 – General
4.5 Introduction 4-7
Section 2 – Process
4.6 Appreciation Indication of a Potential / Actual Crisis 4-12
4.7 Initiate Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating 4-13
Environment
4.8 Develop Initial Understanding of, and Monitor, the Emerging 4-13
Crisis
4.9 Support Development of Initial Strategic Military Advice 4-15

PHASE 2 - OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGIC

ENVIRONMENT
Section 1 – General
4.10 Introduction 4-16
Section 2 – Process
Step 1 - Appreciation of SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment
4.11 Initiate an Operational Level Appreciation of the Crisis 4-20
4.12 Appreciation of the Strategic Context of the Crisis 4-22
4.13 Appreciate the Level and Scope of International Engagement 4-25
4.14 Appreciate Implications for NATO 4-26
4.15 Appreciate Strategic Military Considerations 4-27
4.16 Brief Commander on SSA Appreciation 4-27

Step 2 - Operational Advice on Military Response Options

4.17 Assist SHAPE during MRO Development 4-29
4.18 Commander’s Guidance for MRO Analysis 4-29
4.19 Analyse Draft Military Response Options 4-30
4.20 Evaluation of the MROs 4-35
4.21 Develop Considerations 4-36

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4.22 Provide Operational Advice 4-37

PHASE 3 - OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

Section 1 – General
4.23 Introduction 4-38

Section 2 – Process
Phase 3a - Mission Analysis
4.24 Initiate Mission Analysis 4-43
4.25 Framing the Operational Level Problem 4-45
4.26 Analyse the Mission 4-52
4.27 The Operational Design 4-60
4.28 Estimate Initial Force / Capability and C2 Requirements 4-66
4.29 Review Critical Operational Requirements 4-68
4.30 Plan and Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing 4-68
4.31 Issue Operational Planning Guidance 4-70
4.32 Develop and Submit Requests to SHAPE 4-70
4.33 Plan and Conduct the Commander’s Theatre Reconnaissance 4-70
Phase 3b - Course of Action Development
4.34 Prepare for Courses of Action Development 4-71
4.35 Develop Own Courses of Action 4-73
4.36 Analyse Courses of Action 4-80
4.37 Compare Courses of Action 4-83
4.38 Plan and Conduct CoA Decision Briefing 4-85
4.39 Refine Selected Course of Action 4-85
4.40 Issue Operational Planning Directive 4-86

PHASE 4 - OPERATIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Phase 4a - Operational Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development
Section 1 – General
4.41 Introduction 4-87
Section 2 – Process
4.42 Initiate Operational CONOPS Development 4-92
4.43 Development of the Operational CONOPS 4-93
4.44 Develop Coordinating Instructions 4-94
4.45 Describe the Concept for Service Support 4-95
4.46 Describe Concept for Command and Control and 4-95
Communications Information Systems
4.47 Development of Operational CONOPS Annexes 4-96

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4.48 Develop Operational Requirements 4-98

4.49 Review of Draft Component CONOPS 4-101
4.50 Coordinate and Submit Draft Operational CONOPS 4-101
4.51 Assist SHAPE in Finalising the Strategic CONOPS 4-102

PHASE 4b - Operational Operations Plan (OPLAN) Development

Section 1 – General
4.52 Introduction 4-103
Section 2 – Process
4.53 Initiate Operational OPLAN Development 4-107
4.54 SACEUR Approval of Operational CONOPS 4-110
4.55 Plan for the Employment of Operational Forces 4-111
4.56 Plan for Command and Control 4-113
4.57 Force Preparation and Sustainment 4-115
4.58 Plan for Force Deployment 4-117
4.59 Plan Force Protection 4-120
4.60 Rehearsal of Concept and Operational OPLAN Coordination 4-122
for Approval and Handover

PHASE 5 – EXECUTION
4.61 Introduction 4-125
4.62 Considerations for Execution 4-127
4.63 Execution and the Operational Estimate 4-129

PHASE 6 – TRANSITION
4.64 Introduction 4-131
4.65 Considerations for Transition and Termination 4-133

TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page
Fig 4.1 NCRP Schematic - Political Military, Strategic and Operational 4-3
Planning Flow Chart
Fig 4.2 Command and Staff Interaction at the Operational Level 4-6
Fig 4.3 Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential / Actual 4-9
Crisis Main Activities

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Fig 4.4 Phase 2 Operational Appreciation of the Strategic 4-17

Environment Main Activities
Fig 4.5 Phase 3 Operational Estimate Main Activities 4-40
Fig 4.6 Phase 3a Mission Analysis Main Activities 4-46
Fig 4.7 Operating Environment Characteristics and Potential Impact 4-51
Fig 4.8 Factor Analysis – Factor / Deduction / Conclusion 4-53
Fig 4.9 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix 4-56
Fig4.10 Illustrative Risk Evaluation Matrix 4-58
Fig 4.11 Basic Concepts of an Operational Framework 4-62
Fig 4.12 Phase 3b Courses of Action Development Main Activities 4-72
Fig 4.13 CoA Advantages and Disadvantage Comparison Table 4-83
Fig 4.14 Friendly and Opposing CoA Comparison Table 4-84
Fig 4.15 Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria Comparison Table 4-84
Fig 4.16 Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria (Weighted) Comparison 4-84
Table
Fig 4.17 Phase 4a Operational CONOPS Development Main Activities 4-89
Fig 4.18 Phase 4b Operational OPLAN Development Main Activities 4-105
Fig 4.19 Illustrative Tailored Operational Estimate 4-130

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CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONAL LEVEL

CONTEXT
4.1. Introduction. The application of the Operations Planning Process (OPP) at
the operational level1 as carried out by designated Joint Force Command
Headquarters2 (JFC HQ) or Operational Level Headquarters (HQs), follows the six
phases of NATO Crisis Response Process (NCRP) as depicted in Figure 4.1. The
close coordination and alignment of the process between the levels of command,
from NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ), through the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) to the operational level HQ, ensures that subordinate
commands and components considerations are considered and reflected in strategic
decisions and strategic conditions are established for operational success.
Procedures exist within the NCRP that allow, due to the potential urgency of the
situation, or the existence of Advance Plans, for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to
direct that Fast Track or Accelerated Decision Making Procedures (FTDM / ADM) be
applied and followed. These procedures and others such as the handover / takeover
(HOTO) of an ongoing operation will be mentioned where appropriate and should be
considered by planning staffs where appropriate but this chapter will follow and focus
on the steps required under the baseline OPP.

4.2. Operational Level Process and Products. The operational level OPP
phases as shown in Figure 4.1 are specifically designed to develop the operational
level input, planning products, directives and orders required by the strategic and
component levels. The following processes and products are described in the
following sections within this chapter.

a. The different OPP phases support the operational commander’s

decision-making related to:

(1) Developing and maintaining an appreciation of the operating

environment in a potential or actual operational area.

(2) Contributing to the development of strategic Military Response

Options (MROs) within a Comprehensive Approach (CA)3.

(3) Developing the operational mission and the operational tasks.

1
The operational level is defined in AAP-06 as, ‘[t]he level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted
and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Within NATO, the operational level is
often referred to as the ‘joint’ level.
2
Normally, unless a NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters (NFS JHQ) has been generated to perform the role of Joint
Task Force HQ (JTF HQ), the HQ interacting with SHAPE would be one of the Joint Force Commands (JFC) or a Single
Service Command (SSC). The characteristics of a potential or existing operation will be one of the considerations in the
selection of a HQ to plan and / or command at the operational level. HQs will need to be sufficiently ‘joint’ for the command and
control of assigned forces. The NATO Command Structure (NCS) JFCs are no longer deployable HQs and now represent static
warfighting HQs with deployable elements that can fulfil certain specific roles.
3
Comprehensive Approach can be described as a means to enhance a complementary, compatible response to crisis by all
relevant actors.

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(4) Designing the operational framework in terms of Operational

Objectives (OO), Lines of Operation (LoOs), Decisive Conditions (DCs),
Decision Points (DPs), Operational Effects (OE) and Operational
Actions (OA).

(5) Directing the synchronisation of joint and combined operations in

cooperation with non-military and other non-NATO efforts.

(6) Providing operational level operations assessments of progress

in achieving OOs, and contributing to the achievement of Military
Strategic Objectives (MSOs) and the NATO End State.

(7) Providing operational input for adapting operations to meet

changes in strategic and operational conditions.

(8) Planning for transition and termination of military operations.

b. The interaction4 with non-military actors that may have differing goals
and objectives in the potential operating environment is critical to successful
planning at the operational level. While the non-military and partners’
involvement in the planning process is critical for success, their contribution is
not part of the decision making, their activity falls into decision shaping, in
order to ensure wherever possible our objectives are aligned. An early
understanding of the use of the other Instruments of Power (IoP); diplomatic,
information and economic, is therefore essential from the outset of planning. It
begins with operational input to the strategic level development of MROs with
focus on Complementary Non-Military Actions (CNMAs), Strategic
Communications (StratCom), Pre-Conditions for Success (PCS), and risk and
opportunity; it continues through recommendations on drawing in relevant
external actors into the planning process if and when appropriate. This
understanding is then built upon during the operational estimate where
operational actions and effects will be developed as part of the operational
level design5, with an appreciation of the influence on, and impact of, other
actors. The development of a liaison and coordination template for interaction
with other actors for the concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plan
(OPLAN) will be an important element and will always be a balance of what
the operational level sees as essential, what the strategic level sees as
essential and what is politically acceptable to the NAC and NATO.

4
‘Interact’ might involve: liaise, coordination, cooperation, collaboration, consultation, exchange of information, toleration.
5
As described in doctrine (AJP-01, operational design is both a process and a product. In general, the ‘process’ of operational
design, ‘frames the problem, and then develops and refines a commander’s operational ideas – the vision of how the campaign
will unfold – to provide detailed and actionable plans. Operational design continues, often interrupted by changes in strategic
guidance, throughout the duration of a campaign; it should not be deemed complete or immutable from the outset and never
simply implemented as a given without adaptation in the face of changing circumstances.’

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 NATO Crisis Response Planning Process

Political-Military Estimate (PME) Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP) Strategic Political-Military Plan review
development
Phase 1
Phase 2 Phase 3
Indications and
Assessment Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Warnings of Phase 4 Planning
of the of Response Execution Transition
Potential/Actual

(NAC/)MC
Crisis Options
Crisis NAC NAC Approved NID for Approved NED
Tasker NID Approved Strategic Tasker Transition Transition + MC NAC DS
for + MC Strategic FAD Strategic OPLAN, for planning + OPLAN Guidance to Terminate +
Tasker Strategic NED
Information MRO Guidance CONOPS + MC OPLAN, ROEREQ, PMR MC Guidance + MC Guidance
for CONOPS SORs + MC
Sharing SSA MROs + Guidance1 TCSOR MC Guidance
SSA + ROEREQ Guidance SACEUR’s
MC +
Illustrative CJSOR Guidance Mission Strategic
MC Guidance
and TCSOR Progress Transition
Phase 1 Report OPLAN
Initial Phase 3 Phase 4 Strategic Plan Development
Phase 2
Situational Military Phase 5 Phase 6
Strategic Phase 4b
Awareness of Response Phase 4a Execution Transition
Strategic OPLAN Development

SHAPE
Assessment Strategic CONOPS Development
Potential/Actual Options (Force Generation)
Crisis ACTORD ACTORD
Draft ROEIMP SPD on ROEIMP
Strategic Strategic
MROs Draft Op Strategic Transition
Warning CONOPS Op
Information OPLAN OPLAN Op
SSA SPD Draft Op CONOPS SCO
Sharing Order OPLAN
CONOPS SORs Disengagement

4-3
Operational Approval Approval
+ ROEREQ Operations Planning
Advice illustrative SORs Assessment

Flow Chart
Phase 1
Initial Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Operational Plan Development
Situational Operational Appreciation Operational Estimate Phase 5 Phase 6
Phase 3a Phase 3b Phase 4a
Awareness of of the Phase 4b Execution Transition
Mission CoA Operational CONOPS
Operational OPLAN Development

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Potential/Actual Strategic Environment Analysis Development Development

Crisis

Operational Level
SSA Draft Op ACTORD OPG/ ACTORD
CONOPS, Comp ROEIMP Directive on ROEIMP
Draft MROs Op
illustrative CONOPS Draft Comp Transition
Information Operational
OPG OPD Draft Comp SORs Approval Plan OPLAN Comp
Sharing Warning CONOPS + SORs, Plan
Component Op
Order Disengagement
Advice illustrative SORs CONOPS ROEREQ Approval Operations Planning
(As Req) Assessment
Phase 1
Initial Phase 4 Component Plan Development
Phase 2 Phase 3
Situational Phase 4a Phase 4b
Phase 5 Phase 6
Component Appreciation of the Component
Awareness of Component CONOPS Component OPLAN/ORDER Execution Transition
Strategic Environment Estimate Development Development
Potential/Actual

Components
Crisis
Note:
Note: 1. 1. Following
Following FAD
FAD receipt,
receipt,SACEUR
SACEURwill
willrelease provisional CJSOR
releaseprovisional CJSOR ++ ACTWARN
ACTWARNtotocommence
commenceformal Force
formal Generation
Force Process
Generation Process

NAC – North Atlantic Council NID – NAC Initiating Directive OPG – Operational Planning Guidance SOR – Statement of Requirement ROE – Rules of Engagement
SCO – Strategic Coordination Order SPD – Strategic Planning Directive OPD – Operational Planning Directive FAD – Force Activation Directive ROEREQ – ROE Request (message)
SSA – SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment CoA – Course of Action CJSOR – Combined Joint Statement of Requirement NED – NAC Execution Directive ROEIMP – ROE Implementation (message)

Figure 4.1 NCRP Schematic – Political Military, Strategic and Operational Planning
MRO – Military Response Option CONOPS – Concept of Operations TCSOR – Theatre Capabilities Statement of Requirement ACTORD – Activation Order (message) PMR – Periodic Mission Review
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c. Each situation for which the OPP is used will be different; the planning
effort at each HQ will be conducted under different circumstances and each
commander (COM) will consider the problem based on their own experience
and intuition, advised and supported by the staff. The process and
methodology in this chapter represents a capture of best practice; they suit
well a timely and systematic movement through the process from one phase
to another. With appropriate training, they can be used effectively as a guide 6
to develop appropriate operational level operations planning products to
support each situation.

4.3. Commander and Staff Interaction. Planning is a combination of process

and art. The COM is the central figure for the conduct of the operational level OPP.
Throughout the planning process the COM and the key senior staff, must remain fully
engaged and supported by personal experience and judgement, provide direction
and guidance to the staff (e.g. Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG)) to drive the
conduct of staff activities to support decision-making.

a. The close relationship between the COM and planning staff is essential
for effective planning. COMs will differ in their approaches with some leading
the process and conducting their own analysis while others look to the staff to
prepare products for their consideration. Regardless, the planning process
enables the COM’s vision, and it is therefore essential that the planning staff
understand the way their COM thinks and operates.

b. Throughout the OPP there are specified points where the COM will be
required to provide direction and guidance to the staff, make specific decisions
or approve planning products. Points of specific COM and Staff interaction at
the operational level is depicted at Figure 4.2. Regular briefings and
interaction with the staff as they move through the OPP will allow the COM
and the Command Group (CG) to keep the planning effort focussed and
aligned with intent.

4.4. Organisation for Operations Planning and Execution. While the

organisational structure of a JFC or HQ will vary, various cross-functional bodies
used within the HQ provide for the integration of functional expertise to carry out the
main operational level processes. Functional subject matter experts (SMEs),
supported by their parent functional structures, will normally commence functional
staff estimates7 as early in the planning process as possible to help contribute to the
JOPG. In addition, they will contribute to operational CONOPS and OPLAN
development through contributions to the main documents and / or the development
of annexes. In addition to collaborating within the HQ, the staff elements will
collaborate with their counterparts at the strategic level (SHAPE), other operational

6
Functional Planning Guides (FPG) may be generated to assist applicable functional area staff in the conduct of their duties in
support of the OPP.
7
Not to be confused with the operational estimate (as described in Phase 3), a functional staff estimate is essentially a
functional area specific analysis tailored to support the OPP phase being conducted. To illustrate, early in the OPP, functional
area staff estimates commence with a collection and functional analysis of information to help the COM and staff understand
the situation. Later staff estimates will be tailored to provide functional analysis in support of the determination of which courses
of action are viable and which one should be recommended.

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level HQs and subordinate / supporting / component commands during all phases of
operations. Key HQ staff roles and responsibilities related to each phase that are
common to all HQs are detailed throughout this chapter. The entire process can be
supported throughout through the use of collaborative planning tools and functional
services (FS) to enable a better understanding, management, development and
sharing of planning products at all levels.

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 Staff brief to Commander’s Operational
Strategic Direction Commander’s Lead Staff Activity
the Commander Decision Output

Phase 1 Strategic Indications &

Guidance for
Initial Direction & Analyse systems Warning /
Initial Assessment Determine
Situational Taskings and monitor Operational
Situational of Situation Criticality
Awareness changes Advice
Awareness
of a Crisis

Strategic
Phase 2 Warning
Operational Order Guidance for Approve Operational
Strategic CUOE-Process & Assessment
Appreciation Operational Assessment Advice
Assessment Analyse MROs of Options
of the Strategic Appreciation Options
& MRO
Environment

NAC
Phase 3A Initiating Operational
Analyse Mission Mission
Operational Directive Guidance for Approve
and develop Analysis & Planning
Estimate – Strategic Mission Mission
Operational Operational Guidance
Planning Analysis Analysis
Mission Framework Framework
Directive
Analysis

Phase 3B Initial Intent & Operational

Operational Guidance for Develop and Comparison CoA Planning

4-6
Estimate – CoA Analyse CoAs of CoAs Decision Directive
CoA Development
Development

CONOPS
Phase 4A Refined Intent
Develop

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Operational & Guidance Synchronised CONOPS

Operational Statement of
for CONOPS CONOPS Approval
CONOPS CONOPS Requirements
Development
Development

NAC Force
Activation
Phase 4B Directive Plan
Guidance for OPLAN /
Operational SACEUR Deployment, Synchronised Plan
Plan SDP
OPLAN ACTREQ Employment and Plan Approval
Development
Development Sustainment
Allied Force
List

NAC
Phase 5 Execution Guidance for
Operations

Figure 4.2 Command and Staff Interaction at the Operational Level

Execution, Directive Guidance for Assess Operational
SACEUR Assessment. Situation Synchronisation
Operations Operations Operations and
ACTORD Results & Criticality & Future Plans
Assessment / Assessment revise Estimates
Estimates
OPLAN Review
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PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF A POTENTIAL / ACTUAL

CRISIS

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

4.5. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 1 - Initial Situational Awareness of a

Potential / Actual Crisis, is to assist with the identification of potential or emerging
crises that have relevance to NATO’s security interests and support the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) / SHAPE staff in their strategic Phase 1
activities.

a. Overview. The NCRP is initiated by the NAC once there are

indications that suggest that there is an emerging crisis that may affect
NATO’s security interests. These indications could come from the NATO
Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), Allies, SACEUR or other sources,
including JFCs, Single Service Commands (SSC) or Theatre Component
Commands (TCC). There may be multiple emerging crises under analysis at
any one time but for each, at the operational level, Phase 1 normally begins
with:

(1) A task / request from SACEUR / SHAPE, as a result of SHAPE

coordinated horizon scanning activities; or

(2) COM direction, as a result of horizon scanning activities (for

areas where responsibility has been assigned to a JFC / HQ by
SACEUR) identifying that a potential / actual crisis is emerging.

4 b. The HQ(s), in collaboration with SHAPE staff, will initiate the

Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating Environment8 (CUOE)
process (led by intelligence / knowledge development (KD) staff), supported
by the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE),
for the potential / actual crisis in order to develop an initial understanding of
and monitor the crisis. When warranted, the HQ will elevate indications and
warnings to SACEUR / SHAPE of emerging crises that may affect NATO’s
security interests. The COM will direct any necessary preparation activities in
case a move to Phase 2 is directed. In addition, the HQ will also support
SHAPE staff, as appropriate and directed, with the development of any initial
military advice.

5 c. Through direction and guidance from the COM or SACEUR / SHAPE

(depending on how Phase 1 activities were initiated), the issue may be
returned to horizon scanning activities and not transition any further in the
OPP. The main activities of Phase 1 are depicted in Figure 4.3.

8
The terms CUOE and CPOE are often used synonymously, CPOE has traditionally been used to describe the appreciation of
an environment however CUOE with the use of the word ‘understanding’ better implies the need to acquire the knowledge and
then interpret or comprehend its significance with regard to the crisis or OPP.

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6 d. Prerequisites. The initiation of Phase 1 can be either directed by

SACEUR or the COM.

7 e. Desired Outcome of this Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 1

are:

(1) Appropriate indications and warnings (I&W) and initial

appreciation of emerging crises are provided to the COM, and if
appropriate to SACEUR, in a timely fashion.

(2) An initial understanding of an emerging crisis is developed,

which can be shared9 for collaborative situational awareness when
authorised, to include an appreciation of the nature of the problem and
the possible implications for NATO.

(3) Appropriate preparation, guided by the COM, is conducted by

the HQ to provide effective support to the SHAPE staffs development of
initial military advice.

(4) Prompt return to horizon scanning activities due to the emerging

crises not deemed to have impact to NATO’s security interests.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The COM provides

direction and guidance for the conduct of Phase 1 activities, including, where
appropriate, the authorisation for any preparatory activities. The primary staff
elements involved during Phase 1 are:

(1) Intelligence / Knowledge Development Staff. The J2 / KD

staff supported by other staff lead the JIPOE process to develop an
initial understanding of and monitor the crisis, elevating to the COM
and, if warranted, SACEUR / SHAPE appropriate I&W.

(2) JOPG. As necessary, the core of the JOPG interacts with the
intelligence / knowledge staff to identify information and knowledge
requirements for development as part of CUOE development. They
may also conduct activities, guided by the COM, to support initial
military advice development by SHAPE staff.

(3) Joint Operations Centre (JOC). The JOC contributes to

continuous situational awareness by monitoring major events or
incidents as well as establishing and maintaining the Joint Common
Operational Picture (JCOP) of the area when possible.

9
Tools for Operations Planning Functional Areas Services (TOPFAS) Systems Analysis Tool (SAT) provides a mechanism to
capture and share early information and analysis of the crisis; consideration should be given to establishing a SAT database
during Phase 1 to assist collaboration.

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Strategic Level Operational Level

SACEUR COM
Horizon Scanning Horizon Scanning
(CCOMC) Assigned Areas
Initial Indication of a
Potential / Actual Crisis Initial Indication of a
Potential / Actual Crisis

SACEUR /
SHAPE D&G
Indications of Appreciate Indication of a Potential/
Emerging
Operational Level Phase 1

Actual Crisis
Crisis

Indications of
Emerging Crisis

Initiate CUOE

SHAPE
Staff Level
Coordination
(CCOMC)
Develop Initial
Understanding of, and
Monitor Emerging Crisis

Support Development of
Initial Strategic Military
Advice

Initial Situational Awareness

of a Potential / Actual Crisis

Figure 4.3 Phase 1 Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential / Actual Crisis Main
Activities

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g. External Coordination. Phase 1 activities at the operational level are

facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities,
authorised and appropriate for the emerging crisis under investigation. These
may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) SHAPE. Within SHAPE certain staff groups will be the key touch
points for the JOPG and HQ staff during the OPP:

(a) Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management

Centre (CCOMC). The CCOMC, led by the Director CCOMC
(DCCOMC), is the focus for SHAPE cross-functional effort for
the conduct of strategic Phase 1 activities. It raises to the COM /
CG those emerging crises with potential impact to NATO’s
security interests and, as directed, will further develop an
understanding of and monitor the crisis. The HQ intelligence /
knowledge staff and, as directed by the COM, the core of the
JOPG will collaborate with the CCOMC in the development of an
understanding of the crisis and / or the development of initial
military advice on the crisis. The CCOMC will direct information
gathering and knowledge development across ACO and
establish formats, procedures and standards to maintain
accessibility, currency and accuracy.

(b) Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). SHAPE J9 ensures

coordination of strategic engagement and outreach capability,
primarily composed of experts in specific domains including Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International
Organisations (IOs), Development, Stabilisation and
Reconstruction, Humanitarian, Rule of Law (RoL) and
Governance. It is responsible for coordinating with cooperating
civilian organisations and for developing awareness and
contextualised understanding of non-military aspects of the
situation including the activities of IO, NGO and governmental
organisations (GO) in the area of interest. J9 will also ensure
that topics such as Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC),
Protection of Civilians (PoC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP)
and Building Integrity (BI), although a whole HQ responsibility,
are duly considered during this phase.

(c) Political-Social Analysis (PSA). The PSA branch

applies regional and thematic (primarily political, economic and
social) expertise, including to research and analysis activities, in
support of the development of the contextual understanding of
emerging crises and ongoing operations, especially with regard
to how they may impact Alliance interests.

(d) Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC). The CyOC is

the command element responsible for the planning and

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execution of cyberspace effects at a strategic level through a

centralised command and control (C2) function, and provides to
the SACEUR advice and a standing defence plan for cyberspace
operations, establishing pre-approved responses to cyberspace
incidents, events and attack.

(2) Single Service Commands / Theatre Component Commands.

SCCs / TCCs provide domain situation awareness and advice to
SACEUR and the operational level HQs. They are responsible for the
provision of domain specific planning inputs and cross-joint operational
areas (JOA) domain coordination. Interaction with the TCCs throughout
the NCRP is essential to support the strategic and operational level
plans.

(3) NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). The NIFC is a multi-

national (MN) intelligence organisation with intelligence analysts from
participating member nations. It provides timely, actionable, full-
spectrum intelligence in support of the planning and execution of
operations as tasked by SHAPE J2.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS
4.6. Appreciate Indication of a Potential / Actual Crisis. Indications of an
emerging crisis, which may affect NATO’s security interests, are identified by the
intelligence / knowledge staff. These indications can come from: horizon scanning
(for areas where responsibility has been assigned by SACEUR), an appreciation by
operations staff for an on-going operation, SACEUR / SHAPE; NIWS10; Allies; or
other sources. On the identification of indications the following initial activities should
occur:

a. The intelligence / knowledge staff provides advice on the indications of

the emerging crisis from which direction can be given; no action is currently
required and the intelligence / knowledge staff continue scanning; direct them
to develop an initial understanding of and monitor the situation; or can
immediately advise the COM and seek direction and guidance.

b. The source of initial indications of the emerging crisis, the urgency of

the situation and the magnitude of the possible impact to NATO are to be
considered when deciding what operational Phase 1 activities 11 are
appropriate. SACEUR / SHAPE may direct certain HQ activity in support of
strategic Phase 1 efforts.

c. The operations staff will apprise the COM / CG of possible emerging

crises. The COM will provide guidance and direction12 for the conduct of
operational Phase 1 activities for the possible emerging crisis, including on:

(1) The submission of I&W of an emerging crisis to SACEUR /

SHAPE including initial operational considerations, as appropriate.

(2) The necessity for no additional action. The COM would then
direct that intelligence / knowledge staff return the issue to scanning.

(3) The necessity to conduct additional Phase 1 activities, including

to direct:

(a) CUOE commencement and the development an initial

understanding of, and monitor, the emerging crisis.

(b) The activation of a JOPG core to begin to deepen the

understanding of the emerging crisis, consider possible
operational implications and support SHAPE staff development
of initial military advice.

d. Phase 1 for a particular emerging crisis may continue for a significant

period of time; therefore, this step of Phase 1 will be repeated as necessary to
advise, and seek direction and guidance from the COM due to a change in the
10
The NIWS is specifically designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO HQ and ACO to provide early
warning of any developing threat, risk or concern that could impact on NATO’s security interests.
11
Emerging crises can be very politically sensitive; staff need to continually balance the need to develop an understanding of an
issue and be prepared for possible subsequent phases against the ‘need to know’.
12
COM guidance may also address the sensitivity of the Phase 1 activity, with any restriction on interaction.

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situation, or as a result of SACEUR / NAC13 direction. The responsible senior

staff assigned by the COM to perform any Phase 1 activities (i.e. Director /
Chief of Operations and / or Plans), will update the COM periodically, or as
directed, on the emerging crisis situation, including any recommendations on
the need for continued or further Phase 1 activities.

4.7. Initiate Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating Environment.

The CUOE is a crisis-specific cross-headquarters process14, led by the intelligence /
knowledge staff, to develop a comprehensive understanding covering all political,
military, economic, social, infrastructure and information (PMESII) domains, including
associated potential threats risks and opportunities, in support of planning and the
conduct of operations / support of a wider campaign15. It develops an integrated
understanding of the main characteristics of the operating environment including its
land, air / space, maritime dimensions, as well as the PMESII systems of main
adversaries, friends and neutral actors that may influence joint operations. The
intelligence / knowledge staff will lead on development of necessary JIPOE products
to support the CUOE process during the strategic and operational OPP phases.

4.8. Develop Initial Understanding of, and Monitor, the Emerging Crisis.
When directed, the intelligence / knowledge staff will develop an initial understanding
of the emerging crisis, including the development of an initial systems16 perspective
of the area of interest (e.g. across the PMESII domains). This understanding and
subsequent monitoring, should focus on potential adversaries, friendly and neutral
actors as well as other aspects of the strategic and operating environment relevant to
the potential security risks and threats. This allows the intelligence / knowledge staff
to identify within each system the key personalities, organisations, facilities, features
and materiel and how they interact with other system elements within the
environment.
a. Develop Initial Understanding. The development of an initial
understanding of the emerging crisis will be done in consultation with other
JHQ staff (e.g. Political Advisor (POLAD), Legal Advisor (LEGAD), StratCom
Advisor, Special Operations Forces Advisor (SOFAD), J917, Gender Advisor
(GENAD)) and, as appropriate, SHAPE staff, through the following activities:

(1) Appreciate Existing Information and Intelligence. The

intelligence / knowledge staff will gather, collate, organise and analyse
existing information, intelligence and knowledge on the emerging crisis.

(2) Identify Information, Intelligence and Knowledge

Requirements. Following their initial appreciation of the existing

13
In some cases, when the emerging crisis has significant potential impact to NATO’s security interests, the NAC may quickly
pass through NCRP Phase 1 and direct further NCRP activities; this highlights the importance of preparation before and during
Phase 1 to support the later NCRP phases with timely and informed military advice.
14
The CUOE is a cross-headquarters process, supported by the various functional and special staff areas, some of which have
their own functional process to support their contribution to the CUOE, such as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operating Environment (JIPOE) as described in the AJP-2.
15
Campaign - A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and
geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-06).
16
System - A functionally, physically, and / or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements
forming a unified whole. (COPD definition).
17
J9 staff work in support of operations planning is aided by the use of the Bi-SC CIMIC Functional Planning Guide

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information and intelligence, and whenever required throughout their

initial understanding development, the intelligence / knowledge staff will
identify information, intelligence and knowledge requirements needed
to improve their understanding of the emerging crisis.

(a) Determine Commander’s Critical Information

Requirements (CCIRs). Based on this initial analysis, the staff
should advise the COM on critical information that may be
required for future operational decisions. At this stage CCIRs
should focus on recognising changes in the capabilities or
behaviour of specific actors that might lead or contribute to an
unacceptable situation regarding NATO’s security interests and
the need for a decision from the COM, including the need to
provide further direction and guidance to the staff or the
necessity for further strategic guidance.

(b) Develop Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

Based on the CCIRs, the intelligence staff will develop detailed
PIRs and initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the
NIFC as well as to nations in accordance with the NATO
Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements
Management (CCIRM) process.

(c) Identify other Priority Information and Knowledge

Requirements. In many cases NATO intelligence may not be
the most appropriate source or means for collecting information
and developing knowledge. Therefore, the intelligence /
knowledge staff must identify those other priority information and
knowledge requirements about the area of interest (AOI) as a
basis for collection / acquisition and management of information
and knowledge from other sources for a complete picture.

(d) Coordinate Requirements with SHAPE. It is essential

that the intelligence / knowledge staff coordinates its collection
requirements with SHAPE to avoid redundant efforts and to
make the best use of all available means in NATO.

b. Monitor Emerging Crisis. The intelligence / knowledge staff will

continue to maintain, and if time allows deepen, its understanding of the
emerging crisis. This is a continuous process and the staff will continue to, as
appropriate, task or ask for the collection/acquisition of information /
intelligence to fill the identified gaps. To assist this activity, they will continue,
within delegated authority or established mechanisms (e.g. through SHAPE),
to cultivate appropriate expertise to broaden their understanding of the crisis.
The core of the JOPG may be tasked by the COM to begin to appreciate the
crisis and assist in the activities described in this step.

c. Monitor and Report. As the intelligence / KD staff maintains

understanding of the crisis, they will continue to evaluate if a threat to NATO’s

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security interests exists. Periodically and if the situation deteriorates and

threatens NATO’s security interests further, they will update the Operations
Director and / or the COM on the potential crisis under analysis who will
provide additional direction and or guidance as required.

4.9. Support Development of Initial Strategic Military Advice. In support of HQ

NATO, SACEUR / SHAPE may be requested for initial strategic military advice
(SMA). If requested, the core of the JOPG, ideally including the appointed
operational planning and liaison element (OPLE) members, may develop initial
operational considerations to support SHAPE staff efforts. Such initial considerations
could include a quick time, space and force analysis in relation to what seems to be
the prevailing unacceptable conditions that characterise the potential emerging crisis.
The outcome will be briefed to the COM who, with a personal appreciation of the
emerging crisis, will provide direction and guidance on any refinement and on any
additional preparatory staff activity. Once approved by the COM, the operational
considerations are submitted to SACEUR / SHAPE.

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PHASE 2 - OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGIC

ENVIRONMENT
SECTION 1 - GENERAL
4.10. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 2 is twofold: first, to understand the
strategic situation, the nature of the problem, NATO’s desired end state, and NATO
strategic objectives, including if articulated MSOs through SACEUR’s Strategic
Assessment (SSA); and second, to provide formal operational advice to SACEUR on
the draft strategic MROs. The activities are summarised as follows:

a. Overview. Phase 2 at the operational level spans Phase 2 and 3 at the

strategic level (e.g. SSA and MRO development) and it is divided into two
steps.

(1) The first step begins with receipt of SACEUR's Warning Order
(WNGO). It includes the activation of the JOPG18, deploying an OPLE
to SHAPE, and the conduct of an operational appreciation of the SSA.

(2) Phase 2 continues, in the second step, with the request from
SACEUR to provide operational advice on the draft MROs. If, however,
the NAC requests SACEUR to submit the SSA and MROs as a single
package, then the two steps of Phase 2 are merged accordingly.
Phase 2 ends with the provision of the COM’s advice on the draft
MROs to SACEUR, including any urgent requirements for the
implementation of CRMs, such as the authorisation to prepare and / or
deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team 19 (OLRT) or
other measures that may be required.

b. Prerequisites. Phase 2 is initiated by a SACEUR WNGO.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 2 are depicted in Figure

4.4.

d. Desired Outcome of this Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 2

are:

(1) The HQ (COM and staff (including JOPG)) has an appreciation

of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the context for
all operational level activities.

(2) An operational WNGO has been released to components and

supporting commands.

18
Activation of the JOPG is at the discretion of the COM and will not always be tied to formal SACEUR tasking.
19
Under the Static Warfighting HQ Concept the NCS JFCs will no longer be configured or structured to deploy. Any elements of
the JFC that do deploy will be referred to as Deployable Elements (DE) and these could incorporate the functions of the OLRT
or Forward Command Element (FCE). These terms will be retained within the COPD where appropriate as they capture the role
and function of the DE at specific points in the OPP. It must be remembered that whilst the NCS JFCs are static HQs and non-
deployable, other HQs operating at the operational level may well deploy, either in part or completely.

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Subordinate/ Other
Strategic Level Operational Level Component HQs Operational Level
SACEUR COM COM COM

Strategic Operational
Initiate Operational
Warning Warning
Order
Level Appreciation of Order
the Crisis

SACEUR’s Appreciation of the SACEUR’s

Strategic Strategic
Strategic Context of
Assessment Assessment
the Crisis
Operational Level Phase 2 - Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment

Appreciate Level and

Scope of International
Step 1 – Appreciation of the SSA

Engagement
Collaborative Planning / Interaction

Appreciate
Implications for NATO

Appreciate Strategic
Military Considerations

Brief Commander on
SSA Appreciation

SHAPE
CAT Plans
Assist SHAPE during
Collaborative MRO Development
Planning and Collaborative Planning / Interaction
Interaction
Commander’s
Draft MROs
Guidance for MRO
Draft MROs Analysis
Step 2 – Operational Advice on MROs

Analyse Draft Military Component

Response Options OPG

Advice on
MRO
elements
Evaluate MROs (ie Force
Capabilities)

Develop
Considerations Collaborative Planning / Interaction

Operational
Commander’s Provide Operational Op Advice
Share
Advice Advice

Share

Figure 4.4 Phase 2 Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment Main

Activities

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(3) Operational advice on the draft MROs to assist their refinement

has been submitted to SACEUR, including:

(a) The main operational conclusions and concerns on the

different MROs, including strategic risks and possible operational
mitigation, strategic opportunities and potential exploitation at the
operational level, an appreciation of possible coordination,
synchronisation and deconfliction requirements with other HQs,
and an appreciation as to MRO’s adequacy, merits and potential
for operational success. This appreciation includes the COM’s
MRO recommendation.

(b) Critical operational requirements, including strategic

preconditions for operational success, mission essential force
capabilities, interaction requirements with relevant actors, etc.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The COM provides

direction and guidance for the conduct of Phase 2 activities, including, where
appropriate, the authorisation for any preparatory activities. The primary staff
elements involved during Phase 1 are:

(1) JOPG. The JOPG, as guided by the COM, plays the leading
role in the development of the operational appreciation of the SSA and
the analysis and operational evaluation of MROs including their
adequacy, merits and potential for operational success. The JOPG is
supported by subordinate / supporting Component Commands (CCs) if
designated, and other staff branches as required, including intelligence
/ knowledge, operations staff (synchronisation and execution, effects
management), etc. The JOPG must be prepared to conduct its
analysis in a dynamic collaborative process with the SHAPE CAT Plans
and CCOMC staff. Should other operational level HQs or JFCs also be
planning against the same crisis then the JOPG needs to be prepared
to widen its collaborative process. The JOPG composition will be
tailored and adjusted as required.

(2) Intelligence / Knowledge Development Staff. Intelligence and

KD staff will lead the CUOE process. They will also directly assist the
JOPG to understand the nature of the crisis as well as the actions,
capabilities and behaviour of the main actors / systems and influencing
factors that account for the current situation and its development. Their
support should include a holistic briefing based on the developed
CUOE to the JOPG at the commencement of Phase 2.

f. External Coordination. The JOPG and staff branches will be primarily

coordinating with the following staff elements at SHAPE and collaborating
commands:

(1) SHAPE.

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(a) Cross Functional Action Team (CAT) Plans. A task

organised, cross functional team will be established to develop
the SSA and the MROs, under Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS)
J5 lead, in coordination with Director CCOMC. The JOPG will
coordinate / collaborate with CAT Plans, especially to, as
requested, assist in the development of the MROs. A HQ liaison
cell or a full OPLE will be sent to SHAPE to assist this
collaboration.

(b) CCOMC. The CCOMC will transition relevant information,

intelligence and knowledge to support CAT Plans, along with
selected members who participated in the initial analysis work on
the emerging crisis. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the
crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the
CAT Plans.

(2) Operational Level Commands. Depending upon the nature of

the crisis, other operational level HQs or SSC / TCCs may also have
been assigned tasks and be conducting parallel OPP activities.
Reciprocal liaison and planning support requirements must be
identified, agreed and provided as soon as possible in line with
strategic direction and guidance.

(3) Subordinate / Supporting Commands. The subordinate /

supporting CCs and other commands may be required to contribute to
the development of operational advice and they should be alerted to
any requirements for liaison or planning support to the JOPG.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

STEP 1 - APPRECIATION OF SACEUR’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT.

4.11. Initiate an Operational Level Appreciation of the Crisis. Following the

notification of a potential or emerging crisis the JFCs, SSCs, TCCs and other
operational level HQs if relevant, if not already following, must initiate an operational
level appreciation of the crisis. The following actions should be conducted:

a. Appreciate SACEUR’s Warning Order. On receipt of SACEUR’s

WNGO, the urgency of the situation must be assessed and the requirements
for immediate action determined. The staff should update the COM on the
details of the WNGO and initial actions taken, and seek any additional
direction and guidance. The initial staff appreciation should have considered
the following elements:

(1) The strategic task requested by the NAC (e.g. develop an SSA).
In urgent situations, under FTDM procedures, the NAC may request
that SACEUR provide the SSA and MROs at the same time.

(2) Any NAC guidance, including potential military or non-military

roles.

(3) The potential, or precise if clear, operational task(s) to be

accomplished and any guidance.

(4) The time available.

(5) Actions stemming from declared CRMs, including

implementation reports.

(6) Activation of operational crisis response bodies, including the

JOPG, OPLE and liaison elements20.

(7) The need for additional guidance and / or clarification.

b. Commander's Initial Guidance. The COM should provide direction

and guidance on the following:

(1) The need to activate operational crisis response bodies,

including:

(a) JOPG.

(b) OPLE.

20
Depending upon the nature of the identified crisis, potential members of an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
(OLRT) may be identified, accepting that the authority for the preparation and deployment of an OLRT with come from declared
Crisis Response Measures (CRMs).

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(c) SSC / Supporting HQs / Subordinate / Component

Commands to be involved.

(d) Requirements for external coordination and liaison.

(2) Specific focus areas for staff analysis:

(a) Consideration of the need for, or implications of, FTDM.

(b) Requirements for additional NATO CRMs.

(c) Other areas of concern.

(3) Timings for review of the operational appreciation of the SSA.

(4) Issues to be clarified.

c. Activate Operational Crisis Response Bodies. As directed by the

COM, the following actions will be conducted.

(1) Activate the JOPG.

(2) Issue warning orders to subordinate commands and request

liaison / planning elements.

(3) Deploy an OPLE / liaison element to SHAPE, if not already

deployed (i.e. minimum of a JOPG experienced planner).

(4) Determine requirement for external coordination and establish

liaison with other JFCs, HQs, organisations, and agencies, as
appropriate and authorised.

(5) Alert the OLRT for possible deployment.

(6) Update information on AOIs.

(7) Confirm requirement for inclusion of operational staff in the

Strategic Assessment Team21 (SAT).

(8) Liaise with the Standing Joint Logistic Support Group (SJLSG) /
Allied Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC) and prepare to deploy
a liaison officer (LO) to HQ SJLSG.

d. Comprehensive Understanding of the Operating Environment. If

not already commenced, the HQ must initiate the CUOE process to ensure
that products are available to support the development of an appreciation of
21
A SAT may be deployed to a crisis area, when authorised by the NAC, to facilitate the completion of a strategic estimate for
the crisis. Alternatively a Civil-Military Assessment and Liaison Team (CMALT) may be deployed, which has co-leads (one
representing the political-military level and one representing the strategic military level). In the comprehensive environment, this
may be the model for the future, vice a purely military team. Limited in size, a SAT will be tailored to the particular crisis and
may include operational level representation; the deployment of OLRT would have to be coordinated with any deployed SAT.

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the strategic environment, analysis of potential MROs and subsequent

operational level planning beginning in Phase 3 - Operational Estimate.

4.12. Appreciation of the Strategic Context of the Crisis. To analyse SACEUR’s

draft MROs and as part of the prudent operational thinking, the JOPG requires a
thorough appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the
context for all operational level activities, subject to political guidance / constraints,
information and time available. As CAT Plans develops the SSA, the JOPG may in
parallel begin to develop its own appreciation of the situation as described in the
process of this section, keeping abreast of the SSA development by the OPLE at
SHAPE. As a start point for the JOPG, the intelligence / KD staff may provide a
CUOE brief on the situation, if the CUOE work is sufficiently mature at this point.
They can also be asked to provide products or briefings in support of the process
described in this step. When the SSA is completed, the JOPG will analyse it and
update or validate their developing appreciation for the strategic situation.

a. Review Available Knowledge and Assessments. The JOPG should

establish the extent to which SHAPE and / or its own / other operational level
HQs may have already developed a knowledge base for the area and an initial
strategic appreciation of the crisis. This will determine whether the immediate
task is to review existing analysis or to develop an initial strategic appreciation
in parallel with knowledge development. Care must be taken to avoid
duplication of effort between HQs. In the event that a knowledge base has
been developed by another HQ, the COM should request the temporary
deployment of an intelligence / knowledge element from that HQ to transfer
the required knowledge and information22. In any case, the COM and HQ staff
must quickly gain a common understanding of the nature of the crisis, the
main actors, their interrelationships and the main influencing factors as
described in the following paragraphs.

b. Understand the Nature, Scale and Scope of the Problem. The first
step for the JOPG, supported by the intelligence / KD staff, is to review and
update the main structural features and relationships that define the situation
and the current ‘system’ states to establish:

(1) The unacceptable conditions in the current situation in terms of

international norms that characterise the crisis.

(2) The historical background and events leading to the crisis.

(3) The PMESII factors contributing to the crisis.

(4) The main actors influencing the problem and its resolution,
including potential adversaries and friends, as well as the main non-
NATO actors engaged in the crisis.

22
This transfer may be facilitated granting access to an existing TOPFAS database for the crisis, if one exists.

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(5) Current trends, the likely course of future events and potential
outcomes.

(6) Potential strategic risks and threats to NATO’s security interests.

(7) Critical issues requiring urgent attention.

(8) Uncertainties and gaps in knowledge.

c. Understand the Key Factors Contributing to the Crisis. On this

basis, the JOPG needs to identify and understand those key actor systems
and factors influencing the crisis and its likely causes, as well as changes
required to improve the overall situation, to include:

(1) The operating environment, including the influence of geography,

hydrography, weather and climate.

(2) Political aspects, including stability, governance, power

dynamics including through the use of corruption, representation,
political interest groups, administration, international relations and
diplomacy.

(3) Military / security aspects, including the security situation and

stability, internal and external threats, the armed forces, internal
security forces, paramilitary forces and illegally armed groups, strategic
capabilities, WMD, the provision of arms and sustainment.

(4) Economic aspects, including vital national resources and assets,

production, trade and commerce, distribution, consumption, inflation
and debt.

(5) Social aspects, including justice, the rule of law, social support
systems, health, religion, education, welfare, gender relations, scale of
CAAC23 issues, and PoC consideration through a population-centric
approach24.

(6) Infrastructure aspects, including utilities, energy, cultural

properties, logistics and transportation nodes, networks and means,
communications, industry and public facilities.

(7) Information aspects, including: national intelligence; mass

communications and media; utilisation of space technology and
capabilities, information activities by different actors and social groups
as well as their receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability to messages;
cyber threats to Communication and Information Systems (CIS); and
Command and Control Structure / Systems (C2S).

23
As per MCM-0016-2012 , Children and Armed Conflict, dated 10 Jul 12 and Bi-SC Directive 086-004 on Children and Armed
Conflict, dated 10 Jun 2016
24
MC Concept for the Protection of Civilians identifies a Protection of Civilians framework to assist developing such
considerations.

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d. Understand the Main Actors and their Role in the Crisis. It is

critical for the JOPG to understand the effects created by the actions of each
actor25, as well as the attributes of each actor’s systems to gain insight into
how it might be possible to influence them. A clear classification / grouping of
friendly, adversary, neutral, non-aligned and supporting actors is required and
should be conducted at this stage. Building on the existing knowledge about
each actor in the knowledge base as well as insights from intelligence /
knowledge staff, the JOPG should review and understand the following:

(1) Political Goals and Objectives. Review the actions and

statements of each actor and its main elements to understand what
they seek to achieve as well as their desired end state.

(2) Main Characteristics. Consider each actor’s motivations

including the influences of history, culture, values, beliefs, and
prevailing attitudes, as well as the personality traits, psychological
profiles, motives, interests of key individuals. At this point it is also
useful to consider the receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of
actors to different types of external influences.

(3) Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses. Review the key

system elements and influences to identify main attributes, strengths
and weaknesses of each actor to achieve its goals and objectives.
System network diagrams, including a geo-spatial view of each system,
help in determining positive and negative influences as well as critical
dependencies. This will point to the main sources of power, as well as
any deficiencies that must be considered during the analysis of centres
of gravity (CoG), critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR)
and critical vulnerabilities (CV).

(4) Relationships with other Actors. Each actor will have a variety
of relationships with other actors that enhance or detract from its power
and influence in accomplishing its goals. Understanding the nature and
basis of these relationships and how they may evolve may provide
insight into how they might be influenced.

(5) Strategies and the Use of Power. It is essential for the JOPG
to understand the main tenets of each actor’s strategy, and the IoP on
which it depends, to appreciate the possible implications for NATO’s
actions.

(6) Actions and Effects. It is critical at this point to appreciate the

interaction between each actor’s capabilities, actions and resultant
effects26 to gain insight into how they might be influenced, using
25
There may be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, partners and others, whose actions
have contributed to the current crisis and may influence its future development. These actors have interests and act in pursuit
of those interests in accordance with their capabilities and motivation. They can be viewed as systems, comprised of different
elements, which interact with other systems to create effects intended to support their goals. Their actions will also create
effects that may have other consequences in the crisis.
26
Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes.
(Proposed definition).

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different IoP to establish conditions that would improve the overall

situation.

(7) Possible Response to NATO Involvement. Based on an

understanding of the different actors, consider the likely response of
each actor to possible NATO responses. This will provide an initial
indication of potential adversaries, partners and neutrals. It may also
highlight the strengths of these relationships including those that may
be conditional.

(8) Potential Risks / Threats and Opportunities. The SSA may

have identified potential risks / threats and opportunities at the strategic
level. The JOPG should assess these and determine what could be the
implications at the operational level.

(9) Knowledge Gaps. The analysis of actors will highlight gaps in

knowledge. The JOPG should capture any additional requirements for
information, knowledge and intelligence that will be submitted to the
intelligence / knowledge staff for production.

4.13. Appreciate the Level and Scope of International Engagement. The JOPG
must understand the level and scope of international engagement, and potential
engagement, in order to appreciate the broader strategic environment in which they
may be expected to operate within. The following areas must be considered:

a. Review International Legal Aspects. The JOPG, with advice from

the LEGAD and POLAD, will review the legal aspects of the crisis in terms of
applicable law and policy as well as any relevant United Nations (UN)
resolutions.

b. Review International Commitments. The JOPG needs to identify the

lead agencies coordinating efforts in different areas and sectors could
contribute to the resolution of the crisis, including those IOs, GO and NGOs
engaged in humanitarian aid (HA), human rights, protection of minorities,
refugees and displaced persons, CAAC, gender, legal assistance, medical
care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, and general project funding. It is
critical that the JOPG understands the mandate, role, structure, methods and
principles of these organisations to determine:

(5) The lead agencies coordinating efforts in different geographical

and sectors (e.g. governance, development, security, humanitarian).

(6) The nature, level and scope of commitments.

(7) The goals and objectives, as well as major obstacles to

achieving them.

(8) Potential future contributions.

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(9) The relevant international actors with which interaction is

required, as well as the degree of interaction required with each.

(10) The spectrum of interaction with external agencies and IOs

(cooperation, coordination, coexistence etc.).

(11) Potential roles for NATO to enable international efforts, gain

synergies and limit interferences, including security and theatre logistic
(including medical) support.

(12) Possible areas for cooperation and mutual support with early
identification of supporting / supported roles.

(13) Priorities for coordination and liaison.

c. Review the International Media and Public Opinion. Within the

JOPG, with consideration to any StratCom direction and guidance from the
NAC and SHAPE, the StratCom Advisor with military Public Affairs (MilPA)
leads a collaborative process with Information Operations (InfoOps),
Psychological Operations (PsyOps), GENAD and POLAD in developing an
understanding of the level of media interest27 among different audiences, as
well as any prevailing attitudes. This understanding will underpin future
StratCom efforts to communicate with various audiences to gain and retain
strategic initiative. The following should be done to assist development of this
understanding:

(1) Appreciate media infrastructure and assets for production. This

appreciation examines the availability, affiliation and reach of assets as
well as the credibility of contents. Understanding the various media
outlets is essential to inform any appreciation of their potential impact
and to assist the efficient dissemination of information.

(2) Appreciate prevailing attitudes and issues in the region. This

appreciation provides the basis for determining requirements for
InfoOps, as well as the best use of resources to deliver relevant
information to selected populations.

4.14. Appreciate Implications for NATO. Based on the SSA and the strategic
understanding of the situation the JOPG should appreciate the following aspects of
the crisis and their implications for NATO:

a. Appreciate Potential Strategic Risks, Threats and Opportunities.

The JOPG should appreciate the potential risks, threats and opportunities to
NATO’s security interests, including any issues requiring urgent attention at
the operational level.

27
Media attitudes may reflect, or influence, public opinion and ultimately will influence, positively or negatively, popular and
political support of NATO activities and eventual mission success. The analysis of media content helps to understand prevailing
attitudes and key issues; and provides further insight into the different aspects of the crisis, including potential support and
opposition to a possible NATO response.

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b. Appreciate the NATO Political Context. The JOPG will appreciate

the political context, including any limitations and assumptions.

c. Understand the Provisional End-State, Strategic Objectives and

Strategic Effects. The JOPG analyses the desired NATO end state, strategic
objectives28 and strategic effects in the context of the main actors and
systems to understand strategic and operational conditions required to secure
NATO’s security interests. The JOPG should identify the strategic changes
required in the capabilities and behaviour of specific actor and system states
and these actor’s interactions as well as their influences within the strategic
environment.

4.15. Appreciate Strategic Military Considerations. The SSA will conclude with a
succinct synopsis of military considerations to inform the NAC on the applicability of
the use of the NATO military instrument to assist with the situation resolution, if they
so decide. If the NAC decides that the Alliance should become involved in the crisis,
the SSA and its military considerations should assist the NAC in providing the
necessary direction (through a subsequent NAC Decision Sheet requesting options)
for SACEUR to develop MROs. The JOPG should appreciate the military
considerations or other summary comments included in the SSA or its cover letter.
What is articulated under military considerations will vary for each situation, but could
include:

a. Applicability of the Military IoP. Applicability of the military IoP in

general to assist with resolution of the crisis, including necessity, suitability,
availability and existing constraints; this can include an appreciation on the
possible use of NATO forces held at high readiness, or the activation of an
advance plan the possible impact on other NATO operations, etc.

b. Military Strategic Objectives. As part of military considerations and

the use of the NATO military IoP, the SSA may articulate provisional MSOs; if
so, the JOPG must analyse them to appreciate the possible strategic aims to
be achieved with military power. It is critical that the JOPG recognises that the
development of MSOs is an iterative process throughout strategic assessment
and option development, which must ensure that MSOs are balanced with the
means and ways available for their achievement.

c. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements. The JOPG should appreciate

those actors with whom SHAPE or the HQ and other HQs may need to
interact with to further develop an understanding of the situation and, when
requested, to develop military options for possible NATO involvement.

4.16. Brief Commander on SSA Appreciation. The main purpose of the

appreciation of the SSA is to position the HQ for their role in MRO development with
a thorough appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the
context for all operational level activities. It is extremely important at this stage to

28
MC 0133 outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives
may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any
strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.

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ensure that the COM and the staff share the same appreciation of the strategic
situation and this will be achieved through the following actions:

a. The JOPG presents to the COM a succinct summary of their

appreciation of the SSA, especially any areas where the JOPG analysis and
the SSA diverge. The COM, who will also have reviewed the SSA and
developed an initial personal appreciation of the strategic situation, validates
its analysis or refocuses the staff, as required, and directs further work in
areas of concern as necessary.

b. While there is no requirement to provide feedback to SACEUR /

SHAPE on the appreciation of the SSA, if there are divergences between the
strategic appreciation of the situation and that from the operational level, these
should be brought to the attention of CAT Plans by the JOPG if not already
done so by the OPLE or, if required, to SACEUR by the COM.

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STEP 2 - OPERATIONAL ADVICE ON MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

4.17. Assist SHAPE during MRO Development. MROs are developed by SHAPE
and provide the NAC with a series of military options for achieving MSOs, which will
contribute to the establishment of the desired NATO end state conditions within the
context of a comprehensive approach by the wider international community (IC).
Throughout Phase 2, the JOPG will collaborate with CAT Plans in the development
of MROs; this is done primarily through the OPLE at SHAPE, but the JOPG could
also be requested to advise CAT Plans in a specific area, such as with the
development of capability listings for each MRO.

4.18. Commander’s Guidance for MRO Analysis. Prior to staffing the MROs to
SACEUR, SHAPE will seek formal advice from the operational level command(s) to
assist in their finalisation. The COM, with a personal appreciation of the situation
and how the military instrument at the operational level may contribute to its
resolution, will provide guidance and direction to the JOPG to focus their analysis of
the draft MROs for the development of operational advice. The COM’s direction and
guidance should include:

a. Ensure that the military ends, ways and means (forces likely to be
available) are balanced and those strategic PCS, including the contributions of
non-military efforts, have been addressed, may ask key questions to the HQ
staff, such as:

(1) Will the achievement of the MSO(s) establish the conditions

necessary for the achievement of the desired NATO end state?

(2) What military operational actions must be conducted to create

the effects required to achieve MSOs?

(3) What are the essential military capabilities and enabling common
funded resources required to conduct the military operations
successfully?

(4) Are the MSOs achievable with the means likely to be available
and the ways acceptable to political authorities?

(5) Are the necessary strategic conditions in place to ensure

operational success and effective cooperation with other instruments?

(6) What are the operational risks (i.e. risk to mission and risk to
force) and how can they be mitigated?

b. As time for development of operational advice is often limited, in

addition to asking the JOPG to evaluate the feasibility of each MRO from an
operational point of view and to validate the recommended MRO, the COM
may ask the JOPG to focus on certain MRO elements of concern (e.g.
strategic military objectives, strategic military effects, CNMAs, force capability
requirements, PCS and / or operational risks and opportunities).

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4.19. Analyse Draft Military Response Options. With consideration to their

previous appreciation of the SSA, the NAC guidance for MRO development, and any
COM’s guidance and direction, the JOPG analyses each draft MRO to determine
their operational viability, the comparison of MROs, and the conclusions including
which MRO is likely to be recommended if known. The JOPG is supported in its
analysis by functional expertise from across the HQ as required, including system
analysts and, to look at the MROs from an opposing actors’ point of view, the
intelligence / KD staff.

a. Appreciate the NATO Planning Environment. The JOPG should

make every effort to determine if there are lessons from previous operations
that should be considered during their analysis of MROs and development of
operational advice. Where operational advice is being provided by several
operational level HQs or JFCs, then the JOPG must consider the implications
of their advice on the other HQs. The JOPG will analyse the elements of each
MRO and their comparison, as described by the following paragraphs, and
populate the annexes of the operational advice template as provided in Annex
D Appendix 1.

b. Appreciate the NATO End State. Provided in the NAC decision sheet
requesting the submission of MROs, the desired NATO end state would
describe the conditions that must be established at the end of a NATO
engagement; these conditions may be established through a combination of
military and non-military means. MROs would normally be designed to
achieve strategic military aims to support one desired NATO end state.
However, depending on the situation and guidance received, MROs leading to
different NATO end states may be developed. The JOPG must appreciate the
conditions described in the NATO end state, to evaluate the effectiveness of
each MRO to contribute to establishing these conditions and achieving the
end state.

c. Appreciate the Mission. SACEUR’s Mission will ultimately be given

by the NAC; however, as part of the MRO process, SACEUR can recommend
a potential mission associated with a specific MRO. The mission statement 29
should, among other things, include the MSOs that SACEUR must achieve to
contribute to the achievement of NATO’s end state.

d. Appreciate Military Strategic Objectives. Potential MSOs will be

developed for each MRO; these may have been first proposed with the SSA.
The JOPG must provide advice on the operational feasibility of achieving
these objectives.

e. Appreciate Military Strategic Effects. The JOPG analyses the MSEs

that must be created using primarily military means to achieve each SO /
NMSO and MSO. They should also appreciate any essential support to non-
military efforts or support to be received by non-military means. The JOPG

29
A mission is described as a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it
will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted.

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must ensure that the desired changes in the capabilities, actions and / or
influences of specific actor / systems could be created through the use of
military means or whether non-military means or a combination of military and
non-military would be appropriate.

f. Appreciate Military Strategic Actions. The JOPG analyses any

given MSAs30. These must logically:

(1) Cover the range of actions to create effects required to change

the capabilities and behaviour of specific actors / systems, and lead to
achievement of the MSOs.

(2) Be feasible in terms of strategic power projection, operational

reach and sustainment.

(3) Avoid creating any unintended effects that would undermine the
achievement of the NATO strategic objective(s).

g. Appreciate the Use of Complementary Non-Military Actions. In

many cases desired strategic effects cannot be created by military action
alone or could be created more effectively by diplomatic, information and
economic actions31, possibly in conjunction with military means. At this early
stage in the planning process it must be remembered that the position,
involvement and actions of non-military actors and organisations may not be
clear or agreed, therefore there is inherent risk in making assumptions about
what other supporting activity may occur. The COM must be satisfied that
proposed CNMA would:

(1) Be sufficient to create required effects in conjunction with

prescribed military activity.

(2) Allow required coordination with military efforts at appropriate

levels of command.

h. Appreciate Force Capability Requirements. With the input of liaison

/ planning elements from the designated component commands, the JOPG
should appreciate the adequacy of the primary military capabilities 32 described
in the option to conduct the MSAs and create the desired effect, taking into
account the possible opposition. In addition, the JOPG should appreciate (not
in order of priority):

30
MSAs are an intellectual tool to assist the development of MROs in sufficient detail for them to be understood by the NAC and
the operational level. They may be ‘activities’ to be done by strategic forces or assigned to one or more operational
commanders. They assist further in the identification of force capability requirements. Following approval by the NAC of a
selected response option, and its military contribution, MSAs assist in the development of provisional missions, including
objectives, for the operational COM(s) which will be included in the Strategic Planning Directive (SPD). With the issue of the
SPD, the MSAs cease to have utility; they are not to be construed to have the intent of constraining the op level COM in the
conduct of an operational estimate and the subsequent development and selection of a course of action.
31
Political, economic and civil if using the PMEC construct for IoPs.
32
Capability requirements are stated using Bi-SC agreed capability codes to facilitate force generation by nations and
harmonisation with NATO defence planning, as outlined in Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements.

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(1) The capability and suitability of any high readiness forces, such
as the NRF, to meet urgent requirements.

(2) The readiness, suitability and availability of other forces or

capabilities.

(3) The need to incorporate partner capabilities, or opportunities for

their incorporation.

(4) Impact on force generation (FGen) for the option and other
operations over time.

i. Appreciate the Main Support Requirements. The JOPG with input

from designated subordinate / supporting and component commands, must
appreciate the main implications of the logistics, engineering and medical
support requirements for each option to verify feasibility in terms of:

(1) Strategic lift requirements and costs for NATO33.

(2) Theatre logistics requirements for establishing and operating

staging and logistic bases, Air Ports of Debarkation (APODs), Sea
Ports of Debarkation (SPODs), Rail Points of Debarkation (RPODs),
storage and distribution of all classes of supply, establishing and
maintaining lines of communications (LoCs), and developing
infrastructure. The logistic element of an OLRT plays a critical role in
reconnaissance of movement infrastructure and coordination with the
Host Nations (HN), as well as with relevant international actors
operating in the area, for the use of facilities and LOCs.

(3) Potential logistic support to / from relevant IOs, GOs and NGOs.

(4) Military Engineering (MILENG) support and infrastructure

requirements.

(5) Medical support.

(6) Budget estimates, including costs associated with Deployable

Communication and Information Systems (DCIS) deployment and
sustainment (e.g. satellite costs) and service provision. Due to the lack
of detail of requirements in an MRO (as compared to that provided in a
CONOPS), the financial estimate at this point will likely be only a rough
order magnitude (RoM) covering, if possible, both military budget (MB)
and NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) aspects.

(7) Availability of potential Host Nation Support (HNS).

(8) Potential commercial support requirements.

33
Strategic movement is a collective responsibility where NATO and Nations have specific and shared responsibilities, MC
0336.

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In this task the JOPG is supported by HQ SJLSG, and specifically SJLSG /

AMCC for the deployment and strategic movement analysis.

j. Appreciate Provisional Theatre of Operations (TOO) and Joint

Operations Area (JOA)34. With input from designated component
commands, the JOPG should provide advice on whether the provisional TOO
and JOA(s), as determined by SACEUR, will be sufficient to achieve the
MSOs.

(1) Assigned TOO provides space for the conduct or support of the
military option.

(2) Assigned JOA provides space for the conduct of operations.

(3) Assigned JOA allows for coordination and deconfliction with

adjacent JOAs where applicable.

k. Appreciate Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements. The

JOPG with input from designated subordinate, supporting and component
commands must ensure that the principal command arrangements for each
option meet potential operational requirements:

(1) C2 structure is adequate for the operational level, including JHQ

and necessary component, regional and / or functional commands.

(2) Appropriate use of NCS (e.g. JFCs, SCCs, TCCs) and / or NFS
(i.e. NFS JHQ) and other structures available to NATO (e.g. NSHQ or
CyOC). Any selected HQ(s) must be, or be augmented to be,
sufficiently joint for the possible scope of military operations for the
MRO. The JOPG should also consider the need for and the
implications / ramifications of deploying the HQ (e.g. early
considerations of possible manpower reinforcement and the
mechanism35 best suited to manage this reinforcement (either a Crisis
Establishment (CE) or a reinforced Peacetime Establishment (PE)).

(3) If the HQ(s) identified in the MRO to command the operation are
not current designated, then operational advice should include
considerations for how operational planning should be conducted if that
MRO is selected.

(4) C2 structure is feasible in terms of deployment and sustainment

of DCIS.

34
For simplicity TOO is generally associated with the strategic level, JOA with the operational level and Area of Operations
(AOO) with the tactical level.
35
Standard Manpower Procedure (SMAP) 15 - NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy (change 19 to MC 0216/4-AAP–16 (D)).

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(5) Initial Supported and Supporting Inter-relationship36 (SSI) has

been defined.

(6) Where non-military organisations have been identified they must

be included in a liaison structure.

l. Appreciate Rules of Engagement (ROE) Requirements. The JOPG,

with input from designated subordinate, supporting and component
commands, has to identify specific ROE requirements from the operational
aspect and provide advice for each MRO on the use of force, including lethal
and non-lethal measures.

m. Appreciate Legal Requirements. The JOPG must review the legal

requirements identified for each option and provide operational advice on the
requirement for:

(1) Ensuring an appropriate legal basis for the option.

(2) Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU), Technical Agreements / Arrangements (TAs),
etc. These cover such areas as country clearance for transit, over
flight, staging, basing and support with HNs and transit countries as
required.

(3) Necessary additional agreements for mission support with host

and third nations (e.g. handover of suspected criminals, handling and
prosecution of suspected pirates, etc.).

n. Appreciate Strategic Communication Requirements. The HQ must

ensure that the principal requirements for StratCom have been identified and
adequately cover:

(1) Potential audiences and any need for prioritisation.

(2) Effects to be created.

(3) Requirements for policy guidance on methods to enable and

promote relationships with all appropriate actors (civil, military,
governmental and non-governmental) in the information environment.

(4) Required authorities for addressing the prioritised potential

audiences (including level (by whom), timing (when), and any
constraints / restraints).

(5) Specialised capabilities and staff requirements to plan, develop

and execute operations in the information environment.

36
Clear command relationships are central to effective operations and organisations. The SSI designations are designed to
ensure that all COMs and Commands fully understand their relationship to one another and from that what they will be
expecting to receive (supported) or delivery (supporting).

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o. Appreciate Requirements for Interaction with Relevant National

and International Actors. The JOPG should appreciate the requirements
and arrangements for effective interaction with relevant national and
international actors, including:

(1) Arrangements for in-theatre coordination with cooperating

civilian organisations.

(2) Liaison requirements with local, IO, NGO and GO entities.

p. Appreciate Preconditions for Success. JOPG should provide

operational guidance on those strategic PCS that must be established or
fostered by the political level in order to achieve operational success.

q. Consider Pre-Deployment of Enabling Forces. The JOPG should

assess the need for enabling capabilities may be required to pre-deploy, such
as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), special operations,
logistics, civil-military cooperation or deployable elements (DE) from a HQ.

r. Appreciate CRMs Requirements. CRMs requirements for different

MROs will most likely be similar; nevertheless, the JOPG must provide advice
for declaration of pre-authorised CRMs and recommendations for further
devolution of CRM authorities to SACEUR by the NAC.

s. Appreciate Possible Partner and Non-NATO Nations Participation.

A final decision on Partner and non-NATO Nations’ participation will rest with
the NAC; nevertheless, SACEUR will, at this early stage of the planning
process, provide a view on possible partner and non-NATO nations’
participation. The HQ can contribute with operational views on this issue.

4.20. Evaluation of MROs. Each of the MROs must be formally evaluated in order
to allow an appropriate comparison made to help inform the final operational advice.

a. Appreciate Strategic Evaluation of MROs. Following the review of

each MRO, the JOPG will then review the strategic evaluation of the MROs,
as articulated in the draft MRO document, including advantages,
disadvantages, impact on ongoing operations and strategic risks. Strategic
risk can be understood as the probability of failure in achieving a MSO within
an acceptable cost. Therefore, the JOPG should review the evaluation of
strategic risks by carefully examining the degree to which MSOs (ends),
concepts (ways) and resources (means) may be in or out of balance. The
JOPG should conclude this appreciation by considering the strategic level’s
recommended MRO and rationale.

b. Operational Evaluation of MROs. Based on their analysis of each

MRO and appreciation of the strategic evaluation of the MROs, the JOPG
conducts an evaluation of the MROs from an operational perspective,
including developing an appreciation of possible operational risks and
opportunities (i.e. risk to mission / risk to force and opportunities). Operational

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risks and opportunities are based on probability of an operational failure or

success and the consequences. The JOPG should review the main strategic
factors related to time, space, forces / actors and information within the
theatre to identify risks and their possible consequences on the
accomplishment of an operational military mission.

4.21. Develop Considerations. The JOPG draws together its conclusions from its
analysis and comparison of the different MROs as to their adequacy, merits and
potential for operational success, highlighting in the process any operational
concerns or advice. When developing their considerations, they should focus on the
guidance and direction provided by the COM, including the key operational questions
previously identified. They should also consider lessons learned from previous
operations that should be reflected in the COM’s operational advice. Some of these
conclusions may highlight critical operational requirements or key issues.

a. Identify Critical Operational Requirements. The JOPG may have

identified specific operational requirements that are critical for operational
success, including in particular, but not limited to:

(1) Preconditions for success.

(2) Mission essential force capabilities.

(3) Critical in-theatre support and infrastructure.

(4) Essential C2 arrangements (including if the HQ needs to

deploy), including CIS enablers and Cyberspace Defensive operations.

(5) Pre-deployment of enabling forces37.

(6) Deterrence operations.

(7) ROE considerations.

(8) StratCom and Information strategy.

(9) Relevant national and international actors with which interaction

will be required and the degree of such interaction.

(10) Additional CRMs, in particular to prepare and / or deploy an

OLRT, as well as other enabling elements.

Operational advice on these requirements can be captured in the Operational

Advice annexes. If however, they are considered critical to the viability of one
or all MROs then they must be highlighted to SACEUR in the Operational
Advice main body.

37
Enabling force – A force tailored to the requirements sent in advance to prepare for the full deployment of a main force in
theatre. NATO Term.

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b. Determine Key Issues for SACEUR. Throughout the process, the

JOPG will have been collaborating with CAT Plans and raising significant
issues as they arise. However, in addition the JOPG should assist the COM
in identifying those specific issues that have not been resolved and should be
raised directly with SACEUR.

4.22. Provide Operational Advice. The final operational advice provided to

SACEUR from the operational level COM(s) represents the conclusion of Phase 2.
Collaborative working and interaction between the operational level staffs and
SHAPE throughout the phase will have helped influence the design and composition
of the MROs and the final operational advice will represent the COM’s opinion,
supported by the staff analysis, on each of the MROs and a recommendation on the
most appropriate from the operational perspective.

a. Brief Commander on Staff MRO Analysis and Considerations. The

JOPG presents to the COM a summary of its analysis, considerations and
proposed operational advice with respect to the operational viability of the
MROs. This can be done through a formal brief or informally, using the draft
Operational Advice document, by select members of the JOPG; the approach
will depend on the COM’s preference and will also have to balance the need
for timely provision of operational advice to SACEUR so that it can be
considered in the finalisation of the MROs prior to their submission to the
NAC. The JOPG should present a succinct summary of their main
conclusions, concerns and advice for each MRO, leading to a staff
recommendation. This presentation should include feedback to the COM on
any area on which analysis was specifically requested. The JOPG should
also highlight critical operational requirements or other considerations, key
issues or operational concerns. The COM, who will have by this time
developed a personal appreciation of the draft MROs, provides direction and
guidance for the refinement of operational advice to ensure it highlights the
areas that are of concern.

b. Submit Operational Advice. The JOPG finalises the Operational

Advice and staffs it for the COM’s approval and submission to SACEUR. The
JOPG continues to collaborate with CAT Plans as they review the operational
advice and refine the MROs for submission to SACEUR and, following
approval, the NAC.

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PHASE 3 - OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

4.23. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 3 - Operational Estimate38 is to

understand the problem, the operating environment, the mission and to develop
courses of action39 (CoAs), from which one will be selected. Guided by the COM, the
operational estimate is a mechanism designed to draw together the vast amount of
information necessary for the thorough analysis of a set of circumstances. This
enables the development of feasible CoAs leading to the COM’s selection of one to
achieve the operational mission. It combines objective, rational analysis with the
intuition of the COM, where the combination of experience, intellect, creativity and
innovation is often referred to as ‘operational art’.

a. Overview. Phase 3 at the operational level is separated into two

distinct parts: Phase 3a - Mission Analysis and Phase 3b - CoA Development.
It begins with receipt of SACEUR’s Strategic Planning Directive (SPD) that will
follow the release of a NAC Initiating Directive (NID) and any Military
Committee (MC) guidance, which will have initiated formal planning for a
military response to a crisis.

(1) Phase 3a Mission Analysis. Mission analysis consists of an

in-depth analysis of the crisis situation to determine the operational
problem that must be solved and the operational conditions that must
be established. It identifies the key operational factors that will
influence the achievement of those conditions and any limitations on
the operational freedom of action for the development of an overall
operational design. The main outcome of Phase 3a is the initial
operational design, the COM’s planning guidance and the Operational
Planning Guidance (OPG) which formally trigger the Mission Analysis
at the subordinate, supporting and component level.

(2) Phase 3b CoA Development. After appreciating the COM’s

planning guidance, the JOPG develops possible CoAs to achieve the
mission. In consultation with the COM, several are chosen and further
developed, analysed and compared against each other and opposing
CoAs. Phase 3 concludes with a COM decision on which CoA to
develop along with a refined final operational design, as a basis for the
development of a CONOPS and OPLAN in Phase 4. An Operational
Planning Directive (OPD) is released to formally trigger CoA
development at the subordinate, supporting and component level.

38
During Phase 5, the results of operations assessment or a sudden change in the operational situation may require a review of
the original operational estimate or a new estimate; if a new operational estimate is required, the COM will have to decide if a
deliberate operational estimate, as described here, or a tailored operational estimate is appropriate. If time is a factor, the COM
can either provide guidance to the HQ staff on what to concentrate on in their rapid conduct of an operational estimate, or can
decide to personally conduct one with selected key staff. The situation will dictate the approach, guided by the COM’s
experience and judgement.
39
Course of Action (CoA) - In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a
mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6).

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b. Prerequisites. Issue of SACEUR’s SPD.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 3 are depicted in Figure

4.5.

d. Desired Outcome of the Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 3

are:

(1) Phase 3a - Mission Analysis.

(a) Operational WNGO has been released to subordinates,

components and supporting commands (if necessary).

(b) The operational mission, including objectives, is

understood, and any recommendations for change are
successfully staffed to SACEUR.

(c) COM releases an initial operational design and provides

directions and guidance on the development of CoAs.

(d) The COM releases an OPG to provide guidance to

subordinate and supporting commands to assist their parallel /
prudent planning and activities.

(2) Phase 3b - CoA Development.

(a) The COM has selected a viable CoA as the basis for the
development of an operational CONOPS for efficient and
effective mission accomplishment.

(b) The COM’s vision and intent for the conduct of the
operation, to guide further planning by staff and subordinate
commanders, has been clearly communicated. An OPD is
released to the subordinate, supporting and component level.

(c) Subordinate and supporting commanders contributed to

the conduct of the operational estimate and are well positioned
to conduct component planning activities in support.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The operational estimate

is guided and energised by the COM. The JOPG is responsible for the
conduct of the operational estimate activities described in the following
process as required to meet the needs of the COM and to coordinate other
staff activities that support the conduct of the operational estimate. The JOPG
is supported by other HQ branches as required, including intelligence /
knowledge, coordination and synchronisation, and operations assessment
staff.

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Subordinate/ Other
Strategic Level Operational Level Component HQs Operational Level
SACEUR COM COM COM

Operational
Initiate Mission Warning Order
Analysis (as req)

SACEUR’s
Strategic
Assessment Framing of Operational
Level Problem Collaborative Planning / Interaction

Strategic
Planning Commander’s
Analyse Mission Direction and
Directive
Phase 3A - Mission Analysis

Guidance

Other strategic Develop Draft Initial

Staff
analysis, Operational Design
Functional
assessments Estimates
Estimate Initial Force/
Capability and C2 Advice from
Requirements Subordinates

Advice from
cooperating
Plan and Conduct IO/GO/NGOs
Mission Analysis Briefing

Issue Operational OPG

Operational Level Phase 3

Planning Guidance

Share
Develop and Submit Conduct Theatre Recce
Requests to SHAPE and Coordination
OPG
SHAPE
CAT Plans
Component
Collaborative OPG
Prepare for CoA
Planning Development Collaborative
Operational Estimate – Guided by Commander

Planning
Commander’s
Direction and
Guidance
Collaborative Planning and Interaction

Collaborative Planning and Interaction

Develop Own CoAs

Staff
Functional
Phase 3B - CoA Development

Estimates
Analyse CoAs
Advice from
Subordinates

Advice from
Compare CoAs cooperating
IO/GO/NGOs

Plan and Conduct

Course of Action
Decision Briefing

Refine Selected CoA Collaborative Planning / Interaction

Issue Operational OPD

Planning Directive

Share

Figure 4.5 Phase 3 Operational Estimate Main Activities

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f. Role of the Commander. The COM is the central figure for the
conduct of the operational estimate. The COM will provide direction and
guidance to the JOPG on the manner in which the operational estimate is to
be conducted (e.g. if any time constraints necessitate any abbreviation to the
process, and how / when the COM will participate in the process). The COM
will discuss and resolve issues with SACEUR, such as those related to the
assigned provisional mission, including objectives, and the potential ways and
means to accomplish them, and collaborate with subordinate, supporting and
component commanders during the conduct of the operational estimate.

g. External Coordination. Throughout Phase 3 close coordination and

contact will be required with a number of external commands, branches and
agencies:

(1) SHAPE. CAT Plans will have transitioned into Phase 4 of the
strategic OPP to begin the development of the strategic CONOPS in
parallel to the conduct of the operational estimate. The JOPG will
continue to collaborate with CAT Plans, facilitated by the OPLE at
SHAPE. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and
provide support, information and intelligence to CAT Plans.

(2) Operational Commands. Depending upon the nature of the

crisis, other operational level HQs or SSCs / TCCs may also be
conducting in parallel an operational estimate. Reciprocal liaison and
planning support requirements must be identified, agreed and provided
as soon as possible in line with strategic direction and guidance.

(3) Subordinate / Supporting Commands. The OPP relies on

planning being collaborative, concurrent and convergent, maximising
the use of liaison and planning elements from subordinate and
supporting commands integrated with the JOPG to facilitate
collaborative planning.

(a) Collaborative, using Functional Services (FS) tools such

as TOPFAS, LOGFAS, in place systems for document
management and video teleconferences (VTCs) for transparency
and timely input.

(b) Concurrent, in that the subordinate / supporting

commands and components need to input environmental advice
in real time to foster the viability and suitability of operational
planning, whilst conducting their own planning slightly behind the
HQ.

(c) Convergent, in that the supporting plans should

seamlessly nest within the resulting operational plan.

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(4) NIFC. Depending on the situation, the NIFC may deploy an

intelligence support team to the designated HQ(s) to provide direct
intelligence support and facilitate intelligence reach back to the NIFC.

(5) NATO HQ Enablement and Resilience Section (ERS). The

NATO HQ ERS may be requested, through SHAPE, to deploy a liaison
element to the supported HQ. It can also draw on additional experts
from its Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS)
database available in a wide range of civil / commercial / technical
areas.

(6) Designated Relevant National and International Actors.

Given SACEUR authorisation for direct liaison (DIRLAUTH) and
coordination with relevant national and international actors (including
relevant IOs, GOs and NGOs), the HQ will arrange for their
participation in operational level planning as required. The JOPG must
ensure that the required memoranda between NATO and the relevant
national and international actors are in place for the release of NATO
classified information.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

PHASE 3A - MISSION ANALYSIS

4.24. Initiate Mission Analysis. Mission analysis assists the COM to determine
what must be done for mission success, by analysing the crisis situation in depth,
determining precisely the operational problem that must be solved, identifying the
critical operational requirements, limitations on freedom of action and inherent risks
and opportunities. The JOPG will analyse the relevant facts related to the strategic
context and the operational environment, review the framing of the problem, make
deductions about mission implications and draw conclusions related to the mission
requirements that must be addressed in planning and / or further analysis. The COM
must be able to appreciate the specific operational conditions that must be
established as part of the overall strategic plan and the inter-relationships with other
operational level commands and HQs. Figure 4.6 outlines the main activities
conducted during Phase 3a.

a. Determine Planning Requirements and Milestones. Upon receipt of

the SPD, the JOPG will review SACEUR’s direction and guidance. This initial
review focuses on determining planning requirements and milestones required
to manage planning efforts and identifying key issues for consideration by the
COM. In particular, the JOPG must evaluate the time available for planning
and ‘plan the planning’ based on the earliest possible deployment. In addition,
the JOPG must confirm:

(1) Authorisation to prepare and deploy an OLRT40.

(2) Authorisation for DIRLAUTH and coordination with relevant

national and international actors.

(3) COM visit to the theatre, if required / authorised.

(4) Requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling and initial

entry forces.

(5) Any issues for immediate clarification.

b. Commander’s Guidance for Mission Analysis41. At this stage the

COM provides guidance to the JOPG to include at a minimum:

(1) Recommendations for any abbreviation of the operational level

OPP due to time constraints.

(2) Framing the problem.

40
All NATO deployments are coordinated and deconflicted by SJLSG / AMCC.
41
Although the situation may require rapid action, the COM’s Planning Guidance should always be recorded in the form of a
written document to allow all members of the JOPG and staff to refer to it and gain a deep understanding of the guidance.

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(3) Key issues and areas of specific attention.

(4) Coordination and liaison requirements.

(5) Time critical requirements.

(6) Deployment of the OLRT / enabling forces.

(7) COM / CG activities that could impact planning.

(8) Planning milestones, including specifically when the COM will be

available for a Mission Analysis Briefing (MAB) and CoA Decision
Briefing (DB).

c. Establish Liaison / Co-ordination. The JOPG should make

arrangements to:

(1) Receive and deploy liaison or liaison and planning elements, as

appropriate, from / to SHAPE, other operational level HQs, subordinate
/ supporting commands, external agencies etc. if not already in place.

(2) Establish direct liaison and coordination with relevant national

and international actors as authorised by SACEUR.

d. Issue Warning Orders to Subordinates. An operational level WNGO

should have been sent to subordinates in Phase 2. Following review of the
SPD, the COM may need to approve the release of another WNGO to
additional subordinate / supporting commands. The WNGO42 should provide
the essential information regarding the nature of the mission and the earliest
possible deployment of forces in addition to any amendments or changes to
the original WNGO.

e. Preparation and Deployment of an OLRT.

(1) If an OLRT has not been prepared and / or deployed in Phase 2,

the COM may direct its preparation and / or deployment43 to assist with
liaison, coordination and information gathering to help build the
operational picture of the environment. The exact timing of OLRT
deployment will depend on the situation but almost certainly it will be
one of the first requests that the COM will make to SACEUR at the start
of the planning process.

(2) In the preparation of the OLRT, the JOPG should consider the
need for:

(a) A suitable senior officer to lead the team.

42
For Warning Order format see Appendix 2 Annex D
43
The preparation and deployment of an OLRT will be done in accordance with the necessary CRM.

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(b) A clear OLRT mission with specified tasks to address but

not restricted to: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and
Integration (RSOMI); Force Protection (FP); legal issues with the
HN; contracting for HNS; and development of contact
information for HN authorities, IOs, GOs, NGOs.

(c) Tailoring the composition of the OLRT.

(d) Clearly defined authorities for the conduct of

engagements with HN and other stakeholders, and any
approved influence activities.

(e) A single HQ authority for direction and tasking of the

OLRT, as well as to establish and maintain effective
communications for the exchange of information.

(f) Guidance on the JOPG relationship to and / or interaction

with any deployed SAT / Civil Military Assessment Liaison Team
(CMALT).

(3) Following the deployment of the OLRT, the JOPG needs to

provide them, as required, with prioritised coordination and collection
requirements for the confirmation of critical aspects of the mission
analysis and key assumptions.

4.25. Framing the Operational Level Problem. It is important to ‘frame’ the

problem in the unique context of the operational level; this allows the COM and the
JOPG to develop a shared understanding of the operating environment in terms of
the crisis background, the underlying causes, and the specific dynamics. It assists in
the visualisation of the problem and begins the appreciation of how to alter the
environment to achieve the operational mission.

a. Strategic Context Review. The COM and the JOPG need to update
their appreciation of the strategic context through a review of the SPD.

(1) Review the Current Strategic Situation. The COM and the
staff should have collaborated with SACEUR and SHAPE (through CAT
Plans) in the development of the SSA and MROs. The JOPG should
review the SPD to check for changes to the strategic appreciation of:

(a) The nature, scale and scope of the problem and its
causes.

(b) The key strategic (PMESII) factors contributing to the

crisis.

(c) The principal actors and their role in the crisis.

(d) International legal aspects, including international law and

treaty obligations.

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Subordinate/ Other
Strategic Level Operational Level Component HQs Operational Level
SACEUR COM COM COM

Operational
Initiate Mission Warning Order
Analysis (as req)

SACEUR’s
Strategic
Assessment Framing of Operational Collaborative Planning / Interaction
Level Problem

Strategic
Planning Commander’s
Analyse Mission Direction and
Operational Level Phase 3a

Directive
Guidance

Other strategic Develop Draft Initial

Staff
analysis, Operational Design
Functional
assessments Estimates
Estimate Initial Force/
Capability and C2 Advice from
Requirements Subordinates

Advice from
cooperating
SHAPE Plan and Conduct IO/GO/NGOs
CAT Plans Mission Analysis Briefing

Collaborative
Planning
Issue Operational OPG
Planning Guidance

Share

Develop and Submit Conduct Theatre Recce

Requests to SHAPE and Coordination

Collaborative Planning Operational Estimate Collaborative Planning

and Interaction Phase 3A – Mission Analysis and Interaction
Guided by Commander

Figure 4.6 Phase 3a Mission Analysis Main Activities

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(e) International engagement in the crisis.

(f) International media and public opinion related to the

problem and the potential involvement of NATO.

(g) Potential risks and threats to NATO’s security interests.

(2) Review Strategic Guidance. The NID with MC guidance and

SACEUR’s SPD, establish the boundaries of the strategic problem to
be solved and the conditions that must be established to achieve an
acceptable NATO end state. The JOPG must now review the SPD to
get a thorough understanding of the strategic planning guidance as it
pertains to the COM. The JOPG should appreciate the following points
and may require conversations between: the COM, CG, the JOPG lead
and any embedded liaison staff; the COM and SACEUR; the COM and
other JFCs, HQs, SSCs, TCCs and / or the JOPG and CAT Plans:

(a) NATO End State and associated conditions.

(b) Political Guidance and Limitations.

(c) NATO strategic military and non-military roles,

(d) SACEUR’s intent, the provisional mission statement and

MSOs, and the strategic results expected from the employment
of military force.

(e) Guidance on ROE, the use of force and targeting,

authorities for interaction with external actors, possible partner
involvement, and the provisional TOO and JOAs.

(f) OOs, provisional missions and objectives of other HQs

and those conditions to be established by the operational level,

(3) Collect and Review Historical Analysis and Lessons

Learned. NATO is in possession of studies and analysis reports from
past operations and activities which may provide useful lessons44
applicable to the current strategic context and how to deal with it. A
review of historical analysis and lessons learned will input salient points
into the JOPG activity.

b. Understand the Operating Environment and Main Actors. Having

developed an initial understanding of the operating environment and actors
through phases 1 and 2, the JOPG need to develop a broader understanding
and appreciation for the possible operational impact of the environment main

44
The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) has both analysis reports and the NATO Lessons Learned
Database (NLLDB) which users can search for relevant information. Other bodies in NATO, such as Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) Capability Development or the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), produce reports that may have relevance.

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characteristics and those opposing, friendly and neutral actor systems that
may have to be influenced to establish the conditions required to contribute to
the achievement of the MSOs. This appreciation will assist the JOPG later
with analysis of key factors and CoG analysis.

(1) Understand the operational context and the impact of the

environment. The high-level time, space, force and information
analysis from the initial phases (1 and 2) may still be valid, but the
fundamental relationships between these factors must now be put into
actual context and understood by the JOPG as this will be instrumental
when setting the boundaries and the ‘realm of the possible’ within which
the solutions must be developed.

(a) Time - Space relates to the relative speed with which

forces can reconnoitre, gain, occupy, secure, and stabilise or
control a given area. COM and the staff should evaluate the JOA
in terms of space and the time necessary to accomplish
objectives within it. COM can harmonise the factors of time and
space by selecting the objectives that lie at short distances;
shortening average distances by operating from a central
position enhancing speed in execution; changing routes. For
attacking forces the objective is to gain space as quickly as
possible while the defending forces try to keep control over the
space and delay or deny the attacking forces´ achievement of an
objective. Any gain of time is an advantage for an actor that
wants to maintain the status quo. If a defending force is not
decisively beaten, it may retain sufficient space and time to
withstand an attack. The less time available for the defending
forces the more likely the attacking forces will catch the
defending forces unprepared. This is the key to surprise.

(b) Time - Force relates to the relative readiness and

availability of forces and their necessary support over time.
Velocity multiplies the overall striking power of the force. The
attributes that affect the timely availability of forces include: the
type and size of forces and their organisation, the distance to the
employment area, the transportation mode and the infrastructure
in the employment area.

(c) Space - Force relates to the relative ability to control

significant areas; the concentration and dispersion of forces
within areas and the ability to give up space in order to avoid
becoming decisively engaged. Overcoming the factor of space
involves movement of forces, the impact of fires, and the
transmittal of messages. Movement of forces can be affected by:
the limited means of transportation available; inefficient
infrastructure; the general requirement to move large quantities
of personnel and materiel; and the time consumption of longer
distance moves. In general, the more distant the physical

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operational objective in space, the larger the sources of power

needed to accomplish it. A sound force-to-space ratio is one of
the most critical factors in planning an operation. In general, the
greater the expanse of space involved, the more stringent the
limitations on resources will be.

(d) Time – Space - Force relates to the capability to project

forces into a region and the comparative speed with which they
can build up decisive capabilities in a given area. The larger the
distances involved in moving and deploying one’s force, the
more critical the factor of time will be. Furthermore, the larger the
prospective theatre, the larger the force that will be required to
accomplish objectives.

(e) Information - Space. Current information technologies

allow for detailed and accurate information on all aspects of the
physical space. Nevertheless, networking in information and
communications is not without limitations; geographic location
and distance significantly affect the establishment, control and
use of ‘information highways’ as these are heavily dependent on
the bandwidth of the network nodes and the power supply to the
connected ‘server farms’. Both bandwidth and energy supply can
be costly, such as when satellite links have to be established or
power sources installed in remote and deserted areas. The
JOPG must be aware of such relationships when attempting to
balance the space factor with information.

(f) Information - Time. Today, every action could reach a

global audience in near real time. This new quality makes active,
transparent and trustworthy information an imperative. Moreover,
modern information technology allows for a dramatic reduction in
the time required to make decisions and in the time required for
planning. Today, an effective network of sensors, platforms, C2
and logistics centres allows more tasks to be accomplished
faster and more accurately. In principle, the force that is able to
generate an information advantage and facilitates quicker
reactions, is in a position to surprise the adversary and seize the
initiative.

(g) Information - Force. Accurate and timely information can

enable sound decisions about the forces required for operations.
Improved information capabilities increase the commander’s
ability to know the location and movements of adversaries and
relevant actors. In particular, more effective information may
improve the phasing, deployment and employment of forces.

(2) Appreciation of Operating Environment Main

Characteristics. Certain characteristics, see Figure 4.7, may be useful

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to stimulate JOPG insights into the operational impact of the

environment main characteristics.

(3) Appreciation of Adversaries, Friends and Neutrals. To assist

in appreciating the key opposing45, friendly and neutral actor systems of
relevance to the operational level that may need to be influenced, the
actor analysis should address the following:

(a) Goals and objectives of each actor. The political goals

and likely desired end-state for each actor, especially any likely
strategic objectives to be achieved by the use of military force /
violence.

(b) Primary and Supporting IoP. The systems that contribute

to the main IoP that each actor seeks to leverage to influence
other actors and systems.

(c) System interaction, interdependencies, influences and

vulnerabilities. The strengths and weaknesses of the main
actors and systems in terms of their capacity to influence other
actors and systems and their ability to be influenced based on
their vulnerabilities and inter-dependencies, including possible
critical system relationships, nodes and linkages.

(d) Military and other capabilities. The strengths and

weaknesses of each actor to achieve its objectives, in particular
its capabilities and capacity to use force and information in time
and space.

(e) Appreciate possible actions. The fullest possible range of

potential actions or broad CoAs of each actor (e.g. opposing
CoAs), with consideration to the most likely and most
dangerous, including any likely response to a possible NATO
military response. Actor’s CoAs should consider the activities
that will be occurring at the following four stages:

1/ Prior to any public announcement of NATO

intervention.

2/ After a public announcement of NATO intervention

until the initial entry of NATO forces.

3/ After the initial entry of NATO forces until the full

build-up of forces.

4/ After the full build-up of forces.

45
In a force-on-force scenario, the opposing force can be evaluated using: Order of Battle and Current Disposition; Goals and
Objectives; Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses; CoG and DCs; HVTs; Likely Intentions; Potential CoAs.

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CHARACTERISTICS OPERATIONAL IMPACT

Theatre Geometry Possible access, staging, entry, operating areas, bases
and distances, lines of communications, sustainment,
etc.
Geographical Observation, obstacles, movement / mobility, key
Characteristics terrain, littorals, choke points, international sea lanes.
Meteorological and Air operations, ground operations, maritime operations,
Oceanographic risks to personnel.
(METOC)
Characteristics
Population Human development, population movement, displaced
Demographics populations / refugees, dependence on humanitarian
aid, populations at risk, unemployment.
Political Situation Credibility, popularity, effectiveness of governments to
provide for the basic needs of the populace, opposition,
stability, status of forces agreements, rule of law.
Military and Security External / internal threats, surrogates and proxy forces,
Situation illegally armed groups, child soldiers, extremism /
terrorism, operational areas, military dispositions,
police and military activity.
Economic Situation Availability of money, food, energy, raw materials,
industry, services.
Socio-Cultural Situation Social cohesion / conflicts, dominant groups,
extremism, gender relations, contribution to protection
of vulnerable groups due to sexual and gender based
violence and CAAC issues.
Criminal Situation Types and rates of crimes, level of violence,
organisation level of criminal groups intra-, trans- and
international connections, connection to terrorists or
other spoilers.
Health and Medical Risk of famine, diseases, epidemics, environmental
Situation hazards, available medical support.
Infrastructure Situation Possible points of entry, theatre infrastructure (e.g.
adequacy of transportation and communication nodes
and networks), utilities, POL storage and distribution,
host nations support.
Information and Media Control / bias / manipulation of media, public access to
Situation information, use of propaganda, robustness of
communications, narrative landscape.

Figure 4.7 Operating Environment Characteristics and Potential Impact

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(3) CUOE Awareness Brief. Having developed an initial

understanding of the operational context, environment and actors, the
JOPG, supported by the Intel-staff, will share this with the entire HQ -
normally through a CUOE brief which will assist the entire staff later
with analysis of factors and centres of gravity. The CUOE brief will also
facilitate the identification by the COM, CG, or the JOPG, of any
additional CUOE products that are needed to support mission analysis

(4) Review COM Guidance. The JOPG reviews the COM’s

guidance (e.g. the guidance for Mission Analysis and any subsequent
guidance, perhaps received following the framing of the operational
problem), including any initial limitations imposed by the COM, to assist
their focus for the Mission Analysis.

4.26. Analyse the Mission. The purpose of mission analysis is to analyse and
establish precisely the operational results to be achieved (i.e. conditions to be
established) and to identify critical operational requirements, limitations on freedom
of action and inherent risks and opportunities. The JOPG will analyse the relevant
facts related to the strategic context and the operating environment, review the
framing of the problem, make deductions about mission implications and draw
conclusions related to the mission requirements that must be addressed in planning
and / or further analysis.
a. Key Outcomes. The mission analysis should answer the following
questions:
(1) What conditions must be established to achieve OOs?

(2) What effects are required to establish these conditions?

(3) What are the operational actions necessary to create these

effects?

(4) What are the operational implications of time, space, forces /

actors, and information?

(5) What capabilities, support and preconditions for success are

required?

(6) What limitations have been or are likely to be imposed on the

use of military force?

(7) What are the (plausible) assumptions that have to be made in

place of unknown facts to allow planning to proceed?

(8) What are the outline requirements for cooperation with civilian
organisations?

(9) What operational risks and opportunities (i.e. risks to mission /

risks to force) can be identified at this stage?

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b. Factor Analysis. The JOPG should now possess a broad

understanding of factors with operational impact as identified in the previous
analysis of the operational environment and main actors, and presented in the
recent CUOE brief. The JOPG should identify and analyse factors; they
should examine specific aspects, facts or conditions of the operational
environment and the capabilities, goals and relationships between actors to
determine their impact on operational success. It will consider the effects of
the operational environment on the main actors as well as on NATO forces as
they interact in time, space and the information sphere. The deductions and
conclusions gained from this analysis will form important building blocks that
will need to be carried forward in the process. Factor analysis is in its simplest
form captured in a three-column format as per Figure 4.8.

Factor Deduction Conclusion

A significant factual The implications, issues or The outcome or result
statement of information considerations, derived reached that requires
known to be true that from fact(s) that have action in planning or
has operational operational significance. further analysis.
implication.
What is the current state So what is the significance So, what can or should
of affairs or trends? of the factor? be done?

Figure 4.8 Factor Analysis – Factor / Deduction / Conclusion

c. Determine Key Factors. To assist completion of the mission analysis

and the development of an operational framework, the JOPG, with an
appreciation of the provisional operational level mission, including the OOs,
next needs to focus on identifying, analysing and refining the sum of factors
that will have a direct bearing on what must be accomplished in the area of
operations and under what conditions. These ‘key factors’ will typically relate
to the identified (specified or implied) ‘unacceptable conditions’ in the
operating environment. Key factors will normally be presented during the
MAB.

d. Centre of Gravity Analysis. The JOPG will need to conduct CoG46

analysis is conducted on each of the main actors, friendly, opposing and
neutral47, as appropriate. This will be instrumental in determining the
operational conditions to be established or maintained and the operational
effects to be created. The operational level CoGs should naturally link to
46
Centre of Gravity – AAP-06 defines the CoG at the operational level the CoG as ‘The primary source of power that provides
an actor its strength, freedom of action and / or will to fight. Note: At the operational level it will always be an entity.
47
Based on the system (PMESII) analysis of potential adversaries, partners and others, the CAT will examine the foundations
of each actors / system that gives it strength and determine possible strategic CoGs. Having completed the process the CAT
must deduce what can be exploited and what should be protected and draw these findings together in a conclusion. System
network diagrams help in determining positive and negative influences as well as critical dependencies.

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strategic CoG analysis completed by SHAPE during the strategic Phase 2.

Operational CoGs are typically the primary source of power that provides an
actor its strength, freedom of action and / or will to fight which allows the actor
to actually achieve OOs. It is therefore always an entity. By affecting an actor’s
operational CoGs, the actor’s ability to achieve its OOs with its current course
of action (CoA) is influenced. Key insights from the analysis of CoGs should
contribute to the development of the main ideas for the operation and should
be captured in the conclusion as decisive conditions, effects, actions, ROE (to
prevent undesired states and effects), CCIRs, etc. When conducting CoG
analysis, identification of the friendly CoG (from both adversarial and own
perspectives) will inform the JOPG of potential adversary’s courses of action
and assist in developing the plan. A key element of operational art is to derive
ways to affect the primary actors CoGs sufficiently to achieve our objectives,
whether by strengthening, protecting, weakening, or destroying the CoG;
CoGs are always contextual and therefore subject to change at any time
during the operation; consequently, CoG analysis is an iterative, continuous
process. Figure 4.9 can be used to support CoG analysis. CoG analysis will
consider several key characteristics / elements of each actor:

(1) Appreciate the Goals and Objectives of Each Actor. The

JOPG reviews the statements and actions of each actor to appreciate
what they seek to achieve as well as the conditions they may desire as
an end state to the crisis.

(2) Appreciate the Critical Capabilities (CC) of Each Actor.

Once the JOPG has determined what are the aims and objectives of
the actor it must identify ‘what’ the actor must be able to do, what
abilities it requires, in order to achieve the identified aims. These
abilities will start to indicate the potential CoGs of the actor as well as
any deficiencies.

(3) Appreciate the Critical Requirements (CR) of Each Actor.

From the CCs the JOPG must determine those key system elements
and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and
influences required to generate and sustain the CCs, such as specific
assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors, what
are the primary means that enables the actor to gain and maintain
dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten
or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution,
or a political system.

(4) Appreciate Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) of Each Actor. The

JOPG must determine what are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies
are present in the CCs and CRs through which the actor, and in turn
the CoG, may be exploited or protected.

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(5) Determine the CoG. When determining the CoG48, the JOPG
must consider each of the CCs in turn, each must be judged on its
ability to fulfil the objectives in context of the actor’s mission or aim.
From the identified CCs, the JOPG must determine if they represent
the primary strength necessary for an actor to achieve its objective; if
the actor can achieve its goals without a specific CC then it cannot be
the CoG. Care must be taken to ensure that the JOPG focuses at the
operational level in their CoG analysis49.

(6) Conclusions. The JOPG must now draw conclusions against

all of the identified CCs, CRs, CVs and CoG. This is the main step of
the CoG analysis, where potential objectives and effects can be
determined which exploit weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key
system elements and essential conditions, CCs, CRs and CVs in an
opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities,
relationship and behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in
the engagement space.

e. Appreciate Limitations on Operational Freedom of Action. The

JOPG will now identify any limitations on the COM’s freedom of action to
accomplish the mission. Limitations include constraints50 and restraints51.
They may be imposed by law, the mandate, or by NATO political or military
authorities. However, they may also be determined by operational factors that
will dictate the time, place and forces to be used. These need to be identified
as they may impact other requirements and pose risks to mission
accomplishment.

f. Determine Assumptions. Throughout the conduct of the operational

estimate, gaps may be revealed in knowledge and information. In these
cases, the JOPG may find it necessary to make certain assumptions52 in order
to continue planning. Assumptions are often the reason a plan can fail and
they must be avoided, or minimised, unless absolutely necessary. The JOPG
Lead must control assumptions and ensure that they are regularly reviewed.
Any changes in assumptions have to be evaluated as to their impact on the
planning conducted to that point. Any deployed element such as an OLRT,
should have taken all of the assumptions and be finding the information and /
or intelligence which would turn them into facts or allow them to be
disregarded. In addition:

(1) Assumptions are used in place of something that is unknown

and, to be valid, they must be logical, realistic and necessary.

48
At the operational level the CoG will always be an entity. If the CC is not defined as a clear entity the JOPG may have to
consider the identified CRs and / or re-evaluate the CCs. At the highest operational levels the identification of an entity may be
less precise.
49
At the political / military strategic level a CoG may represent a moral strength of an actor rather than a physical entity which
exists in principle at each level of command.
50
Constraint - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action.
51
Restraint - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action.
52
Assumption - In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and / or the future course of events to complete an
estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action. AAP-06.

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CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS MATRIX

ACTOR:
DEDUCED AIM AND DESIRED OUTCOME
What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions does the actor seek to establish
by their actions?
CENTRE OF GRAVITY CRITICAL CAPABILITIES
…is a principal source of strength of …is the primary ability (or abilities) that
power for achieving one’s aim. gives the COG its strength.
What is the primary element of power What are the primary means that enables
upon which an actor depends to achieve the COG to gain and maintain dominant
operational objectives? influence over an opponent or situation,
such as to threaten or coerce an
opponent, or to control a population,
wealth distribution, or a political system?

To be targeted in an opponent and

To be influenced/denied to an opponent
protected in a friend.
and exploited in a friend).
A noun; an entity; a complex system; a
The key word is the verb - the ability
thing.
to….
CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS
…exists when a critical requirement is …are specific conditions, components or
deficient, degraded or missing and resources that are essential to sustaining
exposes a critical capability to damage or those capabilities.
loss. What are those key system elements and
What are the weaknesses, gaps or essential conditions, characteristics,
deficiencies in the key system elements capabilities, relationship and influences
and essential conditions, characteristics, required to generate and sustain the
capabilities, relationship and influences COG’s critical capabilities, such as
through which the COG may be specific assets, physical resources, and
influenced or neutralised? relationships with other actors?

To be exploited in an opponent and To be denied to an opponent and

protected in a friend. provided to a friend.
A noun with modifiers. Nouns, things.
CONCLUSIONS
Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential
conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences could be exploited in an
opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities, relationship and
behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space?
5
6 Figure 4.9 Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

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(2) Assumptions should not be made which dismiss adversary

capabilities or assumed intentions, alter challenging aspects of the
situation or presume our own success.

(3) Assumptions are treated as facts and therefore need to be

analysed.

(4) Once adopted, an assumption will apply throughout planning

until verified as fact or discarded. To assist in their verification,
assumptions will generate information, knowledge or intelligence
requirements.

(5) Each assumption needs to have a risk evaluation to determine if

the requirement for the development of a branch or sequel exists.

g. Operational Risks. During the mission analysis, the JOPG should

identify any risks to the achievement of OOs, risks to the force that result from
the operational environment or the capabilities and actions of the main actors
in the JOA. Risks must be acted upon and managed accordingly based upon
the likelihood of its occurrence and the gravity of its impact. The COM will
always own the risk and through military judgement determine the acceptable
level based on likelihood and consequence 53. The degree of risk can be
greatly reduced by scaling down one’s ends, adapting one’s ways or
increasing one’s means. The problem of mismatch can be resolved by
modifying, altering, or even abandoning one’s ends. Another solution for
resolving mismatch is to find a novel way of using one’s sources of military
and / or non-military IoPs. It is a COM responsibility to weigh opportunities
versus risks, assess their potential impact, and identify opportunities that offer
the greatest operational benefit for the risk incurred. An illustrative operational
level risk evaluation matrix is at Figure 4.10. At this stage the detailed
development of risk and mitigation will be challenging; however, risk will be
addressed again during CoA and CONOPS development and must be
constantly reviewed and updated. The aim is always to reduce the number of
risks by incorporating the mitigations into the CoAs, a CoA that does not
reflect the mitigations to known risks cannot be valid.

h. Operational Opportunities. During the analysis of operational risks,

the JOPG should identify any opportunities that may arise from taking risk(s)
or opportunities that may arise from the achievement of OOs. Like risks,
opportunities will have several aspects; the chances that something will go
right or wrong and the opportunity will be missed or lost, the level of impact on
the operation should the opportunity be taken and is successful and the
mitigation measures needed to be planned in either eventuality. At the
operational level, opportunities typically relate to taking risk over time, space,
forces / actors and information factors within the JOA.

53
A risk that can be sufficiently mitigated against during the planning can be designated as ‘Acceptable’. If a risk / opportunity
will not materialise until later in the operation, it will normally be mitigated through a contingency; a branch plan or a sequel with
associated CCIRs and DPs. Such a risk will then be designated ‘Conditionally acceptable’. As risk management is owned by the
COM, he must be involved if a certain risk remains ‘Unacceptable’ despite the staff’s mitigation efforts.

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Operational Level Risk Evaluation

Source Consequence Severity Probability
for
Actions of the Overall Mission. Extremely High - could result High.
Opponent(s). in failure to accomplish
mission.
Line of Moderate.
Actions of Operation.
Friendly High - could result in failure to Low.
Forces. achieve one or more
Decisive
objectives, or decisive
Conditions.
conditions.
Operational
Environmental Desired
Factors. Moderate - could result in
Operational
failure to meet criteria for
Effect.
success or create operational
effect, or exceed time, space,
forces / actors limits.

Low - minimal impact on

mission accomplishment.
Risk Mitigation
Can we neutralise the source, and if so how?
Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk and if so how?
Can we limit the consequence and / or severity of the occurrence and if so how?
Can we reduce the probability of occurrence and if so how?
Conclusion
Unacceptable - risk mitigation cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level.

Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking

actions to:
Modify force disposition / posture / composition.
Adjust current operations.
Prepare branch plan or sequel.

Acceptable - no risk mitigation actions required.

Figure 4.10 Illustrative Risk Evaluation Matrix

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j. Determine Critical Operational Requirements. Throughout the

conduct of the mission analysis, the JOPG must be continually attuned to the
need to identify critical operational requirements including:

(1) Information, Knowledge and Intelligence Requirements. The

mission analysis will highlight gaps in information, knowledge and
intelligence, including that which is critical for subsequent command
decisions. The JOPG will identify these as a basis for developing
requests through the CCIRM process and to refine the CCIRs. Once
approved by the COM, CCIRs are provided to SHAPE, subordinate and
supporting commands. CCIRs cover all aspects of the COM’s concern
including friendly forces information requirement (FFIR), essential
elements of friendly information (EEFI) and the PIRs.

(2) Critical Operational Capabilities, Support and Resource

Requirements. These must capture the military capabilities (abilities -
across the joint functions), sustainment, enabling and strategic support
requirements required to accomplish the mission; the estimated NATO
resource implications associated with delivering these requirements
must be reflected in the request to SHAPE.

(3) Preconditions for Success (PCS). The JOPG must identify any
essential conditions that are beyond the influence of the HQ that must
be established by higher echelons to allow operational success. These
may include establishing transit authorities, legal agreements and HNS.
More importantly, these may also address the changes needed in the
non-military domains by other IoP to facilitate the achievement of the
objectives at the operational level.

(4) Rules of Engagement / Use of Force. Although challenging at

this stage, the JOPG should highlight any potential mismatch between
the Political Policy Statement (PPS), the Political Policy Indicator (PPI)
and the so far identified requirements for use of force / actions that may
be construed as provocative. Inconsistencies must be discussed with
CAT Plans or raised through the COM to SACEUR as appropriate at
the earliest possible stage. The detailed development of ROE
requirements will continue during CoA development.

(5) Requirements for Interaction with Relevant International and

National Actors. The JOPG will need to consider with which
international and national actors there is a need to interact for the
following reasons:

(a) CNMAs in support of military action.

(b) Military actions in support of non-military activity.

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(c) Mutual support.

(d) De-confliction of critical activities.

(6) Strategic Communication / Information Strategy Requirements.

Taking account of StratCom Implementation Guidance, the JOPG must
identify specific audiences54 and key leaders as well as the basic
themes that may be required to achieve operational and military
strategic objectives and mitigate risks.

(7) Crisis Response Measures. The mission analysis will highlight

operational requirements that may call for the implementation of CRMs
by SACEUR and nations to ensure that necessary preparations are
being made and that capabilities will be ready and available.

4.27. The Operational Design. An operational design is an expression of the

COM’s vision for the transformation of the unacceptable operational situation at the
start of the operation into a series of acceptable operational conditions at its end.
This transformation is done through establishing decisive conditions (DCs) along
different lines of operation (LoOs), leading to the achievement of OOs, while
contributing to the achievement of strategic objectives and NATO end state.

a. General. In general, an operational design is fundamental to:

(1) Communicating the COM’s vision of the operation and the initial
intent.

(2) Providing the common basis for the development of CoAs.

(3) Developing the provisional missions for the components.

(4) Synchronising and coordinating the operation over time, in

cooperation with other HQ(s) and relevant national and international
actors.

(5) Integrating, synchronising, coordinating, prioritising and

allocating capabilities for the operation over time.

(6) Assessing progress or delay of the operation.

(7) Refining plans to deal with foreseen and unforeseen events.

(8) Developing initial ideas for transition and termination of the

operation.

b. The process of developing an operational design consists of two

distinct parts. The first is the development of an operational framework which
is a staff product, normally presented as a schematic as shown in Figure 4.11,
54
When identifying audiences, the JOPG should ensure that NAC designated audiences can be reached through those
selected. The use of ‘specific audiences’ also includes target audiences for InfoOps and PsyOps.

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supported by text as required for detail. It provides a conceptual overview of

the entire operation. The second part is the COM’s initial intent. Once the
COM takes ownership of the operational framework and applies the initial
intent55 then it becomes the initial operational design. This normally occurs
following the MAB and at this stage the initial design basically reflects ‘what
needs to happen’ to transform the current unacceptable, into an acceptable,
situation as defined by the end state.

c. Operational Framework Development. The operational framework

development begins with the JOPG drawing together the results of the factor
analysis, systems analysis, CoG analysis, the analysis of the mission with the
objectives, and the determination of the conditions to be established.

(1) Initially the operational framework is simply based on the staff

analysis of the problem, providing the critical link between the
operational problem to be solved and the required operational
outcomes; however, the COM may, even at this point, provide guidance
to the JOPG for their operational framework development.

(2) The JOPG, in consultation with the operations assessment staff,

will prepare the operational framework, using operational design
concepts such as objectives, DCs, effects, etc. As many operational
framework elements (e.g. effects and / or actions) can communicate
strategically or influence perceptions, the JOPG should review
StratCom guidance prior to beginning work to ensure those chosen
support the overall intent. The COM is normally consulted by the
JOPG during the operational framework development to ensure that it
matches the COM’s own developing vision.

(3) The development of the operational framework, and its

elements, is iterative, especially in the early stages. With the
consideration of each type of new operational element (as outlined
below), the JOPG will often have to reconsider the elements developed
previously to validate if any additional ones are warranted or if the
wording of those already developed needs to be modified. While, the
list below provides a logical way to sequence the development of an
operational framework, the actual order or approach used by the JOPG
could vary with the situation, guidance from the COM and the
experience of its members.

55
Commander’s Initial Intent. In simple terms this will be the COM’s vision for the conduct of the operation. The staff provide
the operational framework and the COM builds a personal vision around the operational actions and effects expressing them in
terms of priority (main effort), phase, time and space, outlining the nature, sequence and purpose of the main operational
activities leading logically to the achievement of the OOs. The initial intent should also identify risks accepted or not accepted
and conclude by relating the COM’s initial intent to the military strategic objectives. The point in the process where the COM
develops an Initial Intent for the operation will vary from individual COM to individual COM; clearly the earlier this is done the
easier it is for the staff to check and update their work if necessary. The initial intent should come no later than immediately
following the MAB.

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 Strategic Non-Mil Line of Engagement
Non-
Military
Action Action Strategic
Operational Operational Operational
Effect
Objective
Effect Objective

DC DC
Operational NATO Strategic
Effect Operational Objectives
Decision Objective
Point NATO
Action Opposing
Operational Opposing End
Current Effect
Actor’s Acceptable
Situation Unacceptable Actor’s Strategic Military State
Friendly Conditions
Conditions Operational Centres Strategic (Desired
Operational Operational
DC of Objective Future
Centre(s) of DC Objective
Operational
Centre(s) Gravity Situation)
Gravity Operational

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Effect Effect of
Gravity
DC DC Military
Action Operational

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Operational Strategic
Decision Effect Objective
Action Objective
Point

DC
Operational
Action Effect
Operational
Action Action Effect

Figure 4.11 Basic Concepts of an Operational Framework

Illustrative Operational Framework
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

d. Determine Lines of Operation. Operations may be planned using

LoOs to arrange operations in time, space or purpose to transform specific
unacceptable conditions at the start of the operation to conditions required to
achieve operational and strategic objectives. The determination of LoOs will
shape the development of the plan as well as the conduct of operations. The
default solution calls for one LoO per OO, but as this is really about visualising
the entire operation, it is really up to the JOPG to outline how best to
communicate the COM vision. It is critical that alternatives are developed and
presented to the COM focusing on:

(1) The purpose of each LoO.

(2) Critical vulnerabilities to be exploited or protected.

(3) DCs required to retain freedom of action and progress towards

the achievement of OOs.

(4) Required interaction with non-NATO entities.

e. Determine Decisive Conditions. For each operation to be successful,

it is necessary to determine the sequence in which specific conditions must be
established to focus the effort required to achieve one or more OOs. When
specific sustainable conditions are determined to be critical to gaining or
retaining freedom of action or to the achievement of the objective, they may
be designated as DCs56; sustainable and self-regulating conditions that must
exist in system states, as well as any conditions or system states that cannot
exist in order for the objective to be met. When the JOPG determines which
DCs to carry forward, it is important to distinguish between those DCs that
give a ‘marked advantage’ and those DCs which actually ‘contribute
materially’ to achieving the objectives. The latter will be the most ‘decisive’ in
terms of visualising the required changes in the operating environment. Once
identified, it is necessary to determine the sequence in which they must be
established to focus the effort required to achieve one or more OOs.
Identifying DCs is critical to the overall design in terms of:

(1) Establishing the nature and sequence of joint operations along

each LoO.

(2) Prioritising the effects to be created.

(3) Determining the force / capability requirements for each LoO

over time.

(4) Synchronising and coordinating operations on different LoOs.

56
A decisive condition is defined as ‘a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function
that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an
operational objective.’ AJP-01.

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(5) The ability to appreciate the progress or delay of the operation,

eventually leading to decisions related to transition and termination of
operations.

f. Determine Operational Effects (OE). The required changes in the

behavioural or physical state of an actor, to establish the required DCs and
ultimately achieve the OOs, primarily using military means, are expressed by
the JOPG as OEs. Effects are always external to own force, and must be
crafted in a manner that makes them measurable. The OPSA staff will assist
in this process.

g. Determine Operational Actions57 (OA). The JOPG will already have

identified a number of OAs required to create the OEs and establish the DCs.
For the creation of effects, the use of both lethal and nonlethal means should
be considered. OAs will ultimately drive the definition of operational
requirements for the allocation of military capabilities, resources and
authorities (ROEs). Therefore, the identification of actions, in close
collaboration with the components, will continue into CoA and potentially
CONOPS development.

h. Determine Complementary Non-Military Actions. The analysis of

systems / system elements / actors that must change will also have identified
those that may not be able to be influenced by military means. The need to
use other, non-military means to create desired effects must be captured
during mission analysis and will need to be addressed with cooperating
organisations or SHAPE during planning. Those changes that require
activities beyond the JOA should be identified as PCS. Consideration needs to
be given to development of appropriate guidance for civil-military interaction,
and to identifying those relevant international and national actors with whom
interaction is required.

i. Sequencing and Phasing. The next major step in the design of an

operation is to sequence and phase the DCs, OEs, key events, critical factors,
functions and OAs. The primary aim in sequencing and phasing an operation
is to maintain its continuity and tempo and to avoid unnecessary operational
pauses. Sequencing and phasing of LoOs can be used to designate and shift
the COM’s main effort58 during the course of the operation. The intellectual
exercise of arranging OAs, OEs and DCs can lead to the development of
alternative operational frameworks, identification of DPs59 (and any related
CCIRs60), and / or begin to identify the requirements for potential branches
and sequels. It can also assist the JOPG to determine if additional OEs are
required to establish necessary operational conditions not previously

57
Operational actions will be further developed as part of CoA development, where different ways to meet the COM’s intent in
the initial operational design are investigated.
58
The main effort is ‘[a] concentration of forces or means in a particular area and at a particular time to enable a commander to
bring about a decision’. AAP-06.
59
Decision point - A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander
must make a decision concerning a specific course of action. AAP-06.
60
For each decision point, there would be associated CCIR(s) to trigger those decisions and PIRs to inform the CCIRs.

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appreciated. While considered at this point, sequencing and phasing will be

reviewed in more detail as part of CoA development and analysis.

(1) Sequencing. Sequencing is the arrangement, simultaneously or

sequentially, of actions designed to create effects to establish DCs
within an operation in an order that is most likely to produce the desired
operational outcomes. Although simultaneous action on multiple LoOs
may be ideal, lack of resources may require a COM to sequence
actions. Alternatively, a COM may choose to sequence actions in order
to reduce risks to an acceptable level. This process assists in thinking
through the entire operation logically in terms of available forces,
resources and time, and helps to determine different operational
phases.

(2) Phases. Phases represent distinct stages in the progress of the

overall operation leading to the establishment of specific DCs required
for subsequent stages and ultimately the successful accomplishment of
the overall objective. Phases are sequential but may overlap. In
addition, the actions required to create certain effects in a certain
phase, may well start prior to the phase in question. In some cases the
beginning of a phase may be contingent on the successful completion
of a preceding phase. This should be clearly recognised in the
operational framework. The arrangement of supported / supporting
relationships may be a valuable instrument in phasing the operations.
The COM may designate a main effort in each phase and assign the
primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks to a subordinate
/ supporting COM(s).

j. Determine Branches, Sequels and Decision Points. An essential

step in the operations design process is to anticipate eventualities that may
occur during the course of an operation and determine alternative LoOs and
sequences of action, while still achieving the objective. For every action there
is a range of possible outcomes that may or may not create the desired effects
or the expected changes of conditions. Outcomes that are more favourable
than expected may present opportunities that can be exploited. Outcomes that
are worse than expected may pose risks that can be mitigated. However, the
ability to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks depends on anticipating such
situations and linking them to DPs and on developing options for dealing with
them. The COM and the JOPG must anticipate possible outcomes and ensure
that options are provided in their planning to preserve freedom of action to
allow them to keep the initiative. This is achieved by developing branches and
sequels derived from continuously exposing the operations design to
questions, concerning situations that could possibly occur61 during each phase
of the operation.
(1) Branches. Branches are options within a particular phase of an
operation, which are planned and executed in response to anticipated

61
One way of capturing such ‘alternatives’, is to use a risk analysis worksheet, from which the JOPG can then extract the
requirements for branches and sequels, and their associated decision points. See COPD Aide Memoire.

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opportunity or reversal within that phase, to provide the COM with the
flexibility to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve the original
objective. Branches address the question of ‘what if’?

(2) Sequels. Sequels are options for subsequent operations within

the operational design or the following phase(s) of an operation. They
are planned on the basis of the likely outcome of the current operation
or phase, in order to provide the COM with the flexibility to retain the
initiative and / or enhance operational tempo and ultimately achieve the
objective. Sequels address the question of ‘what’s next?’

(3) Decision Points. DPs are events defined in time or space on

which the COM is expected to have to make a decision to ensure timely
execution and synchronisation of resources. As such they are not to be
confused with ‘regular reporting requirements’. DPs can be linked to
assumptions and CCIRs and they should lead to the requirement for
branches and sequels. DPs will focus the HQ(s) monitoring activities
and help to prioritise the collection efforts. To support the COM the
JOPG should consider developing a decision support matrix (DSM) to
link DPs with the earliest and latest time a decision is required; the
intelligence (the adversary or actor) requirements; and the FFIRs.

k. Develop Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders. Once

the operational framework is developed, the JOPG will develop provisional
missions, including component objectives, for the subordinate commanders. In
addition, specific limitations for a subordinate commander may be identified at
this time (e.g. constraint of having to support a specific non-NATO actor with
some activity (e.g. UN staff)). These missions will be further refined, in
collaboration with subordinate commands, during the CoA and CONOPS
development before being finally approved by the COM.

4.28. Estimate Initial Force / Capability and C2 Requirements. The mission

analysis will have identified critical operational capabilities requirements, while the
development of the operations design will have identified additional requirements as
well as the general sequence for employment. The JOPG, with the COM, will
determine the command responsibilities and the how the HQ may need to be
configured.

a. Estimate Initial Force / Capability Requirements. The process is

simply to update the estimate of required operational capabilities, and to
compare it with the force capability requirements provided in the SPD. This
will allow identification of any significant differences that may reflect an
imbalance between required objectives and the means likely to be available.
Significant issues may constitute operational risks and should be brought to
the attention of the COM.

b. Estimate C2 Requirements. The JOPG, operations, CIS, Cyber

Defence and CyOC Liaison Elements (CLE) should work together with the

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component / subordinate command liaison elements to establish the basic C2

requirements:

(1) Analyse TOO and JOA(s). The TOO62 and JOA63s designated
by SACEUR are analysed. Conclusions from this analysis will help the
JOPG to determine operational requirements, such as entry points,
LoCs, operations areas, force and logistic requirements etc. It will also
assist the JOPG to determine if the provisional TOO and JOAs as
proposed in the SPD meet the COM’s needs.

(2) Determine Required C2 Functions and Locations. The next

step is to appreciate what actions will be accomplished, where and by
what kind of forces. This should include evaluating how C2 could be
configured and phased if the operational command will deploy utilising
different HQ configurations.

(3) Determine Geographical and Functional Areas of

Responsibility. Based on these considerations, the COM can begin to
appreciate the requirements to organise the command structure based
on geographical and functional areas of responsibility.

(4) Determine Critical Liaison and Coordination Requirements.

The location of other NATO or non NATO military HQs, international
and governmental authorities in the area may require a permanent high
level C2 presence which will influence C2 requirements.

(5) Span of Control. Following military principles, the COM will

want to balance the advantages and disadvantages between a
relatively flat organisation and a multilevel hierarchy.

(6) CIS Points of Presence and IERs. Depending on the theatre

location and communication infrastructures, the COM may have to rely
on deployable CIS that will have a limited number of points of
presence, which in turn will limit the number of deployed HQs locations.

(7) Consider Cyberspace Operations Requirements. Depending

on the operational context, the JOPG should consider the possible
scope of cyberspace operations activities.

(8) Consider the potential for a dispersed HQ. Depending on the

operational context, the JOPG should consider what, if any, HQ
functions need to physically deploy into the JOA. Depending on the
available CIS architecture and capabilities the HQ footprint should be

62
Theatre Of Operations: A designated area, which may include one or more joint operations areas. Note: A theatre of
operations may include land, air, space and sea outside a joint operations area. TOO are usually of significant size, allowing for
operations in depth and over extended periods of time.
63
Joint Operations Area: A temporary area defined by the SACEUR, in which a designated joint commander plans and
executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A JOA and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the
mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission- specific and are normally associated with CJTF operations. AAP-
06.

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minimised wherever possible to reduce resource requirements and

vulnerabilities.

4.29. Review Critical Operational Requirements. At this point the JOPG should
review and validate the critical operational requirements identified during the conduct
of Mission Analysis and determine if others are warranted. Following the estimation
of the initial force / capability and C2 requirements, the JOPG should identify if the
implementation of additional CRMs by SACEUR and nations is warranted to ensure
necessary preparations are being made so required capabilities will be ready and
available.

4.30. Plan and Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing. The JOPG must validate
the results of the mission analysis and the development of the operational
framework, including the risk and opportunity evaluation, within the HQ and,
ultimately, with the COM, which is normally done through a MAB. The MAB provides
the COM an opportunity to validate the JOPG analysis and synthesise it with an
initial personal visualisation of the operation, finalise the initial operational design,
provide direction and guidance on issues that have surfaced, and provide guidance
for subsequent planning. It is also a forum where the entire staff and subordinate /
supporting / component command (CC) LOs, and potentially the COMs, can be
present to ensure a unified vision in preparation for the development of operational
CoAs.

a. MAB Preparation. The JOPG lead will have to carefully orchestrate

the development and conduct of the MAB to ensure that only the information
that is important for the COM is presented; this will vary with each COM and
the manner and depth of their personal involvement in the mission analysis to
this point64.

b. MAB Conduct65.

(1) General. At the COM’s discretion, the component or other

supporting COM(s) could participate in the MAB, through VTC if
necessary. A member of the JOPG will be assigned to capture the
guidance, direction and decisions that result during the conduct of the
MAB. The purpose of the mission analysis briefing is to:

(a) Validate the mission analysis, including confirming the

mission and its OOs, and the operational framework.

(b) Seek guidance from the COM on the initial intent and for
the development of CoAs and orientation of subordinate /
supporting / component HQs.

(2) Validate the Mission Analysis and Operational Framework.

The essential aspects of the mission analysis and the operational
64
Prior to this point, most commanders will have been interacting with the staff influencing the development of the operational
framework. Commanders should be provided the pre-reading materiel (hard copies of slides) well in advance if decisions are
required at the briefing.
65
An outline format for a MAB is presented in Appendix 3 to Annex D.

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framework are presented and, as required, discussed with the COM,

who will, as necessary, provide direction and guidance for modification.
The COM must eventually take ownership of:

(a) The assigned mission including OOs, and any

recommendations for change from those provided by SACEUR
in the SPD.

(b) The risk / opportunity analysis.

(c) The operational framework, including LoOs, DCs and their

sequencing, OEs and OAs.

(d) Provisional missions to subordinate / supporting

commanders.

(e) The opposing CoAs, in broad terms, to be developed as a

basis for planning.

(f) Requests to SACEUR.

(3) Commander’s Initial Intent and Planning Guidance. The

COM should now be in a position to confirm the initial intent and
provide guidance for the subsequent planning of the operation.

(a) Commander's Initial Intent. This intent will be fused

with the operations framework to become the initial operations
design, which will be issued with the operations planning
guidance (OPG). If the staff have not been issued an initial intent
during the earlier interactions with the COM, the JOPG will have
drafted a proposal as they have developed the operations
framework. Ideally this would have been confirmed by the COM
prior to the MAB.

(b) Commander’s Planning Guidance. The COM’s

guidance must provide sufficient direction to the JOPG to allow
them to develop CoAs within the time available. The level of
detail of guidance will typically depend on the nature of the
mission, the operational circumstances, the time available, and
the experience of the JOPG. On this basis the COM may:

1/ Specify opposing actions to be considered and

opposing CoAs to be developed.

2/ Establish criteria for CoA development and

selection.

3/ Describe in broad terms the CoAs to be developed.

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4/ Direct the JOPG to focus its efforts on developing

a single CoA due to the urgency and nature of the
situation.

4.31. Issue Operational Planning Guidance66. With appropriate staff preparation,

the COM will issue OPG to formally capture the output from the MAB, including the
initial operational design. The OPG will provide the necessary direction to formally
initiate planning at the component level and, where it includes the COM guidance,
CoA development by the HQ staff. The OPG can be tailored as required to meet the
COM’s requirements; if maximum use of collaborative tools is made through the
development of the operational estimate (e.g. FS such as TOPFAS), and the
components have been involved including at the MAB, an abbreviated OPG may be
warranted to capture only the COM’s direction and guidance, including provisional
missions for subordinate, supporting and component commanders. The JOPG
should anticipate the COM’s requirement and can be drafting an OPG in parallel to
the conduct of the mission analysis; this would facilitate its rapid release post-MAB
following any required changes.

4.32. Develop and Submit Requests to SHAPE. The JOPG should develop
requests, requirements and issues that require action at the strategic level. These
typically include:

e. Requests to SACEUR for any changes in the COM’s mission, including

OOs.

f. Requests for change in the provisional TOO or JOAs.

g. Requests for the implementation of additional CRMs.

h. ROE requirements (if not identified in SPD).

i. Recommendations for additions / changes to StratCom and authorities

for conduct of influence operations (towards specific audiences).

j. Information, knowledge or intelligence requests.

k. Preconditions for Success. It is critically important that the COM clearly

states those conditions that must be established by the strategic or political
levels (in the PMESII domains) to allow for operational success. Early
identification of issues to SHAPE allows them to work on solutions, in
collaboration with NATO HQ, during CONOPS development.

4.33. Plan and Conduct the Commander’s Theatre Reconnaissance. Ideally, the
COM should visit the theatre with the subordinate, CCs and key staff to conduct high
level coordination and gain first hand insights into the operating environment. This
assists confirming the mission analysis and provides better knowledge and
understanding of the operating environment for CoA development. The JOPG will be
required to contribute to the preparation of the COM.

66
An OPG template is provided at Annex D Appendix 4.

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PHASE 3B - COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

4.34. Prepare for Courses of Action Development. The purpose of the final
portion of the Operational Estimate is to determine how best to carry out operations
that will accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently. Guided by the COM, the
JOPG will develop a set of CoAs, all of which will accomplish the mission effectively
in accordance with the COM’s intent, including that expressed through his
operational design and his guidance. Selected CoAs will be developed, analysed
and compared to develop a coordinated staff recommendation. The results of CoA
development will be presented, typically in a CoA Decision Briefing, where the COM
will select a CoA and confirm the final operational design, as the base concept for
development into a formal CONOPS document. The CoA development process is
captured in Figure 4.12. In advance of their development of own CoAs, the JOPG will
conduct the following preparation:

a. COM Guidance Review. The JOPG should review and discuss the
COM’s guidance. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring a common
understanding of the guidance with respect to opposing CoAs, the intent, the
initial operational design, the risk appetite as well as the CoA selection criteria.

b. Review the Results from Theatre Reconnaissance and

Coordination. It is critical that the JOPG update the results of the mission
analysis based on any new information, knowledge or intelligence received,
including updated information gained from any deployed element / OLRT and
possible visits by the COM to the theatre.

c. Gather Required Additional Planning Information. The JOPG

should gather any additional planning information required to develop and
analyse CoAs, including: order of battle (ORBAT), and port, airfield, road and
rail data etc.

d. Refine Opposing CoAs. The JOPG should ensure that, based on the
guidance received, the intelligence / knowledge staff are refining selected
opposing CoAs. This would normally include combined CoAs for multiple
opponents based on the likelihood that they will cooperate or act for a
common purpose. Where there are multiple operational level HQ(s)
conducting operations the potential impact in other JOAs must be considered
and accounted for in line with any proposed supporting supported inter-
relationship (SSI) designations. This activity is part of the ongoing CUOE.

e. Arrange for Wargaming of the CoAs. As part of the evaluation

process, the JOPG should ideally war game each own CoA against selected
opposing CoAs (e.g. most likely and most dangerous). The conduct of a
wargame requires thorough advance consideration and preparation; it will be
appropriate to dedicate an experienced staff officer to the preparation and
execution of this task.

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Subordinate/ Other
Strategic Level Operational Level Component HQs Operational Level
SACEUR COM COM COM

OPG

Component
OPG
Prepare for CoA
Development Collaborative
Planning
Commander’s
Direction and
Guidance
Develop Own CoAs

Staff
Functional
Operational Level Phase 3b

Estimates
Analyse CoAs
SHAPE Advice from
CAT Plans Subordinates

Collaborative Advice from

Planning Compare CoAs cooperating
IO/GO/NGOs

Plan and Conduct

CoA
Decision Briefing

Collaborative Planning / Interaction

Refine Selected CoA

Issue Operational OPD

Planning Directive

Share

Collaborative Planning Operational Estimate Collaborative Planning

and Interaction Guided by Commander and Interaction

Figure 4.12 Phase 3b Course of Action Development Main Activities

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f. Review and Update Estimates. The COM and staff should update
any personal or functional estimates focusing on the factors most likely to
affect CoA development. Again, the understanding of the implications of time,
space and force will need a review to confirm ‘the art of the possible’.
Additionally, estimates should identify the governing factors for each functional
area based on the mission analysis and the effects of the operational area,
resulting in a clear understanding of those mission requirements that can, in
principle, only be accomplished in one way and those for which clear choices
are possible.

4.35. Develop Own Courses of Action. The JOPG now leads the development of
a number of CoAs that each accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently and
present the COM with a number of options.

a. Analyse Opposing CoAs and Factors Influencing CoA

Development. Before developing own CoAs, the JOPG must appreciate the
CoAs open to opposing forces and those factors that could influence or shape
the development of own CoAs.

(1) Appreciate Opposing CoAs. The intelligence / KD staff will

present their estimate of the opposing CoAs for each opponent and
combined CoAs for multiple opponents as appropriate.

(a) Analysis of the different stages of enemy CoAs provides

the JOPG with a more dynamic understanding of the opponents’
capabilities that may be available to pre-empt or counter our
actions, as well as the inherent risks and opportunities posed by
their actions.

(b) Communications and information activities in the above

stages may be beyond the purview of the COM and may need to
be raised to the strategic level for inclusion in StratCom
planning. The development of own CoAs must be able to cater
for possible opposing actions and identify how it may be possible
to influence opponents’ decision-making through coordinated
communication and information activities (coordinated by the
StratCom Advisor), as well as military and non-military actions
under different conditions, in the following four stages:

1/ Prior to any public announcement of NATO

intervention.

2/ After a public announcement of NATO intervention

until the initial entry of NATO forces.

3/ After the initial entry of NATO forces until the full

build-up of forces.

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4/ After the full build-up of forces and commencement

of operations.

(c) Analysis should also provide insight into the opposing

forces including the following:

1/ Potential DPs.

2/ Critical Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition

and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities.

3/ Critical C2 nodes and decision makers.

4/ High-Value Targets (HVT)67.

(d) The JOPG should consolidate its appreciation of

opposing CoAs using the factor analysis method to capture
those key requirements for further analysis and planning.

(2) Appreciate / Confirm the Actions of Others in the Theatre.

Prior to developing own CoAs, the JOPG must also update their
common understanding of the actions of cooperating relevant national
and international actors, as well as considering the actions of any non-
cooperating actors in the theatre to avoid adversely impacting their
actions or own CoAs, and to enhance interaction with them. Ideally
liaisons from cooperating relevant national and international actors
should be available to support the JOPG and confirm their activities,
especially where cooperation and mutual support may be required.
The result of this should be a common understanding of the planning
requirements to be accommodated in CoA development.

(3) Analyse Other Factors Influencing CoA Development. CoA

development is about determining how to accomplish the mission
according to the COM’s intent and the initial operational design. The
JOPG will already have significant understanding of the operational
factors that will impact how operations can be conducted, in particular
conclusions from its analysis of time, space, forces / actors information.
They should review these now, with the aim of drawing out those key
conclusions that will influence how CoAs are developed, focusing on:

(a) What are the common points applicable to all CoAs?

There will be certain requirements and constraints that will limit
the possibilities for certain operational actions and other
activities. These common elements for all CoAs should be
established prior to CoA development to save time and avoid

67
As described in AD 80-70, a high-value target (HVT), ‘can be considered as a target the adversary commander requires for
the successful completion of the mission. The loss of HVTs would be expected to seriously degrade important adversary
functions throughout the commander’s area of interest.’

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unnecessary work; they should be captured in a list for reference

during CoA development and can be challenged at any point.

(b) What are the main operational activities? Operations

typically have a number of predominant operational challenges
or characteristics which are pivotal to the overall conduct of
operations - a critical event, phase or geographic area.
Identifying these as the main focus for developing alternatives
will be useful in focusing the efforts in CoA development.

(c) Where are there principal alternatives? The JOPG

should begin CoA development with a clear idea as to where
there are major choices in how operations are developed.

b. Own Courses of Action. Guided by the initial operational design, the

appreciation of opposing CoGs and the COM’s guidance, the process of
developing CoAs is designed to encourage creative thinking and the
application of operational art to open up the range of possibilities that could be
considered. It is also at this stage where potential operational opportunities
identified during the previous operations framework development can be
introduced – potentially with a high pay-off in return for an increase in the level
of risk. Originality and imagination are encouraged to produce as many ‘least
predictable feasible CoAs’ as time allows. This provides more flexibility in how
forces might be employed to accomplish the mission and will quickly highlight
similarities and fundamental differences that can be further developed.
Typically, the JOPG will form teams to develop a range of tentative CoAs in
the form of a main idea, illustrated by a sketch and a brief outline of the
sequence of main actions by different forces, to outline how they will create
the operational effects and establish the required DCs in the operations
design68.

(1) CoAs should answer the following questions:

(a) When do the required conditions have to be established,

or need to be in place (e.g. sequencing, phasing)?

(b) The sequence of the operational actions, operational

effects and DCs.

(c) Who will conduct the operation?

1/ The main forces / capabilities required to carry out

the operational actions and create the desired operational
effects. The primary entity / force required is designated
as its own CoG for that tentative CoA and therefore also

68
The operational design of each CoA may vary slightly from the initial operational design, due to the use of different
approaches to establishing the decisive conditions (e.g. sequencing, phasing and different approaches (using possibly different
forces and operational actions)).

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likely to be designated as the supported command at that

stage.

2/ The required CNMAs.

(d) What military operations are being considered?

(e) Where will they be performed?

(f) Why is the operation being conducted?

1/ To achieve OOs to support desired strategic

outcomes.

2/ At what system / system elements are actions

directed?

3/ What message(s) must be communicated to the

main actors?

(g) How will the operation be conducted?

(2) Supported by points common to all CoAs (as explained above),

a CoA should include:

(a) Assumptions.

(b) Limitations (constraints and restraints) and freedoms.

(c) CONOPS including:

1/ Intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort.

2/ Description of sequencing and phasing, and DPs.

3/ Operational reserve.

4/ StratCom themes.

5/ Logistics.

6/ Required non-military actions. Possible effects,

including secondary and tertiary ones, on the civilian
population and on cultural property.

(d) Refined operational design (updated as required to reflect

the CoA).

(e) Operational graphic / map sketch.

(f) Task Organisation (TASKORG).

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(g) C2 arrangements.

(h) Risk assessments.

(i) Opportunities assessment.

(j) ROE requirements.

(k) Provisional missions for subordinate commanders.

(3) Tentative CoAs will be tested for viability and selected for review
with the COM. Reduced to a manageable number (based on time and
resources), remaining CoAs will be further developed and evaluated
through analysis and wargaming, as a basis for recommending a CoA.

c. Conduct Troops-to-Actions Analysis. Troops-to-actions analysis

seeks to determine the military capabilities and capacities required to
implement a CoA by focusing on OAs, OEs and other activities during each
phase of the operation, under conditions expected within the operating
environment. It adds essential detail to the TASKORG required to estimate
deployment feasibility and to conduct the wargame. Eventually it forms the
basis for statement of requirements (SOR) during operational CONOPS
development. Inputs from subordinate commands are critical, as they will be
best positioned to appreciate what is required in terms of activities, forces,
support and authorities etc. as will they also have a better knowledge of what
is actually available in the short term. Despite the critical role of the
components at this stage, the process must be led and coordinated by the
JOPG to optimise the operational force employment and preclude duplication
of effort. A typical sequence of analysis is:

(1) Determine the optimum employment of operational capabilities

for each OA and desired OEs for each phase.

(2) Establish the most effective / efficient mix of component

capabilities.

(3) Determine the most effective / efficient theatre level support

capabilities to support the operational force and the supplemental
support capabilities required by component.

(4) Determine the most effective and efficient C2 / CIS capability

requirements.

(5) Determine, in consultation with the components, if the outlined

actions call for additional ROE requirements and capture these.

(6) Update the TASKORG.

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(7) Prepare a draft operational Troops-to-Actions List69 focusing on

the required capabilities, priorities by phase and the general
geographical area in the JOA.

(8) Appreciate, in coordination with cooperating relevant national

and international actors, potential requirements for support of relevant
national and international actors in accordance with the COM’s
guidance.

d. Appreciate Force Availability. Availability of forces is dealt with by

the Force Generation and Readiness branch (FGR) at SHAPE. The JOPG
should liaise with CAT Plans FGR representative to check the task
organisation for each CoA to appreciate whether the required force /
capabilities are likely to be available and ready given the warning time for the
operation pending a decision by SACEUR to assign the forces.

e. Prepare a Deployment Feasibility Estimate. Movement experts in

the JOPG should develop an estimate of the feasible deployment of the main
forces, based on their assumed readiness, to forecast their potential arrival in
the TOO and the JOA. The deployment can be modelled using operations
and logistics FS tools and deployment issues should be addressed through
the SJLSG LO with SHAPE CAT Plans. The estimated arrival of forces should
be used as a basis for their employment in the wargame. Deployment issues
should be addressed through CAT Plans to the Allied Movements
Coordination Centre (AMCC) at HQ SJLSG. Developing a thorough
deployment feasibility estimate is resource and time consuming. A rough
order of magnitude (RoM) appreciation of the feasibility of the deployment of
each may be necessary prior to approaching the COM for final guidance on
the CoAs under development; however, a full deployment feasibility estimate
may only be available for CoA analysis and wargaming.

f. Consolidate and Synthesise Related CoAs. At this point, the best

aspects from similar CoAs should be merged into a limited number of CoAs
for consideration and further development by the JOPG.

g. Commander’s Guidance for the Refinement of CoAs. Before further

developing a set of CoAs, it is important that the JOPG review the proposed
CoAs with the COM. This provides an opportunity for the COM to influence
further CoA development by ruling out or adding any CoAs and focusing effort.

h. Draft Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria. If not already provided

by the COM, the JOPG should develop draft CoA selection criteria for
consideration. These criteria should reflect what the COM considers to be
most important for mission accomplishment based on strategic direction (e.g.
LoOs, DCs, known risks, etc.) and, as such, will change from one operation to
another.

69
Such as a Joint Troops to Actions List.

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i. Further Develop CoAs for Analysis and Wargaming. Once CoAs

are accepted by the COM, the JOPG further refines them by adding the level
of detail required for further analysis and wargaming. Key requirements are to
refine:

(1) Outline CONOPS describing:

(a) The logical sequence and main purpose of operations to

be achieved in clearly defined phases70.

(b) When, where and in what sequence operations will be

carried out to create desired OEs and establish DCs.

(c) The main and supporting efforts.

(d) OEs to support DCs and OAs to support the creation of

those effects.

(e) Operational reserve.

(f) StratCom themes.

(g) Required non-military actions.

(h) Required ROEs (serials).

(i) Required CRMs (if applicable).

(2) Provisional missions for subordinated and component

commands - these must be developed in conjunction with subordinate
commanders; their development is a collaborative process, but led by
the JOPG and the COM, and should reflect the spirit of ‘Mission
Command’ to allow subordinates and components the freedom to
determine the ‘how’ at the component level.

(3) TASKORG – force / capability requirements two levels down

(e.g. one level below components / subordinate / supporting
commands) based on an initial ‘troops-to-actions’ analysis of OAs, as
well as any significant changes in organisation between phases.

(4) Operational graphic - illustrates the spatial aspects of the CoA

by phase, using map sketches or overlays and standard NATO military
symbols.

(5) Operational timeline - depicts the sequencing of operational

actions, circumstances, effects, key events, critical factors, functions

70
Phase - A clearly defined stage of an operation during which the main forces and capabilities employed set conditions
required to achieve a common purpose. COPD definition.

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and DCs for each phase of the operation, including other key events
and opposing actions.

(6) Decision Points.

4.36. Analyse Courses of Action. CoA analysis provides an opportunity for the
JOPG to examine each CoA from different functional perspectives to identify inherent
advantages and disadvantages as well as to determine key aspects to be evaluated
in wargaming such as: DPs, DCs, high pay-off targets71, risks, opportunities and
branches and sequels.

a. Analyse and Test CoAs for Viability. After the tentative CoAs have
been developed, they should be tested for viability using the feasibility,
acceptability, completeness, compliance, exclusivity and suitability (FACES)
criteria listed below. Any CoA that does not meet all criteria should be
adjusted to meet the criteria or rejected and not be presented to the COM.

(1) Feasibility. Is the CoA possible given the time, space and
resources likely to be available and does it fit the operating
environment? This should include consideration of the likelihood of
other actors fulfilling the CNMAs and the results of any force sensing or
any understanding developed by SHAPE for the provision of forces /
resources.

(2) Acceptability. Are the likely achievements from the CoA worth
the expected costs in terms of forces deployed, resources expended,
potential casualties, collateral effects, media and public reaction, and
levels of risk?

(3) Completeness and Compliance. Is the CoA complete? Does

the CoA answer the questions of when, who, what, why, where and (to
a limited extent) how? Does the CoA conform to or implement Allied
Joint doctrine

(4) Exclusivity. Is the CoA sufficiently varied from other CoAs to

clearly differentiate its comparative advantages and disadvantages?

(5) Suitability. Does the CoA accomplish the mission and comply
with the planning guidance?

b. CoA Risk and Opportunity Evaluation. As the JOPG develop CoAs,

they should be constantly looking for risks and opportunities and, if necessary,
finding ways to either mitigate or exploit them. The CoA risk and opportunity
evaluation provides the COM with an appreciation of the risks / opportunities
for each CoA against specific aspects of the CoA (e.g. mission (including
OOs), DCs, desired OEs, etc.), as well as how they could be mitigated or
exploited, including requirements for branches and sequels. Building on the

71
High-payoff target - A target of significance and value to an adversary, the destruction, damage or neutralisation of which may
lead to disproportionate advantage to friendly forces. AAP-06.

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mission analysis, the JOPG will evaluate any additional risks and opportunities
that have been identified.

c. Wargame CoAs. Wargaming is necessary to evaluate the potential of

each CoA to accomplish the mission against opposition foreseen in the
different opposing CoAs72 and to identify and correct deficiencies or develop
opportunities they present. However, the real value of wargaming is in
allowing the COM and staff to synchronise actions and visualise the conduct
of operation, while gaining insight into implications of opposing capabilities /
actions and conditions in the operating environment. This should help with the
anticipation of possible events and develop the mental agility to deal with
them; identification of potential risks and opportunities that may require
branches and sequels to counter or exploit such situations; and the
identifications of DPs where the COM may need to take action.

(1) Wargame Options. There are three basic wargame options:

(a) Wargame operations by phases: play out critical actions

by phase against the desired outcomes of each phase.

(b) Wargame operations to establish DCs: play out critical

actions for establishing DCs.

(c) Wargame operations in segments of the operating

environment: play out critical actions in specific operating areas.

(2) Preparing the Wargames. This involves:

(a) Determining the desired outcomes.

(b) Deciding on the method and scope.

(c) Determining participants, including subordinates, friendly,

neutral and opposing players (e.g. intelligence / knowledge staff
who developed opposing CoAs).

(d) Organising referees, expert arbitrators and recorders.

(e) Preparing the operational situation.

(f) Acquiring the tools for manual or computer assisted

simulation and analysis.

(g) Preparing a suitable venue.

(h) Establishing rules.

72
As a minimum, each own-force CoA is normally wargamed against the ‘most likely’ and ‘most dangerous’ opposing CoAs.

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(i) Reviewing the COM’s CoA Selection Criteria. Prior to the

wargame the JOPG reviews the COM CoA selection criteria,
including any relative weighting of one criterion to another. Any
proposed changes must be approved by the COM.

(3) Conducting Wargames. The conduct of the wargame is

determined largely by the desired outcomes, selected method and the
scope. Typically, wargames will include:

(a) Setting Conditions. An introduction to set the strategic

and operational conditions affecting the operation, including
political considerations, threat conditions, environmental
conditions, civil conditions, information and media conditions,
etc.

(b) Game Turns. A series of ‘game turns’ considering the

action - reaction - counter-action of opponents, starting with the
opponent deemed to have the initiative.

(c) Analysis. An appreciation of probable results and

outcomes typically follows each game turn and is used to set
conditions for the succeeding game turns.

(4) Recording Results. Observations and conclusions drawn from

the wargame should be recorded in line with the purpose. Typically,
these include:

(a) Advantages and disadvantages.

(b) Refinements to the CoA and correction of deficiencies.

(c) Additional force / capability / ROE requirements.

(d) Synchronisation requirements.

(e) Significant risks / opportunities encountered against

opposing CoAs.

(f) Branches and sequels required.

(g) DPs and supporting CCIRs.

(h) Amendments to the provisional component missions.

(i) Other observations / conclusions.

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d. Synchronise CoAs73. The results from the wargame(s) should be

captured by the JOPG as they are identified in a synchronisation matrix for the
CoA(s). Once the selected CoA is determined, the CONOPS and OPLAN
development will draw on these results. The CONOPS will be included in the
OPLAN Annex A - Concept of Operations as an appendix.

4.37. Compare Courses of Action. CoA comparison remains a subjective process

and should not be turned into a mathematical equation. CoAs can be compared by
considering differing contexts in order to allow for a comparison to be made. The
most important aspect of this process is to be able to articulate to the COM why one
CoA is preferred over another.

a. Comparison. CoAs are compared in three different contexts:

comparing their inherent advantages and disadvantages; comparing their
performance / risks / opportunities against opposing CoAs; and by comparing
them against the COM’s CoAs selection criteria. In addition, a final risk
evaluation should highlight any risks to the achievement of the OOs. Based
on these different comparisons the JOPG should be able to recommend the
CoA with the highest probability for success within acceptable risks.

(1) Compare Advantages and Disadvantages. The JOPG

consolidates the advantages and disadvantages found during the initial
analysis of CoAs as well as those revealed during wargaming. The
process of comparing these should seek consistency across the
different CoAs.

CoA 1 CoA 2 CoA 3

Advantages Advantages Advantages
Disadvantages Disadvantages Disadvantages

Figure 4.13 CoA Advantages and Disadvantage Comparison Table

(2) Compare Friendly and Opposing CoAs. Based on the results

of wargaming, the JOPG should rate how well each own CoA coped
with opposing CoAs. They should indicate the expected effectiveness,
likely costs and potential risks for each combination.

73
A CoA synchronisation matrix provides a useful tool for recording the conduct of the wargame and significant results that
may need to be addressed in the CONOPS. Its use can be a great help in achieving coherence across the different forces and
functions and visualising how the different elements can be harmonised to create synergies.

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Own CoA 1 Own CoA 2 Own CoA 3

Opposing CoA #1 Effectiveness: Effectiveness: Effectiveness:
(e.g. Most Likely) Costs: Costs: Costs:
Risk: Risk: Risk:
Opposing CoA #2 Effectiveness: Effectiveness: Effectiveness:
(e.g. Most Costs: Costs: Costs:
Dangerous)
Risk: Risk: Risk:

Figure 4.14 Friendly and Opposing CoA Comparison Table

(3) Compare CoAs against Commander’s Selection Criteria.

The development of CoAs should have been guided by the COM’s CoA
selection criteria. The JOPG should confirm with the COM what
‘weighting’, or priority the criteria are given and this may be used to
help differentiate CoAs during the comparison. Therefore, all CoAs
should meet these criteria. However, CoAs will differ as to how well
they satisfy the different criteria. The JOPG should compare these
differences using whatever method the COM prefers (e.g. narrative,
one word descriptors, numerical rating, rank ordering or +/0/-) as shown
in Figure 4.15.

Commander’s Own CoA 1 Own CoA 2 Own CoA 3

Selection Criteria
Criterion 1 High / Moderate / Low High / Moderate / Low High / Moderate / Low
Criterion 2 High / Moderate / Low High / Moderate / Low High / Moderate / Low

Figure 4.15 Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria Comparison Table

Commander’s Weight Own CoA 1 Own CoA 2 Own CoA 3 Remarks

Selection Criteria
Criterion 1 3 2 6 3 9 2 6
Criterion 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 3
Criterion 3 2 1 2 3 6 2 4
Totals 10 16 13

Figure 4.16 Commander’s CoA Selection Criteria (Weighted) Comparison

Table

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4.38. Plan and Conduct CoA Decision Briefing. The JOPG presents its
comparison of the CoAs to the COM with a coordinated staff recommendation. This
is typically accomplished by means of a CoA Decision Briefing74 to the COM, possibly
with subordinate and supporting COMs; it could also be provided in written form. A
member of the JOPG will be assigned to capture the guidance, direction and
decisions that result during the conduct of the briefing.

a. Approach. Regardless of the approach taken to seek the COM’s

decision, the presentation must provide optimum information upon which to
base a decision; detailed enough to identify focal points but summarised for
effectiveness and brevity. The COM should coordinate with subordinate,
supporting and component COMs and solicit their input, especially during a
time-compressed CRP. The COM may select a CoA, with or without
modification, or may direct modifications or that additional CoA(s) be
investigated.

b. Results. The essential results of the COM’s CoA decision are:

(1) Clear expression of the COM’s Intent for the conduct of the
operation.

(2) Clear direction on the requirements for any CoA refinement, as

well as required branches and sequels, as the basis for the
development of the operational CONOPS.

(3) Approval of any proposed changes to the provisional

subordinate missions.

(4) Additional guidance and milestones for the development of the

CONOPS.

(5) Issues to be raised with SACEUR / SHAPE.

(6) Priority issues requiring liaison, coordination or reconnaissance

in the theatre.

(7) Guidance on coordination with relevant national and

international actors, for Phase 4 - Operational Plan Development.

(8) Approval of the final operational design.

4.39. Refine Selected CoA. Following the COM’s decision on a CoA, the JOPG will
refine the selected CoA and the final operational design75 according to the COM’s
direction and guidance. They are submitted to the COM by the JOPG Lead for
approval and then promulgated to the JOPG to inform the development of the
operational CONOPS.
74
An example CoA Decision Briefing format is outlined at Appendix 5 to Annex D.
75
Referred to as the operational design from Phase 4 forward.

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4.40. Issue Operational Planning Directive. With appropriate staff preparation,

the COM will issue an OPD to formally promulgate the output of the CoA decision
briefing. The OPD will include the selected CoA, refined as necessary and in line with
COM direction, any significant changes to the operating environment / situation since
the decision brief, the COM’s intent, final operational design, subordinate and CC
missions. The OPD will formally trigger CoA development at the subordinate /
supporting / component command level. An OPD template is provided at Annex D
Appendix 6. It can be tailored as required to meet the COM’s requirements; if
maximum use of collaborative tools is made throughout CoA development and the
subordinate / supporting / component commands have been involved, including at
the CoA decision briefing, an abbreviated OPD may be warranted. The JOPG should
anticipate the COM’s requirement and can be drafting an OPD in parallel to
preparations for the CoA decision briefing; this would facilitate its rapid release
following approval by the COM of the refined CoA and operational design.

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PHASE 4 - OPERATIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT

PHASE 4A - OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

4.41. Introduction. Phase 4 – The development of an operations plan is split into

two distinct parts: Phase 4a - the development of a CONOPS; and Phase 4b - the
development of an OPLAN. The purpose of Phase 4a - Operational level CONOPS
development is to detail the COM’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military
operation, in concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, to achieve the
NATO military OOs and establish conditions required to assist in the achievement of
the strategic objectives and the desired NATO end state.

e. Overview. CONOPS development begins following the refinement of

the COM’s selected CoA, operational design and provisional subordinate and
component missions, which concludes the operational estimate.

(1) The operational CONOPS, developed in collaboration with the

strategic, component levels and the TCCs, is the formal expression of
how the COM will conduct of the operation, including the deployment,
employment, and sustainment of forces; submitted with it are a number
of ‘illustrative’76 statements of requirements that outline the necessary
operational requirements needed to realise the COM’s vision.

(2) The operational CONOPS has essentially the same format as an

OPLAN; the main focus in this phase is the staff work necessary to:

(a) Develop the details of the CONOPS sections that describe

operational direction, execution, service support and command
and signal.

(b) Develop essential annexes.

(c) Develop ‘illustrative’ operational SORs, including CJSOR,

Theatre Capabilities Statements of Requirements (TCSOR),
Manpower SOR (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or
a CE) and Rules of Engagement request (ROEREQ).

(3) Phase 4a concludes with the submission of the draft operational

CONOPS, and its supporting illustrative statements of requirements;
they are essential for the finalisation of the strategic CONOPS. The
draft operational CONOPS also provides the basis for the
76
The term ‘illustrative’ is used here to indicate that these SORs are still in development. The illustrative operational SORs
inform the illustrative SORs that are normally provided with the strategic CONOPS to give the NAC an understanding of what
will be required to realise the strategic concept; the strategic and operational levels will continue to refine these SORs in
collaboration with each other, until the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC. They will then be provided by SACEUR to
nations with the Activation Warning (ACTWARN) message, following the NAC approval of the Strategic CONOPS and their
release of the Force Activation Directive (FAD), to start the formal Force Generation process (at this point the CJSOR will be
termed the ‘provisional’ CJSOR).

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commencement of the development of the operational OPLAN once

approved by SACEUR.

f. Prerequisites. The following elements are required to develop the

CONOPS:

(1) COM’s selected CoA, including a clear expression of the COM’s

Intent for the conduct of the operation, refined as required by the JOPG
according to the COM’s direction and guidance, including:

(a) Operational design.

(b) Provisional subordinate, supporting and component

commands missions, including objectives.

(2) COM’s guidance, including on required branches and sequels,

and milestones for the development of the CONOPS.

(3) COM’s guidance on coordination with relevant national and

international actors.

g. Main Activities. The main activities for Phase 4a are depicted in

Figure 4.17.

h. Desired Outcome of the Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 4a

are:

(1) The draft operational CONOPS is submitted and it meets

SACEUR’s strategic intent and supports achievement of the SOs and
NATO end state. It is accompanied by ‘illustrative’ statements of
requirements (e.g. CJSOR, TCSOR, Manpower SOR, and ROEREQ).
Normally, the draft operational CONOPS is submitted in time for it to be
considered for the finalisation of the strategic CONOPS.

(2) The finalisation of the draft operational CONOPS has considered

the draft component CONOPS, if available.

i. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The JOPG is responsible

for Phase 4a, supported by the intelligence / knowledge, coordination and
synchronisation, operations assessment and other HQ staff. In addition to
supporting the JOPG, functional SMEs, supported by their parent
organisations as required, will be responsible to create functional CONOPS
annexes. The COM approves the CONOPS prior to its submission as a draft
to the strategic level.

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Subordinate/ Other
Strategic Level Operational Level Component HQs Operational Level
SACEUR COM COM COM

Refined
Initiate Operational Comd’s CoA
CONOPS Development and Intent

Develop Operational Collaborative Planning / Interaction

CONOPS

Component
Develop Coordinating Component
OPG
Instructions Component
OPG
SHAPE OPG
CAT Plans Collaborative
Collaborative
Planning and
Collaborative
Planning and
Collaborative Interaction
Planning and
Planning and Describe Service Interaction
Interaction
Operational Level Phase 4a

Interaction Support Concept

Commander’s
Direction and
Guidance
Describe C2 and
Cyberspace
Staff
Functional
Estimates
Develop Operational Advice from
Advice from
Subordinates
CONOPS Annexes Advice from
Subordinates
Subordinates
Advice from
cooperating IO /
Develop Operational GO / NGOs
Requirements
Collaborative Planning / Interaction

Draft
Review Draft Component
Component CONOPS CONOPS
Illustrative
Draft Operational SORs
Share CONOPS
Draft Operational Coordinate and Submit
Illustrative
CONOPS Draft Operational
SORs
Illustrative CONOPS
SORs

Assist CAT Plans in Share

Finalizing the Strategic
CONOPS

Figure 4.17 Phase 4a Operational CONOPS Development Main Activities

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f. External Coordination. Liaison and / or liaison and planning elements

from SHAPE, operational level HQs, SSCs, TCCs, subordinate and supporting
commands, NIFC, NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA),
NCIS Group HQ, NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and
cooperating relevant national and international actors should remain in place
from Phase 3 - Operational Estimate.

(1) SHAPE. The following key staff elements will be the primary
points of contact within SHAPE:

(a) CAT Plans. Supported by the CCOMC, SHAPE

directorates and CG Advisors, CAT Plans will develop the draft
strategic CONOPS; the JOPG will develop the operational
CONOPS in collaboration with CAT Plans, to ensure that it
remains harmonised with the overall intent of the strategic
CONOPS and that the strategic CONOPS adequately supports
the operational CONOPS, especially with identification of
operational requirements. The JOPG will access other SHAPE
entities, initially through CAT Plans and the OPLE, to assist
development of the operational CONOPS. CAT Plans FGR
representative will be the FGen point of contact for the
refinement of the CJSOR and force generation aspects.

(b) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis

situation and provide support, information and intelligence to
CAT Plans.

(c) CyOC. Depending on the required cyberspace role in

support of the operation, CyOC will act as a central point of
coordination for the conduct of cyberspace operations. This
includes the liaison requirements for interacting with Sovereign
Nations in determining cyber offensive capabilities required in
support of operations.

(2) SJLSG. The AMCC within SJLSG supports strategic movement

planning and coordinates with Nations by merging National Detailed
Deployment Plans (DDPs) into a multinational DDP (MN DDP), which is
used to de-conflict any movement issues between nations.

(3) Operational Commands. Reciprocal liaison and planning

support elements will be key to the coordination, de-confliction and
synchronisation with other operational level HQs, SSCs and TCCs
conducting parallel planning. Coordination and / or exchange of LOs, if
not already in place, with the AMCC at HQ SJLSG will be required.

(4) Subordinate and Supporting Commands. The development

of the operational CONOPS should be developed in collaboration with
other assigned operational level HQs, subordinate and supporting

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commands; subordinate commands will be completing their component

estimates early in this phase. Liaison and planning elements from
subordinate / supporting commands will remain integrated with the
JOPG and will provide feedback to / from their COM / command as
required.

(5) NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC).

Depending on the situation, NCIRC will provide Cyber technical
situation awareness (SA) (supplementing SA provided by CyOC).

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

4.42. Initiate Operational CONOPS Development. The operational CONOPS

development will be initiated with a thorough review of all of the information,
intelligence and understanding regarding the crisis; has anything changed that could
alter or impact the planning process since the CoA DB. The JOPG will conduct a full
review of the selected CoA and update the planning work plan:

a. Review Refined Selected CoA. The entire JOPG, either collectively or

individually, conducts a review of the revised CoA and its operational design,
which is the basis for the development to the operational CONOPS. This is
especially important for HQ personnel not involved in depth in the conduct of
the operational estimate.

b. Update Planning Milestones and Work Plan. The SPD will have
provided deadlines for the submission of the draft operational CONOPS and
its supporting ’illustrative’ SORs (e.g. CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR and /
or ROEREQ). The JOPG should also consider those aspects for which work
needs to begin during the development of the operational CONOPS, although
not required for the CONOPS itself, to be ready for the future development of
OPLAN; this includes ensuring someone is assigned and considering
additional annexes / appendices necessary for the OPLAN. The JOPG must
update its planning milestones and adjust its work plan 77 within the HQ, and
coordinate them with those of CAT Plans and the subordinate / supporting /
component OPGs, to make the best use of available time, including as a
minimum:

(1) The first draft of the operational CONOPS main body, supporting
annexes, and supporting documentation (e.g. illustrative CJSOR,
TCSOR, manpower SOR and ROEREQ).

(2) The submission of a draft subordinate / supporting / component

CONOPS, and illustrative SORs.

(3) The staffing of the draft operational CONOPS, and illustrative

SORs, to the COM.

(4) The submission of the HQ’s draft operational CONOPS and

illustrative SORs to SACEUR / SHAPE.

c. Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning. It is important

during the development of the operational CONOPS for the JOPG to continue
77
What is submitted to SACEUR / SHAPE by the operational level before submission of the strategic CONOPS to the MC and
the NAC should have been discussed as the SPD was developed, and, if necessary, agreed between SACEUR and Op level
COM. Normally this will be in the form of a ‘draft’ operational CONOPS, but in the past this requirement has been satisfied by
the submission of a rough draft operational OPLAN, with the essential elements of a CONOPS completed. Following strategic
level review, any issues that might impact the development of the operational OPLAN will be discussed between CAT Plans
and JOPG, or SACEUR and Op level COM, as appropriate. If the agreement was that the COM would submit ‘the’ operational
CONOPS for approval prior to submission of the strategic CONOPS, it would not be formally approved by SACEUR until
approval of the strategic CONOPS by the NAC, after which there may need to be some adjustments to the submitted
operational CONOPS prior to its final approval.

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with external liaison and collaboration; this facilitates maintenance of mutual

situational awareness, improves the overall product, and ensures that the
operational CONOPS meets the strategic requirement, while reflecting the
COM’s concept and intent for the operation. The JOPG should re-evaluate its
requirements for liaison and coordination, although the primary organisations
that are typically involved in Phase 4a are the same as described for Phase 3.
The operational CONOPS will be developed in collaboration with SHAPE
(through CAT Plans), other operational level commands, SSCs, TCCs, with
the strategic and component CCs and especially the component HQs
(component OPGs). Functional experts at the various levels should discuss
functional issues, as required, to ensure clarity (e.g. an interpretation of the
legal mandate - LEGAD at NATO HQ, SHAPE and operational level). With
SHAPE, the JOPG will increase their interaction, initially through CAT Plans,
FGR, and the SJLSG LO to SHAPE. In addition, the JOPG should confirm that
they have the authorities or the mechanisms to engage all of IOs, GOs and
NGOs deemed necessary for the development of the operational CONOPS
and OPLAN. Liaison may be required with the following:

(1) Designated IOs, GOs and NGOs.

(2) HN governments and governments of transit countries.

4.43. Development of the Operational CONOPS. The operational CONOPS,

developed in collaboration with the strategic level, SSCs, TCCs and component
commands, is the formal expression of the COM’s overall intent for the conduct of
the operation, including the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. It
includes the required detail to outline the necessary operational requirements to
realise this vision. The COM will provide additional direction and guidance, as
necessary to focus the development of the operational CONOPS.

a. The format78 for the operational CONOPS is essentially the same as the
operational OPLAN and provides the basis for its development. The JOPG
commences development of the operational CONOPS by transcribing and,
where necessary, deepening the details of the refined CoA selected by the
COM; the main work for the JOPG is to develop: paragraphs 3 through 6 of
the CONOPS, to articulate details of Operational Direction, Execution, Service
Support, and Command and Signal; essential annexes79; and ‘illustrative’
SORs (e.g. CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR, and ROEREQ).

b. While the production of the operational CONOPS is normally done over

a brief period of time, the JOPG must still maintain awareness of any changes
in the situation that may impact the chosen CoA or intent; if necessary, they
will advise the COM of situation changes, with any recommendations for
change. Subordinate, supporting and component commands will be
completing their estimates, and confirming their own missions, prior to
commencing development of their own CONOPS. The JOPG must maintain

78
An operational CONOPS template is at Appendix 7 to Annex D.
79
JOPG functional SMEs, supported by their parent organisations as required, will be responsible to create the various
functional CONOPS annexes and appendices.

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close collaboration with the component OPGs, through the component liaison
and planning elements, to ensure that their CONOPS reflects the COM’s
intent and that necessary details are incorporated in the operational
CONOPS. Issues, such as any requested changes in the component mission,
should be discussed with the COM.

4.44. Develop Coordinating Instructions. Specific requirements, direction and

priorities for different operational functions confirmed during wargaming should be
established as ‘coordinating instructions’ to synchronise activities across all
commands. Required functional details will be developed during OPLAN
development in respective annexes. Items of command interest should be stated in
the CONOPS, including:

a. CCIRs80.

b. CRMs.

c. ROE and the Use of Force.

d. Targeting. Including targeting guidance, joint fires and priorities for

defence of High-Value Asset / Area (HVA / A).

e. Barrier Planning.

f. Mission Vital Infrastructure (MVI), Key Infrastructure (KI) and Vital

Infrastructure (VI).

g. FP81.

h. Military Policing / Stability Policing.

i. StratCom and Information Concept.

j. PA, including media policy, master themes and messages.

k. Liaison.

l. Civil-Military Cooperation.

m. Inter-agency Coordination.

n. Partner Involvement.

o. Environmental Protection.

p. OPSA.

80
CCIRs listed in a CONOPS or OPLAN should relate to possible key decisions during plan execution, including those related
to DPs for branches or sequels, assumptions and identified risks.
81
Force Protection is defined as, ‘all measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and
operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force’. AAP-
06.

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q. Lessons Learned.

r. Exit Criteria.

s. Critical Timings.

t. Other issues may be included for example, rear operations or CBRN

defence, etc.

4.45. Describe the Concept for Service Support. Theatre logistics and MILENG
are integral parts of the operational CONOPS and must be described within the
context of the overall operation. Details will be provided in the main body of the
CONOPS under Service Support and in Annex R - Logistics, Annex S - Movements,
Annex EE – MILENG and Annex QQ - Medical. Annex R, as a minimum, should
describe arrangements for:

a. Logistic Support Concept.

b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.

c. Movement Concept.

d. HNS Concept.

e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.

f. MILENG Support Concept.

g. Medical Support Concept.

h. Contractor Support.

i. Finance.

j. Manpower.

4.46. Describe Concept for Command and Control and Cyberspace Systems.
The description of C2 arrangements82 should establish the key aspects for
establishing command authorities, relationships and liaison required by the
TASKORG.

a. In the operational CONOPS, the details can be provided in Annex B -

Task Organisation and Command Relationships, and as a minimum should
establish the following:

(1) Chain of Command.

(2) Delegation and transfer of command authorities.

82
While not a purview of the operational CONOPS itself, the operational level HQ may have to conduct parallel work in
collaboration with SHAPE to determine what current HQ responsibilities will be re-assigned if any element of the HQ deploys.

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(3) Supported / Supporting Inter-relationships (SSI).

(4) TOO, JOA and Areas of Operations (AOOs).

(5) Liaison and Coordination.

(6) Location / co-location of primary HQs based on CIS limitations.

(7) Phasing of C2 if the op level COM deploys.

(8) Battle Rhythm and Reporting.

b. The communication and information concept will describe in principle

the provision of CIS for the operation to support the C2 concept, and will be
described in the Command and Signal section of the main body of the
CONOPS.

4.47. Development of Operational CONOPS Annexes. The details for most

aspects of the operation will be developed during Phase 4b - Operational OPLAN
Development. However, a limited number of annexes are specifically mandated 83 for
inclusion with the strategic CONOPS to the NAC.

a. Unless otherwise directed, the following annexes are normally

submitted with the operational CONOPS to provide necessary inputs to
SACEUR for incorporation into the strategic CONOPS:

(1) A - Concept of Operations, including the operational design

graphic and potentially an initial synchronisation matrix84.

(2) B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships, which

covers task organisation, command structure, transfer of authority
(TOA), and liaison85 and coordination.

(3) C – Forces, Circumstances, Effects, Key Events, Critical Factors

and Functions.

(4) D - Intelligence.

(5) E - Rules of Engagement, including proposed profiles and ROE

for land, air and maritime operations.

(6) F – Maritime Operations86.

83
Annex C presents the possible annexes for inclusion with an operational CONOPS, including those that are mandated. While
appendices for each annex are also shown in Annex C, in many cases, with the CONOPS there would not be sufficient detail
yet to develop appendices and, therefore, they are not ‘required’ at this point even for mandated annexes. The annexes
themselves would cover the necessary topics if appendices are not included.
84
As the CONOPS, and subsequently the OPLAN, is developed the JOPG will be required to synchronise not only the staff
input to the planning but also develop and maintain a synchronisation matrix for the planned operation which will become
Appendix 1 to Annex A.
85
The identification of the liaison requirements that will need to established should build upon those elements that may already
be in place if elements have already been deployed. A liaison matrix should account for any liaison elements deployed by the
strategic level or other operational level commands.

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(7) G – Land Operations.

(8) H – Air Operations.

(9) I – Amphibious Operations.

(10) J - Force Protection.

(11) K – Special Operations.

(12) L – Cyberspace.

(13) P - Electronic Warfare.

(14) Q – Communications and Information Systems.

(15) R - Logistics.

(16) S - Movements.

(17) T - Environmental Support.

(18) AA - Legal.

(19) DD – Space Operations.

(20) EE – Military Engineering.

(21) FF – Finance.

(22) GG - Non-NATO Force Procedures.

(23) II - Joint Targeting, specifically target sets and, as appropriate,

illustrative target categories and, as far as possible, categories of time
sensitive targets (TST)87.

(24) JJ - NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), including additional

requested implementation of specific CRMs.

(25) OO - Operations Assessment. .

(26) QQ - Medical.

(27) SS – Strategic Communications. StratCom provides specific

instructions for PA, InfoOps and PsyOps.

(28) XX - Record of Change.

86
Inclusion of Annexes F – Maritime Ops, G – Land Ops, H – Air Ops and I – Amphibious Ops will be dependent upon the
nature of the crisis and mission.
87
In accordance with MC 0471 - NATO Targeting Policy. For items to be included in the Targeting Annexes, refer to ACO
Directive 080-70.

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(29) ZZ - Distribution.

b. Annexes in addition to those listed above can be selected for

development if it is felt that additional direction and guidance on these issues
is required at this time; the JOPG selects, and assigned functional SMEs
begin to develop, the annexes selected to support the operational CONOPS.

c. Throughout the development of the operational CONOPS, the content

of the selected annexes will continue to be identified, developed and refined.
The JOPG should, as required, re-evaluate the annexes and appendixes
selected for development as part of the operational CONOPS or identify
annexes / appendices that will be required for submission with the operational
OPLAN (Phase 4b) and assign an appropriate SME to begin to scope their
content. Where content has been identified during annex development that
has an impact on the CONOPS, then the JOPG must re-valuate the
CONOPS, advise the COM as necessary and provide additional direction and
guidance.

4.48. Develop Operational Requirements. One of the most important aspects in

the development of operational CONOPS is the determination of the operational
requirements to support the COM’s operational concept. At the time of the
submission of the draft operational CONOPS to the SACEUR these are termed as
‘illustrative’. In addition, to support the timely availability of forces / capabilities, the
JOPG will consider the requirement for implementation of additional CRMs, which
will be captured in Annex JJ - NATO Crisis Response System.

a. Requirements are articulated using the following main products:

(1) CJSOR.

(2) TCSOR.

(3) Manpower SOR (a request for PE reinforcement or a CE).

(4) ROEREQ.

(5) StratCom Implementation Guidance.

b. Develop the CJSOR. The development of the CJSOR during crisis

response planning is perhaps the most critical step in the development of an
executable OPLAN. The CJSOR is the document / tool which contains the
(generic) forces requirements of the JTF for a specific operation. The CJSOR,
including preliminary deployment information, must be developed in parallel
with the operational CONOPS. It must balance the ends and the means to
ensure the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to achieve agreed
objectives, acceptability of costs and risks, and the feasibility of deployment,
employment and sustainment. The first version of the CJSOR, termed an
‘illustrative CJSOR’, is developed at the operational level by the JOPG, in
collaboration with CAT Plans and subordinate and component OPGs; it is
submitted with the draft operational CONOPS to the strategic level, who vet it

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and provide it as an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR with the strategic CONOPS88 to the

NAC. Critical elements of information required by nations to determine their
contributions and prepare them for deployment include:

(1) Required force / capability89 and any special capabilities.

(2) Echelon that indicates size.

(3) COM's required date for the force to be available for

employment.

(4) Required destination.

(5) Priority of arrival.

(6) Command authority to be transferred to the gaining NATO COM.

c. Develop TCSOR. The TCSOR identifies capabilities required to

support the entire theatre and which could be, in principle, eligible for NATO
common funding. Based on their troops-to-actions analysis, the JOPG should
identify any functional capabilities required to support the entire joint force and
/ or the theatre that could be eligible for common funding as well as the
required timeframe. Given that funding and acquisition may take time, the
JOPG should identify interim solutions. The TCSOR that exists at the time of
the operational CONOPS submission is normally submitted with it as an
‘illustrative’ TCSOR so that coordination can occur as part of the FGen
process.

d. Prepare Manpower Requirements. If available, when the operational

CONOPS is submitted an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR should accompany it (in
the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE90) to identify personnel
required to fill the force C2 requirements or activated HQs. It is developed by
J1 / personnel management staff members of the JOPG. If sufficient detail is
not available to produce even an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR, the JOPG
personnel management staff will develop some considerations on manpower
requirements for submission under the Service Support paragraph of the
CONOPS main body.

e. Develop Illustrative ROEREQ. An illustrative ROEREQ is normally

submitted with the operational CONOPS to help illustrate the ROE that are

88
While the strategic CONOPS is being considered by the NAC, the CAT Plans FGR representative leads the CJSOR’s further
development, in collaboration with the operational level and, through them, the components. After the strategic CONOPS is
approved by the NAC and they release a FAD, SACEUR releases the ‘provisional’ CJSOR, as a precursor to the
commencement of the FGen process. The provisional CJSOR represents SACEUR’s minimum military requirement for forces
to conduct the operation within acceptable risks; it ultimately determines the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to
achieve agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks and the feasibility of deployment, employment and sustainment.
89
They should, if possible, describe these requirements in terms of the Bi-SC agreed capability codes, outlined in Bi-SC Agreed
Capability Codes and Capability Statements.
90
SACEUR will determine the need for reinforcements in coordination with the respective commanders and will coordinate the
provision of the appropriate personnel from the pool of identified reinforcement personnel from within the NCS and by asking
nations for personnel from outside the NCS. Subject to MC endorsement and NAC approval, SACEUR will decide if the
conduct of an operation requires reinforcing a PE or a transition to a CE. (SMAP 15 – NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy -
change 19 to MC 0216/4 - AAP–16 (D).

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considered necessary to support the COM’s vision for the conduct of the
campaign or operation; this ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ is developed by the JOPG
operations staff supported by the LEGAD, in collaboration with strategic,
component and functional experts. It is validated by CAT Plans and further
developed, in collaboration with the JOPG, for submission with the strategic
CONOPS91.

f. Develop Initial StratCom Implementation Guidance. Initial StratCom

Implementation Guidance will explain how the HQ intends to exploit the
Information Environment (IE) to support the achievement of the OOs while
also contributing to the strategic StratCom objectives. Taking account of the
strategic narrative, StratCom Framework and SHAPE StratCom
Implementation Guidance, the HQ guidance in the CONOPS will match the
StratCom aims, themes and focus topics for identified audiences and
stakeholders. The CONOPS will also identify desired information effects,
establish the means to ensure harmonisation of communication and
information activities amongst Alliance members and with partners across the
JOA, and detail requirements for linguistic and cultural expertise.

g. Develop Recommendations for Implementation of Additional

CRMs. Based on its appreciation and the time available to generate forces,
theatre capabilities and manpower, the JOPG should consider the need to
recommend to SACEUR additional specific CRMs that call on nations to
review, prepare and activate national assets to meet NATO requirements. The
key areas in particular they should review CRMs initially are:

A Manpower.

B Intelligence.

E General Operations.

J Electronic Warfare.

K Meteorology / Oceanography.

L CBRN Defence.

M Logistics.

O Forces Readiness.

P Communications and Information Systems.

S Public Affairs.

91
While the ROEREQ is not ‘approved’ by the NAC at this point, they may give direction for its refinement prior to its future
submission for approval with the strategic OPLAN. Depending on the NAC direction, this may impact other areas of the
strategic and operational CONOPS, and necessitate their amendment.

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4.49. Review of Draft Component CONOPS. Normally, the operational CONOPS

will not be submitted prior to receipt of the draft subordinate / supporting / component
CONOPS, and ‘illustrative’ statements of requirements. This is to ensure that each
CONOPS is compatible with the operational one and each other. Any issues
identified should be resolved by functional SMEs through discussion with their
subordinate / supporting / component counterparts as appropriate. The subordinate /
supporting CONOPS will be approved by the COM once the operational CONOPS is
approved by SACEUR; at this stage, the COM should indicate approval ‘in principle’
of the draft component CONOPS, for its use as the basis of component plan
development, pending finalisation once the operational CONOPS is approved.

4.50. Coordinate and Submit Draft Operational CONOPS. Ideally, prior to

submission of the draft operational CONOPS to SHAPE, the subordinate, supporting
and component OPGs are afforded the opportunity to comment on the draft and the
illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR, CE and ROEREQ that will normally accompany it. The
JOPG must also complete a final check that nothing has changed in the operating
environment that could impact on the CONOPS.
a. Final Coordination with the Component and Supporting HQs. The
subordinate, supporting and component HQ liaison and planning elements
should also review the draft operational CONOPS as it develops and raise any
potential issues. If a complete review of the draft operational CONOPS by the
subordinate / component and supporting HQs is not possible, either due to
time constraints or their need to focus on their own CONOPS development,
the JOPG should ensure that any major issues or possible areas for
differences of opinion are discussed between the JOPG and the relevant
OPGs. Prior to submitting the draft operational CONOPS, major issues may
need to be resolved at the JOPG leadership level or through the COM, as
appropriate.

b. Final Coordination with Operational Level Commands. If other

operational commands are planning concurrently and in parallel, the JOPG
should coordinate with them to ensure that the draft CONOPS is
complementary and de-conflicted as necessary if not already done so though
assigned LOs or OPLEs.

c. Final Coordination with SHAPE. If time permits, the JOPG should

coordinate with CAT Plans to ensure the draft operational CONOPS is
consistent with the strategic CONOPS under development. Major issues may
need to be resolved before staffing the draft operational CONOPS for
approval, at the JOPG leadership level or through the COM, as appropriate.

d. Seek Commander’s Approval. The JOPG Lead will oversee the final
preparation and staffing of the operational CONOPS, and illustrative SORs,
for approval by the COM.

e. Submit Draft Operational CONOPS. Once the draft CONOPS has

been approved by the COM, it will be forwarded to SACEUR (and CAT Plans),
with a copy to other operational commands and the component and

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supporting COM’s. This draft92 operational CONOPS will be used by the

JOPG as the basis for the development of the operational OPLAN (Phase 4b).

4.51. Assist SHAPE in Finalising the Strategic CONOPS. Once the operational
CONOPS has been forwarded to SACEUR / SHAPE, the JOPG will provide any
assistance necessary to CAT Plans for the finalisation of the strategic CONOPS,
including the review of its draft as appropriate; this will ensure that it accurately
captures the operational requirements necessary to support the COM’s intent for the
conduct of the operational mission.

92
Following approval of the strategic CONOPS by the NAC and any necessary changes to the draft operational CONOPS, the
final operational CONOPS will be staffed to SACEUR for approval.

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PHASE 4B - OPERATIONAL OPLAN DEVELOPMENT

SECTION 1 - GENERAL

4.52. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 4b - Operational OPLAN development is

to: develop the arrangements and further specify the required activities to implement
the operational CONOPS; and to specify the conduct of operations, including the
deployment, employment and sustainment of forces.

a. Overview. Operational OPLAN development is an iterative,

collaborative process that focuses on synchronising and coordinating the
deployment, employment, protection, support and sustainment of the
operational force during different phases of the operation within a single
operational level plan.

(1) Parallel, collaborative planning with subordinate and supporting

commands, as well as with the strategic level, other operational HQs
and cooperating relevant national and international actors93, ensures
that the activities of all forces and operational functions are
synchronised and coordinated to create the effects required to achieve
the OOs and contribute to the achievement of MSOs and the desired
end-state. Synchronisation of operational OPLAN and component plan
development is critical throughout the process.

(2) Phase 4b concludes with SACEUR’s approval of the operational

OPLAN and the promulgation of the operational OPLAN and approval
of subordinate and component plans.

b. Prerequisites. To commence Phase 4b the following products are

required; draft Operational CONOPS94, approved by the COM, including
illustrative SORs (i.e. CJSOR, TCSOR, Manpower SOR, and ROEREQ).

c. Main Activities. The main activities for Phase 4b are depicted in

Figure 4.18.

d. Desired Outcome of the Phase. The desired outcome of Phase 4b is

the submission and approval of an operational OPLAN95, with supporting legal
agreements and ROE, which meets the criteria for timeliness and adequacy
given the urgency of the planning requirement as follows:

(1) Timeliness.

93
The exchange of information with relevant national and international actors will be subject to arrangements for the release of
NATO classified information. Such arrangements will be defined well in advance of an operation and authority to NMAs to
release information will be determined by the degree of interaction authorised by the NAC.
94
Note that the JOPG must later factor in any issues resulting from SACEUR’s review of the draft operational CONOPS or
changes to it following the NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS.
95
Although this process is written for the production of an OPLAN, it can be used as a basis for the development of operational
level advance planning operations plans, i.e. an operational CONPLAN, Generic CONPLAN, GRP or SDP.

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(a) Planning products are produced in time to allow

subordinates to complete required planning and preparation.

(b) Critical operational planning requirements are covered in

the OPLAN.

(c) Planning and execution are integrated incrementally as

required.

(2) Adequacy.

(a) The legal framework, including an international mandate

and SOFAs, as well as arrangements with HNs or other nations
are established and satisfy mission requirements, such as those
to allow transit or to address specific mission critical legal
requirements.

(b) Force capabilities and resources satisfy minimum military

requirements for mission accomplishment with acceptable risk.

(c) The flow of forces into the theatre supports the

operational scheme of manoeuvre.

(d) C2 arrangements, including liaison and coordination with

external organisations, as well as CIS and ROE, allow effective
integration and employment of forces to execute missions and
achieve objectives.

(e) ROEs allow for appropriate protection and employment of

forces.

(f) Provisions for theatre support and sustainment meet

operational requirements with acceptable risks.

(g) Contingency planning requirements have been identified

and prioritised to cover identified risks.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The JOPG is responsible

for Phase 4b, supported by the HQ staff. Operations staff should be engaged
as required to: monitor the force activation process; to facilitate OPLAN
handover; to begin preparing execution orders; and to integrate planning and
execution in response to an urgent crisis. The COM approves the OPLAN
prior to its submission as a draft to the strategic level, and approves
subordinate, supporting and component level plans after the approval of the
operational level OPLAN96.

96
Where a supporting plan falls outside of the authority of the COM, the approval process will need to be clearly defined and
captured in the OPD.

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Subordinate/ Other
Strategic Level Operational Level Component HQs Operational Level
SACEUR COM COM COM

Approved Draft Operational

Strategic Initiate Operational CONOPS with
CONOPS OPLAN Development Comd D&G
Illustrative
Provisional SORs
CJSOR

Operational SACEUR Approval of Collaborative Planning / Interaction

CONOPS Operational CONOPS

Component
Plan for Employment Component
OPG
for Operational Forces Component
OPG
OPG
SHAPE Collaborative
Collaborative
Planning and
CAT Plans Collaborative
Planning and
Interaction
Planning and
Plan for Command and Interaction
Interaction
Operational Level Phase 4b

Collaborative Control
Planning and
Commander’s
Interaction
Direction and
Guidance
Plan Force Preparation
and Sustainment
Draft Staff
CJSOR Functional
Estimates
AFL Plan for Force Advice from
Advice from
Subordinates
Deployment Advice from
Subordinates
ADL Subordinates

MNDPP Advice from

cooperating IO /
Plan Force Protection GO / NGOs

Draft Draft
Operational Component
OPLAN Draftx
Plans
ROEREQ
Approved Coordinate Operational
Strategic OPLAN for Approval Share
OPLAN and Handover
Operational
Operational
Approvalx
OPLAN
OPLAN

Component
Approvalx Plans

Figure 4.18 Phase 4b Operational OPLAN Development Main Activities

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f. External Coordination. Liaison and / or liaison and planning elements

from SHAPE, operational level HQs, subordinate and supporting commands,
NIFC, NSPA, NCIA, NCISG HQ and cooperating relevant national and
international actors should remain in place from Phase 4a - Operational
CONOPS development. Close coordination will be required throughout this
phase with the AMCC at HQ SJLSG to assist in deployment planning with
nations as well as with the HN(s) via the OLRT.

(1) SHAPE.

(a) CAT Plans. The JOPG will develop the operational

OPLAN in collaboration with CAT Plans, to ensure that it remains
harmonised with the overall intent and is adequately supported
by the strategic OPLAN. The JOPG will access other SHAPE
entities, initially through CAT Plans, to assist development of the
operational OPLAN, specifically the generation of, and planning
for, the deployment of forces.

(b) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis

situation and provide information and intelligence to the CAT
Plans. It will finalise preparations for management of operation
execution.

(c) CyOC. Depending on the required cyberspace role in

support of the operation, CyOC will act as a central point of
coordination for the conduct of cyberspace operations. This
includes the liaison requirements for interacting with Sovereign
Nations in determining cyber offensive capabilities required in
support of operations.

(2) SJLSG. The AMCC within SJLSG supports strategic movement

planning and coordinates with Nations by merging National Detailed
Deployment Plans (DDPs) into a MN DDP, which is used to de-conflict
any movement issues between nations.

(3) Operational Commands. Reciprocal liaison and planning

support elements will be key to the coordination, de-confliction and
synchronisation with other operational level HQs, SSCs or TCCs
conducting parallel planning.

(4) Subordinate and Supporting Commands. The development

of the operational OPLAN should be developed in collaboration with
subordinate, component and supporting commands, and the
development of their plans. Liaison and planning elements from
subordinate and component commands might remain integrated with
the JOPG and to provide feedback to / from their COM / command as
required.

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SECTION 2 - PROCESS

4.53. Initiate Operational OPLAN Development. The development of the OPLAN

should flow naturally from the CONOPS development with the JOPG continuing to
lead the process incorporating elements of the CONOPS where appropriate. The
JOPG must conduct a thorough review of all of the information, intelligence and
understanding regarding the crisis; has anything changed that could alter or impact
the planning process since the CONOPS was developed; has any additional
direction and guidance been issued from NATO HQ / SHAPE and has deconfliction /
coordination with other operational commands generated any changes to the
planning.

a. Review Guidance and Direction. The JOPG should review any COM
guidance for the development of the operational OPLAN, given with the
approval for submission of the draft operational CONOPS, or any issues
raised in SACEUR’s review of the draft operational CONOPS. After seeking
any additional guidance required from the COM, the JOPG will accomplish the
following:

(1) Review the operational CONOPS and refine the synchronisation

matrix.

(2) Establish the schedule for operational OPLAN development to

include:

(a) Submission of initial drafts.

(b) Review and coordination of initial drafts.

(c) Submission of revised drafts.

(d) Review and coordination with other HQs.

(e) Submission of coordinated drafts for final staffing and the

COM’s approval.

(3) Review the status of strategic planning at SHAPE.

(4) Review the status of other operational level HQs planning.

(5) Establish the inputs required from subordinate / component /

supporting commands, as well as cooperating relevant national and
international actors.

(6) Review the risk management matrix.

(7) Task specific JOPG members to address issues raised by

SACEUR.

(8) Coordinate arrangements for OPLAN handover.

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(9) Issue further direction and guidance.

b. Review the Status of Strategic Planning. Operational OPLAN

development depends on a number of critical strategic level planning actions.
The presence of a SHAPE liaison element, if provided, will keep the JOPG
abreast of developments and raise issues requiring attention by SHAPE; if
one is not provided then the HQ liaison to SHAPE / CAT Plans will provide this
conduit. Critical areas that directly impact on the ability of the HQ to develop
its operational OPLAN particularly during crisis response planning, include:

(1) Force Generation. Immediately following the NAC’s approval of

the strategic CONOPS and release of a Force Activation Directive
(FAD), SACEUR will formally initiate the force generation process to
identify national force contributions to fill the ‘provisional’ CJSOR. The
JOPG should monitor this process to track the following:

(a) Release of the ACTWARN97 and the provisional CJSOR98.

(b) Conduct of the Force Generation Conference (FGC) -

presentation of the strategic CONOPS and the filling of the
provisional CJSOR.

(c) Release of the draft CJSOR99 with national commitments.

(d) Release of the Activation Request (ACTREQ) requesting

national confirmation forces commitments in the draft CJSOR.

(e) Receipt of nations’ Force Preparation (FORCEPREP)

messages identifying forces to fill commitments.

(f) Release of the Allied Force List (AFL) confirming the force
package for the operation.

(2) Preliminary Deployment Planning. Typically SJLSG and

national movement planners will meet soon after the FGC to review
and coordinate strategic movements based on the force flow in the
provisional CJSOR. Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) and HQ
movement planners must participate in this initial meeting. The main
issues include:

97
In lieu of an ACTWARN, DSACEUR may send nations a formal ‘calling’ letter to initiate force generation.
98
An ‘illustrative’ CJSOR would have been provided to the NAC with the strategic CONOPS to provide nations an indication of
the type and scale of forces and capabilities required to realise the strategic CONOPS. This ‘illustrative’ CJSOR would be
further developed in collaboration between the strategic and operational level until the strategic CONOPS is approved by the
NAC and they release the FAD. SACEUR then releases the ACTWARN to nations for formally commence the force generation
process and provides them with the further refined CJSOR – termed a ‘provisional’ CJSOR. To ensure an effective and
accurate force generation process it is important that the provisional CJSOR contains enough detail of the requirements for
nations to prepare their force offers.
99
The ‘draft’ CJSOR reflects national force offers towards the operational commander’s requirement and is a product of the
Force Generation Conference. It is issued with the ACTREQ (or acceptance letter, especially for sustained operations) to
advise nations that their offers (as captured in the draft CJSOR) have been accepted and requests nations to prepare their
forces. The ‘draft’ CJSOR provides the first indication of fills and shortfalls and will, as such, provide the basis for the list of
forces available for the operational commander. The CJSOR continues to be updated throughout Phase 4 b and is included in
the strategic OPLAN.

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(a) Designation of APOD / SPOD / RPODs in theatre as well

as staging areas and responsibilities for their operation.

(b) Designation of air, sea and rail / points of embarkation

(APOEs / SPOEs / RPOEs) and responsibilities for their
operation.

(c) Allocation and coordination of strategic air and sealift.

(d) Commanders Required Date(s) (CRDs).

(3) Legal Arrangements with the Host Nation(s). SHAPE will

coordinate with the NATO HQ LEGAD to negotiate SOFAs as a basis
for developing HNS agreements / understandings. These are essential
for planning with the HN(s).

(4) Strategic Communications. StratCom direction and guidance

is developed at NATO HQ with input from SHAPE. It provides critical
information required for all HQ planning, including audiences, master
themes and topics100.

(5) ROE. An illustrative ROEREQ should have accompanied the

operational CONOPS when it was submitted to outline the ROE
required for the use of force to accomplish the mission. SACEUR’s
CONOPS when submitted to the NAC would also have included an
‘illustrative’ ROEREQ based on the operational level requirements and
justification. The JOPG should review the ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ
submitted with the strategic CONOPS and analyse any differences
from the one submitted. In addition, once the strategic CONOPS is
approved, the JOPG should review any NAC direction and guidance on
ROE, specifically with respect to the ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ, for any
implications that may impact the development of the operational
OPLAN.

c. Review the Status of Planning by other Operational Level HQs /

Single Service Commands / Theatre Component Commands. Operational
OPLAN development by the HQ must provide for the coordination and
synchronisation of actions by other operational level HQs / SSCs / TCCs. It is
therefore important for the JOPG to remain fully informed as to the status of
planning through regular updates by their liaison / planning elements related
to:

(1) The status of operational level planning (e.g. CoA, CONOPS, or

theatre component plan development as applicable).

(2) Coordination of supporting / supported requirements.

100
This guidance may also result in the generation of a SECGEN authorised StratCom Framework for the operation or mission.
This framework may be developed in parallel with the planning process, will be fully aligned with planning analysis and
products, and completed in collaboration with ACO StratCom staffs.

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(3) Issues and concerns.

d. Review the Status of Planning by Subordinate, Component and

Supporting Commands. Operational OPLAN development by the HQ must
provide for the integration of the force as well as the coordination and
synchronisation of actions by subordinate, component and supporting
commands. It is therefore important for the JOPG to remain fully informed as
to the status of planning by subordinate, component and supporting
commands through regular updates by their liaison / planning elements
related to:

(1) The status of component planning (e.g. CoA, CONOPS, or

component plan development as applicable).

(2) Coordination of supporting / supported requirements.

(3) Issues and concerns.

e. Review the Planning with Relevant National and International

Actors. HQ planning may require further detailed coordination with a number
of different cooperating relevant national and international actors. It is
important to review the planning requirements, the current status of planning
and the arrangements that will be made to facilitate coordination, including
who is the lead within the JOPG. In particular, planning requirements should
be addressed for the HN(s) as well as cooperating international and regional
organisations in the theatre.

f. Coordinate Plan Handover. During OPLAN development, the JOPG

should be reinforced by operations staff and the JOC who will be responsible
for execution. Arrangements should be made to ensure continuity 101 between
planning and execution across all functional areas and define responsibility for
any branches and sequels that may need to be developed. This must balance
the requirements for those who developed the OPLAN to oversee its
execution with the need to continue planning during the conduct of operations.

4.54. SACEUR Approval of Operational CONOPS. Sometime after the

commencement of operational OPLAN development, the strategic CONOPS will be
approved by the NAC; SACEUR would then be able to approve the operational
CONOPS. The JOPG will refine102 the draft operational CONOPS as required and
staff it to the COM for approval and submission to SACEUR for approval. The
changes that were required to seek its approval will have to be factored into the
developing operational OPLAN. In addition, the JOPG should review the approved
strategic CONOPS for any other salient points that may impact the operational
OPLAN. The JOPG liaison to CAT Plans will be able to assist this process by
101
Continuity between planning and execution across all functional areas is normally enabled by the ‘plan owner’ post in the
JOPG transitioning to J3 for execution as well as the specialists transitioning from planning to execution. This must be
addressed in detail in HQ Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).
102
In a time compressed CRP situation, where collaborative planning between the strategic and operational levels is effectively
conducted, SACEUR and COM may agree to leave the operational CONOPS as a draft so as to not divert CAT Plans and
JOPG from OPLAN development. In this case, CAT Plans would apprise the JOPG of any changes or additions that will need
to be considered in the operational OPLAN development.

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apprising the JOPG of issues during the approval process of the strategic CONOPS
that would impact the operational CONOPS and OPLAN.

4.55. Plan for the Employment of Operational Forces. The operational CONOPS
provided a description of how the operation will be conducted, supported by an
illustrative CJSOR that outlined the force requirements and now becomes an annex
to the OPLAN.

a. Review the Planning Requirements for the Employment of

Operational Forces. Planning development must now refine the employment
of operational forces with subordinate / supporting commands within the
constraints of the expected or actual force package for the operation, adding
the required level of detail regarding C2 of joint forces and appreciating the
impact of any critical force shortfalls.

b. Confirm the Task Organisation. Given the expected or actual force

package based on the provisional (and then draft) CJSOR and eventually the
AFL, the JOPG should review and confirm the TASKORG with subordinate /
component / supporting commands to identify any critical shortfalls that would
prevent them from accomplishing assigned missions. This review should look
at each phase of the operation to understand more precisely the impact. The
TASKORG is depicted schematically and described in Annex B - Task
Organisation and Command Relationships.

c. Synchronise Forces and Functions for Each Operational Phase.

Based on their review of the TASKORG, the JOPG should confirm and, as
required, revise the synchronisation of activities to create the desired
operational effects and establish the DCs required in each phase of the
operation. Working together with subordinate / component / supporting
commands, the JOPG may be able to reallocate or reschedule activities to
compensate for force shortfalls. On this basis, the JOPG should update the
relevant paragraphs of the OPLAN main body and develop respective
Annexes. The refined synchronisation matrix is included in the Annex A -
Concept of Operations. Specific areas to be developed for each phase of the
operation include:

(1) Implementation of the Operational Scheme of Manoeuvre.

The JOPG should confirm the flow of forces into the theatre, including
the conduct of initial entry operations and the operational deployment
within the JOA. In addition to confirming the timing and sequence of
arrivals, this detailed review should confirm movement priorities and
points of entry required to produce the Allied Disposition List (ADL).
The ADL is included in Annex C - Forces and Effects.

(2) Develop Supported and Supporting Inter-Relationships.

The JOPG should review the SSI with subordinate / component /
supporting commands to confirm precisely the support required by the
supported commander designated for each phase and / or LoO.
Missions to supporting commanders should be specified in the OPLAN

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main body (paragraph 4 a). SSI are detailed in Annex B - Task

Organisation and Command Relationship, with the nature of support
articulated in the respective component annexes as well as subordinate
/ supporting plans.

(3) Plan for Joint Targeting and the Employment of Joint Fires.
A major coordinated effort by specific members of the JOPG will be
required to synchronise joint targeting103 and the use of lethal and non-
lethal means to create the desired operational effects and establish the
DCs for each operational phase. Details are provided in Annex II -
Joint Targeting. This activity should seek to achieve coherence and
synergy in the use of all means available in accordance with the COM’s
intent including coordination of the annexes to the OPLAN:

(a) Intelligence Support to Targeting (Annex D - Intelligence).

(b) Maritime Strike Operations (Annex F - Maritime

Operations).

(c) Air Operations (Annex H - Air Operations).

(d) Special Operations (Annex K - Special Operations).

(e) Cyberspace (Annex L – Cyberspace)

(f) Electronic Warfare (Annex P - Electronic Warfare).

(g) Civil-Military Co-operation (Annex W - Civil-Military Co-

operation).

(h) Space Operations (Annex DD – Space Operations).

(i) Military Engineering contribution to the joint fires and

targeting process (Annex EE - Military Engineering).

(j) Strategic Communications (Annex SS – StratCom

(Provides specific instructions for PA, InfoOps and PsyOps)).

(k) Stability Policing contribution to Targeting (Annex WW -

Stability Policing).

(4) Refine ROE. The JOPG must ensure that the ROE being
developed for the operation meets mission requirements, including
likely contingencies, and provide further requests with justification as
required. ROE profiles and ROE for land, air maritime and SOF are
103
For items to be included in the Targeting Annexes refer to ACO Directive 080-70 . Targeting processes must include proper
consideration of targeting consequences to NATO environmental protection, cultural property protection and protection of
civilians responsibilities. Failure to do so risks adverse legal, financial and StratCom consequences and might result in diverting
scarce operational resources from intended tasks to meet environmental, cultural property and protection of civilians response
requirements. Targeting planners and decision-makers must be cognisant that environmental consequences of a targeting
action may only manifest as a second- or third-order effects.

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provided in OPLAN Annex E - Rules of Engagement and developed

into a ROEREQ that will accompany the operational OPLAN for
approval.

d. Plan for the Build-up and Use of Reserves. Plan development must
provide for reserves as required to cover contingencies based on the force
package. Further consideration may have to be given as to where reserves
are positioned, under whose authority they are placed, and any conditions for
their employment. Details are provided in Annex A - Concept of Operations
and Annex C - Forces and Effects.

e. StratCom Implementation Guidance. StratCom Implementation

Guidance in the OPLAN, plus any operational level StratCom frameworks,
explains how the HQ intends to exploit the IE to achieve OOs. The OPLAN will
also provide specific instructions on the employment of MilPA and PsyOps,
and detail contribution to the strategic StratCom objectives. Drawing from the
NATO StratCom Framework and SHAPE StratCom Implementation Guidance,
planning will detail the themes and focus topics for identified audiences and
stakeholders. Planning is coordinated closely with the development of joint
effects and joint targeting, and the employment of all capabilities and forces
(including cyber and electronic warfare (EW). Details are provided in Annex
SS – StratCom.

f. Plan for Cooperation with Relevant National and International

Actors. Given the main areas of cooperation established in the CONOPS,
the JOPG must now develop the practical arrangements required to cooperate
on the ground within the TOO and the JOA. These should be described in
Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships and Annex W -
Civil-Military Co-operation. As a minimum they should specify the following:

(1) The delegation of authority for coordination of specific activities.

(2) Mechanisms and arrangements for coordination and information

sharing in accordance with relevant security policy for release of
information.

4.56. Plan for Command and Control. The CONOPS described the C2
arrangements required to conduct the operation and based on the force package and
further planning by subordinate / supporting commands, the JOPG must now further
review and develop specific aspects and requirements of the C2 arrangements,
including those to consider the multinational nature of the forces from all contributing
nations and the necessary arrangements for coordination with non-NATO entities.
Details are to be included in Annex B - Task Organisation and Command
Relationships. In addition to the review of C2 requirements the JOPG needs to
consider the following additional aspects of C2:

a. Further Specify Authorities and Responsibilities. Unity of command

and freedom of action require that authority is clearly delegated for critical
functions and / or geographical areas. The result must be that a single

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designated authority is established with responsibility for each joint function

and geographical area of responsibility within the JOA and the theatre.

b. Refine and Coordinate Areas of Operations. Subordinate /

component / supporting commanders must confirm that their respective
AOOs104 are sufficient to accomplish their assigned missions and protect their
force.

c. Confirm C2 Locations and Communications Connectivity. The

JOPG must coordinate and confirm the locations and phasing of the different
HQs and C2 facilities, especially those deploying to the theatre. This should
consider initial locations, collocation and any subsequent changes within the
constraints of deployable CIS. The location of the deployed HQ is critical to
determining the location of other HQs that typically will collocate with it. Any
changes need to be reflected in the ADL.

d. Plan for Transfer of Authority (TOA). The JOPG should confirm the
level of authority required for the employment of each force in the force
package against each nation’s FORCEPREP message and further establish
precisely when, where and under what conditions TOA should occur. This
information should be included in the Activation Order (ACTORD) and provide
the basis for nations’ Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA)
messages.

e. Plan for the Exchange of Liaison Elements. Every operation

confirms the importance of the exchange of liaison officers / elements to
facilitate collaboration and coordination. While the use of enhanced network
capabilities may improve real time collaboration, liaisons still play an important
role. Therefore, the JOPG must clearly establish the requirements for the
exchange of liaison elements including effective dates and ensure that
manpower requirements are filled.

f. Plan for Knowledge Development and Management. The HQ must

put into place the mechanisms to collect, fuse, analyse, validate and share
critical information and, where appropriate, knowledge with other commands
and non-NATO actors throughout the life of the operation. Details are
provided in appropriate OPLAN annexes, such as Annex NN - Knowledge
Development, Annex CC - Command Information Management, Annex W -
Civil-Military Cooperation, and Annex D - Intelligence.

g. Lessons Learned. The COM must build into the OPLAN

arrangements for a Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned process that
includes the sharing of such Lessons with NATO and non-NATO entities, as
appropriate. Details should be described in Annex LL - Lessons Learned.

104
Area of Operations – An area within a joint operations area defined by the joint force commanders for conducting tactical
level operations. NATO Term.

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h. Plan for Operations Assessment105. OPSA informs the COM if the

operation is being conducted as planned and if the operation is achieving the
desired results, which assists making evidence-based adjustments to the plan
being executed. Therefore during OPLAN development, the JOPG should
plan for the conduct of OPSA, and articulate details in Annex OO - Operations
Assessment. Routine reporting and the CUOE / JIPOE should provide
sufficient data and information for the conduct of OPSA which should leverage
the functional area assessments of all staff divisions and subordinate
commands and avoid duplicating their analysis and assessments.
Requirements will be different for each operation but should consider the need
to look back at trends to evaluate operational effectiveness, as well as the
need to look forward to anticipate eventualities that pose risks and / or present
opportunities that may require branch and / or sequel plans.

i. Plan for CIS and CD. The operational CONOPS included a description
of the CIS concept based on known C2 requirements and CIS constraints.
The JOPG will refine the CIS concept based on: the actual CIS capabilities
available, including bandwidth and CIS and CD capabilities in the force
package; and the further definition of C2 requirements across different
functional areas.

4.57. Force Preparation and Sustainment. Planning for the preparation and
sustainment of the deployed force will be led by the respective specialist staffs. The
JOPG will ensure that any functional area planning activity is coordinated and
synchronised in close coordination with HQ SJLSG. The purpose of force preparation
and sustainment is to ensure the forces required to mount and conduct operations
are fully capable of meeting mission requirements. It includes the following main
areas:

a. Resource Management and Capability Development. The

preparation and sustainment of a NATO led operation requires the provision
and management of NATO resources as well as the development of
capabilities to meet theatre requirements. Capability Requirements are
submitted to the Nations as part of the FGen process in order to generate the
set of initial enabling capabilities. Persisting capability shortfalls, as well as
operational requirements identified and prioritised by the JOPG for each
phase of the operation, should be addressed taking into consideration the
following:

(1) FGen focuses on identifying National contributions to fill

requirements for forces, HQs, personnel and certain theatre
capabilities.

(2) The acquisition of theatre capabilities considered eligible for

common funded by means of capital investments is managed through
the NATO Security Investment Program. These requirements are

105
Within TOPFAS the Campaign Assessment Tool (CAT) can be used to facilitate the management and visualisation of
assessment data and information.

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normally drawn from the TCSOR and will be listed in the Allied
Operations and Missions (AOM) Requirements and Resources Plan
(ARRP), released along with the first Periodic Mission Review (PMR).

(3) Budget requests are developed and coordinated by J8 as part of

the planning process. Particular attention should be given to theatre
level HQs and critical theatre level enabling capabilities, sustainment of
CEs and contracting of local services such as interpreters and security.

(4) NATO Funding Arrangements106 should be used for early

identification of requirements that can be considered for common
funding.

b. Mission Training and Certification of HQs, Personnel and Forces.

The JOPG should establish mission training and certification requirements for
HQs, personnel and forces deploying to the theatre with the details included in
Annex BB - Training and Mission Rehearsals. These should be based on
operational actions and conditions in the operating environment, including FP
requirements, as well as cultural aspects. Requirements and arrangements to
be implemented should be established for:

(1) Augmentation training.

(2) Pre-deployment training support.

(3) Certification of forces.

(4) In-theatre training support.

c. Logistical Support to the Force in Theatre. The logistic concept that

was developed during CONOPS development described how joint MN logistic
support to the force would be accomplished in theatre. During OPLAN
development detailed planning and coordination is required with Troop
Contributing Nations (TCNs) and HN(s) as well as subordinate / component /
supporting commands to ensure that supplies and services can be delivered
to the force to meet operational requirements for each phase. Logistical
conferences will be required to confirm logistic arrangements, especially with
the HN(s) to ensure that they meet operational needs and allow a sufficient
build-up of logistic resources, including stockpiles for POL and critical
munitions; these will be coordinated by HQ SJLSG alongside any movement
planning conferences. Any shortfalls in HNS may require the activation and
deployment of additional logistic units or the use of pre-planned and / or ad
hoc commercial contracts. The following areas have significant operational
impact and must be closely coordinated with other planning and with the
details provided in Annex R - Logistics:

(1) Logistical Standards. Logistical standards must reflect the

expected operational tempo and demands for each phase. Experts

106
PO(2013)0056, Revised Funding Arrangements for Non-Article 5 NATO-led Operations and Missions, 06 Feb 2013,

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from subordinate / supporting commands must assist in refining

operational requirements for fuel and munitions.

(2) Host Nation Support. The level and scope of HNS must be
confirmed based on close contacts with the HN(s) including access to
specific facilities, infrastructure and logistic operating units, especially
ground transportation. Provisions must be made for TCN(s) to
coordinate with HN(s) within guidelines developed by the JOPG and
established by the COM.

(3) National Responsibilities. Logistic execution by framework,

lead or role specialised nations must be confirmed for critical logistic
activities such as POL distribution.

(4) Multi-National Solutions. MN solutions supporting the mission,

like a JLSG or MN enablers, have to be specified; their tasks and
responsibilities, and those of nations need to be clearly delineated and
agreed.

(5) Contractor Support to Operations (CSO). As cooperation

amongst the Nations and with NATO will contribute to the best use of
contractor resources, eliminate completion amongst TCNs and
encourage completion between providers, this will facilitate visibility and
transparency of contractor support capabilities between NATO and
Nations.

d. Theatre Medical Support. Theatre medical support must meet the

requirements of TCNs in different operating areas. Details are provided in
Annex QQ.

e. Theatre Military Engineering Support. MILENG support to critical

theatre infrastructure requirements is to be identified and prioritised against
operational requirements (e.g. infrastructure requirements to support RSOMI
(PODs, marshalling and staging areas, LoC, etc.) and in support of sustaining
the force (theatre logistic base (TLB), convoy support centres (CSC), main
supply routes (MSR), etc.)).

f. Rotation of HQs, Personnel and Forces. The JOPG should

anticipate the requirement to sustain the operation through to its termination.
They should develop requirements and initial plans to replace HQs and forces,
including personnel augmentation in deployed HQs, with consideration to the
likely tempo of operations and the possibility to adjust force levels over time.

4.58. Plan for Force Deployment. Planning for the deployment of the force will be
led by the respective specialist staffs. The JOPG will ensure that any functional area
planning activity is coordinated and synchronised.

a. Review the Requirements for Planning the Deployment of Forces.

The strategic deployment of forces into a TOO and their onward movement

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into and within the JOA constitutes the initial operational manoeuvre
(influenced by the operational level through the ADL / AFL) and must be
planned as an operation requiring the expertise of operations, movements and
logistic planners. Planning should cover the entire sequence of activities
required for mounting, embarkation, debarkation and RSOM. Details are
provided in Annex S - Movements. It requires close coordination with the
SJLSG / AMCC, TCN(s), the HN(s), port operating organisation, the JLSG HQ
and gaining commands. Legal arrangements must be in place or assumed
regarding the status of forces and understandings / agreements with the
HN(s) as well as arrangements for transit and over-flight.

b. Design and Develop the Theatre Movements Architecture. The

design, development, implementation and control of movements architecture
within the JOA is a JHQ and JLSG responsibility. The JOPG, in close
coordination with the OLRT must confirm with the HN(s), as early as possible,
the availability and capabilities of the following infrastructure:

(1) APOD / SPOD / RPOD and other key transportation nodes such
as route networks.

(2) Staging areas, CSC and facilities required for operational entry
into the JOA.

(3) Reception areas and facilities.

(4) LoCs to and within AOOs.

c. Finalise the Force Flow. Based on detailed planning for the

employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force based on the AFL
force package, the JOPG must make any final revisions to the force flow in the
ADL. Specific deployment requirements must be established for each force in
the force package identified in the AFL, according to the final force flow,
including the following:

(1) Strategic LoCs and entry points into the theatre.

(2) Final destination in the JOA.

(3) CRD for the full operational capability of the force.

(4) Priority107 for sequence of movement.

(5) Command authority to be transferred.

d. Establish Command Authority and Responsibilities for

Deployment Operations. The JOPG must establish specific requirements
and responsibilities for the conduct of specific aspects of deployment
operations. Depending on the ability of the HN(s) to provide adequate support
107
Priority is set to allow de-confliction at PODs.

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for these operations, the HQ may have to establish the required capabilities or
contract for them. Critical aspects to be developed include:

(1) Mounting operations to prepare assigned HQs and forces for

deployment.

(2) Security of entry points, staging / reception areas and LoCs

within the theatre.

(3) Operation of air / sea port and rail facilities and reception areas.

(4) Operation of staging areas.

(5) Control of onward movements into and within the JOA.

e. Coordinate Detailed Deployment Plans with Nations. The ADL

serves as the COM’s principal means for establishing the required flow of
forces into the theatre. It provides the operational basis for the SJLSG /
AMCC to coordinate with nations on behalf of SACEUR for the strategic
deployment of HQs and forces to their required destination, including the
coordination of strategic LoCs, modes of transportation and strategic lift. On
this basis each TCN develops a DDP for its forces for coordination and de-
confliction by the AMCC into a MN DDP to best achieve the required flow of
forces into the theatre. Based on the MN DDP and the scheduled arrival of
forces, the JOPG can further plan for the RSOMI and sustainment operations
in close coordination with the theatre logistics HQs (e.g. SJLSG HQ).
Deployment planning is typically conducted with nations at the strategic level,
but is heavily reliant on operational requirements provided by the JOPG
representatives during a series of Movement Planning Conferences (MPC), as
follows:

(1) Initial Movement Planning Conference (IMovPC). The

IMovPC is hosted by the AMCC as soon as possible after ACTWARN
and will provide the first step of the deployment planning cycle. A
JOPG representative will attend to ensure that the movement plan
reflects the COM’s intent. IMovPC will:

(a) Confirm the overall concept of operations.

(b) Confirm HN resources to include APODs, SPODs and

RPODs.

(c) Establish or confirm possible requirement for sharing

logistic and infrastructure resources with relevant international
actors operating in the JOA.

(d) Review and confirm the required force flow based on the
ADL.

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(e) Establish the movement control (MOVCON) organisation

network and point of contact register.

(2) Main Movement Planning Conference (MMovPC). The

purpose of the MMovPC is to coordinate the details of the actual
deployment of forces based on national deployment planning. The
main activities of the MMovPC are:

(a) Review the DDPs.

(b) Start the initial de-confliction process, including de-

confliction with cooperating relevant international actors
operating in the JOA, as required.

(c) Start the strategic air and sea assessment and identify
national shortfalls.

(d) Confirm HNS agreements and MOUs as well as

resources and throughput capabilities.

(3) Final Movement Planning Conference (FMovPC). The aim of

the FMovPC is to provide a fully co-ordinated and de-conflicted MN
DDP agreed to by all HQs, TCNs and the HNs. The MN DDP will form
the basis of all further movement planning in support of the plan.

4.59. Plan Force Protection. FP planning of the deployed force will be led by the
respective specialist staffs. The JOPG will ensure that any FP planning activity is
coordinated and synchronised.

a. Review Requirements for Force Protection Planning. FP consists

of the following diverse notional capabilities: Security, Military Engineering
Support to FP, Air Defence, Force Health Protection, Consequence
Management and CBRN Defence. FP planning should develop requirements
and measures to be taken to protect the HQs, personnel and forces from
identified risks and threats. Details are provided in Annex J - Force
Protection. Specific measures should be developed to minimise the
vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations for each phase
of the operation. FP planning requires close coordination with the HN(s),
TCNs and supporting / component / subordinate commands. It should
consider possible HN force protection capabilities and their possible
contributions. Particular attention should be given to protection of forces in
transit, choke points, APODs, SPODs and rail heads as well as reception and
staging areas where concentration of personnel and equipment may be
vulnerable to attack. FP planning should consider the following four areas:
Protective Security; Active Defence; Passive Defence; and Recuperation.

b. Protective Security. The JOPG should establish requirements for

protective security for operational activities, facilities and operations as well as
direction to subordinate / component / supporting commands for specific

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protective security measures to be taken based on the evaluated risks and

threats in the following domains: physical security, personnel security,
information security, operational security and industrial security. Coordination
with HN(s) and military engineers is essential to establish practical
arrangements for interaction with local and national law enforcement,
Information and Intelligence Sharing (I&IS), environmental health & safety, fire
protection, medical, road / traffic, recreational safety, etc., as arranged in
SOFAs and memoranda / agreements of understanding.

c. Active Defence. Based on their appreciation of the threat of attack,

the JOPG should determine the required defensive measures to deter,
prevent, neutralise, or reduce the effectiveness of potential attacks, including
defence against surface, sub-surface, air, rocket and missile attack. The
JOPG must coordinate with subordinate / supporting / component commands
and HN(s) for the provision of active defence measures including:

(1) Counter-air operations.

(2) Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).

(3) Port and harbour defences.

(4) Defence of key areas for staging, lodgement, rear area activities
and other vital areas.

(5) CBRN defence.

(6) Counter Terrorism (CT).

(7) Computer Network Defence (CND).

(8) Cyberspace Operations.

d. Passive Defence. FP planning should also develop passive defence

measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of conventional and CBRN
incidents on HQs, forces and personnel and limit the potential operational,
component, psychological and political consequences. Passive defence
includes the preparation of HQs, personnel, forces and facilities to limit their
exposure and to deal with such attacks to ensure their survival and ability to
continue operations with minimal loss of effectiveness. All deployed HQs,
personnel and forces operating in a potential CBRN environment must be
prepared to sustain operations under CBRN conditions. Required training in
passive defence measures should be specified.

e. Recuperation. Based on their appreciation of threats and the potential

consequences of possible attacks, the JOPG should develop recuperation
measures to enable HQs, forces and facilities to recover from the effects of an
attack, restore essential services and allow operations to continue with the
minimum of disruption. In particular, operations in a CBRN environment
require the capability for recuperation from a CBRN incidents, or from the

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effects of Release Other Than Attack (ROTA) and Toxic Industrial Material
(TIM). The centralisation of recuperation capabilities requires clearly
designated organisational responsibilities and command authority to ensure
timely and effective recuperation action. Recuperation planning should
include requirements for:

(1) Damage control.

(2) Post-attack reconnaissance and assessment.

(3) Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance and Disposal (EOR /

EOD).

(4) Firefighting.

(5) Rescue operations, including search and rescue / combat

search and rescue (SAR / CSAR).

(6) Mass casualty handling.

(7) Decontamination.

4.60. Rehearsal of Concept and Operational OPLAN Coordination for Approval

and Handover. Final coordination of an OPLAN at the operational level requires
that responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements and actions are in place for
the essential operational and functional activities called for in the OPLAN. This final
coordination is facilitated through the use of Rehearsal of Concept (RoC) drills and
detailed and deliberate staff checks.

a. Rehearsal of Concept Drill. The COM should direct an OPLAN review

/ rehearsal which may be conducted as a theatre map exercise, often referred
to as a RoC drill, to step through the critical aspects of the operation to ensure
synchronisation. The RoC drill should ensure that all elements of the plan, or
selected parts as directed by the COM, are tested and reviewed and all
components, force elements, HN(s) and Transiting Nations representatives
fully understand their tasks, role and purpose. The RoC drill should be led by
the operations staff in cooperation with the JOPG.

b. Operational and Component Coordination. This typically requires a

deliberate review by the JOPG with representatives from strategic / supporting
/ component / subordinate commands as well HN(s) and TCNs as required,
and, if relevant and feasible108, representatives from relevant international
actors operating in the JOA. Ideally, this would have been preceded by a
JOPG review of the draft component plans. The COM is briefed on the
outcome. In any case the final coordination should examine each phase of
the operation in terms of:

(1) Deployment.
108
In accordance with agreed security requirements and arrangements.

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(2) Employment of operational forces to create desired operational

effects and establish DCs, and the related MoEs and, if appropriate,
criteria for success.

(3) Contingencies.

(4) C2 responsibilities, authorities and relationships.

(5) Sustainment and support.

(6) FP measures.

(7) De-confliction with partners or non-NATO entities operating in

the JOA.

(8) Operational risks especially resulting from shortfalls in required

capabilities.

(9) Strategic requirements.

c. Conduct Final Operational Risk / Opportunity Evaluation. Based

on the outcomes from operational coordination of the OPLAN, the JOPG
should conduct a final evaluation of operational risks and opportunities,
including in particular any risks resulting from shortfalls in critical capabilities.
This evaluation needs to consider both the risks to the mission and risks to the
force as well as the opportunities that could be exploited by taking risk. The
evaluation is presented to the COM with recommendations regarding any risks
considered to remain unacceptable at this point.

d. Complete Strategic Coordination. The COM should arrange to back

brief SACEUR on the final OPLAN focusing on: the main operational aspects
as described above; specific strategic requirements for confirmation and / or
coordination by SHAPE; and any significant or unacceptable operational risks.
To facilitate this strategic coordination, the COM would normally authorise the
release of a draft operational OPLAN to SHAPE to assist in their finalisation of
the strategic OPLAN, especially in time critical crisis response situations,
unless the final operational OPLAN will be completed in time to serve this
purpose. The JOPG would also assist, as necessary, CAT Plans as they
finalise the strategic OPLAN for submission to ensure it supports and correctly
interprets the operational requirements.

e. Forward OPLAN for Approval. Following strategic coordination, the

COM will direct any further changes required in the OPLAN. Once these are
coordinated and incorporated in the OPLAN, the JOPG forwards the
completed OPLAN, including the main body and all required annexes, to the
COM for approval and submission to SACEUR. Following approval of the
strategic OPLAN by the NAC, there may be a need for minor amendments of
the submitted operational OPLAN, coordinated by CAT Plans and JOPG, prior
to gaining SACEUR’s approval.

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f. Handover of the Plan. During Phase 4, the JOPG should have been
reinforced by operations staff and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), who will
assume responsibility for execution. The handover of the plan must include a
clear breakdown of responsibilities and a timeline for the planning of any
branches and sequels. Once the OPLAN is approved, the OPLAN should be
handed over for execution in anticipation of a NAC Execution Directive (NED)
and SACEUR’s ACTORD. Should a plan review be required at any stage, the
JOPG remains the lead.

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PHASE 5 - EXECUTION

4.61. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 5 - Execution is to manage the execution

of the approved operational OPLAN.

a. Overview. Phase 5 includes all operational level activities to ‘execute’

the operational OPLAN, including operations assessment and, if required, the
conduct of an OPLAN review.

b. Prerequisites. The commencement of Phase 5 requires: the decision

by the NAC to execute the operation, with their promulgation of a NED,
SACEUR’s approval of the operational OPLAN and the issue of the ACTORD
to activate the necessary forces.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 5109 are:

(1) Coordinating the actions necessary to initiate an operation.

(2) Implementing the operational OPLAN. The coordination and

synchronisation of the operation, including adjustment, liaison and
coordination, and identifying and managing operational risks and
issues.

(3) Operations Assessment. Reviewing the operational-level

progress of the operation.

(4) Assessing the relevance of current plans with stakeholders, and,

when required, conducting a plan review (using the Phase 2-4
processes as appropriate).

d. Desired Outcomes. The desired outcomes of Phase 5 are:

(1) Smooth commencement of the operation with the subordinate

and component HQs supported by the HQ as required.

(2) Operational direction and guidance for the execution of the

operation, to include Fragmentation Orders (FRAGOs) and Joint
Coordination Orders (JCOs).

(3) Provision of accurate and timely operational military input,

including operational level operations assessment products, to inform
SACEUR and assist decision making.

(4) Revised / new operational OPLAN, as directed by SACEUR.

(5) Joint synchronisation of activities.

109
See also AJP 3 - Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

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(5) The establishment of the conditions in the operating

environment, and the achievement of the operational military
objectives, by military-led NATO forces, including successful military
support of any NATO non-military activities, to contribute to the
achievement of MSOs and the NATO end state.

e. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. Overall, the COM is

responsible for the execution of the operational OPLAN. The main staff focal
point for the coordination and synchronisation of the operation is the
operations staff, who are supported by the HQ staff (e.g. intelligence / KD,
plans, operations assessment, support, etc.). The JOC monitors major events
or incidents as well as establishing and maintaining the Joint Common
Operational Picture (JCOP) of the area when possible, facilitating ISR and EW
cross-cue, enabling joint tactical C2, and conducting real-time coordination of
joint action between subordinate, supporting and component commands.

f. External Coordination. Phase 5 activities at the operational level are

facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of, authorised and
appropriate, external entities. Liaison elements from subordinate, supporting
and component commands, and cooperating relevant national and
international actors should remain in place from Phase 4 or be reactivated if
they have returned to their respective commands.

(1) SHAPE. The CCOMC will be the main staff interface with the
operational level HQ(s) during execution. Once the strategic OPLAN
has been approved by the NAC and SACEUR approves the operational
OPLAN, CAT Plans within the CCOMC, will transition to a CAT Ops.
CAT Ops will become the focus of SHAPE cross-functional effort in
support of mission execution and is responsible for the conduct of
strategic operations assessment including Periodic Mission Reviews
(PMRs) and in conjunction with CAT Plans the drafting and release of
any Strategic Coordination Orders (SCO).

(2) CAT Plans. If required, a CAT Plans will be re-established and

operate simultaneously with the CAT Ops, to conduct activities
described in Phases 2-4 of the strategic OPP, including strategic
OPLAN revisions or generate SCOs as required.

(3) CyOC. Depending on the required cyberspace role in support of

the operation, CyOC will act as a central point of coordination for the
conduct of cyberspace operations. This includes the liaison
requirements for interacting with Sovereign Nations in determining
cyber offensive capabilities required in support of operations.

(4) Operational Commands. Where multiple operational level

commands are engaged in the operation or are part of a strategic
campaign, the maintenance of reciprocal liaison elements will be key to
the coordination, de-confliction and synchronisation.

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(5) SJLSG. SJLSG / AMCC develops the Force Executive Plan

(FEP) from the MNDPP and monitors its execution by the TCNs in
close coordination with the relevant NATO entities.

4.62. Considerations for Execution. Phase 5 is the execution of the developed

and approved operational OPLAN, which occurs in a dynamic, ever-changing
environment. As the staff manage the transition of the OPLAN from Phase 4 to
Phase 5 a number of separate considerations need to be made:

a. Implementation. In order to enable the implementation of the OPLAN,

the JOPG will normally provide one of its key planners (plan owner) to help
the transition of ownership of the plan to the operations staff. Thus as well as
having had membership in the JOPG during the development of key execution
documents such as the synchronisation matrix and operational timeline,
developed by the JOPG to support the understanding of the interrelationships
and ownership of objectives, circumstances, effects, key events, critical
factors, functions, DCs and other elements of the operational design, the
synchronisation and execution staff begins the operation with direct planning
support and a clear understanding of the vision of the operational OPLAN.
Even at the beginning of execution, planners and the JOPG will also need to
consider the impact of emerging information on the OPLAN and any
adaptations or changes that have to be made.

b. Civil-Military Interaction. Execution requires the C2 of military forces

and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated,
coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects. To
accomplish this, the operational OPLAN has to not only sit within the strategic
OPLAN and alongside any other associated operational OPLANs but also
within the comprehensive political approach adopted by the Alliance and any
other contributors. It is often the case that military planning is conducted
before, or more rapidly than, civilian preparation; though it is recognised that
the military’s structure and procedures enable this rapid reaction it is equally
important to recognise that harmonisation between military and civil actors is
also essential. The strategic level will have taken the lead in the early
definition of the parameters and levels of liaison and interdependent planning
for its subordinates and it is within these guidelines that the operational level
must interact with civilian and multinational agencies and structures.

c. Battle Rhythm. As operations commence, the battle rhythm of

briefings and meetings should be established as quickly as possible to support
the COM’s decision making and fuse staff effort; it is an essential mechanism
for maximising concurrent activity and aiding synchronisation. Three essential
forums for the COM and the CG are:

(1) Situational Awareness Briefing (SAB). The SAB is a daily

update brief to the COM on the last and next 24 hours in detail, and the
next 48 hours in outline. It is given by the outgoing watch and should
be attended by all available staff. The COM usually concludes the brief
with any necessary direction and guidance.

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(2) Assessment Board (AB). The AB is the second principal

meeting for the COM. The aim is to seek the COM’s endorsement of
the provided assessment and recommend staff actions and plan
adjustments. Decisions on follow-on actions will be taken by the COM
during the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).

(3) Joint Coordination Board. The JCB is the COM’s principal

meeting. Its aim is to assist the macro aspects of joint activity and
effects synchronisation, specifically to issue COM’s priority guidance
across the subordinates and components, and to resolve potential
areas of conflict. Recommendations from the AB will be presented
during the JCB and the COM will take decisions on follow-on actions
and / or adjustments to the plan. The JCB comprises as a minimum
COM, COS, Functional Commanders (FC) / CCs (in person, by VTC, or
represented by their senior representatives), POLAD, LEGAD, Chief
JOC, StratCom Advisor and other individuals as required. Following
direction from the JCB, a JCO will be developed and issued to
coordinate changes to activity and effects.

d. Adjustment. Throughout the execution of the operation, the COM and

the staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring the
effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects, establishing DCs
and achieving the OOs. Based on these operations assessments, the plan
will be adjusted accordingly. During execution there are a number of tools
available to the operational level to amend and adjust the plan:

(1) FRAGO. Though normally the main tool of the components, this
is also available at the operational level to provide specific direction to
subordinates on an issue already in the OPLAN or agreed at the
strategic level. It permits a rapid reaction through a minor adjustment
or development of the operational OPLAN.

(2) JCO. This is normally the main tool at the operational level
during execution to provide joint synchronisation and detailed direction
and guidance to subordinates on activities, such as transitioning
between phases of an operation, that normally cover a number of
related or unrelated issues. The process of staffing and issuing a JCO
is a deliberate process and normally covers 3 JCB cycles; an initial
draft, coordinated draft and final draft, though this could be condensed
to a single cycle if time is limited. The planning staff should be fully
involved in the JCO development though the lead is normally by the
operations staff. Again the JCO focuses on adjusting / expanding /
adapting something already in the plan but could include a modification
or correction that is within existing guidance of the strategic level
through SCOs.

(3) Plan Revision. A plan revision can be initiated by the outcome

of a PMR but a single major event could equally provide the catalyst.
Normally NATO HQ would provide guidance to the strategic level

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leading to the need to change the strategic OPLAN. This in turn could
initiate a parallel plan review at the operational level. Though the
operational level commander will decide if the revision published by the
strategic level requires a revision of the operational level plan this will
normally be the case. While necessity may lead to a short period of
revision, this process can take up to a number of months and involves
all levels of the operation.

(4) Branches and Sequels. Developed by the planning staff but

normally within the JOPG process, branches and sequels are designed
as contingencies (pre-planned options) that deal with the inability to
establish a decisive condition or take advantage of a positive rapid
development in the operation. Typically they are developed
immediately after the OPLAN and sit ‘on the shelf’ ready for use and
regularly reviewed.

4.63. Execution and the Operational Estimate. During execution, a sudden

change in the operational situation or unexpected results from operations
assessment activities, may require the COM to either re-visit the original operational
estimate or commence a new one; if a new operational estimate is required, the
COM will have to decide if a deliberate operational estimate, as described in Phase
3, or a tailored operational estimate is appropriate. If time is a factor, the COM can
either provide guidance to the staff on what to concentrate on in their rapid conduct
of an operational estimate, or can decide to personally conduct one with selected key
staff. The situation will dictate the approach, guided by the COM’s experience and
judgement. Figure 4.19 is an illustrative outline of a quick tailored operational
estimate.

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MISSION ANALYSIS
Analyse Mission. Intent of higher HQ?
Objectives to be accomplished?
Imposed limitations?
What has changed?
What has to be analysed and decided?
Analyse Operating Geographical factors.
Environment.
Demographic factors (the population).
External Actors.
Information factors.
Appreciation of Identified forces, force disposition, force deployments.
Opponent(s).
Deduced opponent intent, objectives.
Analysis of opponent‘s relative combat power.
Analysis of opponent CoAs related to forces, time and space.
Analysis of impact on own operations.
Analyse own Situation. Own forces disposition, committed, uncommitted, availability of
reserves?
Relative combat power of own forces?
Suitability of own forces for evolving operational requirements
(new mission)?
Sustainability of own forces?
COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
Develop and Analyse potential own CoAs (related to own
forces, to time and to space).
Comparison of CoAs.
 Comparison Own and Opponent CoAs. Comparison of
relative combat power of own and opponent forces related
to: Time (when?) / Space (where?) / Consequences for
own CoAs?
 Compare Own CoAs Advantages and Disadvantages.
Advantages / Disadvantages of own CoAs related to
mission accomplishment. With an existing operation
consider impact on the existing mission and its objectives
and the resultant requirements for consultation with ‘higher’.
Decision on CoA Selection.

Figure 4.19 Illustrative Tailored Operational Estimate

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PHASE 6 - TRANSITION

4.64. Introduction. The purpose of Phase 6 - Transition is to coordinate the

transition and termination of a NATO military operation, including the transition of
NATO military responsibilities to proper authority and the withdrawal of forces under
NATO military command and their return to national command (reverse TOA).

a. Overview. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, periodic

operations assessments will be conducted to evaluate the progress made
towards the desired objectives and the NATO end state; eventually after
concluding that achievement of strategic military objectives is approaching
and, with consideration to the overall conditions of the NATO end-state to
which military efforts contribute, SACEUR will recommend to the NAC that
planning for transition and termination of the NATO military operation should
commence. This phase covers all the activities for the transition and
termination of a NATO military operation to facilitate the handover of
responsibility to proper authority (e.g. the UN, other IOs (e.g. EU) or
indigenous actor) in the crisis area and the withdrawal of forces under NATO
military command, in a controlled manner so as to avoid this action being a
destabilising influence in the region. Depending on the situation, transition and
termination may be able to be managed within the construct of the existing
strategic and operational OPLANs; alternatively, appropriate operations
planning activities may be needed, leading to NAC approval for a specific
transition strategic CONOPS or OPLAN. As the exact moment for transition
may be difficult to define, Phase 5 and 6 are likely to overlap.

b. Prerequisites. The commencement of Phase 6 requires: a NAC decision

sheet to begin preparation for transition and withdrawal of NATO forces under
military command, with SACEUR direction and guidance; or SACEUR
direction and guidance to commence considering the issues associated with a
future transition and withdrawal.

c. Main Activities. The main activities of the disengagement planning process

are:

(1) The provision of operational input to assist SACEUR decision-

making for the transition and termination.

(2) Activities to appreciate the need for and conduct transition

planning to minimise the risks and negative effects on a stabilised crisis
that could result from the disengagement of NATO forces. This may
include activities described in Phases 2-4 depending on how the NAC
wishes to proceed (e.g. the NAC may wish to start the process with a
Strategic Assessment).

(3) Coordination and / or collaboration between HQ(s), SSCs,

TCCs, SHAPE, NATO Agencies and relevant actors.

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(4) The provision of COM guidance and direction and support to

subordinate, supporting and component commanders to facilitate the
transition and termination of NATO military operations, including
minimising risks and negative effects on a stabilised crisis that could
result from the disengagement of NATO forces.

(5) Operational level coordination with relevant non-NATO actors

within the engagement space.

e. Desired outcome of this phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 6 is:

(1) Operational input provided to assist SACEUR decision-making

for the transition and termination of NATO’s role in the crisis, including
the associated military operation(s).

(2) Either / Or:

(a) Operational direction and guidance provided to

subordinates and components, to assist in managing the
transition and termination of the NATO military operation within
the current operational OPLAN and subordinate / supporting /
component plans.

(b) Operational transition OPLAN developed. Development

of appropriate products for SACEUR, as requested, leading to
approval of a revised or new operational OPLAN (e.g.
operational advice on MROs, transition CONOPS and / or
transition OPLAN). Following SACEUR approval of the
operational OPLAN, COM approval of the subordinate,
supporting and component transition plans.

(3) The transition and termination of NATO’s military operation has

been completed, in a controlled manner so as to avoid being a
destabilising influence in the region.

f. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities. The main staff focal point

for transition and termination activities will depend on the manner in which
transition is being considered. If Phase 2-4 activities are required, the JOPG
will lead or coordinate the required HQ staff effort, with the focus shifting back
to the operations staff on approval of the operational transition OPLAN. If
management of the transition will be done within the construct of the current
operational OPLAN, the operations staff will be the main staff focal point for
the coordination and synchronisation of the operation or campaign termination
supported by the HQ staff.

g. External Coordination. Phase 6 activities at the operational level are

facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities,
authorised and appropriate for the ongoing NATO military operation. These
may include but are not limited to the following:

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(1) SHAPE. The HQ will collaborate with the CCOMC, who will lead
initial transition thinking at SHAPE and as required send an appropriate
liaison, to any CAT assembled to conduct strategic level operations
planning activity. As the operation terminates, the HQ will liaise with
the CCOMC who will manage all the strategic post operation
termination activities, such as end of mission reports, archiving
operation information, completing post operation analysis (e.g. lessons
learned process), etc.

(2) Other Relevant Actors. By this point in an operation,

relationships between strategic and operational levels and relevant
actors would have been established; however, there may be additional
actors, not yet involved in the crisis resolution, who will be relevant for
the transition and termination of NATO’s military operation. HQ staff
(operations staff or JOPG as appropriate) will have to ensure they have
the requisite authorities / mechanisms to engage all actors, guided by
SACEUR guidance, relevant to transition and termination activities.

4.65. Considerations for Transition and Termination. Modern conflicts are

complex in nature involving interdependent actors with both convergent and
divergent interests and objectives. The deployment of NATO forces introduces them
into an already complex system and, over time, creates inter-dependencies with
other actors, and systems (e.g. economic, civil, and political) present in the
engagement space.

a. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, commanders and

their staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring
the effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects, establishing
desired conditions and achieving objectives, to contribute to the achievement
of the desired NATO end state.

b. Eventually SACEUR will consider that the MSOs have been achieved;
having established the conditions required by forces under NATO military
command, consideration can now be given to the withdrawal of those forces.
The desired NATO end state may require both military and non-military
activities to establish all the conditions necessary to achieve it; thus following
the achievement of the MSOs, the continued presence of forces under military
command may be required to support non-military efforts. Eventually, through
operations assessment, indications will begin to highlight that military forces
could be withdrawn, the timing for which will be approved by the NAC. As the
exact moment for transition may be difficult to define, Phase 5 and 6 are likely
to overlap.

c. Planning for the disengagement of NATO forces must be initiated well

in advance and may eventually involve a large number of non-NATO actors in
order to minimise the negative effects that the departure of NATO troops may
have on the overall stability of the theatre. Planning for transition may involve
activities to facilitate the coordination and management of the transition and
withdrawal within the construct of the current strategic and / or operational

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OPLANs110; it also may require conduct of some or all of the activities

described in Phases 2-4, culminating in a series of approved transition specific
OPLAN / plans. Each case will be different. The approach to transition and
termination will be guided by appropriate NAC guidance and direction,
including the issue of decision sheets (such as a NID to direct the production
of a transition CONOPS and / or OPLAN). As guided by the COM, the HQ will
collaborate with SHAPE bodies (e.g. CG, CCOMC or CAT) and / or other
operational level commands as appropriate, in the preparation of input on
transition and termination of NATO military operations. Appropriate liaison
elements should be exchanged to facilitate the effort at each level. The
following may help guide the conduct of Phase 2-4 activities if they are
required for transition planning:

(1) Phase 2 – Operational Appreciation of the Strategic

Environment. Already engaged in the theatre in question, the COM
and the HQ will collaborate with the SACEUR / SHAPE if there is a
requirement to produce a strategic assessment (e.g. SSA) and / or
options (e.g. MROs) for the NAC as they begin considering transition
and termination.

(a) Strategic Assessment. Operations Assessments,

including PMRs, lead to the determination that transition and
termination of the NATO military operations is warranted.
Depending on the timing and focus of the last strategic
operations product (e.g. PMR) prior to the decision to begin
transition and termination planning, there may be no need for a
separate strategic assessment to support transition and
termination planning. Ideally, with the PMR advising that a
transition is warranted, the status of relevant actors and the
impact of such a transition, should have been assessed. If not
this updated systems understanding111 of the operating
environment should be established as a basis for further work,
even if not formally tasked.

(b) Options. Once operations assessments indicate the

conditions required of military forces have been established and
that these are sustainable without the current level of NATO
forces in theatre, SACEUR may recommend to the NAC that
options for NATO disengagement (total or partial) be developed.
In such cases, options could be presented at the same time as
the operations assessment itself. Options may or may not
necessitate revised / new strategic or operational planning
products; transition and withdrawal within the construct of the
current strategic and / or operational OPLAN may be achievable

110
If this approach is chosen for transition and termination, the COM will control the necessary activities as described in Phase
5, including through the issue of JCOs or FRAGOs.
111
Not conducting this appreciation can be mitigated by the strategic level, for the consideration of options, if the requisite
authorities for interaction have been received.

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with appropriate strategic guidance and direction112.

Alternatively, the option chosen by the NAC may see the issue
of a NID to direct the production of a transition strategic
CONOPS and / or OPLAN. The options tabled should clearly
state the level of interaction with non-NATO actors required
during strategic and operational planning.

(2) Phase 3 - Operational Estimate. The use of the Operational

Estimate process, as described in Phase 3 or modified by the COM,
would support development of the operational CONOPS, but it could
also be used to develop operational advice to support SACEUR’s
development of options on how to best carry out the transition and
termination of the operation or campaign. If used for the latter purpose,
that operational estimate will have to be revisited once the NAC issues
a NID prior to developing the operational CONOPS; the review of the
operational estimate would be focused by any received strategic
direction and guidance, including a SPD if issued by SACEUR.

(3) Phase 4a - Operational CONOPS Development. An

operational transition CONOPS would articulate how to disengage
NATO forces from the mission most effectively and efficiently. It would
be developed with consideration to the different interdependencies that
were created over the duration of the mission between the deployed
NATO forces and possible ways to mitigate the negative effects caused
by the withdrawal of forces.

(a) Mitigation measures will in most cases involve

international or national actors developing transition plans with
NATO forces adjusting their handover of responsibilities to these
actors in a way that allows them, as much as possible, to
minimise the negative impacts during this critical phase of the
operation. It should be noted that the overriding factor in the
decision to repatriate troops should be the need to maintain
stability in the theatre and to give sufficient time for a proper
handover to take place. In cases where the handover will take
place over a long period of time, it may be necessary to re-tool
or re-role elements of the NATO forces in theatre.

(b) The operational transition CONOPS will require

coordination with the strategic level to articulate to the NAC
required comprehensive activities (including supporting NATO
non-military efforts) required to establish the preconditions for
success.

(4) Phase 4b - Operational OPLAN Development. OPLAN

development will further amplify the operational effects required, the

112
Once this decision is made, the CCOMC would be the focus point at the strategic level to facilitate the operational level
transition and termination of the operation within the construct of the current OPLANs.

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supporting preconditions for success, and the general flow of forces out
of theatre. The NAC would issue a NED to execute the approved
strategic transition OPLAN; SACEUR would then approve the
operational OPLAN.

d. Process Controls. Transition planning is designed to identify and

mitigate, to the maximum extent possible, the negative risks and effects
resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops. It also allows commanders
to coordinate, in detail, the transfer of authority to non-NATO actors, by
allowing the COM and the staff enough freedom to develop ideas and
concepts while ensuring necessary political and military control over the entire
process.

(1) In enabling a coordinated and deliberate transition, a detailed

systemic analysis of the engagement space is necessary. This
systemic analysis should place a particular emphasis on the
interdependencies that have resulted due to the presence of NATO
forces in-theatre. It will be essential that all relevant non-NATO actors
be identified early and that proper liaison and coordination be
implemented to allow these actors to be able to inform and contribute
where appropriate to the strategic and operational planning for the
withdrawal of NATO forces under military command.

(2) The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, as well as to

execute OPLANs, is retained by the NAC and delegated incrementally
to SACEUR.

e. Political Controls. The NAC maintains political control of transition

and termination by:

(1) Issuing direction and guidance to guide the transition and

planning for it, including NAC decision sheets like a NID.

(2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

(3) Approving a strategic transition CONOPS, including approving

strategic effects and endorsing the preconditions for success.

(4) Authorising force de-activation.

(5) Approving a strategic transition OPLAN.

(6) Authorising force redeployment.

(7) Authorising execution.

f. Military Controls. NATO military commanders maintain control of the

OPP by:

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(1) Issuing transition direction and guidance, such as planning

directives.

(2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

(3) Approving subordinate / supporting / component CONOPS.

(4) Approving subordinate / supporting / component plans (e.g.

OPLANs).

(5) Issuing deactivation messages and execution orders (when

authorised).

g. Collaborative / Parallel Planning. The development of strategic and

operational transition CONOPS / OPLANs, if necessary for transition and
termination, requires collaboration and continuous coordination at the Political
/ Military (NAC / MC and Nations) and at strategic, operational, and SCC /
TCC command levels with relevant non-NATO actors.

h. Coordination with Participating Nations. Coordination with

participating nations should take place as soon as authorised. This should
include the early exchange of information with HNs to facilitate comprehensive
planning by the HN as well as with TCNs. Once authorised by the NAC,
SACEUR will negotiate with NATO and non-NATO Nations in order to ensure
a coordinated and deliberate disengagement of forces.

i. Coordination with the Civil Environment. Early liaison and

coordination between Allied HQs and civil authorities and agencies is
essential to the success of the NATO disengagement. This includes
establishing, during the initiation of planning, effective means for coordination
and liaison, initially at the strategic level, with national governments, IOs and
NGOs. Planning by the HQ must provide for effective cooperation with these
same civil organisations within the JOA.

j. StratCom Framework. A well planned and executed StratCom

Framework will be critical to the successful disengagement of NATO forces
from a crisis area. It will address aims with specific respect to: local / regional
audiences to re-assure them about the stability of the situation; the
international community to underline NATO’s accomplishments; potential de-
stabilising actors to demonstrate NATO’s resolve; and the populations of
NATO member and non-NATO partner nations to inform them about the
success of the mission.

k. Operation Termination. Once the manner of transition and

termination is decided, and transition plans are created, approved and
execution initiated as appropriate, the operations staff will conduct their
normal functions as per execution, supported by the other HQ staff as
required.

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para Title Page

5.1 Introduction 5-1
5.2 Overview of Operations Assessment 5-1
5.3 Operations Assessment Process 5-4
5.4 Strategic Level Operations Assessment 5-4
5.5 Operational Level Operations Assessment 5-7
5.6 Operations Assessment at the Component Level 5-8
5.7 Inter-Relations between Levels of Command 5-9

TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page
Fig 5.1 Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level 5-6
Fig 5.2 Operations Assessment at the Operational Process 5-9

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CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

5.1. Introduction1. This chapter provides broad guidance for the conduct of
Operations Assessment (OPSA) in NATO and establishes the link between the
NATO Operations Planning Process (OPP) and OPSA. Crises, conflicts and
disasters in most cases are characterised by dynamic and unpredictable situations;
complex emergencies, political transitions, power vacuums, violent insurgencies,
terrorism, crime, insecurity, ethnic tensions and conflict, government collapse,
economic breakdowns, corruption, disease, and major social upheaval. In response
to these situations, intervening political, military, economic and civil actors engage in
a wide spectrum of activities to meet often overlapping or conflicting aims.

a. Planning and Feedback. Any organisation intervening in a complex

crisis needs to have a plan and, subsequently, a review and feedback process
in order to determine the effectiveness of the intervention and make
recommendations for adjustments to the plan. In NATO, this feedback
process is critical to inform the military and political leadership on progress
being made towards achieving objectives and the NATO end state. The
primary procedure for providing this feedback to the Military Committee (MC)
and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will be the Periodic Mission Reviews
(PMR), unless the NAC decides otherwise2.

b. Process. This is achieved through the OPSA process that measures

progress being made in creating desired effects, establishing decisive
conditions (DCs), achieving objectives and the NATO end state, which in turn
allows for adjustments to be made to the OPLAN, and informs the decision-
making process for the military and political leadership.

5.2. Overview of Operations Assessment. OPSA is defined by NATO as ‘the

process of determining the results and progress of operations towards mission
accomplishment, and the subsequent development and provision of conclusions and
recommendations that support decision making and improve the effectiveness of
operations’. OPSA is a continuous, collaborative and cross functional process led by
the OPSA staff.

a. Aim. The aim of OPSA is to enable evidence-based decision making

built on data collected continuously throughout an operation. OPSA should
maintain a differentiation between measuring performance and measuring
effectiveness, but avoid adding unnecessary burden on staffs by compelling
them to develop a high number of quantitative measurements and consequent
requirement to collect the necessary data.

1
Chapter 5 of the COPD should be read conjunction with the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH) that provides a
detailed description of operations assessment.
2
MC 0133, NATO Operations Planning.

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b. Purpose. The purpose of OPSA is to inform decision makers if an

operation is being executed as planned and if it achieves the desired results,
with a focus on:

(1) Changes towards the creation of effects and achievement of

decisive conditions, objectives and end state.

(2) Risks to and opportunities for mission accomplishment.

(3) The validity of assumptions and achievement of pre-conditions

for success3 (PCS).

(4) The effectiveness of allocated resources against objectives and

whether changes in the force and capabilities allocation are required.

(5) Required changes in plans, orders and guidance.

(6) Requirements to inform higher HQs, subordinate units and other

organisations.

c. Feedback. OPSA provides a process through which feedback can be

used to assess and, if required, review and revise an OPLAN by:

(1) Determining the progress of the execution of actions and tasks in

an OPLAN.

(2) Determining the effectiveness of the executed actions by

comparing the observed achievement of results (effects, DCs,
objectives, end state) to the anticipated achievement of results as
described in the operations plan (OPLAN).

(3) Drawing conclusions about the past situations and makes

forward looking estimates and recommendations.

d. Utility. OPSA should not be merely a historical account of the

assessed period. Besides assessing the progress of the mission / operation
over the part period, OPSA reports should also attempt to estimate and
anticipate, as much and as accurate as possible, the evolution of the
operation / mission and of the operating environment over the upcoming
period. This should lead to recommendations regarding aspects such as
upcoming decision points, movements to the next phase of the plan or
required adjustments to the plan.

e. Support to OPP. OPSA supports and continuously interacts with other

processes throughout the OPP phases in support of knowledge development,
planning and execution.

3
This is especially critical at the strategic level where most of the assumptions and pre-conditions for success are closely tied
to the use of other instruments of power and require political level involvement. All assumptions have corresponding risks and
some assumptions being related to pre-conditions for success. As such, the assessment of risks and opportunities enable the
assessment of the validity of assumptions and of progress towards achievement without additional analysis.

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(1) Knowledge Development (KD). The KD process4 converts

basic data to more usable information, information to awareness (what
is happening) and awareness to understanding (why it is happening).
OPSA follows the same data-information-awareness-understanding
principle and the processes are interdependent by the virtue of their
common linkages to the knowledge base.

(2) Planning. The primary purpose of OPSA is to provide

recommendations to adapt an OPLAN based on the evolution of the
operation / mission during execution. Staff involved in both planning
and OPSA must work collaboratively from the early stages of OPP to
determine that the tasks, actions, effects, desirable conditions and
objectives being considered and defined in the OPLAN are feasible and
measurable, while staying connected to the system elements and their
attributes at the same time. The OPSA process employs a number of
tools5 and techniques to support the planning and decision making
process, such as, but not limited to:

(1) Metrics: A system of measurement, which for the

purposes of operations assessment can be a Measure of
Effectiveness (MOE) or a measure of Performance (MOP).

(2) Measures of Effectiveness: A metric used to measure a

current system state.

(3) Measures of Performance: A metric used to measure

the accomplishment of actions.

(4) Risk Assessment: The OPSA process will provide an

overall risk assessment at the respective level of command,
including the risk mitigation measures accomplishment.

(5) Data Collection Plan (DCP): It includes all the metrics

and indicators required for operations assessment and the
ways to collect and analyse the required data.

(3) Execution. Operations plans are not presumed to be fool proof;

during their execution they will require continuous operations
assessment-informed adjustments. Continuous OPSA is an essential
element of OPLAN execution.

f. Sharing. The structured OPSA process also enables the military to

keep track of and share information with other non-NATO entities resulting in
a better understanding of the inter-connections and inter-dependencies

4
See COPD Chapter 2.
5
Within the Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Services (TOPFAS) suite of tools, the Campaign Assessment Tool
(CAT) is the primary tool available for the OPSA community to use in supporting the OPSA process. CAT has been designed in
compliance with NATO Operations Assessment Hand Book (NOAH) and allows the assessors to prepare the assessment plan
and Data Collection Plan (DCP) in close coordination with Knowledge Development (KD) staff and planners.

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between military and non-military activities and how they should be

coordinated and synchronised. This promotes a comprehensive approach.

5.3. Operations Assessment Process. The OPSA process involves four major
steps6: These steps are conducted throughout the OPP six phases. Steps 1 and 2
are conducted during planning in order to ensure that OPLAN execution can be
assessed, while steps 3 and 4 are conducted continuously during execution and
transition. The outcomes of assessment activity represent the feedback into the
planning process and could result in development of additional assessments,
influence the development of Military Response Options (MRO) / Courses of Action
(CoA) or reviews and revisions of the OPLAN.

a. OPSA design and support to planning.

b. Developing the data collection plan.

c. Data collection and treatment.

d. Analysis, interpretation and recommendations.

5.4. Strategic Level Operations Assessment. At the strategic level, OPSA

is concerned with determining the strategic progress towards the accomplishment of
Military Strategic Effects (MSE) and Military Strategic Objectives (MSO) and should
assess progress towards the achievement of Non-Military Strategic Objectives
(NMSO), Strategic Objectives (SO) and the NATO End State in order to understand
the way in which the NATO military instrument of power (IoP) supports their
achievement and to support the NATO political decision making process (see Figure
5.1). Although NATO does not have all the IoPs to intervene across all Political,
Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) domains,
strategic level OPSA must be comprehensive and look beyond the military domain.

a. Assessment. The assessment of strategic risks and opportunities and

the assessment of the validity of assumptions and achievement of pre-
conditions for success, especially those related to the use of other
complementary Diplomatic, Information and Economic IoP remain critical for
the strategic OPSA. In this respect, informing the political level regarding
requirements from other IoPs and factors that are outside the military mission
/ operation mandate but that can have strategic implications for the application
of NATO’s military IoP will enable SACEUR to provide the best military advice
and recommendations to NATO HQ. Past and ongoing missions / operations
have shown that the smaller the NATO footprint in a theatre of operations
(TOO) and the more restricted the aims of the mission / operation are, the
higher the impact of factors related to other Diplomatic, Information, Military
and Economic (DIME7) IoPs and PMESII domains could be. In this context,
strategic level OPSA should consider as early as possible the establishment
of data collection and analysis mechanisms that could complement and
balance the in-theatre limited OPSA capabilities, especially for systematic

6
The 4 steps are described in detail in the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH).

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access to external expertise and analysis and for opinion polling of local
populations and security forces.

b. Roles and Responsibilities. Within SHAPE, the Comprehensive

Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) has the lead
responsibility for conducting cross-functional OPSA and for putting together
the PMR for ongoing operations and missions in close coordination with the
operational level commands and across SHAPE staff branches.

(1) Requirements. SHAPE J5 has a leading role in the identification

of OPSA requirements for missions and operations, especially those
related to the PMRs, to ensure that the OPLAN reviews and revisions
are properly supported by the OPSA products.

(2) Support. SHAPE J5 supports the strategic OPSA process by

complementing the chain of command OPSA products through the
development of alternative solutions to assess strategic risks and
opportunities as well as the validity of assumptions and the
achievement of preconditions for success, especially those related to
other IoPs and PMESII domains.

c. Characteristics. In NATO, planning is initiated as a top-down

process that begins with the NAC issuing a decision sheet tasking the NATO
Military Authorities (NMA) to provide an assessment of the crisis situation. In
response to the NAC decision sheet and the associated tasking, SHAPE will
produce a SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA), informing the NAC
decision process and eventually serving as a baseline assessment for
operations planning. OPSA SMEs will support the planning staff in the
development of MSOs and MSEs. During the development of the strategic
CONOPS and OPLAN, OPSA SMEs will support the planners and develop
the OPSA design and associated DCP.

d. Strategic OPSA Framework. Strategic OPSA framework is based on

the strategic framework / design and describes how progress will be
measured towards the desired MSEs and MSOs, SOs, NMSOs, the NATO
end state, as well as strategic risks, opportunities, assumptions and
preconditions for success.

7
Instruments of Power (IoP) are often characterised as Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME), however
alternative definitions may be used such as Political, Military, Economic and Civil (PMEC). Either construct will help the staff
consider the issues in a more comprehensive manner.

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 Phase 4 Strategic Plan
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Development Phase 5 Phase 6
Initial Strategic Military Response
Phase 4b Execution Transition
Situational Assessment Options Phase 4a
Strategic OPLAN Development
Awareness of Strategic CONOPS Development
(Force Generation)
Potential/Actual
Crisis
Refinement of
Military Ends, Execution of
Development of Military ways &
PMESII Analysis Military Ends, Ways & Means
Risk mitigation
Ways & Means measures
Refinement of
DIME
Development of Assumptions & Assessment of
Development of Military ends,
PMESII Analysis Complementary Risks
DIME Approaches ways and means
DIME Actions

5-6
Development of
Development of Risk mitigation Assessment of
Development of
DIME Measures DIME
Military
Assumptions & Assumptions,
Considerations
Risks Risks,

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Risk mitigation
Refinement of measures &
DIME Risks Preconditions for
Assessment of Assessment Success
DIME Risks

Development of
DIME
Preconditions for

Figure 5.1 Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level

Success
OPLAN Review / Revision
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

e. Strategic Assessment Plan. Annex OO to the strategic OPLAN is

developed to incorporate generic requirements for the conduct of OPSA,
especially reflecting the key OPLAN elements that need to be assessed
(NATO End State, SOs, NMOs, NMSOs, MSEs, assumptions, PCS, risks and
opportunities). Following OPLAN promulgation, a Strategic Assessment Plan8
(SAP), representing the strategic level DCP is finalised. The SAP develops all
the key strategic level OPSA requirements identified in Operations
Assessment Annex and specifies how SHAPE staffs branches and
operational level commands are to contribute to the strategic level
assessment. This is particularly important with regard to the PMR, which is the
key OPSA product that is forwarded to NATO HQ in support of NATO decision
making process.

f. Timescales. In general, OPSA at the strategic level will consider

longer timescales (typically 6 months or longer) than operational and
component levels. Strategic OPSA should also support the battle rhythm
determined by the PMR timetable set out in NAC level guidance.

5.5. Operational Level Operations Assessment9. The operational level is the

pivotal point in the overall coherent NATO OPSA process, as it acts as the interface
between the strategic / political requirements and component operations. The
primary focus at the operational level of command is the execution of the military
operation and the creation of effects, the establishment of DCs and the achievement
of the operational objectives defined in the plan. At the operational level the
operation is planned by the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) and during the
execution phase is managed and coordinated through the Joint Operations Centre
(JOC). An Assessment Working Group (AWG) will be responsible for assessing the
progress of the operation and an Assessment Board (AB) for providing advice to the
COM. Figure 5.2 shows the generic operational level cycle and where OPSA at the
operational level fits in.

a. Organisation. At the operational level there are dedicated OPSA staff

elements which lead the OPSA process with the AWG as working body10. In
preparing the AB, they must report directly to the COM avoiding an
unnecessary staffing burden and potential undue influence from the staff on
what is supposed to be a coordinated cross-HQ product if they report through
other levels of the command.

b. Roles and Responsibilities. At the operational level, the COM owns

the operational level OPSA. OPSA staff takes responsibility for development
of the OPSA design in the OPLAN (Annex OO), and the conduct of OPSAs
during execution. At the operational level, OPSA staff have the following
specific responsibilities:

8
The SAP is usually approved by COS SHAPE and is not included in the OPLAN to allow for its revision without having to go
back to the NAC as part of the OPLAN revision approval.
9
The OPSA-process at the operational level is conducted in accordance with AJP-3 and the NATO Operations Assessment
Handbook (NOAH)
10
When a Component Command (CC) or NFS HQ acts at the operational level it might not have a staff element dedicated to
OPSA.

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(1) Acting as the focal point for OPSA development in their

respective HQs, including the contribution to doctrine development.

(2) Working within the JOPG during development and revision of the
OPLAN in order to ensure that the operational effects and operational
actions are measurable and connected to the Comprehensive
Understanding of the Environment (CUOE) and systems analysis.

(3) Considering the component level OPSAs received from their

subordinate commands and other areas of NATO.

(4) Producing the operational level OPSAs on ongoing military

operations.

(5) Contributing to strategic OPSAs, as required.

(6) Integrate the risk assessment into the OPSA process (including
the AB).

c. OPSA Integration. The OPSA process is integrated in the operational

level commander’s decision making process through the inclusion of an
Assessment Board into the HQ Battle Rhythm.

d. Measurement. At the operational level, OPSA focuses on the

measurement of two distinct aspects of an operation; the generation of the
intended effects (medium-term assessment), and the achievement of the
objectives (long-term) and the OPSA process is aligned with the planning
horizons in order to support both joint synchronisation (mid-term planning)
and operational planning (long-term planning). This distinction is not a
fundamental delineation between a mid-term and a long-term OPSA but
rather a difference in emphasis. An assessment of progress towards the end
of the current phase or upcoming DCs is required in order to support Joint
Coordination Orders (JCO) development and, possibly branch planning;
whereas an assessment of progress towards the achievement of objectives is
required to support planning for sequels, termination and transition.

5.6. Operations Assessment at the Component Level. At the component level,

the focus is on measuring the achievement of planned operational actions (OAs) that
reflects appointed tasks in order to support the creation of operational effects (OEs).
In some special cases, the component level may measure the establishment of DCs
and creation of OEs. The component COM owns the component level OPSA. The
OPSA staff / AWG assumes responsibility for development of the OPSA annex in the
component OPLAN or SUPPLAN, if required, and the conduct of OPSA during
execution. At the component level, OPSA staff have the following specific
responsibilities:

a. Acting as the focal point for OPSA development in their respective

HQs, including the contribution to doctrine development.

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b. Working with the component OPG during development and revision of

the Component OPLAN.

Joint
Operations
Centre (JOC)

Approved Operations
Orders Assessment
Monitor

Joint
Assessment
Coordination Direct Communicate Assess Board (AB)
Board (JCB)

Recommended
CoAs
Plan
Proposed COM
Orders Guidance
Plans Joint
Operations
Planning Group
(JOPG)

Figure 5.2 Operations Assessment at the Operational Level

c. Considering the OPSA received from their subordinate commands /

units (Task Forces (TF), Task Groups (TG)) and other bodies of NATO.

d. Producing the component level OPSA on ongoing military operations

considering the OPSA of their subordinate commands.

e. Contributing to operational level OPSA as required.

5.7. Inter-Relationships between Levels of Command. The inter-relationship

between the levels of command is replicated within the OPSA community with each
level supporting the requirements of the COM and those of the strategic and other
operational level HQs. Although there are inter-relationships between the levels of
command in the OPSA process, the OPSA products are by nature focused towards
specific COM’s, HQs and operations.

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a. NATO HQ and SHAPE. The NAC decision making requirements drive

the OPSA requirements in NATO. SACEUR identifies in his OPLAN the
periodicity and content requirements for strategic level OPSA, especially his
PMRs for each mission / operation. Once the OPLAN is approved and the
execution of the mission starts, the strategic assessment cycle starts based
on the requirements identified in Annex OO of the OPLAN and the SAP in
close coordination with NATO HQ. Additional reporting requirements might be
identified by the NAC or MC and will have to be included in the PMRs or
other strategic level operations assessment reports.

b. SHAPE and Operational Level HQs. The strategic level initiates the
overall OPSA process as a top-down approach and gives guidance to the
operational level regarding structure of the plan and reporting procedures
mainly through the SAP. The operational level, as the pivotal point in the
overall coherent NATO OPSA process, requires that guidance from SHAPE in
order to ensure consistency. Clear reporting guidance from the strategic level
supports the operational COM’s reporting requirements. In order to maximise
collaborative work, strategic and operational levels must ensure that their
planning and OPSA staff are fully integrated.

c. Operational level HQs and Component Commands. During liaison

or planning, experts of the component commands support the JOPG and
ensure the synchronisation of planning efforts between the levels of
command. The operational design and the OPSA annex will be the leading
references for component level planning and OPSA.

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

CHAPTER 6

FORMATS AND
ADMINISTRATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para Title Page

6.1 Introduction 6-1

6.2 Physical Elements 6-1

6.3 Document Cover 6-1

6.4 Letter of Promulgation 6-1

6.5 Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages 6-3

6.6 Record of Changes 6-3

6.7 Operations Planning Documents 6-3

6.8 Functional Planning Guides 6-4

6.9 Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation 6-4

Procedures

6.10 Review, Revision and Cancelation Procedures 6-4

6.11 Plans Identifications and Nicknames 6-4

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CHAPTER 6
FORMATS

6.1. Introduction. A standard format for planning documents will ensure that all
important aspects connected with the conduct of military operations are considered
in a familiar uniform pattern and that adequate background material is provided for
expeditious decisions to be taken. Planning documents should adhere to the
instructions contained in Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directives AD 35-4,
Preparation of Documents, and AD 70-1, ACO Security Directive. Unless directed
otherwise by HQ NATO, operation plans (OPLANs) are to adhere to the formatting
guidelines of this directive.

6.2. Physical Elements. Planning documents (e.g. OPLANs) should consist of the
following elements:

a. Document Cover.

b. Letter of Promulgation.

c. Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages.

d. Record of Changes.

e. Main Body.

f. Annexes, to include Appendices, Tabs and Enclosures, as applicable.

6.3. Document Cover1. The format for document covers can be found at Annex D
but they must conform to the following colour scheme that is used to identify the
security classification of the material covered:

a. Red: COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) material.

b. Blue: NATO SECRET (NS) material.

c. Green: NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) material.

d. Yellow: NATO RESTRICTED (NR) material.

e. White: NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) material.

6.4. Letter of Promulgation. The purpose of a Letter of Promulgation is to

convey the nature and status of the attached document, e.g. Draft or Final Plan, as
appropriate. The same format should apply to all levels of command.

1
The colour scheme for the document cover is only applicable for a printed document.

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a. Planning documents will be forwarded with a ‘Letter of Promulgation’

(see Annex E for format), which should include the following as applicable:

(1) Key references (e.g. NAC Initiating Directive (NID), higher level
related OPLAN, concept of operation (CONOPS), and Comprehensive
Operations Planning Directive (COPD)).

(2) Purpose of document.

(3) Conditions under which the document is effective (e.g. ‘effective

for planning purposes’, ‘for exercises’, on concurrence of the approving
commander or appropriate authorities).

(4) Date of approval (and reference) of the approving authority.

(5) Document’s effective date (‘upon receipt’ is not to be used).

(6) Further planning and implementation instructions.

(7) Peacetime practice instructions (if required).

(8) Request for comments from Nations and NATO commanders.

(9) Request for approval by the approving authority.

(10) Plan synopsis paragraphs (if required):

(a) Extract of situation.

(b) Commander’s mission.

(c) Extract of commander’s CONOPS.

b. ‘Major Changes’ to documents must be issued with a letter of

promulgation. Editorial changes and other non-substantive amendments are
issued under cover of a military letter.

c. The letter of promulgation is the first page(s) after the document cover.

d. Each page of the letter of promulgation will be numbered ‘i’, ‘ii’, ‘iii’, etc.
The total number of pages of the attached document must be specified (see
format) and includes all pages less the document cover and card stock
separators inserted to facilitate the use of the plan.

e. In situations of urgency, planning documents and substantive

amendments thereto may be promulgated by message action. This
procedure will follow the procedure prescribed above as closely as
circumstances permit.

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6.5. Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages. A list of effective pages is

mandatory for documents classified NATO SECRET and above. However, the list of
effective pages may be combined with the table of contents, provided it includes the
effective page count (start and end page numbers).

6.6. Record of Changes. A sample format for record of changes is at Annex F.

Superseded letters of promulgation and letters promulgating minor changes
constitute the historical record of the document development and review and are to
be recorded at the bottom of the record of changes.

6.7. Operations Planning Documents. Operational staff work produced

during the OPP will normally lead to the production of a CONOPS / OPLAN,
Advance Plan or specific supporting documents. A set format for each of these exists
and should be used as a guide or template when creating the document but the
exact content will be driven by the requirement.

a. CONOPS / OPLAN Main Body.

(1) The format of the CONOPS / OPLAN main body listed in COPD
Annexes A (strategic level) and B (operational level) follows the same
structure and should be honoured where possible. Additional
paragraphs and sub-paragraphs, as well as changes to sub-
paragraphs are permitted to meet the needs of the particular situation.

(2) A CONOPS / OPLAN main body will be accompanied with

appropriate annexes / appendices as mandated or as appropriate, as
described in COPD Annex C.

(a) A list of annexes will be placed at the end of the main

body.

(b) Annex / appendix numbering will follow the list of annexes

/ appendices provided in Annex C.

(c) Where possible annexes and appendices should conform

to the basic six-paragraph OPLAN format as outlined in Annex A
(strategic level) and Annex B (operational level). Where the
basic six-paragraph format is inappropriate, different paragraphs
may be used to meet the needs to the particular situation.

(d) Under certain circumstances annexes may be published

separately; however, the main document should indicate how
the annex is published.

b. Advance Plans. The CONOPS / OPLAN formats described above

can also be used as the basis for the production of advance plans (e.g.
Standing Defence Plan (SDP), contingency operations plan (COP), generic

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COP (GCOP), Graduated Response Plans (GRP) or Sequenced Response

Plans2 (SERP)).

c. Other Operations Planning Documents. The formats for other

operations planning documents, such as Warning Orders (WNGO),
SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA), Military Response Options (MRO),
Planning Directives, etc., can be found in Annex A (strategic level) or Annex B
(operational level).

6.8. Functional Planning Guides. The format of Functional Planning Guides

(FPG) is discussed in Annex G.

6.9. Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation Procedures.

Consultation, approval, promulgation and activation procedures (CAPAP) are
described in Annex H. CAPAP for advance and crisis response planning are
essentially the same however crisis response planning may be expedited due to the
amount of time available based on the ongoing crisis situation.

6.10. Review, Revision and Cancelation Procedures. Periodic review, revision

and possible cancelation of plans and orders must occur in order to evaluate and
confirm their continued relevance and utility. Procedures for periodic review, revision,
and cancelation of plans and operations planning documents are described in Annex
I.

6.11. Plans Identifications and Nicknames. For identification, management and

security reasons a NATO identification system of plans is established. Details are
contained in Annex J.

2
SERP has been approved as a new type of advance plan in accordance with PO (2020)0048 (INV).

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

ANNEXES

i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Annex Title Page

ANNEX AND APPENDIX

A Strategic Planning Templates A-1
 App 1: Strategic Warning Order A-1-1
 App 2: SACEURs Strategic Assessment A-2-1
 App 3: Military Response Options A-3-1
 App 4: Strategic Planning Directive A-4-1
 App 5: Strategic CONOPS / OPLAN Main Body A-5-1
B Operational Planning Templates B-1
 App 1: Operational Advice on Military Response Options B-1-1
 App 2: Operational Warning Order B-2-1
 App 3:Mission Analysis Briefing Outline Format B-3-1
 App 4:Operational Planning Guidance B-4-1
 App 5: Course of Action Decision Briefing Outline Format B-5-1
 App 6: Operational Planning Directive B-6-1
 App 7: Operational CONOPS / OPLAN Main Body B-7-1
C Strategic / Operational CONOPS / OPLAN Annexes C-1
D Format for Document Covers D-1
E Format for Letter of Promulgation E-1
F Format for Record of Changes F-1
G Format for Functional Planning Guides G-1
H Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation H-1
Procedures
I Review, Revision and Cancellation Procedures I-1
J Plans Identification and Nicknames J-1
 App 1: Plan Numbering System J-1-1
K Glossary of Definitions K-1
L Glossary of Abbreviations L-1

iii
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ANNEX A TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

STRATEGIC PLANNING TEMPLATES

1. This Annex provides standard templates1 in Appendices 1 through 5 that

provide common standards and formats for the preparation of the following
documents2:

a. Appendix 1 - Strategic Warning Order.

b. Appendix 2 - SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment.

c. Appendix 3 - Military Response Options.

d. Appendix 4 - Strategic Planning Directive.

e. Appendix 5 - Strategic CONOPS / OPLAN main body3.

(The annexes that may be included with the strategic CONOPS / OPLAN are
presented in Annex C to the COPD).

2. While these template formats should be used as depicted, their layout and
content can be adjusted if required and as such they are illustrative.

1
While these templates carry a NATO Unclassified classification, the documents for a particular crisis will be classified as
appropriate.
2
Refer to ACO Directive 035-4 ‘Preparation of Documents’ and SHAPE Grammar Mama for further details on formatting.
3
The format of the strategic CONOPS / OPLAN main body was determined with reference to the illustrative template provided
in MC 0133 NATOs Operations Planning.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: insert file ref # - insert tasker # Tel: +32-(0)65-44-xxxx (Operator)
Tel: +32-(0)65-44 + ext
NCN: 254 + ext
Date: Month Year Fax: +32-(0)65-44- + ext (Registry)

TO:

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER FOR …

REFERENCES:

1. Background. The situation on / in … is deteriorating and calls for … The UN

Security Council assesses that … As a consequence, the UN Secretary General
(UNSG) has requested NATO to consider …, acting under … of the UN Charter. In
light of the NAC assessment at Reference XX … the IMS issued guidance at
Reference YY … requesting SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA).

2. Operational / Joint Headquarters. I intend to designate JFC … as the

operational / joint planning HQ for this potential crisis. COM JFC … is to:

a. Provide operational advice on potential military response options to be

developed at SHAPE, including…

(1) Recommendations on measures focussing on a deterrence and

prevention posture, in particular in the field of military presence,
surveillance and intelligence gathering.

(2) Recommendations on the necessity and feasibility to conduct

other operations, taking into account the availability of NATO and non-
NATO forces, and the preparatory planning activities necessary for
their conduct.

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(3) Identification and advice of those non-NATO entities with which

NATO-led forces will need to interact.

b. Provide an updated assessment daily. This should include advice on

readiness for forces, including deployable elements / OLRT.

c. Provide a liaison officer to SHAPE CCOMC by E+1.

d. Be prepared to coordinate with EADRCC.

3. Supporting Commands. The following commands4 are to support COM JFC as

described:

a. …

b. …

4. Crisis Response Measures. CRM … are herewith declared.

5. SACEUR Strategic Assessment. The SSA is due to the MC by …

INSERT AUTHORITY LINE HERE, IF APPROPRIATE

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

4
At this early stage roles and responsibilities for supporting commands to support the Op level HQ planning may not yet be fully
developed, and may need their guidance on the support required. Further detail can be provided later in the SPD. Supporting
relationships could come from one of the HQ JFCs, any of the SSCs, TCCs, NCISG, or other structures and capabilities.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

ENCLOSURE 1 TO
file reference #-tasker tracker #
DATED date (eg JUL) year
(eg: 10)

SACEUR’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FOR …

REFERENCES:

1. Strategic Situation.

a. Background. At Reference A, SHAPE was requested to provide a strategic

assessment of the situation …

b. Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis. This section should provide a brief

synopsis of the crisis, including: its nature, scale and scope, main aspects, causes
and symptoms (e.g. humanitarian issues, international law, and instability).

(1) Potential Threats and Risks. The major threats and risks to
international interests and the potential consequences of not taking action or
taking action, i.e. ethnic violence, regional instability, or interruption to LoC /
energy. Potential for collateral damage to civilians, infrastructure and
cultural sites.

(2) Urgency. The most urgent aspects of the crisis are:

(a) Immediate risk. Risk to DPRE / military intervention /

interruption to energy supplies….

(b) Increased risk…

c. Key Factors. The key PMESII (political, military, economic, social,

infrastructure, information) and other significant factors influencing the crisis and
the interaction of the main actors (i.e. METOC and geospatial):

(1) Factor…

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(2) …

d. Principal Actors. The principal actors (including state and non-state

actors) shaping events in the region are: … The assessed strategic centre of
gravity is… The information for this paragraph should be derived from analysis
described in Chapter 3. It should be succinct, providing only a synopsis of the
most importance aspects of the principal actors. Additional detail, if required to be
included in the SSA, can be placed in an Annex to the SSA.

(1) Actor 1. Role, strategic goals and objectives, primary power, key
relationships, dependencies, vulnerabilities, centre of gravity, etc.

(2) Actor 2.

(3) Actor 3.

2. Appreciation of International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis.

a. International Legal Aspects. What, when and summary.

(1) International Agreements.

(2) United Nations Mandates.

(3) United Nations Charter.

(4) United Nations and other international conventions.

b. International Interests and Objectives. This paragraph should set out a

summary of the most likely common aim and objectives of the international
community. It can also set out the interests and / or objectives of principal
international organisations (if overly detailed, but considered necessary for
inclusion with the SSA, this can be in an Annex to the SSA). UN Security Council
resolutions clearly set out the intentions of the Security Council and mandates to
achieve … Safe access, halt violations of international law, end, protect, etc.

(1) UN.

(2) Other international organisations …

c. International Commitments. Based on current commitments, international

contributions to resolve the crisis likely will be: political / diplomatic, humanitarian,
military (NATO), neighbouring nations. This can also describe possible areas for
interaction and / or cooperation between NATO and other non-NATO entities that
may be operating in the crisis area.

d. Information Environment. Overall succinct appreciation of the information

environment within the theatre and in the international community related to the
theatre (if overly detailed, but considered necessary for inclusion with the SSA, this
can be a synopsis with the details in an Annex to the SSA), including:

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(1) Audiences. Cover potential target audiences in broad terms, using
additional sub-paragraphs as needed for clarity, such as those listed:

(a) Alliance Audiences.

(b) International Community Audiences.

(c) Local Audiences.

(2) StratCom Considerations. Any details that may inform the

subsequent development of StratCom requirements for NATO.

e. Media and Public Affairs Environment. A succinct summary of the

important aspects of the media and public affairs environment (if overly detailed,
but considered necessary for inclusion with the SSA, this can be a synopsis with
the details in an Annex to the SSA). Critical media-related Infrastructure in the
area of interest, general attitudes and trends in the media, and local audience
accessibility are:

(1) International Media.

(2) Regional and local Media in potential TOO / JOA.

(3) NATO Nations internal media (contentious issues only).

3. Potential NATO Interests.

a. NATO Political Context. The declaration of the NATO heads of state and
government …

(1) …

b. Political Limitations. Includes those limitations (restraints or constraints)

placed on SACEUR by the NAC.

c. Assumptions. The UN will provide the mandate, terrorist groups will,

involvement by sympathetic nations cannot be ruled out, etc.

d. Desired NATO End State. A region that is … , with the following specific
conditions:

(1) …

e. NATO Strategic Objectives. Achieving the desired NATO end state would
be supported by the following strategic objectives:

(1) …

f. Desired Strategic Effects. In order for NATO to achieve these objectives,

its actions, in concert with those of other cooperating organisations, must create
the following effects.

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4. Military Considerations. A succinct synopsis of military considerations to provide
sufficient SACEUR advice to inform the NAC on the applicability of the use of the NATO
military instrument to assist with the situation resolution, if they so decide. If the NAC
decides that the Alliance should become involved in the crisis, the SSA and its military
considerations should assist the NAC in providing the necessary direction (through a NAC
Decision Sheet requesting options) for SACEUR to develop MROs. The military
considerations for each situation will vary and may include some of the following:

a. Applicability of the Military Instrument. A succinct synopsis of the general

applicability of the military instrument to assist in the resolution of the crisis,
including implication from the use of force and an appreciation if other actors are
available to assist within the security environment.

b. Use of NATO Military Instrument. The considerations on the application of

the NATO military instrument of power to assist in resolution of the situation,
including: necessity, suitability, availability and existing constraints (i.e. lack of
suitable legal framework); this can include an appreciation on the possible use of
the NRF, on the need for FTDM, the possible impact on other NATO operations,
etc.

c. Non-NATO Interaction Requirement. To further develop an understanding

of the crisis and, when requested, develop military options for possible NATO
involvement, SHAPE and the ‘designated JFC’ will require to interact with the
following list of non-NATO actors (if needed this could be articulated in a table as
an Annex to the SSA):

(1) Non-NATO actor #1.

(2) Non-NATO action #2.

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX A TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: insert file ref # - insert tasker # Tel: +32-(0)65-44-xxxx (Operator)
Tel: +32-(0)65-44 + ext
NCN: 254 + ext
Date: Month Year Fax: +32-(0)65-44- + ext (Registry)

TO:

SUBJECT: MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR …

REFERENCES:

1. Introduction. Based on the references, this document provides possible military

response options to address the given crisis. This paragraph should provide a brief
explanation of the crisis (especially if there have been changes since the release of the
NAC decision sheet requesting options) and the task received from the NAC.

2. General. This paragraph can be used to provide context for the MROs to be
presented. If common to all MROs, it can provide a summary of such things as: desired
NATO end state, NATO mission, NATO role, and NATO strategic objectives (if articulated
as generic strategic objectives (i.e. not military and non-military specific)).

3. Military Response Options. Brief introduction of each option, which will be

expanded in the Annex.

4. Military Response Option Comparison. This paragraph should discuss the

major aspects of comparison between the MROs, which led to the recommendation in the
letter (derived from the analysis of Evaluation of Military Response Options Annex).

5. Any Other Considerations. This paragraph summarises any other

considerations relevant to the MROs presented or other issues of importance at this stage
of planning, such as to introduce the StratCom strategy requirements (attached as an
annex) or to highlight the need for further non-NATO interaction authorities.

6. Recommendation. SACEUR recommends Option X, based on …

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a. The military option that provides the best balance between probability for
success, cost-effectiveness and acceptable risks.

b. Most effective option in achieving NATO potential strategic objectives and

desired end state against cost / risk etc. Likely costs compared with expected
strategic benefits.

c. Inherent advantages and disadvantages in creating the desired effects and

achieving the strategic objectives in conjunction with other instruments.

7. Points of Contact.

INSERT AUTHORITY LINE HERE, IF APPROPRIATE

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

A. Potential Military Response Options.

B. Evaluation of Military Response Options.
C. Strategic Communications Approach (if required).
D. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements (if required).

DISTRIBUTION:

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Potential Military Response Options

MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1 MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2 MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3

5
a. NATO End State : a. NATO End State: a. NATO End State:
b. SACEUR’s Mission: SACEUR, in close b. SACEUR’s Mission: b. SACEUR’s Mission:
cooperation with the cooperating
Contain, improve … Enforce…
organisations, conducts type of military
operations in specified areas to create specific
military strategic objectives to achieve NATO
end state. Improve/maintain.
c. Military Strategic Objectives. c. Military Strategic Objectives. c. Military Strategic Objectives.
(1) … (1) … (1) …

d. Military Strategic Effects. d. Military Strategic Effects. d. Military Strategic Effects

(1) Complies with, cooperates with, (1) … (1) …
resumes, stops, disarms, improves,
(2) ... (2) …
increases, is deterred from….
(2) ...
e. Military Strategic Actions. e. Military Strategic Actions. e. Military Strategic Actions.
(1) Conduct, provide, protect, be (1) … (1) …
prepared to, establish, disarm, assist…

f. Complementary Non-Military Actions. f. Complementary Non-Military Actions. f. Complementary Non-Military Actions.

(1) Diplomatic (Political) incentives to (1) (1) Diplomatic (Political) …
influence…
(2) Information …
(2) Information …
(3) Economic …
(3) Economic …

5
This row can be deleted if the desired NATO end state is the same for all MROs. In addition, if provided and needed for clarity when considering MROs, the NATO mission statement (as suggested by the MC
0133 illustrative NID format (Annex D)) and / or non-military or ‘supporting’ objectives can be included in this table as needed.

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MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1 MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2 MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3

g. Force Capability Requirements. g. Force Capability Requirements. g. Force Capability Requirements.
(1) Maritime, ground forces, PSYOPS, (1) … (1) …
CIMIC Logs etc.
(2) … (2) …
h. Resource Implications. h. Resource Implications. h. Resource Implications.
(1) Strategic Lift. (1) Strategic Lift. (1) Strategic Lift.
(2) Sustainment. (2) Sustainment. (2) Sustainment.
(3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be (3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be (3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be
order of magnitude in a range of order of magnitude in a range of estimated order of magnitude in a range of estimated
estimated costs. costs. costs.
(4) Medical. (4) Medical. (4) Medical.
(5) MILENG. (5) MILENG. (5) MILENG.
i. Provisional TOO and JOA. i. Provisional TOO and JOA. i. Provisional TOO and JOA.
(1) TOO. (1) TOO. (1) TOO.
(2) JOA. (2) JOA. (2) JOA.
j. Preliminary Command and Control j. Preliminary Command and Control j. Preliminary Command and Control
Arrangements. Arrangements. Arrangements.
(1) Designated JFC, CC’s etc. (1) … (1) …
(2) C2 Manpower reinforcement (2) … (2) …
considerations.
k. ROE Requirements. k. ROE Requirements. k. ROE Requirements.
l. Legal requirements. l. Legal requirements. l. Legal requirements.
m. StratCom Requirements. m. StratCom Requirements. m. StratCom Requirements.
(1) StratCom Activities, target audiences, (1) … (1) …
potential effects, and requirements for
policy guidance.

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MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1 MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2 MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3

n. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements. n. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements. n. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements.
(1) UN, Governments, local national (1) … (1) …
‘Unions’ e.g. AU…

o. Preconditions for Success. o. Preconditions for Success. o. Preconditions for Success.

(1) Legal, alliance commitment, transfer (1) … (1) …
of command authority, ROE etc.
p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces
including OLRT. including OLRT. including OLRT.
q. CRM requirements. q. CRM requirements. q. CRM requirements.
r. Partner and Non NATO Nation r. Partner and Non NATO Nation r. Partner and Non NATO Nation
Participation. Participation. Participation.

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Evaluation of Military Response Options.

MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1 MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2 MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3

a. Advantages. a. Advantages. a. Advantages.
(1) Minimum forces, non-escalatory, meets (1) … (1) …
immediate security requirement….
(2) … (2) …
(2) …
b. Disadvantages. b. Disadvantages. b. Disadvantages.
(1) Flexibility to cope with deterioration (1) … (1) …
situation, credibility. Long term solution….
(2) … (2) …
(2) …
c. Impact on Ongoing Operations. c. Impact on Ongoing Operations. c. Impact on Ongoing Operations.
(1) Demand on limited assets, e.g. strategic (1) … (1) …
lift…
(2) … (2) …
(2) …
d. Strategic Risks. / Opportunities d. Strategic Risks / Opportunities d. Strategic Risks / Opportunities
(1) Aggression not curtailed, failure of (1) … (1) …
UN/IC to meet … resulting in….
(2) … (2) …
(2) Particularly at the political level,
collateral damage etc.
(3)

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: insert file ref # - insert tasker # Tel: +32-(0)65-44-xxxx (Operator)
Tel: +32-(0)65-44 + ext
NCN: 254 + ext
Date: Month Year Fax: +32-(0)65-44-xxxx (Registry)

TO:

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTIVE FOR…6

REFERENCES:

1. Situation.

a. Strategic Environment. The main aspects of the crisis are drawn from
the NAC ID and SSA to re-emphasise to COM JFC in a broad overview the
key issues, especially any emerging issues. NATO will contribute to
international efforts with cooperating nations in the region. Highlight key
actors but refer to detail as submitted to the NAC with the SSA. Information
environment. Legal basis and requirements.

b. NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.

(1) NATO End state. (Given in NID)

(2) NATO Strategic Objectives. (Normally given in NID)

(a) Military Strategic Objectives. If NAC guidance provides

only generic strategic objectives, Military Strategic Objectives will
be developed by the planning.

(b) Non-Military Strategic Objectives.

c. NATO Centre of Gravity.

6
The format of the SPD generally follows the format of the CONOPS main body. The format is flexible and may be altered as
required to suit the situation. The intent of the SPD is to give timely guidance and direction to COM JFC, to guide the
operational estimate and development of the operational level CONOPS, which is instrumental in the finalisation of the strategic
level CONOPS. The planning group should endeavor to get the guidance and direction as accurate as possible without
unnecessarily delaying its delivery to the operational level. Collaborative planning, including the use of TOPFAS, can mitigate
the need for overly detailed direction and guidance at this point.

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d. Political Guidance and Limitations.

(1) Political Constraints.

(2) Political Restraints.

e. Political Assumptions.

f. Participation of Non-NATO Contributing Nations.

2. Mission. When authorised by the NAC, SACEUR, in close cooperation with

…[UN / other Govts / IOs] will direct the deployment of a [NATO-led] [MN force] to
[country / region] and conduct…operations in the JOA, considering relevant UN
resolution [international law], to establish a secure environment for… to enforce [UN
sanctions etc.], deter, safeguard, counter, etc.

3. Strategic Planning Direction.

a. SACEUR’s Intent. (Refined from selected option – Core of the SPD).

A broad statement of SACEUR’s initial intent covering the vision and aim for
the operation sufficient for COM JFC to begin an operational orientation.

(1) Strategic Main Effort. This item may only be useful for inclusion
if there are two operational commanders for two operations with a
strategic level campaign.

(2) Additional Limitations.

(a) SACEUR Constraints.

(b) SACEUR Restraints.

(3) Cooperation with Non-Military and Non-NATO Efforts.

(4) Risk Evaluation and Mitigation. The strategic risks currently

identified for this operation and possible mitigation. In addition, any
guidance on how to mitigate risk at the operational level.

b. Strategic Planning Assumptions.

c. Strategic Centre of Gravity.

d. MSO Criteria for Success. If necessary, criteria for success may be

developed and articulated for the military strategic objectives to aid clarity of
how the military has interpreted the political intent.

e. Military Strategic Effects.

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f. Preconditions for Success. This should include currently identified

preconditions for success and request further operational requirements (i.e. for
example broad legal arrangements, coordinated StratCom strategy, transfer of
command authority, timely provision of forces, ROE, and Intelligence). This
may also include the changes needed in the non-military domains to support
military efforts and to address the current crisis in a sustainable manner.

g. Strategic Phasing and Sequencing. If needed, provide a description

of the strategic phases of the operation or the intended sequencing of strategic
military effects. This will facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military
and non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well
as Alliance political control.

h. Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area. The provisional

TOO and JOA. Requests for consideration for change should be discussed as
early as possible between SACEUR and COM JFC.

4. Execution.

a. Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders. Draft

mission and objectives for the operational commander (normally these have
been already socialised with the JFC through the JOPG). It should be
emphasised here that these are ‘draft’ at this stage, and COM JFC can
discuss possible amendments with SACEUR following a mission analysis. This
paragraph also lists any supporting commands and a general description of
their responsibilities.

b. Force and Theatre Capability Requirements. Normally taken from

the refined ‘selected’ MRO; these are provisional force capability requirements
that should be used as a basis for planning. Major changes in operational
requirements to support developed courses of action should be discussed with
SHAPE.

c. Coordination of Requirements. Sufficient guidance in some or all of

the following areas to aid / focus operational level orientation and planning. In
some areas SHAPE will request operational level requirements to assist
development of the strategic CONOPS.

(1) SACEUR’s Commanders Critical Information Requirements.

Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions
at the military strategic level. SACEUR’s CCIR should guide
subordinate commands in developing their own CCIRs, PIRs and EEFI
(i.e. Enemy forces changes in readiness, emerging information on key
leaders and disposition…).

(2) Crisis Response Measures. Update on CRMs that SACEUR

may have declared or on the status of previous requests to the NAC for
devolution of authority to declare certain CRMs (i.e. especially those
related to the OLRT). If numerous create an annex to the SPD. Must
include implementation reporting requirements, degree of
implementation and associated risks ...). Request for operational

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requirements for implementing additional crisis response measures

including justification.

(3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. (SHAPE provides

guidance and requests COM JFC requirements). Guidance on the use
of military force including lethal and non-lethal measures. Legitimacy,
non-escalatory…

(4) Targeting. (SHAPE provides guidance and request COM JFC

requirements). COM JFC is to develop target sets and, as appropriate,
illustrative target categories, including, as far as possible, TSTs that
would need to be targeted to counter threats and exploit opportunities to
achieve NAC agreed military strategic objectives. Proposed target sets
and illustrative target categories for engagement using non-lethal and
lethal means should be forwarded to SHAPE for submission to the NAC
for approval and amplifying guidance or caveats. COM JFC will
develop and maintain target lists, to include TST, based on approved
target sets and SACEUR’s targeting guidance.

(5) Force Protection. Guidance and direction for force protection,

focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO
and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.
The protection of the Force is a crucial consideration with implications
that extend well beyond the military mission and into issues such as
public support, political cohesion and other areas that may be exploited
by the adversaries.

(6) Military Policing / Stability Policing. Guidance and direction for

Military Police / Stability Police Operations, focusing on security,
detention and stability policing functions, and strategic threats and risks
that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry
into the theatre of operations.

(7) Strategic Communications. (SHAPE provides guidance and

requests JFC recommendations). General statement introducing the
StratCom concept and addresses how ACO will implement NATO’s
StratCom objectives and guidance. Makes reference to the full Initial
StratCom concept at Annex to the SPD…

(8) Public Affairs. PA plan is to be developed in accordance with

NID, StratCom objectives and guidance, and pertinent NATO policy
setting out the PA mission and specific PA objectives of NATO’s
engagement in the region.

(9) Civil-Military Cooperation. Guidance and any specific direction to

subordinate commands on civil-military interaction. Assist local
authorities and international civil presence to ensure freedom of
movement and secure environment.

(10) Inter-agency Coordination. Guidance on how inter-agency

coordination will be managed.

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(11) Partner Involvement. Guidance on Partner participation in

accordance with the NID and SACEUR’s initial guidance. (i.e. Partner
participation should be authorised for sustainment of operations as well
as to provide special capabilities for intelligence, logistics). Guidance on
Partner participation should cover the preparation, certification and
integration of partner forces, including arrangements for information
sharing.

(12) Environmental Protection. Initial guidance on environmental

protection requirements, measures and considerations, consistent with
operational imperatives.

(13) Operations Assessment. Direction or guidance on, or the

development of, operations assessment criteria, methodologies and
reporting requirements.

(14) Lessons Learned. Specific guidance and requirements should be

established to ensure that operational and strategic lessons are
captured and best practices developed to promote operational
effectiveness and strategic success.

(15) Exit Criteria. (If possible SHAPE provides guidance). If no exit

criteria are provided in the NID by the NAC for the termination of military
operations, the CAT will develop some initial exit criteria, for the OPG to
factor into their operational estimate and which will be further developed
for NAC consideration with the submission of the strategic CONOPS.

(16) Critical Timings. (SHAPE provides guidance). Conferences,

CONOPs to be submitted by, FG conference, OLRT deployment, NLT
deployment date…

5. Service Support. A brief description of the initial service support concepts

with sufficient guidance for COM JFC to commence an orientation, to include
possible discussion on the following:

 Strategic lines of communications.

 Access to the theatre and entry points, including air and sea ports of
debarkation (APODs and SPODs).
 Intermediate staging bases, if required.
 Main logistic bases and forward logistic bases.
 Possibilities for host nation support.

In addition, operational requirements for each of the following should be requested.

a. Logistic Support Concept.

b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.

c. Movement Concept.

d. Host Nation Support Concept.

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e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.

f. Contractor Support Concept.

g. MILENG Support Concept.

h. Medical Support Concept.

i. Finance.

j. Manpower.

6. Command and Signal. Sufficient initial guidance on Command and Signals

to permit COM JFC to conduct an operational estimate and develop an initial
operational concept. COM JFC is to be requested to submit operational C2
requirements to SACEUR.

a. Command and Control.

(1) Command Structure. The military chain of command runs from

SACEUR… (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational
requirements)…

(2) Command Authority.

(a) Transfer of Authority.

(b) Delegation of Command Authority.

(3) Liaison and Coordination. (SHAPE provides guidance and

request operational requirements).

(4) Conduct of Combined Operations.

b. Communications and Information Concept. A brief description of the

initial CIS concept with sufficient guidance for COM JFC to commence an
orientation, to include possible discussion on the following:

(1) NATO CIS links.

(2) The Main Networks and information exchange gateways (IEGs),

DCIS for each point of presence (PoP), required AIS, back up
communications, alternative networks, etc.

(3) NATO Satellite Coverage.

(4) Connectivity with external organisations.

(5) OPSEC Direction / Security Conditions. (Alfa…Gamma…etc.).

(6) Host Nations CIS Infrastructure Utility. (Leased Lines, GSM,

ADSL, DSM etc.).

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INSERT AUTHORITY LINE HERE, IF APPROPRIATE

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX A TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

insert file ref # - insert tasker # Day Month Year

SACEUR CONOPS / OPLAN XXX00 REV X CHANGE X7

‘FORMAL PLAN/OPERATION NAME’
REFERENCES:

Note - The framework below supports the development of strategic level CONOPS
and operations plans (CONPLAN / SDP / OPLAN / COP / SERP).

1. Situation. This introductory paragraph describes: the political / military

situation leading to the requirement for the applicable planning product. It draw on
SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment, Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP) (if one
exists), the NID and the SPD to highlight: the key factors (in a broad overview),
specifically addressing any emerging issues; details of NATO’s contribution to
international efforts and role with cooperating actors in the crisis area; and the legal
basis for involvement.

a. Political Environment.

b. Strategic Environment. The main aspects of the crisis. Sub-

paragraphs succinctly summarise those main actors necessary to allow a full
appreciation of the crisis.

(1) Opposing Actors. This could include criminal organisations and

terrorists groups.

(2) Friendly and Cooperating Actors. This should include the UN and
as appropriate Governments including those providing HNS, IOs and
NGOs.

(3) Neutral Actors.

c. Information Environment.

d. NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.

(1) NATO End State. (Given in NID).

7
REV and CHANGE are only used in the title when applicable as per Annex K.

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(2) NATO Strategic Objectives. (Normally given in NID)

e. NATO Centre of Gravity.

f. Political Guidance and Limitations.

(1) Political Constraints.

(2) Political Restraints.

g. Political Assumptions.

h. Legal Basis. The legal and legitimate basis for NATO’s involvement.

i. Participation of Non-NATO Contributing Nations.

2. Mission. Clear, concise definition of the nature of the operation, identification

of the military commander responsible for the conduct of the operation, the location of
the operation and, if appropriate, the likely timeframe for the operation.

3. Strategic Direction.

a. SACEUR’s Intent. This paragraph should be a broad statement of

SACEUR’s intent covering the vision and aim for the operation. This broad
statement should consider, but not be limited to, the following areas, which can
if necessary be articulated as separate specific sub-paragraphs:

(1) Strategic Main Effort. This item may only be useful for inclusion if
there are multiple operational level commands operating as part of a
strategic level campaign.

(2) Additional Limitations.

(a) SACEUR Constraints.

(b) SACEUR Restraints.

(3) Cooperation with Non-Military and Non-NATO Efforts.

(4) Risk Evaluation and Mitigation.

b. Strategic Planning Assumptions.

c. Strategic Centre of Gravity.

d. Military Strategic Objectives.

(1) Criteria for Success. If necessary, criteria for success may be

developed and articulated for the military strategic objectives to aid
clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent.

e. Military Strategic Effects.

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f. Preconditions for Success. This should include for example broad

legal arrangements, coordinated StratCom strategy, transfer of command
authority transferred, timely provision of forces, ROE, and Intelligence; in
addition, it may include non-military supporting or complementary activities, not
considered sufficiently addressed as non-military objectives or guidance in the
NID.

g. Strategic Phasing and Sequencing. If needed, provide a description

of the strategic phases of the operation or the intended sequencing of strategic
military effects. This will facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and
non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well as
Alliance political control.

h. Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area.

4. Execution.

a. Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders.

b. Force and Theatre Capability Requirements. A summary of the scale

and type of force capability requirements necessary for the successful
prosecution of the operation. This should include key capabilities and enablers.

c. Coordination of Requirements. General overview supported by

detailed Annexes where appropriate.

(1) SACEUR’s Commanders Critical Information Requirements.

Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions
at the military strategic level. SACEUR’s CCIR should guide subordinate
commands in developing their own CCIRs, PIRs and EEFI.

(2) Crisis Response Measures. Requirements for implementing

additional crisis response measures including justification.

(3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. Guidance on the

use of military force including lethal and non-lethal measures.

(4) Targeting. Targeting guidance on, and direction to further

determine, target sets and, as appropriate, target categories, and
categories of TSTs.

(5) Force Protection. Guidance and direction for force protection,

focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and
nations during deployment and entry into the TOO.

(6) Military Stability Policing. Guidance and direction for MP / SP

Operations, focusing on security, detention and stability policing
functions, and strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO
and nations during deployment and entry into the TOO.

(7) Strategic Communications. A summary of the concept for

implementation of the StratCom objectives and guidance detailed in the

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NID, this paragraph outlines specific direction provided to subordinate

commands and describes how StratCom contributes to creation of the
desired strategic effects with reference to Annexes TT, UU and VV (PA,
Info Ops and PsyOps respectively). This is meant to be a concise
overview, not a reproduction of the entire StratCom concept, which is
outlined in detail in Annex SS and developed in parallel with the
SECGEN’s Framework. The direction and guidance contained in the
concept will also have been taken into account in the individual
PSYOPS, Info Ops and PA annexes.

(8) Public Affairs. PA plan is to be developed in accordance with

NID, the StratCom concept and pertinent NATO policy setting out the PA
mission and specific PA objectives of NATO’s engagement in the region.

(9) Civil-Military Co-operation. Guidance and any specific direction to

subordinate commands on civil-military interaction.

(10) Inter-agency Coordination. Guidance on how inter-agency

coordination will be managed.

(11) Partner Involvement. Guidance on Partner participation In

accordance with the NID and SACEUR’s initial guidance. This should
cover the preparation, certification and integration of partner forces,
including arrangements for information sharing.

(12) Environmental Protection. Initial guidance on environmental

protection requirements, measures, considerations, consistent with
operational imperatives.

(13) Operations Assessment. Direction or guidance on, or the

development of, OPSA criteria, methodologies and reporting
requirements.

(14) Lessons Learned. Specific guidance and requirements should be

established to ensure that operational and strategic lessons are captured
and best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness and
strategic success.

(15) Exit Criteria. ‘Exit criteria’ are those conditions that must be
established prior to the conclusion of the NATO military activity called for
in the operation described by the strategic plan, and the transition of
residual authorities to a proper authority. These will have been further
developed from the issue of the SPD. They are developed and used as a
basis for planning the transition and exit from the theatre while ensuring
that favourable conditions can be sustained as military forces are
withdrawn from the theatre.

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(16) Critical Timings. Direction or guidance on critical timings, such

as:

(a) Operational CONOPS with provisional CJSOR due …

(b) Force generation conference on …

(c) Operational OPLAN due to SACEUR…

(d) Forces ready to deploy, etc.

5. Service Support. A brief description of the support requirements necessary

for mission accomplishment to include, where appropriate the theatre logistics
architecture. This could include comment on the following areas:

 Strategic lines of communications.

 Access to the theatre and entry points, including air and sea ports of
debarkation (APODs and SPODs).
 Intermediate staging bases, if required.
 Main logistic bases and forward logistic bases.
 Possibilities for host nation support.

a. Logistic Support Concept.

b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.

c. Movement Concept.

d. Host Nation Support Concept.

e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.

f. Contractor Support Concept.

g. MILENG Support Concept.

h. Medical Support Concept.

i. Finance.

j. Manpower.

6. Command and Signal.

a. Command and Control.

(1) Command Structure. The military chain of command runs from

SACEUR…

(2) Command Authority.

(a) Transfer of Authority.

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(b) Delegation of Command Authority.

(3) Liaison and Coordination.

(4) Conduct of Combined Operations.

b. Communications and Information Concept.

(1) NATO Communications and Information Systems will be

extended to link…

(2) The Main Networks and IEGs, DCIS for each PoP, required AIS,
back up communications, alternative networks, etc.

(3) NATO Satellite Coverage.

(4) Connectivity with external organisations.

(5) OPSEC Direction / Security Conditions. (Alfa…Gamma…etc.).

(6) NCIA will …

(7) IEGs will provide to (PfPs forces, HN …coalition unit’s ships, etc.).

(8) HN CIS Infrastructure Utility. (Leased Lines, GSM, ADSL, DSM

etc.).

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ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

OPERATIONAL PLANNING TEMPLATES

1. This Annex provides a series of illustrative standard templates8 in Appendices

1 through 7 that provide common standards and formats for the preparation of the
following documents and briefings:

a. Appendix 1 - Operational Advice on Military Response Options.

b. Appendix 2 - Operational Warning Order.

c. Appendix 3 - Mission Analysis Briefing-Outline Format.

d. Appendix 4 - Operational Planning Guidance.

e. Appendix 5 - COA Decision Briefing-Outline Format.

f. Appendix 6 - Operational Planning Directive.

g. Appendix 7 - Operational CONOPS / OPLAN Main Body.

2. While these templates should be used as depicted, their layout and content
can be adjusted if required.

8
While these templates carry a NATO UNCLASSIFIED classification, the documents for a particular crisis will be classified as
appropriate.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

OPERATIONAL ADVICE ON MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL ADVICE ON SACEUR’S MILITARY RESPONSE

OPTIONS (MRO) FOR…

REFERENCES: A. Draft Military Response Options.

1. Introduction. Based on Reference A, this document provides operational

advice and recommendations to SACEUR on the draft MROs, with details on each
MRO provided in the attached annexes.

2. Summary of MRO Review. These paragraphs contain a succinct summary

of the main conclusions and operational concerns / advice from the analysis and
comparison of the different MROs, as to their adequacy, merits and potential for
operational success. They can include comments on any element of the MRO (i.e.
desired End State, MSOs, etc.) that is necessary for inclusion in the cover letter –
otherwise the detail in the attached table will stand for itself. Some specific areas
that should be covered are the use of complementary non-military actions and
operational risk.

a. MRO #1.

b. MRO #2.

c. MRO #3.

3. Critical Operational Requirements. Each MRO annex provides the venue

for expressing operational requirements for that MRO. This paragraph is to capture
those operational requirements, either common to all MROs or to ensure the viability
of one MRO, that need to be highlighted to SACEUR; as such, each list will be
tailored to identify the Commander’s specific concerns for the set of MROs under
consideration. Items shown below are for example only.

a. Preconditions for Success.

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b. Mission Essential Force Capabilities.

c. Rules of Engagement Considerations.

d. Interaction Requirements with Relevant Actors.

e. Crisis Response Measures.

4. Any Other Considerations / Concerns. This paragraph can include any other
considerations, key issues or operational concerns that need to be highlighted to SACEUR.

5. Recommendation. This paragraph identifies the MRO recommended by COM with a

succinct explanation of the reasons for its selection.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

A. Operational Analysis of MRO #1 - Matrix.

B. Operational Analysis of MRO #2 - Matrix.
C. Operational Analysis of MRO #3 - Matrix.
D. Operational Evaluation of MROs.

DISTRIBUTION:

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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Operational Analysis of draft MRO # (Name Option #) Matrix9

MRO # – NAME MRO #10 Operational Analysis Operational Advice

a. NATO End State:
b. SACEUR’s Mission: SACEUR, in close
cooperation with the cooperating
organisations, conducts type of military
operations in specified areas to create specific
strategic military objectives to achieve NATO
end state. Improve / maintain.
c. Military Strategic Objectives.
(1) …

d. Military Strategic Effects.

(1) Complies with, cooperates with,
resumes, stops, disarms, improves,
increases, is deterred from….
(2) ...
e. Military Strategic Actions.
(1) Conduct, provide, protect, be
prepared to, establish, disarm, assist…

9
Matrix shown is illustrative; the matrix used to evaluate a set of MROs should use the format in which the MROs are presented.
10
Content of this column comes from the draft MRO provided by SACEUR / SHAPE.

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MRO # – NAME MRO #10 Operational Analysis Operational Advice

f. Complementary Non-Military Actions.
(1) Diplomatic (Political) incentives to
influence…
(2) Information …
(3) Economic …
g. Force Capability Requirements.
(1) Maritime, ground forces, PSYOPS,
CIMIC Logs etc.…
h. Resource Implications.
(1) Strategic Lift.
(2) Sustainment.
(3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be
order of magnitude in a range of
estimated costs.
(4) Medical.
(5) MILENG.
i. Provisional TOO and JOA.
(1) TOO.
(2) JOA.
j. Preliminary Command and Control
Arrangements.
(1) Designated Op level HQs, CC’s etc.
(2) C2 Manpower reinforcement
considerations.

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MRO # – NAME MRO #10 Operational Analysis Operational Advice

k. ROE Requirements.
l. Legal requirements.
m. StratCom Requirements.
(1) StratCom Activities, target audiences,
potential effects, and requirements for
policy guidance.
n. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements.
(1) UN, Governments, local national
‘Unions’ e.g. AU…
o. Preconditions for Success.
Legal, alliance commitment, transfer of
command authority, ROE etc.
p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces
including OLRT.
q. CRM requirements.
r. Partner and Non NATO Nation
Participation.

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Operational Evaluation of MRO # - NAME MRO #

Strategic Evaluation Operational Evaluation

a. Advantages. a. Advantages.
(1) Minimum forces, non-escalatory, meets immediate security (1) …
requirement…
(2) …
(2) …
b. Disadvantages. b. Disadvantages.
(1) Flexibility to cope with deterioration situation, credibility. Long (1) …
term solution…
(2) …
(2) …
c. Impact on Ongoing Operations. c. Impact on Ongoing Operations.
(1) Demand on limited assets, e.g. strategic lift… (1) …
(2) … (2) …
d. Strategic Risks. d. Operational Risks.
(1) Aggression not curtailed, failure of UN/IC to meet … resulting (1) …
in…
(2) …
(2) Particularly at the political level, collateral damage etc.
(3) ...

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

OPERATIONAL WARNING ORDER11

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER FOR …

REFERENCES: A.

1. Background. The situation on / in … is deteriorating and calls for …UN

Security Council assesses that … As a consequence, UN Secretary General
(UNSG) has requested NATO to consider …, acting under …of the UN Charter. In
light of the NAC assessment at Ref XX, ….a request was made for a SACEUR’s
Strategic Assessment.

2. Designation of Headquarters. I intend to designate the following HQs for

this crisis:

a. xxx.

b. xxx.

3. Crisis Response Measures. The following CRMs … have been declared by

SACEUR.

4. HQ Updates. HQs are to provide updates daily. This should include advice
on readiness, etc.

11
Illustrative, Commander driven requirement.

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5. Timings. The following actions / products are due to SHAPE by xxxxx.

a. Designated HQ(s) OPLEs in place at SHAPE

b. Op Advice / draft CONOPS

c. SACEUR Conference Call

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING-OUTLINE FORMAT12

1. Introduction.

a. Aim of Brief.

b. Outline.

2. Review of Situation.

a. Current Strategic Situation.

b. Adversaries13, Friends and Neutrals.

(1) Goals and objectives of each key actor.

(2) Primarily and supporting instruments of power.
(3) System interaction, interdependencies, influences and
vulnerabilities.
(4) Military and other capabilities.
(5) Possible Actions14.
c. Political Direction and Guidance.

(1) NATO End State

(2) Strategic Non-Military Objectives

(3) Political Limitations

(4) Additional Direction and Guidance.

3. Higher Headquarters Direction and Guidance.

(1) Strategic Military Mission.

(2) Intent.

12
The format of the MAB should be tailored to ensure that only the information that is important for the Commander is
presented; this will vary with each commander and with the manner and depth of personal involvement in the mission analysis
to this point.
13
In a force-on-force scenario, the opposing force can be evaluated using: Order of Battle and Current Disposition; Goals and
Objectives; Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses; Center of Gravity and Decisive Conditions; High-Value Targets; Likely
Intentions; Potential COAs.
14
For adversaries, present opposing COAs.

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(3) Military Strategic Objectives.

(4) Military Strategic Effects.

(5) Preconditions for Success.

(6) Assumptions.

(7) Limitations.

(8) Provisional Operational Mission (including objectives).

(9) Additional Direction and Guidance.

4. Mission Analysis.

a. Key Factors and Conclusions.

b. Operational Limitations.

(1) Constraints.

(2) Restraints.

c. Operational Assumptions.

d. Operational Risks / Opportunities.

5. Operational Design15.

a. Operational Mission (including Operational Objectives)16.

b. Operational CoGs.

c. Initial Commander’s Intent17.

d. Operational Framework.

(1) Possible Lines of Operations.

(2) Decisive Conditions.

(3) Operational Effects.

(4) Operational Actions.

15
Brief any recommendations for change from the mission and provisional operational objectives promulgated in the SPD.
Include criteria for success if used.
16
The JOPG would highlight here any proposed changes in the operational mission (including objectives) from that provided in
the SPD.
17
If the Commander provided the JOPG with ‘initial intent’ following a review of the draft Operational Framework, then reflect it
here in the MAB; if not, then omit this item.

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e. Complementary Non-Military Actions.

f. Assessment of Possible Branches and Sequels.

g. Provisional Component Missions (including Objectives)18.

6. Initial Force / Capability Estimate.

a. Forces Available for Planning Purposes. (If given).

b. Estimate of Forces / Capability Required.

7. Command and Control.

a. Preliminary C2 Arrangements.

b. Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of Operations.

8. Operational Level CCIR.

9. Critical Operational Requirements.

a. Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.

b. Pre-conditions for Success.

c. Rules of Engagement / Use of Force.

d. CRM.

(1) Declared CRMs.

(2) Additional CRM requirements.

e. Requirements for Interaction with Other Actors.

(1) Requirements.

(2) Guidance for Civil-Military Cooperation.

f. StratCom / Information Strategy Requirements.

(1) Political Guidance.

(2) Core Message.

(3) Themes.

18
If there are any specific component limitations, they would also be identified here (i.e. constraint of having to support a
specific non-NATO actor).

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(4) Themes to avoid.

(5) Audiences.

g. Other Critical Operational Requirements. (i.e. targeting).

10. Critical Timings.

a. Operational Timings.

b. Planning Milestones.

11. Requests to be Submitted to SACEUR / SHAPE.

12. Proposed Commander’s Planning Guidance19.

a. Planning Guidance to Staff. To include guidance on the following

sorts of issues:

(1) Opposing COAs to develop.

(2) Criteria for COA development and selection.

(3) Broad terms on COAs to develop.

b. Direction to Subordinate Commanders.

13. Conclusion.

14. Approvals. Seek approval as necessary of elements of the MAB to include:

a. Operational Framework.

b. Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.

c. Preconditions for Success.

d. Proposed Planning Guidance.

e. ROE requirements.

f. Additional CRMs.

g. Submissions to SACEUR / SHAPE.

19
If Commander has already provided the JOPG with ‘initial intent’, the JOPG can present here some proposed CPG; if not,
then this section is omitted.

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15. Seek from Commander.

a. Commander’s Initial Intent.

(1) Commander’s Planning Guidance.

(2) Guidance to Planning Staff.

b. Direction to Subordinate Commanders.

c. Additional COM Guidance.

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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

OPERATIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE.

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: COM XXXXX OPERATIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE20

REFERENCES: A.

1. Review of Situation.

a. Current Situation.

b. Political Direction and Guidance.

(1) NATO End State.

(2) Strategic Non-Military Objectives.

(3) Political Limitations.

(4) Additional Direction and Guidance.

2. SACEUR's Direction and Guidance.

a. Strategic Military Mission.

(1) Mission.

(2) Intent

20
The OPG intent is to formally capture the output from the MAB, including the initial operational design (with Commander’s
initial intent) and, if desired, the CPG. The format can be tailored as needed to succinctly communicate the information
necessary for component level planning, which will depend on the involvement of the component and supporting commands in
the conduct of the mission analysis and MAB. The JOPG should anticipate the Commander’s requirement and can be drafting
an OPG in parallel to the conduct of the mission analysis to facilitate its rapid release post-MAB following any required
changes.

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b. Military Strategic Objectives21.

(1) MSO1.

c. Military Strategic Effects.

(1) MSE1.

d. Pre-conditions for success.

e. Assumptions.

f. Limitations.

g. Additional Direction and Guidance.

3. Operational Mission22.

4. Mission Analysis.

a. Main Actors23.

(1) Adversaries.

(2) Friends.

(3) Neutrals.

b. Key Factors and Conclusions.

c. Operational Limitations.

(1) Constraints.

(2) Restraints.

d. Operational Assumptions.

(1) …

21
Including criteria for success if promulgated.
22
As provided in the SPD, or as agreed with SACEUR following Mission Analysis.
23
A succinct summary of the key actors relevant to the mission analysis. As appropriate, provide a general summary of
potential goals/objectives, strengths / weaknesses, and possible courses of action.

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e. Operational Risks / Opportunities.

(1) Risk 1:

(a) Probability:

(b) Impact:

(c) Consequence:

(d) Mitigation:

(2) Risk 2:

(3) Opportunity:

5. Operational Design. See Annex A.

a. Commander’s Initial Intent.

b. Line of Operations.

c. Operational COGs.

d. Decision Points.

e. Branches and Sequels.

6. Initial Force / Capability Estimate.

a. Land Forces.

b. Maritime Forces.

c. Air Forces.

d. Special Operations Forces.

e. JLSG.

f. Other Forces.

7. Command and Control.

a. Preliminary C2 Arrangements. Refer to Annex XX.

b. Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of Operations. Refer to Annex

XY.

8. Operational Level CCIR.

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9. Critical Operational Requirements.

a. Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.

b. Pre-conditions for Success.

c. Rules of Engagement / Use of Force.

d. CRM.

(1) Declared CRMs.

(2) Additional CRM requirements..

e. Requirements for Interaction with Other Actors.

(1) Requirements.

(2) Guidance for Civil-Military Cooperation

f. StratCom / Information Strategy Requirements.

(1) Political Guidance.

(2) Core Message.

(3) Themes.

(4) Themes to avoid.

(5) Audiences.

g. Other Sub-Paragraphs as required (targeting, etc.).

10. Planning Guidance.

a. Direction to Planning Staff.

(1) The planning staffs are to focus on the following provisional

Courses of Action:

(a) CoA 1.

(b) CoA 2.

(c) …

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(2) Common to all CoAs:

(3) Additional points to be considered.

b. Direction to Subordinate Commands.

c. Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.

(1) CC Mission24.

(2) CC Mission.

11. Coordination.

a. Critical Timing for Operation. Refer to Annex B.

b. Planning Milestones.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

A. Operational Design.
B. Operational Timeline.
C. Proposed C2.
D. TOO and JOA.

DISTRIBUTION:

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

24
Mission statements include provisional component objectives. If it is necessary to impose specific limitations on a component
commander (i.e. a constraint to support a specific non-NATO actor) they should be listed here with the provisional mission.

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

COA DECISION BRIEFING-OUTLINE FORMAT

1. Introduction.

a. Aim of Brief.

b. Outline.

c. General Introductory Comments.

2. Political and SACEUR Direction and Guidance Highlights.

3. Commander’s OPG Highlights.

a. Higher Direction.

(1) NATO End-state.

(2) Strategic Non-Military Objectives.

(3) SACEUR’s Mission and Intent.

(a) Strategic Military Objectives and Effects.

(b) Preconditions for Success.

(c) Key Assumptions.

(4) Key Imposed Limitations.

b. Own Operational Design25.

(1) Mission.

(2) Initial Intent.

(3) Operational CoGs.

(4) Initial Operational Design.

(a) Operational Objectives26.

25
The JOPG would present the approved initial operational design, normally using the graphic itself, and cover any of the
essential elements listed as necessary to set the stage for the presentation of COAs.

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(b) Lines of Operation.

(c) Decisive Conditions.

(d) Operational Effects.

(e) Operational Actions.

(5) Other Key Elements, including considerations on secondary and

tertiary effects:

(a) Key Assumptions.

(b) Key Limitations.

(c) Provisional Mission for Component Commander’s.

4. Situation Analysis27.

5. Opposing CoAs.

a. General Description.

b. Potential Operational Timeline.

c. Analysis (Advantages and Disadvantages).

d. Assessment of Opposing CoAs.

6. Own Forces CoAs.

a. Common Points Applicable to all CoAs.

b. Specifics for each CoA.

(1) Aim.

(2) General CONOPS. (Including Sequencing / Phasing

Description, map sketches).

(3) CONOPS by Phase. Including, for each phase:

(a) Start and end conditions, and purpose of the phase.

(b) Sub-sequencing as necessary.

26
Include criteria for success if used.
27
Highlight key changes in the situation with operational impact; key factors and deductions that have direct effect on potential
COAs (Opposing, Own).

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(c) Operational effects.

(d) Operational actions.

(e) Essential capabilities required for the phase, if

appropriate.

(f) Possible decision points, and related required CCIR.

(4) Task Organisation.

(5) Operational Timeline.

(6) Logistic Support Concept (if not common to all CoAs).

(7) Military Engineering Concept.

(8) Command and Control Arrangements including Areas of

Operations (if not a common to all CoAs).

(9) Major differences to other CoAs.

7. Analysis and Comparison of CoAs.

a. War Game Results.

b. Comparison of CoAs.

(1) Advantages and Disadvantages.

(2) Friendly CoAs to Opposing CoAs.

(3) Against Commander’s Selection Criteria.

(4) CoA Risk Assessment.

c. Recommended COA.

d. Branch Plan Requirements for Recommended CoA28.

8. Unresolved Critical Issues.

9. Commander Guidance Required.

10. Way Ahead.

28
Branch plan requirements should be related to identified decision points.

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11. Commander’s Decision and Guidance.

a. Decision29 on CoA, including:

(1) Decision on final operational design.

(2) Direction for CoA or operational design revision.

(3) Refined Component Provisional Missions.

b. Confirmation of Commander’s Intent.

c. Planning Guidance for CONOPS Development.

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APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

OPERATIONAL PLANNING DIRECTIVE

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: COM XXXXX OPERATIONAL PLANNING DIRECTIVE30

REFERENCES: A. COM XXXXX Operational Planning Guidance, dated XXX.

B.

1. Review of Situation. With reference to OPG, a succinct précis of the

situation to provide context to the Operational Planning Directive (OPD), including as
required:

a. Update on Current Situation (if required).

b. Update on Higher Direction (if required).

2. Opposing CoAs. An assessment of opposing CoAs as required.

3. Operational Mission.

4. Concept of Operations.

a. Overall description / Aim.

b. Commander Intent.

c. Scheme of Manoeuvre (By Phase).

30
The OPD intent is to formally capture the output from the CoA decision briefing, including the refined CoA, Commander’s
intent, final operational design, and CC missions. The format can be tailored as needed to succinctly communicate the
information necessary to support component level CoA development, which will depend on the involvement of the component
and supporting commands in the conduct of the operational CoA development and the CoA decision briefing.

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(1) Main Effort.

(2) Supporting Effort(s).

d. Assumptions.

e. Limitations and Freedoms.

(1) Operational Design. See Annex A. The operational design

depicted at Annex A can be supported by text in the main body of the
OPD as required, such as:

(2) Operational CoGs.

(3) Decisive conditions.

(4) Effects.

(5) Decision Points.

(6) Branches and Sequels.

(7) Critical timings.

5. Operational Risks / Opportunities.

6. Task Organisation. See Annex B.

7. Command and Control.

a. Preliminary C2 Arrangements. Refer to Annex C.

b. Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of Operations. Refer to Annex D.

8. Operational Level CCIR.

9. Critical Operational Requirements.

a. Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.

b. Pre-conditions for Success.

c. Rules of Engagement / Use of Force.

d. Requirements for Interaction with Other Actors.

(1) Requirements.

(2) Guidance for Civil-Military Cooperation.

e. StratCom / Information Strategy Requirements.

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(1) Political Guidance.

(2) Core Message.

(3) Themes.

(4) Themes to avoid.

(5) Audiences.

f. CRM.

(1) Declared CRMs.

(2) Additional CRM requirements.

g. Other Sub-Paragraphs as required (targeting, etc.)

10. Planning Guidance.

a. Direction to Planning Staff.

b. Direction to Subordinate Commands.

c. Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.

(1) CC Mission31.

(2) CC Mission.

11. Coordination.

a. Critical Timing for Operation. Refer to Annex E.

b. Planning Milestones.

c. Liaison.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

31
Mission statements include provisional component objectives. If it is necessary to impose specific limitations on a component
commander (i.e. a constraint to support a specific non-NATO actor) they should be listed here with the provisional mission.

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ANNEXES:

A. Operational Design.
B. Task Organisation.
C. Proposed C2.
D. TOO and JOA.
E. Operational Timeline.

DISTRIBUTION:

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX B TO
COPD V3.0
DAYED JAN 21
OPERATIONAL CONOPS / OPLAN MAIN BODY1

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

insert file ref # - insert tasker # Day

Month Year

COM XXX CONOPS / OPLAN XXX10 REV X CHANGE X2

‘FORMAL PLAN / OPERATION NAME’

REFERENCES: A.

1. Situation.

a. Political Environment.

b. Strategic Environment.

(1) Opposing Actors.

(2) Friendly and Cooperating Actors.

(3) Neutral Actors that influence mission.

c. Information Environment.

d. NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.

(1) NATO End State.

(2) NATO Strategic Objectives3.

(a) Non-Military Strategic Objectives.

(b) Military Strategic Objectives.

e. Strategic Centres of Gravity.

(1) NATO Strategic CoG.

(2) Friendly Actors’ Strategic CoG.

1
A CONOPS or OPLAN main body will be covered by a document cover as described in Annex E. The CONOPS / OPLAN will
be submitted with a cover letter. Once approved by SACEUR, it will be promulgated by the originator with a promulgation letter
as described in Annex F.
2
REV and CHANGE are only used in the title when applicable as per Annex K.
3
MC0133 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military (i.e. Military Strategic Objectives), non-military and supporting
objectives at the political-military level.

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(3) Opposing Actors’ Strategic Centres of Gravity.

f. Military Strategic Effects.

g. Strategic Planning Assumptions and Limitations. (Political and

Military Strategic).

h. Legal Aspects.

i. Intelligence and Threat Assessment.

2. Operational Mission. On order, COM JHQ will conduct operations in XXX to

operational objective 1, operational objective 2, etc., in order to….

3. Operational Direction.

a. Commander’s Intent.

b. Main Effort.

c. Operational Centres of Gravity.

(1) Own CoG.

(2) Opposing actors’ CoG.

d. Concept of Operations.

e. Operational Design.

(1) Operational Objective (OO) 1 - XXX.

(a) Criteria for Success.

(b) Line of Operations (LoO) 1 - XXX.

1/ Decisive Condition (DC) 1 - XXX.

a/ Operational Effect (OE) 1- XXX.

b/ Operational Action (OA) 1- XXX.

2/ DC 2 - XXX.

(c) LoO 2 – XXX.

(2) OO2 - XXX.

f. Forces and Resources.

g. Cooperation with Others Actors.

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h. Preconditions for Success.

i. Risk Management.

(1) Xxx.

4. Execution.

a. Subordinate Command Missions and Objectives4.

(1) LCC Mission. COM LCC will…in order to…

(2) MCC Mission. COM MCC will…in order to…

(3) Xxx.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Operational Level CCIR.

(2) Crisis Response Measures.

(3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force.

(4) Targeting.

(5) Force Protection.

(6) Military Police.

(7) StratCom and Information Strategy.

(8) Public Affairs.

(9) Civil-Military Cooperation.

(10) Inter-agency Coordination.

(11) Partner Involvement.

(12) Environmental Protection.

(13) Operations Assessment.

(14) Lessons Learned

(15) Exit Criteria.

(16) Critical Timings.

4
If it is necessary to impose specific limitations on a component commander (i.e. a constraint to support a specific non-NATO
actor) they should be listed here with the component mission.

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5. Service Support.

a. Logistic Support Concept.

b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.

c. Movement Concept.

d. Host Nation Support Concept.

e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.

f. Contractor Support Concept.

g. Military Engineering Concept.

h. Medical Support Concept.

i. Finance.

j. Manpower.

6. Command and Signal.

a. Command and Control.

(1) Command Structure.

(2) Command Authority.

(a) Transfer of Forces.

(b) Delegation of Command Authority.

b. TOO and JOA.

c. Liaison and Coordination.

d. Communications and Information Concept.

e. Reporting.

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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ANNEX C TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

STRATEGIC / OPERATIONAL CONOPS / OPLAN ANNEXES

1. The table below presents the possible annexes for strategic and operational
CONOPS and OPLANS. The shaded ‘annexes’ are mandated36 for inclusion with a
strategic CONOPS / OPLAN for NAC approval; however, while the appendixes 37 give
an indication of what a particular annex should cover, they themselves are not
mandated per se. An operational CONOPS / OPLAN shall contain, as a minimum,
the annexes mandated for a strategic CONOPS / OPLAN. Additional strategic
CONOPS / OPLAN annexes that are developed beyond those mandated for
inclusion should also be submitted to the NAC, as per mandated annexes.

2. As necessary, Commanders may use non-assigned annex letters to present

an additional annex felt necessary for a particular CONOPS / OPLAN, or may add
appendixes to an already designated annex. In addition, if a listed appendix is not
required, and therefore not developed, the remaining appendices used may be
renumbered, while preserving the same order as the lists in the table below. In
these cases, the subordinate headquarters should discuss this necessity with the
higher headquarters, to ensure consistency of approach in the development and
presentation of nested operations planning documents.

ANNEX TITLE APPENDIX

A Concept A-1: Synchronisation Matrix
of Operations38 A-2 : Operational Design Graphic
B Task Organisation B-1: Task Organisation
and Command B-2: Command and Control Structure
Relationships B-3: Transfer of Authority
B-4: Liaison
B-5: Coordination Matrix
C Forces and Effects C-1: Decisive Condition-Effect List
C-2: Combined Joint Statement of
Requirements (CJSOR)39
C-3: Allied Force List (AFL)
C-4: Allied Disposition List (ADL)
C-5: Reserves

36
MC 0133 Annex B.
37
It should be noted that some of the appendices as written are appropriate for the Operational level operations plans only, i.e.
Appendix A-2 Operational Design Graphic.
38
The NATO CONOPS is a formal document, with the same format as the OPLAN; as such, the majority of the detail of the
‘concept of operations’ is already contained in the main body of both the CONOPS and the OPLAN. If the Commander
produces a concept of operations synopsis, from which the CONOPS is based, it could be captured in this Annex.
Alternatively, some of the detail of the ‘concept’ could be placed here instead of the main body to keep the main body succinct,
for example a detailed description of the phases. Finally, it could be used only to introduce the attached appendices.
39
The CJSOR is submitted as an Annex to the strategic OPLAN; an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR is submitted ‘with’ the strategic
CONOPS, but not as an Annex for ‘approval’.

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ANNEX TITLE APPENDIX

D Intelligence D-1: Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and
Interest
D-2: Threat Assessment
D-3: Security and Counter Intelligence
D-4: Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence
Requirements Management (CCIRM)
D-5: Intelligence Support, Architecture
D-6: Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
D-7: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
D-8: Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)
D-9: Intelligence Support to Targeting
E Rules of Engagement E-1: ROE Planning Profiles
E-2: ROE for Land Operations
E-3: ROE for Air Operations
E-4: ROE for Maritime Operations
E-5: ROE for Open Sources
E-6: ROE Release Authority Matrix
E-7: ROE Implementation Request Template
F Maritime Operations F-1: Maritime Air Operations
F-2: Anti-Submarine Operations (ASW)
F-3: Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
F-4: Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)
F-5: Mine Warfare
F-6: Submarine Operations
F-7: Naval Cooperation and Guidance to
Shipping
F-8: Land Based Air Support of Maritime
Operations
F-9: Allied World-wide Navigation Information
System (AWNIS)
G Land Operations G-1: Key Points and Rear Area Security
G-2: Cover and Deception
G-3: Area Damage Control
G-4: Aviation Support for Ground Ops
H Air Operations H-1: Counter Air Operations
H-2: Strategic Air Operations
H-3: Air Power Contribution to Land and/or
Maritime Operations
H-4: Supporting Air Operations
H-5: Air Space Control
H-6: Air Bed down
H-7: Data Link Coordination
I Amphibious Operations
J Force Protection J-1: Active Defence
J-2: Passive Defence
J-3: Protective Security
J-4: Recuperation
K Special Operations

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ANNEX TITLE APPENDIX

L SPARE
M Arms Control
N Nuclear Operations
O SPARE
P Electronic Warfare P-1: EW Reports
Q Communications and Q-1: Strategic Communications Architecture
Information Systems Q-2: Maritime Communications
Q-3: Land Communications
Q-4: Air Communications
Q-5: VTC
Q-6: Formal Message Traffic
Q-7: Information Assurance
Q-8: Spectrum Management
R Logistics R-1: Multinational Logistics Arrangements
R-2: Personnel Administration
R-3: Maintenance, Repair and Recovery
R-4: Supply
R-5: Service Support
R-6: Real Estate Management
R-7: Host Nation Support
R-8: Mission Essential Equipment
R-9: Logistic Reporting and Visibility
R-10: Redeployment and Recovery
S Movements S-1: M&T C2 Structure
S-2: Reception, Staging and Onward
Movement (RSOM)
S-3: Designated APOD Data
S-4: Designated SPOD Data
S-5: Road, Waterway and Rail Network
S-6: Movement Visibility and Reporting
T Environmental Support T-1: Geospatial
T-2: Meteorological and Oceanography
U Operations U-1: Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
in a CBRN Nuclear Defence
Environment U-2: Bases and Facilities
V Search, Rescue and V-1: Search and Rescue
Recovery V-2: Combat Search and Rescue
V-3: Evasion and Escape
V-4: Recovery
W Civil-Military W-1: Civil Assessment
Cooperation W-2: CIMIC Structure
W-3: Key Civil Organisations
W-4: CIMIC Sites of Significance
X SPARE
Y Conflict Termination
and De-escalation
(Transition Strategy)

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ANNEX TITLE APPENDIX

Z SPARE
AA Legal AA-1: Guidance on Law and Order
BB Training and Mission BB-1: Augmentation Training
Rehearsals BB-2: Pre-deployment Training
BB-3: In-Theatre Training
CC Command CC-1: Command Information Management
Information CC-2: Records
Management CC-3: Information Exchange Requirements
(IER)
CC-4: Historian Support
CC-5: Visual Information and Combat
Documentation
DD Space Operations DD-1: Space Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
DD-2: Navigation Aids
EE Military Engineering EE-1: Military Engineer Task Organisation
EE-2: Military Engineering Support to
Infrastructure
EE-3: Military Engineering Support to
Environmental Protection
EE-4: Mobility and Counter-Mobility
EE-5: Military Engineering Support to
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EE-6: Military Engineer Capabilities Analysis
FF Financial Support FF-1: Funding Support
FF-2: Contracting Support
GG Non-NATO Force
Procedures
HH Rear Area Operations
II Joint Targeting II-1: Detailed Joint Fires Concept
II-2: Targeting Guidance
II-3: Joint Targeting Process
II-4: Fire Support Coordination Measures
JJ NATO Crisis Response NATO Crisis Response Measures
System (NCRS) (CRM)
KK Operational Analytical
Support
LL Lessons Learned
MM Guidance on
Combating Trafficking
in Human Beings
NN Knowledge NN-1: KD Responsibility and Interest
Development NN-2: System analysis
NN-3: Information acquisition, Co-ordination of
KD Requirements Management.
NN-4: Knowledge Support, Architecture
NN-5: Support to Knowledge Development.

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ANNEX TITLE APPENDIX

OO Operations
Assessment
PP Military Police / Stability PP-1: Mobility Support
Police PP-2: Security Function
PP-3: Detention Function
PP-4: Police Function
PP-5: Stability Function
QQ Medical
RR Gender Perspective RR-1: Sexual and Gender Based Violence
RR-2: Monitoring and Reporting
RR-3: NATO Standards of Behaviour
SS Strategic SS-1: Information Environment Assessment
Communications SS-2: Information Operations
SS-3: Military Public Affairs
SS-4: Psychological Operations
TT SPARE
UU SPARE
VV SPARE
WW SPARE
XX Record of Change
YY Miscellaneous YY-1: Definitions and Abbreviations
YY-2: Bibliography and References
ZZ Distribution

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ANNEX D TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21
A-
FORMAT FOR DOCUMENT COVERS

1. Figure D-1 below depicts the layout and content of an operations plan cover,
including:

a. Cosmic Top Secret (CTS) control number40 for CTS documents.

b. Originator’s abbreviated title.

c. Plan number as per Annex K.

2. An example of a SACEUR OPLAN document cover follows as Figure D-2.

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]
3.

[FULL TITLE OF ORIGINATORS HEADQUARTERS]

[LOCATION]

[FILE NUMBER](a) [DATE]

SHIELD

__(b)__ [PLAN TYPE] __(c)__

“[NICKNAME]”

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

Figure D-1 Document Cover Format and Layout

40
See ACO Manual 70-1-003, ACO COSMIC and ATOMAL Registry Standard Operating Procedures.

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[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

BELGIUM

XX-XXX/XXX XX XXX 2 NOV xx

SACEUR OPLAN XXXXX

AMBER FOX
[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

Figure D-2 Document Cover Example

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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ANNEX E TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21
B-
C. FORMAT FOR LETTER OF PROMULGATION

NOTE: The following formatted example applies to all NATO command levels for
Letters of Promulgation. The letter must clearly state the status of the attached
document (e.g. “Draft”, or “Final Plan” as appropriate).

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: Insert file reference Tel: +32-(0)65-44-7111 (Operator)

Tel: +32-(0)65-44 + ext
NCN: 254 + ext
Date: Insert date Fax: +32-(0)65-44- +ext (Registry)

TO: See Distribution or enter a Single Action Addressee

SUBJECT: SUBJECT OF LETTER

REFERENCES: A. Insert details of reference.

B.

1. Promulgation. This letter promulgates SACEUR’s Strategic plan XXXX for

xxyy. As per reference A, this plan has been approved by the North Atlantic Council.
This Strategic plan is effective as of dd mm yy.

a. Planning: (specific planning instructions as applicable).

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b. Implementation: On separate order, subjects to transfer of operational

command or control of forces required from national authorities to SACEUR.

c. Supporting Plan: (if applicable).

d. Review: Guidance for future review.

2. Plan Synopsis.

a. Extract of Situation – derived from the Plan.

b. Mission – verbatim as in the Plan.

c. Extract of SACEUR Strategic Concept – derived from the Plan.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE:

SIGNATURE BLOCK

DISTRIBUTION:

See Annex ZZ of attached Plan

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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ANNEX F TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

C-
FORMAT FOR RECORD OF CHANGES

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

RECORD OF CHANGES
1. After a change has been incorporated it is to be recorded below and the
pages that have been replaced are to be destroyed in accordance with security
orders.

CHANGE NO SERIAL AND DATE SIGNATURE RANK /

DATE
ENTERED ORGANISATION

2. Superseded letters promulgating changes to be recorded below.

REFERENCE DATE TITLE

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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ANNEX G TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21
D-
FORMAT FOR FUNCTIONAL PLANNING GUIDES

1. Purpose. Functional Planning Guides41 (FPGs) are one mechanism42 to

provide function-specific planning guidance to assist planners from those functional
areas in their contributions to the operations planning process as part of a
headquarters cross-functional planning body (i.e. Joint Operations Planning Group
(JOPG)). These functional areas can include warfare areas (e.g. Joint Air
Operations) or specific areas of expertise (e.g. Stability Policing, Logistics, etc.).
FPGs can be written to support the planning process at any level (e.g. strategic,
operational and / or component).

2. Format. The format of FPGs can vary as required to support the detail
required by planners from the functional area for which it is written. Normally, they
should be divided into three main areas: an introduction, a main body (to support
functional contribution to the planning process) and instructions for preparations of
relevant operations plans annexes and appendices.

a. Introduction. The introduction should clearly describe the purpose of

the FPG; furthermore, it should assist planners in integrating functional
knowledge into the operations planning process and help them identify the
main inputs and products.

b. Main Body. The main body of FPGs should follow the format of the
main activities, as outlined in the Comprehensive Operations Planning
Directive (COPD). It is recognised that it will not always be possible for
functional experts to participate in all steps of the planning process; therefore,
the guides must identify where in the six phases of the planning process their
contribution is needed. In addition, there should be sufficient detail for
developing functional estimates and concepts and to prepare the functional
expert to be an active member of the applicable planning body (i.e. JOPG).
As required, the FPG can also introduce the functional planner to their
responsibilities in the use of Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area
Service (TOPFAS).

c. Annexes and Appendices. Instructions for the preparation of relevant

functional operations plan annexes and appendices (as outlined in Annex C)
should include an outline of the appropriate annex / appendix. It should also
include key reference material concerning NATO policy and doctrine to focus
a new planner’s contribution to the planning process.

41
As described in MC 0133, NATO’s Operations Planning.
42
While a FPG can be a mechanism to standardise functional area support to the OPP across levels (e.g. strategic and
operational) or headquarters of the same level (i.e. HQ JFCs, single service commands, NATO Force Structure Joint
Headquarters), other mechanisms can also be used such as internal Standard Operating Procedures and Standard Operating
Instructions.

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ANNEX H TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21
E-
CONSULTATION, APPROVAL, PROMULGATION AND ACTIVATION
PROCEDURES
1. Introduction. All plans, be they for contingency or for actual operations, will be
developed using a collaborative process involving all levels of planning. For each
strategic level plan, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe (SACEUR) will
decide on the need to develop a supporting operational level version. Approval of a
strategic level plan provides SACEUR with the necessary authority to approve the
operational version of that plan.

2. Consultation Process. The consultation procedures for advance and crisis

response planning (CRP) are essentially the same. However, CRP activities may
require expedited consultation due to the amount of time available based on the
ongoing crisis situation. Commands and Nations participating in an operation, or with
co-ordinating interests, must be consulted at an early stage during the initiation of a
strategic plan and at further appropriate stages in its progression to approval.

a. Contingency Plan (CONPLAN). CONPLANs will be developed in

accordance with the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)
(Chapters 3 & 4). Ideally, for any iteration of a strategic or operational
CONPLAN, 60 days should be allowed between issue and expected
responses. Normally, the following versions of a CONPLAN are produced:

(1) Initial Draft. An initial draft of a CONPLAN will be forwarded to

relevant NATO commanders for comment.

(2) Draft. Taking into account the comments on the initial draft, a
draft CONPLAN will be forwarded to the relevant NATO Commanders,
involved Nations and, for strategic CONPLANs, the International Military
Staff (IMS), for comment. Pending the nature of the comments, it might
be necessary to forward an additional draft(s), which then will be
identified as second, third, draft, etc.

(3) Coordinated Draft. Comments on the draft(s) will be

incorporated, as appropriate, and the coordinated draft CONPLAN will
be submitted to the initiating authority for approval. Once approved, the
final CONPLAN is promulgated.

b. Operation Plan (OPLAN). In general terms, the consultation process

for an OPLAN should be identical to that for CONPLANs. However, there is a
clear recognition that OPLAN development is usually time constrained and,
therefore, the process may need to be compressed.

c. Standing Defence Plan (SDP). Consultation as required.

d. Primary Planning Tools.

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(1) COPD. The COPD consultation process will be based on that

for CONPLANs.

(2) Functional Planning Guides (FPGs). Once a FPG has been

produced, either as an initial draft, or as a draft revision, the Office of
Primary Responsibility (OPR) will distribute the document for review
(including SHAPE J5), comment and approval in accordance with the
procedures as detailed for CONPLANs. Following approval, FPGs
should be forwarded to SHAPE J5 who will coordinate MC ‘notation’ as
required by MC 0133 NATO’s Operations Planning.

3. Approval Procedures. The approval authority is detailed in MC 0133 strategic

operations plans are approved as follows.

a. All strategic level CONPLANs will require Military Committee (MC)

approval while strategic OPLANs and SDPs will require North Atlantic Council
(NAC) approval. All subordinate operations plans, including supporting plans
(SUPPLANs), require approval of the initiating authority, which is the next
superior NATO commander.

b. The initiating authority must approve the concept of operations

(CONOPS) (strategic or operational), as a pre-requisite for the full development
of a CONPLAN / SDP / OPLAN. Approval, however, is not a pre-requisite for
plan development. The planning does not need to stop while awaiting
CONOPS approval.

4. Promulgation Procedure. Once approved by the initiating authority,

operations plans are promulgated by the originator using a Letter of Promulgation.
Details and a format are included at Annex F. Approved FPGs shall also be
accompanied with a Letter of Promulgation.

5. Activation Procedure. The force activation procedures are detailed in MC

0133.

6. Exercise Operations Plans. For NATO exercises, operations plans should be

developed in accordance with the COPD. Depending on exercise specifications and
objectives, the consultation and approval processes described herein for the relevant
type of plan may be abbreviated.

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ANNEX I TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21
F-
REVIEW, REVISION AND CANCELLATION PROCEDURES

1. Periodic review, revision and possible cancellation of operations plans must

occur. This is done to evaluate and confirm their continued suitability, feasibility and
viability. Each headquarters (HQ) will:

a. Maintain a current status of the command’s operations plans (including

related plans at the next immediate subordinate level) and forward that status
whenever it changes to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
J5, who will maintain an Allied Command Operations (ACO)-wide master plans
list.

b. Develop procedures to facilitate the conduct of plan reviews.

c. Determine follow-up action to be taken as a result of such reviews,

including changes to the command's own plan or recommendations for
changes to the superior commander’s plan.

2. Review. A review must occur when there is a significant alteration to the

situation, when any related plan is superseded or when a ‘Major Change’ to it is
issued. In addition, after initial approval or the last comprehensive review, a periodic
review of operations plans should occur on an interval chosen by the original initiating
authority. For the purposes of operations plans, a ‘Major Change’ is:

a. Whenever there is a significant change that alters the basic concept or

affects the force proposals / commitments to the plan.

b. The review will dictate the degree of revision required or cancellation of

plans as appropriate.

3. Revision. Purely editorial changes and other non-substantive amendments

may be issued by the originator when appropriate and without approval or
justification. The amended operations plan will be marked as a ‘change’ as
described in Annex K.

a. Major changes will require approval in accordance with the procedures

detailed for newly developed plans. The amended operations plan will be
marked as a ‘revision’ as described in Annex J.

b. If there is a question as to whether a change is to be considered a

major or a minor change it should be discussed with the original approving
authority or the next superior NATO commander.

4. Cancellation. Cancellation of an operations plan requires the authority of the

original approving authority. The promulgation letter of new draft plans is to list
those plans that the new document supersedes. Should a command decide that a

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plan should be cancelled, the following guidelines will apply:

a. Draft Letter of Intent. Notice of intention to cancel a plan should be

given to all agencies involved in the original consultation process. The Letter
of Intent should include the rationale for plan cancellation and allow at least
60 days for response.

b. Statement of Cancellation. If no major objections to the plan’s

cancellation are raised, a letter directing cancellation of the plan should be
issued to all agencies on the plan’s distribution list. The letter should provide
the effective date of cancellation.

c. Registration. For the registration procedures for valid plans, the

distribution list for both letters must include SHAPE J5.

d. Supporting Plans (SUPPLANs) and Operational Orders (OPORDs).

Cancellation of a plan is automatic authority to cancel its SUPPLANs and
OPORDs.

e. Archive Copy. The originating command for a plan that is cancelled

shall retain at least one copy of the plan as an archive copy. That copy
should be clearly marked as “Cancelled” effective date of cancellation by
date-time group (DTG) of Cancellation Letter. Retain as an archive copy.

5. Other Operations Planning Documents. The review, revision and

cancellation of other operations planning documents should follow the procedure
outlined in this Annex (i.e. Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, functional
planning guides, etc.).

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ANNEX J TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

F. PLANS IDENTIFICATION AND NICKNAMES

1. General. For identification, management and security reasons, a NATO

identification system of plans is established.

a. All or some of the following elements will identify each plan:

(1) A plan number.

(2) A letter suffix to the plan number for supporting plans

(SUPPLANs).

(3) A revision and/or a change number.

(4) The plan originator, category and date.

(5) A Nickname. SHAPE J5 is the focal point for registering all

Nicknames.

(6) A descriptive title.

2. Plan Number. Each Commander's plan will be assigned an unclassified plan

number comprising 5 digits. SHAPE J5 will allocate the plan number. The plan
numbering system (PNS) is described in Appendix 1 to Annex K 43.

3. Revision / Change Number. A plan number may be followed by a revision

and/or a change number, to indicate a major or minor change to the original plan
respectively, as follows:

a. Revision. XXXXX Rev X.

b. Change. XXXXX Change X. A change number follows a revision

number (i.e. XXXXX Rev 1 Change 2).

4. Plan Originator, Category and Date. All plans must be identifiable by

originator, category and date. Plans developed during exercises or those developed
to support the training scenario should be named as “OPLANs” with page markings
to clearly indicate they are ‘exercise’ OPLANs in accordance with ACO Security
Directive 070-1.

a. Originator. The plan originator is identified:

(1) For Allied Command Operations (ACO) plans by the originator’s

abbreviated title.

43
Existing approved operations plans will adopt the new PNS on the next ‘Revision’ of the related strategic plan.

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(2) For national plans by the issuing commander's short title,

proceeded by the letters identifying the nation (e.g. UKCICC).

b. Category and Date. The plan or document category is identified by

the originator as a contingency plan (CONPLAN), standing defence plan
(SDP), operation plan (OPLAN), or National Plan, as appropriate. The date of
a plan is the one appearing on the front cover of the most recent edition

5. Nicknames. The purpose of the Nickname is to provide an unclassified and

easy reference to an operations plan. The usage and allocation of Nicknames are
described below.

a. Usage. A Nickname is NATO UNCLASSIFIED when used on its own.

However, the subject or material to which it relates may be classified.
Therefore, whenever a Nickname is used in a context that reveals the
connection, or discloses classified information, a suitable classification must
be imposed.

(1) A Nickname shall consist of two short separate words.

(a) Hyphenated words are not to be used.

(b) The abbreviation NATO is not to be included in a

Nickname.

(c) The second word is not to be the same as the first word.

(2) Nicknames should have a robust connotation; undignified or

frivolous usage should be avoided.

b. Allocation. NATO commanders may originate and use Nicknames at

their discretion. No accounting is required, but the originating commander is
responsible for informing all interested authorities.

(1) SACEUR will designate the Nickname for new operations, with
the same Nickname designation process used throughout subordinate
operations plan development. The second word will remain the same
throughout each subordinate plan to link all appropriate plans to a
specific campaign/operation (e.g. SACEUR OPLAN is designated
"Operation JOINT GUARDIAN", COM JHQ OPLAN is designated
"Operation DISCREET GUARDIAN", etc.).

(2) The selected Nickname must not conflict with other short titles,
well-known phrases or existing Nicknames. The plan originator will
designate a Nickname, while adhering to paragraph 5.b. (1) above.

(3) There will be no allocation of block letters. This allows for

greater flexibility in selecting Nicknames for operations at all levels.

6. Descriptive Title. The plan originator will allocate to each plan a short,

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properly classified title, which is descriptive in nature (e.g., ‘Employment of 20 (XX)

Division in S Norway’). This title, which constitutes the official one, must appear in
the promulgation letters and in the heading of the first page of the plan.

APPENDIX:

1. Plan Numbering System (PNS).

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX J TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

PLAN NUMBERING SYSTEM (PNS)

1. General. Plans are allocated a plan number44 consisting of 5 digits and, if

appropriate, suffix letters. The plan number, which is unclassified, includes:

a. Plan type / subject characters.

b. Plan level characters.

2. Numbering System. A five-digit number identifies plans:

a. The first three digits identify the specific type / subject of a plan.

b. The last two digits identify the level of the plan.

c. A suffix letter can be added at the end of the plan number to identify
SUPPLANs.

d. Commanders subordinate to Component Commanders (CC) will use

the same number as the corresponding CC plan.

3. Plan Category, Subject Characters. The first three digits of the plan number
will identify the plan category and subject area as listed below. For each new
subject (i.e. a new operation), SHAPE J5 will issue a number sequentially. The
characters "XX" indicate the plan level digits as described below.

OPLANS and SDPs 100XX-299XX

CONPLANS 300XX-499XX
Exercise Plans 500XX-799XX
Spares 800XX-999XX

4. Plan Level Characters. The level45 of the plan will be indicated as shown:

Strategic (SACEUR) XXX00

Operational (COM JHQ) XXX10
Component (COM CC)
Land XXX11

44
Existing approved operations plans will adopt the new PNS on the next ‘Revision’ of the related strategic plan.
45
Exceptions will be decided by SHAPE J5 (i.e. if an operational level theatre HQ was required for a new operation reporting
through an HQ JFC, then the Operational Level (JFC) OPLAN could be numbered XXX10 (as above), with operational theatre
OPLAN numbered XXX20, and if components were required their plans could be numbered XXX21 etc.).

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Maritime XXX12
Air XXX13
Special Operations XXX14
Spare XXX15-XXX19

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ANNEX K TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS
The following table is a glossary of definitions used throughout the Comprehensive
Operations Planning Directive (COPD) v3.0 and relevant associated terminology.

TITLE DEFINITION SOURCE

A
Action The process of doing something to achieve an aim COPD
and in the sense of this paragraph, an action can definition
be considered the process of engaging any
instrument at an appropriate level in the
engagement space in order to create (a) specific
effect (s) in support of an objective.
Actor A person or organisation, including state and non-
state entities, within the international system with
the capability or desire to influence others in pursuit
of its own interest and objectives.
Activity The process of engaging any instrument at each NOAH
level in the in the engagement space in order to
create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an
objective.
Adversary A party acknowledged as potentially hostile and NATO
against which the legal use of force may be Term
envisaged.
Area of An area within a joint operations area defined by NATO
Operations the joint force commanders for conducting tactical Term
level operations.
Assessment The process of estimating the capabilities and NATO
performance of organisations, individuals, materiel Term
or systems.
Note: In the context of military forces, the
hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is:
assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and
certification.
Assumption In planning, a supposition made about the current AAP 06
situation and / or the future course of events to
complete an estimate of the situation and decide
on the course of action.
B

C
Campaign A set of military operations planned and conducted AAP-06

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to achieve a strategic objective within a given time

and geographical area, which normally involve
maritime, land and air forces.
Centre of The primary source of power that provides an actor AJP 05
Gravity its strength, freedom of action, or will to fight.
Note: At the political strategic level, moral-strength
as well as physical-strength CoGs exist. At lower
levels of command, only physical-strength CoGs
normally exist and the CoG is therefore always a
physical entity.
Civil-Military A group of activities, founded on communication, NATO
Interaction planning and coordination, that NATO military agreed
bodies share and conduct with international and
local non-military actors, both during NATO
operations and in preparation for them, thereby
mutually increasing the effectiveness and efficiency
of their respective actions in response to crises.
Commander’s The latest date, calculated from G-day, established AAP 06
Required Date by the theatre commander, on which forces are
required to be complete in their final destination
and organised to meet the commander’s
operational requirement.
Concept of A clear and concise statement of the line of action NATO
Operations chosen by the commander in order to accomplish Term
the given mission.
Constraint A requirement placed on a commander that
dictates an action.
Conduct of The art of directing, coordinating, controlling and NATO
Operations adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific Term
objectives.
Control The authority exercised by a commander over part NATO
of the activities of subordinate organisations, or Term
other organisations not normally under his
command, that encompasses the responsibility for
implementing orders or directives.
Course of Action An option that will accomplish or contribute to the AAP 06
accomplishment of a mission or task, and from
which a detailed plan is developed.
Crisis The coordinated actions taken to defuse crises AAP 06
Management prevent their escalation into armed conflict and
contain hostilities if they should result.
Cyberspace An operating environment consisting of the JDP 0-50
interdependent network of digital technology
infrastructures (including platforms, the Internet,
telecommunication networks, computer systems,
as well as embedded processors and controllers),
and the data therein spanning the physical, virtual

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and cognitive domains.

D
Data Collection A plan which describes the attributes of the data NOAH
Plan to be collected, the data source, how frequently it
is collected, the format the data should recorded
and analyse and assigns responsibilities for data
collection.
Deception Those measures designed to mislead the enemy NATO
by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of Term
evidence to induce him to react in a manner
prejudicial to his interests.
Decision Point A point in space and time, identified during the NATO
planning process, where it is anticipated that the Term
commander must make a decision concerning a
specific course of action.

Decisive A combination of circumstances, effects, or a NATO

Condition specific key event, critical factor, or function that Term
when achieved allows commanders to gain a
marked advantage over an opponent or contribute
materially to achieving an operational objective.
Doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces NATO
guide their actions in support of objectives. It is agreed
authoritative but requires judgement in application.
Domain A specified sphere of activity or knowledge. NATO
Term
E
Effect A change in the state of a system (or system COPD
element), that results from one or more actions, or definition
other causes.
Enabling Force A force tailored to the requirements sent in NATO
advance to prepare for the full deployment of a Term
main force in theatre.
End State The political and / or military situation to be attained NATO
at the end of an operation, which indicates that the Term
objective has been achieved.
Engagement That part of the strategic environment relevant to a
Space particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide,
or has decided, to engage.
Note: the engagement space can be initially viewed
through several conceptual models. The most
common in NATO recognises the six PMESII
domains (political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, information).
Exit Criteria Those conditions that must be established prior to
the conclusion of the NATO military activity called
for in the operation described by the strategic plan,

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and the transition of residual authorities to a proper

authority.
F
Force Protection Measures and means to minimise the vulnerability AAP 06
of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations
to any threat and in all situations, to preserve
freedom of action and the operational effectiveness
of the force.
G
G-Day The day on which an order is or is due to be given NATO
to deploy a unit. Note: Such an order is normally a Term
national one.
H
High Payoff A target of significance and value to an adversary, AAP 06
Target the destruction, damage or neutralisation of which
may lead to disproportionate advantage to friendly
forces.
High Value A target the adversary commander requires for the AD 80-70
Target successful completion of the mission.
Host Nation A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces NATO
and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on Term
/ from or transiting through its territory; b. allows
materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located
Host Nation Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, NATO
Support crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and / or Term
other forces and NATO organizations that are
located on, operating on/from, or in transit through
the host nation's territory.
I
Initial System A functionally, physically, and / or behaviourally
related group of regularly interacting or
interdependent elements forming a unified whole.
Intelligence The product resulting from the directed collection NATO
and processing of information regarding the Term
environment and the capabilities and intentions of
actors, in order to identify threats and offer
opportunities for exploitation by decision makers.
International An intergovernmental, regional or global NATO
Organisation organisation governed by international law and agreed
established by a group of states, with international
juridical personality given by international
agreement, however characterised, creating
enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose
of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common
aims.
Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of
the Red

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Interoperability The ability to act together coherently, effectively NATO

and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational Term
and strategic objectives.
J
Joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations NATO
and organisations in which elements of at least two Term
services participate.
Joint An order that provides further amplification to the
Coordination Commander’s Direction and Guidance in the
Order OPLAN in order to keep the operation on track.
Joint Intelligence The intelligence process and analytical
Preparation of methodology used to produce intelligence
the Operating assessments, estimates and other intelligence
Environment products in support of the commanders decision
making and operations planning process.
Joint Operations A temporary area defined by SACEUR, in which a AAP 06
Area designated joint commander plans and executes a
specific mission at the operational level of war. A
JOA and its defining parameters, such as time,
scope of the mission and geographical area, are
contingency or mission-specific, and are normally
associated with combined joint task force
operations.
K
Key Terrain Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of NATO
which affords a marked advantage to either Term
combatant.
Knowledge A collection of data, information, knowledge,
Base expertise and established contacts that is
distributed, inter-linked and standardised.
Knowledge A proactive, collaborative and iterative process
Development carried out at all levels of NATO, drawing on
NATO and non NATO entities, to develop and
then maintain a holistic understanding of complex
environments in support of NATO political and
military authorities’ decision making.
Knowledge A specific need for understanding about a situation,
Requirement a system, or an element of a system in order to
make a decision.
L
Liaison The contact, intercommunication and coordination NATO
maintained between elements of the military and / Term
or other non-military actors to ensure mutual
understanding and unity of purpose and action.
Line of All the land, water and air routes that connect an NATO
Communication operating military force with one or more bases of Term
operations and along which supplies and

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reinforcements move.
Line of Effort A line that links multiple tasks and mission using
the logic of purpose - cause and effect to focus
efforts toward establishing operational and
strategic conditions.
Line of A path linking decisive conditions to achieve an NATO
Operation objective. Term
M
Main Effort The main effort is ‘[a] concentration of forces or AAP-06
means in a particular area and at a particular time
to enable a commander to bring about a decision.
Measure of A metric used to measure a current system state. NOAH
Effectiveness
Measure of A metric used to determine the accomplishment of NOAH
Performance actions.
Military Strategy That component of national or multinational NATO
strategy, presenting the manner in which military Term
power should be developed and applied to achieve
national objectives or those of a group of nations.
Mission A mission is a clear, concise statement detailing
who will conduct the operation, what is to be
achieved, when it will take place, where it will
occur, and why it is being conducted.
Multinational Adjective used to describe activities, operations NATO
and organisations, in which elements of more than agreed
one nation participate.
N
Network An arrangement of nodes and interconnecting NATO
branches. Term
Non- A private, not for profit, voluntary organisation with NATO
Governmental no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, agreed
Organisation established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of
activities, in particular development-related projects
or the promotion of a specific cause, and organised
at local, national, regional or international level.
O
Objective A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military NATO
operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, Term
neutralising an adversary's force or capability or
achieving some other desired outcome that is
essential to a commander's plan and towards
which the operation is directed.
Operation A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined NATO
purpose. Term
Notes: NATO operations are military. NATO
operations contribute to a wider approach including
non-military actions.

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Operational Art The employment of forces to attain strategic and / NATO

or operational objectives through the design, agreed
organisation, integration and conduct of strategies,
campaigns, major operations and battles.
Operating A composite of the conditions, circumstances and NATO
Environment influences that affect the employment of Term
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander.
Operational The level at which campaigns and major operations AAP 06
Level are planned, conducted and sustained to
accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or
areas of operations. Within NATO, the operational
level is often referred to as the ‘joint’ level.
Order of Battle The identification, strength, command structure and NATO
disposition of units, personnel and equipment of Term
any military force.
P
Periodic Mission A NAC directed task to SACEUR to provide the
Review strategic operations assessment of progress
towards achieving strategic objectives and their
contribution to achievement of the desired end
state.
Phase A clearly defined stage of an operation or COPD
campaign during which the main forces and definition
capabilities employed set conditions required to
achieve a common purpose.
Preconditions Those prerequisites or requirements that must be COPD
for Success in place or achieved before something else may definition
happen or be completed
Q
Qualitative An observation that is a word, or a sentence, or a NOAH
description, or a code that represents a category
(attempting to understand rather than prove).
Quantitative A number that represents an amount or a count. NOAH
R
Restraint A requirement placed on a commander that
prohibits an action.
Risk The process of identifying, assessing and NATO
Management controlling risk arising from operational factors, and Term
making informed decisions that balance risk cost
with mission benefits.
Rules Of Directives issued by competent military authority NATO
Engagement which specify the circumstances and limitations Term
under which forces will initiate and / or continue
combat engagement with other forces
encountered.

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S
Special Military activities conducted by specially NATO
Operations designated, organised, selected, trained and Term
equipped forces using unconventional techniques
and modes of employment.
Strategic In the NATO military context, the integration of NATO
Communications communication capabilities and information staff Term
function with other military activities, in order to
understand and shape the information
environment, in support of NATO strategic aims
and objectives.
Strategic Line of A logical line that connects military, political, COPD
Engagement economic and / or civil actions in time and purpose definition
through strategic effects to strategic objective(s)
and the end state.
Supported A commander having primary responsibility for all NATO
Commander aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO Term
military authority and who receives forces or other
support from one or more supporting commanders.
System A functionally, physically, and / or behaviourally COPD
related group of regularly interacting or definition
interdependent elements forming a unified whole.
System Analysis Identification of networks of systems and system
elements, their relations and interactions, and
their evolution in space and time.
T
Targeting The process of selecting and prioritizing targets NATO
and matching the appropriate response to them, agreed
taking into account operational requirements and
capabilities.
Terrorism The unlawful use or threatened use of force or NATO
violence against individuals or property in an Term
attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or
societies to achieve political, religious or ideological
objectives.
Theatre of A designated area, which may include one or more AAP 06
Operations joint operations areas.
Transfer of Within NATO, an action by which operational AAP 06
Authority command or operational control of designated
forces and / or resources, if applicable, is passed
between National and NATO commands or
between commanders in the NATO chain of
command.
U
Undesired Effect Effects that disrupt or jeopardise the achievement
of objectives.
Unity of Effort In military operations, coordination and cooperation NATO

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 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

among all actors in order to achieve a common Term

objective.
V

W
Wargame NATO defines a war game as: a simulation of a NATO
military operation, by whatever means, using Term
specific rules, data, methods and procedures.
Weapon of A weapon that is liable to cause widespread NATO
Mass devastation and loss of life. Term
Destruction
X

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ANNEX L TO
COPD V3.0
DATED JAN 21

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. The following table of abbreviations contains those used throughout COPD v3.0.
Where an abbreviation is widely used across NATO the principle source document in
relation to the COPD has been quoted as the source.

2. Abbreviations and terminology used within formal NATO policy and doctrine is
managed centrally at NATO Headquarters by the NATO Terminology Office of the
NATO Standardization Office. AAP-77, NATO Terminology Manual, explains the basic
concepts involved in terminology work and lays out the conventions to be followed
when developing NATO terminology. All official NATO abbreviations are available in
the NATO Term, the official NATO Terminology Database.

ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

A
AAP Allied Administrative Publication AAP 15
AB Assessment Board
ACO Allied Command Operations AAP 15
ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff AAP 15
ACT Allied Command Transformation AAP 15
ACTORD Activation Order AAP 15
ACTPRED Activation Pre-deployment NCRSM
ACTREQ Activation Request AAP 15
ACTWARN Activation Warning AAP 15
ADAMS Allied Deployment and Movement System AAP 15
AD ACO Directive
ADL Allied Disposition List AAP 15
ADM Accelerated Decision Making NCRSM
AFL Allied Forces List
AIFS Allied Information Flow System AAP 15
AIMS AIFS Integrated Message System AAP 15
AIRCOM (Headquarters) Allied Air Command MC 0324
AJD Allied Joint Doctrine AAP 15

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

AJP Allied Joint Publication AAP 15
AMCC Allied Movement Coordination Centre AAP 15
AOI Area of Interest AAP 15
AOM Allied Operations and Missions
AOO Area of Operations AAP 15
AOR Area of Responsibility AAP 15
APOD Airport of Debarkation AAP 15
APOE Airport of Embarkation AAP 15
ARRP AOM Requirements and Resources Plan
ASG Assistant Secretary General AAP 15
AU African Union
AWG Assessment Working Group
B
Battlefield Information Collection and AAP 15
BICES
Exploitation System
BI Building Integrity
Bi-SC Bi-Strategic Commands AAP 15
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence
C
C2 Command and Control AAP 15
C2S Command and Control System AAP 15
C2W Command and Control Warfare AAP 15
CA Comprehensive Approach COPD
MCM 0016-
CAAC Children and Armed Conflict
2012
CALM Crane Attachment Lorry Mounted
Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and
CAPAC
Activation Procedures
CAT Cross Functional Action Team (Plans or Ops)
CAT Campaign Assessment Tool TOPFAS
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear AAP 15
CC Component Command AAP 15

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

CC Critical Capability
CCD CIS and Cyber Defence
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement AAP 15
Collection, Coordination and Intelligence AAP 15
CCIRM
Requirements Management
Comprehensive Crisis and Operations CCOM HB
CCOMC
Management Centre
CD Cyber Defence
CD Collective Defence
CE Crisis Establishment AAP 15
CEP Civil Emergency Planning AAP 15
CEPC Civil Emergency Planning Committee AAP 15
46
CG Command Group
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation AAP 15
CIS Communications and Information Systems AAP 15
CIVAD Civil Actors Advisor
CIVCAS Civilian Casualties
CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirements AAP 15
CLE CyOC Liaison Element
CM Crisis Management
CMALT Civil-Military Assessment and Liaison Team
CMC Chairman of the Military Committee AAP 15
CMI Civil-Military Interaction
CMPS Civil-Military Planning and Support Section
CMTF Crisis Management Task Force
CMRB Crisis Management Requirements Board
CN Contributing Nation AAP 15
CNA Computer Network Attack AAP 15
CND Computer Network Defence
CNI Critical National Infrastructure

46
Within SHAPE, ‘COM’ is normally used to denote the Command Group. In the COPD, CG has been chosen to represent
‘Command Group’ so as not to cause confusion with the AAP-15 acronym ‘COM’ to denote ‘Commander’.

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

CNMA Complementary Non-Military Activity COPD
CoA Course of Action AAP 15
CoC Chain of Command
CoG Centre of Gravity AAP 15
COM Commander AAP 15
COMPASS Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support
CONOPS Concept of Operations AAP 15
CONPLAN Contingency Plan AAP 15
COP Contingency Operations Plan CCOM HB
COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive MC 0133
Coalition Reception Staging and Onward LOGFAS
CORSOM
Movement
COS Chief of Staff AAP 15
Comprehensive Preparation of Operational AJP 05
CPoE
Environment
CPP Cultural Property Protection
CR Critical Requirements
CRD Commander’s Required Date AAP 15
CRM Crisis Response Measure AAP 15
CRO Crisis Response Operation AAP 15
CRP Crisis Response Planning
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue AAP 15
CSC Convoy Support Centre
CSO Contractor Support to Operations
CT Counter Terrorism
CTS COSMIC Top Secret AAP 15
Comprehensive Understanding of the
CUoE
Environment
CV Critical Vulnerabilities
CyOC Cyber Operations Centre
D
DAMCON Damage Control AAP 15

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

DB Decision Brief
DC Decisive Condition AJP 01
Director Comprehensive Crisis and Operations CCOM HB
DCCOMC
Management Centre
Deployable Communication and Information AAP 15
DCIS
Systems
DCOS Deputy Chief of Staff AAP 15
DCP Data Collection Plan
DDP Detailed Deployment Plan AAP 15
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration AAP 15
DE Deployable Element
DHS Document Handling System
DIME Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic,
DIMEFIL
Financial, Intelligence, Legal
DIRLAUTH Direct Liaison Authority
DoA Desired Order of Arrival AAP 15
DP Decision Point
DPRE Displaced Persons and Refugees
DSACEUR Deputy SACEUR AAP 15
DSM Decision Support Matrix
DTG Date-Time Group AAP 15
E
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination AAP 15
EADRCC
Centre
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council AAP 15
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information AAP 15
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal AAP 15
EOR Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance AAP 15
ERS Enablement and Resilience Section
E&T Exercises & Training
EU European Union AAP 15

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

EUMS European Union Military Staff AAP 15
EVAL Evaluation
EVE Effective Viable Execution LOGFAS
EW Electronic Warfare AAP 15
F
Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness, COPD
FACCES
Compliance, Exclusivity and Suitability
FAD Force Activation Directive MC 0133
FC Functional Commanders
FCE Forward Coordination Element CFAO
FFIR Friendly Forces Information Requirement AAP 15
FGen Force Generation
FGC Force Generation Conference
FGR Force Generation and Readiness Branch
FMovPC Final Movement Planning Conference
FORCE PREP Force Preparation AAP 15
FP Force Protection AAP 15
FPG Functional Planning Guide AAP 15
FRAGO Fragmentation Order AAP 15
FS Functional Services
FTDM Fast Track Decision-Making MC 0133
G
GCOP Generic Contingency Operations Plan
GENAD Gender Advisor
GO Governmental Organisation
GRF Graduated Readiness Forces
GRP Graduated Response Plan
H
HA Humanitarian Assistance / Aid
HF High Frequency
HISAD Historical Advisor

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

HN Host Nation AAP 15
HNS Host-Nation Support AAP 15
HOTO Handover Takeover
HQ Headquarters AAP 15
HQ JFC Headquarters Joint Force Command MC 0324
HUMINT Human Intelligence AAP 15
HVA/A High Value Asset / Area
HVT High Value Target AAP 15
I
I&IS Information & Intelligence Sharing
IAMD Integrated Air and Missile Defence
IC International Community
ICC International Criminal Court
ICE Initial Command Element CFAO
ICI Istanbul Cooperation Initiative AAP 15
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB Integrated Database AAP 15
IE Information Environment
IEA Information Environment Activities
IEG Information Exchange Gateway MC 0593
IER Information Exchange Requirement AAP 15
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IKM Information Knowledge Management
IM Information Management
IMINT Imagery Intelligence AAP 15
IMovPC Initial Movement Planning Conference
IMS International Military Staff AAP 15
Info Ops Information Operations AAP 15
INTEL FS Intelligence Functional Services
INTREP Intelligence Report AAP 15
INTSUM Intelligence Summary AAP 15

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

IMINT Imagery Intelligence AAP 15
IMS International Military Staff AAP 15
IO International Organisation AAP 15
IoP Instrument of Power
IS International Staff AAP 15
ISB Intermediate Staging Base AAP 15
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance AAP 15
Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and AAP 15
ISTAR
Reconnaissance
I&W Indications and Warnings
J
JALLC Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre AAP 15
JCB Joint Coordination Board
JCO Joint Coordination Order
JCOP Joint Common Operational Picture AD 80-80
JEWCS Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff AAP 15
JFC Joint Force Command AAP 15
JHQ Joint Headquarters
JIA Joint Implementation Arrangement
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
JIPOE
Environment
JISD Joint Intelligence and Security Division
JLSG Joint Logistics Support Group
JOA Joint Operations Area AAP 15
JOC Joint Operations Centre AAP 15
JOPG Joint Operations Planning Group AAP 15
JPDAL Joint Prioritised Defended Asset List
JPTL Joint Prioritised Target List
JSEC Joint Support Enabling Command
JTF Joint Task Force
JTF HQ Joint Task Force Headquarters CFAO
JWC Joint Warfare Centre

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

K
KB Knowledge Base
KD Knowledge Development
KI Key Infrastructure
KM Knowledge Management
KR Knowledge Requirement
L
LANDCOM Headquarters Allied Land Command MC0324
LEGAD Legal Advisor AAP 15
LL Lessons Learned AAP 15
LN Lead Nation AAP 15
LO Liaison Officer
LoA Level of Ambition
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict
LoC Lines of Communication
LoE Line of Effort
LOGFAS Logistic Functional Area Services AAP 15
LoO Line of Operations AAP 15
M
M&T Movements and Transport AAP 15
MAB Mission Analysis Briefing
MARCOM Headquarters Allied Maritime Command MC 0324
MB Military Budget AAP 15
MC Military Committee AAP 15
MD Mediterranean Dialogue AAP 15
MEDAD Medical Advisor
METOC Meteorological and Oceanographic AAP 15
MILENG Military Engineering AAP 15
MilPA Military Public Affairs
MJO Major Joint Operation
MMovPC Main Movement Planning Conference

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

MN Multi National
MN DDP Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan AAP 15
MOE Measure of Effectiveness AAP 15
MOP Measure of Performance AAP 15
MOU Memorandum of Understanding AAP 15
MOVCON Movement Control
MP Military Police AAP 15
MPC Movement Planning Conferences
Military Political Economic Civil (sometimes COPD
MPEC
written as PMEC)
MRO Military Response Option AAP 15
MSA Military Strategic Action COPD
MSE Military Strategic Effect COPD
MSO Military Strategic Objective COPD
MSR Main Supply Route
M&T Movement and Transportation
MVI Mission Vital Infrastructure
N
NA5CRO Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation
NAC North Atlantic Council AAP 15
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control AAP 15
NAEW&CS
System
NAGS NATO Ground Surveillance System
NATO HQ NATO Headquarters AAP 15
NC NATO Confidential AAP 15
NCIA NATO Communication and Information Agency
NCIRC NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
NATO Communications and Information
NCISG
Systems Group
NCRP NATO Crisis Response Process AAP 15
NCRS NATO Crisis Response System AAP 15
NCRSM NATO Crisis Response System Manual AAP 15

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

NCRTA NATO Crisis Response Tracking Application NCRSM
NCS NATO Command Structure AAP 15
NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process AAP 15
NED NAC Execution Directive NCRSM
NLLP NATO Lessons Learned Portal
NLLDB NATO Lessons Learned Database AAP 15
NED NAC Execution Directive NCRSM
NFS NATO Force Structure AAP 15
NFS JHQ NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters CFAO
NGCS NATO General Communications Systems
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation AAP 15
NID NAC Initiating Directive NCRSM
NIFC NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre
NIMP NATO Information Management Policy
NIWS NATO Intelligence Warning System AAP 15
NMA NATO Military Authority AAP 15
NMIC NATO Media Information Centre
NMR National Military Representative AAP 15
NMSE Non-Military Strategic Effect
NMSO Non-Military Strategic Objective
NNTCN Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nation AAP 15
NOAH NATO Operations Assessment Handbook
NR NATO Restricted AAP 15
NRF NATO Response Force AAP 15
NS NATO Secret AAP 15
NSHQ NATO Special Operations Headquarters CFAO
NSIP NATO Security Investment Programme AAP 15
NSPA NATO Support and Procurement Agency
NU NATO Unclassified AAP 15
O
OA Operational Action COPD

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation
OCC E&F
and Feedback Programme
OE Operational Effect COPD
OLRT Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team AAP 15
OO Operational Objective COPD
OPSA Operations Assessment
OPC Operations Planning Committee
OPCOM Operational Command AAP 15
OPCON Operational Control AAP 15
OPD Operational Planning Directive
OPC Operations Policy Committee AAP 15
OPG Operational Planning Guidance
OPLAN Operations Plan AAP 15
OPLE Operational Planning and Liaison Element
OPP Operations Planning Process AAP 15
OPORD Operation Order AAP 15
OPSA Operations Assessment
OPT Operations Planning Tool TOPFAS
ORBAT Order of Battle AAP 15
ORBATTOA Order of Battle Transfer of Authority
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in AAP 15
OSCE
Europe
OSO Office of Special Operations
OTF Operational Task Force
P
PA Public Affairs AAP 15
PAO Public Affairs Office AAP 15
Public Affairs and Strategic Communications
PASCAD
Advisor
PASP Political Affairs and Security Policy
PCB Police Capacity Building
PCS Preconditions for Success COPD

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

PCWL Potential Crisis Warning List
PD Partnership Directorate
PD Public Diplomacy
PDD Public Diplomacy Division
PDIM Primary Directive on Information Management
PE Peacetime Establishment AAP 15
PfP Partnership for Peace AAP 15
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement AAP 15
PM Provost Marshal AAP 15
PME Political Military Estimate NCRSM
PMEC Political Military Economic Civil
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
PMESII Information (i.e. Systems within the
Engagement Space)
PMR Periodic Mission Review NCRSM
PNS Plan Numbering System COPD
PO Private Office
POC Point of Contact AAP 15
PoC Protection of Civilians
POD Port / Point of Debarkation AAP 15
POE Port / Point of Embarkation AAP 15
POL Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants AAP 15
POLAD Political Advisor AAP 15
PoP Point of Presence AAP 15
PPI Political Policy Indicators
PPS Political Policy Statement
PsyOps Psychological Operations AAP 15
PVO Private Volunteer Organisation AAP 15
Q

R
RCB Resources Coordination Board

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

REM Resource Management
RES Resources Directorate
RFI Request for Information
RMP Risk Management Process
ROC Rehearsal of Concept
ROE Rules of Engagement AAP 15
ROEREQ Rule-of-engagement Request AAP 15
ROEIMP Rules of Engagement Implementation Message AAP 15
RoL Rule of Law
RoM Rough Order of Magnitude
ROTA Release Other Than Attack
RPOD Rail Point of Debarkation
RPOE Rail Point of Embarkation
RPPB Resource, Planning and Policy Board
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement AAP 15
RSOM (I)
(Integration)
RTR Royal Tank Regiment
S
SA Situational Awareness
SAB Situational Awareness Briefing
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe AAP 15
SAC Strategic Analysis Capability
SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation AAP 15
SAR Search and Rescue AAP 15
SASE Safe And Secure Environment
SAT Strategic Assessment Team NCRSM
SAT Systems Analysis Tool TOPFAS
SATCOM Satellite Communications AAP 15
SC Strategic Command AAP 15
Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by
SCEPVA
Allies
SCO Strategic Coordination Order COPD

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

SCPB Strategic Communication Policy Board
SCR Senior Civilian Representative AAP 15
SDP Standing Defence Plan AAP 15
SECGEN Secretary General AAP 15
SERP Sequenced Response Plan
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe AAP 15
SHF Secure High Frequency
SIA Strategic and International Affairs Advisor
SIGINT Signals Intelligence AAP 15
SITCEN Situation Centre AAP 15
SJLSG Standing Joint Logistic Support Group
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication AAP 15
SMA Strategic Military Advice NCRSM
SMAP Standard Manpower Procedure MC0216
SME Subject Matter Expert
SN Sending Nation AAP 15
SO Strategic Objective
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement AAP 15
SOFAD Special Operations Forces Advisor
SOI Standard Operating Instruction
SOP Standard Operating Procedure AAP 15
SOR Statement of Requirements AAP 15
SOSA Systems of Systems Analysis
SP Stability Policing
SPD Strategic Planning Directive COPD
SPMP Strategic Political-Military Plan NCRSM
SPOD Seaport of Debarkation AAP 15
SPOE Seaport of Embarkation AAP 15
SSA SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment NCRSM
SSC Single Service Command MC 0324

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

SSI Supported Supporting Inter-relationship
STANAG NATO Standardisation Agreement AAP 15
StratCom Strategic Communications
SUPPLAN Support Plan AAP 15
T
TA Technical Agreement / Arrangement
TASKORG Task Organisation
TBM Theatre Ballistic Missile AAP 15
TBMD Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence AAP 15
TCC Theatre Component Command
TCN Troop Contributing Nation AAP 15
TCSOR Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements AAP 15
TD Targeting Directive
TF Task Force
TG Task Group
TIM Toxic Industrial Material
TLB Theatre Logistic Base
TMD Theatre Missile Defence AAP 15
ToA Transfer of Authority AAP 15
TOO Theatre of Operations AAP 15
Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area AAP 15
TOPFAS
Services
ToR Terms of Reference AAP 15
TST Time Sensitive Target AD 80-70
U
UCM Urgent Capabilities Management
UHF Ultra-High Frequency
UN United Nations AAP 15
United Nations Office for the Coordination of
UNOCHA
Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

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ABBREVIATION KEY TERM SOURCE

V
VCOS Vice Chief of Staff
VI Vital Infrastructure
VTC Video Teleconference AAP 15
W
WAN Wide-Area Network AAP 15
WISE Web Information Services Environment
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction AAP 15
WNGO Warning Order
WP Warning Problems
X

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